编辑和出版商谨此感谢普林斯顿高等研究院在本书出版过程中提供的合作。本书是第一部《现代战略的缔造者》的续篇，该书源于 1941 年普林斯顿高等研究院和普林斯顿大学举办的美国外交政策和安全问题研讨会。
The Editors and Publisher wish to acknowledge the cooperation of the Institute for Advanced Study in the publication of this volume, the successor to the first Makers of Modern Strategy, which originated in a seminar in American foreign policy and security issues at the Institute and Princeton University in 1941.
版权所有 © 1986 普林斯顿大学出版社
Copyright © 1986 by Princeton University Press
本书是《现代战略的缔造者》 （版权所有1943年，© 1971年普林斯顿大学出版社）的续篇。亨利·盖拉克、R·R·帕尔默和爱德华·米德·厄尔的文章基本保持不变地重印了原著。费利克斯·吉尔伯特关于马基雅维利的文章以及西格蒙德·诺伊曼关于恩格斯和马克思的文章进行了重写；戈登·A·克雷格关于德尔布吕克的文章以及哈约·霍尔本关于普鲁士-德意志学派的文章进行了修订。其余二十二篇文章均为新作。迈克尔·霍华德的文章《以火攻火：1914年的进攻理论》曾以略有不同的形式发表于1984年夏季刊的《国际安全》（第9卷，第1期）。
This is a sequel to Makers of Modern Strategy, copyright 1943, © 1971 by Princeton University Press. The essays by Henry Guerlac, R. R. Palmer, and Edward Mead Earle are reprinted without significant change. Those by Felix Gilbert on Machiavelli and by Sigmund Neumann on Engels and Marx have been rewritten; the essays by Gordon A. Craig on Delbruck and by Hajo Holborn on the Prusso-German School have been revised. The remaining twenty-two essays are new. Michael Howard's essay “Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914” appeared in a slightly different form in International Security, Summer 1984 (Vol. 9, No. 1).
由普林斯顿大学出版社出版，地址：41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
版权所有
All Rights Reserved
美国国会图书馆出版物编目数据
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
主条目标题：
现代战略的缔造者
Main entry under title:
Makers of modern strategy
参考文献：页码。
包含索引。
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. 战略——演讲、论文、讲座。2. 军事艺术与科学——演讲、论文、讲座。3. 近代军事史——演讲、论文、讲座。I. 帕雷特，彼得。II. 克雷格，戈登·亚历山大，1913-。III. 吉尔伯特，费利克斯，1905-。
1. Strategy—Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Military art and science—Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Military history, Modern—Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Paret, Peter. II. Craig, Gordon Alexander, 1913- . III. Gilbert, Felix, 1905- .
U162.M25 1986 355′.02 85-17029
ISBN 0-691-09235-4 ISBN 0-691-02764-1（pbk。）
U162.M25 1986 355′.02 85-17029
ISBN 0-691-09235-4 ISBN 0-691-02764-1 (pbk.)
本书采用 Linotron Sabon 字体排印。
This book has been composed in Linotron Sabon type
普林斯顿大学出版社的图书采用无酸纸印刷，符合图书馆资源委员会图书寿命生产指南委员会制定的关于图书持久性和耐用性的准则。
Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources
美国印刷
Printed in the United States of America
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ISBN-13：978-0-691-02764-7（pbk。）
ISBN-13: 978-0-691-02764-7 (pbk.)
内容
Contents
PART ONE. THE ORIGINS OF MODERN WAR
1. Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War Felix Gilbert
2. 拿骚的莫里斯、古斯塔夫·阿道夫、雷蒙多·蒙特库科利与十七世纪的“军事革命” 冈瑟·E·罗滕贝格
3. Vauban: The Impact of Science on War Henry Guerlac
4. 腓特烈大帝、吉贝尔、比洛：从王朝战争到民族战争 R·R·帕尔默
4. Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War R. R. Palmer
PART TWO. THE EXPANSION OF WAR
5. Napoleon and the Revolution in War Peter Paret
PART THREE. FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR
8. 亚当·斯密、亚历山大·汉密尔顿、弗里德里希·李斯特：《军事力量的经济基础》 爱德华·米德·厄尔
9. 恩格斯和马克思论革命、战争与军队 （西格蒙德·诺伊曼和马克·冯·哈根著）
9. Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen
10. 普鲁士-德国学派：毛奇与总参谋部的崛起 哈约·霍尔本
10. The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff Hajo Holborn
11. Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment Gunther E. Rothenberg
12. Delbrück: The Military Historian Gordon A. Craig
13. 俄罗斯军事思想：西方模式与苏沃洛夫的阴影 沃尔特·平特纳
13. Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov Walter Pintner
14. 布若、加列尼、利奥泰：《法国殖民战争的发展》， 道格拉斯·波奇著
14. Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare Douglas Porch
15. 美国战略：从其起源到第一次世界大战 拉塞尔·F·韦格利
15. American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War Russell F. Weigley
16. 阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉：海军历史学家 菲利普·A·克劳尔
16. Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian Philip A. Crowl
PART FOUR. FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR
17. The Political Leader as Strategist Gordon A. Craig
18. Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914 Michael Howard
19. 机器战争时代的德国战略，1914-1945 米歇尔·盖耶
19. German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945 Michael Geyer
20. 利德尔·哈特和戴高乐：有限责任原则与移动防御 布莱恩·邦德和马丁·亚历山大
21. Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists David Maclsaac
22. The Making of Soviet Strategy Condoleezza Rice
23. 盟军在欧洲的战略，1939-1945年 莫里斯·马特洛夫
23. Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939–1945 Maurice Matloff
24. American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War D. Clayton James
25. The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists Lawrence Freedman
26. Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age Michael Carver
27. Revolutionary War John Shy and Thomas W. Collier
28. 对当前和未来战略的思考 戈登·A·克雷格和费利克斯·吉尔伯特
28. Reflections on Strategy in the Present and Future Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert
致谢
Acknowledgments
编者们衷心感谢本书的作者们，他们的辛勤付出使我们的工作异常愉快。我们还要感谢迈克尔·霍华德、约翰·夏伊和罗素·韦格利在本书规划阶段提供的建议，感谢詹姆斯· E ·金一如既往提出的中肯批评，以及唐纳德·阿本海姆在书目编纂方面提供的帮助。普林斯顿大学出版社的洛伦·霍克泽玛、伊丽莎白·格雷茨和苏珊·毕晓普以卓越的智慧和严谨的态度完成了本书的出版工作。罗莎莉·韦斯特再次制作了一份实用而非晦涩难懂的索引。我们还要特别感谢普林斯顿大学出版社社长赫伯特·S·贝利，正是他对这一主题重要性的坚定信念，才使得本书得以出版。
THE EDITORS owe a debt of gratitude to the authors of this volume, who have made our task an unusually pleasant one. We also want to express our appreciation to Michael Howard, John Shy, and Russell Weigley for their advice in planning the book, to James E. King, whose criticism has been pertinent as always, and to Donald Abenheim for his assistance with the bibliographies. Loren Hoekzema, Elizabeth Gretz, and Susan Bishop of Princeton University Press saw the book through publication with exemplary intelligence and care. Rosalie West once again produced an index that is useful rather than impenetrable. To Herbert S. Bailey, Jr., Director of Princeton University Press, whose belief in the importance of the subject helped make the volume possible, go our special thanks.
介绍
Introduction
C克劳塞维茨将战略定义为运用战斗或以战斗相威胁来实现战争目标。一位现代历史学家认为，这一表述既具有革命性又过于简单，但实际上可以很容易地进行修正或扩展。克劳塞维茨本人并不十分看重绝对的定义，而是根据具体情况灵活运用战略的含义。战略是指运用武装力量来实现战争的军事目标，并由此延伸至政治目的。对于那些参与战争指挥和实施的人来说，战略通常更简单地表现为毛奇所说的权宜之计体系。但战略也基于并可能包含对国家所有资源的开发、智力掌控和利用，以在战争中贯彻其政策。本书正是运用了战略的这两种含义——狭义的操作性含义及其广义的内涵。
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ defined strategy as the use of combat, or the threat of combat, for the purpose of the war in which it takes place. This formulation, which a modern historian has characterized as both revolutionary and defiantly simplistic, can be amended or expanded without difficulty.1 Clausewitz himself, setting no great store in absolute definitions, varied the meaning of strategy according to the matter at hand. Strategy is the use of armed force to achieve the military objectives and, by extension, the political purpose of the war. To those engaged in the direction and conduct of war, strategy has often appeared more simply, in Moltke's phrase, as a system of expedients. But strategy is also based on, and may include, the development, intellectual mastery, and utilization of all of the state's resources for the purpose of implementing its policy in war. It is in both of these senses—the narrower, operational meaning, and its broadly inclusive implications—that the term is used in this volume.
战略思想必然具有高度实用性。它依赖于地理、社会、经济和政治的现实，以及其他一些往往转瞬即逝的因素，这些因素引发了战争旨在解决的问题和冲突。战略史学家不能忽视这些力量。他必须分析战略的各种背景，以及背景与思想之间的相互作用，同时追溯从思想到理论再到实施的发展历程——这一过程反过来又会催生新的思想。战略思想史并非纯粹理性史，而是应用理性史。因此，本书收录的文章远远超越了理论层面，触及了许多影响战争走向的军事和非军事因素。它们以各种方式展现了和平与战争的密切互动，以及社会与其军事机构和政策之间的联系；但战略思想贯穿始终。这些文章探讨了自文艺复兴以来军人和平民关于如何最有效地运用社会军事资源的思想：如何才能最大限度地利用现有或潜在的战斗力？在探讨了这些观点之后，这些文章转向了另一个问题：战略理论对战争以及随后的和平时期产生了什么影响？
Strategic thought is inevitably highly pragmatic. It is dependent on the realities of geography, society, economics, and politics, as well as on other, often fleeting factors that give rise to the issues and conflicts war is meant to resolve. The historian of strategy cannot ignore these forces. He must analyze the varied context of strategy, and the manner in which context and ideas act on each other, while he traces the development from idea to doctrine to implementation, a progression that in turn will give rise to further ideas. The history of strategic thought is a history not of pure but of applied reason. Consequently the essays in this volume go far beyond theory and touch on many of the military and nonmilitary factors that help shape war. In a variety of ways they demonstrate the close interaction of peace with war, the links between society and its military institutions and policies; but the thread of strategic thought runs through them all. The essays explore ideas of soldiers and civilians since the Renaissance on the most effective application of their society's military resources: how can the fighting power available, or potentially available, be used to best purpose? Having addressed these ideas, the essays turn to the further issue: what impact did strategic theory have on wars and on the periods of peace that followed?
我
I
本书的概念及其部分内容源自早期的一部著作。1941年，爱德华·米德·厄尔为普林斯顿高等研究院和普林斯顿大学的教职人员组织了一场关于美国外交政策和安全问题的研讨会。研讨会促成了一部名为《现代战略的缔造者》的论文集，收录了21篇题为“从马基雅维利到希特勒的军事思想”的文章。两年后，厄尔在戈登·A·克雷格和费利克斯·吉尔伯特的协助下，出版了这部论文集。本书的一大亮点在于编者和作者们坚信，在世界大战的背景下，战略思想史值得得到严肃而广泛的关注。在他们看来，当下的考验并未削弱历史的重要性。相反，历史在此时显得尤为重要。厄尔在引言中宣称，本书的目的是“阐释现代战争战略的发展历程，并坚信对最佳军事思想的了解将使读者能够理解战争的起因以及支配战争行为的基本原则。”他补充道：“我们认为，在这些事情上保持永恒的警惕是自由的代价。我们也认为，如果我们想要实现持久和平，就必须清楚地了解武装力量在国际社会中扮演的角色。而我们并非一直都对此有这种认识。”
The concept of this volume, and some of its substance, derive from an earlier work. In 1941 Edward Mead Earle organized a seminar on American foreign policy and security issues for faculty of the Institute for Advanced Study and Princeton University. The seminar led to a collection of twenty-one essays on “military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler,” which Earle, assisted by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, brought out two years later under the title Makers of Modern Strategy. One of the striking features of this book was the confidence of its editors and authors that in the midst of a world war the history of strategic thought deserved serious and wide attention. In their eyes, the trials of the present did not diminish the significance of the past. On the contrary, history now seemed particularly relevant. In his introduction, Earle declared that it was the purpose of the book “to explain the manner in which the strategy of modern war developed, in the conviction that a knowledge of the best military thought will enable…readers to comprehend the causes of war and the fundamental principles which govern the conduct of war.” He added, “we believe that eternal vigilance in such matters is the price of liberty. We believe, too, that if we are to have a durable peace we must have a clear understanding of the role which armed force plays in international society. And we have not always had this understanding.”2
这些文字深受其写作环境的影响，这一点显而易见。一个直到不久前还鲜少关注境外事件的社会，如今却卷入了史上规模最大的战争。人们自然会对战争产生新的兴趣，对那些曾被忽视如今却主导公共生活的议题产生兴趣，甚至渴望从历史的角度审视这场冲突的政治、意识形态乃至军事层面。而这些文章的写作氛围，也同样体现在人们坚信，公民不仅需要，而且能够理解战争的决定性现实。《现代战略的缔造者》一书，堪称当代民主阵营的学术力作，它严肃而又充满乐观精神，回应了美国在战争时期以及迈向世界强国之巅的重要知识需求。
The impact on these words of the condition in which they were written is apparent. A society that until recently had paid little attention to events beyond its borders was now fighting in the greatest war of all time. A new interest in learning about war, about matters that had been ignored but that now dominated public life, even an interest in gaining some kind of historical perspective not only on the political and ideological but also on the military elements of the conflict, might be expected. And as much a part of the atmosphere in which the essays were written was the belief not alone in the need but also in the possibility of a citizenry that understood the determining realities of war. Makers of Modern Strategy was a scholarly contribution from the arsenal of democracy in the best sense of that contemporary term; a serious and fundamentally optimistic response to important intellectual needs of America at war and at the threshold of world power.
这本书另一个令人瞩目的特点是，其战时起源和使命并未损害其学术客观性。尽管内容质量参差不齐，但总体水平很高，而且没有一篇文章带有沙文主义色彩或诋毁当时的敌人；即使是关于“日本海军战略”和“纳粹战争观”的文章，也保持了堪称典范的学术严谨性。毫无疑问，这正是该文集在战后数十年依然畅销的原因之一。如今，这本书已为两代读者提供了丰富的知识和深刻的见解；对某些读者而言，这很可能是他们唯一一次接触到严谨的战争研究，而非那种喧嚣浮夸的战争宣传。
It was a further remarkable aspect of the book that its wartime origin and mission did not compromise its scholarly objectivity. Its contents varied in quality, although the general level was very high, but none of the essays was marred by chauvinism or denigrated current enemies; even essays on “Japanese Naval Strategy” and “The Nazi Concept of War” maintained an exemplarly intellectual honesty. No doubt that is one reason for the collection's continued success, decades after the war ended. The book has now provided two generations of readers with a rich fund of knowledge and insight; for some, very likely, it has been their only encounter with the sophisticated study of war, as opposed to its drum-and-bugle variety.
《现代战略的缔造者》已成为一部现代经典。尽管书中关于二战的文章很快就被历史事件所超越，但这并未削弱其整体影响力。任何此类书籍都无法始终与时俱进；更重要的是，它界定并解读了战略思想早期阶段的关键事件，揭示了这些事件与历史的联系（这一点甚至很多历史学家都容易忽略），并将一些持续存在的战争与和平问题置于更广阔的历史视角下进行考察。然而，随着时间的推移，这部著作整体上不可避免地显得不够令人满意。自德国和日本战败以及核时代的到来以来，战略分析朝着新的方向发展，而历史研究也在不断发展，加深我们对遥远过去的理解。因此，如今人们迫切需要一部能够替代《现代战略的缔造者》的著作。
Makers of Modern Strategy became a modern classic. That the essays dealing with the Second World War were soon overtaken by events did not weaken its overall impact. No book of this kind can remain up to date; more important was the fact that it defined and interpreted crucial episodes in earlier phases of strategic thought, showed their connection with general history, which even many historians tend to ignore, and placed some continuing issues of war and peace in broad historical perspective. But, inevitably, over time the volume as a whole became less satisfactory. Since the defeat of Germany and Japan and the advent of the nuclear age strategic analysis has moved in new directions, while historical research has continued to change and deepen our understanding of the more remote past. A replacement for Makers of Modern Strategy has now become desirable.
在编纂这本新卷时，编者们并不想抛弃旧卷的模式。本书既不追求面面俱到，也不追求解释上的统一性。作者们并未被要求采用特定的理论框架；每个人都从各自的视角切入主题。与前作一样，为了控制篇幅，这本原本就已颇具规模的著作不得不舍弃战略史上的一些重要人物和事件。尽管如此，这些文章——按时间顺序排列，且常常围绕主题展开——共同为读者提供了一部关于战略理论以及从马基雅维利撰写《战争艺术》至今的关于有组织暴力运用的思想指南。
In preparing the new volume, the editors have had no wish to discard the model of the old. Neither comprehensiveness nor interpretive uniformity is aimed for. Contributors were not asked to employ a particular theoretical scheme; each approaches the subject from his or her point of view. As in the earlier work, too, significant figures and episodes in the history of strategy have had to be excluded if the volume, already large, was to be kept to reasonable size. Nevertheless, collectively the essays—linked chronologically and often thematically—offer the reader a guide to strategic theory and to ideas on the use of organized violence from the time Machiavelli wrote his Arte della guerra to the present.
新版《现代战略的缔造者》比前一版多收录了八篇文章。其中一些文章沿用了前作的内容，但大部分并非如此。 1943年版中的三篇文章基本保持不变，仅做了一些修正和风格上的调整：亨利·盖拉克论沃邦及其对十七世纪战争的影响，罗伯特·R·帕尔默论腓特烈大帝及其战争模式从王朝战争向民族战争的转变，以及爱德华·米德·厄尔论军事力量的经济基础。关于这些人物和议题，当然还有更多值得探讨之处，但每篇文章在持续的学术讨论中都保持着重要的地位。这些文章的参考文献已更新。另有两篇文章进行了大幅改写，还有两篇文章进行了修订。本书其余二十二篇文章均为新增内容。
The new Makers of Modern Strategy contains eight more essays than did its predecessor. A few essays have been taken over from the earlier work; most were not.3 Three essays of the 1943 edition remain unchanged except for some corrections and stylistic alterations: Henry Guerlac on Vauban and the impact of science on war in the seventeenth century, Robert R. Palmer on Frederick the Great and the change from dynastic to national war, and Edward Mead Earle on the economic foundations of military power. More might certainly be said about these figures and issues, but each essay retains a strong voice in the continuing scholarly discourse. The bibliographical notes of these essays have been updated. Two further essays have been very extensively rewritten, and two others revised.4 The remaining twenty-two essays in the present volume are new.
为了总结这两本书的简要比较，或许有必要指出它们之间一些更为重要的主题差异。新卷对美国战略的论述远比前作详尽。它还收录了四篇关于1945年以来的文章，而1945年对于厄尔及其合作者而言，当时还未涉及这一时期。更广泛地说，新版《现代战略的缔造者》对主题的探讨更为宽泛。厄尔原本更倾向于将自己及其合作者的研究范围限定于对主要理论家的分析，但主题的性质迫使他进行更深入的探索。由于美国“没有涌现出克劳塞维茨或沃邦这样的人物”，前一卷中讨论的美国军人只有马汉和米切尔。其他美国和欧洲人物则未被纳入讨论范围，“要么是因为他们更擅长战术而非战略，要么是因为他们没有为后世留下任何连贯的战略理论。” 最后一个原因也解释了为何书中没有关于拿破仑的文章。厄尔在导言中写道，拿破仑“在战场上记录了他的战略（如果我们排除他那些陈词滥调的话）；因此，他在这里是由他的诠释者克劳塞维茨和约米尼来代表的。” ⁵这种观点似乎过于片面。战略与战术的区别固然值得保留；但战略并非仅仅是——甚至主要不是——那些热衷于阐述其理论的伟大思想家的产物。尽管拿破仑没有就其战争和战略思想撰写一部全面的专著，但他的思想值得研究，而不仅仅要透过克劳塞维茨和约米尼的诠释来理解。因此，本书中将收录一篇关于拿破仑的文章。但我们也必须认识到，拿破仑的战略并非他一人所创。它之所以成为可能，是因为他拥有整合和利用他人思想和政策的天赋和魄力。这些人中的一些人，甚至像征兵制这样无法归于任何特定个人的力量，也属于战略史的范畴，并将在本书中进行探讨。正如一位撰稿人所评论的那样，由于其更广泛的历史视角，这本新书或许更应该被命名为《现代战略的形成》。
To conclude this brief comparison of the two books, it may be appropriate to note some of the more significant thematic differences between them. The new volume has far more to say about American strategy than did its predecessor. It also contains four essays on the period since 1945, which still lay in the future for Earle and his collaborators. More generally, the new Makers of Modern Strategy takes a somewhat broader view of its subject. Earle would have preferred to limit himself and his collaborators to the analysis of major theorists, although the nature of the subject compelled him to look further. Because the United States had “not produced a Clausewitz or a Vauban,” the only American soldiers discussed in the earlier volume were Mahan and Mitchell. Other American and European figures were not included “either because they were more tacticians than strategists or because they bequeathed to posterity no coherent statement of strategical doctrine.” This last consideration also explains the absence of an essay on Napoleon. In his introduction, Earle wrote that Napoleon “recorded his strategy on the battlefield (if we exclude his trite maxims); hence he is represented here by his interpreters Clausewitz and Jomini.”5 This seems too exclusive a point of view. The difference between strategy and tactics is worth preserving; but strategy is not exclusively—or even mainly—the work of great minds, interested in spelling out their theories. Although Napoleon did not write a comprehensive treatise on his ideas on war and strategy, they deserve to be studied, and not only through the intervening screen of Clausewitz's and Jomini's interpretations. An essay on Napoleon will therefore be found in the present volume. But it must also be recognized that Napoleonic strategy was not created by the emperor alone. It was made possible because he had the genius and the compulsion to combine and exploit the ideas and policies of others. Some of these men, and even such forces as conscription, which cannot be identified with any particular individual, also belong to the history of strategy and are discussed here. As a contributor has commented, because of its broader historical focus, the new volume might be more appropriately titled The Making of Modern Strategy.
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新版《从马基雅维利到核时代：现代战略的缔造者》问世之时，其所处的时代问题和冲突与催生早期著作的时代截然不同。如今，理解战争的必要性，即便可能比1943年还要强烈。然而，问题的复杂性既促进了研究，也阻碍了研究的深入。许多人面对核武器的破坏力，选择否定战争的概念，并因此认为战争的本质已不再需要探究。甚至有人声称，核武器使所有战争都变得非理性且不可能——这种对现实的否认，恰恰反映了当代人普遍存在的焦虑。迄今为止，核时代已经容纳了所有可以用非核武器发动的战争形式，从恐怖袭击和游击战到大规模空袭和装甲战。战争并未消失，只是变得更加危险。即使在不可思议的领域——正如核威慑理论所表明的那样——战略以及研究战略的必要性也没有消失。
The problems and conflicts of the times in which the new Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age appears are very different from those that gave rise to the earlier work. The need to understand war is, if possible, even greater now than it was in 1943. But the enormity of the issues has inhibited as much as it has encouraged their study. Many people have reacted to the destructive power of nuclear weapons by rejecting the concept of war in general, and consequently feel that the nature of war itself no longer requires investigation. It is even claimed that nuclear weapons have made all wars irrational and impossible, a denial of reality that is a measure of the special anxiety that has become a part of contemporary life. Until today the nuclear age has accommodated every conceivable kind of war waged with non-nuclear weapons, from terror and guerrilla operations to large-scale air strikes and armored campaigns. War has not been excluded, it has merely become more dangerous. And even in the realm of the unthinkable—as theories of nuclear deterrence show—strategy and the need to study it have not disappeared.
尽管存在间断性和辩证性，但从1945年以前的战略到此后的常规战争战略，存在着一条连续的脉络。核时代之前与核战略之间的联系则不那么明显，也更加模糊。有人认为，至少就核冲突而言，核边界这一侧的一切都是新的。技术固然是新的；但人类及其社会政治观念和结构却几乎没有改变。拥有核武库的政府和军队，其成员与他们的父母和祖父母相比，并没有太大的不同。
A continuum—intermittent and dialectical though it may be—runs from the strategies before 1945 to the strategies of conventional war since then. The link is less apparent, more ambiguous, between the prenuclear age and nuclear strategy. It has been argued that at least so far as nuclear conflict is concerned, everything on this side of the nuclear divide is new. The technology is certainly new; but man and his social and political ideas and structures have changed very little. Governments and armed services that dispose over nuclear arsenals are made up of men and women who are not yet so very different from their parents and grandparents.
在当前危机和局部断裂的背景下，我们以往的许多经验似乎都显得无关紧要，《现代战略的缔造者》新作比其前作更加有力地提出了历史相关性的问题。爱德华·米德·厄尔坚信，对战争历史的理解将有助于读者更明智地应对当下的战争。并非所有人——当然也并非所有历史学家——都会完全认同他对历史在当代意义的信念。每个时代不仅在条件、问题和人物的组合上都独一无二；有时，技术、信仰或社会政治组织的深刻变革似乎会将我们与历史割裂开来，在某些人看来，这甚至将历史的意义贬低为一种荒谬的虚构。然而，很多时候，关键在于如何定义“相关性”。过去——即便我们能够自信地对其进行高度精确的解读——也很少能提供直接的借鉴。声称历史具有这种意义，无异于自欺欺人。但作为对过往历史的理性记忆，历史是一种不可轻易舍弃的资源。在国家事务、国家间关系以及个人生活中，当下总是蕴含着过去的维度，承认这一点远比忽视或否认要好。即便我们只能从表面层面看待当下，我们仍然可以利用历史所能提供的最大价值：它能够通过阐明和解读过去，帮助我们思考现在和未来。
Under these conditions of crisis and partial discontinuity, in which so many of our earlier experiences seem to be beside the point, the new Makers of Modern Strategy raises the question of relevance even more forcefully than did its predecessor. Edward Mead Earle had no doubt that an understanding of war in history would help the reader deal more intelligently with war in the present. Not everyone—certainly not every historian—would fully share his faith in the contemporary relevance of history. Not only is every age unique in its combination of conditions, issues, and personalities; occasionally a profound revolution in technologies, beliefs, or in social and political organization seems to sever us from history, and in the view of some reduces its relevance to an absurd fiction. Much depends, however, on what is meant by relevance. The past—even if we could be confident of interpreting it with high accuracy—rarely offers direct lessons. To claim that kind of relevance is to deceive oneself. But history as the educated memory of what has gone before is a resource not to be abandoned lightly. In the affairs of a nation and in the relations between states, as in the life of the individual, the present always has a past dimension, which it is better to acknowledge than to ignore or deny. And even if we can see the present only in its own surface terms, we still have available to us what may be the greatest value history has to offer: its ability, by clarifying and making some sense of the past, to help us think about the present and future.
研究战争的历史有助于更好地理解战争现象。这是本书的主旨之一。但为了理解历史本身，我们也应该研究战争史。历史学家有时不愿承认这种必要性。尽管他们很难否认，从政治组织诞生之初到今天，战争一直是社会和政治存在的根本现实，但战争的悲剧性以及它在理智和情感上带来的冲击如此巨大，以至于他们在研究中往往选择回避。在历史学家的培养和历史教学中，尤其是在美国，战争从来都不是一个受人欢迎的主题。其结果之一是，为通俗的、本质上浪漫化的战争文学留下了太多空间。这类文学作品无法解释战争的本质，只是粗暴地迎合了过去和现在战争对我们想象力和求知欲的吸引力。本书试图阐明将军事思想史和军事政策史与一般历史相结合的益处。
The phenomenon of war can be better understood by studying its past. That is one message of this book. But the history of war should also be studied in order to understand the past itself. Historians have sometimes been reluctant to acknowledge this necessity. Although they can hardly deny that war has been a fundamental reality of social and political existence from the earliest stage of political organization to our own day, war is so tragic and intellectually and emotionally so disturbing that they have tended to sidestep it in their research. In the training of historians and the teaching of history, particularly in the United States, war has never been a favorite subject. One result has been to leave far too much scope for a popular, essentially romantic literature on war, which explains nothing, but crudely responds to the fascination that war past and present exerts on our imagination and on our wish to understand. This volume tries to suggest the usefulness of integrating the history of military thought and policy with general history.
接下来的几篇文章都以武力在国家间关系中的作用为共同主题。所有文章都认为，战争从来都不是，也并非当今社会单一的或纯粹的军事现象，而是诸多因素的复合体，涵盖政治、技术以及极端压力下的人类情感等各个方面。战略只是其中之一——尽管有时是至关重要的因素。二十四篇文章追溯了前人运用和滥用战争的思想和行动；其余四篇文章则分析了近代和当代的军事思想和政策。本书主要侧重于历史研究；但它也致力于——正如其前作一样——对“更广泛地理解战争与和平”这一永恒目标的追求。
The essays that follow have as their common subject the role of force in the relations between states. All recognize that war never has been, and is not today, a unitary or even a wholly military phenomenon, but a compound of many elements, ranging from politics to technology to human emotions under extreme stress. Strategy is merely one of these elements—if a large one at times. Twenty-four of the essays trace the ideas and actions of former generations, as they used and misused war; the remaining four analyze military thought and policy in the very recent past and the present. The book is largely historical; but it also addresses and—as was its predecessor—is dedicated to the timeless cause of “a broader understanding of war and peace.”
1 Michael Howard，“战略的被遗忘的维度”，《外交事务》 （1979 年夏季）；转载于 Michael Howard，《战争的原因》，第 2版（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1984 年），第 101 页。
1 Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1979); reprinted in Michael Howard, The Causes of War, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 101.
2爱德华·米德·厄尔，《导论》，载于《现代战略的缔造者》 ，爱德华·米德·厄尔编（普林斯顿，1943 年），viii。
2 Edward Mead Earle, “Introduction,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943), viii.
在未被收录的文章中，有几篇与新的主题分配不符，例如德温特·惠特尔西的地缘政治研究和西奥多·罗普对欧洲大陆海权理论的概述。另一些文章则是在相关主题的充分文献资料出现之前撰写的，或者尽管在当时具有学术价值，但如今已被其他文章所取代。还有一两篇——例如，笔名为欧文·M·吉布森的作者撰写的关于马奇诺防线和利德尔·哈特的文章——质量不及其他文章。
3 Of the essays that were not retained, several did not fit into the new distribution of topics—e.g., Derwent Whittlesey's study of geopolitics and Theodore Ropp's sketch of Continental doctrines of sea power. Others were written before adequate documentation on their subject was available or, although advancing scholarship at the time, have now been superseded. One or two—e.g., the essay on Maginot and Liddell Hart by the author who used the pseudonym Irving M. Gibson—did not achieve the quality of the rest.
4.费利克斯·吉尔伯特重写了他关于马基雅维利的文章，马克·冯·哈根也重写了西格蒙德·诺伊曼关于马克思和恩格斯的文章。戈登·克雷格对他关于德尔布吕克的文章做了一些修改，彼得·帕雷特修订了哈约·霍尔本关于毛奇的文章的第一部分，该文章的第二部分已被一篇新文章取代。
4 Felix Gilbert has rewritten his essay on Machiavelli, as has Mark von Hägen the essay on Marx and Engels by Sigmund Neumann. Gordon Craig has made some changes in his essay on Delbrück, and Peter Paret has revised the first part of Hajo Holborn's essay on Moltke, the second part of which has been replaced by a new essay.
5 Earle，“引言”，ix。
5 Earle, “Introduction,” ix.
1. 马基雅维利：《战争艺术的复兴》
1. Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War
我意大利发生的各种战役和起义似乎表明军事能力已经消亡，但真正的原因是旧的战争方法行不通，而且没有人能够找到新的方法。一个新上台的人要想获得更高的声望，没有什么比发现新的规则和方法更重要的了。马基雅维利在其著作《君主论》著名的最后一章——“劝诫意大利摆脱蛮族”——中，用这段话表达了一个在他所有著作中反复出现的观点：新的军事制度和新的战争方式是他所处时代最紧迫、最根本的需求。人们通常认为，马基雅维利开启了政治思想发展的新纪元，即现代主义时代；他坚信当时意大利国家的军事组织需要变革，这种信念是他所有政治思考的驱动力，也是其核心关注点。毫不夸张地说，马基雅维利之所以成为政治思想家，是因为他是一位军事思想家。他对当时军事问题的看法塑造了他整个政治视野。
IF THE VARIOUS campaigns and uprisings which have taken place in Italy have given the appearance that military ability has become extinct, the true reason is that the old methods of warfare were not good and no one has been able to find new ones. A man newly risen to power cannot acquire greater reputation than by discovering new rules and methods.” With these words from the famous last chapter of The Prince—“The exhortation to free Italy from the barbarians”—Machiavelli expressed an idea that recurs frequently in his writings: new military institutions and new processes in warfare are the most urgent and the most fundamental requirement of his time. Machiavelli is usually held to have introduced a new era, the modern era, in the development of political thought; his conviction that the military organization of contemporary Italian states needed changing was a driving force, a central concern behind all his reflections on the world of politics. It hardly goes too far to say that Machiavelli became a political thinker because he was a military thinker. His view of the military problems of his time patterned his entire political outlook.
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马基雅维利在军事思想领域占据着独特的地位，因为他的思想建立在对军事组织变革与社会政治领域革命性发展之间联系的认识之上。对于普通观察者而言，军事发展中的因果关系似乎显而易见。火药的发现以及火器和大炮的发明表明，骑士的盔甲注定要被淘汰，中世纪以骑士为主导的军事组织的崩溃已不可避免。在马基雅维利的同代人、意大利同胞阿里奥斯托的史诗巨著《疯狂的奥兰多》（1516年）中，他讲述了主人公奥兰多——所有骑士美德的化身——如何被迫面对一个拥有火器的敌人：
Machiavelli occupies a unique position in the field of military thought because his ideas are based on a recognition of the link between the changes that occurred in military organization and the revolutionary developments that took place in the social and political sphere. To the ordinary observer, the connection between cause and effect in military developments seemed obvious. The discovery of gunpowder and the invention of firearms and artillery suggested that the armor of the knight was doomed and the collapse of the military organization of the Middle Ages, in which knights played the decisive role, had become inevitable. In his epic Orlando Furioso (1516), Ariosto, Machiavelli's contemporary and Italian compatriot, narrates how Orlando, his hero and the embodiment of all knightly virtues, was forced to face an enemy with a firearm:
突然间，闪电划破夜空，大地颤抖。
At once the lightning flashes, shakes the ground,
颤抖的城墙回荡着这声音。
The trembling bulwarks echo to the sound.
这种害虫，从不白费力气，
The pest, that never spends in vain its force,
但它会粉碎一切胆敢违抗它步伐的事物。
But shatters all that dares oppose its course,
强劲的动力随风飞驰。
Whizzing impetus flies along the wind.
当所向披靡的奥兰多成功战胜了这个强大的敌人，并可以从丰厚的战利品中挑选时：
When the invincible Orlando succeeded in overcoming this redoubtable enemy and could choose from the rich booty:
……冠军不会带走任何东西。
…nothing would the champion bear away
从那场胜利日的所有战利品中……
From all the spoils of that victorious day
保留那个装置，它不受阻碍的力量
Save that device, whose unresisted force
疾驰而去，宛如雷霆。
Resembled thunder in its rapid course.
然后他扬帆出海，将武器插入海中，高声喊道：
Then he sailed out on the ocean, plunging the weapon into the sea and exclaiming:
哦！该死的装置！死亡的基石！
O! curs'd device! base implement of death!
被困于下方黑暗的塔尔塔罗斯领域！
Fram'd in the black Tartarean realms beneath!
由别西卜的恶意艺术设计
By Beelzebub's malicious art design'd
毁灭整个人类种族……
To ruin all the race of human kind….
使你再也不敢有骑士胆敢挑战你。
That ne'er again a knight by thee may dare,
或者卑鄙的懦夫，在战争中得到你的帮助，
Or dastard cowards, by thy help in war,
利用有利地形，向更强大的敌人发起进攻。
With vantage base, assault a nobler foe,
永远沉睡于此深渊之下！
Here lie for ever in th' abyss below!1
简而言之，如果火器没有被发明出来，或者现在可以被禁止使用，骑士的世界将永远辉煌灿烂地存在下去。
In short, if firearms had not been invented or could now be banished, the world of the knights would live on forever in all its splendor.
这种对骑士权力衰落的戏剧性解释与现实相去甚远。军事制度的历史无法脱离特定时期的整体历史而存在。中世纪的军事组织是中世纪世界不可分割的一部分，随着中世纪社会结构的瓦解而衰落。无论在精神层面还是经济层面，骑士都是中世纪的典型产物。在上帝被视为等级制度之首的社会中，所有世俗活动都被赋予了宗教意义。骑士精神的特殊任务是保护和捍卫国家人民；在战争中，骑士侍奉上帝。他将自己的军事服务置于领主的指挥之下，而教会则将世俗活动的监督权委托给领主。然而，除了精神和宗教层面之外，封臣与领主之间的军事纽带也包含法律和经济层面。骑士的土地，即封地，由领主赐予，骑士在接受封地的同时，也承担了在战时为领主服役的义务。这是货物与服务交换，符合中世纪的农业结构和庄园制度。
This dramatic explanation of the decline of the power of the knights hardly corresponds with reality. The history of military institutions cannot be separated from the general history of a period. The military organization of the Middle Ages formed an integral part of the medieval world, and declined when the medieval social structure disintegrated. Spiritually as well as economically the knight was a characteristic product of the Middle Ages. In a society in which God was envisaged as the head of a hierarchy, all secular activity had been given a religious meaning. The particular task of chivalry was to protect and defend the people of the country; in waging war the knight served God. He placed his military services at the disposal of his overlord, to whom the supervision of secular activities was entrusted by the church. Apart from its spiritual-religious side, however, the military bond between vassal and overlord also had its legal and economic aspects. The knight's land, the fief, was given to him by the overlord, and in accepting it, the knight assumed the obligation of military service to the overlord in wartime. It was an exchange of goods against services as was fitting to the agricultural structure and manorial system of the Middle Ages.
中世纪的战争形式和作战方式，主要取决于宗教对战争的理解，即战争是伸张正义的行为；兵役仅限于拥有土地的骑士及其随从；以及维系军队团结的道德法律准则。中世纪军队只有在出现明确的冲突时才能集结；它为特定的战役而征召，也只能在战役期间维持存在。兵役的临时性以及贵族战士地位的平等，使得严格的纪律难以维持，甚至几乎不可能。战斗常常演变为骑士之间的单挑，而首领之间的这种单挑往往决定着战局的走向。由于战争代表着履行宗教和道德义务，因此人们强烈倾向于按照既定的规则和准则来进行战争和战斗。
A religious concept of war as an act of rendering justice, the restriction of military service to the class of landholding knights and their retainers, and a moral-legal code which operated as the main bond holding the army together—these are the factors that determined the forms of military organization as well as the methods of war in the Middle Ages. The medieval army could be assembled only when a definite issue had arisen; it was ordered out for the purposes of a definite campaign and could be kept together only as long as this campaign lasted. The purely temporary character of military service as well as the equality of standing of the noble fighters made strict discipline difficult if not impossible. A battle frequently developed into fights between individual knights, and the outcome of such single combats between the leaders was decisive. Because warfare represented the fulfillment of a religious and moral duty, there was a strong inclination to conduct war and battles according to fixed rules and a settled code.
这种军事组织是中世纪整个社会体系的典型产物，体系基础的任何变化都必然会对军事领域产生影响。当货币经济的迅速扩张动摇了中世纪社会的农业基础时，这种发展对军事机构的影响立竿见影。在军事领域，那些作为新经济发展主导者的人——城市和富裕的领主——能够充分利用新的机遇：即接受金钱报酬而非服役，或者通过金钱奖励和薪俸来确保服役。领主可以接受那些不愿履行兵役义务的人的金钱报酬，另一方面，他可以通过承诺定期支付报酬来留住那些在战后长期留在军队中的骑士。这样，他便能够建立一支常备的职业军队，并摆脱对封臣的依赖。封建军队向职业军队的转变，封建国家向官僚专制国家的转变，是一个极其缓慢的过程，直到十八世纪才达到顶峰，但封建军队中真正的骑士精神却早早消亡。十五世纪的一首民谣便生动地描绘了勃艮第大胆查理军队的生活，展现了这一转变。<sup> 2 </sup> 十五世纪的勃艮第是一个新兴的政治实体，老牌列强视其为暴发户；因此，大胆查理格外热衷于通过严格遵守旧传统和习俗来巩固其国家的合法性，实际上成为了某种浪漫主义骑士精神复兴的领袖。因此，这首民谣中“骑士、侍从、军士和封臣”只有一个念头，那就是“军饷官何时到来”，就更能说明问题了。在这里，在骑士精神光鲜亮丽的外表之下，显露出物质利益的平凡现实。
This military organization was a typical product of the whole social system of the Middle Ages, and any change in the foundations of the system had inevitable repercussions in the military field. When rapid expansion of a money economy shook the agricultural basis of medieval society the effects of this development on military institutions were immediate. In the military field those who were the protagonists of the new economic developments—the cities and the wealthy overlords—could make great use of the new opportunities: namely, to accept money payments instead of services, or to secure services by money rewards and salaries. The overlord could accept money payments from those who did not wish to fulfill their military obligations and, on the other hand, he could retain those knights who remained in his army beyond the period of war and for longer stretches of, time by promises of regular payments. Thus he was able to lay the foundations of a permanent and professional army and to free himself from dependence on his vassals. This transformation of the feudal army into a professional army, of the feudal state into the bureaucratic and absolutist state, was a very slow process and reached its climax only in the eighteenth century, but the true knightly spirit of the feudal armies died early and quickly. We possess an illustration of this change in a fifteenth-century ballad, describing life in the army of Charles the Bold of Burgundy.2 In the fifteenth century Burgundy was a very recent political formation and the older powers considered it as a kind of parvenu; therefore, Charles the Bold was particularly eager to legitimize the existence of his state by strict observance of old traditions and customs, and became in effect the leader of a kind of romantic revival of chivalry. It is the more revealing, therefore, that in this ballad, “knight, squire, sergeant and vassal” have only one thought, namely, “when will the paymaster come?” Here, behind the glittering façade of chivalry, is disclosed the prosaic reality of material interests.
在法国、阿拉贡或英国等强国的军队中，传统与现代、封建征兵制与职业化并存；但当时的财力雄厚的意大利城邦却完全依赖职业军人。自十四世纪以来，意大利一直是所有骑士的“应许之地”，对他们而言，战争主要是一种敛财手段。这些独立的雇佣兵团（compagnie di ventura ）由其首领（condottieri ）提供补给和薪饷，而这些首领则向任何愿意支付高价的势力兜售他们的服务。因此，在意大利，军旅生涯成为一种独立的职业，与任何其他平民活动完全分离。
In the armies of the greater powers, France, Aragon, or England, old and modern elements, feudal levy and professionalism, were mixed; but the great money powers of the period, the Italian cities, came to rely entirely on professional soldiers. Since the fourteenth century, Italy had been the “promised land” of all knights to whom war was chiefly a means of making money. The single groups, the compagnie di ventura, were supplied and paid by their leaders, the condottieri, who offered their services to every power willing to pay their price. Thus, in Italy soldiering became a profession of its own, entirely separated from any other civilian activity.
货币经济的影响为军队招募提供了更广阔的机会。摆脱了以往军事传统的新阶层人士被金钱吸引入伍，随着这些新兵的涌入，新的武器和新的作战方式得以引入和发展。在百年战争期间，弓箭手和步兵出现在法军和英军中。15世纪末，查理大帝的军队在瑞士军队中遭遇惨败，这进一步推动了这种对新军事方法的探索。在莫拉特战役和南锡战役（1476年）中，查理大帝的骑士们无法突破瑞士步兵的方阵，也无法突破其长矛阵，最终惨败。这场战役震惊了整个欧洲。步兵在当时的军事组织中确立了自己的地位。
The impact of the money economy provided a broader opportunity for recruiting armies. New classes of men, free from the preceding military traditions, were attracted into the services by money, and with this infiltration of new men, new weapons and new forms of fighting could be introduced and developed. Archers and infantry made their appearance in the French and English armies during the Hundred Years' War. This tendency toward experimentation in new military methods received a further strong impetus from the defeats that the armies of Charles the Bold suffered at the hands of the Swiss near the end of the fifteenth century. In the battles of Morat and Nancy (1476), the knights of Charles the Bold, unable to break up the squares of Swiss foot soldiers and to penetrate into the forest of their pikes, were thoroughly defeated. This event was a European sensation. Infantry had won its place in the military organization of the period.
火药的发明的重要性必须放在以下这些总体发展背景下进行评价：首先是货币经济的兴起；其次是封建领主试图摆脱对封臣的依赖，建立可靠的权力基础；第三是由于封建纽带的削弱而导致的军事组织实验趋势。
The importance of the invention of gunpowder has to be evaluated against the background of these general developments: first, the rise of a money economy; second, the attempt of the feudal overlord to free himself from dependence on his vassals and to establish a reliable foundation of power; and third, the trend toward experimentation in military organization resulting from the weakening of feudal bonds.
火器和大炮并非这些发展的直接原因，但它们是重要的促成因素，加速了这一演变进程。首先，它们巩固了领主相对于其封臣的地位。在战役中使用大炮是一项繁琐的工作；运输重型火炮及其设备需要大量的马车，因此需要机械师和工程师，整个过程极其昂贵。这一时期的军费开支记录显示，大炮开支在总开支中占比过高。只有非常富有的统治者才能负担得起大炮。此外，大炮发明的主要军事影响有利于列强，不利于较小的国家和地方独立中心。在中世纪，骑士地位的最终保障在于，在他的城堡中，他相对免受攻击。这一时期，筑城技艺得到了极大的发展。4.小国通过在边境修建一系列堡垒来保护自己，使它们即使面对优势兵力也能坚守阵地。然而，这些中世纪的防御工事很容易受到炮火攻击。因此，军事力量的天平严重向进攻方倾斜。15世纪意大利伟大的建筑师之一弗朗切斯科·迪·乔治·马蒂尼（Francesco di Giorgio Martini）负责为乌尔比诺公爵建造堡垒，他在其军事建筑论著中抱怨道：“能够平衡防御与进攻的人，与其说是人，不如说是神。” 5
Firearms and artillery were not the cause of these developments but they were an important contributory factor, accelerating the tempo of the evolution. First of all, they strengthened the position of the overlord in relation to his vassals. The employment of artillery in a campaign was a cumbersome task; many wagons were needed for transportation of the heavy cannon and for their equipment, mechanics and engineers became necessary, and the whole procedure was extremely expensive. The accounts of military expenditures for this period show that the expenses for artillery constituted a disproportionately large part of the total.3 Only the very wealthy rulers were able to afford artillery. Also, the principal military effect of the invention of artillery worked in favor of the great powers and against the smaller states and local centers of independence. In the Middle Ages, the final sanction of the position of the knight had been that, in his castle, he was relatively immune from attack. The art of fortification was much cultivated in this period.4 Small states protected themselves by establishing at their frontiers a line of fortresses that enabled them to hold out even against superior forces. These medieval fortifications were vulnerable, however, to artillery fire. Thus, the military balance became heavily weighed in favor of the offensive. Francesco di Giorgio Martini, one of the great Italian architects of the fifteenth century, who was in charge of the building of the fortresses for the Duke of Urbino, complained in his treatise on military architecture that “the man who would be able to balance defense against attack, would be more a god than a human being.”5
军队组成和军事技术的这些变化也改变了军事组织的精神。封建制度发展起来的道德准则、传统和习俗，已经失去了对军队兵源的约束。那些渴望财富和掠夺的冒险家和暴徒，那些一无所有却想通过战争获得一切的人，构成了军队的主力。由于战争不再被视为宗教义务，服兵役的目的变成了谋取经济利益。由此产生了一个道德问题：从事以杀戮为目的的职业是否是一种罪过？在欧洲最文明的地区，例如意大利，人们对士兵和军旅生涯都抱有鄙夷的态度。
These changes in the composition of armies and in military technique also transformed the spirit of military organization.6 The moral code, traditions, and customs, which feudalism had evolved, had lost control over the human material from which the armies were now recruited. Adventurers and ruffians who wanted wealth and plunder, men who had nothing to lose and everything to gain through war, made up the main body of the armies. As a result of a situation in which war was no longer undertaken as a religious duty, the purpose of military service became financial gain. The moral problem arose whether it was a sin to follow a profession that aimed at the killing of other people. In the most civilized parts of Europe, such as Italy, people looked with contempt on soldiers and soldiering.
二
II
马基雅维利的个人生活境遇是他意识到当时形势和问题的关键因素。
The circumstances of Machiavelli's personal life were a crucial factor in his becoming aware of the situation and the problems that had emerged in his time.
马基雅维利的政治写作生涯始于1512年美第奇家族重返佛罗伦萨，并将他从佛罗伦萨总理府驱逐之时。此前，他已在佛罗伦萨共和国任职十四年。正如许多人所言，从马基雅维利本人开始，他的著作便体现了他从“长期处理时代事务的经验”中汲取的教训。<sup> 7</sup>这些著作将他在佛罗伦萨总理府工作期间对政治局势的观察提炼为条文、规则和法律。
Machiavelli's career as a political writer began when the Medici returned to Florence in 1512 and ousted him from the Florentine Chancellery, where he had served the Florentine republic for fourteen years. His writings, as many have said, beginning with Machiavelli himself, present the lessons that he had drawn from his “long experience of the affairs of his time.”7 They reduce to prescripts, rules, and laws his observations of the political scene made in the course of his work in the Florentine Chancellery.
在文艺复兴时期的意大利城市，官吏通常是些冷酷无情的公务员，他们负责记录并执行统治集团的决定。马基雅维利是个例外；在1498年至1512年间，他是佛罗伦萨共和国一位举足轻重的政治人物。正如圭恰尔迪尼在他失势的那些年里，在他接受了一项微不足道、近乎荒谬的任务——前往方济各会的一个分会——写信戏谑地对他说的那样：“在其他时候，[你]曾与许多国王、公爵和王子谈判。”<sup> 8</sup>
In the Italian cities of the Renaissance, chancellery officials usually were somewhat bloodless civil servants who wrote down and carried out the measures on which the ruling circle had decided. Machiavelli was an exception; he was a person of political importance in the Florentine republic between 1498 and 1512. As Guicciardini wrote to him teasingly in the years of his disgrace, when he had accepted a minor, almost ridiculous mission to a chapter of the Franciscan Order—“in other times [you] negotiated with many kings, dukes and princes.”8
马基雅维利在1512年之前扮演的政治角色比一般的宰相官僚更为重要，原因有几个。马基雅维利家族历史悠久，备受尊崇，家族中曾出过十二位旗手和六十六位高级官员。尼科洛·马基雅维利出身于该家族的一个私生子分支，因此无法成为执政委员会或决策官员的成员，但他的姓氏以及与著名政治家尼科洛·迪·亚历山德罗·马基雅维利的友谊，使他与其他宰相官员截然不同。
There were several reasons why Machiavelli had played a greater political role before 1512 than Chancellery bureaucrats usually did. The Machiavelli were an old, highly regarded family with twelve Gonfalonieri and sixty-six high magistrates among them. Niccolò Machiavelli was descended from an illegitimate branch of this family and could not be a member of the ruling councils or of the policy-making magistrates, but his name and his friendship with Niccoló di Alessandro Machiavelli, a leading politician, set him apart from other Chancellery officials.9
然而，马基雅维利声名显赫的主要原因在于他与终身执政官皮耶罗·索德里尼的密切关系。<sup> 10</sup>终身执政官一职由一群佛罗伦萨贵族于1502年设立，他们希望执政官能够限制并削弱中产阶级占据主导地位的大议会的影响力。但索德里尼令贵族们失望，因为他将自己的当选视为维护和稳定以大议会为代表的民众政权的授权。索德里尼十分器重马基雅维利，并让他承担各种政府任务和使命，因为他深知，在与贵族对手的斗争中，拥有一个完全依附于自己的人至关重要。
The principal reason, however, for Machiavelli's prominence was his close relation to Piero Soderini, the lifetime Gonfaloniere.10 The office of a lifetime Gonfaloniere had been created in 1502 by a group of Florentine patricians who had hoped that the Gonfaloniere would restrict and reduce the influence of the Great Council in which the middle classes had the upper hand. But Soderini disappointed the patricians because he viewed his election as a mandate to maintain and stabilize the popular regime embodied in the Great Council. Soderini favored Machiavelli and used him in a variety of governmental tasks and missions, knowing that in his struggle with his aristocratic opponents it was useful to have the services of a man who was entirely dependent on him.
然而，除此之外，马基雅维利还是一位非凡的人物，这无疑是他能够超越普通政府官员的范畴，行使如此广泛的权力和权力的关键因素。现存的马基雅维利的同代画像并无存世。那些被认为是他画像或半身像的作品，展现了他狡黠的眼神和意味深长的微笑，这些作品大多创作于十六世纪后期，那时马基雅维利已被视为精于算计、冷酷无情和邪恶的化身。但马基雅维利并非仅仅是理性与智慧的化身。他也会流露情感，在激情澎湃之时，他会抛却一切顾虑。他喜欢自嘲，也喜欢戏谑他人。马基雅维利与佛罗伦萨的几位主要政治家——圭恰尔迪尼、菲利波·斯特罗齐、弗朗切斯科·韦托里——之间的主要联系在于他们对当时政治局势的共同关注，而这些佛罗伦萨人无疑对马基雅维利对时局的分析深感兴趣。但马基雅维利还扮演着许多其他角色：他可以兴致勃勃地为好友圭恰尔迪尼的女儿们筹划婚事，或者为菲利波·斯特罗齐安排一顿丰盛的宴席。马基雅维利深知，扮演“宴客之道”的角色有助于他维系与这些权贵的友谊，而这些人又与世事息息相关。他的世界观和处事方式正是在这种境况下形成的：他处于一种依附性的、局外人的位置，却觉得自己对政治世界的把握与那些拥有决策权的人不相上下，甚至更胜一筹。马基雅维利深深地卷入了政治世界，但他同时也保持着一种超然的视角。他的同时代人中，无人能像他那样，将敏锐与远见完美结合，并在现实与理想之间游刃有余地切换。马基雅维利深知自身处境的暧昧性所带来的张力。在他的《曼德拉戈拉》序言中，他这样评价这位作者：“在整个意大利世界，他不承认任何人比他强，但他会对任何穿得更好的人卑躬屈膝。”<sup> 12</sup>
Beyond that, however, Machiavelli was a remarkable personality, and this was certainly the crucial factor in extending his activities and responsibilities beyond the scope of an average government official. Contemporary portraits of Machiavelli do not exist. The pictures and busts that are supposed to represent him and show a face of foxlike cleverness with an ambiguous smile were made in the later part of the sixteenth century when Machiavelli had become the personification of calculating amorality and evil. But Machiavelli was not just an embodiment of rationality and intelligence. He could be emotional, and in the storms of passion could throw all caution to the wind. He loved to make fun of himself and of others. The chief bond between Machiavelli and the leading Florentine statesmen—Guicciardini, Filippo Strozzi, Francesco Vettori—was a common interest in the political developments of their time, and certainly these Florentines found Machiavelli's analysis of the contemporary situation fascinating. But Machiavelli served them also in many other functions: he could eagerly embark on excogitating marriage proposals for the daughters of his friend Guicciardini, or organize a sumptuous meal for Filippo Strozzi. Machiavelli knew that acting as a maître de plaisir helped him retain the friendship of these great men, who kept in touch with the goings on in the world. His outlook and approach were formed by this situation: being kept in a dependent, outsider position, but feeling equal and even superior in his grasp of the political world to those who had the right and the power to make decisions. Machiavelli was deeply involved in the political world, yet he also looked upon it from a distance. None of his contemporaries had to the same degree a view that combined both sharpness and perspective, and that moved continuously between what is and what ought to be.11 Machiavelli was aware of the tension inherent in the ambiguity of his position. In the prologue of his Mandragola, he says of the author that “in the whole Italian world he acknowledges no one to be his superior, but he will cringe before anyone who can afford better clothes.”12
马基雅维利在总理府的职责之一是担任十人委员会（负责战争和军事事务的政府委员会）的秘书。因此，马基雅维利深度参与了佛罗伦萨夺回比萨的行动，而对比萨的战争在接下来的十年里一直是他关注的焦点——直到1509年比萨最终投降。在他首次离开佛罗伦萨执行政府任务时，他与一位雇佣兵首领谈判薪金，佛罗伦萨政府认为这位首领的要求过高。之后，马基雅维利又卷入了关于保罗·维泰利命运的讨论，维泰利是佛罗伦萨雇佣的雇佣兵首领之一。维泰利的部队已经攻占了比萨防御工事的一处要塞，城池已在他们面前敞开，但维泰利却迟迟不敢下令进攻，错失了良机。维泰利过分谨慎的态度引起了人们对他叛国的怀疑。他被废黜，押往佛罗伦萨，囚禁，最终被斩首。关于此事的许多信件都落入了马基雅维利手中。维泰利事件无疑加深了马基雅维利对雇佣兵首领效用的疑虑，而当他奉命前往比萨城外的佛罗伦萨营地时，亲眼目睹了法国国王（佛罗伦萨的盟友）为了履行恢复佛罗伦萨对比萨统治的承诺而派遣的兰斯克内特人和加斯科涅人的行径，这无疑更加深了他的疑虑：他们拒绝攻城，抱怨薪饷和伙食，发动兵变，最终从营地消失。
One of Machiavelli's functions in the Chancellery was to serve as a secretary of the Office of Ten, the government committee in charge of war and military affairs.13 Thus, Machiavelli became intimately involved in the Florentine efforts to regain possession of Pisa, and the war against Pisa remained his continuous preoccupation for the next ten years—until Pisa finally surrendered in 1509. In his first government mission outside Florence, he negotiated the salary of a condottiere whose demands the Florentine government found excessive. Then Machiavelli was drawn into the discussions concerning the fate of Paolo Vitelli, one of the condottieri whom Florence had hired. Vitelli's troops had taken one of the bulwarks of the defense of Pisa and the city lay open before them, but Vitelli hesitated to order his troops to advance and so this opportunity was lost. Vitelli's exaggerated caution raised the suspicion of treason. He was deposed, brought to Florence, imprisoned, and finally decapitated. Much of the correspondence on this affair was in Machiavelli's hands. Doubts about the usefulness of relying on the services of a condottiere, which the Vitelli affair must have raised in Machiavelli's mind, were certainly reinforced when, on a mission to the Florentine camp before Pisa, he witnessed the behavior of the lansquenets and Gascons whom the French king, the ally of Florence, had sent in fulfillment of his promise to restore Florentine rule over Pisa; they refused to advance against the city, complained about their pay and their food, mutinied, and disappeared from the camp.
马基雅维利最著名、也最受关注的官方使命，是1502年末对切萨雷·博尔吉亚的访问。当时，切萨雷·博尔吉亚在锡尼加利亚说服了一些敌对的雇佣兵首领与他会面，然后下令将他们全部杀害。这些雇佣兵首领如此愚蠢地落入切萨雷的圈套，更加印证了马基雅维利对雇佣兵制度的蔑视。他们的短视、优柔寡断和胆怯尤其令他感到震惊，因为与此同时，他在切萨雷·博尔吉亚身上却看到了一个在他看来具备所有伟大统帅特质的人：雄心勃勃、坚持最高指挥权、善于周密计划、精于保密、果断、行动迅速，以及必要时毫不留情的冷酷无情。尽管马基雅维利对切萨雷的看法在多年后发生了变化，但西尼加利亚的经历对于他认识到需要一种新型的军事领导至关重要。
Machiavelli's most famous and most discussed official mission was that to Cesare Borgia in the last months of 1502; he was present at Sinigaglia when Cesare Borgia had persuaded a number of hostile condottieri to meet with him and then ordered his men to slay them. The stupidity with which the condottieri had fallen into Cesare's trap further justified for Machiavelli the contempt he felt for the condottieri system. Their shortsightedness, indecisiveness, and timidity struck him particularly because at the same time he had encountered in Cesare Borgia a man who seemed to him to have all the qualities of a great captain: ambition, insistence on supreme command, capacity for detailed planning, secrecy, decisiveness, quickness of action, and, if needed, ruthlessness. Although Machiavelli's view of Cesare underwent changes in the course of years, the experience of Sinigaglia was crucial for his recognition of the need for a new type of military leadership.
马基雅维利军事思想最重要的官方体现是1505年12月颁布的法令，该法令命令组建佛罗伦萨民兵。<sup> 14</sup>该法令由马基雅维利起草，其颁布立即阐明了他的一些核心理念：共和国的基石是“正义与武力”，而长期的经验、巨额的财政开支和种种危险都表明，雇佣军的效用值得怀疑。这项名为《条例》（Ordinanza）的法令规定，要组建一支由10000人组成的民兵，由政府委员会从居住在佛罗伦萨统治下的托斯卡纳农村地区的18至50岁男性中选拔。民兵将被分成若干个300人的连队，并在节日期间按照德国长矛兵的模式进行操练。征兵仅限于农村地区，因为武装佛罗伦萨领土内城镇的居民会更容易引发叛乱。马基雅维利并不指望佛罗伦萨市民会主动承担兵役的负担，尽管他希望将来有一天能够实现这一点。他认为《条例》仅仅是一个开始。他曾努力争取在步兵之外增设骑兵，但未能成功。他的最终目标是建立一支由佛罗伦萨城、周边城镇和农村地区的居民组成的军队，并由统一指挥。
The most important official reflection of Machiavelli's thought on military affairs is the law of December 1505, which ordered the organization of a Florentine militia.14 It was drafted by Machiavelli, and its introduction immediately enunciated some of Machiavelli's favorite ideas: the foundation of a republic is “justice and arms,” and long experience, great financial expenses, and dangers have shown us that mercenary armies are of questionable usefulness. The law, called the Ordinanza, provided for the formation of a militia of 10,000 who were to be selected by a government committee from males between eighteen and fifty years, living in the rural districts of Tuscany under Florentine rule. The militia was to be divided into companies of three hundred men, who were to be drilled—in the pattern of German lansquenets—on festival days. Conscription was limited to rural districts because arming the inhabitants of the towns in the Florentine territory would have made it easier for these towns to revolt. It was not expected that the citizens of Florence could be persuaded to accept for themselves the burden of some military service, although Machiavelli hoped that at some future time this would come about. He considered the Ordinanza merely a beginning. He worked—without success—toward adding a levy of horsemen to the levy of foot soldiers. His final aim was an army composed of men from the city of Florence, the towns of the territory, and the rural districts, under a unified command.
雇佣兵和雇佣军的不可靠只是马基雅维利热衷于建立征兵制军队的原因之一。他预期这将对佛罗伦萨的内外政策产生重大影响：在外交事务上获得更大的自主权，并在国内局势上实现稳定。马基雅维利在其多次外交出使中了解到，依赖雇佣兵或外国军队会限制行动自由，并使佛罗伦萨受制于其他强权。他曾被迫请求其他意大利统治者允许佛罗伦萨使用他们的雇佣兵和雇佣军；在一次出使法国的旅程中，他的任务是恳请法国国王派遣法军，帮助佛罗伦萨在叛乱地区恢复统治。军事力量薄弱带来的危险在十六世纪初的几十年里尤为突出。 1494年法国入侵打破了意大利原有的权力平衡，随后切萨雷·博尔吉亚在教皇和法国国王的支持下崛起，导致局势动荡不安，每个强权都认为可以通过武力扩张并吞并弱小的邻国。马基雅维利在就任总理府成员后不久撰写的第一份政治备忘录中指出，国家实现目标只有两条途径：“武力或爱”（o la forze o lo amore），并立即解释说，谈判和协议——他所说的“爱”（amore）指的就是谈判和协议——永远无法达成预期目标；政府必须依靠武力。
The unreliability of the condottieri and of mercenaries was only one reason for Machiavelli's passionate interest in the creation of a conscript army. He expected it would have important consequences for Florentine foreign and domestic policy: greater independence in foreign affairs and stabilization of the domestic situation. Machiavelli had learned on several of his diplomatic missions that the necessity of relying on mercenaries or foreign troops limited freedom of action and created dependence on other powers. He had been forced to ask other Italian rulers to allow Florence to engage the services of their condottieri and mercenaries; on a mission to France his task was to implore the French king to send French troops who would help to reestablish Florentine authority in areas that had revolted. The dangers arising from military weakness loomed particularly large in the first decades of the sixteenth century. The overthrow of the Italian balance of power by the French invasion in 1494, followed by the rise of Cesare Borgia supported by the pope and the French king had brought about an unstable and fluid situation in which every larger power believed it might be able to expand and to absorb its weaker neighbors by the use of force. In Machiavelli's first political memorandum, written soon after he became a member of the Chancellery, he stated that a state had two ways only to attain its goal: “o la forze o lo amore,”15 and he immediately explained that negotiations and agreements—and that is what he understood by “amore”—would never lead to the desired goals; governments had to rely on force.
此外，他非常清楚，雇佣雇佣兵首领、确定其薪俸以及计算特定军事行动所需兵力，总是会加剧内部紧张局势。所需资金主要来自贷款和向富裕公民征收的税款；因此，上层阶级竭力将这些额外开支控制在最低限度。在一份提交给军旗官的备忘录中，马基雅维利猛烈抨击了那些总是在被要求做出牺牲时制造麻烦的富裕公民。<sup> 16</sup>在起草《军令》时，马基雅维利非常重视该法的财政方面。他讨论了应建立的行政机构以确保定期支付；由于应征入伍的士兵每月只需集中进行一两次几个小时的军事训练，其余时间只有在战时离家服役时才需要领取薪饷，因此他认为《军令》的开支是可以预见的，并且可以通过常规税收来支付。其具体结果将是削弱与索德里尼敌对的富裕精英阶层的影响力，并削弱他们对外交政策的主导地位。起初，佛罗伦萨人，包括马基雅维利在内，将征兵范围限定于农民。这些农民受到城镇的压迫，只能依靠佛罗伦萨寻求庇护，因此对佛罗伦萨忠诚。马基雅维利很清楚，民兵只有在其成员受到所在国家善待的情况下，才会心甘情愿地、甚至热情地战斗。马基雅维利期望——或者至少希望——民兵经受住最初的考验后，征兵制军队的优势将会显现，民众对《义务兵役条例》扩展至佛罗伦萨城的阻力也将得以克服。一旦人民掌握了武器，富裕上层阶级的影响力就会减弱，民众政权也将得以稳定。
Furthermore he knew only too well that the hiring of a condottiere, the determination of his salary, and the calculations about the number of troops needed for a particular military operation always increased internal tension. The required sums were provided primarily through loans and taxes imposed on the wealthier citizens; accordingly the upper classes tried to keep these extraordinary expenses to a minimum. In a memorandum to the Gonfaloniere, Machiavelli bitterly attacked the wealthy citizens who always raised difficulties when they were expected to make sacrifices.16 In his draft for the Ordinanza, Machiavelli gave much attention to the financial aspects of this law. He discussed the administrative apparatus that ought to be established to secure regular payments; because the conscripted men needed to come together for a few hours of military training only once or twice a month, and otherwise had to be paid only in wartime when they were absent from home, the expenses of the Ordinanza seemed to him forseeable and could be provided from regular taxes. The concrete result would be a diminution of the influence of the wealthy elites, hostile to Soderini, and a shift away from their domination over foreign policy. At the outset, the Florentines, Machiavelli among them, limited conscription to the peasants, who were suppressed by the towns and looked to Florence for recourse and accordingly were loyal. That a militia would fight willingly, perhaps even enthusiastically, only if its members were well treated by the state in which they lived was evident to Machiavelli. Machiavelli expected—or at least hoped—that, after the militia had stood its first tests, the advantages of a conscript army would become clear and the resistance to the extension of the Ordinanza to the city of Florence could be overcome. With arms in the hands of the people, the influence of the wealthy upper classes would be diminished and the popular regime would be stabilized.
马基雅维利对民兵的组建极为关注。在一些地区，他亲自挑选民兵，并监督他们的操练。他还安排民兵在佛罗伦萨的领主广场举行阅兵式。在比萨围城战的最后阶段，马基雅维利亲自指挥各民兵连队。比萨的陷落更加坚定了他军事理念的正确性。即使在普拉托战役中民兵惨败，美第奇家族卷土重来之后，也未能动摇他的这些信念。
Machiavelli took an intense interest in the formation of the militia. In some districts he himself selected the men who were to serve in the militia, and supervised their drill. He arranged for a parade of the militia on the Piazza della Signoria in Florence. Machiavelli was in actual command of the various militia companies when they were employed before Pisa in the last stages of the siege. The surrender of the city confirmed him in his conviction of the correctness of his military ideas. Even the return of the Medici, after a disastrous defeat of the militia before Prato, did not shake him in these convictions.
在《佛罗伦萨史》中，马基雅维利尤其热衷于描述十五世纪意大利雇佣兵在意大利土地上进行的战役。1423年，在扎戈纳拉战役中，这场“举世闻名的胜利”中，“除了洛多维科·德利·奥比齐之外，无人阵亡。而他本人和他的两名部下从马上摔下来，窒息而死在泥泞中。”在安吉亚里战役中，“从20小时持续到24小时，只有一人阵亡，他并非身负重伤或被英勇的攻击击倒，而是从马上摔下来，被践踏致死。”这种对意大利雇佣兵的轻蔑和嘲讽显然是不公平的；他们当中有些人是能干的士兵，英勇无畏，并且非常重视荣誉和名誉。<sup> 17</sup>但马基雅维利的目的并非追求历史的真实性和客观性。在他执政期间，发生了三场震惊意大利的战役：切里尼奥拉战役，贡萨尔沃·达·科尔多瓦率领训练有素的西班牙军队击败法军，将其逐出那不勒斯；阿尼亚德洛战役，法军内部雇佣兵的不和导致威尼斯人失去了他们的堡垒；拉文纳战役，加斯顿·德·福瓦率领的法军猛攻击败了西班牙和教皇联军，这场战役被认为是整个世纪最血腥的战役。马基雅维利向他的同时代人明确表明，战争的新时代已经到来，而这些战役也成为了人们热议的话题。
In his Florentine History Machiavelli took particular pleasure in describing the battles fought by the condottieri on Italian soil in the fifteenth century. In 1423, in the battle of Zagonara, a victory “famous throughout all Italy, none was killed except Lodovico degli Obizzi and he, together with two of his men, was thrown from his horse and suffocated in the mud.” In the battle of Anghiari “lasting from the 20th to the 24th hour, only one man was killed and he was not wounded or struck down by a valiant blow but fell from his horse and was trampled to death.” This contemptuous and derisive picture of the Italian condottieri is obviously unfair; some of them were competent soldiers, courageous, with a strong feeling for honor and reputation.17 But Machiavelli's aim was not historical truth and objectivity. During his years in office three battles had been fought that had aroused wonder and fear all over Italy: Cerignola, where Gonsalvo da Cordoba's superbly drilled Spaniards defeated the French and drove them out of Naples, the French victory of Agnadello where the discord of their condottieri cost the Venetians their terra ferma, and Ravenna, where the tempestuous attack of Gaston de Foix brought the French victory over the Spanish and papal troops and which is believed to have been the bloodiest battle of the entire century. Machiavelli made it evident to his contemporaries, to whom these battles were a subject of much discussion, that a new era of war had opened.
三
III
在《君主论》中，马基雅维利承诺，一位能够引入全新战争法则的新君主将名垂青史；读者几乎可以肯定，马基雅维利正是深谙这些新法则之人。同样显而易见的是，他将在《孙子兵法》一书中阐述这一革命性的新理论。然而，研读此书的读者或许会感到惊讶，甚至失望，因为他们会发现，书中的内容与所谓的“新”现代理论截然不同。问题就出在“新”这个词上。在我们这种认为未来必然优于过去和现在的错觉中，“新”在我们看来似乎是“旧”的反义词。但在进步观念深入欧洲人心之前，人们主要将过去所发生的一切视为从昔日辉煌的巅峰走向衰落。文艺复兴初期的局面为文艺复兴时期的人文主义者树立了理想的典范：古典时代曾存在一个完美的世界。
In The Prince Machiavelli promised fame to a new ruler who would introduce new laws of warfare; the reader can have little doubt that Machiavelli was the man who knew what these new rules were. And it is also clear that the new revolutionary doctrine will be presented in his book The Art of War. But the student of this book will be astonished and perhaps disappointed because he will find in this book something very different from a “new” modern theory. The problem lies in the word “new.” In our illusionistic belief that the future must be better than the past and the present, “new” seems to us the opposite of “old.” But before the idea of progress had taken hold over the European mind people saw what happened mainly as a decline from a high point that lay in the past. The situation at the beginning set the ideal norm for humanists of the Renaissance: a perfect world had existed in classical times.
马基雅维利是一位受过人文主义教育的人：罗马尤其向他展现了城邦共和国崛起为世界强国的可能性，因此在他眼中，罗马是理想共和国的化身。他深受罗马人思想影响的一个典型例子是，他担任十人议会秘书期间撰写的一份备忘录，该备忘录旨在回答佛罗伦萨恢复统治后应如何对待反抗佛罗伦萨的阿雷佐人民的问题。备忘录首先解释了根据李维的记载，卢西奥·富里奥·卡米洛在拉提姆人民叛乱后所采取的措施。
Machiavelli was a humanistically educated man: it was particularly Rome that demonstrated to him the possibility of the rise of a city-republic to world power, and therefore was for him the embodiment of an ideal republic. A characteristic example of the extent to which he modelled his views in accordance with those that he believed the Romans had held is a memorandum he wrote as Secretary of the Office of Ten in answer to the question how the people of Arezzo, who had revolted against Florence, ought to be treated after Florentine rule had been restored. The memorandum began by explaining what, according to Livy, Lucio Furio Camillo had done after the people of Latium had rebelled.18
因此，马基雅维利想要在意大利推行的新战争法则，实际上就是罗马军事秩序的旧法则。在很大程度上，他真正的军事原则是试图根据古代史料来展现罗马人如何进行战争。然而，我们必须始终牢记，马基雅维利的目的并非是对历史事实进行精确的重构。他想要推导出罗马军事史事实背后的法则和原则，并证明它们对当今的适用性。诚然，马基雅维利眼中的罗马是一个乌托邦，他利用史料来构建他心中早已存在的图景。但是，在他不断努力探寻特定事件或个体行为背后的普遍规律的过程中，他最终触及了战争和军事秩序的根本问题。
The new laws of warfare therefore, which Machiavelli wanted to see introduced in Italy, were the old laws of the Roman military order. To a large extent his true principles of military warfare are attempts to show on the basis of ancient sources how the Romans conducted war. However, it ought always to be kept in mind that Machiavelli's aim was not a historically correct reconstruction of facts. He wanted to deduce the laws and principles that stood behind the facts of Roman military history, and show their applicability to the present. Certainly Machiavelli's idea of Rome is a Utopia and he used facts to build up the picture that was already in his mind. But in his steady striving for discovering the general rule behind a particular event or an individual action, he penetrates to the basic issues of war and military order.
在马基雅维利的政治著作中，只有《孙子兵法》在他生前出版。马基雅维利很可能在撰写此书时就考虑到了它对当时公众的影响。这本书符合当时的文学和学术惯例。<sup> 19</sup>他的思想以佛罗伦萨贵族和雇佣兵首领法布里齐奥·科隆纳之间的对话形式呈现。<sup> 20</sup>书中对罗马军队的组织和作战方法的描述主要依据古代文献，特别是维吉提乌斯、弗龙提努斯和波利比乌斯的著作，有时还会翻译他们的长篇段落。<sup> 21</sup>根据马基雅维利的说法，或者更准确地说，根据对话的主要发言者法布里齐奥·科隆纳的说法，罗马军队是一支经过精心挑选的民兵，士兵来自农村地区。罗马军队规模适中，步兵是其主力；骑兵在战斗中的作用非常有限，尽管他们在侦察和阻止敌军补给方面发挥了作用。马基雅维利强调步兵是罗马军队的核心，这暗示着他对雇佣兵的批判和否定，因为雇佣兵的核心是重骑兵；此外，正如《罗马军规》所证明的那样，意大利城市能够组织民兵，因此效仿罗马模式并非不可能。对马基雅维利而言，这种复兴罗马军事体系的可能性，使得他对罗马军队的实践进行了详尽的描述。他描述了军队的不同编制、指挥系统、军队的列队和作战行动、营地的选择以及要塞的攻防。马基雅维利显然乐于精确地阐述罗马人的作战方式，而文艺复兴时期对古典世界一切事物的推崇，或许也使他十六世纪的读者对这些细节产生了兴趣。对于今天的马基雅维利研究者来说，《孙子兵法》并非他最引人入胜的作品。
Of Machiavelli's political writings, only The Art of War was published during his lifetime. In all likelihood Machiavelli wrote this book with its impact on the public of his time in mind. It fit the literary and scholarly conventions of the time.19 His ideas are presented in the form of a dialogue among Florentine patricians and the condottiere, Fabrizio Colonna.20 The organization of the Roman army and the Roman methods of warfare are described on the basis of ancient sources, particularly Vegetius, Frontinus, and Polybius, from whose works sometimes lengthy passages are translated.21 According to Machiavelli or, perhaps more precisely, according to Fabrizio Colonna, the main speaker of the dialogue, the Roman armies were a carefully selected militia whose soldiers came from rural areas. The Roman armies were of moderate size, and foot soldiers were their backbone; the value of the cavalry in a battle was very limited, although they were useful in reconnoitering and in preventing supplies reaching the enemy. Machiavelli's emphasis on the infantry as the core of the Roman army implies criticism and rejection of the condottieri, the core of whose armies was formed by heavy cavalry; moreover, because, as the Ordinanza had proved, Italian cities could organize a militia, imitation of the Roman example was in the realm of possibility. For Machiavelli this possibility of resurrecting the Roman military system justified a very detailed description of Roman army practice. He described the different units into which the army was divided, the chain of command, the drawing up of the army in battle order and its operations during the battle, the selection of campsites, and the attack and defense of fortified places. Machiavelli clearly delighted in establishing with precision how the Romans proceeded, and the Renaissance admiration for everything that came from the classical world might have enabled his sixteenth-century readers to take interest in all these details. For today's student of Machiavelli, The Art of War is not his most exciting work.
这篇论述不可能完全局限于对罗马军事体系的解释，因为马基雅维利必须讨论一个显而易见的反对意见，即罗马模式是否适用于他所处的时代：火炮的发明，它为战争引入了一个似乎使罗马方法过时的因素。法布里齐奥对这一反对意见的回答很简短，因为正如他所解释的，这个问题在其他地方已经详细讨论过——这里指的是马基雅维利《论说集》第二卷第十七章。
It could not be entirely limited to an explanation of the Roman military system because Machiavelli had to discuss an obvious objection to the applicability of the Roman model to his own times: the invention of artillery, which had introduced an element in warfare that seemed to make the Roman methods obsolete. Fabrizio's answer to this objection is brief because, as he explains, this issue had been discussed at length at other places—an allusion to the seventeenth chapter of the second book of Machiavelli's Discourses.
法布里齐奥的主要论点是，火炮精度不高，炮弹经常过高或过低。此外，火炮移动缓慢且困难：在战斗中，炮兵很容易被强攻夺取；战斗的胜负取决于近身肉搏，火炮在近身肉搏中几乎没有发挥作用的空间。最后，火炮对进攻方的作用远大于防守方，尤其是在围城战中。由于罗马军队的优势在于其强大的进攻能力，火炮可以用来强化罗马的作战方式，而不是否定其作战方式。22
Fabrizio's chief argument was that artillery is inaccurate; its shots are frequently too high or too low. Moreover artillery is slow and difficult to move: in a battle it would be easy to take the artillery by storm; a battle is decided in hand-to-hand fighting in which there is no room for action by artillery. Finally, artillery is of greater use to the attacker than to the defender, particularly in the siege of a town, and since the great strength of the Roman army was its capacity for attack, artillery might be used to reinforce the Roman methods of warfare. It does not invalidate them.22
但是，对火药发明革命意义的讨论，或者更准确地说，是对这一意义的反驳，并不能完全消除现代世界对马基雅维利理想罗马的侵蚀。马基雅维利指出，战争的目的必须是在战场上与敌人正面交锋并击败他们；这是“使战争圆满结束”的唯一途径。<sup> 23</sup>
But the discussion or—more correctly—the refutation of the revolutionary significance of the invention of gunpowder does not entirely remove the modern world from encroaching upon Machiavelli's ideal Rome. Machiavelli states that the aim of war must be to face an enemy in the field and to defeat him there; this is the only way “to bring a war to a happy conclusion.”23
马基雅维利的《孙子兵法》分为七卷，其中位于中间的第三卷用了相当大的篇幅来描述一场虚构战役的毁灭。而且，这场虚构的战役被设定在现代，并以目击者的视角进行叙述。 “你们难道没听到我军的炮声吗……看看我军士兵多么英勇地冲锋陷阵……看看我军将领如何鼓舞士气，向士兵们保证胜利……看看我军士兵在敌军中造成了多么大的破坏；看看他们多么英勇、自信、冷静地向敌人施压……多么惨烈的屠杀！多少伤员！他们开始逃跑了……战斗结束了；我们取得了辉煌的胜利。”<sup> 24</sup>虽然《孙子兵法》的其余部分主要关注军事组织的技术方面——武器装备、行军队形、指挥体系、防御工事——但关于战斗的章节则着重强调战争中所需的人性品质：勇气、服从、热情和勇猛。
Machiavelli's Art of War is divided into seven books and a good part of the third book, which is in the center, is taken up with the destruction of an imaginary battle. Moreover this fictitious battle is placed in the present and is reported from the point of view of an eyewitness. “‘Do you not hear our artillery…. See with what virtù our men charge…. See how our general encourages his men and assures them of victory…. Behold what havoc our men wreak among the enemy; see with what virtù, confidence and coolness they press upon the enemies…. What carnage! How many wounded men! They are beginning to flee…. The battle is over; we have won a glorious victory.’”24 Although the rest of The Art of War is concerned with the technical aspects of military organization—weaponry, marching order, line of command, fortifications—the section on the battle concentrates on the human qualities needed in war: courage, obedience, enthusiasm, and ferocity.
我们曾说过，在《孙子兵法》中，马基雅维利对传统做出了妥协。他在该书序言中写道，古代统治者竭力激励所有臣民，尤其是士兵，让他们忠诚、热爱和平、敬畏上帝。“还有谁比那些生命时刻受到战争威胁的士兵更渴望和平呢？”<sup> 25</sup>读过《君主论》和《论战争》的读者会怀疑这些话是否反映了马基雅维利的真实想法。《君主论》和《论战争》是论述政治规则和行为的著作，而非军事组织和战争，但如果我们想要了解马基雅维利的战争思想，就必须研究这两部著作。我们在《君主论》和《论战争》中找不到任何关于和平可取性的论述；战争在书中被描绘成一种无法逃避、规模宏大且令人恐惧的力量。在这些著作中，世界似乎处于永恒的变迁之中。马基雅维利并不认同当时普遍认为人类完全受命运女神（Fortuna）掌控的观点，但他承认命运女神的力量；只有当人民和国家尽可能强大时，才能避免沦为她手中的玩物。因此，国家及其统治者渴望扩张和征服是人之常情。战争是政治生活中最重要的活动。
We have said that in The Art of War Machiavelli makes compromises with convention. In the preface of the book he wrote that the rulers of ancient times took care to inspire all their subjects, and particularly their soldiers, with fidelity, love of peace, and fear of God. “Who ought to be fonder of peace than soldiers whose life is placed in jeopardy by war?”25 Readers of The Prince and the Discorsi will doubt that these sentences reflect Machiavelli's true sentiments. The Prince and the Discorsi are books on political rules and behavior and not on military organization and war, but when we want to enter into Machiavelli's ideas about war, we must study them. We find nothing about the desirability of peace; in The Prince and the Discorsi war appears as an inescapable, grandiose, and terrifying force. In these works the world appears in permanent flux. Machiavelli does not share the widespread belief of his time that man is entirely in the hands of Fortuna, but he acknowledges Fortuna's power; only when people and states make themselves as strong and powerful as possible can they resist becoming a helpless toy in her hands. It is very natural, therefore, for states and their rulers to wish to expand and to conquer. War is the most essential activity of political life.
斗争和不确定性的持续存在塑造了战争的性质和方式：没有绝对安全的道路。在这种充满不确定性和危险的环境中，必须承担风险；战争应当尽快结束，并取得明确的结果：彻底击败敌人。战争应当“速战速决”。然而，只有在战斗中才能迅速做出决定。因为一切都取决于战斗的结果，所以你必须竭尽全力确保胜利；即使敌人看起来实力较弱，你也应该动用全部兵力。通过战斗决胜负是每一次军事行动的目标，而军事行动必须是有计划、有协调的。因此，指挥权必须掌握在一人手中。如果国家是君主制，统治者本人应当担任总司令。但共和国在战时也应当将军队委托给一位拥有无限权力的指挥官；罗马人正是这样做的，他们将战役的所有细节都交由“执政官的酌情决定权和权威”来决定。27
The continued existence of struggles and uncertainties patterns the character and the methods of war: there is no safe course. Risks must be taken in these surroundings of uncertainties and dangers, wars ought to be ended as quickly as possible with the attainment of a definite result: the complete defeat of the enemy. Wars ought to be “short and sharp.”26 A quick decision, however, can be reached only in a battle. Because everything depends on the outcome of the battle, you ought to do everything to make sure of victory; you should use your full forces even if the enemy seems of inferior strength. Decision by battle is the aim of every military campaign, which must be a planned and coordinated operation. Command, therefore, must be in the hands of one man. If the state is a monarchy, the ruler himself ought to be the commanding general. But republics too should entrust their army in wartime to one commander who should have unlimited authority; that is what the Romans had done who had left all the details of a campaign “to the discretion and authority of the consul.”27
马基雅维利充分认识到，他所设想的“速战速决”的战争需要士兵们的激情投入，而且将会是一场残酷的战争。在他看来，战争固有的残酷性会带来复杂且矛盾的后果。它既有危险，也有机遇。危险在于，当战斗变得混乱而激烈时，广大士兵将不再服从命令，而只考虑自身的安危。他们可能会开始劫掠，企图利用战争谋取私利。军队将会瓦解。《君主论》和《论战》中反复强调了纪律和训练的重要性。军事上的成功取决于秩序和纪律。仅仅依靠天生的勇气是不够的。马基雅维利赞许地指出，德国的城市“高度重视军事演习，并制定了许多规章制度来维持演习”。训练永无止境。一位明智的领导者应该始终牢记训练的必要性，并在和平时期和战争时期都坚持训练。但是，即使是训练和纪律所建立的纽带也无法保证绝对的服从。必须以严厉的惩罚来强化这种威慑力。严酷无情是维系政治团结的必要手段。29 “君主为了保持臣民的团结和忠诚，不应惧怕被人指责残暴”；“被人畏惧远比被人爱戴安全得多。” 马基雅维利认为，这条普遍的政治准则尤其适用于军队的指挥。汉尼拔的“非人道的残暴”对于维系其军队的团结至关重要，这支军队“由来自世界各地的士兵组成，在异国他乡作战”；那些将汉尼拔奉为伟大英雄并谴责其残暴的作家是轻率的；他的残暴恰恰是他成功的主要原因。
Machiavelli fully recognized that the “short and sharp” war that he envisaged demanded involvement of the soldiers' passions, and would be a ferocious war. For Machiavelli the brutality inherent in war had its ambiguous consequences. It had dangers but also possibilities. The dangers were that the great masses of soldiers, when the struggle became confused and vehement, would no longer obey but think only of their own salvation. They might start looting, hoping to exploit the struggle for their personal advantage. The army would disintegrate. The importance of discipline and training is emphasized again and again in The Prince and the Discorsi. Military success depends on order and discipline. Natural courage is not enough. Machiavelli observed with approval that the German cities “hold military exercise in high repute and have many regulations for maintaining them.”28 Training is never finished or completed. A wise leader should keep the necessity of training always in mind and insist on it in peacetime as well as in wartime. But even the bonds that training and discipline create cannot guarantee obedience. They must be reinforced by fear of harsh punishment. Severity and harshness are needed to hold a political body together.29 “A prince must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful”; “it is much safer to be feared than loved.” According to Machiavelli this general poliítical rule was particularly appropriate to the command of an army. Hannibal's “inhuman cruelty” was necessary to keep his forces, “composed of men of all nations and fighting in foreign countries,” united; writers who admire Hannibal as a mighty hero and blame him for his cruelty are thoughtless; his cruelty was a principal cause of his success.
然而，强制手段需要辅以截然不同的措施。必须在军队士兵中建立一种能够激励他们英勇行动的精神纽带。这种纽带最直接的产生源于迫切的需求；即便形势并非毫无希望，将领也应当强调战败的危险巨大，从而使士兵们以绝望的勇气奋战。然而，激发勇气和热情的最强动力，源于个人的参与感和道德责任感。战争服役必须被视为履行宗教义务。马基雅维利认为，在古代，宗教仪式的盛大场面——“通过屠杀大量动物进行的残酷血腥的祭祀，以及人们对这种可怕景象的习以为常”——使人们沉醉于好战的狂热之中。基督教阻碍了尚武精神的培养，因为它“将至高幸福置于谦卑、卑微和对世俗事物的蔑视之上”；它使人变得软弱。然而，即便古代宗教与尚武精神之间的联系无法重现，基督教中宗教与爱国主义并不冲突，为祖国牺牲生命也堪比圣徒殉道。在马基雅维利的思想中，爱国主义诉诸武力是激励军队英勇作战的最有力力量之一，而且也的确如此。
Coercion, however, needs to be supplemented by measures of a very different character. A spiritual bond that will inspire heroic action must be created among the soldiers of an army. Such a bond is most directly produced by necessity; even if a situation is not hopeless, a general ought to emphasize that the dangers of defeat are great, so that the soldiers fight with the courage of desperation. The strongest incitement to courage and enthusiasm, however, is aroused by a feeling of personal involvement and moral obligation. War service must be considered fulfillment of a religious duty.30 Machiavelli believed that in the ancient world the pomp and show of religious ceremonies—“the ferocious and bloody nature of the sacrifice by the slaughter of many animals and the familiarity with this terrible sight”—intoxicated men with bellicose zeal. The Christian religion has created difficulties to the development of warlike virtues because it “places the supreme happiness in humility, lowliness and a contempt for worldly objects”; it has made men feeble. However, even if the relationship between religion and martial courage that existed in the ancient world cannot be revived, religion is compatible with love for one's country in Christianity, and sacrificing one's life for one's patria has been compared to the martyrdom of saints. In Machiavelli's thought the appeal to patriotism could be and was one of the most powerful forces in inspiring an army to heroic deeds.
然而，只有由为祖国而战的士兵组成的军队才能激发爱国热情。马基雅维利在其所有著作中都强调的最根本论点是，统治者或共和国的军队必须由其所保卫的国家的居民组成。“意大利如今的衰败，无非是依赖雇佣兵造成的。”<sup> 31</sup> “他们四分五裂、野心勃勃、缺乏纪律、不忠不义，在朋友面前傲慢自大，在敌人面前却胆怯懦弱；他们既不敬畏上帝，也不忠于人。”战争胜利的必要前提——信心和纪律——“只有在军队由同一国家的公民组成，并且长期共同生活的情况下才能存在。” 因此，马基雅维利设想的军事改革的第一步，也是至关重要的一步，就是国家组建一支由本国居民组成的军队，一个国家拥有自己的“私兵”。<sup>32</sup>
However, patriotic enthusiasm could be expected only of an army composed by men fighting for their native land. Machiavelli's most fundamental thesis, emphasized in all his writings, is that the military forces of a ruler or of a republic must be composed by the inhabitants of the state that the army is expected to defend. “The present ruin of Italy is the result of nothing else than reliance upon mercenaries.”31 “They are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, disloyal, overbearing among friends, cowardly among enemies; there is no fear of God, no loyalty to men.” The necessary prerequisite of success in war—confidence and discipline—“can exist only where the troops are natives of the same country and have lived together for some time.” Thus, the first crucial step in military reform which Machiavelli envisages is that the state forms an army composed of its own inhabitants, that a state has its “proprie armi.”32
然而，马基雅维利坚信，只有当公民对所处的社会感到满意时，他们才会愿意为统治者或政府而战，甚至牺牲。“一支心满意足、为自身声誉而战的军队，与一支心怀不满、只能为他人利益而战的军队，二者之间有着天壤之别。”这一关于政治和军事制度之间紧密联系和相互关系的论点，是马基雅维利思想中最重要、也最具革命性的论断。从《佛罗伦萨政体法》草案开始，“正义与武器密不可分”的论断几乎贯穿于他所有的著作之中。在《君主论》中，他写道：“有精良的武器，必有良法；有精良的武器，必有良法。”<sup> 34 </sup> 在《论军事与政治》的结尾，他给出了军事组织与政治组织相互依存这一概念的最明确的表述：“虽然我曾在其他地方主张，国家的根基在于良好的军事组织，但我认为在此重申一点也并非多余：没有这样的军事组织，既不可能有良法，也不可能有任何其他美好的事物。”<sup> 35</sup>
Machiavelli is convinced, however, that citizens will be willing to fight and die for their ruler or government only when they are content in the society in which they live. “There is a great difference between an army that is well content and fights for its own reputation and one that is ill disposed and has to fight only for the interests of others.” This thesis of the close connection and interrelationship between political and military institutions is the most important and also the most revolutionary argument of Machiavelli's notions.33 From the draft of the law for the establishment of a Florentine Ordinanza on, the statement that “la justitia et le armi” belong together can be found in almost all his writings. In The Prince he wrote that “there must be good laws where there are good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws,”34 and at the end of the Discorsi he gave this notion of the interdependence of military and political organization its most categorical formulation: “Although I have elsewhere maintained that the foundation of states is a good military organization, yet it seems to me not superfluous to report here that without such a military organization there can neither be good laws nor anything else good.”35
第四
IV
马基雅维利的《孙子兵法》是一部畅销书：在十六世纪，它出版了二十一个版本，并被翻译成法语、英语、德语和拉丁语。<sup> 36</sup>蒙田将马基雅维利与凯撒、波利比乌斯和科米内斯并列为军事权威。<sup>37</sup>尽管十七世纪军事方法的变革使其他作家崭露头角，但马基雅维利的著作仍然被频繁引用。十八世纪，萨克森元帅在创作《孙子兵法沉思录》（1757年）时大量借鉴了马基雅维利的思想；阿尔加罗蒂——尽管缺乏充分的依据——认为马基雅维利是腓特烈大帝的战术导师，正是他用这些战术震惊了欧洲。<sup> 38</sup>与大多数关注军事事务的人一样，杰斐逊的藏书中也收藏了马基雅维利的《孙子兵法》 。<sup> 39 </sup> 1812年战争加剧了美国人对战争问题的关注，《孙子兵法》也推出了美国特别版。40
Machiavelli's Art of War was a successful book: in the course of the sixteenth century twenty-one editions appeared and it was translated into French, English, German, and Latin.36 Montaigne named Machiavelli next to Caesar, Polybius, and Commynes as an authority on military affairs.37 Although in the seventeenth century changing military methods brought other writers to the fore, Machiavelli was still frequently quoted. In the eighteenth century, the Marshal de Saxe leaned heavily on him when he composed his Reveries upon the Art of War (1757), and Algarotti—though without much basis—saw in Machiavelli the master who had taught Frederick the Great the tactics by which he astounded Europe.38 Like most people concerned with military matters, Jefferson had Machiavelli's Art of War in his library,39 and when the War of 1812 increased American interest in problems of war, The Art of War was brought out in a special American edition.40
人们对马基雅维利作为军事思想家的持续兴趣并非仅仅源于他的盛名；《孙子兵法》中的一些建议——例如关于训练、纪律和兵种分类的建议——在近代早期欧洲军队由来自不同社会阶层的专业人士组成时，其实际意义日益凸显。但这并不意味着十六世纪军事艺术的进步——无论是在操练、军队划分、战役计划与组织方面——都归功于马基雅维利的影响。相反，当时的军事革新者们欣喜地发现，有一部著作能够解释并论证他们实践中的某些方面。此外，十六世纪的人们博览群书，对古代文献和古典智慧推崇备至，普遍认为罗马人的军事胜利归功于他们对纪律和训练的重视。因此，马基雅维利试图将罗马的军事组织模式作为当时军队的典范，并未被视为异想天开。例如，在十六世纪末，尤斯图斯·利普修斯在其关于军事事务的颇具影响力的著作中，也将罗马军事秩序视为一个永久有效的模式。
This continued interest in Machiavelli as a military thinker was not only caused by the fame of his name; some of the recommendations made in The Art of War—those on training, discipline, and classification, for instance—gained increasing practical importance in early modern Europe when armies came to be composed of professionals coming from the most different social strata. This does not mean that the progress of military art in the sixteenth century—in drilling, in dividing an army into distinct units, in planning and organizing campaigns—was due to the influence of Machiavelli. Instead, the military innovators of the time were pleased to find a work in which aspects of their practice were explained and justified. Moreover, in the sixteenth century, with its wide knowledge of ancient literature and its deep respect for classical wisdom, it was commonly held that the Romans owed their military triumphs to their emphasis on discipline and training. Machiavelli's attempt to present Roman military organization as the model for the armies of his time was therefore not regarded as extravagant. At the end of the sixteenth century, for instance, Justus Lipsius, in his influential writings on military affairs, also treated the Roman military order as a permanently valid model.
然而，也应该承认，马基雅维利在某些方面误判了他那个时代的可能性和可行性。
However, it ought also to be admitted that in several respects Machiavelli misjudged what was possible and feasible in his own day.
过去，甚至在今天，马基雅维利因其倡导征兵制而在军事思想发展史上占据重要地位：他的军事思想具有开创性意义；他似乎能够预见未来。尽管将马基雅维利的军事思想视为预言或许令其研究者和仰慕者感到欣喜，但过分强调其征兵主张则是一种误解。他所设想的征兵军队是城邦民兵，一种仿照古代城邦共和国模式的兼职兵役，但显然并不适用于领土国家的军队。此外，至少在马基雅维利之后的两三个世纪里，未来并不属于征兵军队，而是属于马基雅维利所鄙视和嘲讽的那种士兵：雇佣兵，职业军人。
In the past, and sometimes still in our time, Machiavelli has been assigned a prominent place in the development of military thought because of his advocacy of conscription: his military thought was of a seminal character; he was able to foresee what would happen in the future. Although the assumption of the prophetic character of Machiavelli's military ideas might be pleasing to students and admirers of Machiavelli, it would be a mistake to attribute great importance to his advocacy of conscription. His idea of a conscript army was that of a city-state militia, a part-time military service patterned on the model of the ancient city-republics, but hardly suited for the army of a territorial state. Moreover, the future, at least in the two or three centuries following Machiavelli, did not belong to conscript armies but to that kind of soldier whom Machiavelli despised and ridiculed: the mercenary, the professional.
马基雅维利显然低估了一个对这一发展起决定性作用的因素：士兵装备火器以及炮兵作用的增强。结果，专业人员和常设军事机构构成了任何军队的必要核心。开支，特别是炮兵开支，不断增长。尽管马基雅维利意识到任何军事组织的财政需求，但他显然没有充分考虑到枪支弹药等军事装备成本的不断攀升，以及经济实力与军事实力之间的相互关系。只有拥有较大领土的统治者才能负担得起军队，并借助军队将各等级或邻近的小等级置于自己的控制之下。专制主义必须依赖常备军；两者相互依存。
A factor that Machiavelli clearly misjudged in its importance contributed decisively to this development: the equipment of soldiers with firearms, and the increased role of artillery. As a result, specialized personnel and permanent military establishments formed the necessary core of any army. Expenses, particularly expenses for artillery, grew. Although Machiavelli was aware of the financial needs of any military organization, he certainly had not taken fully into account the growing costs of military equipment with guns and rifles, the interrelationship between economic strength and military strength. Only rulers of larger territories could afford an army, and with its help force the estates or their smaller neighbors under their control. Absolutism had to rely on standing armies; each was dependent upon the other.
但马基雅维利对军事思想的影响远远超出了军事技术领域。尽管他对罗马军事组织典范的推崇可能使他低估了新式武器和经济发展对军事发展的影响，但他对罗马的崇敬却至关重要，因为它使他认识到战争在现代社会中的作用。在中世纪的几个世纪里，战争的指挥是特定社会阶层的职责，并受到其价值观和荣誉准则的塑造。马基雅维利从对古代世界的研究中汲取的首要且至关重要的教训是：保卫国家并非某个特权阶层的专属职责，而是生活在同一社会中的所有人的共同责任。
But Machiavelli's influence on military thought reached far beyond the technical-military sphere. If his view of the exemplary character of the Roman military organization might have misled him in underestimating the impact of new weapons and of the economy on military developments, his admiration for Rome was crucial in opening his eyes to the role of war in modern times. In the centuries of the Middle Ages, the conduct of war had been the function of a particular class of society and had been shaped by its values and code of honor. The first and crucial lesson that Machiavelli drew from his study of the ancient world was that defense of a state was the task not of a special privileged group but should be the concern of all those who live in the same society.
更重要的是，对罗马史学家的研究帮助他理解了当时的国际体系：各国都在稳步发展扩张；它们常年卷入战争，力图扩张势力和领土，并为生存而战，抵御外敌的征服。马基雅维利是最早领悟到现代国家体系竞争本质的人之一——正如他那不情愿的追随者普鲁士国王腓特烈二世所言：“扩张”是国家政策的“永恒原则”——并得出结论：一个国家的生存取决于其战争能力。
It was of even greater importance that the study of Roman historians helped him to understand the international system of his time: states were steadily growing and expanding; they were permanently involved in war, seeking to extend their power and territories, and fighting for their existence in fending off others trying to subdue them. Machiavelli was one of the first to grasp the competitive nature of the modern state system—that as his reluctant follower, Frederick II of Prussia, wrote: “s'agrandir” is the “principe permanent” of the policy of a state—and to conclude that the existence of a state depends on its capacity for war.
由于国家的生命取决于军队的优劣，政治制度的组织方式必须为军队的运作创造有利的先决条件。这是贯穿马基雅维利所有军事论述——《孙子兵法》、《君主论》和《论说集》——的一个核心论点。另一个论点是，战争的目的是使敌人臣服于己方意志；因此，军事行动必须是在统一指挥下进行的有计划的行动，最终以决战告终。实现这一目标的适当手段——即正确的战略——取决于战役进行的具体情况。
Because the life of the state depends on the excellence of its army, the political institutions must be organized in such a manner that they create favorable preconditions for the functioning of the military organization. That is one thesis that permeates all of Machiavelli's military discussions—in The Art of War, The Prince and the Discourses. The other thesis is that the aim of war is to subject the enemy to your will; a military campaign therefore must be a planned operation, under a unified command, culminating in a battle of decision. What the appropriate means are—what the correct strategy is—to carry out this aim will depend on the particular circumstances under which a campaign is conducted.
马基雅维利对战争本质以及军事机构在社会结构中的作用的深刻洞察，构成了他军事思想的基础；这些问题所引发的思考并非局限于特定的历史时期。因此，即便在法国大革命和拿破仑崛起之后，军事组织和战争形式发生了变化，马基雅维利的思想依然具有生命力。
Machiavelli's insight into the nature of war and the role of the military establishment in the structure of society is the foundation of his military thought; the problems that these questions raise are not bound to a particular historical period. Thus, even when, with the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon, military organization and the conduct of war had assumed new forms, Machiavelli's ideas retained their vitality.
令人惊讶的是，自十六世纪以来，军事思想在很大程度上都建立在马基雅维利奠定的基础之上。这并非意味着马基雅维利的建议被奉为圭臬。然而，进一步的讨论并非与他的观点相悖，而是对其思想的扩展和深化。例如，尽管马基雅维利关于战役决定性作用的观点十分重要，但人们很快意识到，有必要对其后果进行更为深入的分析。军事理论不能仅仅止步于制定正确的作战序列规则；它还必须仔细审视战斗过程中的事件发展。另一方面，如果一场战役构成战争的高潮，那么显然，整个战役都必须围绕这场决定性战役进行规划和分析。这些考量表明，理论准备和军事行动的计划指导在现代战争中所起的作用，远远超出了马基雅维利的设想。他曾敷衍地承认将军角色的重要性，但实际上他几乎只提到将军应该懂历史和地理。后来，军事领导中的计划问题以及将军的知识训练成为军事思想的核心问题。在这些问题的探讨中，军事思想远远超越了马基雅维利，但这些更为现代的结论却是他所开启的探索的合乎逻辑的延续。
To a surprising degree, military thought since the sixteenth century has proceeded on the foundations that Machiavelli laid. This is not to say that Machiavelli's recommendations were accepted as final truth. Yet further discussion did not develop in opposition to his view, but rather as an expansion and enlargement of his ideas. For instance, however important Machiavelli's idea of the decisiveness of battle was, it soon became clear that there was a real need for a much more thorough analysis of its consequences. Military theory could not stop with making rules for the formation of the correct battle order; it had also to scrutinize the course of events during the combat action. On the other hand, if a battle constituted the climax of war, it is clear that the whole campaign had to be planned and analyzed in respect to the decisive battle. Such considerations show that the role which theoretical preparation and planned direction of military action played in modern war was much greater than Machiavelli had envisaged. He had made a perfunctory acknowledgment of the importance of the role of the general, but in reality he had hardly said more than that a general should know history and geography. Later, the question of planning in military leadership and of the intellectual training of the general became central problems in military thought. In developing these problems, military thought advanced far beyond Machiavelli, yet these more modern conclusions were a logical continuation of the inquiry that he had started.
然而，现代军事思想中有一个方面不仅与马基雅维利的思想毫无关联，反而截然相反。马基雅维利主要关注的是适用于所有国家和时代的军事组织的普遍准则；而现代军事思想则强调，不同历史环境下的军事行动必然有所不同，军事制度只有与特定国家的宪法和国情相契合才能发挥其应有的作用。此外，马基雅维利强调军事制度的建立和战争的进行应遵循理性且普遍适用的规则，这使得理性因素在军事事务中占据了极其重要的地位。尽管马基雅维利最初对十五世纪的博弈式战争持强烈批判态度，但十八世纪的将领们在某种程度上又回归到机动战的模式，而这种发展并非完全违背了马基雅维利开创的军事科学思路。如果将战争视为由理性规律决定，那么就理所当然地认为不应留有任何侥幸，并期望对手在理性上已然败局已定时会主动出击。然而，将战争仅仅视为一门科学，或者至少过分强调军事事务中的理性因素，很容易导致这样一种观点：战争的胜负完全可以在纸面上决定，而非在战场上决定。
Nevertheless, there is one aspect in modern military thought that not only cannot be connected with Machiavelli's thought, but is in sharp contrast to it. Machiavelli was mainly concerned with a general norm, valid for the military organizations of all states and times; modern military thought emphasizes that actions under different historical circumstances must differ and that military institutions will be satisfactory only when they are fitted to the particular constitution and conditions of an individual state. Moreover, Machiavelli's emphasis on the establishment of military institutions and conduct of war according to rational and generally valid rules gave great weight to the rational factor in military matters. Although Machiavelli began as a vehement critic of the chesslike wars of the fifteenth century, eighteenth-century generals returned to some extent to wars of maneuvering, and this development is not entirely against the line of thought in military science that Machiavelli had started. When war is seen as determined by rational laws, it is only logical to leave nothing to chance and to expect that the adversary will throw his hand in when he has been brought into position where the game is rationally lost. The result of considering war as a mere science or at least of overvaluing the rational element in military affairs leads easily to the view that war can be decided quite as well on paper as on the battlefield.
人们后来认识到，战争不仅是一门科学，也是一门艺术。随着十八世纪末和启蒙时代的结束，人们突然意识到理性因素之外的其他因素也同样重要。人们不再仅仅关注现象的普遍特征，而是重视其个体和独特的特征；那些不可预测的因素被认为与理性可计算的因素同样重要。
It has since been realized that war is not only a science but also an art. With the end of the eighteenth century and of the Age of Reason, there was a sudden recognition of the importance of other than rational factors. Not the general element, but the individual and unique feature of a phenomenon was considered as of supreme importance; the imponderables were seen as no less influential than the rational and calculable elements.
将这些新的思想潮流——认识到独特性和个性的重要性，以及在科学之外承认创造性和直觉性因素——引入军事理论，与克劳塞维茨的名字紧密相连。然而，值得注意的是，克劳塞维茨通常对其他军事作家持极其批判和轻蔑的态度，但他不仅非常认真地审视了马基雅维利的观点，而且还承认马基雅维利“在军事问题上有着非常正确的判断”。<sup> 41</sup>这表明，尽管克劳塞维茨在军事理论中引入了一些马基雅维利思想框架之外的新特征，但他与马基雅维利在基本出发点上是一致的。与马基雅维利一样，他坚信，任何对军事问题的具体分析的有效性都取决于对战争本质的普遍认知和正确理解。克劳塞维茨的所有理论都源于对战争普遍本质的分析。因此，即使是这位十九世纪军事思想家中的伟大革命家，也没有推翻马基雅维利的基本论点，而是将其纳入了自己的论点之中。
The introduction of these new intellectual trends—of the realization of the importance of uniqueness and individuality, of the recognition of the creative and intuitive element aside from the scientific—into military theory is connected with the name of Clausewitz. It is remarkable, however, that Clausewitz, who usually is extremely critical and contemptuous of other military writers, is not only very careful in examining suggestions made by Machiavelli but concedes that Machiavelli had “a very sound judgment in military matters.”41 This is an indication that, despite the new features which Clausewitz introduced into military theory and which are outside the framework of Machiavelli's thought, he agreed with Machiavelli in his basic point of departure. Like Machiavelli he was convinced that the validity of any special analysis of military problems depended on a general perception, on a correct concept of the nature of war. All doctrines of Clausewitz have their origin in an analysis of the general nature of war. Thus, even this great revolutionary among the military thinkers of the nineteenth century did not overthrow Machiavelli's fundamental thesis but incorporated it in his own.
1 Lodovico Ariosto， Orlando Furioso，译。约翰·胡尔（John Hoole，伦敦，1783 年；费城，1816 年），bk. 1、第9章。
1 Lodovico Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, trans. John Hoole (London, 1783; Philadelphia, 1816), bk. 1, canto 9.
2埃米尔·德尚的民谣，“Quand viendra le trésorier?”见 E. Deschamps，《作品集》，编辑。圣伊莱尔（巴黎，1884 年），4:289。
2 Ballad by Emile Deschamps, “Quand viendra le trésorier?” in E. Deschamps, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Saint Hilaire (Paris, 1884), 4:289.
3参见。例如，“Ordine dell'Esercito Ducale Sforzesco，1472-1474”， Archwio storico Lombardo，ser。我，卷。 3（1876），448-513。
3 Cf. for instance “Ordine dell'Esercito Ducale Sforzesco, 1472–1474,” Archwio storico Lombardo, ser. I, vol. 3 (1876), 448–513.
4参见查尔斯·奥曼，《中世纪战争艺术史》（伦敦，1924 年），第 1 卷，第 358 页。
4 Cf. Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (London, 1924), 1:358.
5 Francesco di Giorgio Martini，《民用和军事建筑特拉塔托》，编辑。卡洛·普罗米斯（都灵，1841 年），131。
5 Francesco di Giorgio Martini, Trattato di architettura civile e militare, ed. Carlo Promis (Torino, 1841), 131.
6一般而言，参见皮耶罗·皮恩的《意大利的文艺复兴与军事危机》（都灵，1952 年），另见 ME Mallett 和 JR Hale 的《文艺复兴国家的军事组织》 （剑桥，1984 年）中的“军事发展与战斗潜力”和“士兵与国家”两章，第 65-100 页、181-198 页。
6 In general, see Piero Pien, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Torino, 1952), and see also the chapters “Military Development and Fighting Potential” and “Soldiers and the State” in M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State (Cambridge, 1984), 65–100, 181–98.
7马基雅维利为洛伦佐·德·美第奇所作的《君主论》献词：“lunga esperienza delle cose Moderne”。
7 From Machiavelli's dedication of The Prince to Lorenzo de' Medici: “lunga esperienza delle cose moderne.”
8弗朗切斯科·吉恰尔迪尼 (Francesco Guicciardini) 致尼科洛·马基雅维利 (Niccolò Machiavelli)，1521 年 5 月 18 日。
8 Francesco Guicciardini to Niccolò Machiavelli, May 18, 1521.
9参见罗伯托·里多尔菲，《尼科洛·马基雅维利传》，塞西尔·格雷森译（伦敦，1963 年），第 29 页；这是近期关于马基雅维利生平事实的最佳著作。
9 See Roberto Ridolfi, The Life of Niccolò Machiavelli, trans. Cecil Grayson (London, 1963), 29; this is the best recent work on the facts of Machiavelli's life.
10关于马基雅维利在索德里尼时代的地位，请参阅我的《马基雅维利和圭恰尔迪尼》（普林斯顿，1965 年；平装本，纽约，1984 年），特别是第 2 章。
10 On Machiavelli's position in the times of Soderini, see my Machiavelli and Guicciardini (Princeton, 1965; pbk., New York, 1984), particularly ch. 2.
11关于马基雅维利对这个问题的关注，请参阅《君主论》第 15 章。
11 On Machiavelli's concern with this issue, see The Prince ch. 15.
12 “…in ogniparte del mondo ove e sì sona, non istima persona, ancor che facci e sergieri a colui che può portar miglior mantel di lui。”
12 “…in ogni parte del mondo ove e sì sona, non istima persona, ancor che facci e sergieri a colui che può portar miglior mantel di lui.”
13有关马基雅维利在总理府的活动，请参阅 Jean-Jacques Marchand 的《尼科洛·马基雅维利：政治著作初稿（1499–1512）》（帕多瓦，1975 年），该书收录了马基雅维利作为总理府官员撰写的大部分官方文件，并对其进行了分析。
13 For Machiavelli's activities in the Chancellery, see Jean-Jacques Marchand, Niccolò Machiavelli: I primi scritti polttici (1499–1512) (Padua, 1975), which reproduces most of the official documents written by Machiavelli as a Chancellery official, and analyzes them.
14参见 Marchand，《尼科洛·马基雅维利》，450-61。“民兵”在佛罗伦萨并非新概念，而是有着悠久的传统；参见 Charles Calvert Bayley， 《文艺复兴时期佛罗伦萨的战争与社会》（多伦多，1961 年），特别是“从布鲁姆到马基雅维利，民兵传统的延续”一章。
14 See Marchand, Niccolò Machiavelli, 450–61. The “militia” was not a new idea in Florence, but had a long tradition; see Charles Calvert Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence (Toronto, 1961), particularly the chapter “The Survival of the Militia Tradition from Brum to Machiavelli.”
15马尚， Ntccolò 马基雅维利，403。
15 Marchand, Ntccolò Machiavelli, 403.
16同上，412–16。
16 Ibid., 412–16.
17扎戈纳拉战役：佛罗伦萨历史，第 4 卷，第6章；安吉亚里战役：同上，第 5 卷，第 33 章。有关雇佣兵的更积极的评价，请参阅 Michael E. Mallett 的《雇佣兵及其主人》（伦敦，1974 年）。
17 Battle of Zagonara: Florentine History, bk. 4, ch. 6; battle of Anghiari: ibid., bk. 5, ch. 33. For a more positive evaluation of the condottieri see Michael E. Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters (London, 1974).
18马尔尚，尼科洛·马基雅维利，427。
18 Marchand, Niccolò Machiavelli, 427.
19有关马基雅维利对人文主义思想的借鉴的最新讨论，请参阅 JGA Pocock 的《马基雅维利时刻》（普林斯顿，1975 年）和 Quentin Skinner 的《现代政治思想基础》第 1 卷（剑桥，1978 年）。
19 For recent discussions of Machiavelli's indebtedness to humanist notions, see J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975) and Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1978).
20马基雅维利的《战争艺术》（Arte della guerra）的英文译本——题为《战争的艺术》（The Art of War）——由鲍勃斯-梅里尔公司（Bobbs-Merrill Company）于1965年在印第安纳波利斯出版，属于文科丛书系列。该译本是对十八世纪译本的修订，因此并非完全准确。该版本由尼尔·伍德（Neal Wood）撰写了精彩的导言，并附有精选书目。
20 An English translation of Machiavelli's Arte della guerra—with the title The Art of War—has been published in the Library of Liberal Arts by the Bobbs-Merrill Company (Indianapolis, 1965). The translation is the revised text of an eighteenth-century translation and is not always correct. The edition has an excellent introduction by Neal Wood and contains a useful selected bibliography.
21有关马基雅维利对这些来源的依赖的特别调查，请参阅 L. Arthur Bird，“Le fonti letterarie di Machiavelli nell'Arte della Guerra”， Atti della Academia del Lincei，系列 5，卷。 4（1896），pt。 1，第 187-261 页。
21 For a special investigation of Machiavelli's dependence on these sources, see L. Arthur Bird, “Le fonti letterarie di Machiavelli nell'Arte della Guerra,” Atti della Academia del Lincei, series 5, vol. 4 (1896), pt. 1, pp. 187–261.
22这段讨论是根据《孙子兵法》第三卷中对一场战役的描述展开的
22 This discussion follows the description of a battle in book 3 of The Art of War.
23 “……non condurrà mai una guerra a onore”，摘自第一本书。
23 “…non condurrà mai una guerra a onore,” from book 1.
24出自第 3 册；英文译本第 92-94 页（见注释 20）。
24 From book 3; in the English translation pp. 92–94 (see note 20).
25 “In quale debbe essere più amore dipace, che in quello che alone dalla guerra puote essere offeso?”
25 “In quale debbe essere più amore di pace, che in quello che solo dalla guerra puote essere offeso?”
26 “Fare le guerre, come dicano i Franciosi, corte egrose”， Discorsi，II，6。
26 “Fare le guerre, come dicano i Franciosi, corte e grosse,” Discorsi, II, 6.
27 Discorsi，II，33。
27 Discorsi, II, 33.
28 《君主论》第10章。
28 The Prince, ch. 10.
29关于这一点以及接下来的内容，请参阅《君主论》著名的第17 章： “An sit melius amari quam timeri, vel e contra.”
29 For this and the following, see the famous chapter 17 of The Prince: “An sit melius amari quam timeri, vel e contra.”
30 Discorsi，II，2；关于基督教中作为宗教义务的爱国主义，参见恩斯特·坎托罗维茨，《中世纪政治思想中的为祖国而死》，载于其《精选研究》 （纽约，1965 年），第 308-24 页。
30 Discorsi, II, 2; for patriotism as religious duty also in Christianity, see Ernst Kantorowicz, “Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Political Thought” in his Selected Studies (New York, 1965), 308–24.
31关于这一点和下文，尤其参见《君主论》第 12 章。
31 For this and the following, see particularly The Prince, ch. 12.
32 Discorsi，1，43。
32 Discorsi, 1, 43.
33同上。有时，马基雅维利很难将军事措施的效用与其对国内政策的影响区分开来。马基雅维利对要塞的价值持怀疑态度，但要塞究竟是巩固政权还是削弱政权，这一问题在这些讨论中起着至关重要的作用；参见JR Hale编，《文艺复兴战争研究》（伦敦，1983年），第189-209页，《加固还是不加固？马基雅维利对文艺复兴辩论的贡献》。
33 Ibid. Sometimes it is difficult for Machiavelli to separate the usefulness of military measures from their impact on domestic policy. Machiavelli is very skeptical about the value of fortresses, but the question whether they serve to strengthen or to undermine a regime plays a crucial role in these discussions; see “To Fortify or Not to Fortify? Machiavelli's Contribution to a Renaissance Debate” in J. R. Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London, 1983), 189–209.
34 《君主论》第12章。
34 The Prince, ch. 12.
35 Discorsi，III，31。
35 Discorsi, III, 31.
36参见 Sergio Bertelli 和 Piero Innocenti，《Bibliografia Machiavelliana》（维罗纳，1979 年）。
36 See Sergio Bertelli and Piero Innocenti, Bibliografia Machiavelliana (Verona, 1979).
37蒙田，埃塞斯，bk。 2，第 1 章。 34：“对凯撒大帝的战争的观察。”
37 Montaigne, Essais, bk. 2, ch. 34: “Observations sur les moyens de faire la guerre de Julius Caesar.”
38弗朗切斯科·阿尔加罗蒂 (Francesco Algarotti)，他的著作《佛罗伦萨安全军事科学》(Scienza militare del Segretario Fiorentino)的第 8 封和第 9 封信，载于 F. 阿尔加罗蒂 (F. Algarotti)，歌剧，卷。 5（威尼斯，1791 年）。
38 Francesco Algarotti, lettres 8 and 9 of his work Scienza militare del Segretario Fiorentino, in F. Algarotti, Opere, vol. 5 (Venice, 1791).
39国会图书馆目录 1815 年，即托马斯·杰斐逊的图书馆。
39 Catalogue of the Library of Congress 1815, i.e., Thomas Jefferson's library.
40 尼古拉斯·马基雅维利所著《七卷孙子兵法》……以及纽约州一位绅士所作的战争提示（奥尔巴尼，1815 年）。
40 The Art of War in Seven Books Written by Nicholas Machiavel…to Which Is Added Hints Relative to Warfare by a Gentleman of the State of New York (Albany, 1815).
41卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战略》，埃伯哈德·凯塞尔编（汉堡，1937 年），第 41 页。另见彼得·帕雷特，《克劳塞维茨与国家》（牛津和纽约，1976 年；普林斯顿，1985 年重印），第 169-179 页中对克劳塞维茨对费希特关于马基雅维利的文章的回应的讨论。
41 Carl von Clausewitz, Strategic, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Hamburg, 1937), 41. See also the discussion of Clausewitz's response to Fichte's essay on Machiavelli in Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Oxford and New York, 1976; repr. Princeton, 1985), 169–79.
2. 拿骚的莫里斯、古斯塔夫·阿道夫、雷蒙多·蒙特库科利与十七世纪的“军事革命”
2. Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the “Military Revolution” of the Seventeenth Century
T近代早期欧洲“军事革命”的概念已被普遍接受。然而，对于这一发展的确切时间框架仍存在争议。传统上，历史学家认为查理八世于1496年率军进军意大利的军队是第一支现代军队，“其组成与三百年后拿破仑率领的军队并无本质区别”。<sup> 1 </sup> 另一方面，尽管一些历史学家认同军事革命的许多要素，包括步兵的兴起、火器的广泛应用以及能够抵御新型火炮的防御工事的迅速发展，在十五世纪末就已经出现，但另一些历史学家则认为，这场革命最重要的组成部分——职业常备军的出现——发生得更晚，在1560年至1660年间。<sup> 2</sup>
THE CONCEPT of a “military revolution” in Europe during the early modern era has come to be generally accepted. There is, however, disagreement about the exact time frame of this development. Traditionally historians have regarded the army that Charles VIII took to Italy in 1496 as the first modern army, “not fundamentally different in composition to that which Napoleon was to lead to the same battlefields three hundred years later.”1 On the other hand, while agreeing that many of the elements of the military revolution, including the rise of infantry, the widespread adoption of firearms, and the rapid evolution of fortifications capable of withstanding the new artillery, had already made their appearance by the end of the fifteenth century, other historians have argued that the most important component of this revolution, the emergence of professional standing armies, took place later, between 1560 and 1660.2
在此之前，他们认为，西欧和中欧的战争——诚然，东部边缘地区的情况略有不同——变得越来越僵持和不分胜负。战术上，曾经在阿金库尔战役中展现得最为淋漓尽致的远程火力与快速机动相结合的致命优势，已被庞大的火枪和长矛阵所取代。尽管这些阵型迫使骑兵放弃对阵型严密、沉着冷静的步兵发起冲锋，但纵深纵深的战斗序列（士兵排列成十二列或更多列）也阻碍了进攻行动。后勤和战略因素加剧了战术上的迟缓。很少有地区能够长期维持军队的运转，而且由于通讯不畅，部队的补给依赖于固定的补给点，通常是位于要塞内的弹药库。但这些至关重要的要塞，其工事如今采用多棱堡式设计，即所谓的“意大利式防御工事”，已无法再用炮火迅速攻克。它们必须经过正式的围攻，这是一个漫长的过程，需要重型火炮、大量的弹药和物资。整个战役都围绕着围攻展开，围攻被认为比野战更为重要，而且数量也远超野战，即便是在那些希望在开阔地带作战的指挥官的记录中也是如此。在这种军事环境下，“战争艺术变得僵化，几乎完全丧失了‘战略’这一抽象概念，而不再将其作为看待军事行动的方式。” ³
Before this period, they would maintain, warfare in western and central Europe—matters admittedly were somewhat different in the eastern fringe areas—had become increasingly static and indecisive. Tactically, the lethal combination of missile fire and rapidity of movement, demonstrated perhaps most effectively at Agincourt, had been replaced by massive formations of musket and pike. And although these formations forced cavalry to abandon charges against formed and unshaken infantry, the deep order of battle, with men ranged in twelve lines or more, also inhibited offensive action. Tactical sluggishness was reinforced by logistic and strategic factors. Few areas could sustain armies for prolonged periods, and with poor communications, troops were dependent for supply on fixed points, usually magazines located in fortresses. But these vital points, their works now constructed on the multibastioned design, the so-called Italian trace, no longer could be rapidly reduced by artillery. They had to be formally besieged, a lengthy process requiring heavy artillery, much ammunition, and stores. Whole campaigns came to revolve around sieges, considered more important than battles in the field and now also far more numerous, even in the records of commanders wishing to fight in the open. In this military environment the “art of war was stiffening into immobility,” with an “almost total lack of an abstract conception of ‘strategy’ as a way of looking at a military enterprise.”3
然而，不应假定这一发展完全归因于当时的后勤和攻城战问题。或许，阻碍持续军事行动的最大障碍在于大多数军队的社会特征。尽管到了十六世纪，已经出现了一些常备部队，但这些部队不足以组成强大的野战军，野战军必须从其他来源招募。虽然大多数国家保留了过时的中世纪制度，如封建骑士制度和民兵征召，但这些制度通常效率低下，各地军队的主体都由雇佣兵组成。雇佣兵作战能力尚可，但同时又不可靠，而且常常对雇主构成威胁。除非及时获得报酬和补给（这在近代早期国家中很难做到），否则他们可能会叛变、逃兵或叛逃，导致作战行动瘫痪。5总而言之，战术防御的兴起、新防御工事的坚固以及军队的雇佣兵性质，解释了为什么欧洲的战争变得如此旷日持久且胜负难分。
It should not be assumed, however, that this development was entirely due to contemporary problems of logistics and siege warfare. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the conduct of consistent military operations could be found in the social characteristics of most armies. Although by the sixteenth century there existed some permanently embodied units, these were inadequate to provide strong field armies, which had to be constituted from other sources. And although most countries retained relics of obsolete medieval institutions, feudal knight service and militia levies, these normally were inefficient and the great bulk of armies everywhere was composed of mercenaries.4 Mercenaries were competent enough in combat, but at the same time unreliable and often dangerous to their employers. Unless promptly paid and supplied, something early modern states found difficult, they might mutiny, desert, or defect, paralyzing operations.5 Altogether, the ascendancy of the tactical defense, the strength of the new fortifications, and the mercenary character of the troops explain why warfare in Europe had become so drawn out and indecisive.
如何组建一支能够作为国家政策可靠工具的有效军队这一问题，早在十五世纪末就已被人们所认识。很快，人们对古典文明的兴趣复兴便对军事理论和实践产生了显著影响。罗马军事方法的研究尤其成为改革者的灵感源泉，而马基雅维利的《战争艺术》只是众多重新发现希腊罗马军事体系优点并提倡复兴该体系的论著中最著名的一部。尽管这些“新古典主义者”经常被嘲笑为不切实际的业余人士，但实际上其中不乏经验丰富的军人，例如拉扎勒斯·冯·施文迪和胡格诺派上尉拉努埃。即便他们在武器和战术方面的建议常常被证明是不切实际的，许多受古典主义启发的改革也昙花一现或很快面目全非，但马基雅维利和其他人文主义者的核心思想——纪律的必要性以及社会负有军事义务——是正确的。从佛罗伦萨人开始，许多作家都认为本土军队比雇佣兵更优秀、更可靠。然而，统治者们却迟迟不愿武装他们的臣民，或许更重要的是，他们认为只有经验丰富的雇佣兵才能掌握当时武器和战术的精髓。事实上，在西欧和中欧，兼职民兵的表现都差强人意。他们集结缓慢，作战笨拙，主要作用在于保卫自己的城镇，但不足以应对复杂而持久的作战行动。6
The problem of how to raise an effective army, capable of serving as a reliable instrument of state policy, was recognized as early as the late fifteenth century, and soon the revival of interest in classical civilization had a distinct impact on military theory and practice. The study of Roman military methods especially became a source of inspiration for reformers, and Machiavelli's Arte della guerra ranks only as the most famous in a long line of treatises that rediscovered the virtues of the Graeco-Roman military system and recommended its revival. Although frequently scorned as impractical amateurs, these “neoclassicists” actually included some experienced soldiers like Lazarus von Schwendi and the Huguenot captain La Noue, and even if their suggestions on weapons and tactics often proved impractical and many classically inspired reforms were short-lived or quickly changed beyond recognition, Machiavelli and other humanists were right in their central idea—the need for discipline and the notion that society had a military obligation. Beginning with the Florentine, many of these writers suggested that native troops were superior and more reliable than mercenaries. Rulers, however, hesitated to arm their subjects and, perhaps more importantly, believed that only experienced mercenaries could master the intricacies of contemporary weapons and tactics. Indeed, in both western and central Europe, the performance of part-time militia troops left much to be desired. Slow to muster and clumsy in the field, they were primarily useful in the defense of their own towns, but inadequate for complex and prolonged operations.6
即便如此，马基雅维利强调基于等级森严的指挥链、职能分工以及通过持续演练和训练来提升军事能力的纪律，这些都隐含在他对罗马军团制度的推崇之中，对荷兰八十年战争期间既能有效作战又能有效控制的军队的出现产生了相当大的影响。当时，统治荷兰的寡头集团准备将组建一支新型军队的重任委托给其指挥官——奥兰治-拿骚家族的诸侯。与当时其他受过良好教育的军人一样，奥兰治家族的诸侯们熟知古代军事著作，但他们也认识到，要最大限度地发挥火枪和长矛战术组合的优势，需要更高水平的控制、新的作战指挥风格以及更充分的训练。为了实现最高的火力和机动性，步兵不再能以大规模方阵部署，而是越来越多地分散成较小的作战单位，这要求官兵展现出更高的个人主动性和战术技巧，同时还要服从整体作战计划。仅仅机械地模仿罗马战术模式是不够的；它必须辅以一种新的军事精神，这种精神既不同于封建骑士鲁莽的个人勇气，也不同于雇佣兵追求个人致富的自私动机。为了解决这个问题，奥兰治改革者们创造了一种新型的职业军人和作战指挥官，他们将军事技能与特定的社会和精神价值观相结合。
Even so, Machiavelli's emphasis on discipline based on a hierarchical chain of command, functional assignments, and military competence achieved by constant drill and training, all implicit in his advocacy of the Roman legion system, had considerable influence on the emergence of combat-effective but also controlled forces during the Eighty Years' War in the Netherlands. Here the ruling Dutch oligarchy was prepared to entrust its commanders, princes of the House of Orange-Nassau, with the organization of a new model army. Like other cultured soldiers of the age, the Orangist princes were acquainted with the military texts of the ancients, but they also recognized that obtaining the greatest possible benefits from the tactical mix of musket and pike required a new degree of control, combined with a new style of combat leadership and more training. To achieve the highest degree of fire and mobility, infantry no longer could be deployed in large mass-formations, but instead was increasingly strung out in smaller units, requiring officers and men to display a greater degree of personal initiative and tactical skills, while at the same time conforming to an overall battle plan. A purely mechanistic imitation of Roman tactical models was not enough; it had to be supplemented by a new military ethos, different from the reckless individual courage of the feudal knights and the selfish drive for personal enrichment of the mercenaries. Resolving this problem, the Orangist reformers created a new type of professional soldier and combat leader, combining martial expertise with specific social and spiritual values.
此次改革的灵感很大程度上源于尤斯图斯·利普修斯（Justus Lipsius），这位新斯多葛派哲学家、博学多才的历史学家和语言学家于1571年至1591年间在莱顿大学任教，对拿骚的莫里斯产生了直接影响。利普修斯崇拜马基雅维利，并将他与柏拉图和亚里士多德相提并论。在他的演讲和著作中，他强调服从、忠诚和为国家服务的原则。他于1589年出版的《政治学六书》（Politicorum libri six）被认为是荷兰改革的理论基础，他曾将此书赠予他的学生莫里斯。利普修斯认为，战争并非不受控制的暴力行为，而是由称职且合法的权威机构为了国家利益而有序地运用武力。他理想中的军官并非以追求个人荣耀为动机，而是既懂得指挥又懂得服从，首先将自己视为服务于社群的专业人士。这样的军官沉着冷静，绝不会做出任何有损自身声誉的暴力行为，不仅能为部下树立榜样，还能通过持续不断的操练和训练，将部队打造成高效且纪律严明的战士。利普修斯认为，正是这些品质使得罗马公民士兵能够战胜人数占优但纪律涣散的敌人。7
Inspiration for this owed much to Justus Lipsius, a neo-Stoic philosopher, polyhistorian, and philologist at the University of Leiden between 1571 and 1591, who had a direct influence on Maurice of Nassau. In his lectures and writings, Lipsius, an admirer of Machiavelli, whom he ranked with Plato and Aristotle, stressed the doctrines of obedience, loyalty, and service to the state. His Politicorum libri six, published in 1589, a copy of which he presented to his sometime student Maurice, has been described as the intellectual basis of the Dutch reforms. War, Lipsius argued, was not an act of uncontrolled violence, but rather the orderly application of force, directed by a competent and legitimate authority, in the interest of the state. His ideal officer was not motivated by the quest for individual glory, but, having learned to command as well as to obey, would consider himself first and foremost as a professional serving his community. Patient and sober, with no act of common violence besmirching his standing, such an officer not only would provide an example for his men, but through constant drill and training, turn his troops into effective and disciplined fighters. These qualities, Lipsius maintained, had been the main factors enabling Roman citizen-soldiers to overcome superior numbers of less disciplined foes.7
纪律由此成为关键要素。尽管形势迫使奥兰治改革者放弃了公民军队的概念，转而建立一支长期服役的职业雇佣军，但他们仍然强调纪律，并通过职业军官、操练和训练来实现这一目标。这足以改变士兵与国家之间的关系，并极大地提升荷兰军队的战斗力。马克斯·韦伯总结道：“是纪律而非火药开启了这场变革”，“只有在纪律存在的情况下，火药及其相关的所有战争技术才变得重要。”<sup> 8</sup>社会和道德因素，而非技术，构成了近代早期新型军事体制的基本参数，莫里斯及其同僚所实践的方法也成为了后来所有欧洲军队的规范标准。尽管按照利普修斯制定的标准来衡量，后来在欧洲占据主导地位的职业军队仍然存在严重的缺陷，但与前一时期的雇佣兵相比，他们是相当有效的国家政策工具，能够按照可预测的模式服从既定的政治军事指挥链的命令。
Discipline then became the key element, and even though circumstances compelled the Orangist reformers to discard the concept of a citizen army for a long-service professional mercenary force, they retained an emphasis on discipline, achieved by professional officers, drill, and training. It was enough to transform the relationship between the soldier and the state and to increase greatly the combat capabilities of the Dutch army. “It was discipline and not gunpowder,” Max Weber concluded, “which initiated the transformation,” and “gunpowder and all the war techniques associated with it became significant only with the existence of discipline.”8 Social and moral dimensions, rather than technology, provided the fundamental parameters for the new military establishments of the early modern era, and the methods practiced by Maurice and his cousins became the normative standards for all later European armies. Although when measured against the standards set by Lipsius, the professional forces that came to predominate in Europe retained grave deficiencies, compared to the mercenaries of the preceding period they were reasonably efficient instruments of state policy, responding in a predictable pattern of obedience to the orders of a defined political-military chain of command.
这些发展对战略和战术产生了重大影响。尽管两国都继续受到通讯不畅和堡垒林立的困境，尽管战略与战术之间的界限在18世纪后期仍然模糊不清，但训练有素的常备军使指挥官能够计划并执行持续的作战行动。此外，尽管他们的军队在许多方面与莫里斯的军队有所不同，但仍存在相当程度的延续性。古斯塔夫·阿道夫和蒙特库科利都是“尼德兰改革者的追随者”，尤其是在他们坚信训练有素的军队是现代战争的基本要求这一点上。然而，值得注意的是，欧洲常备军的演变源于两条独立的路线。毫无疑问，荷兰模式被更广泛地效仿，但同时还存在一种源于与土耳其长期战争的“帝国”模式。在神圣罗马帝国，像阿文蒂努斯这样的人文主义者以及像弗龙斯佩格和施文迪这样的将领都对奥斯曼帝国的军事体制赞赏有加，并多次力主引入类似的体系。<sup> 10</sup>蒙特库科利在与瑞典人和土耳其人作战的经验中，最终将这两种思路融合在他的著作中，这是近代早期首次系统地尝试从战略、战术、行政、政治和社会等各个层面探讨战争现象。正是以这种形式，荷兰、瑞典和奥地利的军事遗产传承给了欧根亲王、马尔伯勒、腓特烈大帝，并最终延续到法国大革命时代。克劳塞维茨的导师沙恩霍斯特非常钦佩蒙特库科利，认为他是理解战争永恒本质的不可或缺的向导。<sup> 11</sup>
These developments had a substantial influence on strategy and tactics. Although both continued to suffer from poor communications and an environment dominated by fortresses, and although the lines between strategy and tactics continued to be blurred into the late eighteenth century, disciplined standing armies enabled commanders to plan and carry out sustained operations. Also, even though their forces differed in many aspects from those of Maurice, there was substantial continuity. Both Gustavus Adolphus and Montecuccoli were “disciples of the Netherlandish reformers,” especially in their conviction that well-regulated troops were a basic requirement of modern war.9 Still, it should be noted that the evolution of standing European armies came from two independent lines of development. The Dutch model, undoubtedly, was the more widely imitated, but there also existed an “imperial” model, derived from the long wars against the Turks. In the Holy Roman Empire, humanists like Aventinus and commanders like Fronsperger and Schwendi had come to admire the military establishment of the Ottoman Empire and repeatedly urged the introduction of a similar system.10 With experience in fighting both the Swedes and the Turks, Montecuccoli eventually fused these two lines in his writings, the first systematic attempt in early modern times to address the phenomenon of war in all its strategic, tactical, administrative, political, and social dimensions. And it was in this form that the Dutch, Swedish, and Austrian heritage was transmitted to Eugene, Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and ultimately to the age of the French Revolution. Scharnhorst, Clausewitz's mentor, greatly admired Montecuccoli and considered him an indispensable guide to the eternal nature of war.11
因此，如果将“军事革命”一词理解为不仅仅是采用新式武器和战术阵型，而是指军队和战争性质的彻底根本性转变，那么这种转变直到1560年以后才发生，也就是在莫里斯、古斯塔夫·阿道夫和蒙特库科利的时代。正是在那时，建立在等级森严的服从、纪律严明和社会责任原则之上的现代军队才形成了沿用至今的形态。这一转变在很大程度上归功于这三位统帅的努力、实践和理论，的确构成了一场真正的“军事革命”。
If, then, the term “military revolution” is taken to mean more than the adoption of new weapons and tactical formations and is designed to embrace a complete and fundamental shift in the nature of armies and warfare, such a shift took place only after 1560, that is, in the era of Maurice, Gustavus Adolphus, and Montecuccoli. It was only then that modern armies, founded on the principle of hierarchical subordination, discipline, and social obligation, took the shape they have retained to the present day. This transformation, accomplished in large part by the efforts, practices, and theories of these three commanders, does indeed constitute a true “military revolution.”
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拿骚的莫里斯，威廉一世（沉默者威廉）的次子，其名声主要与荷兰职业军队的组织联系在一起。尽管他是一位杰出的管理者、战术家和攻城大师，但莫里斯算不上真正伟大的战略家。他极其谨慎，避免让军队身陷险境，二十年间只打过一场大战。他实现了战略目标，确保了联合尼德兰的独立，但他的谨慎有时使他在面对更具战斗力、缺乏策略的对手时处于劣势。即便如此，他成功地将一群不可靠的雇佣兵和临时民兵改造成一支精锐部队，足以使他在现代战争发展史上占据一席之地。
The name of Maurice of Nassau, the second son of William the Silent, is associated above all with the organization of the Dutch professional army. Although a distinguished administrator, tactician, and master of siege warfare, Maurice can not be ranked as a truly great strategist. Exceedingly cautious, he avoided placing his army at risk and fought only one major battle in twenty years. He achieved his strategic objective, securing the independence of the United Netherlands, but his caution sometimes placed him at a disadvantage against more combative and less methodical adversaries.12 Even so, his success in transforming a motley crowd of unreliable mercenaries and part-time militias was enough to win him a lasting place in the evolution of modern war.
当然，1589年至1609年间军事改革的实际实施是合作的成果。在构建军队的整体框架和财政方面，莫里斯得到了荷兰地方法官约翰·范·奥尔登巴内费尔特的支持。约翰·范·奥尔登巴内费尔特在长达三十年的时间里，一直是荷兰七省议会（即组成联合尼德兰的议会）中最重要的官员。在行政和战术方面，莫里斯得到了他的两位堂兄弟——威廉·路易斯和拿骚-锡根的约翰的协助。<sup> 13 </sup> 最后，在攻城战和军事技术方面，莫里斯依靠他的数学和攻城技术导师西蒙·斯蒂文的建议。斯蒂文后来成为军队的总工程师，指挥了许多重大的围城战，并帮助建立了军事工程师部队。<sup> 14</sup>
Of course, the actual implementation of military reforms in the years 1589 to 1609 was the product of collaboration. In building the overall framework of the army and in finances, Maurice had the support of Johan van Oldenbaarneveldt, the landsadvocaat of Holland and for three decades the most important official in the States General, the assembly of the Seven Provinces forming the United Netherlands. In administrative and tactical matters Maurice was assisted by his two cousins, William Louis and Johann of Nassau-Siegen.13 Finally, in siege warfare and military technology, Maurice relied on the advice of Simon Stevin, his tutor in mathematics and siege techniques, who became chief engineer of the army, directed many of the major sieges, and helped establish the corps of military engineers.14
莫里斯谨慎而深思熟虑的战略也源于他独特的地位，反映了荷兰共和国复杂的政治和军事形势。与古斯塔夫·阿道夫、腓特烈大帝或拿破仑不同，他并非独裁的军阀，而是始终受到相当程度的文官控制。1588年，年仅21岁的莫里斯被任命为“联合尼德兰海军上将”以及“布拉班特和佛兰德斯军队总司令”，后者是各省的主要野战军。此外，莫里斯此前已担任荷兰省和泽兰省的执政官（相当于君主的代表），并在1591年后兼任海尔德兰省、上艾塞尔省和乌得勒支省的执政官。与此同时，他的堂兄威廉·路易斯担任弗里斯兰省的执政官，并从1594年起兼任格罗宁根省和德伦特省的执政官。<sup> 15</sup>然而，身兼多职并不意味着拥有实权。作为海军司令，莫里斯要对五个不同的省海军部负责。尽管各省经常称他为“陆军总司令”，但他从未指挥过荷兰的全部陆军。地方主义阻碍了军队的发展，有时甚至影响了作战行动。与此同时，荷兰议会的一个特别委员会——国务委员会——始终负责协调军事事务，并通过特派的野战代表监督作战行动。一位历史学家将莫里斯的职位描述为“技术专家、作战经理和各省的军事顾问”。<sup> 16</sup>
Maurice's cautious and deliberate strategy also derived from his unique position, reflecting the complex political and military conditions of the Dutch Republic. Unlike a Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon, he was not a sovereign warlord but always subject to a substantial degree of civilian control. In 1588, then twenty-one years old, Maurice was appointed “Admiral-General of the United Netherlands” as well as “Captain-General of the Troops in Brabant and Flanders,” the main field army of the provinces. In addition, Maurice already held office as stadtholder, representative of the sovereign, in two of the provinces, Holland and Zeeland, and after 1591 also in Gelderland, Overijsel, and Utrecht. At the same time his cousin William Louis was stadtholder of Friesland and from 1594 on of Groningen and Drenthe.15 But the many offices did not mean power. As naval commander, Maurice was answerable to five different provincial admiralty boards and though often called “General of the Armies” by the States, he never commanded all Dutch land forces. Provincial particularism inhibited force development and sometimes operations, while at all times a special committee of the States General, the Council of State, coordinated military affairs and watched over operations through special field deputies. One historian has described Maurice's position as that of a “technical expert, operational manager, and military advisor to the States.”16
尽管这种安排本身就存在潜在冲突，但在很长一段时间内，它运作得相当不错。莫里斯的政治野心有限，而统治的商人寡头们缺乏尚武传统，对军事生涯也毫无兴趣，他们乐于将军队管理的细节交给执政官处理。然而，冲突终究无法完全避免。1600年，政治压力迫使莫里斯发动了一场雄心勃勃的弗兰德斯战役，高级军官们抱怨那些“长袍政客”不必要地让军队陷入危险。最终，在一次教派政治冲突中，奥尔登巴内费尔特试图通过组建由城市供养的军队来削弱军队的作用，莫里斯于1619年将其逮捕、审判并处决。但即使是这起不幸事件——老朋友之间的致命争吵——也未能动摇文官对军队的控制。
Despite the potential conflict inherent in this arrangement, for a long time it worked well enough. Maurice had limited political ambitions, while the ruling merchant oligarchs lacked martial traditions and a taste for military careers and were content to leave details of army management to the stadtholders. Still, conflict could not be avoided entirely. When political pressures compelled Maurice to undertake an ambitious campaign into Flanders in 1600, senior officers grumbled about the “long coats,” the politicians, for needlessly hazarding the army.17 And ultimately, when during a sectarian-political conflict Oldenbaarneveldt tried to reduce the role of the army by raising city-paid forces, Maurice had him arrested, tried, and executed in 1619. But even this unhappy event, a deadly quarrel among longtime friends, did not shake civil control over the army.
这一切在1588年莫里斯被任命为总司令时都还未发生。当时，政界人士和军界人士都意识到，必须将一支效率低下的雇佣兵和民兵混合部队改造成一支能够击退经验丰富的西班牙佛兰德斯军队的强大力量。这支军队当时由能干的帕尔马公爵亚历山大·法尔内塞率领，正准备完成对尼德兰北部地区的收复。那一年，正如荷兰起义伊始一样，这场斗争是不对称的。低地国家的长期冲突既是一场内战，也是一场民族解放战争。面对当时最强大的军事力量，荷兰人之所以能够幸存下来，不仅是因为他们自身的非凡努力，也得益于他们的地理位置以及西班牙难以长时间进行大规模军事行动。
All this still lay in the future when Maurice was appointed commander in chief in 1588. At that time politicians and soldiers were united by the need to transform the ineffective mix of mercenaries and militias into a force capable of repelling the veteran Spanish Army of Flanders, then led by the able Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma, and poised to complete its reconquest of the northern Netherlands. That year, as it had been from the outset of the Dutch revolt, the struggle was asymmetrical. The long conflict in the Low Countries had been as much a civil war as a war of national liberation, and the Dutch, facing the leading military power of the time, had survived not only because of their extraordinary efforts but also because of their geography and the difficulties the Spanish experienced in mounting large-scale operations for extended periods of time.
1566年起义之初，西班牙尼德兰由十七个省组成，约有三百万居民。莱茵河、马斯河和斯海尔德河水系将南部十个省份与较为贫困、人口稀少的北部地区分隔开来。南部地区地广人稀，农业发达，主要城市也位于南部。起义最初以南部为中心，但到了1579年，由于临时组建的起义军屡遭战败，以及贵族领袖与其日益激进的城市支持者之间出现分裂，南部各省最终回归西班牙统治。此时，北部七个省份结成联盟，试图援助南部仍在抵抗的地区。然而，在1584年，唯一一位受到南北双方尊敬的起义领袖“沉默者”威廉遇刺身亡后，他们的军事行动开始瓦解。由于派系林立和地方纷争，北方各省无法联合起来，而那些未领到薪水的雇佣兵则要求“在接到作战命令时支付报酬”。<sup>18</sup>在缺乏援军的情况下，帕尔马的军队攻陷了一座又一座城镇。一些城镇，尤其是安特卫普，进行了顽强抵抗，但许多城镇最终投降或因叛变而失守。帕尔马继续北上，越过河流屏障，并在东部开辟了第二战场，从弗里斯兰、格罗宁根和海尔德兰一路推进至艾塞尔河，威胁着乌得勒支、荷兰和泽兰。由于担心西班牙军队获胜，此前已间接支持叛军的英国女王伊丽莎白二世直接出兵并提供援助。然而，英国的干预最终收效甚微。指挥官莱斯特伯爵与议会发生争执，他的一些副官将委托给他们的重要据点卖给了帕尔马。 1587年，叛乱危机迫在眉睫。帕尔马的东线攻势抵达须德海，与南线会合，将仍在交战的地区缩减至荷兰、泽兰、乌得勒支、上艾塞尔省、海尔德兰省和弗里斯兰省的几个零星地区，以及位于大河以南的奥斯坦德和卑尔根奥普佐姆。帕尔马在1587-1588年间未能完成他的计划，是因为英国的干预激怒了菲利普国王，他派遣“无敌舰队”进攻爱尔兰岛，帕尔马奉命前往敦刻尔克准备登船。行动失败后，他准备在次年再次行动，却被调去支持法国宗教战争中的天主教一方。
At the outset of the revolt in 1566, the Spanish Netherlands consisted of seventeen provinces with about three million inhabitants. The Rhine, Maas, and Scheldt river systems divided the ten southern provinces, open, prosperous farming country that also included the major cities, from the poorer, more sparsely inhabited north. The South had been the original focus of the revolt, but by 1579, following repeated defeats of the improvised insurgent field armies and a split between the aristocratic leaders and their increasingly radicalized urban supporters, the southern provinces had returned to Spanish rule. Forming their own union at this time, the seven northern provinces tried to succor the places continuing to resist in the south, but after William the Silent, the one insurgent leader respected by North and South, was assassinated in 1584 their military effort faltered. Divided by factional and local rivalries, the northern provinces would not make a joint effort, while their unpaid mercenaries demanded “money when they were ordered to fight.”18 Without relief, town after town fell to Parma's troops. Some, above all Antwerp, offered protracted resistance, but many surrendered or were delivered by treachery. As Parma continued north across the river barriers, he opened a second front in the east, moving through Friesland, Groningen, and Gelderland against the Ijsel river, threatening Utrecht, Holland, and Zeeland. Fear of a Spanish victory compelled Elizabeth of England, already providing indirect support to the insurgents, to intervene directly with troops and subsidies. In the event, the English intervention proved ineffective. The commander, the Earl of Leicester, quarrelled with the States and some of his lieutenants sold important strongholds entrusted to them to Parma. In 1587, the crisis of the revolt was at hand. Parma's eastern offensive reached the Zuider Zee and linked up with his southern front, reducing the area still in arms to Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, a few isolated places in Overijsel, Gelderland, and Friesland, with Ostend and Bergen-op-Zoom south of the great rivers. If Parma did not complete his undertaking in 1587–1588, it was because English intervention had angered King Philip enough for him to send the “Invincible Armada” against the island, and Parma was ordered to Dunkirk to prepare to embark his army. After the enterprise failed and he was ready to move again the following year, he was diverted to support the Catholic side in the French religious wars.19
这些牵制行动为莫里斯重建军队、收复东北部大片地区并加强防御提供了时间。守住这片战略要地——荷兰人称之为“荷兰要塞”（Vesting Holland）的区域（该地在1672年抵御了法国的进攻，但在1940年被德国人攻陷）——至关重要。它北临北海和须德海，西临河流，东临艾塞尔河和沼泽地，地势低洼，纵横交错着运河、堤坝、河口和沼泽，点缀着一些小型防御城镇。20通过开凿堤坝，守军可以淹没大片区域，这一措施在1572年至1574年间就曾用于阻止西班牙的入侵。此外，自那时起，荷兰人通常都能控制近岸和内陆水域。如果西班牙能够集中一支更强大的舰队，它或许仍能取得胜利，但它对法国的干预、在地中海的军事行动以及海外帝国的安全需求消耗了其大量资源。此外，西班牙的财政困境导致佛兰德斯军团频繁发生兵变，而由于英吉利海峡的控制权岌岌可危，军队的增援只能通过漫长而曲折的陆路——西班牙大道——从意大利运来。21
These diversions provided the time for Maurice to rebuild the army, recover much of the northeastern area, and bolster defenses. Retention of the strategic redoubt area, the Vesting Holland as the Dutch would call it (which held against the French in 1672, but fell to the Germans in 1940), was a crucial asset. Protected north and west by the North Sea and the Zuider Zee, in the south by the rivers, and in the east by the Ijsel and marshlands, it consisted mainly of low-lying terrain, cut up by canals, dikes, estuaries, and bogs and studded with small fortified towns.20 By cutting dikes, the defenders could inundate vast stretches, a measure already employed in 1572–1574 to halt a Spanish penetration. Moreover, since that time, the Dutch usually maintained control over the inshore and inland waters. If Spain could have concentrated a superior fleet, it still might have gained victory, but its intervention in France, its Mediterranean commitments, and the security needs of its overseas empire dissipated resources. And finally, Spanish financial difficulties provoked frequent mutinies in the Army of Flanders, while with control of the Channel in doubt, reinforcements for the army had to come over the long and circuitous land route from Italy, the Spanish Road.21
相比之下，对海洋和内陆水域的控制使荷兰人能够迅速调动兵力沿大河前进，并对布拉班特和佛兰德斯发动短兵相接的进攻。此外，随着对海上通道控制力的不断增强（尽管尚未完全确立），荷兰人的海上贸易迅速扩张，经济也随之繁荣发展。“然而，”阿姆斯特丹市长评论道，“战争的本质通常是破坏土地和人民，但这些国家却因此得到了显著改善。”<sup> 22</sup>雄厚的财力使奥兰治改革者有能力维持一支常备职业军队，进行大规模围攻战，并在前线修建新的防御工事。
By contrast, mastery of the sea and inland waters enabled the Dutch to shift their forces rapidly on the great rivers and mount short stabs into Brabant and Flanders. Moreover, with growing, though not yet undisputed, control of the sea approaches, the Dutch rapidly expanded their maritime commerce, and their economy prospered. “Whereas,” commented the mayor of Amsterdam, “it generally is the nature of war to ruin land and people, these countries have been noticeably improved thereby.”22 Financial strength provided the Orangist reformers with the resources to pay a standing professional army, conduct large-scale siege warfare, and construct new fortified lines along their fronts.
二
II
军队改革的灵感源于古典模式以及十六世纪战争的实际需要。<sup>23</sup>尽管近期的事件表明雇佣军并非完全可靠，尽管利普修斯主张使用忠诚的公民士兵，但改革者们不得不雇用职业军人。虽然他们在海上表现出色，但“荷兰人自己很少拿起武器与敌人作战……战斗主要由从国外招募的军队承担。” 这并非仅仅是对战斗的厌恶。在早期低地国家的围城战中，荷兰市民民兵表现出色，但海上贸易和日益壮大的海军首先需要本土人力。因此，尽管地方防御和驻防任务保留了原有的民兵连队，并辅以雇佣的驻防部队（waardgelder ），但执政者们——他们一贯是现实主义者而非教条的新古典主义者——招募了一支纪律严明的雇佣兵野战军，用米什莱的话来说，“人数不多，但精挑细选，伙食优渥，报酬丰厚。”<sup> 24</sup>
Inspiration for army reforms was derived from classical models as well as from the practical necessities of sixteenth-century warfare.23 Although recent events had demonstrated that mercenary forces were not totally reliable, and although Lipsius had advocated the use of loyal citizen-soldiers, the reformers were forced to use hired professionals. Though they served with distinction at sea, it “was only rarely that the Dutch themselves bore arms against the enemy…fighting was left largely to the troops recruited from abroad.” This was not just a dislike of combat. During the earlier sieges in the Low Countries Dutch burgher militias had fought well enough, but maritime trade and the growing navies had first call on native manpower. Therefore, although for local defense and garrison duties the old militia companies, supplemented by paid garrison troops, the waardgelder, were retained, the stadtholders, always realists rather than doctrinaire neoclassicists, recruited a disciplined mercenary field army, in Michelet's words “not many men, but well chosen, well fed, and very well paid.”24
这支新部队的显著特点是：英明的领导、绝对的服从、对部队的忠诚，以及战术部署和机动能力的提升。改革首先从裁减兵力开始，使部队规模与缩减后的财政状况相匹配。直到1600年，荷兰野战部队的人数很少超过12000人，其中骑兵约2000人，步兵约10000人，并拥有一支相对强大的炮兵部队——1595年时有42门火炮，但只有6门野战炮。<sup> 25</sup>士兵大多是外国人，包括法国人、德国人、英国人和苏格兰人，还有少量瑞士人和丹麦人。由于全年都有工作，并且工资按时发放，这些士兵都接受了纪律。尽管莫里斯实行了严格的行为准则，但他同时也重新发现了操练这种灌输纪律的方法。根据威廉·路易斯的建议，士兵们每天都要进行操练，操练内容直接取自埃利安和利奥描述的罗马模式，并将命令翻译成荷兰语、英语和德语。26当然，军队一直都有训练士兵使用武器，但这里的目标超越了个人或部队的熟练程度。正确执行武器操作规程成为纪律的外在体现，训练旨在培养士兵对命令的即时服从和增强部队凝聚力。将操练重新引入军队是奥兰治改革的重要组成部分，也是对现代军事体系的根本贡献。27
The distinguishing characteristics of the new force were intelligent leadership, unquestioning obedience, loyalty to the unit, and improvements in tactical deployment and movement. Reform began with a reduction in numbers, bringing troop strength into line with reduced finances. Up to 1600, the Dutch field forces rarely exceeded twelve thousand men, about two thousand horse and ten thousand foot, supported by a relatively powerful artillery train, forty-two pieces in 1595, but only six field guns.25 The majority of the rank and file were foreigners, French, German, English, and Scotch, with a few Swiss and Danes. With year-round employment and prompt payment, these men accepted discipline. Although Maurice enforced a stern code of conduct, he also rediscovered drill as a method to instill discipline. Following the suggestion of William Louis, the men were drilled daily with routines taken directly from the Roman models as described by Aelian and Leo, with the commands translated into Dutch, English, and German.26 Of course, armies always had trained soldiers to handle weapons, but here the objective transcended the achievement of individual or unit proficiency. Proper execution of the manual of arms became the outward manifestation of discipline, with exercises designed to teach instant obedience to commands and to build unit cohesion. The reintroduction of drill into the army was an essential element of the Orangist reforms and a basic contribution to the modern military system.27
操练和部队凝聚力的必然结果是战斗力的提高。“自然，”利普修斯写道，“造就了一些勇士，但勤奋训练带来的良好秩序造就了更多勇士。”<sup> 28</sup>每日的武器训练使得行军动作更加精准，火枪和长矛的配合更加协调，并通过采用一种新的反向行军方式——所谓的合唱式行军法——提高了射速。这种方法是威廉·路易斯于1594年推荐给莫里斯的。<sup> 29</sup>顺应部队规模缩小的趋势，即使是西班牙方阵在1584年后也被缩减到约1500人。莫里斯将各级连队人数减少到130人，提高了火枪兵与长矛兵的比例，并将部队的纵深最初设置为十列，后来改为六列。他没有建立永久性的主要战术阵型，但在战斗中，各连队被合并成营，最初为800人，后来为550人，以类似于罗马军团的线性棋盘格阵型排列。<sup> 30 </sup>
A corollary of drill and unit cohesion was improved combat effectiveness. “Nature,” Lipsius wrote, “brings forth some valiant men, but good order through industry makes more.”28 Daily exercises under arms permitted more precise evolutions, improved coordination of shot and pike, and increased the rate of fire by the adoption of a new form of the countermarch, the so-called choric method, recommended to Maurice by William Louis in 1594.29 Conforming to the general tendency toward smaller units, even the Spanish tercios were reduced to about 1,500 men after 1584, and Maurice cut down companies to 130 of all ranks, raised the ratio of shot to pike, and formed his units first ten and later six deep. He did not establish permanent major tactical formations, but for battle the companies were combined into battalions, initially 800, and later 550, strong, arrayed in a linear checkerboard pattern similar to the Roman legionary deployment.30
荷兰战术体系中各分队承担的独立作战角色以及持续不断的训练，需要更多受过良好教育的初级军官，因此莫里斯被誉为现代欧洲军官团的奠基人。更重要的是，他改变了这一职业的基本精神。受其加尔文教派成长经历和新古典主义教义的影响，他将指挥权视为一种公共信托，其权威并非源于贵族出身，而是源于国家授予的委任状。结合既定等级制度下无条件服从的理念，这为现代指挥结构奠定了基础。当然，实际情况并非如此。荷兰军队中的大多数高级职位都由市政官的亲属担任，贵族在上层军衔中占据主导地位。许多外国人也被聘为高级军官，因为只有他们才具备必要的专业知识，直到1618年才引入了固定的晋升标准。<sup> 31</sup>
Constant training as well as the more independent combat roles assumed by subunits in the Dutch tactical system required better-educated and a larger number of junior officers, and Maurice has been described as the progenitor of the modern European officer corps. More importantly, he changed the basic ethos of the profession. Influenced by his Calvinist upbringing and neoclassical teachings, he regarded command as a public trust, with authority derived not from noble birth but from a commission awarded by the state. Combined with the concept of unconditional obedience within an established hierarchy of ranks, this provided the foundations of the modern command structure. In practice, of course, things were different. Most senior positions in the Dutch service were held by relatives of the stadtbolders and nobles predominated in the upper grades. Many foreigners were also employed as senior officers because they alone had the necessary expertise, and it was not until 1618 that fixed promotion criteria were introduced.31
新的战术体系有时会受到批评。一位著名历史学家声称，新的秩序未能“恢复骑兵和步兵进行制胜战术进攻的能力”。新的作战队形过于僵化，规模太小，不适宜进行决定性进攻，而且通常只适用于防御。<sup> 32</sup>但事实并非如此。在低地国家崎岖的地形上，荷兰人在仅有的两次重大战役中都表现出色，分别是1597年的图尔豪特战役和1600年的尼厄波特战役。在图尔豪特战役中，骑兵将西班牙骑兵赶出战场，然后击溃了步兵；在尼厄波特战役中，荷兰骑兵先是冲锋陷阵，击败了敌军骑兵，然后在步兵的支援下突破了西班牙的防线。<sup> 33</sup>
The new tactical system has sometimes been criticized. One prominent historian has claimed that the new order failed “to restore, both to horse and foot, the capacity for a battle-winning tactical offensive.” The new combat formations were too rigid, too small for decisive assaults, and generally suitable only for the defensive.32 But this assertion is not borne out by the facts. In the broken terrain of the Low Countries the Dutch did well enough in their only two major actions, the encounter at Tournhout in 1597 and the battle of Nieupoort in 1600. At Tournhout the cavalry drove the Spanish horse off the field and then shattered the infantry; at Nieupoort the Dutch mounted charge first defeated the enemy horse and then, supported by advancing infantry, broke the Spanish front.33
莫里斯对攻城战的贡献毋庸置疑。他扩充了攻城辎重，开始在军队中为炮兵、工兵和后勤部队设立固定岗位，并通过引入士兵劳动提高了攻城效率。在此之前，士兵们一直认为挖掘工事有损尊严，军队只能依靠雇佣或强征的劳工来完成这项工作。一些指挥官意识到这种做法有失体面，便亲自拿起镐和铲子，以身作则，激励士兵效仿。利普修斯曾建议“军官们应该携带木板……来教导他们，而不是命令他们。”莫里斯更进一步，将铲子列为步兵的标准装备，并根据需要安排士兵从事这项工作。高达数倍于正常工资的额外报酬，也激励着士兵们积极参与。在1593年格特鲁伊登贝格的长期围攻期间，“三千名工兵日夜不停地工作”，但据记载，“士兵们很喜欢这份工作，因为每个参与其中的士兵每天都能获得十斯蒂弗的额外工资，而且按时发放。”<sup> 36</sup>有了可靠的人力，莫里斯能够迅速建立围攻防线，或在必要时构筑野战工事。
Maurice's contributions to siege warfare are undisputed. He increased his siege train and began to assign a permanent role in his army to artillery, engineers, and supply, and he made siege operations more efficient by introducing the use of troop labor.34 Until this time, soldiers had considered digging to be below their dignity and armies had had to rely on hired or impressed labor for such work. Aware that this was a poor practice, some commanders had taken up pick and shovel themselves to shame their men into following their example. Lipsius had recommended that “officers carry boards and planks…to teach them and not command them.”35 Maurice went further. He made shovels part of the standard infantry equipment and detailed men for work as needed. Extra pay, up to several times the normal rate, provided the incentive. During the long siege of Gertruidenberg in 1593, “three thousand pioneers worked night and day,” but, so it is reported, “the soldiers liked the business, for every man so employed received his ten stivers a day additional wages, punctually paid.”36 With reliable manpower at hand, Maurice was able to establish his siege lines rapidly or to throw up field works when necessary.
在战略方面，莫里斯遵照三级会议的意愿和自身的倾向，追求有限的目标，基本上是收复七省的领土。此外，他主要依靠阵地战来实现这一目标，并不寻求击败敌军主力。1589年至1609年间，他攻占了二十九座以上的要塞，解除了三次围攻，但只进行了一场战斗——尼厄波特战役，而且还是勉强应战。他利用大河的内陆通道，在南部和东部战线之间调动军队，这使得他这支规模不大的军队拥有了远超其兵力的打击能力。一旦脱离水路运输，他发现行军就困难得多，1602年他入侵布拉班特的失败战役就证明了这一点。最后，各省根深蒂固的特殊主义以及三级会议不愿维持超出绝对必要规模的军队，进一步限制了他的军事行动范围。
As for strategy, Maurice, following the wishes of the States General and his own inclinations, sought limited objectives, basically the recovery of the territory of the Seven Provinces. Moreover, he sought to achieve this objective primarily by positional warfare and did not look to defeat the enemy's main force. Between 1589 and 1609 he captured more than twenty-nine fortresses and relieved three sieges, but fought only one battle, Nieupoort, and that reluctantly. He made use of the interior lines of the great rivers to shift his army between the southern and eastern fronts, which gave his small army a far greater striking force than its size warranted. Away from water transport, he found the going much more difficult as was demonstrated in his abortive campaign into Brabant in 1602. Finally, the scope of his enterprises was further restricted by the perennial particularism of the provinces and the reluctance of the States General to maintain a larger force than absolutely necessary.
1590年至1594年间的军事行动体现了莫里斯的战争风格。西班牙军队被牵制于英法两国，这为莫里斯提供了机会，国务委员会宣称这是“重创敌人的良机”。然而，三级议会反对进攻。他们认为，最好利用这段平静时期加强防御；进攻行动“会惊扰沉睡的敌人，使刚刚避免的战争再次爆发”。<sup> 37</sup>最终，莫里斯获准进行有限的军事行动，以收复帕尔马在北部占领的关键城镇。1590年，三级议会军队首先发动政变推翻布雷达，随后清除了西班牙在各大河流以北的据点，并渡过瓦尔河，攻克了布拉班特和佛兰德斯的一系列小型堡垒。次年，莫里斯发动了一场声势浩大的攻势，在5月至10月的战役期间攻占了四座主要堡垒。他从东部开始，于1591年5月和6月的两周内攻占了艾塞尔河沿岸的祖特芬和代芬特尔；随后，他乘驳船转移兵力，于9月仅用五天就攻克了安特卫普附近的胡尔斯特；之后，他折返多德雷赫特，经陆路进军奈梅亨，并在10月经过六天的围攻后攻陷了该城。这些辉煌的战果得益于出其不意的战术和迅速的围攻，以及对敌军守军提供的优厚条件。
Operations during the years 1590 to 1594 illustrate Maurice's style of war. The diversion of Spanish forces against England and France provided an opportunity and the Council of State declared that it was a “good occasion…for doing the enemy an injury.” The States General, however, opposed offensive action. It was better, they maintained, to use the quiet period to strengthen defenses; offensive action “would arouse the sleeping dog and bring the war, now averted, upon themselves again.”37 In the end, Maurice was authorized to undertake limited operations to recover the key towns seized by Parma in the north. In 1590, beginning with a coup against Breda, the Army of the States eliminated Spanish footholds north of the great rivers and then crossed the Waal to reduce a chain of small forts in Brabant and Flanders. The next year Maurice conducted a remarkable offensive, capturing four major fortresses during the campaign season from May to October. Beginning in the east, he took Zutphen and Deventer on the Ijsel line in two weeks in May and June 1591; next he shifted his forces by barge to capture Hulst near Antwerp in five days in September, and then he doubled back to Dordrecht and marched overland to Nijmegen, which fell after a six-day siege in October. These spectacular results were achieved by surprise and by rapid siege operations, aided by favorable terms offered to the enemy garrisons.
1592年，莫里斯继续在东北部作战，迅速攻占了斯滕韦克和科沃登。随后，各省的特殊利益开始显现。弗里斯兰省曾支持在奥弗艾塞尔省和海尔德兰省的战役，但当泽兰省的压力迫使莫里斯将目光转向东南部的格特鲁伊登贝格时，弗里斯兰省政府禁止威廉·路易斯及其军队参与此次行动。经过相当长的拖延和长期围攻，格特鲁伊登贝格于1593年6月陷落。次年，莫里斯返回东部，并于1594年7月攻克了格罗宁根。此后，随着近期目标的达成，各省减少了对军队的投入，导致部分军事行动被迫中止。<sup> 38</sup>
In 1592, Maurice continued operations in the northeast, quickly seizing Steenwijk and Coevorden. Then provincial particularism asserted itself. Friesland had supported the campaign in Overijsel and Gelderland, but when pressure from Zeeland compelled Maurice to turn against Gertruidenberg in the southeast, the States of Friesland forbade William Louis and his troops to participate in the operation. After considerable delay and a long siege, Gertruidenberg fell in June 1593, and the following year Maurice returned east and conquered Groningen in July 1594. After that, with the immediate objectives achieved, the provinces scaled down their contributions to the army, forcing a partial suspension of operations.38
在战争间歇期，莫里斯重整旗鼓。1597年，西班牙再次深陷法国战事，他趁机攻占了多座要塞，切断了西班牙东部和南部战线之间的联系。然而，1598年西班牙与法国缔结和平条约，局势随之改变。一支得到增援的西班牙军队越过河防线，从荷兰堡垒的东南侧发起进攻，但在1599年初被击退。随后，西班牙军队再次发生兵变。在胜利的鼓舞下，荷兰三级议会（Stades General）说服莫里斯沿弗拉芒海岸南下，进攻尼厄波特和敦刻尔克的私掠船基地。1600年7月2日，他在尼厄波特附近击败了一支仓促集结的西班牙军队。这是一场战术上的胜利，但并非战略上的胜利，因为荷兰军队无力应对任何一次围攻，最终不得不于8月初从海上撤退。
During the pause, Maurice reorganized and in 1597, with Spain once again heavily committed in France, he took a number of fortresses, severing communications between the eastern and southern Spanish fronts. In 1598, however, peace between Spain and France changed the situation. Reinforced, a Spanish army pushed across the river lines on the southeastern flank of the Dutch redoubt, but was repulsed early in 1599. At that, the Spanish troops mutinied once again, and emboldened by success, the States General prevailed on Maurice to advance down the Flemish coast against the privateer bases at Nieupoort and Dunkirk. On July 2, 1600, he defeated a hastily mustered Spanish army near Nieupoort, a tactical but not a strategic victory because, unequal to either of the proposed sieges, the Dutch army had to be evacuated by sea in early August.
此后，西班牙指挥官阿尔布雷希特大公决定攻占奥斯坦德。莫里斯试图以他迄今为止最雄心勃勃的行动解除围困。他将军队扩充至5442名骑兵和近19000名步兵，计划深入布拉班特，然后转入佛兰德斯击败西班牙人。然而，行动失败了。荷兰军队渡过马斯河后，发现马匹饲料不足，莫里斯被迫撤退到河对岸。<sup>39</sup>他奉荷兰议会之命转入防御；主动权转移到了西班牙手中，以及新近抵达的安布罗焦·斯皮诺拉手中，他是这场漫长战争中迄今为止最优秀的西班牙将领。奥斯坦德是一座依靠海上补给的坚固要塞，围城战持续了三年之久。在此期间，荷兰议会开始修建大规模的土方工事，以加固脆弱的东线。即便如此，当斯皮诺拉于1609年成功将主力部队转移至此后，他在上艾塞尔省和海尔德兰省取得了一些进展，但随后秋季的暴雨阻碍了他的前进。此时，斯皮诺拉意识到西班牙近乎崩溃的财政状况，主张停止敌对行动。双方于1607年4月达成停战协议，期限为12年，自1608年底开始生效。这标志着荷兰共和国的孤军斗争的结束。1621年战火重燃时，这场战争被并入当时在德国进行的更大规模的冲突之中。40
After that, Archduke Albrecht, the Spanish commander, decided to take Ostend. Maurice tried to lift the siege by his most ambitious operation ever. With an army increased to 5,442 horse and almost 19,000 foot, he planned to penetrate into Brabant, and then swing into Flanders to defeat the Spaniards. The operation failed when, after crossing the Maas, the Dutch could not find enough fodder for their horses, and Maurice was compelled to fall back across the river.39 He was ordered by the States General to assume the defensive; the initiative now passed to Spain and to the newly arrived Ambrogio Spinola, by far the best Spanish general in the long war. While the siege of Ostend, a powerful fortress supplied from the sea, dragged on for three years, the States began to construct an extensive line of earthworks to bolster the vulnerable eastern front. Even so, when Spinola managed to transfer his main army there in 1609, he made progress in Overijsel and Gelderland before heavy autumn rains stopped his advance. At this point Spinola, aware of Spain's near catastrophic financial condition, advocated an end to hostilities and a truce was concluded in April 1607 with a term of twelve years dating from the end of 1608. It was the end of the solitary struggle for the Dutch Republic. When fighting was renewed in 1621, it was subsumed in the greater conflict then being waged in Germany.40
三
III
尼厄波特战役之后，荷兰的战术体系引起了广泛关注。荷兰军队被认为是欧洲最精锐的军队，一位作家评论道，“无论好坏”，低地国家都成了“欧洲大部分青年学习军事训练的军事学校”。<sup> 41</sup>总的来说，奥兰治改革最容易被新教国家接受。在瑞典，古斯塔夫·阿道夫“从一开始就沿用了莫里斯亲王的战术方法”，但对其进行了改进，增强了进攻能力。<sup> 42 </sup> 古斯塔夫是第一个充分理解冲击与火力结合价值的军人，他通过新的作战方法和改进武器，增强了冲击和火力结合的效果。在行政方面，国王恢复了国家征兵制，但他主要依靠雇佣兵进行大规模战役，并对他们进行训练，传授他们的战术。在这一切过程中，他都得到了在荷兰接受过专业训练的军官们的协助，其中包括雅各布·德·拉·加迪，有人形容他之于古斯塔夫，“正如施韦林之于腓特烈，或帕尔梅尼奥之于亚历山大”。<sup> 43</sup>
After the battle of Nieupoort, the Dutch tactical system attracted wide attention. The Army of the States was now considered the finest in Europe and “for good or ill,” one writer observed, the Low Countries became “the Military Schools where most of the Youth of Europe did learn their Military Exercises.”41 In general, the Orangist reforms were most readily accepted by the Protestant states. In Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus “established the methods of Prince Maurice from the outset,” but with modifications that added to their offensive capabilities.42 Gustavus was the first soldier to fully understand the value of combining shock and fire, and he increased the effects of both by new fighting methods and improved weapons. Administratively, the king revived the national conscript army, though he fought his great campaigns mostly with mercenaries whom he disciplined and taught his tactics. In all this he was assisted by officers who had learned their profession in the Netherlands, including Jacob de La Gardie who has been described as being to Gustavus “what Schwerin was to Frederick or Parmenio to Alexander.”43
尽管古斯塔夫更倾向于战斗，但他与莫里斯一样，其历史地位主要归功于其战术和行政方面的创新。然而，他的战略理念无法摆脱时代的局限。虽然作为君主，他能够制定比莫里斯更为宏大的计划，但他同时也是一位谨慎的将领，“步步为营，不冒任何不必要的风险”，是一位“稳健而有条不紊的战略家”。<sup> 44</sup>他在德国的著名战役发生在要塞环境中，尽管他制定了宏伟的计划，但实际作战行动通常取决于他夺取并守住控制交通和补给线的要塞的能力。当然，这限制了他快速决策的能力，而且，与莫里斯一样，他被视为阵地战和机动战的倡导者，是十八世纪战略家的先驱。克劳塞维茨反对这种趋势，对古斯塔夫进行了严厉的评价。克劳塞维茨写道，他并非“大胆的征服者”，而是一位“博学多识、善于精心策划的指挥官”，过于注重“人为的、策略性的、系统化的战争方式”。<sup> 45</sup>
Although much more inclined to give battle, Gustavus like Maurice owes his place in history above all to his tactical and administrative innovations. In his strategic concepts he could not escape the limitations of his time. Although as a sovereign he was able to make plans on a far grander scale than was Maurice, he also was a careful general who “secured each step and risked nothing unnecessarily,” a “solid, methodical strategist.”44 His famous campaigns in Germany took place in a fortress environment and, his great plans notwithstanding, his actual operations generally were determined by his ability to seize and hold strong places controlling communications and supply areas. Of course, this limited his capability to achieve a rapid decision, and, like Maurice, he has been regarded as an exponent of positional and maneuver warfare, a precursor of the eighteenth-century strategists. Reacting against this trend, Clausewitz judged Gustavus harshly. He was not, Clausewitz wrote, a “bold conqueror,” but rather a “learned commander full of careful combinations,” much too concerned with an “artificial, maneuvering, systematic style of warfare.”45
1611年，年仅十七岁的古斯塔夫·阿道夫登上瑞典王位时，发现当时的军队“训练不足、纪律涣散”且组织混乱。<sup> 46</sup>其起源可追溯至约五十年前的古斯塔夫·瓦萨和埃里克十四世时期。他们预见到荷兰的改革，将昔日的封建军队和王室雇佣的外国雇佣兵改组为常备国民军。这支军队最初组织良好，由小型营组成，长矛兵和火枪兵搭配合理。然而，这些改革与欧洲主流相去甚远，影响甚微，而且大多昙花一现。在后来的统治者统治下，这支军队在与丹麦、波兰和俄罗斯的断断续续的战争中逐渐衰落。1605年，拿骚-锡根的约翰在波兰考察了这支军队，并深感失望。它根本无法满足这位年轻国王的雄心壮志。尽管古斯塔夫的军事教育十分粗浅，仅略懂古典文学和一些近代人文主义著作，但他了解荷兰的改革，并曾在拉加迪手下当过学徒。他清楚地认识到军队的不足，重建军队成为他的首要任务。47
When Gustavus Adolphus, barely seventeen years old, ascended the Swedish throne in 1611, he found an “ill-trained, undisciplined,” and poorly organized military establishment.46 Its origins dated back some fifty years to Gustavus Vasa and Erik XIV, who, anticipating the Dutch reforms, had converted the late feudal host and the hired foreign mercenaries of the crown into a standing national army. Originally well organized in small battalions with a good mix of pike and shot, these innovations had occurred too far from the European mainstream to have much influence, and in any case most had been short-lived. Under the succeeding rulers the army had declined during the intermittent wars against Denmark, Poland, and Russia. Johann of Nassau-Siegen who observed it in Poland in 1605 had been greatly disappointed. It was not an instrument equal to the ambitions of the young king. Although Gustavus had only a sketchy military education, including an acquaintance with the classical literature and some of the more recent humanist writings, he had knowledge of the Dutch reforms and had served an apprenticeship under La Gardie. He clearly recognized the army's deficiencies, and rebuilding the force became his major priority.47
他立即与波兰缔结停战协定，并于1613年与丹麦结束了战争，尽管条件极其苛刻。随后，他任命拉加迪为副将，进军芬兰，并于1617年成功与俄罗斯达成和约。三年后，他的军队实力大为增强，于是入侵了当时正与奥斯曼帝国和俄罗斯交战的波兰。然而，他预想的速战速决并未实现。这场战争演变成一场旷日持久的消耗战，年轻的国王在这场战争中汲取了后勤、机动、骑兵冲击和围城战等方面的宝贵经验。48这场战争仅在1622年因两年的休战而中断，一直持续到1629年，最终以另一次停战协定告终。此时，古斯塔夫意识到德国的大规模冲突对瑞典既是威胁也是机遇，因此对他的军事体制进行了重大改革。
Immediately he concluded an armistice with Poland and in 1613 settled the war with Denmark, albeit on most unsatisfactory terms. Then, with La Gardie as his second in command, he campaigned in Finland, managing to gain a favorable peace from Russia in 1617. Three years later, with his forces much improved, he invaded Poland, then at war with the Ottoman Empire and Russia. But his expectations of a short and easy campaign did not materialize. Instead, it became a long war of attrition in which the young king learned useful lessons in logistics, mobility, cavalry shock, and siege warfare.48 Interrupted only by a two years truce in 1622, the war continued until 1629, when it was halted by another armistice. By that time, realizing that the greater conflict in Germany represented a threat as well as an opportunity for Sweden, Gustavus, had made major changes in his military establishment.
他于1625年开始着手改革征兵制度。他引入了教区制度，由地方神职人员登记18至40岁男子的信息。服役期定为20年，但通常只有十分之一的男子会被征召入伍，并且有家庭和职业豁免条款。步兵在国内服役期间不领取薪水，由土地分配维持生计；骑兵则从贵族和富裕的农民中招募。城镇居民在扩充后的海军中服役。其余民众缴纳的税款用于提供装备。这套制度打造了一支规模庞大、服役时间长的国民军队，最多可达四万人，是欧洲第一支这样的军队。<sup> 49</sup>
He began, in 1625, by overhauling the method of recruitment. A cantonal system was introduced in which the local clergy kept registers of men between the ages of eighteen and forty. Service was set at twenty years, but normally only one man in ten was called and there were family and occupational exemptions. Unpaid while on home service, foot soldiers were supported by land allotments; cavalry was recruited from the nobility and the wealthier farmers. Townspeople served in the expanded navy. Taxes levied on the rest of the population provided equipment. The system produced a substantial long-service national army, up to forty thousand men, the first such in Europe.49
或许人们对瑞典国民军的评价有些过高了。这套体系最初是为保卫本土而设计的。海外战役，尤其是国王在德国的战争，仅靠一百五十万左右的人口基数是无法支撑的，因此雇佣兵仍然占据着重要的地位。尽管古斯塔夫二世在1627年的法令中宣称“国家的最佳保卫者是其本国公民”，并将外国雇佣兵描述为“不忠、危险且昂贵”，但他甚至在远征波美拉尼亚之前就开始招募英格兰、苏格兰和德国的军团。到1631年，外国军队构成了他军队的主力，并承担了大部分战斗任务。这是一项深思熟虑的政策，目的是即使瑞典军队遭受重创，也能确保瑞典部队能够安全地保卫本土。因此，他们通常被部署在战略预备队中，负责守卫交通线。蒙特库科利观察到：“所有海港都由瑞典指挥官和驻军保护；他们既不信任芬兰人、利沃尼亚人，也不信任德国人。” 51到1632年古斯塔夫阵亡时，他麾下的12万大军中，只有十分之一是瑞典人。其余的都是外国军队，包括盟友和受雇的伙伴，例如萨克森-魏玛的伯恩哈德和其他德意志诸侯。这些外国部队大多接受过瑞典战术的训练并加以运用，这些战术在1631年的布赖滕费尔德战役中首次得到大规模检验。这场战役“以机动性和火力战胜了数量优势和长矛冲锋”，迫使几乎所有其他欧洲军队都不得不重新审视他们的作战方式。52
Perhaps too much has been made of the national army. The system was designed primarily for home defense. Campaigns abroad, above all the king's war in Germany, could not be sustained by a population base of some one and a half million, and mercenaries retained a prominent place. Although his 1627 statutes averred that the “state is best defended by its natives” and he described foreign mercenaries as “faithless, dangerous, and expensive,” Gustavus started recruiting English, Scotch, and German regiments even before sailing for Pomerania. By 1631, foreign troops constituted the bulk of his army and did most of the fighting. It was a deliberate policy so that even if the army was badly hurt, the Swedish units would be safe to defend the homeland.50 Therefore they normally were kept in strategic reserve, guarding the lines of communications. Montecuccoli observed that “all seaports are protected by Swedish commandants and garrisons; they trust neither the Finns, Livonians, or the Germans.”51 By the time Gustavus was killed in 1632, of the 120,000 men under his command, only one-tenth were Swedes. The remainder were foreign troops, including those of allies and paid associates such as Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar and other German princes. Most of the foreign units were trained in and adopted Swedish tactics, first tested on a large scale in the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631, “a victory of mobility and firepower over numbers and the push of the pike,” which forced virtually all other European armies to revise their fighting methods.52
古斯塔夫的战术体系强调诸兵种联合进攻，但由于经常需要即兴发挥，因此“没有一种战术能够被普遍接受”。<sup> 53</sup>步兵团，两个中队或八个连，是基本的行政和战术单位，作战时组成由两到三个团组成的旅。每个团约有八百人，另有九十四名火枪手执行独立任务。通常情况下，火枪和长矛兵都以六排纵深的浅阵型展开，即使在反行军中，各旅也继续推进。古斯塔夫认为长矛是一种进攻性武器，它们在最后的冲击中发挥了作用。<sup> 54</sup>在近距离，反行军中的滚动射击被密集的齐射所取代，由三排紧密排列的火枪手同时发射，“一声绵延不断的雷鸣……对凡人来说，比十声间断的齐射和几声零星的齐射更加可怕。” 55训练有素、擅长疾驰冲锋的骑兵，在火枪手的支援下，通常用于攻击敌军侧翼，而炮兵则从固定炮阵地开火。布赖滕费尔德战役后，轻型机动四磅炮的引入为步兵提供了直接火力支援。预备队，包括骑兵和步兵，则留作随时待命之用。这套体系虽然复杂，但却行之有效。即使是像古斯塔夫这样一位雄心勃勃、意志坚定、果断决策且富有创造力的伟大指挥官，也难以掌控这样的战役。尽管如此，瑞典的这种作战模式却成为了下个世纪所有指挥官的标杆。
The tactical system of Gustavus stressed offensive action by combined arms although, because of frequent improvisations, there was “no moment…when any method universally obtained.”53 Infantry regiments, two squadrons or eight companies, were the basic administrative and tactical unit, combined for combat into brigades of two or three regiments. Each regiment numbered about eight hundred men with an additional ninety-four musketeers for detached duties. Normally deployed in a shallow formation six ranks deep for both shot and pike, the brigades continued to advance even during the countermarch, with the pikes, considered an offensive weapon by Gustavus, contributing to the final impact.54 At close range the rolling fire of the countermarch was replaced by a heavy volley, delivered simultaneously by three ranks of closed-up musketeers, “one long and continuated crack of Thunder…more terrible and dreadful to mortals than ten interrupted and several ones.”55 The cavalry, trained to charge at the gallop, and supported by the commanded musketeers, usually was used against the enemy flanks, while artillery opened the attack with fire from fixed gun lines. After Breitenfeld, the introduction of a light mobile four-pound regimental piece provided direct fire support for the foot. Reserves, horse and foot, were withheld for use as needed. It was an effective, if complicated, system and even Gustavus, a great combat commander with drive, willpower, decisiveness, and originality, found it hard to control such a battle. Nevertheless, the Swedish pattern became the standard for all commanders of the next century.
新组建的瑞典军队作为战略工具的效能远不如以往。古斯塔夫二世认识到战场机动性的基础是纪律，而纪律又依赖于有效的管理，但瑞典军队的这一方面仍然摇摇欲坠。大多数瑞典部队的训练水平很高，雇佣兵团的训练水平也尚可接受，但盟军和相关部队的情况并非总是如此。至于纪律，国王于1621年颁布了一项严格的军规，并辅以军队牧师、每日祈祷和其他道德制裁措施。即便如此，早在1630年，纪律就开始瓦解。这不仅仅是因为强悍的雇佣兵占据主导地位（尽管瑞典征召兵的纪律性相对较好），更是因为军队后勤保障不足。尽管古斯塔夫二世做了周密的后勤准备，但瑞典的资源仍然无法满足在德国不断壮大的军队的需求。正如一位瑞典外交官所说：“其他国家发动战争是因为他们富有，而瑞典是因为贫穷。”<sup> 56</sup>法国和荷兰的援助也无济于事。此外，即便资金到位，物资的采购和运输依然困难重重。1631年春，瑞典军队开始劫掠新教城镇；同年夏天，古斯塔夫抱怨说，他麾下饥寒交迫的士兵正在耗尽其区域补给基地。<sup> 57</sup>尽管战斗纪律始终保持到最后，但瑞典军队和当时的其他军队一样，不得不依靠土地资源生存。由于连富饶的地区也未能幸免，军队的行动更多地受到“供养士兵和战马”的需求而非作战考量的影响，最终导致国王的“宏伟战略计划沦为纸上谈兵”。<sup> 58</sup>
The new Swedish army was much less effective as a strategic instrument. Gustavus recognized that battlefield mobility was founded upon discipline and discipline upon effective administration, but this aspect of Swedish military affairs remained shaky. Training reached a high standard in most Swedish units and was acceptable in the mercenary regiments, but this was not always the case in the allied and associated contingents. As for discipline, the king had introduced a strict code in 1621, backed up by army chaplains, daily prayers, and other moral sanctions. Even so, as early as 1630, discipline began to erode. This was not merely due to the predominance of hard-bitten mercenaries, although the Swedish conscripts remained somewhat better controlled, but to the inability to sustain the army properly. Although Gustavus had made elaborate logistic preparations, Swedish resources could not supply the growing army in Germany. As one Swedish diplomat put it, “others nations went to war because they were rich, Sweden because she was poor.”56 French and Dutch subsidies could not change this. Moreover, when funds were available, there remained the difficulties in procuring and transporting supplies. By the spring of 1631 Swedish troops looted Protestant towns, and that summer Gustavus complained that his unpaid and hungry forces were stripping his regional supply base.57 Although combat discipline was maintained to the end, the Swedish army, as any other army of that time, had to live off the land. By exhausting even rich areas, the “need to feed men and horses,” rather than operational considerations, dictated its movements, with the result that the king's “great strategic schemes were but paper schemes.”58
第四
IV
1630年夏，古斯塔夫二世在奥得河口登陆时，这场始于天主教徒与新教徒之间冲突，同时也围绕德意志帝国权威展开的三十年战争，已演变为国际战争。哈布斯堡王朝初期取得胜利后，法国、英国、丹麦以及一些较小的德意志新教诸侯组成了一个松散的联盟，以对抗帝国的复兴。然而，这个成分不明的联盟很快就被帝国军队击溃，其指挥官是军事奇才阿尔布雷希特·冯·瓦伦斯坦和指挥天主教联盟军队的杰出将领约翰·蒂利。到1627年，皇帝已重新控制了波罗的海南部沿岸的大部分地区。只有少数几个港口，尤其是施特拉尔松德，在丹麦和瑞典军队的增援下，勉强守住了阵地。即便如此，波罗的海地区可能出现的帝国霸权前景仍令国王感到不安。他向议会宣布，他前往德国不仅因为新教的命运岌岌可危，更因为出国作战远胜于在国内作战。到1629年，全面干预德国的准备工作已经展开。
When Gustavus landed at the mouth of the Oder River in the summer of 1630, the Thirty Years' War, originating both as a conflict between Catholics and Protestants but also as a conflict over the issue of imperial authority in Germany, had already become internationalized. After initial Hapsburg victories, a loose coalition of France, England, Denmark, and some lesser German Protestant princes had formed to oppose the imperial resurgence. But this ill-assorted array soon was shattered by imperial forces under Albrecht von Wallenstein, the formidable military entrepreneur, and Johann Tilly, a highly competent general commanding the forces of the Catholic League. By 1627 the emperor had regained control of most of the southern shore of the Baltic. Only a few ports, above all Stralsund, reinforced by Danish and Swedish troops, had managed to hold out. Even so, the prospect of an imperial hegemony on the Baltic disturbed the king and he told his Riksdag that he was going to Germany not only because the fate of Protestantism was in the scales, but also because it would be better to fight abroad than at home. By 1629 preparations for a full-scale intervention in Germany were under way.
战略形势看似有利。斐迪南二世皇帝认为德国的战争已基本结束，于是转而前往意大利与法国作战，解除了瓦伦斯坦的职务，只留下蒂利在北部零星驻防。尽管如此，古斯塔夫二世仍然孤注一掷。他的远征军只有一万三千人，尽管在苏格兰和丹麦的征兵代理人正在招募更多士兵，而且国王也期望能得到德意志诸侯的重要援助。但他的期望落空了。北德意志的两大新教统治者——勃兰登堡和萨克森选帝侯——决心保持中立，因此古斯塔夫二世从一开始就被迫采取一种注定会旷日持久的战略。后勤保障、与本土保持联系的需要，以及对来自丹麦和俄罗斯潜在威胁的担忧，都严重限制了他的战略。首先，后勤保障迫使他沿着河流行军，并巩固沿河的要塞；第二点迫使他在德国北部建立并守住设防基地，以便他的军队可以撤退到那里，并将大部分本土部队保留用于本土防御。59
The strategic situation appeared favorable. Believing the war in Germany as good as over, Emperor Ferdinand II turned to fight the French in Italy, dismissed Wallenstein, and left Tilly with only a few scattered garrisons in the north. Still, Gustavus took a gamble. His expeditionary force could muster but thirteen thousand, though recruiting agents in Scotland and Denmark were gathering more men and the king expected important aid from the German princes. But he was wrong in his expectations. The two major Protestant rulers in North Germany, the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, were determined to remain neutral, and so from the outset Gustavus was forced to adopt a strategy that would produce a protracted war. Logistics and the need to guard communications with the homeland, together with misgivings about potential threats from Denmark and Russia, imposed severe restrictions on his strategy. The first consideration compelled him to follow rivers and to secure the strong places along their courses; the second compelled him to establish and hold fortified base areas in northern Germany into which his army could withdraw and to retain the major part of his native troops for home defense.59
古斯塔夫二世的战役并非从施特拉尔松德（这座城市并不临河）开始，而是从更东边的奥得河口发起。他在这里找到了一个绝佳的战略位置，可以包抄蒂利在梅克伦堡和波美拉尼亚西部的驻军，并以此为据点，迫使勃兰登堡和萨克森结盟。七月初，他顺利登陆，进入了位于奥得河上游四十英里处的什切青。随后，他在1630年的剩余时间里，缓慢扩张自己的势力范围，攻占了一些小城镇，并集结军队。尽管这样做是必要的，但也适得其反。随着他控制区域的逐步扩大，他的野战军也随之分散，缓慢的推进未能促使两位选帝侯放弃谨慎的中立立场。或许古斯塔夫二世错失了一个良机。虽然他的军队规模仍然较小，但他的对手蒂利兵力同样有限，而且他还面临着易北河中游富庶且战略要地马格德堡的叛乱。如果古斯塔夫迅速进军易北河，他或许能在帝国军队集结之前迫使蒂利交战，而一场早期胜利或许能赢得新教徒的支持。然而，瑞典军队却在十月进入波美拉尼亚和梅克伦堡的冬营。
Gustavus opened his campaign not from Stralsund (the city did not lie on a river), but from further east along the mouth of the Oder. Here he found a good strategic location flanking Tilly's garrisons in Mecklenburg and western Pomerania, and from here he might be able to pressure Brandenburg and Saxony into an alliance. After an unopposed landing he entered Stettin, forty miles up the Oder, in early July and then spent the remainder of 1630 slowly expanding his base, reducing some small towns and gathering troops. Although this was necessary, it also was self-defeating. As he gradually enlarged the area under his control, he dispersed his field army, and the slow progress failed to move the two electors from their cautious neutrality. Perhaps Gustavus missed an opportunity. Though his army still was small, his opponent, Tilly, also had few forces and moreover was facing a revolt in Magdeburg, a rich and strategic city on the middle Elbe. If Gustavus had advanced swiftly to the Elbe, he might have compelled Tilly into battle before the imperial forces were concentrated, and an early victory might have rallied Protestant support. Instead, in October the Swedes went into winter quarters in Pomerania and Mecklenburg.
大约在此时，古斯塔夫构思了一个宏大的战略计划，目标是在来年发动进攻。他设想五支军队，总兵力超过十万人，沿着河流向德国中部汇合，形成大致同心圆式的推进路线。尽管一位赞赏有加的传记作家将其描述为“堪比拿破仑的宏大计划”，但它却缺乏实质内容。国王既没有合适的战略位置，也没有足够的兵力。他大大高估了自己征召新兵的能力，并且未能理解距离、通讯、补给以及军队作战范围之间的关系。60
About this time, Gustavus conceived a grand strategic design for the following year. It envisaged five armies, over 100,000 men, converging in a more or less concentric advance along the rivers into central Germany. Although one admiring biographer has described it as a plan of “Napoleonic breadth and grandeur,” it lacked substance. The king did not have the strategic position or the necessary troops. He vastly overestimated his ability to raise new forces and failed to understand the relationship between distances, communications, supply, and the operational range of his army.60
事实上，当补给短缺迫使他提前离开冬营时，他再次未能与蒂利的主力交战。相反，他或许是希望将蒂利从对马格德堡的围困中调离，在奥得河沿岸和梅克伦堡西部进行了一些小规模的军事行动。1631年3月初，蒂利率领12000人前往那里与他决战，但古斯塔夫率领18000人拒绝应战。这是他军事生涯中“最明显的失误之一”，也是克劳塞维茨所嘲讽的“试图通过战略机动赢得战争的新方法”的一个例证。古斯塔夫继续沿奥得河逆流而上，攻占了一些小镇，并于4月3日攻入奥得河畔的法兰克福，屠杀了守军并洗劫了新教徒市民。尽管古斯塔夫二世仍然谨慎行事，显然是担心撤退路线是否安全，但帝国军队于5月20日攻占了马格德堡。随后的劫掠即使在17世纪也闻名遐迩；约有25000人惨遭屠杀，除大教堂外，所有建筑都被焚毁。这对古斯塔夫二世自诩为德国新教徒保护者的地位造成了巨大打击，迫使他采取行动。他最终迫使勃兰登堡选帝侯将屈斯特林和施潘道两座关键要塞置于其指挥之下，随后，在奥得河下游地区部署了稳固的驻军后，国王向西进军至易北河。但他仍然谨慎行事，沿途构筑防御工事。下一个要塞位于哈弗尔河和易北河之间的韦尔本，这是一个坚固的据点，蒂利在7月曾试图攻占，但未能成功。然而，这并非一场大规模的战役。帝国军队正等待着来自意大利的援军，援军抵达后，他们进入萨克森，要求选帝侯约翰·乔治公开表态。这最终迫使选帝侯支持古斯塔夫。
For that matter, when lack of supplies forced him to emerge early from winter quarters, he again failed to engage Tilly's main army. Instead, hoping perhaps to maneuver Tilly away from his investment of Magdeburg, he conducted minor operations along the Oder and in western Mecklenburg. In early March 1631, Tilly moved to fight him there with twelve thousand men, but Gustavus with eighteen thousand declined to accept battle. It was “one of the most conspicuous blunders” of his military career, an example of what Clausewitz scornfully described the “new method of attempting to win a war by strategic maneuver.”61 Gustavus continued up the Oder, capturing some small towns, and stormed Frankfurt on the Oder on April 3, massacring the garrison and plundering the Protestant citizens. While Gustavus still was moving cautiously, clearly concerned about a safe line of retreat, the imperial army took Magdeburg on May 20. The sack that followed became famous even in the seventeenth century; some twenty-five thousand people were butchered and every building, except the cathedral, was burned. It was a great setback to Gustavus's claim to be the protector of the German Protestants, and forced him into action. He finally coerced the elector of Brandenburg to place two key fortresses, Kü;strin and Spandau, at his disposal and then, with the lower Oder firmly garrisoned, the king swung west to the Elbe. But he still moved cautiously, building entrenched camps as he went. The next was at Werben, between the Havel and the Elbe, a strong position which Tilly unsuccessfully tested in July. It was, however, not a major action. The Imperial forces were expecting reinforcements from Italy and when these arrived they entered Saxony and demanded that the Elector John George declare himself. This, at long last, compelled the Elector to support Gustavus.
现在，抉择近在眼前。古斯塔夫率军与萨克森人会合，1631年9月17日，双方主力在布赖滕费尔德交战。尽管萨克森部队在战斗开始后不久便溃逃，但古斯塔夫经过五个小时的激战，取得了决定性的胜利。然而，这场胜利并未被充分利用。蒂利残部撤退后，并没有立即展开追击。相反，战后一周，哈勒召开军事会议，讨论各种可行的方案。追击被否决，讨论的焦点转向了是否要翻越波西米亚山脉进攻维也纳，还是转向西南方向，进军下普法尔茨和莱茵兰地区。进攻维也纳无疑会直击帝国权力的核心，但古斯塔夫认为，随着冬季临近，且只有实力较弱的萨克森人守卫后方，这样做风险太大。因此，他选择向西南方向进军，将军队部署在物产丰富的地区，这里战略位置优越，东临巴伐利亚，西接哈布斯堡可能的援军。为了巩固北方防线，强大的瑞典分遣队被部署在马格德堡附近和德国公路网中心埃尔福特，而约翰·乔治则将一支侦察军派往波西米亚和西里西亚。62
Now a decision was near. Gustavus marched to join the Saxons and on September 17,1631, the main armies collided at Breitenfeld. Although the Saxon contingent fled soon after the battle opened, Gustavus won a signal victory in five hours of hard fighting. But the victory was not exploited. There was no immediate pursuit as the remnants of Tilly's army withdrew. Instead, one week after the battle a council of war at Halle debated available options. Pursuit was ruled out, and the discussion then turned on whether to push across the Bohemian mountains against Vienna or whether to turn southwest into the Lower Palatinate and the Rhineland. A move on Vienna would have struck at the heart of imperial power, but Gustavus considered it too risky with winter approaching and with only the weak Saxons guarding his rear. Therefore he opted to march southwest, placing his army in a rich area that also provided a good strategic position between the Bavarians to the east and possible Hapsburg reinforcements from the west. To secure his lines north, strong Swedish detachments were placed near Magdeburg and at Erfurt, the center of the German road network, while John George moved an army of observation into Bohemia and Silesia.62
一些批评家指责古斯塔夫没有充分利用胜利。蒂利的军队，而非莱茵河或维也纳，才是他真正的目标。事实上，蒂利和他的副官帕彭海姆得以在冬季招募新兵，而受到教训的皇帝则匆忙与瓦伦斯坦达成协议，在波西米亚组建新军。但古斯塔夫更感兴趣的是建立一个稳固的基地。他进军莱茵河，驱逐了哈布斯堡、巴伐利亚和西班牙的小股驻军，很快便控制了莱茵兰地区。他的推进速度很快，围攻策略也十分独特，巧妙地融合了虚张声势和快速突击，很少进行挖掘和炮击。到1631年10月下旬，他又开始为来年制定雄心勃勃的计划。这一次，他计划实施一次大规模的包围战，“将其构想为一次庞大的行动，七支军队将在从维斯瓦河到布伦纳山、从格洛高到博登湖的镰刀形战线上协同作战。”<sup> 63</sup>国王率领的主力部队将入侵巴伐利亚，沿多瑙河一路南下至维也纳，而驻扎在波西米亚和西里西亚的萨克森军队则将成为此次行动的枢纽。其他规模可观的部队将负责驻守德国西北部，还有一些部队将负责保护他与瑞典之间的交通线。除去萨克森军队，国王预计他将拥有约12万兵力，并通过大规模征兵，计划在春末将兵力扩充至17万。与此同时，他一向谨慎，打算将北至多瑙河、东至莱赫河、南至阿尔卑斯山麓之间的整个地区变成一个攻防兼备的基地，即一个“战争要塞”（sedem belli），以防他的宏伟计划遭遇挫折。64
Some critics have blamed Gustavus for not exploiting his victory. Tilly's army, rather than the Rhine or even Vienna, was the real objective. As it was, Tilly and his chief lieutenant, Pappenheim, were able to raise new forces during the winter while a chastened emperor hastily struck a deal with Wallenstein to form a new army in Bohemia. But Gustavus was interested in establishing a secure base. Marching to the Rhine, and evicting the small Hapsburg, Bavarian, and Spanish garrisons, he soon had the Rhineland under control. His progress was fast and his siege methods a remarkable mixture of bluff and rapid assault, with little sapping and bombardment. By late October 1631, he was again making an ambitious plan for the coming year. This time he planned to make a grand envelopment, “conceived as one huge operation, in which seven armies acted in coordination on a sickle-shaped front extending from the Vistula to the Brenner, from Glogau to Lake Constance.”63 The main army, led by the king, was to invade Bavaria and follow the Danube to Vienna, while the Saxons in Bohemia and Silesia were to provide the hinge of the movement. Other substantial detachments would contain imperial forces in northwestern Germany and others still would protect his lines of communication with Sweden. Discounting the Saxons, the king expected to have some 120,000 men at his disposal and by intense recruiting intended to bring this number up to 170,000 by the late spring. Meanwhile, always cautious, he intended to turn the entire region between the Danube to the north, the Lech to the east, and the alpine foothills to the south into an offensive-defensive base, a sedem belli, in case his grand design met with a reverse.64
1632年3月，国王再次出征，于4月10日攻克巴伐利亚最西端的要塞多瑙沃特，五天后又上演了一次精彩绝伦的莱希河对岸渡河作战，堪称战术杰作。然而，此役依然收效甚微。尽管蒂利身负重伤，巴伐利亚军队却只是向下游撤退。当古斯塔夫抵达坚固的要塞因戈尔施塔特城下时，他发现自己无法用惯常的战术攻克它。于是，古斯塔夫转而征服巴伐利亚和施瓦本，虽然取得了一些小规模的胜利，但却失去了战略主动权。
In March 1632, the king took the field again, storming Donauwörth, the most westerly Bavarian fortress on April 10 and five days later making a spectacular opposed river crossing of the Lech, a tactical masterpiece. But again, it decided little. Although Tilly was mortally wounded, the Bavarians merely retreated downstream and when Gustavus appeared before Ingolstadt, a strong fortress, he found that he could not take it with his usual methods. Turning aside, Gustavus made lesser conquests in Bavaria and Swabia, but lost the strategic initiative.
主要原因是他无力继续向维也纳推进。他仍然拥有相当可观的兵力，但征兵工作失败，军队过于分散，难以有效协调。布赖滕费尔德战役后，他未能击溃蒂利，使敌军得以恢复，瑞典人现在面临着新的敌人，尤其是瓦伦斯坦在摩拉维亚迅速集结的强大军队。此外，国王的最终野心也令盟友感到担忧。他在莱茵河沿岸的行动使他与自1631年1月以来一直是其主要财政支持者的法国关系紧张，而他试图控制阿尔卑斯山隘口的举动也疏远了瑞士各州。此外，勃兰登堡和萨克森选帝侯也开始动摇，因为瓦伦斯坦暗中向他们暗示，或许各方都能达成共识的主要目标是将外国入侵者赶出德国。
The main reason was that he lacked the strength to continue his advance on Vienna. He still had very substantial numbers, but his recruiting drive had failed and his armies were too dispersed for effective coordination. His failure to crush Tilly after Breitenfeld had allowed the enemy to recover and the Swedes now were facing new armies, especially the powerful force that Wallenstein was mustering with surprising speed in Moravia. Moreover, the king's ultimate ambitions alarmed his allies. His actions on the Rhine had put him at odds with France, his chief financial backer since January 1631, while his attempts to control the alpine passes had estranged the Swiss cantons. Moreover, the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony were wavering as Wallenstein quietly suggested to them that perhaps the major objective on which all sides could agree was to get the foreign invader out of Germany.
古斯塔夫试图通过摧毁巴伐利亚北部地区迫使瓦伦斯坦进入巴伐利亚，但他的对手却深谙瑞典局势的主要弱点，那就是与萨克森的联盟。如果萨克森失守，古斯塔夫与瑞典的联系将被切断，这是他绝对不能容忍的。因此，瓦伦斯坦进军波西米亚，轻易击退了萨克森人，然后以惊人的速度转向南方，在埃格尔附近与巴伐利亚军队会合。瑞典的首相奥克森斯蒂尔纳试图说服国王继续沿多瑙河推进，必要时切断与瑞典的联系。他认为，只要继续向维也纳推进，即使失去德国北部也无关紧要。然而，古斯塔夫再次拒绝冒险。65未能阻止巴伐利亚军队与瓦伦斯坦会合后，他在纽伦堡附近布设了防御工事。瓦伦斯坦随后也在附近扎营，打算守株待兔。他分析了瑞典的作战方法，意识到他们的战术体系依赖于野战机动性，而战略体系则依赖于在保持基地和通信安全的前提下进行战斗。由于无法在战场上与古斯塔夫一较高下，瓦伦斯坦打算看看谁能坚持更久。两军对峙六周后，双方都饥寒交迫，伤亡惨重。9月3日至4日，古斯塔夫被迫对瓦伦斯坦的防线发起孤注一掷的进攻，但最终以惨败告终。
While Gustavus tried to force Wallenstein into Bavaria by devastating its northern region, his adversary understood perfectly the main weakness in the Swedish situation. It lay in the Saxon alliance. If Saxony were lost, Gustavus would be cut off from his communications with Sweden and this he could not permit. Therefore, Wallenstein moved into Bohemia, easily drove the Saxons out, and then, moving with surprising speed, turned south and linked up with the Bavarians near Eger. From Sweden, Chancellor Oxenstierna tried to persuade the king to continue along the Danube, cutting loose from his communications, if necessary. It did not matter, he argued, if northern Germany was lost as long as the advance on Vienna continued. Once again, however, Gustavus would not take the risk.65 Having failed to prevent the linkup between the Bavarians and Wallenstein he took position near Nuremberg, establishing an entrenched camp. Wallenstein followed and set up a camp nearby, intending to wait out the king. He had analyzed the Swedish operational methods and realized that their tactical system depended on mobility in the field and their strategic system on fighting battles while maintaining secure bases and communications. Unable to meet Gustavus on equal terms in battle, Wallenstein intended to see who could stand the deadlock longer. After the armies faced each other for six weeks, both sides going hungry and being decimated by illness, Gustavus was compelled on September 3–4 to make a desperate assault against Wallenstein's lines and failed with heavy losses.
国王的处境变得岌岌可危。瓦伦斯坦已逼近新教势力范围，为了引诱他南下，古斯塔夫再次向维也纳进军。瓦伦斯坦置之不理，进军萨克森，攻占莱比锡，随后开始劫掠萨克森。这是一步妙棋，是迂回战术的绝佳范例。由于帝国军队比古斯塔夫更能承受萨克森叛变的风险，因此他急忙北上，二十天内行军270英里。这的确是一项了不起的壮举，但古斯塔夫只能率领约一万八千人。补给困难和驻防帝国军队的需要削弱了他的兵力。他最忠诚的德意志盟友，萨克森-魏玛公爵伯纳德率领的一支部队前来支援，但这位萨克森选帝侯已将他庞大的军队撤至托尔高，并拒绝了所有加入瑞典军队的请求。此时已是十一月，瓦伦斯坦打算解散军队过冬。古斯塔夫意识到这一点后，决定发起进攻。“现在我真心相信，”他宣称，“上帝已将他交到我手中。”<sup> 67</sup> 1632年11月6日，在萨克森盟友的孤立无援下，他在莱比锡西南部的吕岑进行了最后一场战役。这是一场殊死搏斗。尽管瓦伦斯坦在战斗中得到了增援，古斯塔夫仍然击败了天主教军队，但他本人却在率领骑兵冲锋时阵亡。
Now the king's situation became critical. Wallenstein was dangerously close to Protestant territory and in order to draw him south, Gustavus commenced another drive toward Vienna. Wallenstein ignored him, marched into Saxony, took Leipzig, and then began to despoil the country. It was a clever move, a fine example of the strategy of the indirect approach.66 Because the imperial forces could spare Vienna far better than Gustavus could risk a Saxon defection, he hurried north, covering 270 miles in twenty days. It was a remarkable feat, but Gustavus could bring only some eighteen thousand men. Difficulties of supply and the need for garrisons against imperial raids had reduced his strength. He was joined by a contingent under Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, his most loyal German ally, but the elector of Saxony had withdrawn his substantial army to Torgau and ignored all pleas to join the Swedes. By this time it was already November, and Wallenstein intended to disperse his troops for the winter. When he realized this, Gustavus decided to attack. “Now in the very truth,” he declared, “I believe that God has delivered him into my hands.”67 On November 6, 1632, unsupported by his Saxon allies, he fought his last battle at Lützen, southwest of Leipzig. It was a desperate affair. Even though Wallenstein was reinforced during the fighting, Gustavus defeated the Catholic host, but was killed charging with his cavalry.
这为他辉煌的军事生涯画上了圆满的句号，尽管古斯塔夫37岁阵亡时，他的事业已过了巅峰。国王在吕岑战役中阵亡，他控制和利用德国作为作战基地的宏伟计划也随之破灭。即便他幸存下来，并设法维持盟友的忠诚，再多一场胜利也无法结束战争。中欧的通讯状况和农业资源匮乏，使得古斯塔夫设想的那种全战区作战成为不可能。除非提前储备物资或通过船只运输，否则很少有地区能够长期维持庞大军队的驻扎，因此军队的行动更多地取决于后勤而非战略考量。此外，所有行动都十分缓慢，尤其是重型装备需要陆路而非水路运输时。即使是晚了一代人的马尔伯勒，也无法通过一次大规模战役结束战争；像布伦海姆战役或拉米利战役这样的重大胜利之后，往往紧接着就是第二年的另一场战役。尽管古斯塔夫在1630年和1631年的多军作战计划中有时试图忽略这些限制，但实际上他不得不遵守，他的战略“体现了时代的典型特征，而非超越了时代特征”。<sup> 68</sup>
It was a fitting end to a spectacular martial career, although when he fell at the age of thirty-seven, Gustavus had already passed the peak of his success. When the king died on the field at Lützen his great scheme to control and exploit Germany as a base of operations had failed. Even had he survived and managed to retain the loyalty of his allies, one more victory would not have ended the war. The state of communications and the agricultural resources of central Europe made theater-wide operations such as Gustavus had contemplated impossible. Unless supplies were laid down in advance or were transported in boats, few areas could sustain large armies over extended periods and movement was dictated more by logistic than by strategic considerations. Moreover, all moves were slow, especially if heavy equipment had to be shifted by land rather than by water. Even Marlborough, over a generation later, could not finish his wars in one major operation; great victories such as Blenheim or Ramillies were followed by another campaign the next year. And although Gustavus sometimes tried to ignore these constraints in his multi-army schemes of 1630 and 1631, in practice he had to conform and his strategy “typified rather than transcended that of the age.”68
即便如此，他仍然是三十年战争中最杰出的统帅。他以阵地战和机动战术为核心的战略，加上在合适的条件下敢于冒险作战的魄力，一直延续到法国大革命和拿破仑时代。在客观条件下，古斯塔夫取得了巨大的成就。他极大地扩展了军队的作战范围，尽管在1632年被瓦伦斯坦击败，但他从未在战场上败北。他的行政、战术和作战实践被广泛效仿，而且比同时代任何其他将领都更精通构成战斗领导力的各种要素。他是一位伟大的统帅，将自己的意志和决心灌输给军队，使之相信没有什么事情是他们做不到的。尽管他也有失误，但他仍然是一位伟大的统帅，一位实战家而非空谈家，是蒂雷纳、蒙特库科利、萨伏依的欧根亲王和马尔伯勒的“军事先驱”。拿破仑将古斯塔夫列入他那极少数的伟大将领名单，这足以证明他的卓越才能。69
Even so, he was the outstanding commander of the Thirty Years' War. His strategy of position and maneuver, backed by his willingness to risk battle under the right conditions, prevailed until the French Revolution and Napoleon. Given the objective conditions, Gustavus achieved much. He greatly expanded the operational range of his army and although outmaneuvered by Wallenstein in 1632, he was never defeated in the field. His administrative, tactical, and operational practices were widely imitated and more than any other general of his age, he mastered the various elements that comprise leadership in combat. He was a great captain of men, imposing his will and determination on the army, which he infused with the sense that there was nothing it could not do. Despite his mistakes he was a great commander, a practitioner of war rather than a theorist, the “military ancestor” of Turenne and Montecuccoli, of Eugene of Savoy and Marlborough. Napoleon recognized his merits when he included Gustavus on his very short list of great generals.69
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雷蒙多·蒙特库科利，奥地利哈布斯堡王朝陆军中将兼元帅，1664年圣哥达战役的胜利者，1673年击败蒂雷纳的机动战大师，一位能干的管理者，据称是哈布斯堡常备军的创始人之一，但他最广为人知的身份或许是军事思想家。他在圣哥达的重大胜利被1683年维也纳战役中击败土耳其人的胜利所超越，而两年后他那场略显平淡的战役也未能重现当年击败蒂雷纳的辉煌。事实上，他在行政、技术和战术方面的创新影响有限。作为一名管理者，蒙特库科利始终无法克服哈布斯堡官僚机构固有的迟缓；他的战术，如同当时所有其他西欧军队一样，都借鉴了瑞典模式。他真正的价值和对战略思想发展的伟大贡献体现在他的著作中。他是第一位尝试对战争的各个方面进行全面分析的现代理论家。蒙特库科利在其著作中体现了“法则”和“体系”概念的重要性，他寻求一种普世范式，一种整合所有源于经验的科学、军事和政治知识的体系，同时又牢牢扎根于他始终忠诚的天主教会的框架之内。他希望，如果运用得当，他的理论能够使作战行动可预测，同时减少伤亡和成本。当然，这最终被证明是不可能的，他的理论倾向于一种僵化的教条主义，与其说是创新，不如说正如一位赞赏他的历史学家所言，是“试图从一种曾经辉煌但如今已逝的战争艺术中榨取最大价值”。70即便如此，他的著作在他去世后才得以出版，而且也只是部分出版，却成为马基雅维利时代到法国大革命和拿破仑时代之间流传最广的军事论著，并得到了腓特烈、沙恩霍斯特，甚至伟大的皇帝本人的认可和引用。71
Raimondo Montecuccoli, lieutenant general and field marshal of the army of the Austrian Hapsburgs, victor at the battle of St. Gotthard in 1664, master of maneuver warfare who outgeneralled Turenne in 1673, able administrator with claims to be one of the founders of the Hapsburg standing army, is perhaps known best as a military intellectual. His major victory at St. Gotthard was surpassed by the defeat of the Turks before Vienna in 1683 and his success against Turenne was not repeated during his somewhat lackluster campaign two years later. For that matter, the impact of his innovations in administration, technology, and tactics was limited. As an administrator Montecuccoli could never overcome the innate sluggishness of the Hapsburg bureaucracy; his tactics, like those of all other western European armies of the time, were adopted from the Swedish model. His real importance and his great contribution to the development of strategic thought lie in his writings. He was the first modern theorist to attempt a comprehensive analysis of war in all of its aspects. Reflecting the prevailing importance of the ideas of “law” and “system” in his writings, Montecuccoli searched for a universal paradigm, an integration of all knowledge, scientific, military, and political, derived from experience, yet firmly within the framework of the Catholic Church of which he always remained a faithful son. If properly applied, he hoped that his axioms would make the conduct of operations predictable while reducing casualties and costs. This, of course, proved impossible, and his concepts tended toward a rigid dogmatism that was not so much innovative as, in the words of one admiring historian, “an effort to extract the utmost from a once glorious but now passing art of war.”70 Even so, his writings, published only after his death and then only in part, became the most widely read treatise on military matters between the time of Machiavelli and that of the French Revolution and Napoleon, cited with approval by Frederick, Scharnhorst, and even the great emperor himself.71
蒙特库科利的著作之所以广为流传，是因为他作为机动战的杰出实践者之一而享有盛誉。他对蒂雷纳的战役备受赞誉。即使是克劳塞维茨，这位并非机动战略拥护者的人，也承认有时机动战是必要的，并认为蒙特库科利在1673年和1675年的行动是“此类战术中最辉煌的范例”。<sup> 72</sup>在他那个时代，蒙特库科利有时被攻击为胆怯的指挥官，一个“法比乌斯式的懦夫”，但这些指责并没有动摇他的决心。他曾写道：“每个人都想成为指挥官和军事评论家”，但优秀的将领不会被反复无常的民意所左右。相反，他建议“人们应该研究独裁者法比乌斯，以了解在经历一系列失败后，必须改变作战方法，同时采取消耗战的策略。”<sup> 73 </sup> 然而，消耗战并非他唯一的战略模式。在有利条件下，他非常乐意作战。“有些人，”他写道，“自欺欺人地认为战争可以不经战斗就能进行。但征服和决断只能通过战斗和战斗来实现，否则就是一种错觉。”此外，他指的是正规的野战，而非小规模冲突。突袭、入侵、伏击等等，这些在与土耳其作战期间与他激烈争吵的匈牙利领导人非常推崇的战术，从来都不是决定性的。他警告说：“如果有人想用这种方式发动战争，那他就是在追逐影子，而忽略了本质。”但是，由于战斗具有决定性意义，“它能对诸侯国之间做出不可上诉的判决，结束战争，并使将领永垂不朽”，因此不应轻视战斗。蒙特库科利认识到战争有两个对立的极端，后来德尔布吕克将其描述为消耗战和歼灭战，他试图在他的理论中涵盖这两者。
Montecuccoli's writings were so widely accepted because of his reputation as one of the foremost practitioners of maneuver warfare. His campaigns against Turenne were greatly admired. Even Clausewitz, not a proponent of maneuver strategy, conceded that occasionally it was necessary and that Montecuccoli's actions in 1673 and 1675 were among “the most brilliant examples of this form.”72 In his own time Montecuccoli was sometimes attacked as a timid commander, a “Fabius Cunctator,” but such charges did not disturb him. “Everybody,” he once wrote, “wants to be a commander and a military critic,” but good generals would not be dictated by fickle mass opinion. On the contrary, he advised that “one ought to study the dictator Fabius to learn that after a series of defeats it is necessary to change one's fighting methods and meanwhile to adopt a strategy of attrition.”73 Attrition, however, was not his only strategic mode. Under favorable conditions, he was quite willing to fight. “There are those,” he wrote, “who deceive themselves that war can be waged without battle. But conquests and decisions can only be achieved by combat and battle and to believe otherwise is a delusion.” Moreover, he was writing about pitched field battles and not skirmishes. Raids, incursions, ambushes, and the like, much favored by the Hungarian leaders with whom he bitterly quarrelled during the campaign against the Turks, never were decisive. He warned that “if someone wants to make war in this fashion he is grasping at shadows and misses the substance.” But because battles were decisive, “handing down nonappealable judgments between princes, ending wars, and making commanders immortal,” they should not be accepted lightly.74 Montecuccoli recognized that war had two opposite poles, later described by Delbrück as attrition and annihilation, and he tried to encompass both in his theories.
蒙特库科利生于1609年，是艾米利亚-罗马涅大区摩德纳一个地位较低的贵族家庭的儿子。他十六岁时从一名普通士兵开始了他的军旅生涯，到1632年晋升为骑兵中校，1635年晋升为上校。三十年战争结束时，他已晋升为将军。他参加了大多数重大战役，在布赖滕费尔德战役中负伤被俘；六个月后获释，并在1632年的诺德林根战役中表现出色，1636年帝国军队在维特施托克战败后掩护撤退时再次立功。1639年梅尔尼克战役后的后卫战中负伤，被俘后在什切青的瑞典战俘营中度过了三年。他接受了良好的基础教育，并在战俘营期间继续学习，创作了他最早的两部作品。获释后，他被晋升为陆军元帅（Generalfeldwachtmeister），但应其本人要求，他离开帝国军队，前往摩德纳公国，担任该公国与教皇国交战中的指挥官。1643年，他重返帝国军队，并在战争末期作为一名骑兵指挥官表现出色。威斯特伐利亚和约签订后，他执行了一系列外交任务，随后指挥奥地利辅助军团在北欧战争（1656-1658）中协助波兰对抗瑞典。此后，他在匈牙利担任多个职务。1663年土耳其人发动进攻时，他指挥奥地利、帝国和法国的联军，于1664年8月1日在圣哥达战役中击败了兵力占优的敌人。一位感激不尽的皇帝任命他为中将，这是当时军队的最高军衔。 1668年，他被任命为宫廷军事委员会主席，从而同时担任奥地利最高军事职务。在1672年至1678年对法战争期间，他于1673年指挥了一场堪称典范的图雷讷战役，并于1675年再次担任野战指挥官，但这次战绩略逊一筹。此后，他因饱受批评且健康状况恶化而返回奥地利，并于1680年去世。
Montecuccoli was born in 1609, the son of a minor noble family of Modena in the Emilia Romagna. He began his military career as a simple soldier at the age of sixteen and advanced to lieutenant colonel of horse by 1632 and to colonel by 1635. By the end of the Thirty Years' War he had attained the rank of general. A participant in most major battles, he was wounded at Breitenfeld and taken prisoner; released six months later, he distinguished himself at Nördlingen in 1632 and again in covering the retreat after the imperial army suffered defeat at Wittstock in 1636. Wounded in the rearguard action following the battle of Melnik in 1639, he was captured and spent three years as a Swedish prisoner in Stettin. He had a good fundamental education and continued his studies during this period, producing two of his earliest works. Following his release he was promoted to Generalfeldwachtmeister, but at his own request, released from the imperial service to become the Modenese commander in the duchy's conflict with the papal states. He returned to the imperial army in 1643 and distinguished himself as a cavalry leader during the waning years of the war. Following the Peace of Westphalia, he carried out a series of diplomatic missions and then commanded the Austrian auxiliary corps assisting Poland against Sweden in the Nordic War (1656–1658). Thereafter, he held a number of posts in Hungary, and when the Turks assumed the offensive in 1663, took command of a combined Austrian, imperial, and French army, defeating a superior enemy in the battle of St. Gotthard on August 1,1664. A grateful emperor appointed him lieutenant general, then the highest rank in the army; in 1668 he also was named president of the Hofkriegsrat, thus holding the two highest military offices in the state. During the war against France from 1672 to 1678 he conducted a model campaign against Turenne in 1673 and again held field command in 1675, though this time with somewhat less success. Thereafter, wounded by criticism and in failing health, he returned to Austria and died in 1680.75
蒙特库科利的作战风格在其军事生涯中不断变化。1648年之前，他是一位英勇善战的骑兵指挥官，效仿巴纳和托尔斯滕松的风格。获得独立指挥权后，他变得更加谨慎。他深知奥地利常备军仅有九个步兵团和十个骑兵团，且训练有素的补充兵力十分困难，因此始终谨慎地使用兵力。他在北欧战争和匈牙利战争中都秉持着这一原则。此外，在匈牙利战争中，他还必须应对盟军指挥中固有的种种难题。而且，他与匈牙利人的关系，尤其是与像米克洛什·兹里尼这样任性妄为的贵族之间的关系，十分紧张。蒙特库科利在论述治理匈牙利的种种困难时总结道，马扎尔人“反复无常、固执己见、忘恩负义、缺乏纪律且桀骜不驯”，需要采取强硬的手段。76这使他长期受到匈牙利爱国者和十九世纪历史学家的厌恶，他们贬低他的军事才能，甚至创造了一个贬义词“ metodizmus”（诡辩术）来形容他的机动战略。77
Montecuccoli's style of war changed during his career. Up to 1648 he was a dashing cavalry combat leader, modeling himself on Baner and Torstensson. As he obtained independent command he became more cautious. Fully aware that the Austrian standing army comprised but nine regiments of foot and ten of horse, with trained replacements difficult to obtain, he husbanded his strength at all times. He did so during the Nordic War and again in Hungary where, moreover, he also had to contend with the command difficulties inherent in an allied force. Moreover, his relations with the Hungarians, especially self-willed magnates like Miklos Zrinyi, were strained. Writing about the difficulties of governing Hungary, Montecuccoli concluded that the Magyars were “unstable, stubborn, ungrateful, undisciplined, and tumultuous,” and required a firm hand.76 This earned him the lasting dislike of Hungarian patriots and nineteenth-century historians who denigrated his generalship and even coined a derogatory term, metodizmus, for his maneuver strategy.77
正是这一策略使他在对抗蒂雷纳的战役中取得了胜利。蒂雷纳常被认为是拿破仑之前最伟大的法国将领。1673年，蒂雷纳的任务是阻止帝国军队渡过莱茵河入侵阿尔萨斯，并阻止蒙特库科利北上与低地国家的荷兰军队会合。蒙特库科利的目标是加入荷兰军队。为了先发制人，蒂雷纳渡过莱茵河，进军维尔茨堡。在那里，蒙特库科利先是假装交战，然后悄然脱身，迷惑了蒂雷纳。他沿着美因河行进至莱茵河，缴获了蒂雷纳的补给，并佯装渡过莱茵河，迫使法军匆忙赶往阿尔萨斯进行防御。然而，法军却发现帝国军队已经登上驳船，顺着莱茵河而下，与荷兰军队会合。联军随后将法军逐出荷兰，而蒂雷纳仍在阿尔萨斯组织军队。相比之下，1675 年，尽管蒙特库科利采取了一些精彩的策略，蒂雷纳总体上还是占据了上风，尽管最终他在战斗中阵亡，抵消了法国的大部分优势。
But it was this strategy that brought him success in his campaign against Turenne, often considered the greatest of French generals before Napoleon. In 1673 Turenne's mission was to keep the imperial army from crossing the Rhine and invading Alsace, and to keep Montecuccoli from moving north to link up with the Dutch army in the Low Countries. Montecuccoli's objective was to join the Dutch. Seeking to preempt him, Turenne crossed the Rhine and moved to Würzburg, where Montecuccoli deceived him by first offering battle and then slipping away. He moved along the Main to the Rhine, captured Turenne's supplies, and by feinting a push across the Rhine, forced the French to hasten to the defense of Alsace, only to find that the imperial army had embarked on river barges and floated down the Rhine to join the Dutch. The combined allied armies then forced the French out of Holland, while Turenne still was trying to organize in Alsace. By contrast, in 1675, Turenne, despite some brilliant moves by Montecuccoli, generally managed to hold the upper hand, although in the end his death in battle nullified most of the French advantage.
自1675年起，蒙特库科利的处境愈发艰难。作为宫廷军事委员会主席，他不得不应对根深蒂固的宫廷官僚机构及其没完没了的文书工作。“这些人，”他写道，“花了一年时间才完成一个小时就能完成的事情。”<sup> 78</sup>他不得不不断争取资金，以维持规模不大的常备军，并引进新式武器、团级火炮，甚至实验性的燧发枪。他认为常备军是国家的唯一保障；在常备军的保护下，“艺术和商业才能繁荣发展，而如果军备衰落，就没有安全、力量和荣誉。”这对奥地利而言尤为重要，因为“欧洲其他任何地区都没有奥地利面临如此多的敌人。”<sup> 79</sup>蒙特库科利反对将常备军团作为骨干部队，在战争爆发时匆忙组建的做法。他指出，训练有素且从未解散的老兵是一支可靠的军队，而新组建的部队“不过是一群卑鄙的乌合之众，缺乏经验且纪律涣散，徒有虚名”。<sup> 80</sup>然而，他的建议并未被采纳。1679年《奈姆韦根条约》签订后，奥地利解散了军队。1683年，尽管战术上明显处于劣势，土耳其人仍能轻松击败驻扎在匈牙利的奥地利帝国军队，并进军围攻维也纳。<sup> 81</sup>围攻一座重要的设防城镇（尽管并非一座坚固的要塞）被证明是一个战略错误。土耳其人的后勤能力已接近极限，最终无力攻克维也纳，维也纳最终坚守到国际联军的援军到来。82在围城期间，正规军是防御的中坚力量，也是正规军在1683年后领导了奥地利将土耳其人驱逐出匈牙利的行动。蒙特库科利的判断是正确的，但尽管他竭尽全力，哈布斯堡王朝的常备军规模并没有显著扩大。他的主要遗产在于他为继任者——洛林的弗朗西斯、施塔伦贝格的吕迪格、巴登的路易，或许还有萨伏依的欧根亲王——树立的榜样，尤其体现在他的著作中。
From 1675 on, Montecuccoli's position became more difficult. As president of the Hofkriegsrat he had to deal with an entrenched court bureaucracy and its endless paper shuffling. “It took these men,” he wrote, “a year for what should and could have been done in one hour.”78 He continually was compelled to fight for funds to maintain the small permanent military establishment and to introduce new weapons, regimental guns, and even experimental flintlock muskets. A standing army he considered the only guarantor of the state; under its protection “arts and commerce flourished, while if arms decayed, there is no security, no strength, no honor.” And this was particularly important for Austria because “no other part of Europe faces as many enemies.”79 Montecuccoli opposed the practice of maintaining the standing regiments as cadre formations, hastily completed when hostilities opened. Veteran troops, “trained and never disbanded,” he noted, constituted a reliable instrument, whereas freshly raised units were “nothing but a despicable rabble, inexperienced and indisciplined, an army in name only.”80 His recommendations were not heeded. After the Treaty of Nijmwegen in 1679, the Austrians disbanded their forces and in 1683, despite their clear tactical inferiority, the Turks were able to brush aside the weak imperial army in Hungary and advance to besiege Vienna.81 Laying siege to a major fortified town, albeit not a great fortress, proved to be a strategic mistake. Operating at the extreme end of their logistic capability, the Turks were too weak to take the town, and in the end Vienna managed to hold out until relieved by an international force.82 During the siege, the regulars had provided the backbone of the defense, and it was regulars who spearheaded the Austrian drive to expel the Turks from Hungary after 1683. Montecuccoli had been right, but despite his best efforts, the permanent military establishment of the Hapsburgs did not appreciably increase. His major legacy was in the example he set for his successors, Francis of Lorraine, Rüdiger of Starhemberg, Louis of Baden, and perhaps Eugene of Savoy, and above all in his writings.
六年级
VI
蒙特库科利的文学创作跨越三十年，可分为三个主要时期：第一时期为1640年至1642年，第二时期为1649年至1654年，第三时期为1665年至1670年。在第一时期，他创作了《论战争》（ Sulle battaglie）和《战争论》（ Trattato della guerra）。在第二时期，他完成了《军事艺术纲要》（Compendium Dell'arte militare），该书论述了数学、后勤、组织和防御工事，并撰写了《论战争》的第二个版本。他最著名的著作《论匈牙利境内的土耳其战争》（ Delia guerra col Turco in Ungheria），更广为人知的标题是《战争艺术格言集》（ Aforismi dell'arte bellica），其中包含了他为未来对抗土耳其人的战役所构思的理论，完成于1670年。尽管蒙特库科利的著作似乎以手稿的形式在维也纳的高级政治和军事阶层中流传，但他生前并未出版任何作品。然而，在18世纪初，《论匈牙利境内的土耳其战争》——有时还附有他其他著作的节选——以七个意大利语版本、两个拉丁语版本、两个西班牙语版本、六个法语版本、一个俄语版本和两个德语版本出版，确立了他作为军事理论家的声誉。<sup> 83</sup>
Montecuccoli's literary work spanned thirty years and can be divided into three main periods: the first from 1640 to 1642., the second from 1649 to 1654, and the last from 1665 to 1670. During the first period he wrote the Sulle battaglie (On battle), and the Trattato della guerra (Treatise on war). During the second, he completed the compendium Dell'arte militare (On the art of war), devoted to mathematics, logistics, organization, and fortification, and produced a second version of Sulle battaglie. His most famous work, Delia guerra col Turco in Ungberia (On war against the Turks in Hungary), better known under the title Aforismi dell'arte bellica (Aphorism on the art of war), containing his ideas for a future campaign against that enemy, was finished in 1670. Although Montecuccoli's writings appear to have circulated in manuscript among the upper political and military echelons in Vienna, nothing was published in his lifetime. During the early eighteenth century, however, the Delia guerra col Turco in Ungheria, sometimes augmented with excerpts from his other works, appeared in seven Italian, two Latin, two Spanish, six French, one Russian, and two German editions, establishing his reputation as a military theorist.83
蒙特库科利采用的是归纳法。他在《战争论》的序言中宣称：“我非常乐于遵循利普修斯的方法”，并且“仔细研读了古代主要历史学家以及当代优秀作家的著作。此外，我还补充了十五年不间断服役经验中的例证。” 他没有列出作者名单，但其脚注详尽的著作《匈牙利土耳其战争史》表明，他的资料来源包括十五位古代作家、五位中世纪晚期和文艺复兴时期作家，以及二十二位同时代或相近时期的作家。古代作家包括希腊人和罗马人，如埃涅阿斯·塔克提库斯、希罗多德、修昔底德和色诺芬，以及凯撒、埃利安、弗龙提努斯、波利比乌斯和维吉提乌斯。中世纪作家如科米内斯和弗鲁瓦萨尔仅提供了一些历史细节，但马基雅维利的著作显然影响了他对战争政治方面的思考。当然，现代作家和事例经常被引用，但蒙特库科利从一开始就竭力宣称，他比前人更加务实和全面。他在《战争论》（Trattato della guerra ）中写道：“许多古代和现代的学者都著述过战争。然而，大多数人并未超越理论的局限。尽管有些人，如巴斯塔、梅尔齐、罗昂、拉努埃等人，将实践与思辨相结合，但他们仅仅涉猎了浩瀚领域的一部分，或者局限于泛泛而谈，而没有深入研究具体行动的细节。而对细节的了解才是优秀指挥官的必备素质。毕竟，如果不了解整体的组成部分，就不可能理解整体。”<sup> 84</sup>他始终坚持这一方法，同时，他的所有著作都保持着惊人的一致性，因此可以将其视为一个整体。
Montecuccoli's approach was inductive. “I have,” he declared in the preface to the Trattato della guerra, “found much pleasure in following the methods of Lipsius” and “have carefully read the major ancient historians as well as the best of modern authors. To these I have added examples derived from my experience of fifteen years of unbroken service.” No listing of authors was provided, but the carefully footnoted Delia guerra col Turco in Ungheria indicates that his sources included fifteen ancient, five late-medieval and Renaissance, and twenty-two contemporary or near-contemporary authors. The ancients included both Greeks and Romans, Aeneas Tacticus, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, as well as Caesar, Aelian, Frontinus, Polybius, and Vegetius. Medieval writers like Commines and Froissart contributed only some historical detail, but Machiavelli's writings clearly influenced his thinking on the political side of war. Naturally, modern authors and examples are cited frequently, but from the outset, Montecuccoli was at pains to claim that he was more practical and comprehensive than his predecessors. “Many ancients and moderns,” he wrote in the Trattato della guerra, “have written about war. Most, however, have not transcended the limits of theory. Although some, like Basta, Melzi, Rohan, La Noue, and others, have combined practice with speculation, they have cultivated but part of a very large field or have restricted themselves to generalities without immersing themselves in details of the specific acts. Knowledge of the latter is what makes an accomplished commander. After all, it is impossible to understand the whole, if one does not understand its constituent parts.”84 He maintained this approach throughout, and at the same time was remarkably consistent in all of his writing so that they can be considered as one body.
他对世界、政治和战争的看法是现实的。他承认战争是极大的罪恶，但它也是自然秩序的一部分：“哲学家们或许会争论自然界是否存在永久的战争状态，但政治家们不会怀疑，强大的竞争国家之间不可能存在真正的和平；要么镇压，要么被镇压；要么杀戮，要么灭亡。”<sup> 85</sup>然而，冲突也有不同的层次。在《战争论》中，他已经区分了对外战争和内战、侵略战争和防御战争，以及通过间接手段进行的敌对行动。他警告说，一个国家可能会被颠覆，并建议社会政治解决方案优于军事行动。“如果一位君主不是暴君，他就不会受到叛国和阴谋的威胁。”蒙特库科利的表述似乎预示了克劳塞维茨的观点，他将战争定义为“对外国君主或人民使用武力或武器”，将战争艺术定义为“善战取胜的能力”。他认为战争需要事先准备，并重复了詹-雅各布·特里武尔齐奥早先对法国国王路易十二所说的话，宣称“金钱、金钱、还是金钱”是“战争的命脉”。他认为，指挥官的选拔应基于其职位和资历，包括鼓舞人心的领导才能和迅速决策的能力。由于战争关乎国家的生死存亡，他敦促“君主和共和国应给予指挥官必要的自主权，使其能够迅速行动并抓住机遇”。<sup> 86</sup>
His view of the world, politics, and war was realistic. War, he conceded, was a great evil, but it was part of the natural order: “Philosophers may debate whether a permanent state of war exists in nature, but statesmen cannot doubt that there can be no real peace between powerful competing states; one must suppress or be suppressed, one must either kill or perish.”85 There were, however, different levels of conflict. In the Trattato della guerra, he already differentiated between foreign and civil wars, aggressive or defensive wars, and hostilities conducted by indirect means. A state, he warned, could be subverted, and he advised that sociopolitical solutions were preferable to military action. “If a prince is not a tyrant, he is safe from treason and conspiracies.” And in a formulation that may seem to foreshadow Clausewitz, Montecuccoli defined war as “the use of force or arms against a foreign prince or people” and the art of war as the “ability to fight well and to win,” requiring advance preparation and, repeating an earlier statement made by Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio to Louis XII of France, he declared that “money, money, and again money” was the “very nerve of war.” Commanders should be selected on the basis of their position as well as their qualifications, which should include inspiring leadership and the ability to make rapid decisions. Because war was a matter of life or death for the state, he urged that “princes and republics should give their commanders the necessary latitude to act rapidly and to exploit opportunities.”86
蒙特库科利最常被引用的论述出现在《匈牙利土耳其战争》一书中，书中以格言的形式重申了他早期的观点。他认为，战争是“敌对双方竭尽所能互相伤害的活动；战争的目标是胜利”。无论战争的性质和规模如何，胜利都取决于准备、计划和行动。准备工作包括人力、物力和财力。计划则取决于敌我双方的实力比、战区以及总体目标。在任何情况下，行动都必须秘密、迅速且果断地进行。蒙特库科利详细阐述了他的作战准则，他称之为“事物秩序”，这些准则后来被弗里德里希、克劳塞维茨和毛奇等人所采纳。在采取行动之前，他建议“应该仔细权衡利弊，然后迅速执行”。即便如此，蒙特库科利也对其追求高度可预测性的目标做出了修正，他指出，所有因素都不可能事先计算，有些事情“应该听天由命”，因为“凡事忧虑者一事无成，忧虑过少者自欺欺人”。<sup> 88</sup>蒙特库科利理想的统帅应具备尚武精神、身体健康、身强体壮。他应拥有高尚的道德品质、审慎的处事之道，尤其要具备“魄力”，这种品质涵盖勇气、坚韧、精力和决心，类似于马基雅维利所要求的德行（virtu）和利普修斯所赞扬的坚毅（constantia） 。
Montecuccoli's most often quoted statements appear in the Guerra col Turco in Ungheria where, in the form of aphorisms, they repeat earlier views. War, he held, is an “activity in which the adversaries try to inflict damage on each other by all possible means; the objective of war is victory.” Whatever the nature and level of war, victory will depend on preparation, plans, and operations. Preparations included manpower, matériel, and finances. Planning depended on the strength ratios between opposing forces, the theater of war, and the overall objectives. Under all circumstances, operations were to be conducted with secrecy, dispatch, and resolution.87 Montecuccoli elaborated his operational maxims, the “order of things,” as he called them, in formulations later taken up by Frederick, Clausewitz, and Moltke. Before entering into an action, he advised that “one should weigh matters carefully and then execute them rapidly.” Even so, a modification from his attempt to achieve a high degree of predictability, he noted that it was impossible to calculate all factors in advance and some matters “should be left to fortune,” because “he who worries about everything achieves nothing; he who worries about too little deceives himself.”88 Montecuccoli's ideal commander was warlike, in good health, and of martial stature. He should possess moral strength, prudence, and above all have “force,” a quality embracing courage, fortitude, energy, and determination, similar to the virtu demanded by Machiavelli and the constantia praised by Lipsius.
蒙特库科利并未明确区分战略、作战和战术，他认为三者密不可分。他的基本原则始终是保留预备队，因为“最终谁拥有更多完整的兵力，谁就能赢得战斗”。在他的作战部署中，他采用了古斯塔夫二世发展出的诸兵种合成体系，但主张只有在积极防御削弱敌人之后，才将主力用于决定性的反击，并坚持立即追击。“必须追捕并歼灭溃败的残余部队。”<sup> 89</sup>他意识到军队规模受限于一人能够有效指挥的兵力以及后勤保障体系的承载能力。尽管军队规模迅速增长——路易十四在1672年就曾部署10万人对抗荷兰——蒙特库科利仍然建议野战军的规模上限为5万人。90关于理想军队的构成，尤其是骑兵与步兵的比例，他的观点发生了转变，骑兵力量稳步增强。他效仿瑞典模式，主张骑兵冲锋陷阵，同时通过改进滑膛枪、配备轻型团级火炮以及增加长矛兵的比例来提升步兵的作战能力。91当然，这些观点并非独树一帜，基本上反映了当时西欧和中欧的军事思想。
Montecuccoli did not clearly distinguish between strategy, operations, and tactics, all of which he regarded as an indivisible entity. His basic principle was always to retain a reserve because “whoever at the end disposes of more intact forces wins the battle.” In his battle dispositions, he adopted the system of combined arms developed by Gustavus, but proposed to use the main strength only for a decisive counterattack after an active defense had weakened the enemy, and insisted on an immediate pursuit. “The remnants of the routed army must be hunted and annihilated.”89 He realized that the size of an army was limited by what one man could conveniently command and what the logistic system could sustain. Although the size of armies was increasing rapidly—Louis XIV deployed 100,000 men against the Dutch in 1672—Montecuccoli recommended an upper limit of 50,000 for a field army.90 In regard to the composition of the ideal army, primarily the proportion of horse to foot, his views changed, showing a steady increase in cavalry strength. Following the Swedish model, he favored cavalry charging home, while the infantry's combat potential was to be raised with improved muskets, light regimental guns, and an increased proportion of pikes.91 Such ideas, of course, were hardly unique and basically reflected the contemporary state of military thought in western and central Europe.
蒙特库科利作为一名野战指挥官和军事管理者而声名鹊起，尽管有人认为他过于谨慎小心，或许是因为他深知自己所掌握的资源有限，因此未能跻身真正伟大的将领之列。即便如此，他的统帅才能仍然受到福拉尔、萨克斯公爵和腓特烈大帝的赏识；拿破仑更是将他1673年的战役视为机动战略的杰作。然而，蒙特库科利最重要的贡献在于军事思想领域。尽管他的思想常常以说教的形式呈现，但他并非主要是一位战略家。他认为指挥的艺术只能通过实践来掌握，“在战场上，在汗水和严寒中”。蒙特库科利是一位虔诚的天主教徒，但他同时也是一位理性主义者，试图通过经验探究来发现永恒不变的原则，他认为，如果运用得当，这些原则将使战争成为一项科学的进程，并带来可预测的结果。他在《军事艺术》的引言中写道：“我试图在这个简洁的框架内涵盖对君主至关重要的唯一科学的广阔领域，并竭尽全力去发现所有科学赖以存在的基本规则……而且，在考察了整个世界历史之后，我敢说，我没有发现任何一项值得注意的军事壮举不符合这些规则。”<sup> 94</sup>此外，他的研究不仅限于战争艺术的纯粹机械层面，还包括道德、心理、社会和经济方面的考量。
Montecuccoli made his mark as a field commander and a military administrator, although it might be argued that he was too cautious and prudent, perhaps because he was only too well aware of the limited resources at his disposal, to rank among the truly great. Even so, his generalship was well regarded by Folard, de Saxe, and Frederick the Great; Napoleon considered his 1673 campaign a masterpiece of maneuver strategy.92 Montecuccoli's most important contribution, however, was in the realm of military thought. Although his ideas often were presented in didactic form, he was not primarily a teacher of strategy. He held that the art of command could only be acquired by practice, “under arms, in the field, sweating and freezing.”93 A devout and observant Catholic, Montecuccoli nonetheless was a rationalist trying to discover by empirical inquiry constant principles, which, if correctly applied, would make war a scientific progress with predictable results. In his introduction to Dell'arte militare, he wrote that “I have attempted within this concise framework, to encompass the vast areas of the only science vital for the monarch, and I have done my utmost to discover basic rules on which every science is based…and, having considered the entire range of world history, I dare to say that I have not found a single notable military exploit which would not fit in with these rules.”94 His investigation, moreover, was not limited to purely mechanistic aspects of the art of war, but included moral, psychological, social, and economic considerations.
蒙特库科利的理论方法兼具科学性和人文性，此外，他还将一位老兵的经验和简洁的文风融入到自己的著作中。尽管他最终未能将战争定义为一门科学，而是将其称为“战争的艺术”，但这仍然是一项意义重大的思想成就。一位对蒙特库科利的指挥能力持强烈批评态度的德国历史学家称他“凌驾于十七世纪下半叶所有军事思想家之上”，另一位历史学家则断言“如果说博丹代表了政治科学，培根代表了哲学，那么蒙特库科利就代表了战争科学”。<sup> 95</sup>或许这种说法有些夸张。然而，蒙特库科利既是一位杰出的战争实践者，也是一位富有想象力的战争理论家。他将自己的经验与马基雅维利和利普修斯的思想（经莫里斯改编，并由古斯塔夫·阿道夫进一步发展）融合在一起，构建了一个完整的理论体系。他的著作综合了军事革命的各个不同部分，并将其主要概念传递到下一个世纪，从而在现代战略的演变中形成了重要的一环。
Montecuccoli's approach then was both scientific and humanistic, with the additional advantage that he brought to his writings the experience and the concise style of a veteran soldier. If his attempt to define and delineate war as a scientific enterprise in the end was futile, and he himself chose to designate it as the “art of war,” it nonetheless was a major intellectual undertaking. One German historian, highly critical of Montecuccoli as a commander, described him as “towering above all military thinkers of the second half of the seventeenth century,” and another asserted that “what Bodin represented for the science of politics or Bacon for philosophy, Montecuccoli represented for the science of war.”95 Perhaps this is claiming too much. Still, Montecuccoli was both an impressive practitioner and an imaginative theorist of war. He integrated his own experience with the ideas of Machiavelli and Lipsius, as adapted by Maurice and further developed by Gustavus Adolphus, into a comprehensive intellectual structure. By synthesizing the many different parts of the military revolution and transmitting its major concepts to the next century, his writings form a significant link in the evolution of modern strategy.
1 Michael Howard，《欧洲历史上的战争》（伦敦，1976 年），第 19-20 页；Geoffrey Parker，“‘军事革命，1560-1600 年’——一个神话？”载于《西班牙和荷兰：十项研究》（伦敦，1979 年），第 90、92 页。另见 Charles Oman，《十六世纪战争艺术史》（伦敦，1937 年），第 6 页。
1 Michael Howard, War in European History (London, 1976), 19–20; Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution, 1560–1600'—A Myth?” in Spain and the Netherlands: Ten Studies (London, 1979), 90, 92. Cf. Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1937), 6.
2 Michael Roberts，《军事革命，1560–1600》（贝尔法斯特，1956 年），略作修改后重印于他的《瑞典历史论文集》（明尼阿波利斯，1967 年），第 195–225 页。
2 Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560–1600 (Belfast, 1956) reprinted with slight changes in his Essays in Swedish History (Minneapolis, 1967), 195–225.
3 Roberts，《瑞典历史论文集》，59-60；JR Hale，“军队、海军和战争艺术”，载《新剑桥现代史》（剑桥，1968 年），第 3 卷，第 2.00-201 页。
3 Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, 59–60; J. R. Hale, “Armies, Navies, and the Art of War,” in The New Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge, 1968), 3:2.00–201.
4 André Corvisier，《欧洲的军队与社会 1494–1789》（布卢明顿，1979 年），2740。
4 André Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe 1494–1789 (Bloomington, 1979), 2740.
5 Geoffrey Parker，“1572-1607 年西班牙佛兰德斯军队的叛变和不满”，载《西班牙和荷兰》，第 106-21 页。
5 Geoffrey Parker, “Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1572–1607,” in Spain and the Netherlands, 106–21.
6黑尔，“陆军、海军和战争艺术”，181-82； Helmut Schmtter，《Volk und Landesdefenston》（东柏林，1977 年），passim； Eugen v. Frauenholz， Lazarus von Schwendi（汉堡，1939 年），16-21。
6 Hale, “Armies, Navies, and the Art of War,” 181–82; Helmut Schmtter, Volk und Landesdefenston (E. Berlin, 1977), passim; Eugen v. Frauenholz, Lazarus von Schwendi (Hamburg, 1939), 16–21.
7 Gerhard Oestreich，“Justus Lipsius als Theoretiker des neuzeitlichen Machtstates”， Historische Zeitschrift 181 (1956)，66-67； David C. Rapoport，“军事和民间社会：政治理论中传统主题的当代意义”，政治研究13 (1964)，178-83；和 G. Martin，“Moritz von Oramen”，载于Grosse Soldaten der europäischen Geschichte，编辑。沃尔夫冈诉格鲁特案（法兰克福，1961 年），37-62。
7 Gerhard Oestreich, “Justus Lipsius als Theoretiker des neuzeitlichen Machtstaates,” Historische Zeitschrift 181 (1956), 66–67; David C. Rapoport, “Military and Civil Societies: The Contemporary Significance of a Traditional Subject in Political Theory,” Political Studies 13 (1964), 178–83; and G. Martin, “Moritz von Oramen,” in Grosse Soldaten der europäischen Geschichte, ed. Wolfgang v. Groote (Frankfurt a.M., 1961), 37–62.
8 出自《马克斯·韦伯：社会学论文集》，汉斯·H·格斯和C·赖特·米尔斯译注（纽约，1946 年），第 256-257 页。
8 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans, and ed. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1946), 256–57.
9 Werner Hahlweg，“Prinz Moritz von Oranien 下的 niederländischen Kriegswesens 改革的问题和问题”， Bijdragen en mededeelingen betreffende de geschiedenes der Nederlande 86 (1971), 164, 176。
9 Werner Hahlweg, “Aspekte and Probleme der Reform des niederländischen Kriegswesens unter Prinz Moritz von Oranien,” Bijdragen en mededeelingen betreffende de geschiedenes der Nederlande 86 (1971), 164, 176.
10 Gunther E. Rothenberg，“阿文丁努斯和帝国对抗土耳其人的防御”，《文艺复兴研究》 10 (1961)，60-67；汉斯·施尼特 (Hans Schnitter)，“约翰·雅各比·冯·瓦尔豪森：Ein fortschrittlicher deutscher Militärtheoretiker des 17. Jahrhunderts”， Militärgeschichte 6 (1980)，709-12；汉斯·赫尔弗里茨， Geschichte der preussischen Heeresverwaltung（柏林，1938 年），41-42。
10 Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Aventinus and the Defense of the Empire against the Turks,” Studies in the Renaissance 10 (1961), 60–67; Hans Schnitter, “Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen: Ein fortschrittlicher deutscher Militärtheoretiker des 17. Jahrhunderts,” Militärgeschichte 6 (1980), 709–12; Hans Helfritz, Geschichte der preussischen Heeresverwaltung (Berlin, 1938), 41–42.
11鲁道夫·施塔德尔曼，《沙恩霍斯特：天命与精神世界》（威斯巴登，1952 年），92-95。
11 Rudolf Stadelmann, Scharnhorst: Schicksal und geistige Welt (Wiesbaden, 1952), 92–95.
12 Jan W. Wijn，《 Het krijgswezen in den tijd van Prins Mounts》（乌得勒支，1934 年），538–41；
12 Jan W. Wijn, Het krijgswezen in den tijd van Prins Mounts (Utrecht, 1934), 538–41;
13 Jan W. Wijn，“Johann der Mittlere von Nassau-Siegen”，载于Klassiker der Kriegskunst，编辑。沃纳·哈尔韦格（达姆施塔特，1960），119-24。
13 Jan W. Wijn, “Johann der Mittlere von Nassau-Siegen,” in Klassiker der Kriegskunst, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Darmstadt, 1960), 119–24.
14克里斯托弗·达菲 (Christopher Duffy)，《攻城战》（伦敦，1979 年），81–82；韦恩， Krijgswezen，28-32、376-88。
14 Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare (London, 1979), 81–82; Wijn, Krijgswezen, 28–32, 376–88.
15 Geoffrey Parker，《荷兰起义》（伊萨卡，1977 年），第 241-243 页。
15 Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt (Ithaca, 1977), 241–43.
16 Wijn, Krtjgswezen , 533.
16 Wijn, Krtjgswezen, 533.
17 Parker，《荷兰起义》，第 234 页。
17 Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 234.
18 Geyl，《荷兰的叛乱》，188。
18 Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 188.
19 Parker，《荷兰起义》，第 208-24 页；Charles Wilson，《伊丽莎白女王与荷兰起义》（伯克利，1970 年），全文。
19 Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 208–24; Charles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands (Berkeley, 1970), passim.
20 Duffy，《围攻战》，58-61。
20 Duffy, Siege Warfare, 58–61.
21 Geoffrey Parker，《佛兰德斯军队和西班牙之路，1567–1659》（剑桥，1972 年），第 80–101 页，第 188–202 页。
21 Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659 (Cambridge, 1972), 80–101, 188–202.
22 Geyl，《荷兰的叛乱》，第 233 页。
22 Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 233.
23 Maury D. Feld，“中产阶级社会与军事专业化的兴起：1589-1609 年的荷兰军队”，《武装部队与社会》 1 (1975)，428-29，437-38。标准处理仍然是 Werner Hahlweg，《荷兰军队改革与古代》（柏林，1941 年），20-2.3，191-96。
23 Maury D. Feld, “Middle-Class Society and the Rise of Military Professionalism: The Dutch Army 1589–1609,” Armed Forces and Society 1 (1975), 428–29, 437–38. The standard treatment remains Werner Hahlweg, Die Heeresreform der Oranier und die Antike (Berlin, 1941), 20–2.3, 191–96.
24 Johan H. Huizinga，《十七世纪的荷兰文明》（伦敦，1968 年），34-35；盖尔，《荷兰的起义》，135；韦恩， Krijgswezen，9-10、19-21。
24 Johan H. Huizinga, Dutch Civilization in the Seventeenth Century (London, 1968), 34–35; Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 135; Wijn, Krijgswezen, 9–10, 19–21.
25韦恩，克里格斯韦森，40–43、62–64； FJG 十 Raa 和 François de Bas， Het Staatsche Leger 1568–1795（布雷达，1913 年），2:35。
25 Wijn, Krijgswezen, 40–43, 62–64; F. J. G. ten Raa and François de Bas, Het Staatsche Leger 1568–1795 (Breda, 1913), 2:35.
26 Hahlweg， Heeresreform，31、39、48、255-64；韦恩， Krijgswezen，480-81。
26 Hahlweg, Heeresreform, 31, 39, 48, 255–64; Wijn, Krijgswezen, 480–81.
27 William H. McNeill，《权力的追求》（芝加哥，1982 年），第 128-33 页。
27 William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago, 1982), 128–33.
28尤斯图斯·利普修斯，《政治学或公民学六书》，威廉·琼斯译（伦敦，1594 年），第 5 卷，第 13 页。
28 Justus Lipsius, Six Bookes of Polittckes or Civil Doctrine, trans. William Jones (London, 1594), bk. 5, p. 13.
29 Hahlweg，《军事改革》，61–68，70–78 。詹姆斯·特纳在《帕拉斯·阿玛特：古代希腊、罗马和现代战争艺术的军事论文》（伦敦，1683 年；纽约，1968 年重印）第 9–11 页中描述了合唱
29 Hahlweg, Heeresreform, 61–68, 70–78. The choric countermarch is described by James Turner, Pallas Armate: Military Essayes of the Ancient Grecian, Roman, and Modern Art of War (London, 1683; repr. New York, 1968), 9–11.
30十拉阿和德巴斯，国家法律，2:332–35；韦恩， Krtjgswezen，32-33。
30 Ten Raa and de Bas, Staatsche Leger, 2:332–35; Wijn, Krtjgswezen, 32–33.
31 Wijn，《战争》，第32-33页。职业军官概念的引入有时被认为是瓦伦斯坦提出的。参见弗朗西斯·沃森，《瓦伦斯坦：土星下的士兵》（伦敦，1938年），第161页。
31 Wijn, Krijgswesen, 32–33. The introduction of the concept of professional officership is sometimes ascribed to Wallenstein. See Francis Watson, Wallenstein: Soldier under Saturn (London, 1938), 161.
32 Roberts，《瑞典历史论文集》，61-62。
32 Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, 61–62.
33 Oman，《十六世纪战争艺术史》，578-83，587-603。
33 Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, 578–83, 587–603.
34韦恩， Krijgswezen，319–28、376–88。
34 Wijn, Krijgswezen, 319–28, 376–88.
35引自 Rapoport，“军事与公民社会”，186。
35 Cited in Rapoport, “Military and Civil Societies,” 186.
36约翰·L·莫特利，《从沉默的威廉去世到十二年休战的荷兰联合王国历史——1609 年》（纽约，1886 年），第 3 卷，第 74 页。
36 John L. Motley, History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Years' Truce—1609 (New York, 1886), 3:74.
37 Geyl，《荷兰的叛乱》，220。
37 Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 220.
38阿曼战争行动概述，《十六世纪战争艺术史》，569-603。
38 Summary of operations in Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, 569–603.
39 Martin Van Creveld，《战争补给》（剑桥，1977 年），第 11-12 页。
39 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War (Cambridge, 1977), 11–12.
40 Duffy，《围城战》，85-88；Parker，《荷兰起义》，237-39。
40 Duffy, Siege Warfare, 85–88; Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 237–39.
41特纳， Pallas Armate，360。
41 Turner, Pallas Armate, 360.
42 Michael Roberts，《古斯塔夫·阿道夫》，2 卷（伦敦，1953-58 年），第 2 卷，第 188-89 页。
42 Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, 2 vols. (London, 1953–58), 2:188–89.
43西奥多·A·道奇，《古斯塔夫·阿道夫》（波士顿和纽约，1895 年），第 77 页。
43 Theodore A. Dodge, Gustavus Adolphus (Boston and New York, 1895), 77.
44 Roberts, Gustavus , 2:297。
44 Roberts, Gustavus, 2:297.
45卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨 (Carl von Clausewitz)，《战略部署》，《Hinterlassene Werke》，10 卷。 （柏林，1832–37），9:29, 47。
45 Carl von Clausewitz, Strategische Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzüge, in Hinterlassene Werke, 10 vols. (Berlin, 1832–37), 9:29, 47.
46 Roberts, Gustavus , 1:33。
46 Roberts, Gustavus, 1:33.
47同上，2:191–99。
47 Ibid., 2:191–99.
48道奇，古斯塔夫·阿道夫，61-62，141-42。
48 Dodge, Gustavus Adolphus, 61–62, 141–42.
49 Roberts，《瑞典历史论文集》，64-65。
49 Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, 64–65.
50古斯塔夫·罗伯茨，2：205-206；西奥多·洛伦岑，《Die schwedische Armee im Dreissigjährtgen Kriege》（莱比锡，1894 年），8-9。
50 Roberts, Gustavus, 2:205–206; Theodore Lorentzen, Die schwedische Armee im Dreissigjährtgen Kriege (Leipzig, 1894), 8–9.
51 “Relation ueber die Art der Kriegsfuehrung der Schweden”， Ausgewählte Schriften des Raimund Fürsten Montecuccoli，4 卷，编辑。 A. Veltzé（维也纳和莱比锡，1899-1900），2:9。
51 “Relation ueber die Art der Kriegsfuehrung der Schweden,” Ausgewählte Schriften des Raimund Fürsten Montecuccoli, 4 vols., ed. A. Veltzé (Vienna and Leipzig, 1899–1900), 2:9.
52 JFC Fuller，《决定性战役》（纽约，1940 年），第 340 页。
52 J. F. C. Fuller, Decisive Battles (New York, 1940), 340.
53道奇，古斯塔夫·阿道夫，51岁。
53 Dodge, Gustavus Adolphus, 51.
54 Roberts, Gustavus , 2:258–60。
54 Roberts, Gustavus, 2:258–60.
55特纳，帕拉斯·阿玛特，237。
55 Turner, Pallas Armate, 237.
56洛伦岑，瑞士陆军，3。
56 Lorentzen, Schwedische Armee, 3.
57同上，2.3–24；罗伯茨，《古斯塔夫》，2:204–205。
57 Ibid., 2.3–24; Roberts, Gustavus, 2:204–205.
58 Van Creveld，补给战争，16-17。
58 Van Creveld, Supplying War, 16–17.
59 Roberts, Gustavus , 2:26。
59 Roberts, Gustavus, 2:26.
60同上，450、470-72；道奇，《古斯塔夫·阿道夫》，177-78。
60 Ibid., 450, 470–72,; Dodge, Gustavus Adolpbus, 177–78.
61古斯塔夫·罗伯茨，2：478-79；克劳塞维茨，《战略》，29。
61 Roberts, Gustavus, 2:478–79; Clausewitz, Strategische, 29.
62 Roberts, Gustavus , 2:539, 543–44。
62 Roberts, Gustavus, 2:539, 543–44.
63 Roberts，《瑞典历史论文集》，72-73。
63 Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, 72–73.
64 Roberts, Gustavus , 2:676–78。
64 Roberts, Gustavus, 2:676–78.
65同上，743-44。
65 Ibid., 743–44.
66 Basil H. Liddell Hart，《战略》（纽约，1962 年），第 85 页。
66 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York, 1962), 85.
67 Roberts, Gustavus , 2:747–48。
67 Roberts, Gustavus, 2:747–48.
68 Van Creveld，补给战争，16-17。
68 Van Creveld, Supplying War, 16–17.
69 Roberts，《瑞典历史论文集》，74。
69 Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, 74.
70 Piero Pieri，“Raimondo Montecuccoli”， Klassiker编辑。哈尔韦格，141-43。
70 Piero Pieri, “Raimondo Montecuccoli,” Klassiker, ed. Hahlweg, 141–43.
71 Thomas M. Barker，《军事知识分子与战争》（奥尔巴尼，1975 年），第 1-5 页。
71 Thomas M. Barker, The Military Intellectual and Battle (Albany, 1975), 1–5.
72卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特译注，修订版（普林斯顿，1984 年），第 7 卷，第 13 章，第 542 页。
72 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans, and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1984), bk. 7, ch. 13, p. 542.
73 Raimondo Montecuccoli，“Delia guerra col Turco in Ungheria”，载于Ausgewählte Schriften，编辑。维尔泽，2:257–59, 485–86。
73 Raimondo Montecuccoli, “Delia guerra col Turco in Ungheria,” in Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Veltzé, 2:257–59, 485–86.
74同上，522–23，343–44。
74 Ibid., 522–23, 343–44.
75 H. Kaufmann，“Raimondo Montecuccoli，1609-1680”（论文，柏林自由大学，1974 年），8-28。
75 H. Kaufmann, “Raimondo Montecuccoli, 1609–1680” (Diss., Free Univ. Berlin, 1974), 8–28.
76 Raimondo Montecuccoli，“L'Ungheria nell'anno 1677”，载于Ausgewählte Schriften，编辑。维尔泽，3:423–24, 450。
76 Raimondo Montecuccoli, “L'Ungheria nell'anno 1677,” in Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Veltzé, 3:423–24, 450.
77 Thomas M. Barker，“Montecuccoli 作为匈牙利人的对手”，载于《Armi Antiche》 ， 《Bolletino dell'Academia di S. Marciano》特刊（1972 年），207-21。
77 Thomas M. Barker, “Montecuccoli as an Opponent of the Hungarians,” in Armi Antiche, special issue of Bolletino dell'Academia di S. Marciano (1972), 207–21.
78考夫曼，“雷蒙多·蒙特库科利”，30。
78 Kaufmann, “Raimondo Montecuccoli,” 30.
79 Montecuccoli，“Delia guerra col Turco”，459、467。
79 Montecuccoli, “Delia guerra col Turco,” 459, 467.
80同上，456-57。
80 Ibid., 456–57.
81 Walter Leitsch，“II dolce suono dellapace：Der Kaiser als Vertragspartner des Königs von Polen im Jahre 1683”， Studie Austro-Polonica 3 (1983)，163-67。
81 Walter Leitsch, “II dolce suono della pace: Der Kaiser als Vertragspartner des Königs von Polen im Jahre 1683,” Studie Austro-Polonica 3 (1983), 163–67.
82 Thomas M. Barker，《双鹰与新月》（奥尔巴尼，1967 年），22.8–35。
82 Thomas M. Barker, Double Eagle and Crescent (Albany, 1967), 22.8–35.
83 Kurt Peball, “Raimund Fürst Montecuccoli 1609–1680,” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 2 (1964), 303。 Max Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften (慕尼黑和莱比锡, 1890), 2:1162–1171 提供了著作和 Veltzé, 1:xli-xc（见注释 51）给出了完整的参考书目。
83 Kurt Peball, “Raimund Fürst Montecuccoli 1609–1680,” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 2 (1964), 303. Max Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften (Munich and Leipzig, 1890), 2:1162–1171 provides summaries of the writings and Veltzé, 1:xli-xc (see note 51) gives a complete bibliography.
84 Montecuccoli， Ausgewählte Schriften，编辑。维尔茨，1：5-8。
84 Montecuccoli, Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Veltzé, 1:5–8.
85 Montecuccoli，“Della guerra col Turco”，459-60。
85 Montecuccoli, “Della guerra col Turco,” 459–60.
86 Raimondo Montecuccoli，“Trattato della guerra”，载于Ausgewählte Schriften，编辑。维尔茨，1:2.1, 47, 76, 89–90。
86 Raimondo Montecuccoli, “Trattato della guerra,” in Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Veltzé, 1:2.1, 47, 76, 89–90.
87 Montecuccoli，“Della guerra col Turco”，206-207。
87 Montecuccoli, “Della guerra col Turco,” 206–207.
88同上，253-54。
88 Ibid., 253–54.
89巴克，军事知识分子，153–54, 162–63；皮恩，《雷蒙多·蒙特库科利》，140–41
89 Barker, Military Intellectual, 153–54, 162–63; Píen, “Raimondo Montecuccoli,” 140–41
90 Montecuccoli，“Delia guerra col Turco”，497-99。
90 Montecuccoli, “Delia guerra col Turco,” 497–99.
91皮耶里，“雷蒙多·蒙特库科利”，139-40。
91 Pieri, “Raimondo Montecuccoli,” 139–40.
92考夫曼，“雷蒙多·蒙特库科利”，75-76。
92 Kaufmann, “Raimondo Montecuccoli,” 75–76.
93 Montecuccoli，“Delia guerra col Turco”，482。
93 Montecuccoli, “Delia guerra col Turco,” 482.
94 Raimondo Montecuccoli，“Dellärte militare”，载于Ausgewählte Schriften，编辑。 Veltzé，1：xlvi-xlvii。
94 Raimondo Montecuccoli, “Dellärte militare,” in Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Veltzé, 1:xlvi-xlvii.
95 Jähns， Geschichte，2： 1162；施塔德曼，沙恩霍斯特，95-96。
95 Jähns, Geschichte, 2: 1162; Stadelmann, Scharnhorst, 95–96.
3. 沃邦：《科学对战争的影响》
3. Vauban: The Impact of Science on War
一个从马基雅维利时代到西班牙王位继承战争结束，欧洲几乎一直处于战争状态。法国入侵意大利曾激起马基雅维利的强烈愤慨，但这仅仅是长达两个世纪的残酷国际对抗的序幕，瓦卢瓦王朝和波旁王朝与哈布斯堡王朝之间的斗争由此展开。在这一时期的大部分时间里，内战频发，与王朝斗争交织在一起，从未真正停止，反而常常与王朝斗争融合，引发更加残酷的冲突。十七世纪末，随着内战的平息和欧洲主要国家的最终巩固，旧有的斗争再次爆发，路易十四试图称霸欧洲，但这次有所不同：曾经帮助法国终结西班牙统治的新兴商业强国荷兰和英国，如今却与法国为敌。《乌得勒支和约》（1713年）实际上是英国缔结的和平条约。它为英国控制海洋奠定了基础，但同时，它并没有像其欧洲大陆的竞争对手们所热切期盼的那样削弱法国。它几乎完整地保留了法国最重要的征服成果；它几乎没有改变作为其安全保障的《威斯特伐利亚和约》；最重要的是，它使法国军队——欧洲第一支强大的国家军队——虽然有所削弱，但仍然令人生畏，其作为欧洲大陆首要军事强国的威望也几乎未受影响。
AN ALMOST uninterrupted state of war existed in Europe from the time of Machiavelli to the close of the War of the Spanish Succession. The French invasion of Italy which had so roused Machiavelli proved to be but a prelude to two centuries of bitter international rivalry, of Valois and Bourbon against Hapsburg. For a good part of this period epidemic civil wars cut across the dynastic struggle, never quite arresting it, and often fusing with it to produce conflicts of unbridled bitterness. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, when civil strife had abated and the chief states of Europe were at last consolidated, the old struggle was resumed as part of Louis XIV's bid for European supremacy, but with a difference: for now the newly risen merchant powers, Holland and England, which had aided France in bringing the Spanish dominion to an end, were arrayed against it. The Peace of Utrecht (1713) was an English peace. It set the stage for England's control of the seas, but by the same token it did not weaken France as much as its Continental rivals had fervently desired. It left France's most important conquests virtually intact; it scarcely altered the instrument of Westphalia that was its charter of security; and above all it left its army—the first great national army of Europe—weakened but still formidable, and its prestige as the leading military power of the Continent virtually undiminished.
两百年的军事进步都体现在那支军队中。而这种进步是巨大的。首先，军队规模更大。尽管我们对法国大革命战争期间大规模军队的首次出现印象深刻，但我们很容易忘记欧洲军队规模在十六、十七世纪的稳步增长。例如，当黎塞留于1635年将法国军队扩充至约10万人时，他的兵力几乎是后来瓦卢瓦王朝国王的两倍；然而，这支军队的规模仅为路易十四时期卢瓦军队的四分之一。
The military progress of two hundred years was embodied in that army. And this progress had been considerable.1 In the first place armies were larger. Impressed as we are by the first appearance of mass armies during the Wars of the French Revolution, we are prone to forget the steady increase in size of European armies that took place during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When Richelieu, for example, built up France's military establishment to about 100,000 men in 1635, he had a force nearly double that of the later Valois kings; yet this force was only a quarter as large as that which Louvois raised for Louis XIV.
军事编制的扩张主要归因于步兵的重要性日益提升。在查理八世入侵意大利时，步兵的数量仅为骑兵的两倍，但到十七世纪末，步兵的数量已是骑兵的五倍。通常认为步兵重要性的提升源于火器的改进；的确，滑膛枪的发明、燧发枪的演变以及刺刀的发明，都显著增强了步兵的火力，从而促进了步兵的扩充。但这只是故事的一部分。攻城战日益重要的地位也产生了影响，因为在攻城战中，无论是作为围城部队还是在防御永久性工事时，步兵都承担了骑兵无法完成的任务。
This expansion of the military establishment was primarily due to the growing importance of the infantry arm, which was only twice as numerous as the cavalry in the army with which Charles VIII invaded Italy, but five times as great by the end of the seventeenth century. The customary explanation for this new importance of infantry is that it resulted from the improvement in firearms; and it is true that the invention of the musket, its evolution into the flintlock, and the invention of the bayonet, all led to a pronounced increase in infantry firepower, and hence to an extension of foot soldiery. But this is only part of the story. The steadily mounting importance of siege warfare also had its effects, for here—both as a besieging force and in the defense of permanent fortifications—infantry performed functions impossible to cavalry.
十七世纪的欧洲军队是由许多外国人组成的职业军人队伍，他们通过自愿征兵的方式招募。除了偶尔启用后备军（一种封建遗迹，往往被嘲笑而非实际使用）以及路易十四统治后期复兴民兵的尝试之外，法国几乎没有任何类似普遍兵役的制度。从另一个方面来看，这支“国民”军队乍一看似乎也难以代表整个国家。贵族们竞相进入精锐的骑兵部队，并为步兵提供军官；普通步兵虽然来自社会最底层——尽管并非总是或主要来自道德败坏之人，正如有时暗示的那样——但富裕的自由农和资产阶级成员却可以通过逃避正规兵役来规避义务兵役，或者通过复兴的民兵（他们被豁免了）。
European armies in the seventeenth century were bands of professionals, many of them foreigners, recruited by voluntary enlistment. Except for infrequent recourse to the arrière-ban, a feudal relic more often ridiculed than employed, and except for the experiment of a revived militia late in the reign of Louis XIV, there was nothing in France resembling universal service. In still another respect this “national” army seems, at first glance, hardly to have been representative of the nation. Whereas the nobility competed for admission into the elite corps of the cavalry and provided officers for the infantry, and whereas the common infantryman was drawn from the lowest level of society—though not always or preponderantly from the moral dregs as is sometimes implied—the prosperous peasant freeholder and the members of the bourgeoisie escaped ordinary military service whether by enlistment, which they avoided, or through the revived militia, from which they were exempt.
那么，社会中是否有一个阶层完全没有为国家的武装力量做出贡献呢？绝非如此。资产阶级对法国的军事实力做出了重要贡献，即便他们并不在步兵或骑兵部队服役。他们的显著贡献主要体现在两个方面。首先，他们在技术服务领域发挥了重要作用，即在炮兵、工程以及将科学应用于战争方面；其次，他们在军队的文职管理中扮演了重要角色，而军队的文职管理在十七世纪得到了显著发展，许多其他进步和改革都归功于此。这些技术和组织方面的进步或许是上述进步中最重要的方面。在这两方面，法国军队都发挥了引领作用。
Did one whole segment of society, then, fail to contribute to the armed strength of the country? By no means. The bourgeoisie made important contributions to French military strength, even though they did not serve in the infantry or the cavalry. Their notable contributions fell into two main categories. First, they were important in the technical services, that is to say in artillery and engineering and in the application of science to warfare; and second, they were prominent in the civilian administration of the army that developed so strikingly during the seventeenth century, and to which many other advances and reforms are attributable. These technical and organizational developments are perhaps the most important aspects of the progress that has been noted above. In both, the French army led the way.
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路易十四留给继任者的军队与瓦卢瓦王朝的军队截然不同。军队在组织、纪律和装备方面的改进主要归功于一系列杰出规划者——黎塞留、勒泰利埃、卢瓦和沃邦——对文官行政管理的发展，他们的政治生涯贯穿了整个十七世纪。
The army that Louis XIV passed on to his successors bore little resemblance to that of the Valois kings. The improvement in organization, discipline, and equipment was due chiefly to the development of the civilian administration at the hands of a succession of great planners—Richelieu, Le Tellier, Louvois, and Vauban—whose careers span the seventeenth century.
直到十七世纪，军队事务几乎完全由军方自行管理，中央控制力很弱。各个步兵连队最初在各自的连长领导下几乎完全独立，但后来通过编入团级单位，在一定程度上得到了协调。每个团由一名营长（mestre de camp）指挥，并受制于一位权力强大的军官——步兵总司令（colonel général de l'infanterie）。然而，这一高官的威望和独立性非但没有加强王室对新组建的步兵的控制，反而削弱了王室的控制。十六世纪，骑兵也同样只是部分地服从于王室意志。凭借其威望和传统，骑兵连队直到十七世纪才被编入团级单位。宪兵队的精锐部队是历史最悠久的骑兵单位，仅由其队长和一位王室高级官员——宪兵长——指挥，而宪兵长往往几乎不受王室意志的约束。亨利二世统治之后，轻骑兵也像步兵一样，由一位上将统领。只有炮兵部队略有例外。在炮兵部队，资产阶级的影响力强大，这一传统可以追溯到比鲁兄弟的时代，实际指挥权掌握在炮兵总司令手中，他通常出身中产阶级。但即便如此，名义上的首脑也是炮兵总司令，自十六世纪初以来，他总是由一位地位显赫的人物担任。因此，这支军队表现出明显的缺乏统一性。除了国王之外，没有其他中央权威。而且，除了炮兵部队之外，也没有其他重要的文职官员。
Until the seventeenth century army affairs were almost exclusively administered by the military themselves, and there was very little central control. The various infantry companies, which had at first been virtually independent under their respective captains, had, it is true, been coordinated to some extent by uniting them into regiments, each commanded by a mestre de camp, subject to the orders of a powerful officer, the colonel général de l'infanterie. But the prestige and independence of this high office was such as to weaken, rather than to strengthen, the hold of the crown over the newly regimented infantry. The cavalry, in the sixteenth century, had likewise been only imperfectly subjected to the royal will. By virtue of their prestige and tradition, the cavalry companies resisted incorporation into regiments until the seventeenth century. The elite corps of the gendarmerie, representing the oldest cavalry units, were controlled only by their captains and by a superior officer of the crown, the constable, who was more often than not virtually independent of the royal will. The light cavalry, after the reign of Henry II, was placed under a colonel général like that of the infantry. Only the artillery provided something of an exception. Here bourgeois influence was strong, a tradition dating back to the days of the Bureau brothers, and the effective direction was in the hands of a commissaire général d'artillerie, usually a man of the middle class. But even here the titular head was the grand master of artillery who, since the beginning of the sixteenth century, was invariably a person of high station. Thus, the army manifested a striking lack of integration. Other than the person of the king, there was no central authority. And except in the artillery there were no important civilian officials.
黎塞留奠定了军队文官管理的基础，他将自己著名的依靠中产阶级代理人来巩固王权的政策延伸到了军队。他设立了若干名陆军总督（entintangants d'armée），这些总督通常是在战时被选派执行特殊任务的省级官员，每个野战军配备一名。总督下辖若干名军需官（commissaires），负责军队的薪饷、装备的储存以及其他类似事务。最终，正是在黎塞留时期，重要的陆军大臣一职实际上得以确立。在两位杰出的陆军大臣——米歇尔·勒泰利耶（1643-1668）及其子卢瓦侯爵（1668-1691）的领导下，这一职位的威望以及与之相关的文官管理体系的复杂性都得到了极大的提升。围绕着陆军大臣，一个真正意义上的部门化政府机构逐渐形成，并配备了完整的档案库。到1680年，已设立了五个独立的部门，每个部门都由一名主管领导，并配备众多助手。各部委、专员乃至指挥官都将报告和请求送交这些部门。陆军大臣的命令也由此发出；因为只有地位显赫之人才能直接与大臣打交道，因此，在所有涉及重大军事决策的事情上，大臣都成了国王的亲信顾问。
Richelieu laid the foundations of the civil administration of the army by extending to it his well-known policy of relying upon middle-class agents as the best means of strengthening the power of the crown. He created a number of intendants d'armée who were usually provincial intendants selected for special duty in time of war, one to each field army. Responsible to the intendants were a number of commissaires who were to see to the payment of troops, the storage of equipment, and other similar matters. Finally it was under Richelieu that the important post of minister of war was to all intents and purposes created. Under two great ministers, Michel Le Tellier (1643–1668) and his son, the Marquis de Louvois (1668–1691), the prestige of this office and the complexity of the civilian administration associated with it increased mightily. Around the person of the minister there grew up a genuine departmentalized government office complete with archives. By 1680 five separate bureaus had been created, each headed by a chef de bureau provided with numerous assistants. It was to these bureaus that the intendents, the commissioners, and even commanding officers sent their reports and their requests. From them emanated the orders of the minister of war; for only persons of great importance dealt directly with the minister, who had thus become, in all that pertained to important military decisions, the king's confidential advisor.
以现代标准，甚至拿破仑时代的标准来评判，路易十四时期的法国军队组织结构远称不上均衡。其内部存在各种各样的严重缺陷，组织和管理混乱不堪，征兵和军官管理也弊端重重。但这支军队不再是一支各自为政、各自为政的部队，除了征召他们的上尉或上校之外，没有真正的统帅。它拥有了明确的军事等级制度和清晰的权力划分，下属不再能肆意践踏王权，叛乱的指挥官也无力挑战王权——这一切都得益于十七世纪文官政府的辛勤努力。王室那些权力极大的半独立官职被废除或削弱。将军等级制度内部也进行了改革，使权力更加明确，消除了职能模糊不清以及众多元帅和中将之间无休止的权力斗争。资历原则也得以确立。通过设立临时且特殊的陆军元帅军衔，统一指挥成为可能。该军衔于 1660 年由蒂雷纳首次担任。在这一创新时期，还进行了一系列小的改革，涉及诸多方面，例如严厉遏制军队中官职过多的弊端、根除官职中的贪污腐败、引入统一的着装和纪律，以及改进军队的招募、住宿和薪酬方式。
Judged by modern, or even Napoleonic, standards, the French army of Louis XIV was by no means symmetrically organized. There were gross defects of all sorts, anomalies of organization and administration, vices of recruitment and officering. But this army was no longer an anarchic collection of separate units, knowing no real master but the captain or colonel who recruited them. If it possessed a clearly defined military hierarchy with clearly defined powers, and if the royal authority could no longer with impunity be evaded by underlings or challenged by rebellious commanders—this was made possible by the painstaking work of the civilian administration during the seventeenth century. The great, semi-independent offices of the crown were abolished or brought to heel. Reforms were effected within the hierarchy of general officers to make powers more clear-cut and to eliminate vagueness of function and incessant rivalry among the numerous marshals and lieutenant generals. The principle of seniority was introduced. Unity of command was possible by creating the temporary and exceptional rank of maréchal général des armées, held for the first time by Turenne in 1660. A host of minor reforms were also put through during this creative period, touching such diverse matters as the evil of plurality of office within the army, which was severely checked, venality of office, which proved ineradicable, the introduction of uniform dress and discipline, and improvements in the mode of recruiting, housing, and paying the troops.
毫无疑问，这种持续不断地系统化和规范军队结构的努力反映了其他领域正在发生的事情。在整个法国政治生活中，为了加强中央权力，那些长期以来被奉为圭臬的传统权利和混乱局面都受到了攻击。这种对理性和秩序的崇拜并非仅仅是专制政权的权宜之计，也不仅仅是当时盛行的古典主义强加的一种审美理想。无论在何处，对无意义的混乱都感到不耐烦，这正是笛卡尔的数学新理性主义、帕斯卡发现并记录的几何精神的一种表现形式，而且是其中最重要的表现形式。这是科学革命及其伴随的机械哲学在法国的最初体现。它最终促成了机器的采用——机器的每个部件都履行其预定的功能，没有多余的动作和齿轮——将其作为原始的类比，不仅是人类理性构建的模型，也是上帝宇宙的模型。在这个宇宙中，齿轮是伽桑狄的原子或笛卡尔的涡旋，而原动量则是丰特奈尔的神圣钟表匠。我们常说十八、十九世纪发现了对机器的崇拜，但这只是片面的说法。十七世纪发现了机器，发现了它精妙的精密，发现了它所揭示的——例如帕斯卡和莱布尼茨的计算机器——数学理性的运作。十八世纪只是给这个概念赋予了牛顿式的诠释，而十九世纪崇拜的不是机器，而是权力。因此，在黎塞留和路易十四的时代，改革者们受到时代精神和科学理性主义的影响，努力使军队和文官机构现代化，并赋予国家和军队一些精心设计的机器的特性。然而，科学对军事事务的影响远不止于此，它还产生了其他更为直接的影响，我们现在必须探讨这些影响。
Doubtless this sustained effort to systematize and order the structure of the army reflected what was taking place in other spheres. Throughout French political life traditional rights and confusions sanctified by long usage were being attacked in the interest of strengthening the central power. This cult of reason and order was not merely an authoritarian expedient, nor just an aesthetic ideal imposed by the prevailing classicism. Impatience with senseless disorder, wherever encountered, was one expression, and not the least significant expression, of the mathematical neorationalism of Descartes, of the esprit géométrique detected and recorded by Pascal. It was the form in which the scientific revolution, with its attendant mechanical philosophy, first manifested itself in France. And it resulted in the adoption of the machine—where each part fulfilled its prescribed function, with no waste motion and no supernumerary cogs—as the primordial analogy, the model not only of man's rational construction, but of God's universe. In this universe the cogs were Gassendi's atoms or Descartes' vortices, while the primum mobile was Fontenelle's divine watchmaker. We often speak as though the eighteenth or the nineteenth century discovered the worship of the machine, but this is a half-truth. It was the seventeenth century that discovered the machine, its intricate precision, its revelation—as for example in the calculating machines of Pascal and Leibnitz—of mathematical reason in action. The eighteenth century merely gave this notion a Newtonian twist, whereas the nineteenth century worshiped not the machine but power. So in the age of Richelieu and Louis XIV the reformers were guided by the spirit of the age, by the impact of scientific rationalism, in their efforts to modernize both the army and the civilian bureaucracy, and to give to the state and to the army some of the qualities of a well-designed machine. Science, however, was exerting other and more direct effects upon military affairs, and to these we must now turn.
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科学与战争自古以来就紧密相连。在古代，这种联系在希腊化时期和罗马时期尤为显著。阿基米德对叙拉古防御的贡献便是最经典的例证。十二世纪以后西欧的文化和经济复兴表明，这种联系并非偶然，因为古代战争艺术的复兴与古代科学技术知识的恢复和发展密切相关。早期欧洲科学家中鲜有军人，但许多科学家在本世纪及后世担任军队的咨询技术人员，甚至技术辅助人员。一些军医在医学或解剖学史上占有一席之地；而数量更多的是工程师，他们堪称机械的掌控者，他们在军事建筑、古代和现代火炮以及各种机械的使用方面的综合技能，既推动了战争艺术的发展，也为理论科学做出了贡献。列奥纳多·达·芬奇是现代科学史上遇到的第一位伟大的原创思想家，但他既不是第一位，也不是最后一位多才多艺的军事工程师，尽管他可能是最伟大的。
Science and warfare have always been intimately connected. In antiquity this alliance became strikingly evident in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Archimedes' contribution to the defense of Syracuse immediately springs to mind as the classic illustration. The cultural and economic rebirth of western Europe after the twelfth century shows that this association was not fortuitous, for the revival of the ancient art of war was closely linked with the recovery and development of ancient scientific and technical knowledge.2 Few of the early European scientists were soldiers, but many of them in this and later centuries served as consulting technicians or even as technical auxiliaries of the army. A number of military surgeons have their place in the annals of medical or anatomical science; while still more numerous were the engineers, literally the masters of the engines, whose combined skill in military architecture, in ancient and modern artillery, and in the use of a wide variety of machines served equally to advance the art of war and to contribute to theoretical science. Leonardo da Vinci, the first great original mind encountered in the history of modern science, was neither the first nor the last of these versatile military engineers, although he is probably the greatest.
在整个十六世纪和十七世纪的大部分时间里，在军队技术兵种真正发展起来之前，意大利、法国和英国的一些最伟大的科学家将注意力转向了与战争技术方面相关的问题。到1600年，人们普遍认识到，除了外部专家的服务之外，军官自身也必须接受某种技术培训。所有未能实现的系统性军事教育计划，例如亨利四世和黎塞留的早期计划，都为基础科学训练留出了一席之地。伟大的伽利略在一份鲜为人知的文件中概述了一项相当艰巨的数学和物理学习计划，旨在培养未来的军官。尽管有组织的军事教育，更不用说技术教育，直到十八世纪才真正出现，但在沃邦时代，几乎所有有功的军官都略懂一些技术知识，或者后悔自己缺乏这方面的知识。要了解促成这一现象的科学发展，最好简要概述一下军事建筑和火炮的变革。
Throughout the sixteenth century and most of the seventeenth, before the technical corps of the army had really developed, a number of the greatest scientists of Italy, France, and England turned their attention to problems bearing upon the technical side of warfare. By the year 1600 it was generally realized that the service of outside specialists must be supplemented by some sort of technical training among the officers themselves. All the abortive projects for systematic military education, such as the early plans of Henry IV and of Richelieu, gave some place to elementary scientific training.3 The great Galileo outlines in a little-known document a rather formidable program of mathematical and physical studies for the future officer. Although organized military education, to say nothing of technical education, had to await the eighteenth century, nearly every officer of any merit by the time of Vauban had some smattering of technical knowledge, or regretted that he had not. The developments of science that brought this about are best described by a brief survey of the changes in military architecture and in artillery.
在马基雅维利时代的意大利战争之后的一个世纪里，军事建筑的艺术或科学经历了剧烈的变革。法国炮兵——使用第一种真正有效的攻城炮——轻而易举地摧毁了意大利城镇高耸的中世纪防御工事。意大利人的回应是发明了一种新的“enceinte”（堡垒的主要围墙）模式，这种模式经过后来的多次改进，成为19世纪初之前在欧洲盛行的防御工事。它的主要特征在于其轮廓：通常为规则的多边形，每个角都突出有棱堡，使进攻者能够有效地进行交叉火力攻击。经过后来意大利工程师的完善，这种“enceinte”由三个主要部分组成：一道厚实的低矮城墙，带有胸墙；一条宽阔的壕沟；以及一道外侧的城墙，即“glacis”（斜坡），它缓缓地向下延伸至周围的乡村地带。
The art or science of military architecture suffered a violent revolution in the century following the Italian wars of Machiavelli's time. The French artillery—using the first really effective siege cannon—had battered down with ridiculous ease the high-walled medieval fortifications of the Italian towns. The Italians' reply was the invention of a new model enceinte—the main enclosure of a fortress—which, improved by a host of later modifications, was that which prevailed in Europe until the early nineteenth century. It was characterized primarily by its outline or trace: that of a polygon, usually regular, with bastions projecting from each angle, in such a manner as to subject the attacker to an effective cross fire. As it was perfected by the later Italian engineers this enceinte consisted of three main divisions: a thick low rampart, with parapet; a broad ditch; and an outer rampart, the glacis, which sloped gently down to the level of the surrounding countryside.
设计这些堡垒成为一门需要大量数学和建筑知识的学问。许多一流科学家都是这一新兴应用科学领域的专家。意大利数学家尼科洛·塔尔塔利亚和伟大的荷兰科学家西蒙·斯蒂文，在他们那个时代就以工程师的身份闻名，如今他们因对数学和力学的贡献而为人称道。甚至伽利略也曾在帕多瓦教授筑城学。
Designing these fortresses became a learned art, involving a fair amount of mathematical and architectural knowledge. A number of scientists of the first rank were experts in this new field of applied science. The Italian mathematician Niccolò Tartaglia, and the great Dutch scientist, Simon Stevin, were as famous in their own day as engineers as they are in ours for their contributions to mathematics and mechanics. Even Galileo taught fortification at Padua.4
法国国王弗朗索瓦一世深知意大利工程师的技艺，便招揽了一批意大利工程师，让他们参与到他早期加强北部和东部边境防御、抵御查理五世威胁的工程中。这第一波建设热潮一直持续到亨利二世统治时期，直到内战爆发才被迫中断。亨利四世和苏利时期工程重启后，荷兰人开始挑战意大利人在该领域的领先地位，而像埃拉尔·德·巴尔勒迪克这样的法国工程师也随时准备取代这些外国工程师。
Francis I of France, aware of the skill of the Italian engineers, took a number of them into his service, using them in his pioneer efforts to fortify his northern and eastern frontiers against the threat of Charles V. This first burst of building activity lasted throughout the reign of Henry II, only to be brought to a halt by the civil wars. When the work was resumed under Henry IV and Sully, the Dutch were beginning to contest the primacy of the Italians in this field, and French engineers like Errard de Bar-le-Duc were available to replace the foreigners.5
埃拉尔是法国防御学派的奠基人，该学派的起源可追溯至他于1594年出版的《防御工事简化论》（Fortification réduicte en art）。十七世纪涌现出许多杰出的工程师，其中一些是军人，另一些则是颇具成就的民间科学家。后者包括伟大的数学家热拉尔·德萨格、多才多艺的二流科学家皮埃尔·佩蒂以及天文学家兼物理学家让·里歇。在防御理论的发展过程中，沃邦的伟大先驱，甚至可以说他的导师，是帕甘伯爵。
Errard is the titular founder of the French school of fortification, which may be said to date from the publication of his Fortification réduicte en art (1594). In the course of the seventeenth century there appeared a number of able engineers, some of them soldiers, others civilian scientists of considerable distinction. Among the men in the latter category can be mentioned Gerard Desargues, the great mathematician, Pierre Petit, a versatile scientist of the second rank, and Jean Richer, astronomer and physicist. In the development of the theory of fortification the great precursor of Vauban, one might almost say his master, was the Count de Pagan.
布莱斯·德·帕甘（1604-1665）是一位理论家，而非实践工程师。据目前所知，他从未实际指导过任何重要的工程建设。在工程领域，正如他在科学领域（尽管他自认为比实际的业余爱好者更胜一筹）一样，他的贡献也仅限于纸上谈兵。然而，他成功地在几个重要方面改革了17世纪后期法国建造的要塞类型。沃邦著名的“第一体系”实际上只是帕甘的风格，稍作改进，并能灵活适应不同的地形。帕甘的主要思想体现在他的著作《帕甘伯爵的防御工事》（1645）中。所有这些思想都源于一个根本的考量：提高火炮的效能，无论是在进攻还是防御方面。在帕甘看来，堡垒是轮廓中最重要的部分，它们的位置和形状是由他根据城墙外部（而不是内部）制定的简单几何规则决定的。
Blaise de Pagan (1604–1665) was a theorist, not a practical engineer. So far as is known he never actually directed any important construction. In engineering, as in science where he fancied himself more than the dilettante that he really was, his contributions were made from the armchair. He succeeded, however, in reforming in several important respects the type of fortresses built by the French in the later seventeenth century. Vauban's famous “first system” was in reality nothing but Pagan's style, executed with minor improvements and flexibly adapted to differences in terrain. Pagan's main ideas were embodied in his treatise Les fortifications du comte de Pagan (1645). They all sprang from a single primary consideration: the increased effectiveness of cannon, both for offense and in defense. To Pagan the bastions were the supremely important part of the outline, and their position and shape were determined by the help of simple geometrical rules that he formulated, with respect to the outside, rather than the inside, of the enceinte.
在16、17世纪火炮的发展过程中，科学技术与军事需求同样发挥着相互作用的作用。比林古乔的《论火药技术》（1540年）如今被公认为化学史上的经典著作之一，长期以来一直是军事烟火技术、火药制备和火炮冶金方面的权威手册。同样，现代动力学的两位奠基人塔尔塔利亚和伽利略也发展出了外弹道学理论。或许可以说，现代物理学的基础是解决基本弹道问题的副产品。塔尔塔利亚对亚里士多德动力学的批判源于他进行的实验——或许是最早的动力学实验——研究了发射角度与射程之间的关系。他的实验结果揭示了最大射程角为45度，这一发现促使炮兵广泛使用方尺或象限仪。但伽利略最根本的发现是：在忽略空气阻力等干扰因素的理想情况下，抛射体的轨迹必然是抛物线。这一发现的取得，得益于他的三项主要动力学发现：惯性原理、自由落体定律和速度合成原理。后世学者正是基于这些发现，逐步构建了经典物理学的体系。
In the development of artillery there was the same interplay of scientific skill and military needs during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Biringuccio's De la pirotechnia (1540), now recognized as one of the classics in the history of chemistry, was for long the authoritative handbook of military pyrotechnics, the preparation of gunpowder, and the metallurgy of cannon. The theory of exterior ballistics similarly was worked out by two of the founders of modern dynamics, Tartaglia and Galileo. Perhaps it would not be too much to assert that the foundations of modern physics were a by-product of solving the fundamental ballistical problem. Tartaglia was led to his criticisms of Aristotelian dynamics by experiments—perhaps the earliest dynamical experiments ever performed—on the relation between the angle of fire and the range of a projectile. His results, embodying the discovery that the angle of maximum range is forty-five degrees, brought about the widespread use of the artillerist's square or quadrant. But to Galileo is due the fundamental discovery that the trajectory of a projectile, for the ideal case that neglects such disturbing factors as air resistance, must be parabolic. This was made possible only by his three chief dynamical discoveries, the principle of inertia, the law of freely falling bodies, and the principle of the composition of velocities. Upon these discoveries, worked out as steps in his ballistic investigation, later hands erected the structure of classical physics.
到十七世纪末，“新学问”的发展势头强劲，足以促成技术军事教育的首次尝试，并得到英法两国政府的科学赞助。1662年，伦敦皇家学会获得查理二世颁发的特许状；四年后，在科尔伯特的鼓励下，法国皇家科学院成立。这两个机构自成立之初便致力于“实用知识”，开展了许多对陆军和海军具有直接或潜在价值的研究。弹道学研究、冲击现象和后坐力研究、改进火药和硝石特性的研究、以及寻找一种令人满意的海上经度测定方法等，都占据了这两个科学院成员的研究重点。两国的科学院成员中不乏优秀的陆军和海军将领。尤其是在法国，科学家们经常被征询有关军队技术问题的意见。在科尔伯特的监督下，法国科学院的科学家们开展了一项详细的海岸和大地测量调查，作为科尔伯特伟大的海军扩张计划的一部分。更重要的是，他们为现代科学制图奠定了基础，因此在接下来的一个世纪里，随着著名的卡西尼法国地图的完成，军队第一次拥有了其所保卫国家的精确地形图。
By the end of the seventeenth century the progress of the “New Learning” had become compelling enough to bring about the first experiments in technical military education and the patronage of science by the governments of England and France. The Royal Society of London received its charter at the hands of Charles II in 1662, while four years later, with the encouragement of Colbert, the French Académie Royale des sciences was born. In both of these organizations, dedicated as they were at their foundation to “useful knowledge,” many investigations were undertaken of immediate or potential value to the army and navy. Ballistic investigations, studies on impact phenomena and recoil, researches on improved gunpowder and the properties of saltpeter, the quest for a satisfactory means of determining longitude at sea: these, and many other subjects, preoccupied the members of both academies. In both countries able navy and army men are found among the diligent members. In France especially the scientists were frequently called upon for their advice in technical matters pertaining to the armed forces. Under Colbert's supervision scientists of the Académie des sciences carried out a detailed coast and geodetic survey as part of Colbert's great program of naval expansion, and what is perhaps more important, they laid the foundations for modern scientific cartography so that in the following century, with the completion of the famous Cassini map of France, an army was for the first time equipped with an accurate topographic map of the country it was charged to defend.
三
III
如果我们探究这些发展如何在十六、十七世纪的军事文献中得到体现，答案很简单：数量远超质量。在军事理论的宏观层面和军事天才的奥秘方面，古代仍然是伟大的导师。维吉提乌斯和弗龙蒂努斯的著作被视为不可或缺；而本世纪最受欢迎的书籍，亨利·德·罗昂的《完美统帅》（Parfait capitaine），则是改编自凯撒的《高卢战记》。毫无疑问，关于战争艺术最重要的著作可分为两类：国际法领域的先驱性著作；以及军事技术领域的先驱性著作。
If we ask how these developments are reflected in the military literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the answer is simple enough: the volume is, on the average, greater than the quality. Antiquity was still the great teacher in all that concerned the broader aspects of military theory and the secrets of military genius. Vegetius and Frontinus were deemed indispensable; and the most popular book of the century, Henri de Rohan's Parfait capitaine, was an adaptation of Caesar's Gallic Wars. Without doubt the most important writing concerned with the art of war fell into two classes: the pioneer works in the field of international law; and the pioneer works of military technology.
马基雅维利曾是无限制战争时代的理论家，但到了十七世纪之交，他的影响力已逐渐减弱。弗朗西斯·培根或许是他最后一位杰出的门徒；因为直到今天，我们很难找到像马基雅维利某些著作中那样毫不掩饰地鼓吹无限制战争的论调。然而，到了培根时代，反动势力已经开始出现。像格劳秀斯这样的人带头反对国际无政府状态和无限破坏性的战争。这些国际法的奠基人宣称，他们已在自然法中找到了国际法的准则，而他们的核心原则，正如塔列朗曾在一封措辞强烈的致拿破仑的信中所说，是各国在和平时期应当彼此行善，在战争时期应当彼此行恶至最小。
Machiavelli had been the theorist for the age of unregulated warfare, but his influence was waning by the turn of the seventeenth century. Francis Bacon was perhaps his last illustrious disciple; for it is hard to find until our own day such unabashed advocacy of unrestricted war as can be found in certain of the Essays. But by Bacon's time the reaction had set in. Men like Grotius were leading the attack against international anarchy and against a war of unlimited destructiveness. These founding fathers of international law announced that they had found in the law of nature the precepts for a law of nations, and their central principle, as Talleyrand put it once in a strongly worded reminder to Napoleon, was that nations ought to do one another in peace, the most good, in war, the least possible evil.
人们很容易低估这些宽容的理论对战争现实的影响，并引用阿尔伯特·索雷尔对旧制度时期国际道德和行为的负面描述。事实上，在十七世纪末之前，国际法的基本原则对战争的方式和方法产生了不可否认的影响。<sup> 6</sup>即使它们没有彻底消除政治上的不道德行为，至少也通过一系列细则和禁令来规范战争行为，从而使得十八世纪的战争成为一项相对人道且规范的活动。交战双方的指挥官都了解这些规则，并且普遍遵守。例如，关于战俘的待遇和交换的规定；对某些杀伤手段（如使用毒药）的谴责；关于非战斗人员待遇以及安排谈判、停战和安全通行证的规则；或者那些关注掠夺或对被征服领土征收赋税以及结束围城方式的人。总而言之，其总体趋势是在战争时期保护私人及其权利，从而减轻战争带来的弊端。
It is easy to underestimate the influence of these generous theories upon the actual realities of warfare, and to cite Albert Sorel's black picture of international morals and conduct in the period of the Old Regime. Actually the axioms of international law exerted an undeniable influence on the mode and manner of warfare before the close of the seventeenth century.6 If they did not put an end to political amoralism, they at least hedged in the conduct of war with a host of minor prescriptions and prohibitions that contributed to making eighteenth-century warfare a relatively humane and well-regulated enterprise. These rules were known to contending commanders and were quite generally followed. Such, for example, were the instructions concerning the treatment and exchange of prisoners; the condemnation of certain means of destruction, like the use of poison; the rules for the treatment of noncombatants and for arranging parleys, truces, and safe-conducts; or those concerned with despoiling or levying exactions upon conquered territory and with the mode of terminating sieges. The whole tendency was to protect private persons and private rights in time of war, and hence to mitigate the evils.
在第二类书籍，即军事技术书籍中，没有哪部作品的影响力或声望能超过路易十四时期伟大的军事工程师塞巴斯蒂安·勒普雷斯特·德·沃邦的作品。他在十八世纪的权威极其巨大，即使在拿破仑时代之后也未明显减弱。然而，沃邦留给十八世纪的文学遗产却十分匮乏且高度专业化，几乎仅包括一部攻城论、一部要塞防御著作和一部关于地雷的短篇作品。他没有发表任何关于军事建筑的著作，也没有对战略或战争艺术做出任何系统的贡献；然而，他在所有这些领域的影响是不可否认的。这种影响是通过对他的事迹和榜样的记忆，以及众多弟子的努力和著述，以微妙而间接的方式产生的。但在这个过程中，他的许多贡献和思想被误解和曲解，他的许多成就也长期被世人遗忘。得益于十九、二十世纪学者们的工作，他们得以出版沃邦相当一部分书信和手稿，并对其余部分进行研读和分析，我们对沃邦的生平及其思想有了比十八世纪的仰慕者们更为清晰的了解。现代研究不仅没有削弱沃邦的地位，反而提升了他的声望。我们看到沃邦的传奇故事得到了澄清和佐证；我们看到它在许多重要方面得到了修正；但我们并没有看到它被彻底推翻。
In the second class, that of books on military technology, no works had greater influence or enjoyed greater prestige than those of Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, the great military engineer of the reign of Louis XIV. His authority in the eighteenth century was immense, nor had it appreciably dimmed after the time of Napoleon.7 And yet Vauban's literary legacy to the eighteenth century was scanty and highly specialized, consisting almost solely of a treatise on siegecraft, a work on the defense of fortresses, and a short work on mines.8 He published nothing on military architecture, and made no systematic contribution to strategy or the art of war in general; yet his influence in all these departments is undeniable. It was exerted subtly and indirectly through the memory of his career and of his example, and by the exertions and writings of a number of his disciples. But by this process many of his contributions and ideas were misunderstood and perverted, and much that he accomplished was for a long time lost to view. Thanks to the work of scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who have been able to publish an appreciable portion of Vauban's letters and manuscripts, and to peruse and analyze the rest, we have a clearer understanding of Vauban's career and of his ideas than was possible to his eighteenth-century admirers. He has increased in stature, rather than diminished, in the light of modern studies. We have seen the Vauban legend clarified and documented; we have seen it emended in many important points; but we have not seen it exploded.
沃邦的传奇需要一些解释。为什么一个技艺精湛、兢兢业业的普通工程师，能如此迅速地被捧为民族偶像？为什么他关于攻城术和要塞防御的专业著作足以让他成为最具影响力的军事作家之一？
The Vauban legend requires some explanation. Why was a simple engineer, however skillful and devoted to his task, raised so swiftly to the rank of a national idol? Why were his specialized publications on siegecraft and the defense of fortresses sufficient to rank him as one of the most influential military writers?
答案并不难寻：沃邦的这些著作是十八世纪战争中一个极其重要，甚至可以说是至关重要的方面——围城战——的权威著作。在十七世纪末和整个十八世纪，战争在我们看来往往不过是一场永无止境的围城战。围城战几乎总是战役的核心：即便攻克敌方要塞并非主要目标（而这种情况很常见），围城战也必然是入侵敌方领土的先决条件。围城战远比正面交锋频繁，而且发动围城战的意愿与避免正面交锋的意愿一样强烈。一旦发生正面交锋，其走向往往取决于解救或阻止敌军解救被围困要塞的需要。除了少数杰出的指挥官之外，几乎所有人的战略想象力都被围城战的既定规则所束缚。在那个无条件接受围攻战略首要地位的时代，沃邦的著作被认为是不可或缺的，他的名字也必然是一个令人敬畏的名字。
The answers are not far to seek: these works of Vauban were the authoritative texts in what was to the eighteenth century a most important, if not the supremely important, aspect of warfare. In the late seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century, warfare often appears to us as nothing but an interminable succession of sieges. Almost always they were the focal operations of a campaign: when the reduction of an enemy fortress was not the principal objective, as it often was, a siege was the inevitable preliminary to an invasion of enemy territory. Sieges were far more frequent than pitched battles and were begun as readily as battles were avoided. When they did occur, battles were likely to be dictated by the need to bring about, or to ward off, the relief of a besieged fortress. The strategic imagination of all but a few exceptional commanders was walled in by the accepted axioms of a war of siege. In an age that accepted unconditionally this doctrine of the strategic primacy of the siege, Vauban's treatises were deemed indispensable and his name was necessarily a name to conjure with.
然而，沃邦的声望和威望，仅仅一部分源于他的技术著作。他之所以能引起人们的共鸣，是因为他的人格魅力、他作为一位开明国家公仆的漫长生涯、他在专业领域之外对军事进步做出的诸多贡献，以及他对公共福祉的博爱和人道主义关怀。从一开始，沃邦作为公仆的形象就赢得了人们最大的敬佩。他出身卑微，勤勉正直，勇敢无畏，忠于国家，仿佛是罗马共和国的化身。事实上，丰特奈尔在他著名的赞词中，将他描述为“一位罗马人，路易十四的时代似乎将他从共和国最美好的岁月中偷走了”。伏尔泰称他为“最优秀的公民”。圣西蒙不仅称他为罗马人，还首次用“爱国者”（patriote）一词来形容他，赋予了它现代的含义。9沃邦是一位受人尊敬的公务员、组织天才、开明的改革家，他似乎集所有特质于一身，而这些特质正是无数平凡人努力结合，铸就了新的民族国家。
Yet only a part of the aura and prestige that surrounded Vauban's name arose from these technical writings. He has appealed to the imagination because of his personal character, his long career as an enlightened servant of the state, his manifold contributions to military progress outside of his chosen speciality, and his liberal and humanitarian interest in the public weal. From the beginning it was Vauban the public servant who aroused the greatest admiration. With his modest origin, his diligence and honesty, his personal courage, and his loyalty to the state, he seemed the reincarnation of some servitor of the Roman Republic. Indeed, Fontenelle, in his famous éloge, describes him as a “Roman, whom the century of Louis XIV seems almost to have stolen from the happiest days of the Republic.” To Voltaire he was “the finest of citizens.” Saint-Simon, not content with dubbing him a Roman, applied to him, for the first time with its modern meaning, the word patriote.9 In Vauban, respected public servant, organizational genius, enlightened reformer, seemed to be embodied all the traits which had combined, through the efforts of countless lesser persons, to forge the new national state.
沃邦的技术知识、应用数学技能、对精确和秩序的追求，以及他作为法国科学院院士的身份，更巧妙地象征着科学知识对国家福祉的新重要性。笛卡尔式的理性、应用科学在战争与和平时期对社会的作用、时代的几何精神：所有这些都体现在沃邦身上，在他设计的宏伟堡垒的轮廓中清晰可见。
Still more felicitously did Vauban's technical knowledge, his skill in applied mathematics, his love of precision and order, and his membership in the Académie des sciences, symbolize the new importance of scientific knowledge for the welfare of the state. Cartesian reason, the role of applied science in society both for war and peace, the esprit géométrique of the age: all these were incarnated in the man, visible in the massive outline of the fortresses he designed.
V
V
沃邦的生涯漫长而辉煌，在此类文章中只能作简要概述。路易十四麾下几乎无人能及他如此长久的活跃生涯。他二十出头便在马扎林麾下效力于王室，直至七十三岁去世前几个月仍活跃在战场上。在这半个世纪的不懈努力中，他指挥了近五十场围城战，并绘制了超过一百座要塞和港口设施的设计图。
Vauban's career was both too long and too active for anything but a summary account in an essay of this sort. Scarcely any other of Louis XIV's ministers or warriors had as long an active career. He entered the royal service under Mazarin when he was in his early twenties and was still active in the field only a few months before his death at the age of seventy-three. During this half century of ceaseless effort he conducted nearly fifty sieges and drew the plans for well over a hundred fortresses and harbor installations.
他出身于介于资产阶级和下层贵族之间的模糊地带，是莫尔旺地区巴佐什一位富裕公证人的后裔，这位公证人在十六世纪中叶获得了一小块附近的封地。他于1633年出生于圣莱热，在附近的瑟米尔昂奥克苏瓦接受了并不完善的教育——略懂历史、数学和绘画；1651年，十七岁的他以学员身份加入了孔代亲王的军队，当时孔代亲王正在反抗国王。由于孔代亲王的赦免，他于1653年进入皇家军队，在克莱维尔骑士手下表现出色。克莱维尔骑士虽然才华平庸，却被认为是法国最杰出的军事工程师。两年后，他获得了“国王普通工程师”的荣誉称号。不久之后，他便获得了马雷夏尔·德·拉·费尔特团步兵连连长的闲职。
He came from the indeterminate fringe between the bourgeoisie and the lower nobility, being the descendant of a prosperous notary of Bazoches in the Morvan who in the mid-sixteenth century had acquired a small neighborhood fief. He was born at Saint-Léger in 1633, received his imperfect education—a smattering of history, mathematics, and drawing—in nearby Semur-en-Auxois; and in 1651, at the age of seventeen enlisted as a cadet with the troops of Condé, then in rebellion against the king. Sharing in Condé's pardon, he entered the royal service in 1653 where he served with distinction under the Chevalier de Clerville, a man of mediocre talents who was regarded as the leading military engineer of France. Two years later he earned the brevet of ingénieur ordinaire du roi; and soon after acquired as a sinecure the captaincy of an infantry company in the regiment of the Maréchal de La Ferté.
在 1659 年与西班牙停止敌对行动到 1667 年路易十四第一次征服战争之间的这段时间里，沃邦在克莱维尔的指导下努力修复和改进王国的防御工事。
During the interval between the cessation of hostilities with Spain in 1659 and Louis XIV's first war of conquest in 1667, Vauban was hard at work repairing and improving the fortifications of the kingdom under the direction of Clerville.
1667年，路易十四入侵低地国家。在这场短暂的权力继承战争中，沃邦凭借其在攻城术及其他领域的精湛技艺脱颖而出，以至于卢瓦注意到他明显优于克莱维尔，并任命他为总督，实际上负责其辖区内的所有工程建设。权力继承战争的战利品开启了沃邦的大规模建设计划。埃诺和佛兰德斯的重要城镇被他攻占，成为其扩张的前哨：贝尔格、富尔内、图尔奈和里尔。这些以及许多其他重要地点都按照所谓的沃邦第一体系进行防御，该体系将在下文详述。
In 1667 Louis XIV attacked the Low Countries. In this brief War of Devolution Vauban so distinguished himself as a master of siegecraft and the other branches of his trade that Louvois noticed his distinct superiority to Clerville and made him the virtual director, as commissaire général, of all the engineering work in his department. The acquisitions of the War of Devolution launched Vauban on his great building program. Important towns in Hainaut and Flanders were acquired, the outposts of the great expansion: Bergues, Furnes, Tournai, and Lille. These and many other important positions were fortified according to the so-called first system of Vauban, which will be discussed below.
这就是沃邦在路易十四麾下永不停歇的生活节奏：和平时期，他负责持续的监督、修缮和新建工程；战争时期，他则忙于攻城略地和进一步的扩张；随后的和平时期，他又会更加热火朝天地进行建设。为了履行这些职责，沃邦一直奔波于法国各地，直至去世，他骑马或晚年乘坐著名的马轿，穿梭于法国各地。他似乎鲜有闲暇。他很少陪伴妻子，也无暇顾及1675年购置的乡间庄园，并且刻意避开宫廷，尽可能缩短在巴黎和凡尔赛的停留时间。他大部分的日日夜夜都待在边境村庄的客栈里，忙于处理数不胜数的事务，远离文化和繁华的中心。在工程工作之余，沃邦会利用零碎时间处理公文和其他写作。他与卢瓦保持着密切联系，经常以犀利而直白的文风给卢瓦写信和报告。不仅如此，沃邦还对许多与自身专业领域虽有间接联系但同样涉及民事和军事的问题产生了浓厚的兴趣。其中一些问题他在信件中有所论述，而另一些则写进了长篇回忆录中，这些回忆录最终汇集成十二卷手稿，即《瓦西维特》。
This, then, was to be the ceaseless rhythm of Vauban's life in the service of Louis XIV: constant supervision, repairs, and new construction in time of peace; in time of war, renewed sieges and further acquisitions; then more feverish construction during the ensuing interval of peace. In the performance of these duties Vauban was constantly on the move until the year of his death, traveling from one end of France to the other on horseback or, later in life, in a famous sedan chair borne by horses. There seem to have been few intervals of leisure. He devoted little time to his wife and to the country estate he acquired in 1675, and he sedulously avoided the court, making his stays at Paris and Versailles as short as possible. The greatest number of his days and nights were spent in the inns of frontier villages and in the execution of his innumerable tasks, far from the centers of culture and excitement. Such free moments as he was able to snatch in the course of his engineering work he devoted to his official correspondence and to other writing. He kept in constant touch with Louvois, whom he peppered with letters and reports written in a pungent and undoctored prose. As though this were not enough Vauban interested himself in a host of diverse civil and military problems only indirectly related to his own specialty. Some of these subjects he discussed in his correspondence, while he dealt with others in long memoirs which make up the twelve manuscript volumes of his Oisivetés.
这些回忆录涉及的主题包罗万象。有些是技术性的，有些则不然。但几乎在所有回忆录中，他都符合伏尔泰对他的描述：“一个总是关注一些有用、一些不太实用且都很独特的问题的人。”<sup> 10</sup>除了讨论军事和海军问题，或报道内河航道和朗格多克运河等跨洋工程外，他还论述了植树造林计划的必要性、改善法国在美洲殖民地状况的可能方法、废除南特敕令的恶劣后果，以及——以一种预示拿破仑创立荣誉军团的方式——建立一个面向所有阶层的精英贵族制度，以取代那种毫无意义且陈旧的出身特权贵族制度。
These memoirs treat the most diverse subjects. Some are technical, others are not. But in nearly all of them he answers to Voltaire's description of him as “un homme toujours occupé de sujets les uns utiles, les autres peu practicables et tous singuliers.”10 Besides discussing military and naval problems, or reporting on inland waterways and the interocean Canal of Languedoc, he writes on the need for a program of reforestation, the possible methods of improving the state of the French colonies in America, the evil consequences of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and—in a manner that foreshadowed Napoleon's creation of the Legion of Honor—the advantages of instituting an aristocracy of merit open to all classes, in place of the senseless and archaic nobility of birth and privilege.
《瓦西维特文集》揭示了其起源，也与其名称相悖。这些文集写作于不寻常的时间、地点和日期。它们有时仅仅是沃邦游历法国各地时收集的笔记和观察记录；有时则是篇幅较长的论著。这些作品之所以具有某种统一性，在于贯穿其中的人文关怀和所展现的科学精神。沃邦的著作和生平印证了本文前文提出的论点：在十七世纪，科学理性主义是改革的源泉。沃邦的提议基于第一手经验和观察。他为履行职业职责而不断旅行，这使他有机会深入了解自己的国家及其需求。他广泛的好奇心和敏锐的头脑促使他以只有收藏家才具备的毅力，收集有关他工作地区的经济和社会状况的资料；而他科学的思维方式则促使他尽可能地将观察结果量化。
The Oisivetés reveal their origin and belie their name. They were written at odd times, in strange places and at various dates. They are often little more than notes and observations collected in the course of his travels over the length and breadth of France; at other times they are extended treatises. What gives the writings a certain unity is the humanitarian interest that pervades them all and the scientific spirit which they reveal. The writings and the career of Vauban illustrate the thesis suggested earlier in this paper that in the seventeenth century scientific rationalism was the wellspring of reform. Vauban's proposals were based on first-hand experience and observation. His incessant traveling in the performance of his professional duties gave him an unparalleled opportunity to know his own country and its needs. His wide curiosity and his alert mind led him to amass facts, with the pertinacity known only to collectors, about the economic and social conditions of the areas where he worked; and his scientific turn of mind led him to throw his observations, where possible, into quantitative form.
这些考量有助于我们回答这样一个问题：沃邦是否从根本上配得上“科学家”的称号，或者他仅仅是一位略懂数学和机械知识的士兵和建筑师？ 1699年他被授予法国科学院院士称号是否仅仅是为了表彰一位公职人员？丰特奈尔是否因此有义务为他撰写一篇不朽的赞美科学家的颂词？
These considerations help us to answer the question whether Vauban deserves, in any fundamental sense, the label of scientist, or whether he was merely a soldier and builder with a smattering of mathematics and mechanical knowledge. Was membership in the Académie des sciences accorded him in 1699 solely to honor a public servant and was Fontenelle thus obliged to devote to him one of his immortal éloges of men of science?
沃邦的成就体现在应用科学和简单的应用数学领域。他不像后来的法国军事工程师拉扎尔·卡诺那样是一位杰出的数学家和物理学家。他不像卡诺的同代人库仑那样对机械工程做出重大的理论贡献。他也没有像库尼奥那样发明蒸汽战车。除了堡垒设计（这几乎算不上纯粹的科学）之外，他对工程学的唯一贡献是对挡土墙的合适比例进行了经验研究。沃邦在科学原创性方面的主要贡献在于，他试图将定量方法扩展到一些领域，而除了他的英国同代人之外，几乎没有人认真涉足这些领域。事实上，他是系统气象学的创始人之一，与罗伯特·胡克共同享有这一荣誉；他也是统计学领域的先驱之一，当时只有约翰·格朗特和威廉·佩蒂爵士与他并肩。他的统计学习惯在他的许多军事和工程报告中都有体现。其中许多内容充斥着与主题无关的细节，例如法国各个地区的财富、人口和资源。
Vauban's achievements are in applied science and simple applied mathematics. He was not a distinguished mathematician and physicist like the later French military engineer, Lazare Carnot. He made no great theoretical contributions to mechanical engineering, as did Carnot's contemporary, Coulomb. He invented no steam chariot like Cugnot. Aside from the design of fortresses, scarcely a matter of pure science, his only contribution to engineering was an empirical study of the proper proportions of retaining walls.11 Vauban's chief claim to scientific originality is that he sought to extend the quantitative method into fields where, except for his English contemporaries, no one had yet seriously ventured. He is, in fact, one of the founders of systematic meteorology, an honor that he shares with Robert Hooke, and one of the pioneers in the field of statistics, where the only other contenders were John Graunt and Sir William Petty.12 His statistical habit is evident in many of his military and engineering reports. Many of these are filled with apparently irrelevant detail about the wealth, population, and resources of various regions of France.
他要求那些疲于奔命的下属进行同样细致的调查。在写给曾任敦刻尔克至伊普尔西北边境要塞总监的于·德·卡利尼的一封信中，他表达了对所收到的关于该地区报告信息不完整的不满。他敦促卡利尼提供地图，详细描述水道、木材供应情况及砍伐日期，并提供按年龄、性别、职业和等级划分的详细人口统计数据。此外，卡利尼还需提供他所能收集到的所有关于该地区经济生活的信息。<sup> 13</sup>正是凭借这类信息——这些信息是他作为陆军工程师工作中不经意间获得的——沃邦试图将他运用在军事问题上的批判性评估精神、对逻辑、秩序和效率的追求运用到民事事务中。
From his harried underlings he exacted the same sort of painstaking survey. In a letter to Hue de Caligny, who was for a time director of fortifications for the northwest frontier from Dunkirk to Ypres, he expressed annoyance at the incomplete information he received in reports about that region. He urged Caligny to supply a map, to describe in detail the waterways, the wood supply with the date of cutting, and to provide him with detailed statistical information on population, broken down according to age, sex, profession, and rank. In addition Caligny was to give all the facts he could mass about the economic life of the region.13 It was by information of this sort, painstakingly acquired as a byproduct of his work as an army engineer, that Vauban sought to extend into civilian affairs the same spirit of critical appraisal, the same love of logic, order, and efficiency, that he brought to bear on military problems.
六年级
VI
沃邦是本世纪最执着的军事改革家之一。他的信件和《奥西维特》充满了他的各种建议。在军事生活的方方面面，以及军事组织和军事技术等诸多棘手问题上，沃邦几乎都提出了富有成效的建议或方案，旨在进行全面的改革。<sup> 14</sup>
Vauban was one of the most persistent of the military reformers of the century. His letters and his Oisivetés are filled with his proposals. There were few aspects of military life or of the burning problems of military organization and military technology where Vauban did not intervene with fertile suggestions or projects for overall reorganization.14
他毕生致力于将他的工程师纳入正规军，组建一支拥有自己军官、士兵和独特制服的正规部队，但收效甚微。<sup> 15</sup>然而，他的建议在接下来的一个世纪里结出了硕果，他在技术兵种科学教育方面的努力也同样卓有成效。他热情赞扬了路易十四统治末期建立的最早的炮兵学校；尽管他未能为工程师建立类似的学校，但他建立了一套定期考试制度，以检验皇家委任状候选人的准备情况，并采取了一些措施，确保他们接受专门教官的充分培训。
The incorporation of his engineers into a regularly constituted arm of the service, possessed of its own officers and troops and its distinctive uniform, was something for which he struggled, though with little success, throughout his career.15 His recommendations, however, bore fruit in the following century, as did also his efforts in the matter of scientific education for the technical corps. He enthusiastically praised the earliest artillery schools which were created toward the end of the reign of Louis XIV; and though he never succeeded in creating similar schools for the engineers, he established a system of regular examinations to test the preparation of candidates for the royal brevet, and took some steps to see that they were adequately prepared by special instructors.
作为一名攻城术专家，他对改进炮兵部队抱有浓厚的兴趣。他在这一领域的研究和创新不胜枚举。他试验过用雪橇运输重型火炮。他指出了当时使用的青铜炮的缺陷，并试图说服陆军效仿海军使用铁炮。他对一种新型投石迫击炮进行了多次试验，但均未取得令人满意的结果。最终，他发明了跳弹射击，并在菲利普斯堡围城战中首次应用。这种射击方式大幅减少了发射药的装药量，使炮弹在击中目标区域后四处反弹，对附近的人员和机械造成威胁。
Improvement of the artillery arm was a matter in which, as an expert on siegecraft, he was deeply interested. His studies and innovations in this field were numerous. He experimented with sledges for use in transporting heavy cannon. He found fault with the bronze cannon then in use, and tried to persuade the army to emulate the navy in the use of iron. He made numerous, but unsatisfactory, experiments on a new stone-throwing mortar. And finally he invented ricochet fire, first used at the siege of Philipsbourg, where the propelling charge was greatly reduced so that the ball would rebound this way and that after striking the target area, a peril to any man or machine in the near vicinity.
沃邦在他的信件和《奥伊西韦特》一书中，为步兵和整个军队提出了许多根本性的改革建议。他是步兵使用燧发枪最不遗余力的倡导者之一，也是第一支令人满意的刺刀的发明者。早在1669年，他就致信卢瓦，强烈敦促普遍使用燧发枪并废除长矛；此后不久，他又明确提出用一种带有套筒或插槽的刺刀来取代长矛，这种刺刀的刀刃固定在枪管侧面，使得枪支可以在刺刀固定的情况下射击。
Vauban found space in his correspondence and in the Oisivetés to suggest numerous fundamental reforms for the infantry and for the army as a whole. He was one of the most tireless advocates of the flintlock musket for the infantry and was the inventor of the first satisfactory bayonet. As early as 1669 he wrote to Louvois strongly urging the general use of flintlocks and the abolition of the pike; and shortly thereafter he specifically proposed to substitute for the pike the familiar bayonet with a sleeve or socket that held the blade at the side of the barrel, permitting the piece to be fired with bayonet fixed.
他非常关注士兵的状况和福利，以及他们的装备。他力求进一步改进军队的招募和薪饷方式。限制士兵驻扎在平民百姓中的做法，部分归功于他。在亚琛和约签订后，军营的建设进一步完善了这一做法。<sup>16</sup>这些特殊的营房，其中许多是由沃邦设计建造的，主要用于边境地区和新近征服的领土。
He was preoccupied with the condition and welfare of the men as well as with their equipment. He sought to improve still further the mode of recruiting and paying the troops. To him is due in part the limitation of the practice of quartering soldiers on the civilian population which, after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, was supplemented by the creation of casernes.16 These special barracks, many of them designed and built by Vauban, were chiefly used in frontier regions and recently conquered territory.
沃邦并未对海军建造进行系统研究，他所掌握的知识似乎都来自克莱维尔，后者精于此道。<sup> 17</sup>他最初的尝试是在土伦，他改进了港口设施，但他的杰作是敦刻尔克港。他曾对桨帆船的海军作用进行过深入研究，设想将其用途从地中海扩展到大西洋沿岸，使其可以作为巡逻舰、近岸重型舰船的移动屏障，或对奥克尼群岛甚至英国海岸进行快速骚扰。与这些研究密切相关的是他对“航海战争”（guerre de course）的倡导，他认为在科尔贝苦心建立的法国海军力量崩溃之后，航海战争是唯一可行的战略。
Vauban made no systematic study of naval construction, and what he knew seems to have been learned from Clerville who was skilled in this sort of work.17 His first effort was at Toulon, where he improved the harbor installations, but his masterpiece was the port of Dunkirk. He devoted an interesting study to the naval role of galleys, in which he envisaged extending their use from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic coast, where they could serve as patrol vessels, as a mobile screen for heavier ships close to shore, or for swift harassing descents upon the Orkneys, or even upon the English coast. Closely related to these studies was his advocacy of the guerre de course, which he deemed the only feasible strategy after the collapse of the French naval power painstakingly built up by Colbert.
第七章
VII
正如人们所预料的那样，沃邦对战争艺术最重要的贡献体现在他自己的专长领域：攻城术和筑城学。沃邦厌恶不必要的流血，这既体现在他所处的时代开始盛行的战争节制精神，也体现在他攻城术的创新旨在规范攻城，尤其要减少围城部队的伤亡。在他完善平行防御体系（这套体系可能并非他发明）之前，进攻防御严密的永久性工事往往要付出巨大的代价。18战壕和石笼的使用缺乏系统性，步兵常常被随意地投入到假定的薄弱点，从而暴露在致命的火力之下。
Vauban's most significant contributions to the art of war were made, as was to be expected, within his own specialties: siegecraft and the science of fortification. It was characteristic of Vauban's dislike of unnecessary bloodshed, as much as of the new spirit of moderation in warfare that was beginning to prevail in his day, that his innovations in siegecraft were designed to regularize the taking of fortresses and above all to cut down the losses of the besieging force. Before his perfection of the system of parallels, which he probably did not invent, attacks on well-defended permanent fortifications took place only at a considerable cost to the attackers.18 Trenches and gabions were employed without system, and as often as not the infantry was thrown against a presumed weak point in a manner that left them exposed to murderous fire.
沃邦的进攻体系在十八世纪几乎被完全沿用，其流程高度程式化且较为缓慢。进攻者将人员和物资集结在防御火力范围之外，并利用天然或人工掩体进行充分隐蔽。工兵在此开始挖掘战壕，并缓慢地向要塞推进。战壕推进一段距离后，工兵会垂直于进攻战壕，平行于未来的进攻点挖掘一条深壕。这条所谓的“第一平行壕”内会部署人员和装备，形成一个“武器库”。之后，进攻战壕会从这里再次向前推进，呈之字形接近要塞。推进到预定距离后，工兵会挖掘第二平行壕，并再次推进战壕，直到在距离堡垒底部不远处挖掘出第三条，通常也是最后一条平行壕。战壕被进一步推进，工兵们精心把握时机，在敌军占据第三纬线的同时抵达冰碛丘脚下。沿着冰碛丘向上推进是一项极其危险的任务，因为敌军从隐蔽通道向他们猛烈扫射。为了完成这项任务，工兵们建造了名为“冰碛丘骑兵”（cavaliers de tranchées）的临时工事。这些高耸的土方工事设有胸墙，围攻者可以从胸墙上向隐蔽通道的守军开火。这条外围防线可以通过“工业化”（par industrie）的方式清除，即利用跳弹轰炸敌军，或者派遣掷弹兵在“冰碛丘骑兵”的火力掩护下发起突击。一旦敌军的隐蔽通道被攻占，工兵们便会架设攻城炮，并试图突破敌军的主要防御工事。
Vauban's system of attack, which was followed with but little variation during the eighteenth century, was a highly formalized and leisurely procedure. The assailants gathered their men and stores at a point beyond the range of the defending fire and adequately concealed by natural or artificial cover. At this point the sappers would begin digging a trench that moved slowly toward the fortress. After this had progressed some distance, a deep trench paralleling the point of future attack was flung out at right angles to the trench of approach. This so-called first parallel was filled with men and equipment to constitute a place d'armes. From it, the trench of approach was moved forward again, zigzagging as it approached the fortress. After it had progressed the desired distance, the second parallel was constructed, and the trench was moved forward once more, until a third and usually final parallel was constructed only a short distance from the foot of the glacis. The trench was pushed ahead still further, the sappers timing their progress so as to reach the foot of the glacis just as the third parallel was occupied by the troops. The perilous task of advancing up the glacis, exposed to the enemy's raking fire from their covered way, was accomplished with the aid of temporary structures called cavaliers de tranchées, which were high earthworks, provided with a parapet, from which the besiegers could fire upon the defenders of the covered way. This outer line of defense could be cleared par industrie, that is, by subjecting the defenders to the effects of a ricochet bombardment, or by sending up grenadiers to take the position by assault under cover of a protecting fire from the cavaliers. Once the enemy's covered way was seized, siege batteries were erected and an effort was made to breach the main defenses.
因此，沃邦攻城体系的核心在于运用临时防御工事、战壕和土方工事来保护推进的部队。他的类似策略最早于1673年的马斯特里赫特围城战中得到实践，随后在1684年的卢森堡围城战中，由“战壕骑士”（cavaliers de tranchées）运用。这套完善的体系在其1705年为勃艮第公爵撰写的《围城论》（Traité des sièges）中得到了详尽的描述。
The essential feature of Vauban's system of siegecraft, then, was the use he made of temporary fortifications, trenches, and earthworks in protecting the advancing troops. His parallels were first tried out at the siege of Maestricht in 1673, and the cavaliers de tranchées at the siege of Luxembourg in 1684. The perfected system is described at length in his Traité des sièges, written for the Duc de Bourgogne in 1705.
沃邦在军事建筑方面的作品一直备受争议，首先是他的堡垒风格是否展现了极大的原创性，其次是他在建造堡垒时是否遵循了保卫法国的总体规划。
Vauban's work in military architecture has been the subject of considerable dispute, first as to whether the style of his fortresses showed great originality, second as to whether in placing them he was guided by any master plan for the defense of France.
直到最近，即使是沃邦最热情的拥护者也一致认为，作为一名军事建筑师，他缺乏原创性，几乎没有对从帕甘那里继承来的要塞设计进行任何创新。拉扎尔·卡诺对沃邦的欣赏方式与其他十八世纪工程师一样，但他也几乎找不到任何原创性的迹象。“沃邦的防御工事乍看之下只是在他之前就已经存在的一系列作品，但在善于观察的人看来，它却展现出卓越的成果、巧妙的组合和精湛的工艺。” <sup>19</sup>阿伦特也赞同他的观点：“更好的横截面、更简洁的轮廓、更大更合理的外围工事：这些是他对当时使用的体系所做的唯一改进。”<sup> 20</sup>这种评价一直流行到最近。最近一项严肃的研究，即拉扎尔中校的研究，修正了这种略显负面的观点，使之对沃邦更有利。<sup> 21</sup>
Until very recently even Vauban's most fervent admirers have agreed that he showed little originality as a military architect and added almost nothing to the design of fortresses he inherited from Pagan. Lazare Carnot admired Vauban in the manner characteristic of other eighteenth-century engineers, yet he could find few signs of originality. “The fortification of Vauban reveals to the eye only a succession of works known before his time, whereas to the mind of the good observer it offers sublime results, brilliant combinations, and masterpieces of industry.”19 Allent echoes him: “A better cross section, a simpler outline, outworks that are bigger and better placed: these are the only modifications that he brought to the system then in use.”20 This judgment remained in vogue until very recent times. The most recent serious study, that of Lieutenant Colonel Lazard, has modified in Vauban's favor this somewhat unfavorable opinion.21
拉扎尔对我们解读沃邦的防御工事方法做出了重要修正。此前的学者习惯于提及沃邦的三种防御体系，但拉扎尔指出，严格来说，沃邦并没有明确的体系；相反，他曾不同时期偏爱截然不同的设计，所有这些设计都是对上文讨论过的棱堡式防御工事的改进。考虑到这一限制，保留原有的分类方式更为妥当。
Lazard has made important changes in our interpretation of Vauban's methods of fortification. Whereas earlier writers have had the habit of referring to Vauban's three systems, Lazard points out that, strictly speaking, Vauban did not have sharply defined systems; rather, he had periods in which he favored distinctly different designs, all modifications of the bastioned trace discussed above. With this restriction in mind, it is convenient to retain the old classification.
沃邦的第一套防御体系，也是他建造绝大多数防御工事所依据的体系，几乎完全照搬了帕甘的模式。这些堡垒的轮廓尽可能地采用正多边形：八边形、四边形，甚至像拉凯诺克堡垒那样近似三角形。棱堡仍然是防御体系的关键，尽管它们往往比沃邦前人的棱堡要小。除了细节上的改进和更多地使用独立的外部防御工事（例如塔奈尔和半月形防御工事，以及托比叔叔词典里提到的其他一些术语）之外，自帕甘时代以来，几乎没有什么变化。因此，由于沃邦的大多数建筑都是按照这种保守的设计建造的，而且这种设计也被认为是沃邦作品的典型特征，所以后来的评论家们认为这些建筑缺乏原创性也就不足为奇了。拉扎德认为，沃邦的原创性更多地体现在另外两种风格上，这两种风格对沃邦的后继者影响甚微，并且只在他的少数作品中有所体现。
Vauban's first system, according to which he built the great majority of his fortified places, consisted in using Pagan's trace almost without modification. The outlines of these forts were, whenever possible, regular polygons: octagonal, quadrangular, even roughly triangular, as at La Kenoque. The bastions were still the key to the defensive system, though they tended to be smaller than those of Vauban's predecessors. Except for improvements of detail and the greater use of detached exterior defenses (such as the tenailles and the demi-lune, and other items in Uncle Toby's lexicon), little had altered since the days of Pagan. Since, therefore, most of Vauban's structures were built according to this conservative design, and since this was taken as characteristic of Vauban's work, it is not to be wondered at that later critics could find there little or no originality. The originality, according to Lazard, is evident rather in those other two styles that had little influence on Vauban's successors and that were exemplified in only a few samples of his work.
第二种防御体系最早用于贝尔福和贝桑松，是在先前体系的基础上发展而来的。它保留了多边形结构，但加长了城墙（堡垒之间的区域），堡垒本身则被角上的小型工事或塔楼所取代，这些工事或塔楼又被建在壕沟中的所谓独立堡垒所覆盖。
The second system, used for the first time at Belfort and Besançon, was an outgrowth of that previously used. The polygonal structure was retained, but the curtains (the region between the bastions) were lengthened, and the bastions themselves were replaced by a small work or tower at the angles, these being covered by so-called detached bastions constructed in the ditch.
所谓的第三种防御体系只是第二种体系的改进版。它仅用于一项工程，即沃邦在诺夫布里萨赫的伟大杰作。在该体系中，城墙的形状有所改变，以便更多地使用火炮进行防御，同时塔楼、独立棱堡和半月形堡垒的规模也都扩大了。
The so-called third system is only a modification of the second. It was used for only a single work, the great masterpiece of Vauban at Neuf-Brisach. In this scheme the curtain is modified in shape to permit an increased use of cannon in defense, and the towers, the detached bastions, and demi-lunes are all increased in size.
真正值得我们关注的是第二种防御体系。尽管当时的同代人未能察觉，但沃邦在此体系中做出了一项重要乃至革命性的改进：他摆脱了对主城墙的依赖，迈出了纵深防御的第一步。他获得了更大的灵活性，能够根据地形调整防御设计，同时又不危及主防线。此前，所有对地形的调整都依赖于突出的冠状工事或角状工事，这些工事仅仅是主城墙的华丽附属物；而一旦这些工事被攻破，主防线便会直接受到影响。第二种体系遭到了科尔蒙田的反对，后来又遭到了梅济耶尔学院的反对。梅济耶尔学院的思想主导了十八世纪，他们的防御工事设计完全基于沃邦的第一种体系。在他们看来，第二种体系只不过是对中世纪防御方法的粗糙回归。直到十八世纪后期，我们才看到沃邦第二体系的复兴：蒙塔朗贝尔的改革（德国人早在法国人之前就接受了这一改革）主要在于用小型独立堡垒取代了传统的突出外墙工事，而这些工事实际上是主城墙的一部分。<sup>22</sup>蒙塔朗贝尔的伟大变革，如同后来对纵深防御工事的倡导一样，都隐含在沃邦的第二体系中，尽管蒙塔朗贝尔是否受到其启发尚存疑问。
It is the second system that deserves our attention. Here, although his contemporaries could not see it, Vauban had made an important, even revolutionary improvement: he had freed himself from reliance on the main enceinte and taken the first steps toward a defense in depth. He had gained a new flexibility in adapting his design to the terrain without imperiling the main line of defense. In all previous cases adaptation had been through projecting crown works or horn works that were merely spectacular appendages to the primary enceinte; and when these were taken the main line was directly affected. The second system was rejected by Cormontaigne and later by the staff of the Ecole de Mézières, whose ideas dominated the eighteenth century, and whose schemes of fortification were based squarely upon Vauban's first system. To them this second system seemed only a crude return to medieval methods. Only late in the eighteenth century do we find a revival of Vauban's second system: the revolt of Montalembert, which the Germans accepted long before the French, consisted chiefly in substituting small detached forts in place of the conventional projecting outworks, in reality part of the main enceinte.22 Montalembert's great revolution, like the later advocacy of fortification in depth, was implicit in Vauban's second system, though whether Montalembert was inspired by it may well be doubted.
直到最近，人们对沃邦思想的理解仍然存在诸多困惑，这源于沃邦从未撰写过关于永久防御工事的专著，也从未像阐述其攻防理论那样系统地阐述过这一领域。在他生前及身后出现的所有声称总结其秘诀的书籍，都是彻头彻尾的赝品。只有贝利多尔的巨著——该书并非探讨基本设计或军事部署问题，而仅关注建造问题和管理细节——才是直接受到沃邦启发。然而，现存的两部手稿论述了防御工事的基本原理，并直接受到沃邦的启发。其中一部由数学家索沃尔撰写，他是沃邦钦点的导师，负责指导和考核工程师候选人；另一部则由沃邦的秘书托马辛撰写。除了沃邦的著作本身，这两部手稿是了解沃邦防御工事基本原理的最佳资料来源。我们只能谈论一些普遍原则，而非教条式的体系，而沃邦的三种防御风格都很好地体现了这些原则。这些原则数量不多，而且相当普遍。首先，堡垒的每个部分都必须同样安全，这种安全既体现在坚固的棱堡结构上，也体现在城墙的充分覆盖上。一般来说，如果满足以下条件，就能满足这些要求：（1）城墙的每个部分都由防御工事环绕；（2）这些防御工事尽可能大；（3）它们之间的距离至少为一支火枪的射程。这些防御工事的设计应确保侧翼部分始终尽可能直接地面向其保护的部分；反之，侧翼部分只能从受保护的部分看到。稍加思考便会发现，这些基本原则适用于沃邦的所有防御方案。建造永久性防御工事的实际问题在于，如何使棱堡式防御工事（或带有独立棱堡的多边形防御工事）适应特定地形的需要，同时又不违背任何基本原则。显然，这赋予了工程师极大的自由度和令人钦佩的灵活性。正是通过这种工作方法，第二种防御风格得以发展，因为沃邦本人告诉我们，这种风格并非源于理论考量，而是贝尔福的地形条件迫使他采用的。<sup> 24</sup>
The confusion about his ideas that has existed until recently results from the fact that Vauban never wrote a treatise on the art of permanent fortification, never expounded it systematically as he did his theories of the art of attack and of defense. All the books that appeared in his own lifetime and thereafter, purporting to summarize his secrets, were the baldest counterfeits. Only the great work of Bélidor, which treated not of basic design or the problems of military disposition, but only of constructional problems and administrative detail, was directly inspired by Vauban.23 There are, however, two treatises remaining in manuscript that deal with basic principles of fortification and that were directly inspired by him. One of these was written by Sauveur, the mathematician whom Vauban chose to instruct and to examine the engineer candidates; the other by his secretary, Thomassin. These are the best sources, aside from the works themselves, for learning Vauban's general principles of fortification. It is possible to speak only of general principles, not of a dogmatic system, and these principles are exemplified equally well by all three of the Vauban styles. They are few enough and quite general. First of all, every part of the fort must be as secure as every other, with security provided both through sturdy construction of the exposed points (bastions) and by adequate coverage of the curtains. In general these conditions will be provided for if (1) there is no part of the enceinte not flanked by strong points, (2) these strong points are as large as possible, and (3) they are separated by musket range or a little less. These strong points should be so designed that the parts which flank should always confront as directly as possible the parts they are protecting; conversely, the flanking parts should be visible only from the protected parts. A little thought will show that these basic principles are applicable to all of Vauban's schemes. The actual problem of building a permanent fortification consisted in so adapting the bastioned trace (or the polygonal trace with detached bastions) to the exigencies of a particular terrain that none of the basic principles was violated. Clearly this left the engineer a wide range of freedom and an admirable flexibility. It was by this method of work that the second style was developed, for Vauban himself tells us that it was not arrived at as a result of theoretical considerations but was forced on him by the terrain conditions at Belfort.24
第八
VIII
路易十四的军事建设计划在多大程度上受到某种统一战略构想的指导？如果真有这样的构想，又有什么证据表明它源于沃邦的天才设计？这两个问题至关重要，但却并不容易回答。
To what extent was the military building program of Louis XIV guided by some unifying strategic conception; and what is the evidence that his conception, if in truth there was such a thing, was due to the genius of Vauban? These are two of the most important questions, but they are not the easiest to answer.
早期的沃邦传记作者们，出于对这位英雄的偏爱，常常给人留下这样的印象：在沃邦之前，法国根本没有像样的防御体系；而他晚年环绕王国的堡垒群，则是这位伟大工程师精心构思的宏伟蓝图的完美体现。在这些作者看来，除了沃邦之外，竟然还有人参与组织这套防御体系，这简直令人难以置信；而这套体系本身，也并非历史缓慢发展的结果。
The earlier biographers of Vauban, with characteristic impetuosity on behalf of their hero, leave us sometimes with the distinct impression that before Vauban France had no system of fortification worthy of the name, and that the ring of fortresses girding the kingdom by the end of his career represented the execution of some cleverly conceived master plan sprung from the mind of the great engineer. To these writers it was just as incredible that anyone besides Vauban could have had a hand in organizing this defensive system as it was that this system itself might have been the result of a slow historical growth.
近来，我们或许矫枉过正了。虽然如我们所见，近期的研究提升了沃邦作为军事建筑师的技术声誉，但与此同时，一些学者却倾向于将他贬低为一位缺乏战略想象力的伟大工匠。他们把他描绘成一位技艺精湛的技术员，盲目地执行历史需要或上级命令所规定的任务，而所有战略思考都出自上级之手。
Of late we have drifted perhaps too far in the other direction. Although, as we have seen, Vauban's technical reputation as a military architect has been enhanced by recent studies, there has been a simultaneous tendency on the part of certain writers to reduce him to the level of a great craftsman devoid of strategic imagination. He has been represented as a brilliant technician, executing blindly the tasks dictated by historical necessity or by the orders of superiors who alone did all the strategic thinking.
谁能在沃邦的专业领域挑战他的权威？答案是国王本人。事实证明，路易十四精通筑城术。他年轻时就学习过这门技艺，并在统治初期受益于蒂雷纳、维勒鲁瓦和孔代的建议和指导。在他的一生中，他对筑城术的每一个细节都保持着浓厚的兴趣，并且多次坚决反对沃邦的坚持。路易堡和皇家山堡这两座重要的堡垒都是在国王的倡议下建造的，其中至少有一座是违背了沃邦的明确建议。25 在一位作者看来，勤勉的路易十四在所有方面，甚至包括这些技术问题上，都是无可争议的大师。卢瓦只不过是个“优秀的仆人，甚至可以说是办事员”，而沃邦则“始终只是命令的执行者，尽管……他执行得非常出色”。<sup> 26</sup>另一位作者将沃邦描述为“一项伟大工程的总负责人，但这项工程的指挥权从未完全交给他”。<sup>27</sup>这种解释实际上是无可辩驳的。沃邦绘制或修改了所有已确定的要塞设计图；他提交了技术报告和建议；他被征询意见时，有时甚至在未被征询意见时，都会就关键问题发表意见。但在讨论决策时，他的参与并非必要。他并非决策者；他只是一个顾问。
Who was there who was capable of challenging Vauban's authority in the field of his speciality? The answer is, the king himself. Louis XIV, it has been shown, was more than decently proficient in the art of fortification. He had studied it in his youth, and, during the early part of the reign, he had profited by the advice and instruction of Turenne, Villeroi, and Condé. Throughout his career he showed a constant interest in the most humble details connected with the art of fortification and on a number of occasions he resolutely opposed insistent recommendations of Vauban. Two important forts, Fort Louis and Mont-Royal, were created on the initiative of the king, and one at least of these was against the express advice of Vauban.25 To one author, Louis the Diligent was in everything, even in these technical matters, the unquestioned master. Louvois was only an “excellent servant, not to say clerk,” while Vauban in his turn “was never anything but the executor of his orders, albeit…an excellent one.”26 Another writer describes Vauban as “the chief workman of a great undertaking, the direction of which was never fully entrusted to him.”27 This interpretation is in fact inescapable. Vauban drew or corrected all plans for fortresses that had been decided upon; he submitted technical memoirs and recommendations; he gave his opinion on crucial matters when asked and sometimes when he was not asked. But his presence was not deemed necessary when the decisions were being debated. He was not a policy maker; his was only a consultative voice.
这不应使我们低估沃邦对王室决策的影响。然而，即便沃邦确实有一个保卫法国的宏伟计划，也只能是差强人意。许多沃邦珍视的建议都被否决了；他的许多计划都被战争和外交的现实所粉碎。例如，1697年的里斯维克和约标志着路易十四首次从征服的巅峰时期撤退。对于沃邦而言，由于他并未被直接征询有关条约条款的意见，因此，尽管该条约没有他预想的那么糟糕，但仍然是一个巨大的骗局。为了弥补失去卢森堡（他认为卢森堡是欧洲最坚固的堡垒之一）以及布里萨赫、弗里堡和南锡的损失，法国不得不进行大量的重建工作。<sup> 28</sup>
This should not lead us to underestimate his influence upon the royal decisions. Yet even if Vauban had had a master plan for the defense of France, it could only have been imperfectly executed. Many recommendations dear to Vauban's heart were rejected; many of his schemes were shattered by the realities of war and diplomacy. The Peace of Ryswick in 1697, for example, marked Louis XIV's first withdrawal from the high watermark of conquest. To Vauban, who was not directly consulted about its terms, this treaty, though not as bad as he feared, was a great deception. Much work had to be done over to make up for the loss of Luxembourg—which he considered one of the strongest places in Europe—and of Brisach, Fribourg, and Nancy.28
沃邦真的有一个总体规划吗？对此，几乎存在完全不同的观点。上个世纪的学者们普遍认为沃邦的要塞布局遵循着某种战略模式，尽管他们并不完全确定其具体内容。一位学者将其描述为“一系列彼此足够接近的工事，使得工事之间的空隙并非毫无防备。每座工事都足够坚固，物资充足，足以迫使敌人进行围攻，但规模又足够小，只需少量守军即可。” <sup>29</sup>加斯顿·泽勒对此解释持完全不同意见。他指出，路易十四和沃邦并非从零开始，他们二人不可能在不参考前人工作的情况下，强加一套教条式的防御方案；他还指出，该防御体系的许多特征都源于弗朗索瓦一世、苏利、黎塞留和马扎林等人的建筑计划和条约。正如路易十四时期法国的实际疆界是长期国家政策的最终体现，要塞城镇的布局也是“王国为适应不断变化的疆界而不断调整防御体系的长期努力的结果”。<sup> 30</sup>泽勒认为要塞体系是历史演进的产物，而非某个人一手缔造的，而沃邦本人的经历便印证了这一观点。我们所熟知的沃邦要塞大多并非新建的要塞，而是更古老的要塞，其中一些甚至可以追溯到埃拉尔或他的意大利前辈，沃邦对其进行了现代化改造和加固。沃邦发现的这些要塞，在任何意义上都算不上一个体系；它们的重要性仅仅在于各自独立的单元。要塞之间没有任何联系，而且彼此之间几乎总是相距甚远。此外，每个要塞的选址都基于其局部重要性：守卫桥梁、十字路口或两条河流的交汇处。它们的总价值不取决于它们的相对位置，而是取决于它们的数量。31泽勒和拉扎尔都认为，沃邦的总体规划源于对这些要塞的甄选。他通过选择一些位置优越、值得保留和加固的要塞，并建议拆除其他要塞，从而在当时的混乱局面中建立起秩序。他的战略构想无法完全自由地运作；他受到限制——主要是出于公共经济的考量——只能利用法国已有的资源。很容易发现指导他甄选过程的原则，从而找到他战略思维的关键。泽勒认为这些原则并无过人之处；沃邦所实现的“秩序”远称不上伟大的战略构想。但拉扎尔则给予了更高的评价。他认为沃邦是历史上第一个对要塞的战略作用有整体认识的人。他不仅是一位工程师，更是一位战略家，而且他的思想远远超越了他所处的时代。只有沃邦本人的著作才能让读者在这两种解读之间做出选择。
Did Vauban in reality have a master plan? On this question there is almost complete disagreement. The writers of the last century took it for granted that Vauban had a strategic pattern for his fortresses, though they were not altogether certain in what it consisted. One writer described it as “an assemblage of works sufficiently close to one another so that the intervals between them are not unprotected. Each of these works is strong enough and well provisioned enough to impose upon the enemy the obligation of a siege, yet small enough to demand only a small number of defenders.”29 With this interpretation Gaston Zeller is in categorical disagreement. He points out that Louis XIV and Vauban did not start work with a clean canvas, that neither of these men could have imposed a doctrinaire plan of defense without reference to the work that had gone before; and he indicates that many of the characteristics of the defense system were due to Francis I, Sully, Richelieu, and Mazarin, to their building programs and their treaties. Just as the actual frontier of the France of Louis XIV was the culmination of a long-sustained national policy, just so the disposition of the fortress towns was “the resultant of a long succession of efforts to adapt the defensive organization of the kingdom to the changing outline of the frontier.”30 In support of Zeller's contention that the fortress system was the work of historical evolution, not the work of a single man, is the evidence from the career of Vauban himself. The greatest number of strongholds that we associate with him were not places neuves but older fortresses, some dating back to Errard or his Italian predecessors, that Vauban modernized and strengthened. The fortresses did not in any sense constitute a system as Vauban found them; they were important only as separate units. There was no liaison between them and they were almost always too far apart. Each situation, moreover, had been chosen for its local importance: to guard a bridge, a crossroads, or the confluence of two rivers. Their total value depended not on their relative positions but rather upon their number.31 Zeller and Lazard both agreed that Vauban's general scheme resulted from a process of selection from among these fortresses. He made order out of prevailing chaos by choosing certain forts whose positions made them worth retaining and strengthening, and by suggesting that others be razed. His strategic vision could not work with complete freedom; he was limited—largely for reasons of public economy—to working with what France already possessed. It is easy to discover the principles that guided his process of selection and thus to find the key to his strategic thinking. To Zeller there is nothing outstanding about these principles; the “order” that Vauban effected fell far short of a great strategic conception. But Lazard is much more flattering. He takes the view that Vauban was the first man in history to have an overall notion of the strategic role of fortresses. He was not only an engineer but a stratège, and one with ideas far in advance of his own day.32 Only Vauban's own writings can allow the reader to decide between these two interpretations.
应当记住，由于与西班牙的继承权战争（路易十四的第一场征服战争），路易十四将其领土沿西北边境向西班牙控制的佛兰德斯地区深处扩张。从靠近海岸的富尔内向东，途经贝尔格和科特赖，直至沙勒罗瓦，这些新据点使法国在西班牙驻军之间形成了一系列坚固的堡垒。沃邦的首要任务是加强和巩固这些新获得的据点，这占据了他在1668年至1672年和平时期的大部分时间。然而，在1672年春天，路易十四发动了对荷兰的战争。沃邦借此机会首次提出了边境总体规划的问题。在1673年1月20日写给卢瓦的一封信中，他写道：“陛下，说真的，国王应该认真考虑一下如何完善他的领土。这种友军和敌军要塞混杂在一起的局面让我非常不满意。您有义务维护三座要塞，而不是一座。”<sup> 33</sup>
It should be remembered that as a result of the War of Devolution against Spain, his first war of conquest, Louis XIV extended his holdings along the northwest frontier deep into Spanish-held Flanders. The new positions—from Furnes near the coast eastward through Bergues and Courtrai to Charleroi—gave France a number of strong points scattered among the Spanish garrisons. Vauban's first great task was to strengthen and refortify these new acquisitions, and this occupied most of his time during the peaceful years from 1668 to 1672. In the spring of 1672, however, Louis launched his war against the Dutch. Vauban took the opportunity to raise for the first time the question of the general organization of the frontier. In a letter to Louvois, dated January 20, 1673, he wrote: “Seriously, my lord, the king should think seriously about rounding out his domain [songer à faire son pré carré]. This confusion of friendly and enemy fortresses mixed up pell-mell with one another does not please me at all. You are obliged to maintain three in the place of one.”33
1675年，沃邦忙于巩固法国在弗朗什-孔泰及其他地区的征服成果，并提出了更为具体的建议。同年9月，他提议围攻孔代、布尚、瓦朗谢讷和康布雷。他认为，攻占并守住这些地方将确保路易十四的征服成果，并形成他梦寐以求的“方格地带”（pré carré）。这些城镇随后相继被攻克：孔代和布尚于1676年被攻克，瓦朗谢讷和康布雷于1677年被攻克。次年8月签订的《尼姆韦根和约》使法国的边界大致符合“方格地带”的划分。法国放弃了一些佛兰德斯的领土，但获得了圣奥梅尔、卡塞尔、艾尔、伊普尔以及其他六座重要的要塞。在东部，法国获得了洛林的南锡和莱茵河对岸的弗里堡。但沃邦对西部边境的状况并不满意；他认为近期的和平破坏了边境，使其向低地敞开。1678年11月，在尼姆韦根战役三个月后，他撰写了一系列关于北部边境（从英吉利海峡到默兹河）规划的重要总论，这是其中的第一篇。<sup> 34</sup>
In 1675, a year that saw him busy consolidating French conquests in Franche Comté and elsewhere, Vauban made more specific suggestions. In September of that year he proposed the sieges of Condé, Bouchain, Valenciennes, and Cambrai. The capture and retention of these places would, he said, assure Louis's conquests and produce the pré carré that was so desirable. These towns were accordingly taken: Condé and Bouchain in 1676, Valenciennes and Cambrai in 1677. The Peace of Nimwegen, signed in August of the following year, gave France a frontier approximating the pré carré. France gave up some Flemish holdings but acquired instead Saint-Omer, Cassel, Aire, Ypres, and a half-dozen other important strongholds. To the eastward were gained Nancy in Lorraine and Fribourg across the Rhine. But Vauban was not satisfied with the western end of the frontier; he felt that the recent peace had disrupted it and left it open toward the Lowlands. In November 1678, three months after Nimwegen, he wrote the first of a series of important general statements on the organization of the northern frontier from the Channel to the Meuse.34
沃邦首先探讨了设防边境的目的：它应该封锁所有进入王国的入口，同时便于对敌方领土发动进攻。沃邦从未认为要塞仅仅具有防御功能；他着重强调要塞作为进攻敌方行动基地的重要性。要塞的选址应能控制本国境内的交通要道，并通过控制重要道路或桥头堡来进入敌方领土。要塞的规模应足以容纳防御所需的物资，以及维持和保障以要塞为基础的进攻所需的补给。这些在回忆录中简明扼要阐述的观点，后来被沃邦的一位十八世纪弟子——工程师兼冒险家梅格雷——进一步阐述和系统化。伏尔泰在其著作《查理十二世》中提到了梅格雷，而梅格雷的《论以要塞维护国家安全》则成为论述要塞战略意义的经典著作。这本书鲜为人知，却被著名的法国军事工程学院——梅济耶尔学院（Ecole de Mézières）所采用。书中，梅格雷写道：“最好的堡垒是既能阻止敌人进入己方领土，又能提供机会在敌方领土上发动攻击的堡垒。”<sup> 35</sup>他列举了堡垒的价值和重要性：控制通往王国的关键通道，例如山谷或隘口；控制大河上的桥头堡，例如斯特拉斯堡就完美地满足了这一条件；控制国内重要的交通线路，例如卢森堡，它保障了皇帝与低地地区的交通。
Vauban opens by discussing the purposes of a fortified frontier: it should close to the enemy all the points of entry into the kingdom and at the same time facilitate an attack upon enemy territory. Vauban never thought that fortresses were important solely for defense; he was careful to stress their importance as bases for offensive operations against the enemy. The fortified places should be situated so as to command the means of communication within one's own territory and to provide access to enemy soil by controlling important roads or bridgeheads. They should be large enough to hold not only the supplies necessary for their defense, but the stores required to support and sustain an offensive based upon them. These ideas, enunciated tersely in this memoir, were later elaborated and systematized by one of Vauban's eighteenth-century disciples, the engineer and adventurer Maigret, whom Voltaire mentions in his Charles XII and whose Treatise on Preserving the Security of States by Means of Fortresses became the standard work dealing with the strategic significance of fortifications. This book, all too little known, was used by the famous French school of military engineering, the Ecole de Mé-zières. In this work Maigret writes that “the best kind of fortresses are those that forbid access to one's country while at the same time giving an opportunity to attack the enemy in his own territory.”35 He lists the characteristics that give value and importance to fortresses: control of key routes into the kingdom, such as a mountain gorge or pass; control of the bridgeheads on great rivers, a condition eminently fulfilled by Strasbourg, for example; control of important communication lines within the state, as for example, Luxembourg, which secured the emperor's communications with the Lowlands.
还有其他一些因素可能使一座堡垒变得重要。它可能是进攻行动的补给基地，或是周边乡村居民的避难所；或许它能主导贸易和商业，向外国人征收通行费；又或许它是一个拥有良好安全港湾的设防海港；一座富裕的边境大城市，完全有能力承担防御工事和驻军的费用；或者一座能够为国王提供储存财宝以抵御内外敌人的城市。36当然，堡垒的价值在很大程度上取决于其地理位置。技术或科学或许可以弥补地形上的某些缺陷，但在交通方面却无能为力。因此，某些堡垒选址有利，因为守军能够很好地控制通往堡垒的交通要道，而敌人则因此难以运送维持围攻所需的补给。37
There were still other factors that might make a fort important. It might be a base of supplies for offensive action, or a refuge for the people of the surrounding countryside; perhaps it could dominate trade and commerce, exacting tolls from the foreigner; or perhaps it might be a fortified seaport with a good and safe harbor; a great frontier city with wealth, more than able to contribute the cost of fortification and sustaining the garrison; or a city capable of serving the king as a place to store his treasure against internal and external enemies.36 The value of a fortress depends in large part, of course, upon the nature of its local situation. Art or science may make up for certain defects in the terrain but they can do little with respect to the matter of communication. Thus certain fortresses are advantageously situated because the defenders have the communications leading to them well under their control, whereas the enemy, in consequence, will have difficulty in bringing up the supplies necessary for a sustained siege.37
这些标准使得优先选择某些要塞成为可能，但它们之间的关系，即彼此间的联系，仍然存在问题。沃邦在1678年的回忆录中总结道，如果将要塞限制在两条线上，每条线由大约13个要塞组成，并模仿步兵的作战序列横跨北部边境，那么边境的防御就足够牢固了。<sup> 38</sup>第一道防线可以通过利用从大海延伸到斯海尔德河的水线来进一步加强和统一。运河或人工开凿的溪流或河流将各个要塞连接起来，而运河本身则以固定的间隔由棱堡保护。这一方案并非沃邦首创；事实上，在他写作之时，它已经在部分边境地区投入使用。他对防线的坚固程度毫不怀疑，因为他明白防线的主要目的是抵御敌军小股部队在乡间肆虐的骚扰性袭击。如果敌人决定用军队进攻防线，那么防线也必须用军队防守。39
These criteria make it possible to select certain fortresses in preference to others but there still remains the question of their relation one to the other, of liaison. Vauban, in the memoir of 1678, concluded that the frontier would be adequately fortified if the strongholds were limited to two lines, each composed of about thirteen places, stretched across the northern frontier in imitation of infantry battle order.38 This first line could be further strengthened and unified by the use of a waterline stretching from the sea to the Scheldt. Canals or canalized streams or rivers would link one fort with another, and the canals themselves would be protected at regular intervals by redoubts. This scheme was not original with Vauban; in fact it was in operation over part of the frontier even as he wrote. He was under no illusions as to the strength of the waterlines, for he saw that their chief purpose was to ward off the harassing raids by which small enemy detachments plagued the countryside. Should an enemy decide to attack the lines with an army, then the lines must be defended with an army.39
这样的工程当然需要新建防御工事，但沃邦谨慎地指出，这也意味着要拆除许多古老的要塞。因此，他力主夷平所有远离边境且不在两条防线之内的堡垒。他认为，这不仅能节省国库开支，还能节省兵力：拆除十座要塞的驻军，就意味着可以腾出大约三万名士兵去其他地方服役。
Such a project would of course necessitate new construction, but Vauban was careful to point out that it would also mean the elimination of numerous ancient strongholds, and he accordingly urged the razing of all fortresses remote from the frontier and not included in the two lines. This would not only be a saving for the treasury but, he urged, also a saving in manpower: with the elimination of their garrisons, ten fewer strongholds would mean about thirty thousand soldiers free for duty elsewhere.
这篇写于1678年的著名回忆录也体现了对未来可能征服的思考，这表明，就北部和东部边境而言，沃邦愿意为比仅仅修正一条边界线更为宏大的计划铺平道路。他指出，一旦爆发战争，某些敌方要塞必须立即攻占。迪克斯穆德、科特赖和沙勒蒙将打开通往低地的大门，而东部的斯特拉斯堡和卢森堡则是至关重要的要塞。这些要塞不仅在规模、财富和地理位置方面都堪称绝佳——在这些方面，它们堪称欧洲之最——而且它们是法国向其自然边界扩张的关键。如果沃邦不接受法国北部和东部的自然边界是莱茵河这一既熟悉又诱人的原则，他就称不上是一位真正的法国人和爱国者。我们知道他持有这种观点，而且我们可以推测，这种观点在他职业生涯早期就已经在他心中清晰形成。当然，后来的确如此。就在里斯维克和约签订前夕，他担心法国即将失去斯特拉斯堡和卢森堡，于是写道：“如果我们不能重新夺回它们，我们将永远失去以莱茵河为边界的机会。”<sup> 40</sup>
This famous memoir of 1678 also embodied a consideration of possible future conquests and these indicate that, so far as the northern and eastern frontiers were concerned, Vauban was willing to pave the way for something more ambitious than a mere local rectification of a line. In the event of a future war, he said, certain enemy fortresses should be immediately seized. Dixmude, Courtrai, and Charlemont would open up the Lowlands, while to the east, Strasbourg and Luxembourg were the supremely important cities to acquire. Not only did these fortresses have the most admirable features of size, wealth, and situation—in these matters they were the best in Europe—but they were the keys to France's expansion to its natural boundaries. Vauban would not have been Frenchman and patriot had he not accepted the familiar and tempting principle that France's natural frontier to the north and east was the Rhine. We know that he held this view and we can suspect that it was already clearly formulated in his mind early in his career. It certainly was later. Just before the Peace of Ryswick, when he was terrified for fear France was about to lose both Strasbourg and Luxembourg, he wrote: “If we do not take them again we shall lose forever the chance of having the Rhine for our boundary.”40
很难断言1678年的这篇回忆录是否代表了沃邦对永久性防御工事问题的成熟且最终的观点。沃邦后期的回忆录在关于要塞作用的战略思考方面远不尽如人意。除了关于巴黎防御工事的回忆录（其中他详尽地探讨了国家首都的战略重要性）之外，他后期的大部分研究都缺乏真正的战略意义。这些研究主要关注于提出详细的建议，例如哪些要塞应该拆除，哪些要塞应该扩建或重建。
It is not easy to say with certainty whether this memoir of 1678 represents Vauban's mature and final view on the matter of permanent fortification. Vauban's later memoirs leave much to be desired as examples of strategic thinking about the role of fortresses. Except for a memoir on the fortification of Paris, in which he discusses at length the strategic importance of a nation's capital, most of the later studies are lacking in genuine strategic interest. They are concerned chiefly with detailed recommendations as to which fortresses should be condemned and which enlarged or rebuilt.
尽管存在这些不利因素，沃邦的观点仍不难看出一系列变化，这部分是由于他思想的逐渐演变，但主要原因在于他在路易十四统治后期所处环境的改变。日益严峻的财政紧缩和人力供应的不断减少促使沃邦更加重视拆除防御工事，甚至超过了新建工事。<sup> 41</sup>这导致他力主摧毁许多在他1678年回忆录中列出的第二道防线。与此同时，路易十四的军队越来越倾向于防御，沃邦也逐渐适应了防御思维。他顺应了世纪末日益明显的趋势，即更加依赖北部边境的连续水线。但他深知这种防御方式的特殊弱点。 1696年，他撰写了一篇回忆录，力主建立“后方营地”（camps retranchés），即加强堡垒防御和水线防御的设防营地。这些营地的目的在于守卫堡垒之间的水线，或通过构筑坚固的外部防御工事来强化堡垒本身。一支规模小于普通野战军的小规模军队驻扎在堡垒外围，并由精心设计的土方工事保护，便可干扰任何胆敢直接进攻堡垒的围攻部队，或迫使他们扩大防御范围。
Despite these handicaps it is not hard to detect a series of changes in Vauban's opinions, due partly to a gradual evolution of his ideas, but chiefly to the changed conditions under which he was obliged to work in the later years of the reign. Increasing financial stringency and a growing drain on the manpower supply encouraged Vauban to stress the razing of fortifications as much if not more than new construction.41 This led him to urge the destruction of many of the places that had been listed in his second line of defense in the memoir of 1678. At the same time the armies of Louis XIV were being thrown more and more on the defensive and Vauban adapted himself increasingly to defensive thinking. He followed the trend that was becoming evident at the close of the century toward still greater reliance upon a continuous waterline along the northern frontier. But he was aware of the peculiar weakness of this sort of defense. In 1696 he wrote a memoir in which he urged the creation of camps retranchés, fortified encampments to supplement the fortresses and to strengthen the waterline. The purpose of these encampments was either to guard the waterline in the interval between the fortresses or to strengthen the forts themselves by producing a veritable external defense. With a small army—smaller than the ordinary field army—camped beyond the outworks of a fortress and protected by elaborate earthworks it was possible either to interfere with any besieging forces unwise enough to tackle the fortress directly or to impose upon them a wider perimeter to be invested.
综合来看，这两个因素——首先，强调以设防营地补充的连续防线；其次，愿意放弃他在1678年所推崇的第二道防线——并不支持拉扎尔的论断，即沃邦是现代战略所采用的“防御区”的先驱倡导者。恰恰相反，沃邦的思想似乎朝着越来越细的防线方向发展。他简化了从前人那里继承来的杂乱无章的防御区模式。起初，他将其简化为双层防御工事，明显模仿了人们熟悉的步兵防线；然后，他又进一步简化为一条由要塞构成的单层防线，这些要塞通过连续的水道连接，并由军队支援。或许，我们可以从中看出，这位伟大的工程师在其职业生涯后期，逐渐将重心从防御工事转移到军队本身，这种观点并非牵强附会。他似乎更接近于吉贝尔的观点，即一个国家的真正防御在于其军队，而不是其防御工事；防御工事只不过是更大堡垒的棱堡，而军队则构成了这座堡垒的活生生的、灵活的帷幕。
Taken together these two factors—first, the stress upon the continuous line supplemented by the fortified encampments; and second, the willingness to sacrifice the second line of forts he had favored in 1678—do not offer support to Lazard's assertion that Vauban was a pioneer advocate of the “fortified zone” that modern strategy has adopted. Quite the contrary, Vauban's thinking seems to have evolved in the direction of favoring a thinner and thinner line. He simplified that disorganized parody on a fortified zone that he had inherited from his predecessors. At first he reduced it to a double line of fortifications, a palpable imitation of the familiar infantry line, and then proceeded to simplify this still further into a single cordon, based on strong points linked by a continuous waterline and supported by troops. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to see in this a sign that the great engineer, toward the close of his career, was led gradually to lay more emphasis upon armies and less upon fortification. He seems almost to have come closer to the idea of Guibert that the true defense of a country is its army, not its fortifications; that the fortified points are merely the bastions of that greater fortress of which the army forms a living and flexible curtain.
1在本节和下一节中，我主要参考了 Edgard Boutaric 的《法国前卫军事机构》（Institutions militaires de la France avant lesarmées permanentes）（巴黎，1863 年）；卡米尔·鲁塞 (Camille Rousset)，《卢瓦的历史与行政管理与军事》，第 4 卷。 （巴黎，1862-64）；苏珊将军的《法国古代步兵历史》（巴黎，1849 年）、《法国骑兵历史》（巴黎，1874 年）和《法国炮兵历史》（巴黎，1874 年）。路易·安德烈、米歇尔·勒特利尔和君主军队的组织（巴黎，1906 年）被证明是 17 世纪有关军队改革的最有价值的著作。
1 In this and the following section I have relied heavily upon Edgard Boutaric, Institutions militaires de la France avant les armées permanentes (Paris, 1863); Camille Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire, 4 vols. (Paris, 1862–64); and General Susane, Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie française (Paris, 1849), Histoire de la cavalerie française (Paris, 1874), and Histoire de l'artillerie française (Paris, 1874). Louis André, Michel Le Tellier et l'organization de l'armée monarchique (Paris, 1906) proved the most valuable single work concerned with army reform in the seventeenth century.
2本节主要依据我自己未发表的博士论文《旧制度下的科学与战争》（哈佛大学，1941 年）。
2 In this section I have relied chiefly upon my own unpublished doctoral dissertation, “Science and War in the Old Régime” (Harvard University, 1941).
3 F. Artz，法国教育技术首次亮相，1500-1700 年（巴黎，1938 年）。
3 F. Artz, Les débuts de l'éducation technique en France, 1500–1700 (Paris, 1938).
4 JJ Fahie，“伽利略的科学著作”，载于查尔斯·辛格编， 《科学史与科学方法研究》（牛津，1921 年；纽约，1975 年重印），第 2 卷，第 217 页。
4 J. J. Fahie, “The Scientific Works of Galileo,” in Studies in the History and Method of Science, ed. Charles Singer (Oxford, 1921; repr. New York, 1975), 2:217.
5 Antoine Augoyat 中校，《防御工事历史》，1:13–21。
5 Lt. Col. Antoine Augoyat, Aperçu historique sur les fortifications, 1:13–21.
6霍夫曼·尼克森在其著作《武装部落，1793-1939》（纽约，1940 年）第 34-40 页中强调了这一概念
6 The notion has been stressed by Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde, 1793–1939 (New York, 1940), 34–40.
7一位十八世纪贵族教育作家建议学生应该学习的五位最重要的作家是罗昂、圣克鲁斯、福基埃、蒙泰库科利和沃邦。比照。 Chevalier de Brucourt，《贵族教育论文集，新版修订和增强》（巴黎，1748 年），2：262-63。
7 An eighteenth-century writer on the education of the nobility suggests that the five most important authors a student should study are Rohan, Santa Cruz, Feuquiéres, Montecuccoli, and Vauban. Cf. Chevalier de Brucourt, Essai sur I'éducation de la noblesse, nouvelle édition corrigée et augmentée (Paris, 1748), 2:262–63.
8他生前出版的著作有两部：一部是关于行政问题的著作，名为《防御工事总论》（ Directeur général des fortifications，海牙，1685年，巴黎重印，1725年）；另一部是《皇家百科全书》（Dixme Royale，海牙[？]，1707年）。然而，在他去世之前，已经出现了一些伪作，声称阐述了他的防御工事方法。他最广为人知的三部十八世纪著作首次以粗制滥造的合集形式出版，名为《攻城与防御工事论及矿山论》（ Traité de I'attaque et de la défense des places suivi d'un traité des mines，海牙，1737年）。该书于 1742 年和 1771 年再版。《论场所防御》由 Jombert 于 1769 年在巴黎单独出版。直到 1795 年才出版了精心编纂的版本。
8 The works published in his lifetime were two: a work on administrative problems, called the Directeur général des fortifications (The Hague, 1685, reprinted in Paris, 1725), and his Dixme Royale (The Hague [?], 1707). A number of spurious works, however, had appeared before his death, purporting to expound his methods of fortification. His three treatises best known to the eighteenth century were printed for the first time in a slovenly combined edition titled Traité de I'attaque et de la défense des places suivi d'un traité des mines (The Hague, 1737). This was reprinted in 1742 and again in 1771. The Traité de la défense des places was published separately by Jombert in Paris in 1769. No carefully prepared editions were published until 1795.
9 Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban，《Lettres intimes inédites adressées au Marquis de Puyzieulx》（1699-1705）。 Hyrvoix de Landosle 的简介和注释（巴黎，1924 年），16-17。
9 Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, Lettres intimes inédites adressées au Marquis de Puyzieulx (1699–1705). Introduction et notes de Hyrvoix de Landosle (Paris, 1924), 16–17.
10伏尔泰，《路易十四世纪》，第 1 章。 21.
10 Voltaire, Le siècle de Louis XIV, ch. 21.
11 Abraham Wolf，《十八世纪科学、技术和哲学史》（纽约，1939 年），第 531-32 页；Bernard Forest de Bélidor，《工程师的科学》（1739 年），第 1 卷，第 67-79 页。
11 Abraham Wolf, History of Science, Technology and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1939), 531–32; Bernard Forest de Bélidor, La science des ingénieurs (1739), bk. 1, 67–79.
12他在气象学领域获得先驱地位的权利，源于他向法国科学院提交的一篇关于降雨的回忆录。参见 Bélidor，《工程师的科学》，第 4 卷，87-88 页。
12 His right to pioneer status in meteorology rests upon a memoir on rainfall that he submitted to the Académie des sciences. Cf. Bélidor, La science des ingénieurs, bk. 4, 87–88.
13乔治·米歇尔，《沃邦历史》（巴黎，1879 年），447–51。
13 Georges Michel, Histoire de Vauban (Paris, 1879), 447–51.
14皮埃尔·埃利齐尔·拉扎德，沃邦，1633-1707（巴黎，1934），445-500。
14 Pierre Elizier Lazard, Vauban, 1633–1707 (Paris, 1934), 445–500.
15 H. Chotard，“Louis XIV、Louvois、Vauban et les fortifications du Nord de la France, d'après les lettres inédites de Louvois adressées à M. de Chazerat, Gentilhomme d'Auvergne”，法国弗拉芒委员会年鉴18 (1889-90)，16-20。
15 H. Chotard, “Louis XIV, Louvois, Vauban et les fortifications du nord de la France, d'après les lettres inédites de Louvois adressées à M. de Chazerat, Gentilhomme d'Auvergne,” Annales du Comité Flamand de France 18 (1889–90), 16–20.
16 Bélidor，《工程师科学》，bk。 4、73。
16 Bélidor, La science de ingénieurs, bk. 4, 73.
17拉扎德，沃邦，501-24； La Roncière，《法国海洋史》（1932 年），6：164-69。
17 Lazard, Vauban, 501–24; La Roncière, Histoire de la marine française (1932), 6:164–69.
18有关早期方法的描述，请参见。加斯顿·泽勒 (Gaston Zeller)，《北方和十七世纪的边境防御组织》( 1928 )，54-55。
18 For a description of early methods, cf. Gaston Zeller, L'organisation défensive des frontières du nord et de l'est au XVIIe siècle (1928), 54–55.
19 Didot-Hoefer， Nouvelle Biographie Générale（巴黎，1870 年），sv“Vauban，Sébastien Le Prestre”。
19 Didot-Hoefer, Nouvelle Biographie Générale (Paris, 1870), s.v. “Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre.”
20同上，但参见。 A. Allent, Histoire du Corps Impériale du Génte (1805), 1:209–10（仅出版一卷）。
20 Ibid., but cf. A. Allent, Histoire du Corps Impériale du Génte (1805), 1:209–10 (only one volume published).
21 Lazard， Vauban，377–94。
21 Lazard, Vauban, 377–94.
22拉扎德，沃邦，389-90； A. de Zastrow， Histoire de la fortification permanente（第 3 版，1856 年），2:62–208（译自德文，作者：Ed. de La Barre Du Parcq）。
22 Lazard, Vauban, 389–90; A. de Zastrow, Histoire de la fortification permanente (3d ed., 1856), 2:62–208 (trans, from the German by Ed. de La Barre Du Parcq).
23 Bélidor，《工程师科学》，bk。 3、29–34、35–43、90–96。
23 Bélidor, La science des ingémeurs, bk. 3, 29–34, 35–43, 90–96.
24给卢瓦的信，1687 年 10 月 7 日，泽勒引用，《防御组织》，144。
24 Letter to Louvois, October 7, 1687, cited by Zeller, L'organisation défensive, 144.
25乔塔尔，“路易十四、卢瓦、沃邦”，30-35；泽勒，《组织防御》，96–117；沃邦·拉扎德，49–50、202–204。
25 Chotard, “Louis XIV, Louvois, Vauban,” 30–35; Zeller, L'organisation défensive, 96–117; Lazard, Vauban, 49–50, 202–204.
26乔塔尔，“路易十四、卢瓦、沃邦”，36。
26 Chotard, “Louis XIV, Louvois, Vauban,” 36.
27泽勒，《组织防守》，118。
27 Zeller, L'organisation défensive, 118.
28同上，103-104； Th。拉瓦莱，《法国边境》（巴黎，1864 年），83-85。
28 Ibid., 103–104; Th. Lavallée, Les frontiéres de France (Paris, 1864), 83–85.
29 Hennebert，被 Chotard 引用，“Louis XIV，Louvois，Vauban”，42。
29 Hennebert, cited by Chotard, “Louis XIV, Louvois, Vauban,” 42.
30泽勒，组织防守，2。
30 Zeller, L'organisation défensive, 2.
31同上，第 123 页。
31 Ibid., 123.
32 Lazard， Vauban，408–21。
32 Lazard, Vauban, 408–21.
33同上，155；阿尔伯特·德·罗查斯·达艾格伦 (Albert de Rochas d'Aiglun)，沃邦 (Vauban)，《家庭及其编辑、家庭事务和通讯》，2 卷。 （巴黎，1910 年），2:89。
33 Ibid., 155; Albert de Rochas d'Aiglun, Vauban, sa famille et ses écrits, ses oisivetés, et sa correspondance, 2 vols. (Paris, 1910), 2:89.
34拉扎德，沃邦，409-14；泽勒，《组织防御》，96–98。在 Rochas Vauban, sa famille et ses écrits , 1:189f中全文印刷
34 Lazard, Vauban, 409–14; Zeller, L'organisation défensive, 96–98. This important memoir is printed in extenso in Rochas Vauban, sa famille et ses écrits, 1:189f.
35 Traité de la sûreté etservation des états, par le moyen les forteresses。 Par M. Maigret，工程师、圣路易斯皇家军事骑士勋章（巴黎，1725 年），149。
35 Traité de la sûreté et conservation des états, par le moyen les forteresses. Par M. Maigret, Ingénieur en Chef, Chevalier de l'ordre Royal et Militaire de Saint Louis (Paris, 1725), 149.
36同上，129-48。
36 Ibid., 129–48.
37同上，152f，221-22。
37 Ibid., 152f, 221–22.
38第一线：敦刻尔克、贝尔格、弗内斯、拉基诺克堡、伊普尔、梅宁、里尔、图尔奈、莫尔塔涅堡、孔代、瓦朗谢纳、勒克努瓦、莫伯日、菲利普维尔和迪南。第二条线：格拉沃利讷、圣奥梅尔、艾尔、贝蒂讷、阿拉斯、杜埃、布尚、康布雷、朗德雷西斯、阿韦讷、马林堡、罗克鲁瓦和沙勒维尔。
38 The first line: Dunkirk, Bergues, Furnes, Fort de La Kenoque, Ypres, Menin, Lille, Tournai, Fort de Mortagne, Condé, Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy, Maubeuge, Philippeville, and Dinant. The second line: Gravelines, Saint-Omer, Aire, Béthune, Arras, Douai, Bouchain, Cambrai, Landrecies, Avesnes, Marienbourg, Rocroi, and Charleville.
39拉扎德，沃邦，282–84；奥戈亚特，《历史史》，1:229。
39 Lazard, Vauban, 282–84; Augoyat, Aperçu historique, 1:229.
40拉瓦莱，《法国边境》，83-85。
40 Lavallée, Les frontiéres de France, 83–85.
41泽勒，《组织防御》，98–107。
41 Zeller, L'organisation défensive, 98–107.
4. 腓特烈大帝、吉贝尔、比洛：《从王朝战争到民族战争》
4. Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War
T从1740年到1815年，以腓特烈大帝登基为普鲁士国王，到拿破仑被废黜为法兰西皇帝，这一时期既见证了旧式战争的完善，也见证了新式战争的兴起，而这种新式战争在许多方面至今仍被沿用。本章将着重探讨这两种战争风格的对比。然而，许多旧式战争的理念在新式战争中得以延续。前三章概述的基本思想并未过时，至今仍是战争理论的重要组成部分。马基雅维利将战争研究发展成为一门社会科学。他将战争与伦理目的的考量脱钩，并将其与宪政、经济和政治的思辨紧密联系起来。在军事方面，他试图扩大人为规划的范围，减少偶然因素的影响。沃邦则为军人开启了自然科学和技术资源的运用。十七世纪在军队规模空前扩张的同时，也推进了有序管理和控制的原则。它更加强调纪律，建立了更为复杂的战术单位层级，明确了指挥链，将军队领导人转变为公职人员，并使武装力量成为政府的公仆。所有这些发展都在本文所探讨的变革时期得到加速和完善。
THE PERIOD from 1740 to 1815, opening with the accession of Frederick the Great as king of Prussia, and closing with the dethronement of Napoleon as emperor of the French, saw both the perfection of the older style of warfare and the launching of a newer style which in many ways we still follow. The contrast between the two styles is the main subject of this chapter. Much of the old, however, was continued in the new. The underlying ideas sketched in the three preceding chapters were not outdated and they remain today essential to the theory of war. Machiavelli had made the study of war a social science. He had dissociated it from considerations of ethical purpose and closely related it to constitutional, economic, and political speculation. He had tried, in military matters, to enlarge the field of human planning and to reduce the field of chance. Vauban had opened up to military men the resources of natural science and technology. The seventeenth century, while enlarging armies beyond precedent, had advanced the principles of orderly administration and control. It had put a new emphasis on discipline, created a more complex hierarchy of tactical units, clarified the chains of command, turned army leaders into public officials, and made armed force into a servant of government. All these developments were accelerated and elaborated in the period of change with which this essay deals.
这些重大创新涉及宪法和军队的运用，即人力和战略。公民军队取代了职业军队。积极、机动、好战的战略取代了缓慢的围城战略。马基雅维利曾预见过这两项变革，但自1500年以来，这两项变革都未曾大规模实现。1792年之后，这两项变革共同彻底改变了战争，以“无限战争”取代了旧制度下的“有限战争”。这一转变伴随着国家从王朝制向民族制的转变，是法国大革命的后果。法国大革命前的战争本质上是统治者之间的冲突。自那以后，战争日益演变为民族之间的冲突，因此也日益成为“全面战争” 。
The significant innovations concerned the constitution and the utilization of armies, i.e., manpower and strategy. Citizen armies replaced professional armies. Aggressive, mobile, combative strategy replaced the slow strategy of siegecraft. Both had been anticipated by Machiavelli, but neither had been realized on a large scale since 1500. Together, after 1792, they revolutionized warfare, replacing the “limited” war of the Old Regime with the “unlimited” war of subsequent times. This transition came with the shift from the dynastic to the national form of state, and was a consequence of the French Revolution. War before the French Revolution was essentially a clash between rulers. Since that event it has become increasingly a clash between peoples, and hence has become increasingly “total.”1
王朝制国家对军队体制的可能性设定了明确的限制。国王虽然理论上拥有绝对权力，但实际上却处于不利地位。每个王朝国家都维持着统治家族与贵族之间脆弱的平衡。贵族的特权限制了政府的行动自由。这些特权包括免缴某些税款的权利，以及几乎垄断军队军官职位的权利。由于征税权受到限制，政府无法充分利用国家的物质资源，也无法充分利用人力资源。军官必须来自一个世袭阶层，而这个阶层的人口很少超过总人口的百分之二。民众与政府之间几乎没有任何情感联系。君主与臣民之间的联系是官僚的、行政的和财政的，是统治者与被统治者之间一种外在的机械联系，这与革命引入的原则截然相反。革命在其公民责任和人民主权的理论中，实现了政府与被统治者近乎宗教般的融合。旧制度下的“好政府”对臣民的要求很少，视他们为国家有用、有价值且富有生产力的资产，并且在战时尽可能少地干预平民生活。“好人民”是指遵守法律、缴纳税款、忠于统治家族的人民；他们不必有民族认同感、国家统一感、公共事务责任感，也不必有在战争中竭尽全力的义务。
The dynastic form of state set definite limits to what was possible in the constitution of armies. The king, however absolute in theory, was in fact in a disadvantageous position. Every dynastic state stood by a precarious balance between the ruling house and the aristocracy. The privileges of the nobility limited the freedom of government action. These privileges included the right not to pay certain taxes and the right almost to monopolize the commissioned grades in the army. Governments, with their taxing power restricted, could not draw on the full material resources of their countries. Nor could they draw on their full human resources. Officers must come from a hereditary class that rarely exceeded two percent of the population. Between populations as a whole and their governments little feeling existed. The tie between sovereign and subject was bureaucratic, administrative, and fiscal, an external mechanical connection of ruler and ruled, strongly in contrast to the principle brought in by the Revolution, which, in its doctrine of responsible citizenship and sovereignty of the people, effected an almost religious fusion of the government with the governed. A good government of the Old Regime was one that demanded little of its subjects, which regarded them as useful, worthy, and productive assets to the state, and which in wartime interfered as little as possible with civilian life. A “good people” was one that obeyed the laws, paid its taxes, and was loyal to the reigning house; it need have no sense of its own identity as a people, or unity as a nation, or responsibility for public affairs, or obligation to put forth a supreme effort in war.
军队反映了国家。它内部阶级分化严重，缺乏共同精神；军官的动机是荣誉、阶级意识、荣耀或野心；而士兵则长期服役，把打仗当作谋生的手段，被认为缺乏高尚的情感，他们最强烈的归属感通常只是对所属部队一种天真的自豪感。俄国、奥地利和普鲁士的军队主要由农奴组成。普鲁士和英国一样，也大量使用外国人。奥地利军队的语言构成十分复杂。在所有国家，都倾向于招募经济上最无用的人，也就是社会中最堕落的群体。各地的平民都对士兵保持距离。即使在拥有欧洲最民族化军队的法国，咖啡馆和其他公共场所也竖起了“禁止狗、仆人、妓女和士兵入内”的标语。
The army reflected the state. It was divided internally into classes without common spirit, into officers whose incentive was honor, class consciousness, glory, or ambition, and soldiers enlisted for long terms who fought as a business for a living, who were thought incapable of higher sentiments, and whose strongest attachment was usually a kind of naive pride in their regiments. The armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia were composed largely of serfs. Prussia also used large numbers of foreigners, as did England. The Austrian forces were linguistically heterogeneous. In all countries the tendency was to recruit men who were economically the most useless, which is to say the most degraded elements in the population. Civilians everywhere kept soldiers at a distance. Even in France, which already had the most national of the large armies of Europe, cafés and other public places put up signs reading, “No dogs, lackeys, prostitutes or soldiers.”2
要将这样一支成分复杂的军队——士兵几乎是社会弃儿，军官往往只是年轻的贵族——凝聚起来，就必须创造某种共同目标。而军队自身缺乏足够的道德和心理资源来实现这一目标。鉴于当时的形势，各国政府有充分的理由相信，秩序只能从外部自上而下地建立。三十年战争后，尤其是在德国，人们仍然铭记着一支不受约束的军队所带来的恐怖后果。十八世纪开明的君主制国家出于人道主义和财政收入的双重考虑，试图保护平民。为了维护社会秩序，并鼓舞那些无法通过思想层面打动的士兵的士气，各国政府日益重视士兵的物质生活，为他们提供营房、医生和医院，提供充足的食物，并建立大型的固定粮仓来储备物资。人们担心，如果让士兵们分批外出觅食，或者无法提供体面的生活水平，他们就会开小差，因为职业军人的主要目标是谋生，而不是为理想而战或牺牲。事实上，在十八世纪，无论战时还是和平时期，军官和士兵在不同军队之间流动都非常容易，这在法国大革命之后是难以想象的。
To make armies of such motley hosts, of soldiers who were almost social outcasts and of officers who were often only youthful aristocrats, some kind of common purpose had to be created. For this end the troops had few moral or psychological resources in themselves. Governments believed, with good reason in the circumstances, that order could be imposed only from outside and from above. The horrors of an ungoverned soldiery were remembered, especially in Germany after the Thirty Years' War. The enlightened monarchies of the eighteenth century tried to spare their civilian populations, both for humane reasons and as sources of revenue. To promote civil order, and to build morale among troops who could not be appealed to on a level of ideas, governments increasingly took good physical care of their men, quartered them in barracks, provided them with doctors and hospitals, fed them liberally, and established great fixed permanent magazines for their supply. It was feared that soldiers would desert if left to forage in small parties or if not furnished with a tolerable standard of living, since to make a living, not to fight or die for a cause, was the chief aim of the professional soldier. And in truth, in the eighteenth century, both officers and men passed from one army to another, in war or in peace, with a facility inconceivable after the French Revolution.
伴随着悉心照料而来的，是自上而下严格要求的纪律和训练。只有铁腕统治才能将原本缺乏凝聚力的士兵凝聚成一支统一的军队。统治者和贵族几乎不指望在组成士兵的下层阶级身上找到任何道德品质——勇气、忠诚、集体精神、牺牲精神和自立精神。事实上，当时的士兵也并未培养出这些品质，他们如同王朝国家的大多数民众一样，对战争缺乏参与感。士兵作为个体、分散行动或脱离军官视线都不可信赖。技术上的考量也抑制了个人主义。糟糕的通讯状况和低下的侦察能力（反过来又源于士兵的无知和不可靠）使得在战场上分散军队变得异常危险。火枪的精度低、射程短，使得单兵射击相对无害。因此，军事训练的理想是将一群毫无斗志的毛头小子打造成机器般的营队。与敌人交战时，每个营紧密排列成一条纵队，士兵们几乎肩并肩，通常有三排纵深，每个营都像一台射击机器，听到命令后立即齐射。为了达到战术警觉，必须进行长期而高强度的训练。人们认为，两年时间几乎不足以将一个衣衫褴褛的士兵训练成一名优秀的职业军人。
Along with good care went a strict attention to discipline and training, also handed down from above. Only iron rule could make into a unified force men who had no cohesion in themselves. Rulers and aristocrats scarcely expected to find moral qualities in the lower classes who made up the soldiery—neither courage, nor loyalty, nor group spirit, nor sacrifice, nor self-reliance. Nor were these qualities in fact developed in the troops of the time, who, like the peoples in general of the dynastic states, felt little sense of participation in the issues of war. Soldiers could not be trusted as individuals, or in detached parties, or out of sight of their officers. Technical considerations also discouraged individuality. The poor state of communications and low quality of scouting (due in turn to the ignorance and unreliability of individual soldiers) made it more than ordinarily hazardous to divide an army in the field. The inaccuracy and short range of muskets made individual firing relatively harmless. As a result the ideal of military training was to shape a spiritless raw material into machinelike battalions. When engaged with the enemy each battalion stood close to the next in a solid line, the men being almost elbow to elbow, usually three ranks deep, and each battalion constituting a kind of firing machine, delivering a volley at the word of command. To achieve tactical alertness, long and intensive training was necessary. Two years were considered scarcely sufficient to turn a ragamuffin into a good professional soldier.
军队的编制对其运用产生了重大影响。对于资源有限的旧制度政府而言，职业军队成本高昂。每名士兵都代表着一笔巨大的时间和金钱投入。训练有素的部队一旦在战斗中损失，便难以补充。由于运输条件落后，大量的军需品和粮食必须存放在预计的战斗地点附近，因此需要加以保护。此外，17世纪后期，科学进步提升了筑城技术，而法国和德国也对所谓宗教战争中混乱无序、四处征战的局面深恶痛绝，因为这些战争严重损害了平民的正常生活。最终的结果是，军队被集中部署在重兵把守的防御工事中。军队及其部分兵力被限制在基地附近，不得离开基地行军超过五天。即使后方紧跟着军需品库，他们还要拖着长长的辎重队，因此一天的行军距离非常短。辎重队也无法轻易缩减：大多数军队中的贵族军官出行都很讲究，而士兵们在没有政治激情的情况下作战，如果食物供应不稳定或者作战变得令人厌恶地艰苦，就会失去士气。
The constitution of armies strongly affected their utilization. For the governments of the Old Regime, with their limited resources, the professional armies were expensive. Each soldier represented a heavy investment in time and money. Trained troops lost in action could not easily be replaced. The great magazines of munitions and foodstuffs, which, in the poor state of transportation, had to be kept near the expected scenes of action, needed protection. In addition, in the latter part of the seventeenth century scientific progress improved the art of fortification, and a great revulsion spread through France and Germany against the chaotic and roving warfare of the so-called wars of religion, by which productive civilian life had been much impaired. The net result was to concentrate armies in chains of heavily fortified positions. Armies, and fragments of armies, were immobilized near their bases, from which they were not supposed to depart by more than five days' march. Even with magazines close behind them, they carried long baggage trains, so that a day's march was very short. Nor could the baggage trains be easily reduced: in most armies the aristocratic officers traveled in style, and the troops, fighting without political passion, would lose morale if their food supply became uncertain or if operations became distastefully strenuous.
在当时的形势下，大规模的正规军交战实属罕见。指挥官很难与不愿参战的敌人建立联系。即使两军面对面，列阵也需要时间，如果一方选择在另一方列阵时撤退，则无法进行全面交战。战争风险极大。战场上取得的优势难以扩大，因为当时的追击战术尚不成熟。军事思想家认为，国家可能因胜利而遭受与失败同等的损失。无论如何，战争都无法带来迅速而决定性的政治结果。十八世纪的战役与拿破仑战争的对比在此尤为明显。布伦海姆战役、马尔普拉凯战役、丰特努瓦战役或罗斯巴赫战役之后，战争往往持续数年之久。而马伦戈战役、奥斯特里茨战役、耶拿战役、瓦格拉姆战役或莱比锡战役之后，和平谈判在几个月内便开始了。
A large-scale pitched battle between complete armies was in these circumstances a rare occurrence. It was not easy for a commander to establish contact with an unwilling enemy. Even with two armies face to face, to draw up a battle line took time, and if one side chose to depart while the other formed, no complete engagements would ensue. Battle was a tremendous risk. A margin of advantage gained on the battlefield could not easily be widened, because the technique of destructive pursuit was undeveloped. Military thinkers held that a state might suffer almost as much by victory as by defeat. Quick and decisive political results were in any case not expected from battle. Here the contrast between eighteenth-century and Napoleonic battles is especially clear. After Blenheim, Malplaquet, Fontenoy, or Rossbach, the war dragged on for years. After Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Wagram, or Leipzig, peace overtures began in a few months.
总而言之，法国大革命前诸多因素共同促成了有限战争的出现，战争手段有限，目标也有限。战争旷日持久，但并不激烈；战斗虽然破坏力巨大（营级齐射威力惊人），但正因如此，人们并不热衷于发动战斗。作战行动倾向于攻击要塞、弹药库、补给线和关键阵地，由此形成了一种讲究策略的战争，在这种战争中，机动战术的巧妙运用比战斗中的鲁莽行事更为重要。阵地战胜过机动战，逐步取得小胜的战略胜过歼灭战。
To sum up, many factors combined before the French Revolution to produce a limited warfare, fought with limited means for limited objectives. Wars were long, but not intense; battles were destructive (for the battalion volleys were deadly), but for that reason not eagerly sought. Operations turned by preference against fortresses, magazines, supply lines, and key positions, producing a learned warfare in which ingenuity in maneuver was more prized than impetuosity in combat. War of position prevailed over war of movement, and a strategy of small successive advantages over a strategy of annihilation.
1789年后席卷欧洲的剧变改变了这一切。1792年至1815年的“世界大战”，除了最初几年以及法英之间的战争之外，实际上是一系列短暂的战争，每一场战争都在战场上迅速决出胜负，并以强加和平而告终。权威人士一致认为，这些战争标志着一个重要的转折点，结束了始于1500年左右的时期，并开启了一个我们至今尚未完全走出的时期。大多数学者将这一变化归因于法国大革命，以及随之而来的公众舆论的民族化和政府与被统治者之间更紧密的关系。这种解释早在半个世纪前就由马克斯·扬斯和汉斯·德尔布吕克确立。然而，也出现了一些“修正主义”倾向，例如让·科林的著作，他试图寻找更物质化或至少是技术性的解释，并在18世纪后半叶火炮、军队组织、道路建设和地图绘制方面的巨大进步中找到了答案。尽管认识到技术进步的重要性，但有识之士仍然认为政治革命的影响更为深远。正如德尔布吕克所说，法国大革命的新政治世界观催生了“军队的新体制，这首先催生了新的战术，而新的战略又由此发展而来。” ³
All this was changed in the upheaval that shook Europe after 1789. The “world war” of 1792.-1815 was, except in the earliest years, and except for the struggle between France and Great Britain, a series of short wars each of which was promptly decided on the battlefield and concluded by the imposition of peace. Authorities agree that these wars marked a major turning point, closing a period which had begun about 1500, and opening a period from which we have not yet clearly emerged. Most writers attribute the change to the French Revolution, with the consequent nationalizing of public opinion and closer relations between governments and governed. This interpretation was established half a century ago by Max Jähns and Hans Delbrück. There has been some evidence of a “revisionist” tendency, as in the writings of Jean Colin, who looked for a more material or at least technical explanation, and found it in the great improvements in the latter half of the eighteenth century in artillery, army organization, road building, and cartography. The burden of informed opinion, while recognizing the importance of technical progress, still considers the effects of the political revolution to have been more profound. As Delbrück said, the new politisches Weltbild of the French Revolution produced “a new constitution of the army, which first brought forth a new tactics, and from which a new strategy would then grow.”3
在下文将要讨论的三位作家的作品中，这种转变显而易见。他们三人分别代表了军事思想史上的一个重要阶段。腓特烈大帝体现了法国大革命前欧洲军事成就的巅峰。吉贝尔是腓特烈的忠实追随者，但他比腓特烈更清晰地预见了即将到来的一些变革。比洛是法国大革命和拿破仑战争的亲历者，他逐渐领悟了这些战争带来的诸多教训。三人之中，只有腓特烈是一位经验丰富的实战指挥官。他的著作描述了当时的战争实况。吉贝尔和比洛虽然受过军事训练，但并未指挥过军队；他们以评论家、预言家和改革家的身份而闻名。腓特烈展现出对军事思想的完全掌控。吉贝尔和比洛的写作较少基于经验，旨在超越既有的条件，因此他们的论述远不如腓特烈那样严谨。它们所展现的见解时好时坏，且不全面，可以用来说明各个时代都存在的难题：军事理论很难适应现实世界中不断变化的现实。
The transition is evident in the works of the three writers treated below. Each of the three represents a significant stage in the history of military thinking. Frederick the Great embodied the utmost in military achievement that was possible in Europe in the conditions prevailing before the French Revolution. Guibert was a conscious disciple of Frederick, but he forecast more clearly than Frederick some of the transformations that were to come. Bülow, a contemporary of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, gradually perceived many of the lessons that they offered. Of the three, only Frederick was an experienced practical commander. His writings describe the actual warfare of the day. Guibert and Bülow, though army officers by training, commanded no armies; they were notable as critics, prophets, and reformers. Frederick reveals a mind completely master of its subject. Guibert and Bülow, writing less from experience, aiming to go beyond existing conditions, were much less steady in their grasp. With their fluctuating and partial insights they may be taken to illustrate the difficulty, familiar in all ages, with which military theory adjusts itself to shifting realities in the world of fact.
1740年，腓特烈大帝不经警告便入侵西里西亚，让欧洲尝到了后来被称为闪电战的滋味。在三次西里西亚战争中，他成功守住了这片梦寐以求的省份，其扩张几乎使他原本面积不大的王国版图翻了一番。他以少胜多，在看似不可能的情况下，证明了自己作为将领的卓越才能，远胜任何对手。此外，他的普鲁士王国几乎完美地体现了王朝国家的主要特征。在欧洲主要国家中，普鲁士的体制最为机械化，统治最为自上而下，民众精神最为匮乏，物质和人力资源也最为匮乏。腓特烈还是一位著作颇丰、才华横溢的作家。在这样一位君主的著作中，上文所述的种种特征都得到了具体而明确的体现。
Frederick the Great, invading Silesia without warning in 1740, gave Europe a taste of what later was to be called blitzkrieg. In three Silesian wars he managed to retain the coveted province, whose acquisitions almost doubled the size of his small kingdom, and he proved himself, fighting at times against incredible odds, to be incomparably superior as a general to any of his opponents. His Prussia, in addition, possessed to the point of exaggeration the main features of the dynastic state. Of the chief states of Europe Prussia was the most mechanically put together, the most ruled from above, the least animated by the spirit in its people, and the poorest in both material and human resources. Frederick was also a voluminous and gifted writer. In the writings of such a king of such a kingdom, the generalities outlined in the section above take on definite and concrete form.
腓特烈一世的第一部重要军事著作是1746年写成的《战争总纲》（Principes généraux de la guerre） ，这部著作凝聚了前两次西里西亚战争的经验。它最初在将军们之间秘密传阅。1760年，其中一位将军被法军俘虏，促使该书得以出版。 1752年，腓特烈一世为王位继承人撰写了一份政治遗嘱（Testament politique），进一步阐述了他的军事思想。《战争总纲》作为附录附于这份遗嘱之后。1768年，战争结束后，腓特烈一世的军事思想有所改变，他为继承人撰写了一份军事遗嘱（Testament militaire）。1771年，他向将军们颁布了《兵器结构与战术要素》（Elements de castramétrie et de tactique）。在他统治期间，他持续为军队各兵种撰写专项指令，这些指令于1846年与他的其他著作汇编出版。他公开发表的作品包括一首教谕诗《战争的艺术》（L'art de la guerre）、若干篇探讨军事问题的政治论文，以及他统治时期的各种历史著作和回忆录及其序言。同时代的人试图从这些著作中探寻他统帅之道的秘诀。他的大部分理论著作是用法语写成的，但许多战术和技术指令是用德语撰写的。他的文学创作生涯持续了四十余年。总的来说，他在军队组织和战术方面坚持相同的理念，但在战争战略和政治方面，他从1740年的咄咄逼人的进攻姿态转向了相对被动的策略。
Frederick's first military work of importance was his Principes généraux de la guerre, written in 1746, and embodying the experience of the first two Silesian wars. It was circulated confidentially among his generals. The capture of one of these generals by the French in 1760 led to its publication. The king further developed his ideas in a Testament politique composed in 1752 for the private use of his successors to the throne. To this testament the Principes généraux was attached as an appendix. In 1768, when his wars were over and his ideas somewhat modified, he drew up a Testament militaire for his successors. To his generals in 1771 he issued his Eléments de castramétrie et de tactique. Continuously throughout his reign he composed special instructions for various branches of the army, which were brought together and published with his other writings in 1846. Among works that he made public are a didactic poem, L'art de la guerre, a number of political essays that touch on military questions, and the various histories and memoirs of his reign, together with their prefaces. In these writings contemporaries tried to discover the secrets of his generalship. He wrote most of his theoretical works in French, but many of the tactical and technical instructions are in German. His literary career reached over more than forty years. In general he adhered to the same ideas in army organization and tactics, but in the strategy and politics of war he moved from the sharp aggressiveness of 1740 to a philosophy of relative inactivity.
军队的组织一直是普鲁士统治者关注的焦点。1640年，也就是腓特烈登基整整一个世纪前，他的曾祖父，大选帝侯，在三十年战争的白热化阶段登上王位。当时的普鲁士王国并不存在，只有北德平原上零星散落的领土，饱受各路交战国残暴雇佣兵的蹂躏。大选帝侯建立了一支军队。为了支撑这支军队，他实际上建立了一个新的政治体系和经济体系。普鲁士的独特特征始于他的统治时期。首先，普鲁士的生存和民族认同都依赖于其军队。其次，军事科学、政治和经济密不可分地融合为一门伟大的治国之道。第三，由霍亨索伦王朝缔造的普鲁士，是精心规划的结晶。到了腓特烈的父亲腓特烈·威廉一世时期，普鲁士国王腓特烈·威廉一世被公认为是欧洲最勤勉的人之一。他亲自执掌国家大权，一切事务都由他掌控，而他本人就是国家统一的中心。在普鲁士，秩序并非源于自由讨论与合作。正如腓特烈大帝曾经说过的那样，如果牛顿必须咨询笛卡尔和莱布尼茨，他就永远无法创立他的哲学体系。
The organization of the army was an old concern of the rulers of Prussia. In 1640, exactly a century before Frederick's accession, his great-grandfather, the Great Elector, came to the throne in the full fury of the Thirty Years' War. There was then no kingdom of Prussia, only parcels of territories along the flat north German plain, swarmed over and ravaged by the brutal mercenaries of every contending power. The Great Elector founded an army. To support this army he virtually founded a new polity and a new economy. With his reign began the distinctive features of Prussia. First, Prussia owed its existence and its very identity to its army. Second, military science, politics, and economics merged inseparably into a great science of statecraft. Third, Prussia, made by the Hohenzollern dynasty, was a triumph of careful planning. By the time of Frederick's father, Frederick William I, the king of Prussia was commonly considered one of the hardest-working men in Europe. He directed the state in person, all threads came together in his hand, and the only center of unity was his own mind. Order, in Prussia, had not come from free discussion and collaboration. As Frederick the Great once observed, if Newton had had to consult with Descartes and Leibnitz, he would never have created his philosophical system.
在腓特烈看来，普鲁士国王若想拥有一支军队，就必须在国家内部各阶级之间以及经济生产与军事力量之间保持稳固的平衡。他必须禁止将贵族土地出售给农民或城镇居民，以此维护贵族阶层。农民显然愚昧无知，无法胜任军官；4让资产阶级担任军官将是“军队衰落和灭亡的第一步”。5森严的阶级结构——由贵族和不可剥夺的“贵族”土地组成——对于军队和国家而言都至关重要。腓特烈说，一位勇敢的上校能造就一支勇敢的营；一位上校在危机时刻的决策甚至可能左右王国的命运。但国王必须确保（当时的国家如此新奇、支离破碎、矫揉造作），这些贵族拥有所需的精神。腓特烈在其第一份政治遗嘱中向其继承人透露，在第一次西里西亚战争期间，他曾特别努力地向其军官灌输为普鲁士王国而战的理念。6
A king of Prussia, in Frederick's view, must, to have an army, hold a firm balance between classes in the state and between economic production and military power. He must preserve the nobility by prohibiting the sale of noble lands to peasants or townsmen. Peasants were clearly too ignorant to become officers;4 to have bourgeois officers would be “the first step toward the decline and fall of the army.”5 Rigid class structure—with noble persons and inalienably “noble” land—was necessary to the army and to the state. A brave colonel, says Frederick, makes a brave battalion; and a colonel's decision in a moment of crisis may sway the destiny of the kingdom. But the king must make sure (so new, disjointed, and artificial was the state) that these aristocrats have the desired spirit. In his first political testament Frederick confides to his successors that, during the first Silesian wars, he had made a special effort to impress upon his officers the idea of fighting for the kingdom of Prussia.6
对于普通士兵，腓特烈常常表现出一种粗犷的尊重，如同对待那些为他冒着生命危险的人一样，但他对他们的真正关心几乎完全在于纪律和物资方面。农民家庭（即易北河以东的农奴）必须得到保护；他们的土地不得被资产阶级或贵族侵占；只有那些在农业上并非不可或缺的人，例如幼子，才应该被征召入伍。总的来说，农民和城镇居民作为生产者最为有用。“勤劳有用的人应该像眼中的瞳仁一样受到保护，在战时，只有在最迫切的需要时，才能在本国征兵。”<sup> 7 </sup> 军队中可能有一半甚至更多的是非普鲁士的职业军人、战俘或外国军队的逃兵。腓特烈赞扬了普鲁士的州制度，该制度通过为特定地区分配兵力，使各团的征兵负担趋于一致。 1768年，他欣慰地发现，通过这套制度（以及使用外国人），每年只需征召五千名普鲁士本地人。然而，他也意识到爱国公民军队的价值，他认为各州通过将邻州并肩作战来培养这种军队。他在1746年写道，我们的军队由“公民”招募而来，他们英勇无畏、荣誉至上。“有了这样的军队，我们就能征服全世界，如果胜利对他们自己和敌人来说不是同样致命的话。”后来，腓特烈和其他启蒙思想家一样，更加重视爱国主义的理论价值。但他从未采取任何行动，而且他也不可能在不彻底改革王国的情况下采取行动。实际上，他认为普通士兵没有荣誉可言，并且他至死都坚信，使用外国人作战才是明智的治国之道。
For common soldiers Frederick often expressed a rough respect, as for men who risked their lives in his service, but his real interest in them rested almost entirely on disciplinary and material questions. The peasant families (i.e., serfs, east of the Elbe) must be protected; their lands must not be absorbed by bourgeois or nobles; only those not indispensable in agriculture, such as younger sons, should be recruited. By and large, the peasants and townsmen are most useful as producers. “Useful hardworking people should be guarded as the apple of one's eye, and in wartime recruits should be levied in one's own country only when the bitterest necessity compels.”7 Half the army or more might be filled with non-Prussian professionals, with prisoners of war or with deserters from foreign armies. Frederick praises the Prussian canton system, by which, to equalize the burden of recruiting, specific districts were assigned to specific regiments as sources of manpower. By this system (and by the use of foreigners), he observed with satisfaction in 1768 that only five thousand natives of Prussia needed to be conscripted each year. Yet he was aware of the value of patriotic citizen forces, which he thought that the cantons produced by putting neighbors beside each other in war. Our troops, he wrote in 1746, recruited from “citizens,” fight with honor and courage. “With such troops one would defeat the whole world, were victories not as fatal to them as to their enemies.” Later on Frederick, like other philosophes, placed even higher theoretical value on patriotism. But he never did anything about it, nor could he, without revolutionizing his kingdom. In practice he assumed that common soldiers were without honor, and he died in the belief that to use foreigners to do one's fighting was only sensible statecraft.8
腓特烈的士兵对他并没有深厚的感情。逃兵是所有十八世纪指挥官的噩梦，尤其是在政治分裂的德国，因为在每场战争中，双方都可能出现说同一种语言的人。1744年，腓特烈不得不停止在波西米亚的推进，因为他的军队开始溃散。他制定了详尽的规则来防止逃兵：部队不得在大片森林附近扎营；后方和侧翼必须由骠骑兵警戒；除非万不得已，否则不得夜间行军；外出觅食或沐浴时，必须由军官列队带领。
Frederick's soldiers felt no great inward attachment to him. Desertion was the nightmare of all eighteenth-century commanders, especially in politically fragmented Germany, where men of the same language could be found on both sides in every war. In 1744, Frederick had to stop his advance in Bohemia because his army began to melt away. He drew up elaborate rules to prevent desertion: the troops should not camp near large woods, their rear and flanks should be watched by hussars, they should avoid night marches except when rigorously necessary, they should be led in ranks by an officer when going to forage or to bathe.9
由于军队的兵力不足，腓特烈坚持严明的纪律，而普鲁士军队正是沿袭了他父亲的严苛作风。“哪怕一丝一毫的纪律松懈，”他说道，“都会导致野蛮化。”<sup> 10 </sup> 军队再次体现了国家的本质。纪律的目的部分出于家长式作风，旨在通过权威来约束士兵，防止酗酒和盗窃等违法行为，从而使士兵成为理性的人。但其主要目的是将军队打造成统一思想和意志的工具。军官和士兵必须明白，每一项行动“都是一个人的杰作”。或者说：“没有人思考，每个人都执行”；也就是说，思考是集中进行的，在国王的脑海中完成的。他说，对士兵所能做的就是赋予他们“军团精神”（Korpsgeist），将他们的个性融入到他们的军团之中。随着年龄的增长和愤世嫉俗的加剧，他观察到，善意对普通民众的影响远不如恐吓。军官必须带领士兵进入危险； “因此（既然荣誉对他们毫无作用），他们必定惧怕军官胜过惧怕任何危险。”但他补充说，人道主义要求获得良好的医疗护理。11
Working with untrustworthy material Frederick insisted on exact discipline, to which the Prussian armies had been habituated by his father. “The slightest loosening of discipline,” he said, “would lead to barbarization.”10 Here again the army reflected the state. The aim of discipline was partly paternalistic, to make the soldier a rational being by authority, through preventing such offenses as drunkenness and theft. But the principal aim was to turn the army into an instrument of a single mind and will. Officers and men must understand that every act “is the work of a single man.” Or again: “No one reasons, everyone executes”; that is, the thinking is done centrally, in the mind of the king. All that can be done with soldiers, he said, is to give them Korpsgeist, to fuse their personalities into their regiments. As he grew older and more cynical, he observed that good will affected common men much less than intimidation. Officers must lead men into danger; “therefore (since honor has no effect on them) they must fear their officers more than any danger.” But he added that humanity demanded good medical care.11
经过严格的纪律约束，部队必须接受精心的训练。普鲁士的操练场闻名遐迩，令外国观察家叹为观止的是，营和中队在那里以极高的精准度进行着复杂的演练。其目的是为了培养战术机动性、行军队形与战斗队形之间的快速转换能力、在炮火下的沉着冷静以及对指挥的绝对服从。腓特烈反复强调，这样一支训练有素的军队能够充分发挥统帅的才能。指挥官可以胸有成竹地构想作战计划，因为他知道这些计划终将实现。一切都在他的掌控之中，他的指挥才能得以充分发挥。因此，腓特烈始终不厌其烦地敦促他的将领们无论在战时还是和平时期都要坚持不懈地进行操练。“除非每个人都在和平时期接受过战时所需技能的训练，否则最终得到的只是一群徒有虚名却不懂如何执行的人。”<sup> 12</sup>
Made amenable by discipline the troops were to be put through careful training. Prussia was famous for its drillfields, where, to the admiration of foreign observers, battalions and squadrons performed intricate evolutions with high precision. The aim was to achieve tactical mobility, skill in shifting from marching order to battle order, steadiness under fire, and complete responsiveness to command. An army so trained, Frederick repeatedly said, allowed full scope to the art of generalship. The commander could form his conceptions in the knowledge that they would be realized. With all else shaped to his hand, his presiding intelligence would be free. Frederick therefore never tired of urging his generals to ceaseless vigilance over drill, in war and in peace. “Unless every man is trained beforehand in peacetime for that which he will have to accomplish in war, one has nothing but people who bear the name of a business without knowing how to practise it.”12
在军队精神高度机械化的背景下，战斗成为一项有条不紊的行动。敌对双方的军队按照既定模式排列，几乎如同棋局开始时的棋子一般整齐：两侧是骑兵，炮兵均匀分布在后方，步兵营排成两列平行的实线，前后相距数百码，每列（至少第一列）由三排组成，每排都听从同一命令开火，而其他两排则负责装填弹药。腓特烈从未偏离这一战斗阵型的基本原则，尽管像所有优秀的将领一样，他也允许自己根据具体情况灵活调整。战斗序列往往决定了行军序列：根据腓特烈的说法，部队应该以纵队行进，这样只需快速转向，纵队就能形成火力线，骑兵则位于侧翼。战斗序列也是严格纪律的最终目标。要让士兵们在数百码之外的敌人面前，肩并肩地站在视野中，保持阵型的稳定，并非易事。但命令十分严苛。“若有士兵在战斗中露出逃跑的迹象，或胆敢踏出防线，站在他身后的士官将用刺刀将其刺穿，当场处死。”<sup> 13</sup>若敌军溃逃，胜利一方必须坚守阵地。掠夺死伤者将被处死。
Battle, with troops so spiritually mechanized, was a methodical affair. Opposing armies were arrayed according to pattern, almost as regularly as chessmen at the beginning of a game: on each wing cavalry, artillery fairly evenly distributed along the rear, infantry battalions drawn up in two parallel solid lines, one a few hundred yards behind the other, and each line, or at least the first, composed of three ranks, each rank firing at a single command while the other two reloaded. Frederick never departed from the essentials of this battle formation, though like all good generals he allowed himself liberty in adapting it to specific purposes. Battle order tended to determine marching order: troops should march, according to Frederick, in columns so arranged that by a quick turn the columns presented themselves as firing lines with cavalry on the flanks. Battle order was also the end object of severe discipline. It was not easy to hold men in the lines, standing in plain sight, elbow to elbow, against an enemy only a few hundred yards away. But orders were strict. “If a soldier during an action looks about as if to flee, or so much as sets foot outside the line, the non-commissioned officer standing behind him will run him through with his bayonet and kill him on the spot.”13 If the enemy fled, the victorious line must remain in position. Plundering the dead or wounded was forbidden on pain of death.
腓特烈非常重视骑兵，骑兵约占其军队的四分之一，但他通常只将其用于以稳固战术单位进行的突击作战。因此，他的侦察能力很差；1744年，他拥有两万骑兵，却未能找到奥地利军队的踪迹。他也没有成功地利用轻步兵进行小规模冲突和巡逻。奥地利拥有大量的轻步兵，包括克罗地亚人和潘杜尔人；法国人则在革命时期利用未经训练的征召兵进行轻步兵作战。腓特烈几乎不知道该如何指挥这些分散且各自为政的部队，这些部队无法贯彻他的指挥理念。
Frederick set a great value on cavalry, which constituted about a fourth of his army, but he used it in general only for shock action in solid tactical units. His scouting service was therefore poor; in 1744, with twenty thousand cavalry, he could not locate the Austrians. Nor was he successful in the use of light infantry for skirmishing and patrolling. The Austrians had many light troops, mounted and foot, in their Croatians and Pandours; the French were to make use of light infantry in the untrained levies of the Revolution. Frederick hardly knew what to do with such troops, which, dispersed and individualistic, could not be extensions of his own mind.14
十八世纪中叶，火炮的使用增长速度超过了十六世纪至二十世纪之间的任何其他时期，与其他武器相比，火炮的使用增长更为迅猛。<sup> 15</sup>奥地利人在惨败于西里西亚之后，尤其依赖火炮来应对腓特烈大帝机动纵队的威胁。法国是欧洲最先进的火炮国家。腓特烈大帝对此发展常常感到惋惜，因为在所有主要国家中，普鲁士最无力承担火炮竞赛。国王在1768年指出，火炮的新潮流对国家财政来说简直是一个无底洞。然而，他自己也加入了这场争夺；正是腓特烈大帝，凭借其对快速机动的重视，引进了马拉野战炮，以便在战斗中快速转移阵地。他始终坚持认为炮兵并非“兵种”，而只是“辅助兵种”，其地位低于步兵和骑兵。但他对炮兵的运用却日益重视。他最后的著作之一，即1782年的一份训令，似乎体现了拿破仑后来学习的法国炮兵理论家的影响。腓特烈在此命令炮兵军官避免仅仅为了满足步兵或骑兵的需求而开火，要学习如何有选择地使用实心弹和霰弹，并将首轮火力集中于敌军步兵，以便在敌军防线上撕开缺口，帮助己方步兵突破。<sup> 16</sup>
The middle years of the eighteenth century saw a more rapid increase in the use of artillery, in proportion to other arms, than any other period from the sixteenth century to the twentieth.15 The Austrians, after their humiliating loss of Silesia, turned especially to artillery to meet the menace of Frederick's mobile columns. The French were the most progressive artillerists of Europe. Frederick often bemoaned this development, for Prussia of all major states could least afford an artillery race. The new vogue for artillery, observed the king in 1768, was a veritable abyss to the state's finances. Yet he joined the scramble; it was Frederick, with his appreciation of speedy movement, who introduced horse-drawn field artillery for shift of position during battle. He continued to insist that artillery was not an “arm” but only an “auxiliary,” inferior to infantry and cavalry, but he gave increasing thought to its use, and one of his last writings, an Instruction of 1782, seems to show the influence of the French artillery theorists from whom Bonaparte was to learn. Frederick here orders his artillery officers to avoid firing simply to satisfy the infantry or cavalry, to educate themselves in the discriminate use of ball and canister, and to concentrate their opening fire on the enemy's infantry in order to smash a hole in the enemy line and help their own infantry to break through.16
由于两道如此密集的战线正面交锋会造成惨重伤亡，因此腓特烈大帝非常重视侧翼攻击，并为此设计了著名的“斜线阵型”——即一翼以梯队推进，另一翼则保持中立。省略战术细节，我们可以简单地说，腓特烈大帝推崇这种作战方式的目的是：如果成功，便可迅速瓦解敌军防线，取得胜利；如果失败，则可最大限度地减少伤亡，因为被中立的翼可以机动掩护主力翼的撤退。腓特烈大帝卓越的机动性和协调性赋予了这些侧翼攻击特殊的效用，而侧翼攻击本身当然也是最古老的战争手段之一。<sup> 17</sup>
The use of the long unbroken battle array, since a frontal clash of two such solid lines would be butchery, caused Frederick to prize the flank attack, for which he designed his famous “oblique order,” the advance of one wing by echelons with refusal of the other. Omitting tactical details, it may simply be said that Frederick's purpose in favoring this type of battle was, in case of success, to gain a quick victory by rolling up the enemy's line, and, in case of failure, to minimize losses, since the refused wing maneuvered to cover the withdrawal of the wing engaged. Frederick's superior mobility and coordination gave a special effectiveness to these flanking movements, which in themselves were of course among the oldest expedients of war.17
在军队组织和战术方面，腓特烈从未真正改变过他的观点。他改变的是在更宏大的战略问题上的想法。起初，他似乎引入了一种新的精神，但最终他接受了政治秩序对战争发动条件、作战地点和时间的限制。
On these matters of army organization and tactics Frederick never seriously altered his opinions. He changed his mind on the larger issues of strategy. At first he seemed to introduce a new spirit, but in the end he accepted the limitations imposed by the political order on questions of under what circumstances wars should be fought, and where and when battle should be joined.
他对西里西亚的闪电战震惊了欧洲。第一次西里西亚战争（1740-1742）是一场孤注一掷的赌博，对普鲁士国王而言，这场战争的赌注极其巨大。在第二次西里西亚战争（1744-1745，与第一次战争一样，也是奥地利王位继承战争的一部分）中，他一度甚至渴望彻底摧毁哈布斯堡王朝。虽然计划失败，但腓特烈保住了西里西亚。此后，他的战争政策变得不再那么雄心勃勃。在七年战争（1756-1763）中，罗斯巴赫战役和洛伊滕战役或许拯救了普鲁士免于灭亡，之后他只能疲于应对法国、奥地利和俄罗斯的联合防御，而这三个国家的人口至少是普鲁士的四倍。弗里德里希的最后一场战争，即巴伐利亚王位继承战争（1778-1779 年），最终以不流血的军事示威和游行结束。
His lightning attack on Silesia startled Europe. This first Silesian war (1740–1742) was a desperate gamble, played for what to a king of Prussia were very high stakes. In the second Silesian war (1744–1745, forming like the first a part of the War of the Austrian Succession) he aspired for a while even to the total destruction of the Hapsburg monarchy. The project failed, but Frederick retained Silesia. Thereafter his war policy became less ambitious. In the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), after the battles of Rossbach and Leuthen, which probably saved Prussia from extinction, he was reduced to maintaining a brilliant defensive against the combined powers of France, Austria, and Russia, each of which had a population at least four times his own. Frederick's last war, that of the Bavarian Succession (1778–1779), dragged itself out in bloodless military demonstrations and promenades.
在《战争总论》中，我们发现他呼吁采取闪电战战略，尽管他没有使用“闪电战”这个词。他说，普鲁士的战争应该是“短暂而激烈的”；普鲁士将领应该力求迅速决胜。<sup> 18</sup>事实上，这些正是他最初行动所遵循的原则。然而值得注意的是，他为这些大胆的行动给出的理由，与后来使他日益谨慎的理由大同小异。他说，旷日持久的战争会耗尽普鲁士的资源，并破坏普鲁士军队“令人钦佩的纪律”。从倾向于速战速决的战争，到倾向于完全不打仗，或者倾向于打一场耗时更长但兵力物力消耗较低的战争，两者之间并没有太大的差别。总之，当时的统治条件是相同的：国家资源有限，军队依赖预先准备的固定弹药库，以及士兵虽然训练有素，但在危难之际却缺乏内在信念支撑。
In the Principes généraux de la guerre, we find him calling for a strategy of blitzkrieg, though he did not use that term. The wars of Prussia, he says, should be “short and lively”; Prussian generals should seek a speedy decision.18 These were in fact the principles on which he at first acted. It is notable, however, that the reasons given for these dashing operations were much the same as those which in later years made him increasingly cautious. A long war, he said, would exhaust the resources of Prussia and break down the “admirable discipline” of the Prussian troops. From preferring a short quick war it was no great distance to preferring either no war at all, or a longer war of low intensity in expenditure of men and material. In any case the governing conditions were the same: the limited resources of the state, the dependence of armies on fixed magazines prepared beforehand, and the use of soldiers who, however well drilled, had no inward conviction to sustain them in times of trouble.
腓特烈无法克服这些困难。他无法使普鲁士成为一个富裕的国家，只能节约资源。他无法像法国大革命时期的政府那样，让军队驻扎在占领区，尽管他曾建议这样做。如果军队分散开来寻找食物，就会溃散；如果补给不及时，士气就会低落。他也无法指望在占领区受到欢迎。他在波西米亚建立“第五纵队”的努力屡屡失败。而且，如果不改变整个体制和人生观，他就无法将士气传递给他的军队。
None of these conditions could Frederick overcome. He could not make Prussia a wealthy state; he could only economize its resources. He could not, like the governments of the French Revolution, let his armies live on occupied countries, although he recommended this procedure. His armies would melt away if dispersed to seek subsistence, and lose morale if they were not regularly supplied. Nor could he count on any welcome in occupied territories. His efforts to build a “fifth column” in Bohemia repeatedly failed. And he could not communicate moral enthusiasm to his troops without changing his whole system and view of life.
此外，奥地利在失去西里西亚后加强了炮兵和防御工事，这无疑给腓特烈二世的进攻战略发展设置了技术障碍。这位老国王晚年反复指出，形势已与他年轻时截然不同——普鲁士此后只能进行阵地战。他本人拥有庞大的永久弹药库和脆弱的边境，因此非常重视固定防御工事。他认为，要塞是“将统治者各省紧密联系在一起的坚固钉子”。围攻并攻克这些要塞成为战争的主要目标。自沃邦以来，围攻战术就一直是一门学问。腓特烈二世继承了这一传统，甚至他的战争理念也深受其影响。“我们应该根据围攻阵地的规则来制定作战部署。”他在1770年指出，战斗序列中的两列步兵阵型，就如同围攻部队所形成的平行阵型。即使在占领村庄时，也不应忘记这些原则。这与当时的军事实践发展方向截然相反。拿破仑一生只指挥过两次围城战。19
In addition, when the Austrians strengthened their artillery and their fortifications after the loss of Silesia, they added technical hindrances to the development of aggressive strategy by Frederick. The old king, in his last years, repeatedly observed that conditions had changed since his youth—that henceforth Prussia could fight only a war of position. He himself, with his great permanent magazines and vulnerable frontiers, set a high value on fixed fortifications. Forts, he observed, were “mighty nails which hold a ruler's provinces together.” To besiege and overwhelm such fortresses became a main object of warfare. The conduct of sieges had been a science since Vauban. Frederick carried on in this tradition. Even his concept of battle was colored by it. “We should draw our dispositions for battle from the rules of besieging positions.” The two lines of infantry in battle order, he said in 1770, corresponded to the parallels formed by a besieging force. Even in occupying villages these principles should not be lost from mind. Nothing could be further from the direction in which military practice was to move. Napoleon was to conduct only two sieges in his whole career.19
与拿破仑不同，腓特烈虽然是一位战功卓著的将领，却并不喜欢大规模战役，也就是交战双方主力部队之间的正面交锋。在他看来，战争的胜负很大程度上取决于运气，而运气恰恰与理性计算背道而驰。在腓特烈看来，最高超的计划智慧和指挥能力——这些是科学战争的首要前提——在激烈的大规模战斗中却无法依赖。“此外，值得注意的是，大多数热爱战争的将领之所以诉诸这种权宜之计，是因为缺乏其他手段。这非但不被视为他们的优点，反而通常被认为是他们才能匮乏的标志。” 20
Again unlike Napoleon, Frederick, though a successful battle general, was not fond of full-size battles, that is, showdown clashes between the main forces of the belligerents. To his mind the outcome of battle depended too much upon chance and chance was the opposite of rational calculation. The supreme planning intelligence, the power of command to elicit obedience, which to Frederick were the first premises of scientific war, could not be relied on in the heat of a major engagement. “It is to be remarked in addition that most generals in love with battle resort to this expedient for want of other resources. Far from being considered a merit in them, this is usually thought a sign of the sterility of their talents.”20
因此，歼灭敌军主力并非腓特烈通常的战略目标。他确实明白，一旦开战，胜利者应当对敌军进行毁灭性追击。但对腓特烈军队而言，毁灭性追击并非易事：骑兵训练有素，擅长以坚固的部队进行突击作战，一旦分散便容易逃亡；他们既没有克罗地亚非正规军那种半野蛮的凶猛，也没有现代军队那种政治激情，因此并不适合追击溃逃的残兵败将。腓特烈绝不可能像拿破仑在耶拿战役后那样发动骑兵突袭。实际上，对腓特烈而言，战斗的目的是迫使敌人撤退。“赢得战斗意味着迫使你的对手放弃阵地。”<sup> 21</sup>
To annihilate the enemy's main combat force was thus not Frederick's usual strategic objective. He indeed realized that, if battle is fought, the winner should attempt a destructive pursuit of the enemy. But destructive pursuit was not easy to a Frederician army: the cavalry, trained for shock action in solid units, inclined to desert if scattered, fired neither by the half-barbaric ferocity of Croatian irregulars, nor by the political passion of more modern troops, was not suited to pursue a fugitive and broken army. Nothing like Napoleon's cavalry action after the battle of Jena would have been possible to Frederick. In effect for Frederick the purpose of battle was to force an enemy to move. “To win a battle means to compel your opponent to yield you his position.”21
因此，腓特烈式战争日益演变为一场阵地战，一场复杂机动、步步为营的战争；其总体轮廓悠闲缓慢（尽管战术上并非如此），与1746年提倡的速战速决截然不同。他在1768年写道：“取得许多小胜利意味着逐步积累财富。” 他在1770年补充道：“战争中的所有行动都取决于将领能够占据的优势阵地，以及能够以最小损失进攻的阵地。” 他还从波西米亚的惨痛经历中得出结论：军队无法成功地远距离作战。 “我观察到，”他在1775年写道，“所有远离发动国边境的战争，其成功率都低于在国界附近进行的战争。这难道不是出于人类的本能吗？人们觉得保卫自己比掠夺邻国更正义。但或许，实际原因胜过了道德因素，因为在远离边境的地方提供粮食补给十分困难，而且很难及时提供新兵、新马、服装和军需品。” 波拿巴曾在远至奥斯特里茨和弗里德兰的地方赢得过战役，他或许会对这种谨慎的格言一笑置之，尽管博罗季诺后来提醒了他这些格言的威力。对腓特烈来说，这条规则同样适用。22
So Frederician war became increasingly a war of position, the war of complex maneuver and subtle accumulation of small gains; leisurely and slow in its main outlines (though never in tactics), and quite different from the short sharp warfare recommended in 1746. “To gain many small successes,” he wrote in 1768, “means gradually to heap up a treasure.” “All maneuvers in war,” he added in 1770, “turn upon the positions which a general may occupy with advantage, and positions which he may attack with the least loss.” He concluded also, from unfortunate experiences in Bohemia, that an army could not successfully operate far beyond its own frontiers. “I observe,” he wrote in 1775, “that all wars carried far from the frontiers of those who undertake them have less success than those fought within reach of one's own country. Would this not be because of a natural sentiment in man, who feels it to be more just to defend himself than to despoil his neighbor? But perhaps the physical reason outweighs the moral, because of the difficulty in providing food supplies at points distant from the frontier, and in furnishing quickly enough the new recruits, new horses, clothing and munitions of war.” Bonaparte, who could win battles in places as far from France as Austerlitz and Friedland, would have smiled at such maxims of caution, though Borodino came to remind him of their force. For Frederick the rule held good.22
尽管腓特烈的战略思维仍局限于旧有的阵地战框架内，尽管他仍然不愿发动大规模战役（在罗斯巴赫和洛伊滕战役那一年，是他的顾问们力主采取行动），但他从未在作战中采取被动策略。他始终坚持奇袭的重要性。在七年战争后的和平时期，他随时准备突袭萨克森或波西米亚，并配备了详尽的地图、精确的情报，以及作为国家机密的新型十磅榴弹炮和新型骑兵冲锋战术。他倾向于在战场上采取进攻性战略，因为这能带来更大的主动权；但当兵力不如敌或预期能通过时间优势扭转战局时，他也会毫不犹豫地采取防御作战，而这往往是他不得不做的。然而，这种防御必须是积极主动且充满挑战性的，它既要依托固定的防御工事，又要能够自由地攻击敌军阵地和分遣队。他说道：“一位指挥官如果自以为在防御战中指挥得当，却不采取任何主动行动，在整个战役中都无所作为，那他就是在自欺欺人。这样的防御最终只会导致整支军队被逐出将军原本想要保卫的国家。” 23
But although Frederick's strategic thinking remained within the old limits of the war of position, and although he remained disinclined to serious battle (it was his advisors who pressed for action in the year of Rossbach and Leuthen), he never favored passivity in operations. He continued to insist on the importance of surprise. He was prepared, in the years of peace after the Seven Years' War, to spring at a moment's notice into Saxony or Bohemia, equipped with detailed maps and exact information, and with new ten-pound howitzers and new kinds of cavalry charges kept as a state secret. He favored offensive strategy in the field, as permitting more freedom of initiative; but would willingly fight on the defensive, as he often had to, when less strong than his enemy or when expecting to gain an advantage by time. It must however be an active and challenging defensive, which, while based on fixed fortifications, freely assaulted enemy positions and detachments. A commander, he said, “deceives himself who thinks he is conducting well a defensive war when he takes no initiative, and remains inactive during the whole campaign. Such a defensive would end with the whole army being driven from the country that the general meant to protect.”23
在当时的形势下，他对战争可能带来的收益越来越持怀疑态度。他初次登场便促成了其一生中欧洲大陆权力平衡最成功的变革，但随着西里西亚的吞并，他转而成为和平主义者，并最终坚信普鲁士作为欧洲权力平衡主要组成部分之一的价值。他设想普鲁士最终将扩张至波兰、萨克森和瑞典波美拉尼亚；但（除了第一次瓜分波兰——那次瓜分是在没有战争、没有扰乱权力平衡的情况下完成的，令外交官们非常满意）他愿意将最终的扩张留给他的继任者。他是一位王朝统治者，而非革命家或冒险家；他能够将一些事情留给他人去做。1775年，他主张维持军事现状。他写道：“雄心勃勃之人首先应当考虑到，欧洲各地的军备和军事纪律大同小异，而联盟通常会导致交战各方实力相当，因此，君主们目前所能期望的最大优势，不过是通过不断积累战果，在边境地区夺取一座小城，或一块无需支付战争利息、人口甚至远不及战死沙场人数的领土。” 他也并不担心会被强大的邻国所压倒。 “我认为，小国（指人口五百万的普鲁士）只要勤奋务实，并能有效管理政务，就能与大国（指人口约两千万的法国、奥地利和俄罗斯）抗衡。我发现，大帝国充斥着弊端和混乱；它们仅仅依靠庞大的资源和庞大的人口力量来维持统治。这些宫廷的阴谋诡计足以摧毁实力较弱的君主；它们总是有害的，但却无法阻止庞大军队的运转。” 他似乎从未考虑过，如果最大的君主国摆脱弊端和混乱，打破王朝贵族制度的束缚，并像普鲁士那样注重实务，欧洲的“平衡”将会发生怎样的变化。他没有预见到法国大革命。24
Of the gains to be expected from war, under conditions then existing, he became increasingly dubious. Having made his debut by achieving the most successful revolution in the balance of power effected on the continent of Europe in his lifetime, he became with the acquisition of Silesia a man of peace, and ended by believing firmly in the value of the European balance now that Prussia was one of its main components. For Prussia he envisaged eventual expansion in Poland, Saxony, and Swedish Pomerania; but (except for the first partition of Poland, which was accomplished without war and without disturbance to the balance of power, to the great satisfaction of diplomats) he was willing to leave this eventual expansion to his successors. He was a dynast, not a revolutionary or an adventurer; he could leave something to be done by others than himself. In 1775 he stood for the military status quo. “The ambitious,” he wrote, “should consider above all that armaments and military discipline being much the same throughout Europe, and alliances as a rule producing an equality of force between belligerent parties, all that princes can expect from the greatest advantages at present is to acquire, by accumulation of successes, either some small city on the frontier, or some territory which will not pay interest on the expenses of the war, and whose population does not even approach the number of citizens who perished in the campaigns.” Nor did he fear being crushed by his huge neighbors. “I perceive that small states [meaning Prussia, with its five million inhabitants] can maintain themselves against the greatest monarchies [meaning France, Austria, and Russia with some twenty million each], when these states put industry and a great deal of order into their affairs. I find that the great empires are full of abuses and confusion; that they maintain themselves only by their vast resources and by the intrinsic force of their mass. The intrigues of these courts would ruin less powerful princes; they are always harmful, but do not prevent the keeping of numerous armies on foot.” He seems never to have considered what would happen to the “equilibrium of Europe,” should the greatest of the monarchies throw off its abuses and confusion, break down the limits set by the dynastic-aristocratic regime, and introduce into its affairs some of the attention to business already familiar in Prussia. He did not foresee the French Revolution.24
二
II
然而，在法国，拿破仑战争的基础早已奠定。1763年屈辱的和平条约使法国失去了海外帝国和在欧洲的威望，此后，法国开始认真思考军事问题。格里博瓦尔通过引入可互换部件的原理，彻底革新了火炮，提高了射击精度，并通过减轻重量增强了火炮的机动性。他的改革创造了一直沿用至19世纪20年代的标准火炮类型。1760年代，布罗格利元帅和舒瓦瑟尔公爵引入了一种新的、规模更大的军队编制单位——师。师逐渐发展完善，最终被定义为军队中一个独立的、永久的、兵力大致相当的组成部分，由一名将军指挥，足以在其他师抵达战场之前成功抵御敌人。庞大的军队不再是战场上形成不间断战线的单一整体，而是变成了可分离、可独立机动的组成部分。这为总司令开辟了全新的战略和战术可能性，与此同时，作为师级指挥官的下级将领也获得了腓特烈时期从未有过的重要性。美国独立战争是师级单位首次发挥重要作用的战争。拿破仑和他的元帅们正是这一战争的成果。25
In France, however, the foundations of Napoleonic warfare were already being laid. The humiliating peace of 1763, by which France lost its empire overseas and its prestige in Europe, was followed by serious military thinking. Gribeauval revolutionized artillery by introducing the principle of interchangeable parts, improving the accuracy of fire, and heightening the mobility of guns through reducing weight. His reforms created the types that remained standard until the 1820s. The marshal de Broglie and the duke de Choiseul, in the 1760s, introduced a new and larger unit of army organization, the division. Developed gradually, the division came to be defined as a distinct, permanent, more or less equal part of an army, commanded by a general officer, and strong enough to engage the enemy successfully until other divisions reached the scene of action. Large armies ceased to be a single mass forming an unbroken front in battle; they became articulated wholes, with detachable and independently maneuverable members. Great new strategic and tactical possibilities were opened for a commander in chief, and at the same time, as divisional commanders, subordinate generals achieved an importance never enjoyed under Frederick. The Revolutionary Wars were the first in which the division was important. Napoleon and his marshals were the outcome.25
1763年之后，伴随着诸多实用创新，大量的理论著作也随之涌现。其中一位理论家是年轻的贵族吉贝尔伯爵，他于1772年出版了《战术通论》（Essai général de tactique）。当时他年仅29岁，但这本书使他一举成名。他成为沙龙的宠儿，与莱斯皮纳斯的米莱坠入爱河，创作了三部诗体悲剧，曾在陆军部任职一段时间。1789年，在一次为选举三级会议代表而召开的地区议会上，他被反动派、心怀不满者和嫉妒者联合起来，从这场萌芽中的革命中除掉了。1790年，他去世了，临终前哭喊道：“我将名垂青史！我将得到公正的审判！”<sup> 26</sup>
Along with practical innovations, after 1763, went a great deal of theoretical writing. Among the theorists was a young nobleman, the count de Guibert, who in 1772 published his Essai général de tactique. He was only twenty-nine, but his book made him a celebrity at once. He became a lion of the salons, fell in love with Mile, de Lespinasse, wrote three tragedies in verse, served for a while in the War Office, and in 1789, at one of the district assemblies called to elect members to the Estates-General, he was liquidated from the incipient revolution by a combination of the reactionary, the disgruntled, and the jealous. He died in 1790, crying on his deathbed: “I shall be known! I shall receive justice!”26
吉贝尔性格不稳定，虚荣、反复无常，却才华横溢，既是文学家又是哲学家，被同时代的人视为天才的化身。他反复无常，言辞过激，容易受一时热情左右。写《论战》时，他曾在德国和科西嘉岛担任军官。和其他哲学家一样，他非常崇拜腓特烈，在他们眼中，腓特烈是现代性和启蒙的象征。据说，伟大的腓特烈发现自己的秘密被这个无礼的年轻人洞悉后，勃然大怒，以至于每次读到《论战》都会勃然大怒。这本书是否真的洞悉了老弗里茨的秘密，我们不得而知；但可以肯定的是，它有时的内容超越了腓特烈式的战争。
Guibert was an unstable person, vain, unpredictable, and brilliant, a littérateur and a philosophe, regarded by contemporaries as the embodiment of genius. He was inconsistent, overemphatic, swayed by the enthusiasm of the moment. When he wrote the Essai he had served as an officer in Germany and Corsica. Like other philosophes he warmly admired Frederick, who stood in their eyes for modernity and enlightenment. The great Frederick, according to rumor, was so annoyed to find his secrets divined by this impertinent youngster, that reading the Essai threw him into fits of rage. Whether the book divined old Fritz's secrets we cannot know; that it sometimes went beyond Frederician warfare is certain.
《战术通论》贯穿两大主题。一是呼吁建立一支爱国或公民军队，二是号召开展机动战争。这两点都符合吉贝尔对战术的理解。当时，“战术”一词通常指军队的机动，包括我们今天所说的战略（属于“大战术”）和战术（属于“基本战术”）。吉贝尔认为这种解释过于狭隘。在他看来，战术几乎涵盖了所有军事科学。它包含两部分：第一，军队的组建和训练；第二，将领的艺术，也就是当时人们所说的战术，以及我们今天所说的战术和战略。这位年轻的作者希望将他自己扩展后的战术概念提升到普遍真理的高度。“它将成为，”他说，“适用于所有时代、所有地点和所有兵种的科学……总之，它是历代军事思想的精华，也是我们这个时代所能增添的精华。”<sup> 27</sup>
Two themes pervaded the Essai général de tactique. One demanded a patriot or citizen army. The other sounded the call for a war of movement. Both fell within Guibert's conception of tactique. The word at this time usually meant the maneuvering of troops, including under “grand tactics” what we call strategy, and under “elementary tactics” what we call tactics. This meaning Guibert rejected as too narrow. Tactics to him meant virtually all military science. It had two parts: first, the raising and training of armies; second, the art of the general, or what people then called tactics, and what we call tactics and strategy. Tactics, in his own enlarged sense, the young author wished to raise to the level of universal truth. “It becomes,” he said, “the science of all times, all places and all arms…in a word the result of everything good which the military ages have thought, and of what our own age has been able to add.”27
公民军队的主题在启蒙思想家圈子里是一个普遍的理论。孟德斯鸠、卢梭、马布利以及18世纪70年代构成自由主义主流观点的众多人物都认为，为了防止暴政，一个国家的公民必须接受军事训练。曾为狄德罗的《百科全书》撰稿、并在法国大革命期间担任战争部长的让·塞尔旺于1780年出版了一本关于公民士兵的书籍。吉贝尔正值这一思潮的鼎盛时期。他的《论军事》 （Essai），题献给“我的祖国”，提出“建立一部军事和政治宪法”，使所有法国人，无论贵族还是平民，国王还是臣民，都以“公民”的身份为荣。这部著作可以被视为启蒙思想家在军事科学领域最重要的著作。
The theme of the citizen army was a common doctrine in philosophe circles. Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mably, and the host of lesser figures who by the 1770s made up liberal opinion maintained that, as a safeguard against tyranny, the citizens of a country must be trained to arms. A contributor to Diderot's Encyclopédie, J. Servan, who became war minister during the Revolution, published in 1780 a book on the citizen soldier. Guibert was riding the crest of a mighty wave. His Essai, dedicated “à ma patrie,” proposing “to erect both a military and a political constitution” in which all Frenchmen, noble and commoner, king and subject, should glory in the title of “citizen,” can be regarded as the leading work on military science by a philosophe.
吉贝尔开篇便指出，欧洲现今的各国政府都是专制机器。所有民族都渴望推翻它们，没有哪个民族会为它们而战。没有哪个政府真正对军事科学感兴趣。即使在普鲁士，纪律也只是流于表面，居民大多缺乏军事素养，青年也未接受过尚武和斯巴达式的训练。在法国，国王并非军人，情况则更为宽松。民众对战争的胜负漠不关心，因为战俘不再被冷血屠杀，被征服省份的平民除了缴纳通常与旧税额相差无几的贡赋外，不会遭受任何不便。总之，欧洲所有民族都软弱无能，所有政府也都软弱无力。 “但是假设，”他说，“欧洲兴起一个民族，他们精神抖擞，政府精良，拥有充足的资源，他们意志坚韧，组建了一支国家军队，并制定了扩张的宏伟计划。我们将会看到这样的民族征服邻国，像北风吹弯芦苇一样，压垮我们脆弱的体制。” 28
The present governments of Europe, Guibert begins, are all despotic machines. All peoples would overthrow them if they could. No people will fight for them. No government is really interested in military science. Even in Prussia discipline is purely external, the inhabitants are mostly unmilitary, and youth is not trained to warlike and Spartan habits. In France, where the king is not a soldier, conditions are even more relaxed. Peoples are indifferent to the fortunes of war, because prisoners are no longer slaughtered in cold blood, and the civilians of a conquered province suffer no inconvenience except to pay a tribute often no heavier than their old taxes. In short, all the peoples of Europe are soft, and all the governments are weak. “But suppose,” he says, “that a people should arise in Europe vigorous in spirit, in government, in the means at its disposal, a people who with hardy qualities should combine a national army and a settled plan of aggrandizement. We should see such a people subjugate its neighbors and overwhelm our weak constitutions like the north wind bending reeds.”28
这段话常被断章取义地引用，被认为是预言了法国大革命和拿破仑战争。事实并非如此。吉贝尔说，不会再出现如此充满活力的民族了。本世纪初，彼得大帝统治下的俄国或许曾有过这样的景象，但如今的俄国也过于西化，过于沉溺于“奢侈”和文明的精致。尽管吉贝尔并不指望会发生足以符合他理论的变革，但他指出，在这个日渐衰落的世界里，哪怕只是稍加改革的国家，也能比其他国家拥有巨大的优势。他希望法国能够做到这一点。
This remark has often been quoted out of context as a prophecy of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It was no such thing. No such vigorous people, says Guibert, will arise. Russia under Peter might have become such at the beginning of the century, but even Russia is now too westernized, too habituated to “luxury” and the refinements of civilization. But though Guibert expects no change adequate to his theories, he observes that, in so effete a world, the country that reforms itself only slightly will have a great advantage over others. This much he hopes for France.
通过将人民的活力注入军队，法国或许能够发展出一种更果断、更迅速、更具毁灭性的战争方式。但即便如此，尽管他抱有希望，却也并不抱太大期望。他认为，现代战争的“弊病”若不进行政治革命，是无法根除的。革命是不可能的——吉贝尔和其他启蒙思想家一样，几乎没有意识到革命思想会转化为革命行为。他说，我们必须做的是，“既然我们不可能拥有公民军队和完美的军队，那么至少要让我们的军队纪律严明、训练有素。”因此，在一番慷慨激昂的阐述之后，吉贝尔深入探讨他的主题，最终得出的结论与伟大的腓特烈大帝的出发点大致相同，即腓特烈大帝在1746年提出的观点：公民士兵的确是最好的，但由于大多数士兵并非公民，因此必须对他们进行严格的纪律约束和训练。29
By introducing the vigor of its people into its army. France may develop a more decisive, swifter, and more crushing kind of war. But even this much, though he hopes for it, he scarcely expects. The “vices” of modern warfare, he says, are incorrigible without political revolution. Revolution is out of the question—Guibert, like other philosophes, had little notion that revolutionary thinking might be followed by revolutionary behavior. What we must do, he says, “since we cannot have citizen troops and perfect troops, is to have our troops at least disciplined and trained.” So, after the fanfare of general principles, as he works into his subject, Guibert arrives about where the great Frederick had started, at the idea, expressed by Frederick in 1746, that citizen-soldiers were indeed the best, but that since most soldiers were not citizens they must be rigidly disciplined and trained.29
《论战争》的第二个主题，即对机动战争的诉求，因此比公民军队的主题更为详尽。与第一个主题一样，第二个主题也贯穿着同样的原始主义倾向，同样认为十八世纪的文化过于复杂繁复，同样崇尚粗犷的斯巴达式美德。吉贝尔希望通过简化战争要素，使战争更加灵活果断。他认为当时的军队规模过大，火炮被过分重视，防御工事和弹药库过度建设，地形研究也过于繁琐。在他看来，欧洲民族缺乏精神力量，却沉溺于物质和空洞的人数。他们缺乏勇气，却依赖金钱。
The second theme of the Essai, the demand for a war of movement, is accordingly far more developed than the theme of a citizen army. Through this second theme, as through the first, runs the same strain of primitivism, the same feeling that the culture of the eighteenth century is too complex and sophisticated, the same idealizing of rude and Spartan virtues. Guibert hopes to make war more mobile and decisive by simplifying its elements. He thinks the armies of his day too big, artillery overvalued, fortifications and magazines overgrown, the study of topography overdone. The European peoples, in his opinion, having no force of spirit, proliferate themselves in material objects and empty numbers. Lacking valor, they rely on money.
在军队规模和炮兵数量方面，吉贝尔的观点——这两者都在蓬勃发展，并在1813年的莱比锡战役中达到20世纪之前战争规模的巅峰——却始终停留在其导师腓特烈大帝的时代，并坚持有限战争的理念。尽管他偏爱民兵，但他并非大规模军队的拥护者。他认为庞大的军队是掌权者无能的标志。他曾说过，一位优秀的将领所指挥的作战部队超过七万人，反而会成为他的负担。对于当时的炮兵竞赛，他与腓特烈大帝一样深感忧虑。和腓特烈大帝一样，他认为炮兵只是辅助武器，而非“主力军”。格里博瓦尔的技术创新一如既往地在专家中引发了巨大的分歧。在某种程度上，当时的炮兵地位类似于我们今天的航空兵。吉贝尔采取了中间立场，倾向于格里博瓦尔，但他始终未能充分理解杜泰等当代炮兵理论家的工作。这些理论家利用火炮的新型机动性实现了火力的集中，他们的理论塑造了最成功的炮兵军官——拿破仑·波拿巴的思想。30
In his views on the size of armies and quantity of artillery, both of which were in the ascendant, reaching at Leipzig in 1813 the highest point attained in battle until the twentieth century, Guibert saw no further than his master Frederick, and remained within the school of limited war. However partial to citizen troops, he was no prophet of mass armies. Huge armies he regarded as signs of the ineptitude of men in authority. A good general, he said, would be encumbered by an operating force of more than seventy thousand. On the contemporary artillery race he echoed Frederick's lamentations. Like Frederick, he regarded artillery only as an auxiliary, not as an “arm.” The technical innovations of Gribeauval had, as usual, produced a wide split among experts. In a smaller way artillery was then in somewhat the position of aviation in our time. Guibert took a middle ground, favorable to Gribeauval, but he never fully appreciated the work of contemporary artillery theorists, such as Du Teil, who were using the new mobility of guns to achieve heavy concentration of fire, and whose teaching shaped the mind of that most successful of all artillery officers, Napoleon Bonaparte.30
吉贝尔对防御工事和弹药库的评价极低，这使他与腓特烈大帝的观点渐行渐远，也更接近即将到来的世界大战的惯例。他认为，军队应该依靠占领国的征用物资维持生存。战争必须以战为本，正如罗马帝国鼎盛时期那样；军队应该节俭，需求少，辎重少，忍受物资匮乏和艰苦环境而不抱怨。他指出，法国现行的文职人员随军监督补给的制度是灾难性的，因为军事决策最终取决于文职官员的同意，而这些官员更关心的是保护物资供应，而不是与敌人作战。一支轻装上阵、依靠当地资源生存的军队将获得新的机动性、作战范围和出其不意的能力。31
Guibert departed further from Frederick, and approached nearer to the practice of the world war that was soon to come, in his low opinion of fortifications and magazines. Armies, he thought, should live by requisitions on the countries they occupied. War must support war, as in the best days of Rome; troops should be frugal, have few needs, carry short baggage trains, endure scarcity and hardship without complaint. The present French system, he says, by which civilians accompany an army to supervise its provisioning, is ruinous, for military decisions come to depend on the consent of civil officials who care more about protecting supplies than about fighting the enemy. An army that travels light, living on the country, will gain new mobility, range of action, and power of surprise.31
吉贝尔认为，自沃邦以来，筑城艺术被过分高估了。随着大型弹药库（其保护功能之一）的废除，要塞的必要性也会降低。修建连绵不断的要塞使战争成本远超必要。将部队分散驻扎在各处使军队规模过大。将军事行动变成一系列围攻使战争不必要地延长。吉贝尔也不承认，对于他设想的那种高度机动的军队而言，设防据点具有任何真正的防御价值。“仿佛，”他写道，“只有棱堡才能保卫它们所环绕的城市，仿佛这些城市的命运不取决于保卫和支援它们的军队的素质和实力；仿佛，简而言之，防御薄弱的要塞不会使建造和统治它们的被征服民族精疲力竭、蒙受耻辱，并最终沦为奴隶。”他总结道，要塞应该数量少、结构坚固，并且完全辅助战略调动。32
The art of fortification, Guibert thought, had been greatly overvalued since Vauban. Fortresses would become less necessary with the abolition of the large magazines which it was one of their functions to protect. Building chains of forts made war more costly than necessary. Dispersing the troops in garrisons made armies larger than necessary. The turning of military operations into a series of sieges made wars needlessly long. Nor would Guibert admit that fortified points had any real defensive value against a highly mobile army of the kind he envisaged. “As if,” he wrote, “bastions alone could defend the cities which they surround, as if the destiny of these cities does not depend on the quality and vigor of the troops which defend and support them; as if, in short, fortresses poorly defended would not turn to the exhaustion, disgrace and certain enslavement of the conquered peoples who were their builders and masters.” Forts, he concluded, should be few, very strong, and entirely auxiliary to strategic movement.32
为了加快行军速度，吉贝尔利用了当时新近发明的师制。1772年，师制原则尚未得到广泛应用，吉贝尔也未能清晰地区分法军新式师制与腓特烈大帝时期临时性的部队划分。然而，他的理论清晰明了，标志着对腓特烈的超越。腓特烈通常的做法是在行军途中将军队分割，以便在抵达敌军阵地时，各部分能够按照预先制定的战线展开。军队的行军方式与其作战方式相同。吉贝尔则使行军秩序摆脱了对作战秩序的依赖。根据吉贝尔的构想，在行军中，每个师构成一个纵队。这些纵队在行军途中分散开来，行进速度更快，覆盖范围更广，并迫使敌人转向所需方向；在战斗中，它们能够集中兵力，始终保持着作为一支军队的高度统一性。总司令走在前线，勘察即将交战的战场，根据所见情况制定作战策略，并安排各师抵达战场后的部署。战斗变得比以往更加灵活，更加精准地适应地形和环境，也更容易在军队投入战斗后由总司令进行指挥。吉贝尔认为腓特烈在霍亨弗里德贝格战役中使用了这种体系，但实际上，这种理念更多地源于拿破仑而非腓特烈。33
To accelerate movement Guibert had available the recent invention of the division. The divisional principle had not been carried very far in 1772, and Guibert failed to distinguish clearly between the new divisions in the French army and the temporary division of forces practiced by Frederick the Great. His doctrine, however, is clear, and marks an advance beyond Frederick. Frederick's usual aim was to divide his army on the march in such a way that, upon reaching the enemy, the parts would fall into place in a battle line planned in advance. The army marched as it intended to fight. Guibert emancipated marching order from this dependency on battle order. In marching, according to Guibert's conception, each division constitutes a column. These columns, in separating on the march, move more rapidly, cover a wider theater, and force the enemy to turn in a desired direction; for battle they concentrate, never having lost the higher unity that makes them a single army. The commander in chief, going ahead, surveys the field of prospective battle, determines his battle tactics in the light of what he sees, and arranges the placing of his divisions as they arrive upon the field. Battle becomes more flexible than before, more exactly adapted to terrain and circumstance, more susceptible to guidance by the commanding general after the armies are committed. Guibert credits Frederick with having used such a system at Hohenfriedberg, but in truth the idea was more Napoleonic than Frederician.33
《战术通论》的核心信息，简而言之，就是呼吁建立一种新型军队，理想情况下是人民军队，但无论如何，这支军队都应该更加机动灵活，因为它可以驻扎在乡村，摆脱了防御工事的束缚，行动更加自由，并且由于以师为单位进行组织，机动性更强。有了这样一支军队，旧的阵地战就会让位于运动战。“随着我们更多地进行运动战，我们应该摆脱目前的常规，回归规模更小、负重更轻的军队，减少对所谓‘阵地’的追求，因为阵地永远只能是机动灵活、指挥良好的军队的最后手段。当一支军队懂得如何机动，并且渴望战斗时，几乎没有哪个阵地是它无法从后方攻击或迫使敌人撤退的。总之，只有当有理由不采取行动时，占据阵地才是明智之举。”他还概述了波拿巴即将推行的闪电战。他说，一位优秀的将领会摒弃传统意义上的“立场”。“我的意思是，一位在这方面能够摆脱既定偏见的将领，会让敌人惊慌失措，使其动弹不得，迫使其不断战斗或撤退。但这样的将领需要一支与我们今天的军队截然不同的军队，一支由他亲自组建，并能胜任他所要求的新型作战行动的军队。” 34革命正是为了催生这种新型军队。
The net message of the Essai général de tactique, in a sentence, was to call for a new kind of army, ideally a people's army, but in any case an army made more mobile by living on the country, more free to act because released from fortified points, more readily maneuverable because organized in divisions. With such an army the old war of position would yield to a war of movement. “In proportion as we fought more a war of movements, we should get away from the present routine, return to smaller and less overburdened armies, and seek less for what are called ‘positions,’ for positions should never be anything but a last resource for a mobile and well commanded army. When an army knows how to maneuver, and wants to fight, there are few positions that it cannot attack from the rear or cause to be evacuated by the enemy. Positions, in a word, are good to take only when one has reason not to try to act.” And he sketches the lightning war that Bonaparte was to practice. A good general, he says, will ignore “positions” in the old-fashioned sense. “I say that a general who, in this matter, shakes off established prejudices will throw his enemy into consternation, stun him, give him no chance to breathe, force him to fight or to retreat continuously before him. But such a general would need an army differently constituted from our armies today, an army which, formed by himself, was prepared for the new kind of operations which he would require it to perform.”34 The Revolution was to produce this new kind of army.
不幸的是，吉贝尔作为先知的声誉受到了损害。他于1779年出版的第二部重要的军事科学著作《现代战争体系的辩护》（Défense du système de guerre moderne）明确否定了《论军事科学》的主要观点。 “我写那本书的时候，”他说，“我比现在年轻十岁。现代哲学的迷雾让我头脑发热，判断力也受到了影响。”<sup> 35</sup>此外，在凭借《论军事科学》成名之后，他结识了腓特烈大帝，游历了德国，融入了上流社会，被誉为专家，并且更加安于现状。
Unfortunately for his reputation as a prophet, Guibert's second important work on military science, the Défense du système de guerre moderne, published in 1779, explicitly repudiated the main ideas of the Essai. “When I wrote that book,” he said, “I was ten years younger. The vapors of modern philosophy heated my head and clouded my judgment.”35 In addition, after becoming famous by the Essai, he had met Frederick, traveled through Germany, broken into society, been hailed as an expert, and become more contented with the world.
《辩护》一书试图维护的“现代体系” ，不过是当今战争与古典时代战争的对比。它实际上是1779年保守的军事技术。本书正文仅探讨了这场“现代”战争的一个方面：纵队与线列在步兵作战战术中的相对优劣，这一争论已持续了一代人之久。吉贝尔站在保守的一边，捍卫线列（即火力原则），反对纵队（即冲击原则）。在这一讨论之后，吉贝尔又增加了一章，题为“从政治和行政角度审视现行战争体系”。至此，他开始彻底否定自己的观点。
The “modern system” that the Défense tries to vindicate is simply the warfare of the day as contrasted with the warfare of classical antiquity. It is the conservative military technique of 1779. The body of the book deals with only one aspect of this “modern” war: the relative merits, debated for a generation, of column and line in the combat tactics of infantry. Guibert took the conservative side, defending the line, or principle of firepower, against the column, or principle of shock assault. To the body of this discussion Guibert added a final chapter, “The present system of war examined in relation to politics and administration.” Here came the great recantation.
他现在完全不接受公民军队的想法。吉贝尔写道，公民军队正在美洲与英国和黑森的职业军人作战。许多欧洲军官饶有兴趣地观看了这场战斗；拉法耶特、贝尔蒂埃、茹尔当和格奈森瑙后来从美洲带回了一些关于爱国士兵和开放式作战阵型的有利想法。吉贝尔坚持认为，前平民永远无法与职业军人抗衡，并将美国人的胜利完全归咎于英国人的无能。他说，任何现代国家都不可能冒使用公民征召兵的风险，这种做法对古代人来说或许很好，因为古代的军事行动简单，而且还没有火器，但除了土耳其和波兰之外，欧洲所有国家都已经超越并抛弃了这种做法——而波兰现在已是一片废墟。在这些语境中，“公民”一词的含义几乎与“居民”无异。36
He will now have none of the idea of a citizen army. Citizen forces, while Guibert wrote, were fighting British and Hessian professionals in America. Many European officers watched the spectacle with interest; Lafayette, Berthier, Jourdan, and Gneisenau were to bring back from America some favorable ideas on patriot-soldiers and open fighting formations. Guibert insists that ex-civilians can never stand against professionals, and attributes the success of the Americans entirely to the incompetence of the British. No modern state, he says, could possibly take the risk of using citizen levies, which were all very well for the ancients, among whom maneuvers were simple and firearms unknown, but which every nation of Europe has outgrown and discarded, except Turkey and Poland—and Poland is in ruins. In these contexts the word “citizen” meant hardly more than “inhabitant.”36
吉贝尔也赞扬了“现代”的、即职业化的战争，认为其性质温和甚至无害，而这恰恰是《论战争》中对其的主要批评。他指出，如今被征服的国家可以免于复仇和毁灭的恐怖，但“任何由其居民保卫的国家都必然会经历这种灾难”。让人民旁观战争暴力更为人道。强调防御工事以及所有形式化作战的微妙之处，“或许是一种滥用……但无疑有利于国家的安宁和帝国的安全”。各军事强国在训练、纪律、资源和才能方面的相对平等创造了一种有益的平衡。因此，“战争对国家造成的决定性灾难就越少；征服的可能性就越小，野心勃勃的统治者可利用的对象就越少，帝国的动荡也就越少。”《论战争》的思想到此结束。它与腓特烈大帝的几乎一模一样。37
Guibert also praises “modern,” that is professional, war for the mild and even innocuous character which in the Essai was a main charge against it. Nowadays, he observes, a conquered country escapes the horrors of revenge and destruction, but “any country defended by its inhabitants must inevitably experience this kind of calamity.” It is more humane for peoples to remain spectators to warlike violence. The emphasis on fortified positions, with all the subtleties of formalized maneuver, “may be an abuse…but certainly results advantageously for the tranquillity of nations and security of empires.” The relative equality of training, discipline, resources, and talent among the military powers creates a salutary balance. So much the less, therefore, “will wars be decisive and consequently disastrous to the nations; the less possibility will there be of conquest, the fewer subjects of temptation for ambitious rulers, and the fewer revolutions of empires.” Thus ends the thought of the Défense. It is scarcely distinguishable from that of Frederick the Great.37
吉贝尔在他的两部著作中都敏锐地察觉到有限战争与无限战争之间的区别，或者说职业军人的冲突与民族间破坏性斗争之间的区别。他看到了战争与政府结构之间的密切联系。他的矛盾并非逻辑上的，而是道德上的，是一种态度上的不一致，而非分析上的不一致。29岁时，他赞同建立国家军队和闪电战战略的理念；35岁时，他却对这些理念持否定态度。无论在哪个时期，他都没有展现出多少实际的远见卓识（而非仅仅是幸运的预言），也没有意识到他在1772年赞同、1779年否定的那些理念，会在当时的世代成为现实。
Guibert, in both his books, glimpsed the difference between limited and unlimited war, or between the clashes of professional soldiers and the destructive struggles of peoples. He saw the close relation between warfare and the structure of government. His inconsistency was not logical but moral, an inconsistency of attitude, not of analysis. At twenty-nine, he looked upon the ideas of national armies and blitzkrieg strategy with favor. At thirty-five he looked upon these same ideas with disapproval. At neither time did he show much practical foresight, as distinguished from lucky predictions, or any sense that the ideas that he favored in 1772. and rejected in 1779 would become realities for the generation then alive.
在结束《辩护》之前，吉贝尔对启蒙哲学家们进行了临别抨击。这些启蒙哲学家有时表现出和平主义倾向，或者至少反对当时政府发动的战争。他说：“反对战争……无异于徒劳无功，因为野心勃勃、不公正或强大的统治者绝不会被这种手段所约束。但其结果，而且必然的结果，是逐渐扼杀军国主义精神，使政府对这一重要的行政部门失去兴趣，最终有一天，将自己的国家——软弱无力、解除武装——拱手让给那些或许文明程度较低，但却更有判断力和审慎精神的好战国家。”<sup> 38</sup>这也预言了法国的命运。然而，在十八世纪，这则警告并不需要，因为在启蒙哲学家们的思想中，最终占据主导地位的并非和平主义。
Before concluding the Défense Guibert took a parting shot at the philosophes, who sometimes showed pacifist inclinations, or at least objected to the wars fought by governments then existing. “To declaim against war,” he said, “…is to beat the air with vain sounds, for ambitious, unjust or powerful rulers will certainly not be restrained by such means. But what may result, and what must necessarily result, is to extinguish little by little the military spirit, to make the government less interested in this important branch of administration, and some day to deliver up one's own nation, softened and disarmed—or, what amounts to the same thing, badly armed and not knowing how to use arms—to the yoke of warlike nations which may be less civilized but which have more judgment and prudence.”38 Here too was a prophecy for France. It was a warning not needed in the eighteenth century, however, for of the ideas of the philosophes it was not pacifism that was to prevail.
三
III
1793年，革命后的法兰西共和国面临着由英国、荷兰、普鲁士、奥地利、撒丁岛和西班牙组成的联盟。在实行统一统治的民族中，法国人口最多，或许也是最富有的。为了应对危机，公共安全委员会以旧制度下从未有过的方式，充分发挥了法国的军事潜力。摆脱了旧有特权、地方特权、阶级特权、内部壁垒和排他性垄断的束缚，委员会以独裁手段建立了战时经济，激发了民众的民族意识，并在“全民征兵制”（levée en masse）中推行了普遍兵役制。在战争的政治层面，革命者致力于建立新的军事秩序，但在技术和战略层面，他们却鲜少进行创新。卡诺的战略思想显得有些过时。39然而，共和党人让军队依靠征用而不是依靠军需库来补给，从而在后勤方面取得了革命性的进展；他们将训练不足的部队投入战斗，以快速推进的纵队或散兵线（即独立作战、射击和躲避的步兵）的形式，打破了弗雷德里克式的固定营制，并推动了战术方面的革命。
In 1793 the revolutionary French Republic faced a coalition of Great Britain, Holland, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia, and Spain. Of peoples living under one government the French were the most numerous and perhaps the most wealthy. A Committee of Public Safety, to meet the crisis, exploited their military potentialities in a way never possible under the Old Regime. Freed from the old special rights, local and class privileges, internal barriers and exclusive monopolies that had encumbered the monarchy, the Committee created a war economy by dictatorial methods, stimulated the national self-consciousness of the population, and introduced the principle of universal military service in the levée en masse. In this, the political side of warfare, the revolutionists were conscious of bringing about a new military order. They were less conscious of innovating in technical and strategic matters. Carnot's strategic ideas were rather old-fashioned.39 Yet in leaving their armies to be supplied by requisitions rather than magazines the Republicans effected a revolution in logistics, and in throwing their half-trained troops into battle in rushing columns or in fanned-out lines of tirailleurs, men who fought, fired, and took cover as individuals, they broke away from the Frederician system of solid battalions, and gave impetus to a revolution in tactics.
1794年，法军转守为攻。1795年，普鲁士、荷兰和西班牙退出战争。1796年，波拿巴从山区空降意大利。1797年，欧洲大陆恢复和平，英国参与谈判。1798年，第二次反法同盟成立，战争再次爆发。1799年，波拿巴成为法国独裁者。1800年，他摧毁了第二次反法同盟，再次凭借在意大利的闪电战，赢得了他伟大、迅速且决定性的“拿破仑式”战役的第一场——马伦戈战役。
By 1794 the French took the offensive. In 1795 Prussia, Holland, and Spain withdrew from the war. In 1796 Bonaparte dropped into Italy out of the mountains. By 1797 the continent was at peace, and England negotiated. In 1798 war was resumed with the Second Coalition. In 1799 Bonaparte became autocrat of France. In 1800 he destroyed the Second Coalition, winning, again by lightning operations in Italy, the first of his great, quick, decisive “Napoleonic” battles—Marengo.
战争艺术发生了一场革命。这场革命的意义直到后来才逐渐被观察者所领悟。例如，一些平民，如马莱·杜潘和根茨，比职业军人更早地洞察到一些更深层次的原因。这是因为最根本的变化在于军事组织的政治前提，在于德尔布吕克所说的那种新的世界观的出现，而这种世界观的出现对于战争的革命性变革至关重要。在法国，这些年的职业军人忙于作战，无暇撰写关于他们所作所为的论著。在德国，沙恩霍斯特编辑了一份期刊，并发表了一些零散的事件研究；格奈森瑙在西里西亚的一个驻军城镇，试图按照更现实、更少机械化的原则训练他的连队；他们都在各自的职业领域进行自我教育，并在1806年后都挺身而出，参与了普鲁士军队的重建工作。在1800年前后几年里，最受公众关注的军事作家——贝伦霍斯特、比洛、霍耶、文图里尼——似乎一度对摆在眼前的事实视而不见。仔细研究比洛的著作尤其具有启发意义。40
A revolution had occurred in the art of war. Its significance dawned only gradually on observers. Certain civilians, Mallet du Pan and Gentz, for example, perceived some of the deeper causes sooner than professional soldiers. This is because the most fundamental change was in the political premises of military organization, in that new Weltbild whose coming, according to Delbrück, was necessary to the revolutionizing of warfare. In France the professional soldiers in these years were too busy in action to write treatises on what they were doing. In Germany Scharnhorst edited a journal and published piecemeal studies of events, and Gneisenau in a Silesian garrison town attempted to train his company according to more realistic, less mechanical principles; both were reeducating themselves in their profession, and both came forward after 1806 to rebuild the Prussian army. The military writers most in the public eye, in the years just before and just after 1800—Behrenhorst, Bülow, Hoyer, Venturini—seemed for a while to learn nothing from the facts before them. It is most instructive to dwell upon Bülow.40
海因里希·迪特里希·冯·比洛男爵与吉贝尔伯爵一样，是一位出身卑微的贵族，略有军旅经验。为了谋生，他撰写了许多书籍，涉猎广泛。事实证明，他与吉贝尔一样反复无常，甚至更加病态地自负。他自诩拥有不为人知的智慧，这令所有人反感；在普俄同盟时期，他得罪了俄国人；最终被判定为精神失常，并于1807年在里加的监狱中去世。此后，人们对他的评价褒贬不一，从自负的怪人到现代军事科学的奠基人，莫衷一是。<sup> 41</sup>
Freiherr Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow, like the count de Guibert, was a minor aristocrat with a modicum of experience in the army. To earn a living he wrote books on many subjects. He proved to be as erratic as Guibert, and even more pathologically egotistical. He repelled everyone by his claims to unrecognized wisdom, offended the Russians during the period of the Prusso-Russian alliance, was adjudged insane, and died in 1807 in confinement at Riga. He has since been called everything from a conceited crank to the founder of modern military science.41
他的第一部军事论著《新战争体系的精神》（Geist des neuern Kriegssystems）于1799年出版，广受好评，很快便被翻译成法文和英文。如今的地缘政治学家认为，这部著作标志着该学科发展的一个里程碑。比洛在书的结尾对政治“空间”进行了反思。他宣称（与腓特烈的观点相反），由于现代军事体系的出现，小国时代已经结束。他认为，国家权力倾向于占据一定的区域，超出该区域则效力有限；因此，每个强权都有其天然的边界；这些边界的达成将带来政治平衡和持久和平，因为届时每个强权都将达到其行动的自然极限。他预言，欧洲将会出现大约十几个国家：不列颠群岛；疆域延伸至默兹河的法国；以普鲁士为中心，从默兹河延伸至梅梅尔的北德意志；面向奥地利的南德意志，奥地利的疆域则可能沿多瑙河延伸至黑海；统一的意大利；统一的伊比利亚半岛；瑞士；土耳其；俄罗斯；瑞典；以及可能（但不一定）独立的荷兰和独立的丹麦。42
His first military treatise, the Geist des neuern Kriegssystems, appeared in 1799, won great favor, and was soon translated into French and English. Geopoliticists today see in it a step in the development of their subject. Bülow concluded his book with reflections on political “space.” He declared (contrary to Frederick) that, because of the modern military system, the age of small states was over. He held that state power tended to fill a certain area, and beyond that area to be ineffective; hence each power had natural frontiers; the attainment of these frontiers would produce a political balance and lasting peace, since each power would then have reached the natural limits of its action. There would be, he said, about a dozen states in Europe: the British Isles; France extending to the Meuse; a North Germany gathered around Prussia, reaching from the Meuse to Memel; a South Germany looking to Austria, which in turn would extend its borders down the Danube perhaps to the Black Sea; a united Italy; a united Iberian peninsula; Switzerland; Turkey; Russia; Sweden; and probably, though not necessarily, an independent Holland and an independent Denmark.42
令人惊讶的是，这幅图景对1870年欧洲的版图做出了相当准确的预测。然而，它几乎没有基于对1799年军事形势的准确认识。《新战争体系的精神》一书并未真正展现出对革命战争的理解。比洛仅在新的散兵阵型——即步兵战术——中发现了一些重要的创新。他因澄清术语而受到赞誉，他赋予了“战略”、“战术”和“作战基地”这些术语明确的含义，尽管他的定义并未被普遍接受。但他的著作的核心论点是对过时思想的重新编纂。
This was a surprisingly good anticipation of the map of Europe as it came to be by 1870. It was scarcely grounded on an accurate perception of the military situation in 1799. Der Geist des neuern Kriegssystems showed no real understanding of the wars of the Revolution. Only in the new open formation of tirailleurs, that is, only in infantry tactics, did Bülow find any significant innovation.43 He is credited with clarifying terminology, by giving currency, as words of distinct meaning, to the terms “strategy,” “tactics,” and “base of operations,” though his definitions were not generally accepted. But the thesis of his book was a codification of obsolescent ideas.
比洛的“现代体系”，如同吉贝尔的体系一样，只不过是十七世纪以来发展起来的体系。然而，他声称自己发现了这一体系的真正关键——作战基地的概念。他还坚持（仿佛是新概念一样）一些古老的战争几何学观念。在他的体系中，“作战基地”必须是一条由预先准备好的弹药库构成的防御工事线；从该基地两端延伸出的两条“作战线”必须以至少90度的角度汇聚于攻击点。进攻部队的行军距离不得超过三天。将军的主要目标不应是攻击敌军，而应是确保自身补给的安全；在进攻作战中，他应该集中火力攻击敌军的补给线，而不是敌军本身。战斗应该避免。一位胜利的将军应该克制住扩大优势的冲动，“在胜利之际明智地止步”。现代战争并不能决定任何事情；战场上战败的敌人总能在几天后再次发动进攻。44
Bülow's “modern system,” like Guibert's, was simply the system developed since the seventeenth century. He claimed, however, to have discovered the true key to this system in the concept of the base of operations. He held also (as if they were new) to old notions of the geometry of war. The “base of operations” in his system must be a fortified line of prepared magazines; the two “lines of operations” projected from the ends of this base must converge upon the point under attack at an angle of at least ninety degrees. The attacking army must not move by more than three days' march from its magazines. The general should have as his principal objective, not attack on the enemy force, but the security of his own service of supply; and in offensive operations he should concentrate not against the enemy army, but against the enemy's supplies. Fighting should be avoided. A victorious general should refrain from pushing his advantage, “stopping judiciously in the midst of triumphs.” Modern battles decide nothing; an enemy defeated on the battlefield can always attack again in a few days.44
早在1794年，法国骑兵在冰面上冲进阿姆斯特丹时，这些观念的不切实际就已显露无疑。比洛的著作出版几个月后，霍亨林登战役和马伦戈战役接踵而至，这无疑是对他“体系”的有力回击。这场战役让他茅塞顿开。他为此写了一本书，固执地坚持认为法军的胜利证明了他的理论，但实际上却与他之前的许多言论相悖。他吸取了教训，但却是极其不情愿的。
The unreality of these conceptions had been shown as early as 1794, when the French cavalry rode into Amsterdam on the ice. The battles of Hohenlinden and Marengo, a few months after the publication of Billow's book, came as an answer to his “system.” This campaign opened his eyes. He wrote a book on it, perversely insisting that the French victories gave proof of his doctrine but in reality contradicting much of what he had said before. He learned, but he learned very reluctantly.
比洛说，马伦戈战役在不到一个月的时间里“决定了法国大革命的命运，进而决定了欧洲人类的命运”。机动性是法国军队成功的秘诀。在一支机动性强的军队面前，大多数防御工事都显得毫无用处。减少辎重队和摆脱军需仓库的束缚，使得机动性和大胆行动成为可能。他指出，拿破仑翻越阿尔卑斯山时只带了饼干——一种无需烹饪、方便携带且易于储存的食物；他带着一支饥肠辘辘的军队抵达意大利，计划在当地定居。尽管比洛对此进行了详尽的论述，但他未能阐明这一切如何与“作战基地”理论及其舒适的90度角相协调。他指出，法国军队中新型人员的出现，是这种新的行动大胆性的根源。他说，奥地利军官的职位是靠资历得来的，他们的才能平庸。 “伴随着革命的酝酿，法国涌现出一些人，他们在平静时期甚至不会想到自己能做到什么。这种超凡能力的突然展现，是法国在这场战争中取得显著优势的首要原因之一。” 45
Marengo, said Bülow, in less than a month “has decided the destiny of the French Revolution and hence of humanity in Europe.” Mobility is the secret of French success. Before a mobile army most fortifications are shown to be useless. Mobility and audacity are made possible by reduction of baggage trains and emancipation from magazines. Bonaparte, he observes, crossed the Alps with no food but biscuit, a compact, durable, portable nutriment that needs no cooking; and he arrived in Italy with a hungry army, planning to live on the country. How all this harmonized with the theory of the “base of operations” with its comfortable ninety-degree angle, Bülow failed to make clear, though he argued the matter at great length. He noted, as a source of the new boldness of action, the new type of personnel in the French army. The Austrian officers, he said, owe their positions to seniority. Their talents are average. “With the fermentation inseparable from revolution there have appeared in France men who in time of calm would not even have suspected what they were capable of. This sudden deployment of transcendent abilities is one of the first causes to which the marked superiority of the French in this war must be ascribed.”45
即便有了这些解释，比洛仍然无法理解这场震惊欧洲的闪电战。他称法国的胜利是预兆、是奇迹、是天意。他转而支持波拿巴主义，亲法。随着民族主义运动席卷德国，他的处境日益尴尬，无疑也加剧了他的偏执倾向。
Even with these explanations Bülow could not understand a blitzkrieg that astounded Europe. He called the French victory a portent, a miracle, a message from Providence. He became Bonapartist and pro-French. This made his position increasingly awkward as the national movement swept over Germany, and no doubt accentuated his paranoid inclinations.
随后爆发了1805年的战役。那一年，奥地利和俄罗斯与英国结盟，组成了第三次反法同盟。这两个欧洲大陆强国向西调集了大军。这些军队承载着欧洲贵族阶层的最高期望。然而，失望来得如此之快，实属罕见。波拿巴在短短几天内就率领数个军团从沿海地区进军至德国南部。在乌尔姆，他迫使以战略大师著称的马克将军兵不血刃地投降，三万大军应声投降。随后，他继续进军维也纳和摩拉维亚，发现奥俄联军早已摩拳擦掌，准备发起进攻。他在奥斯特里茨村击溃了联军。
Then came the campaign of 1805. In that year Austria and Russia joined with Great Britain in the Third Coalition. The two Continental powers moved large armies westward. In these armies centered the highest hopes of aristocratic Europe. Seldom has disappointment been so swift. Bonaparte in a few days marched several army corps from coastal points to South Germany. There, at Ulm, he forced General Mack, reputed to be a master strategist, to surrender thirty thousand men without serious fighting. Moving on to Vienna and into Moravia, he found the combined Austro-Russian forces eager to attack. He routed them at the village of Austerlitz.
比洛立即着手撰写了一部关于这场战役的两卷本著作，并在奥斯特里茨战役后那段焦虑不安的几个月里出版。在此期间，普鲁士政府奉行两面派外交政策，如同被催眠般走向耶拿战役的惨败。比洛不得不私下出版这部著作。除了他自己，任何人都不敢触碰它，而这也最终导致了他的身败名裂。这是一部奇异而矛盾的著作，既反映了他自身的精神失常，也反映了当时整个欧洲的迷茫。他坚信只有自己才能洞悉真相，即便无人问津，也必须尽职尽责地为所有人提供建议，这源于康德的绝对命令——在德国，形而上学和军事思想早已密不可分。他宣称自己注定要创立一套全新的战争理论，名为“比洛式战争理论”，所有未来的军官都将以此为准则进行训练。他猛烈抨击腓特烈大帝及其“腓特烈体系”，要求普鲁士进行一场在耶拿战役之前一直不愿进行的革新。然而，他也说改革毫无希望，拿破仑即将通过战争统一欧洲，欧洲大陆列强应该接受他的霸权。比洛说，奥斯特里茨战役就是现代的阿克提乌姆战役。46
Bülow immediately wrote a two-volume work on the campaign, published in the anxious months after Austerlitz, during which the Prussian state, having conducted a two-faced diplomacy, moved as if hypnotized toward the disaster of Jena. Bülow had to publish this work privately. It was too dangerous for anyone to touch but himself and it led to his ruin. A strange and contradictory book, it reflected both his own mental unbalance and the general bewilderment of Europe. He wrote as one convinced that he alone saw the truth, that ignored though he was he must in duty give everyone advice, impelled by Kant's categorical imperative—metaphysics and military thought have gone together in Germany. He announced that he was destined to create a new theory of war, to be known as Bülowisch, by which all future officers would be formed. He berated Frederick the Great and the Frederician system, demanding the kind of regeneration that until Jena Prussia was not willing to undergo. Yet he said, too, that reform was hopeless, that Napoleon was about to unify Europe by war, and that the Continental powers should accept his supremacy. Austerlitz, said Bülow, was the modern Actium.46
比洛认为1805年法国的胜利证明了吉贝尔的理论。他借用了一个商业比喻。他说，战争的精髓在于最大限度地利用自身资源，而不是将军队分散在各个驻防点，而是要让整支军队保持持续运转。拿破仑比其他人更能“保持其资源的活跃”。这表明旧的阵地战已经过时。在乌尔姆战役中，马克拥有一支强大的军队，占据着有利位置。然而，拿破仑仍然迫使他投降。拿破仑运用了吉贝尔的原则：巧妙地调动各师（得益于拿破仑对军团的创新）；为了加快行军速度和覆盖更大的战区，在不丧失作战理念统一性的前提下，分散部署各师；同时根据具体情况调整作战阵地，并在目标点重新集结。比洛认为，其结果是“现代战争中战略优于战术的最完美体现”。47
Bülow saw in the French victory of 1805 a proof of the doctrine of Guibert. He used a metaphor from business. The great art in war, he said, is to get the most out of one's capital, not to scatter an army in garrisons but to keep the whole of it constantly in circulation. Napoleon, more than others, “keeps his capital active.” This was to recognize the obsolescence of the old war of position. At Ulm Mack had a strong army in a powerful position. Napoleon nevertheless forced him to surrender. He did it by applying Guibert's principles: skillful manipulation of the divisions (facilitated by the Napoleonic innovation of the army corps); physical dispersal of these divisions for speed in marching, and to cover a larger theater of action, without loss of unity of conception; simultaneous reconcentration at the objective with adoption of battle positions in the light of concrete local conditions. The result, according to Bülow, was “the most perfect manifestation of the superiority of strategy over tactics in modern war.”47
随着战略的重要性日益凸显，战术的重要性相对降低，最高统帅的问题变得前所未有的复杂和广泛。战争失去了腓特烈大帝所担忧的纯粹偶然性，而这种偶然性在革命前曾起到威慑侵略性行动的作用。战争更多地成为对精心准备的检验。计划变得更加有效，预测也变得更加可行，战争更像是一门“科学”。军事指挥一方面与外交关系交织，另一方面又与国内政策和宪政实践紧密相连。比洛就这些问题发表了许多见解。
As more depended on strategy and comparatively less on tactics, the problems of supreme command took on a hitherto unknown complexity and scope. Battle lost some of the element of pure chance that Frederick had feared in it, and that before the Revolution had served as a deterrent to aggressive operations. It became rather the test of elaborate preparations made long beforehand. Planning became more fruitful, prediction somewhat more possible, warfare more of a “science.” Military command shaded into diplomatic relations on the one hand, and into domestic policy and constitutional practice on the other. On these matters Bülow had much to say.
比洛和腓特烈一样，坚持认为国家元首必须拥有统一的统帅智慧。他认为，在现代战略条件下，政治与战争不可分割——优秀的将领必须精通外交，正如成功的外交家必须了解军事行动一样。拿破仑的军事生涯便是将外交政策和军事责任融为一体的例证，而协约国政府的笨拙应对则是一种反面教材。随着现代科技的发展，一个强有力的指导性情报机构也变得愈发必要。最高统帅部必须凌驾于各领域专家之上。比洛指出，筑城技术、炮兵射击理论、军事医学、后勤保障等等都只是“准备性科学”。“真正军事科学在于如何恰当地运用所有这些知识来加强和保卫社会。”这才是统帅的真正职责。 “听好了：当一个国家元首被迫将国家在战争中的精力指挥权交给一群仅仅接受过战前科学训练的专家时，其必然结果是分裂和目标不一致，其首要后果是软弱无力——如同一个满是牛犊和驴子的马厩——最终导致国家瓦解；因为缺乏智慧的凝聚力，而智慧正是将各种要素凝聚成一个整体或一个共同目标的关键所在。”这里，拿破仑与其他所有欧洲统治者之间的对比再次强调了这一教训。48
Bülow, like Frederick, insisted on the need of a single unifying intelligence at the head of a state. He held that under modern conditions of strategy there could be no separation between politics and war—great soldiers must understand foreign affairs, as successful diplomats must understand military action. Of the advantage of uniting foreign policy and military responsibility in one mind Napoleon's career was an example and the fumbling of the Allied governments a kind of negative demonstration. A firm guiding intelligence also became more necessary with modern conditions of technology. The supreme command must rise above the specialists and the experts. The technique of fortification, the theory of artillery fire, military medicine, logistics, said Bülow, are only “preparatory sciences.” “The science of employing all these things fittingly for the strengthening and defense of society is true military science.” This is the real business of generalship. “Hear this plainly: when a chief of state is obliged to leave the guidance of the state's energies in war to a squad of mere specialists trained in the preparatory sciences, the inevitable outcome will be fragmentation and cross-purposes, of which the first result will be weakness—a stable full of calves and donkeys—and the end result dissolution; because the binding power of intelligence is missing, which unites the materials in one building, or in one purpose.” Here again the lesson was driven home by the contrast between Napoleon and every other ruler of Europe.48
在人力或军队编制方面，比洛的观点对当时的普鲁士来说绝非恭维。他斥责普鲁士政府盲目地维护腓特烈制度，并指出，就连腓特烈本人在去世前也已意识到该制度的弊端——这一制度使普通民众士气低落、缺乏教育，并遭受着侵犯人权的纪律约束。他推荐法国的普遍征兵制度，认为其能有效提升士气，增强民族主义情绪。“即便我们仅从功利主义的角度来看，军队也可以被视为青年人最普遍的教育机构。”军事科学必须面对“一个重要的内部管理问题，即如何激励和奖励美德与才能”。他指出，普鲁士鲜有天才人物；然而，若无能之士掌管资源，资源便会被浪费。因此，比洛呼吁推行以人才为本的职业政策，并以拿破仑的荣誉军团为典范。他提议建立一个“精英联盟”（Bund der Tugend），根据智力、判断力和对国家的效用对人进行分级，并希望至少在理想情况下消除旧的贵族等级制度。49
On manpower, or the constitution of armies, Bülow had views not at all flattering to contemporary Prussia. He upbraided the Prussian government for blindly maintaining the Frederician system, of which he said even Frederick saw the weaknesses before his death—a system that left the common people demoralized and uneducated, subject to a discipline that violated the rights of man. He recommended the French system of universal conscription with its nationalistic effect on morale. “Even if we take a purely utilitarian view, an army could be regarded as the most general educational establishment for youth.” Military science must face “a weighty matter of internal administration, the inspiring and rewarding of virtues and talents.” Prussia, he observes, has produced few men of genius; yet resources are wasted unless able men control them. So Bülow calls for a policy of careers open to talent, and offers Napoleon's Legion of Honor as a model. He proposed a Bund der Tugend, in which men should be graded by intelligence, judgment and utility to the state, and which, at least ideally, should efface the old aristocratic distinctions.49
比洛的脑海中始终没有形成统一的理念。他始终未能达到他认为对领导力至关重要的那种坚定的把握和单一的目标。我们无从得知他究竟认为自己的目标是什么。他似乎支持法国大革命，也对人权赞不绝口；然而，与另一位职业军人格奈森瑙相比，他的自由主义倾向却更弱。他自称是普鲁士爱国者，却鄙视腓特烈大帝，并声称普鲁士的存在本身就终结了德国的民族存在。有时他以德国民族主义者的身份发言，但始终顽固地亲法。有时他支持权力平衡；有时他又声称自己不在乎欧洲各国君主是否保持独立。他无疑是一位十字军战士，但其目的却不得而知。他是一位激烈的改革者，却认为改革不过是空想。他是一位军事科学领域的超验哲学家，秉持着一种不拘泥于具体目标的、纯粹出于责任感的使命感。在实践层面，他建议普鲁士乃至整个欧洲在奥斯特里茨战役后与拿破仑达成和解；他认为第四次反法同盟毫无意义，并敦促欧洲大陆与法国皇帝联手羞辱英国。耶拿战役后，他的态度很简单：“我早就告诉过你们了。”
All these ideas remained unassembled in Billow's mind. He never attained that firmness of grasp and singleness of purpose that he recognized as essential to leadership. It is impossible to say what he felt his own aims to be. He seemed to favor the French Revolution, and spoke well of the rights of man; yet he was less a liberal than Gneisenau, to name another professional soldier for comparison. He called himself a Prussian patriot, but he despised Frederick, and said that Prussia by its very existence had ended the national existence of Germany. Sometimes he spoke as a German nationalist, but he remained stubbornly pro-French. Sometimes he favored a balance of power; again, he professed not to care whether the sovereigns of Europe maintained their independence. He certainly was a crusader, to what end is not clear. He was a vehement reformer but held reform to be a chimera. He was a kind of transcendental philosopher in military science, enjoying a sense of duty for its own sake without specifying its object. On the practical level, he advised Prussia, and all Europe, to come to terms with Napoleon after Austerlitz; he said that a Fourth Coalition would be useless and urged the Continent to join with the French emperor for the humiliation of England. His attitude after Jena was simply, “I told you so.”
到1807年，比洛的所作所为已令普鲁士政府视他为疯子，或至少在公共灾难时期视他为眼中钉。他似乎写作毫无目的，只是为了宣扬自己的观点。考虑到1807年的灾难性局面，那些将他投入监狱的官员们，最可悲的莫过于只看到了他的缺点，却未能认识到他的优点。他太过不负责任、虚荣自负、思维含糊，根本无法参与实际的重建工作。他的死并没有让沙恩霍斯特号沉没。
Bülow by 1807 had given cause to the Prussian government to regard him as a madman, or at least as a nuisance in time of public disaster. He seemed to write for no purpose except to air his own views and the worst that can be said of the officials who sent him to prison, given the catastrophic conditions of 1807, is that in perceiving his faults they failed to recognize his merits. He was too irresponsible, vain, and vague to collaborate in the practical work of reconstruction. The world lost no Scharnhorst with his death.
作为一名理论家，他的功绩在于，尽管缓慢而迷茫，但他敏锐地感知到了当时军事革命的本质。这场革命并非基于技术，尽管火炮得到了显著改进；也并非严格意义上的战略革命，尽管摆脱了弹药库的束缚、以师为单位进行编组，军队的机动性和打击力都得到了提升。这场军事革命的本质是一场政治革命。法国人的驱动力在于他们新的政治世界观。这种世界观体现在革命所实现的政府与人民的融合。一方面，人民以前所未有的方式感受到自己参与了国家建设，从政府中获益良多，因此理应忠诚而热情地为之奋斗。另一方面，政府凭借民族权威和主权，能够以腓特烈大帝都未曾设想的方式调动人力和物力资源。法国人更为短暂的优势在于革命狂热和传教热情。最终结果是，1793年之后，法国的财富、人力和智慧被投入到欧洲战场，其威力一度势不可挡。在19世纪，政府与人民的融合——无论这种融合是否民主——这一基本原则被纳入了大多数欧洲国家的政治体系。君主之间的战争结束了，人民之间的战争开始了。
As a theorist, he had the merit of sensing, though slowly and confusedly, the nature of the military revolution of his time. This revolution was not based on technology, despite important improvements in artillery; nor was it primarily a revolution of strategy in the strict sense, despite the heightened mobility and striking power of an army emancipated from magazines and organized in divisions. The military revolution was at bottom a political revolution. The driving force of the French was their new politisches Weltbild. This consisted in the fusion of government and people which the Revolution had effected. On the one hand the people, in a way not possible before 1789, felt that they participated in the state, that they derived great advantages from their government, and therefore should fight for it loyally and with passion. On the other hand the government, ruling by the authority of the nation and invoking its sovereign power, could draw upon human and material resources in a way not dreamed of by Frederick the Great. More temporary advantages of the French were revolutionary fanaticism and missionary zeal. The net result was that, after 1793, the wealth, manpower and intelligence of France were hurled against Europe with an effectiveness that for a time was irresistible. During the nineteenth century the fundamental principle, the fusion of government and people, which may or may not be democratic, was built into the political system of most European states. The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun.
1有关该主题的当代文献，请参阅 Max Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmltch in Deutschland , 3 vols. （慕尼黑和莱比锡，1889-91）。
1 For the contemporary literature of the subject see Max Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmltch in Deutschland, 3 vols. (Munich and Leipzig, 1889–91).
2 M. Weygand，《法国军队历史》（巴黎，1938 年），173。
2 M. Weygand, Histoire de l'armée française (Paris, 1938), 173.
3汉斯·德尔布吕克 (Hans Delbrück)，《战争史》，7 卷。 （柏林，1900-1936），4:363, 426； Jean Colin，《拿破仑军事教育》（巴黎，1900 年）。
3 Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1900–1936), 4:363, 426; Jean Colin, L'éducation militaire de Napoléon (Paris, 1900).
4 1752 年《政治遗嘱》，载于Die Werke Friedrichs des Grossen，10 卷。 （柏林，1912-14），7：164。 Die Werke Friedrichs des Grossen以下简称为Werke。
4 Politisches Testament von 1752, in Die Werke Friedrichs des Grossen, 10 vols. (Berlin, 1912–14), 7:164. Die Werke Friedrichs des Grossen hereafter cited as Werke.
5 Exposé du gouvemement prussien, des principes sur lequels il roule (1775), in Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand , 30 卷。 （柏林，1846-56），9：186。弗雷德里克·勒·格兰德的作品以下简称为作品。
5 Exposé du gouvemement prussien, des principes sur lequels il roule (1775), in Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand, 30 vols. (Berlin, 1846–56), 9:186. Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand hereafter cited as Oeuvres.
6 波尔。测试。 1752 年，《 Werke》，7:146；作品，29:58。
6 Pol. Test. 1752 in Werke, 7:146; Oeuvres, 29:58.
7 1768 年《军事遗嘱》， Werke，6：226-27。
7 Militärisches Testament von 1768, in Werke, 6:226–27.
8 《战争原理》（1746 年） ， 《作品》，28：7； Lettres sur l'amour de la patrie (1779)，《作品》，9：211-44。
8 Principes généraux de la guerre (1746) in Oeuvres, 28:7; Lettres sur l'amour de la patrie (1779), in Oeuvres, 9:211–44.
9 原则。将军。（1746），《作品》，28：5-6； Ordres für die sämmtlichen Generale von der Infanterie und Cavalerie, wie auch Huzzaren, desgleichen für die Stabsofficiere und Commandeurs der Bataillons (1744), in Oeuvres , 30:119–23; Règles de ce qu'on exige d'un bon commandeur de bataillon en temps de guerre (1773)，《作品》，29:57–65。
9 Prin. gén. (1746), in Oeuvres, 28:5–6; Ordres für die sämmtlichen Generale von der Infanterie und Cavalerie, wie auch Huzzaren, desgleichen für die Stabsofficiere und Commandeurs der Bataillons (1744), in Oeuvres, 30:119–23; Règles de ce qu'on exige d'un bon commandeur de bataillon en temps de guerre (1773), in Oeuvres, 29:57–65.
10 波尔。测试。 1752 年，《 Werke》，7:172。
10 Pol. Test. 1752, in Werke, 7:172.
11 百万。测试。 1768 年，《Werke》，6:233, 237；作品，28:5。
11 Mil. Test. 1768, in Werke, 6:233, 237; Oeuvres, 28:5.
12 波尔。测试 1751，在Werke中，7:173–75；打印。杜松子酒。 (1746)，《作品》，28:7。
12 Pol. Test 1751, in Werke, 7:173–75; Prtn. gin. (1746), in Oeuvres, 28:7.
13 《 处置》，《普鲁士军队中的 Bataille bei seiner königlichen Majestät》（1745 年），《作品》，30:146。
13 Disposition, wie es bei vorgehender Bataille bei seiner königlichen Majestät in Preussen Armée unveränderlich soll gehalten werden (1745), in Oeuvres, 30:146.
14德尔布吕克，《战争史》，4：327-28。
14 Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 4:327–28.
15参见下表第二列，该表根据 G. Bodart 的《军事史战争词典》（维也纳，1908 年）第 612、784-85、816-17 页的数据汇编而成，显示了自 1600 年以来战争强度不断增加的情况。
15 Cf. column II of the following table, which, compiled from data in G. Bodart, Militärhistorisches Kriegslexikon (Vienna, 1908), 612, 784–85, 816–17, shows the mounting intensity of war since 1600.
16 百万。测试。 1768 年，《Werke》，6:228ff。 Mémoires depuis la patx de Hubertsbourg，《作品》，6:97； Eléments de castramétrie et de tactique (1771)，《作品》，29:42；作品，30：139-41、391-96。
16 Mil. Test. 1768, in Werke, 6:228ff.; Mémoires depuis la patx de Hubertsbourg, in Oeuvres, 6:97; Eléments de castramétrie et de tactique (1771), in Oeuvres, 29:42; Oeuvres, 30:139–41, 391–96.
17 Eléments de castramétrie，《作品》，29:25；德尔布吕克，《战争史》，4：314-22。
17 Eléments de castramétrie, in Oeuvres, 29:25; Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 4:314–22.
18 原则。将军。 (1746)，《作品》，28:84。
18 Prin. gén. (1746), in Oeuvres, 28:84.
19 百万。测试。 1768 年，《Werke》，6:247, 257；波尔。测试。 1752 年，《 Werke》，7:176；《Elements de Castramétrie》，《作品》，29:4, 21, 38。
19 Mil. Test. 1768, in Werke, 6:247, 257; Pol. Test. 1752, in Werke, 7:176; Eléments de castramétrie, in Oeuvres, 29:4, 21, 38.
20 《查理十二世的反思》 (1759)，《作品》，7:81；《关于政府形式的论文》(Essai sur les formes du gouvernement ) (1777)，《作品集》，9:203。
20 Réflexions sur Charles XII (1759), in Oeuvres, 7:81; Essai sur les formes du gouvernement (1777), in Oeuvres, 9:203.
21 百万。测试。 1768 年，6：246–49；波尔。测试。 1752 年，《 Werke》，7:174。
21 Mil. Test. 1768, 6:246–49; Pol. Test. 1752, in Werke, 7:174.
22 百万。测试。 1768 年，《 Werke》，6:248；作品，29:3；《Histoire de mon temps》，1775 年序言，收录于《作品》，2:xxviii。
22 Mil. Test. 1768, in Werke, 6:248; Oeuvres, 29:3; Histoire de mon temps, preface of 1775, in Oeuvres, 2:xxviii.
23 百万。测试。 1768 年，《Werke》，6:253, 260–61； Jähns， Gescbichte，3：2027。
23 Mil. Test. 1768, in Werke, 6:253, 260–61; Jähns, Gescbichte, 3:2027.
24 Pol. Test. 1752，在Werke，7:158； Histotre de mon temps，1775 年序言，在Oeuvres，2:xxviii-xxx。
24 Pol. Test. 1752, in Werke, 7:158; Histotre de mon temps, preface of 1775, in Oeuvres, 2:xxviii-xxx.
25 E. Picard，《L'artillerie française au XVIII e siècle》（巴黎，1906 年）； J. Campana，《田野炮兵》，1791–1901（巴黎，1901）；魏刚，《法国军队的历史》，192；科林，《军事教育》，1–85。
25 E. Picard, L'artillerie française au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1906); J. Campana, L'artillerie de campagne, 1791–1901 (Paris, 1901); Weygand, Histoire de l'armée française, 192; Colin, Education militaire, 1–85.
26编者简介，1790 年写给 Guibert， Journal d'un voyage en Allemagne（巴黎，1803 年）； P. de Ségur，“一位沙龙大佬：吉贝尔伯爵，1743-1790”， Revue de Paris 2 (1902)，701-36； P. Vignié，“Un Montalbanais célèbre；le comte de Guibert”， Bulletin archéologique de Tarn-el-Garonne 52 (1924)，22-43； Guibert, Précis de ce qui s'est passé à mon égard à l'Assemblée de Berry (巴黎，1789)；扬斯，历史，3：2059–72。
26 Editor's introduction, written in 1790, to Guibert, Journal d'un voyage en Allemagne (Paris, 1803); P. de Ségur, “Un grand homme des salons: Le comte de Guibert, 1743–1790,” Revue de Paris 2 (1902), 701–36; P. Vignié, “Un Montalbanais célèbre; le comte de Guibert,” Bulletin archéologique de Tarn-el-Garonne 52 (1924), 22–43; Guibert, Précis de ce qui s'est passé à mon égard à l'Assemblée de Berry (Paris, 1789); Jàhns, Geschichte, 3:2059–72.
27 Essai général de tactique (1772) in Oeuvres militaires du comte de Guibert , 5 vols. （巴黎，1803 年），1：136-41。在他的《Défense du système de guerre Moderne》（1779 年）中，同上，第 1 卷。在第 3 和第 4 章中，吉伯特引入了术语“la Stratégique”。
27 Essai général de tactique (1772) in Oeuvres militaires du comte de Guibert, 5 vols. (Paris, 1803), 1:136–41. In his Défense du système de guerre moderne (1779), in ibid., vols. 3 and 4, Guibert introduces the term la Stratégique.
28 Essai général，in Oeuvres militaires du comte de Guibert，1：1-23。
28 Essai général, in Oeuvres militaires du comte de Guibert, 1:1–23.
29同上，1:1-151。
29 Ibid., 1:1–151.
30同上，1:97, 445–72。
30 Ibid., 1:97, 445–72.
31同上，2:254–307。
31 Ibid., 2:254–307.
32同上，2:208–20。
32 Ibid., 2:208–20.
33同上，2:15–88。
33 Ibid., 2:15–88.
34同上，2:249–54。
34 Ibid., 2:249–54.
35 现代战争系统防御，载于吉贝尔伯爵军事著作，4:212。
35 Défense du système de guerre moderne, in Oeuvres militaires du comte de Guibert, 4:212.
36同上，4:219–31。
36 Ibid., 4:219–31.
37同上，4:263–75。
37 Ibid., 4:263–75.
38同上，4:213。
38 Ibid., 4:213.
39 R. Warschauer，《Studien zur Entwicklung der Gedanken Lazare Carnots über Kriegführung》（柏林，1937 年）。
39 R. Warschauer, Studien zur Entwicklung der Gedanken Lazare Carnots über Kriegführung (Berlin, 1937).
40 J. Mallet Du Pan，《法国革命自然的考虑》（伦敦，1793 年）； F. Gentz，《 Von dem politischen Zustande von Europa vor und nach der französischen Revolution》（1801 年）；并参见 Jähns, Geschichte，在引用的名称下。
40 J. Mallet Du Pan, Considérations sur la nature de la révolution de France (London, 1793); F. Gentz, Von dem politischen Zustande von Europa vor und nach der französischen Revolution (1801); and see Jähns, Geschichte, under the names cited.
41 Jähns，历史，3：2133–45。
41 Jähns, Geschichte, 3:2133–45.
42 R. Strausz-Hupé，《地缘政治：空间与权力的斗争》（纽约，1942 年），第 14-21 页；HD v. Bülow，《现代战争体系的精神》（伦敦，1806 年），第 187-285 页。
42 R. Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (New York, 1942), 14–21; H. D. v. Bülow, The Spirit of the Modern System of War (London, 1806), 187–285.
43比洛，《现代体系的精神》，第 109 页及后续页。
43 Bülow, Spirit of the Modern System, 109ff.
44同上，全文，但参见第 1-2.5、81-82、108、183-84 页。
44 Ibid., passim, but see pp. 1–2.5, 81–82, 108, 183–84.
45 HD v. Bülow, Histoire de la Campagne de 1800 en Allemagne et en Italie (巴黎, 1804), 4–5, 16, 90, 92, 142ff., 183。
45 H. D. v. Bülow, Histoire de la campagne de 1800 en Allemagne et en Italie (Paris, 1804), 4–5, 16, 90, 92, 142ff., 183.
46 HD v. Bülow， Der Feldzug von 1805，mtlitärisch-politisch betracbtet，2 卷，（auf Kosten des Verfassers [莱比锡]，1806 年），1：i-lxxvi； 2:158。
46 H. D. v. Bülow, Der Feldzug von 1805, mtlitärisch-politisch betracbtet, 2 vols, (auf Kosten des Verfassers [Leipzig], 1806), 1:i-lxxvi; 2:158.
47同上，1：lviii-lix； 2：三十四，109。
47 Ibid., 1:lviii-lix; 2:xxxiv, 109.
48同上，1:5-20。
48 Ibid., 1:5–20.
49同上，2：xviii-xxxii，131-136； HD 诉 Bülow， Neue Taktik der Neuern（莱比锡，1805 年），48。
49 Ibid., 2:xviii-xxxii, 131–136; H. D. v. Bülow, Neue Taktik der Neuern (Leipzig, 1805), 48.
5. 拿破仑与战争中的革命
5. Napoleon and the Revolution in War
我1805年夏末，法国的进一步扩张似乎受到了遏制。法国海军未能控制英吉利海峡哪怕几天，就使英国免遭入侵。奥地利在威尼斯以北、蒂罗尔和德国南部集结了大量兵力，以阻止法国对中欧的任何威胁，甚至可能主动出击，夺回意大利北部。第一批俄军师从波兰出发，支援奥地利；在北方，普鲁士——尽管仍保持中立，但受到沙皇的拉拢——也在进行动员。第三次反法同盟的联合力量，即便尚未完全形成，也预示着新的欧洲力量平衡即将建立。
IN THE LATE summer of 1805 the further expansion of France appeared to have been checked. The failure of the French navy to control the Channel even for a few days rendered England secure from invasion. Austria was concentrating substantial forces north of Venice, in the Tyrol, and in southern Germany to block any French threat to central Europe, perhaps even to take the offensive itself to regain northern Italy. From Poland the first Russian divisions were moving to Austria's assistance, and in the north, Prussia—courted by the czar, although still neutral—was mobilizing. The combined strength of the Third Coalition, if not yet wholly operational, promised to create the basis for a new European balance of power.
8月23日，拿破仑改变了军事目标。17.6万大军离开英吉利海峡沿岸，于9月最后一周渡过莱茵河，沿多瑙河推进。由于匆忙缔结的联盟，他们穿越德国南部的道路畅通无阻，威胁到奥地利通往维也纳的交通线以及驻扎在摩拉维亚的俄军。奥地利在乌尔姆的前沿阵地被包围；10月19日，3.3万士兵投降。大军未经历一场大规模战斗，便于11月13日攻入维也纳，并继续向城外推进，在奥地利和俄国联军获得增援之前将其逼入绝境。12月2日，拿破仑在奥斯特里茨战役中歼灭了联军。三周后，《普雷斯堡和约》使奥地利脱离第三次反法同盟，将威尼托割让给法国，并使法国在中欧占据主导地位。
On August 23, Napoleon changed his military objective. The 176,000 men of the Grande Armée left the Channel coast, crossed the Rhine in the last week of September, advanced on the Danube, their way through southern Germany smoothed by alliances hurriedly negotiated, and threatened the Austrian lines of communication to Vienna and to the Russian army in Moravia. The Austrian forward position at Ulm was enveloped; on October 19, 33,000 men surrendered. Without fighting a major battle, the Grande Armée entered Vienna on November 13, and continued beyond the city to reach the now united Austrians and Russians before reinforcements would make them too strong to attack. On December 2, Napoleon destroyed the Allied army at Austerlitz. Three weeks later the Peace of Pressburg detached Austria from the Third Coalition, ceded Venetia to France, and made France dominant in central Europe.
这些事件在以往的战争中前所未有。交战双方的兵力规模固然不同寻常，但法军行动的速度和范围更是史无前例，皇帝运用外交和武力手段在短短数月内摧毁欧洲大陆传统的制衡体系也同样史无前例。这场战争给各国政府和士兵带来了巨大的冲击；其影响至今仍可在次年的士气低落和混乱中找到踪迹，这最终导致了普鲁士军队在耶拿和奥尔施泰特的覆灭，并助长了法军的势力扩张至俄罗斯边境。
These events had no parallel in earlier wars. The magnitude of the opposing armies was merely unusual; but the speed and sweep of French operations were unique, as was the emperor's handling of diplomacy and force to destroy within a matter of months the traditional checks and balances on the Continent. The shock to governments and soldiers was profound; its effect can still be traced in the discouragement and confusions of the following year, which contributed to the destruction of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstedt, and helped carry French power to the borders of Russia.
后来的观察家们对1805年战役的结果并不感到意外。克劳塞维茨在《战争论》中注意到，奥地利军队在乌尔姆的阵地周围散布着“由科学理论构成但极其脆弱的战略方案”，并评论说，这样的网或许能困住那些习惯于十八世纪谨慎战术的将领；“但它对革命皇帝波拿巴来说却不够牢固。” ¹这段话揭示了震惊欧洲的最终根源：一位天才人物的卓越才能，他同时也是“革命皇帝”，他体现并利用了法国旧制度被推翻后所带来的社会、政治和军事因素的独特融合。
Subsequent observers found the outcome of the campaign of 1805 less surprising. In On War, Clausewitz took note of the “flimsy web of scientific but extremely feeble strategic schemes,” which radiated from the Austrian position at Ulm, and commented that such a net might have caught generals schooled in the cautious maneuvers of the eighteenth century; “but it was not strong enough for Bonaparte, Emperor of the Revolution.”1 These words reveal the ultimate sources of the shock that had stunned Europe: the genius of one man, who also, as “Emperor of the Revolution,” personified, and profited from, the unique fusion of social, political, and military elements brought about by the overthrow of the Old Regime in France.
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I
法国大革命与君主制末期持续数十年的战争革命几乎同时发生。两者很快融合。军事制度和实践中一些在旧制度下已根深蒂固的变革，以及另一些仍处于试探和实验阶段的变革，都被大革命采纳并进一步发展。大革命将这些变革注入自身的活力，并将其与自身时常充满暴力的内政外交政策联系起来，从而扩大了这些创新的范围。军队及其需求和价值观在法国社会中获得了新的意义，最终体现在军人政治权力的崛起；但早在国民公会和督政府时期，内政和对外扩张就已经齐头并进。与此同时，军事革命不再仅仅是法国独有的现象。自1792年起，法国历届政府发动的战争确保了不仅政治和社会变革，而且军事变革也席卷了整个欧洲。
The French Revolution coincided with a revolution in war that had been under way through the last decades of the monarchy. Soon the two meshed. Profound changes in military institutions and practice, some already firmly established under the Old Regime, others still tentative and experimental, were adopted by the Revolution, and developed further. By infusing them with its dynamic, and linking them with its frequently violent domestic and foreign policies, the Revolution expanded the scope of these innovations. The army, its requirements and values, gained new importance in French life, which eventually was reflected in the rise to supreme political power of a soldier; but already under the Convention and the Directory domestic policy and foreign expansion went hand in hand. At the same time the military revolution ceased to be a purely French phenomenon. The wars waged by a succession of French governments from 1792. on ensured that not only political and social change, but military change as well, spread across Europe.
这些创新中最重要的一项，其法国渊源与其说是源于君主制的实践，不如说是源于启蒙运动晚期的军事和政治文献。这项创新是国民公会逐步采纳的一项政策，该政策至少在理论上接近于全民征兵。它极大地增加了士兵的数量，赋予法国外交政策新的分量，并使法国指挥官能够发动更具侵略性和代价更高的战役，以及更多的战役。君主制末期不断扩张且日益完善的军事管理体系，为新军的装备、训练和维护提供了保障。自七年战争以来，关于步兵战术的激烈辩论最终促成了“混合”作战体系的诞生，该体系包括散兵、行军纵队和进攻纵队以及线形阵型，经反复试验后，被证明最适合革命军队。自18世纪60年代起，格里博瓦尔、杜泰伊等人对皇家炮兵的改革，使革命后的法国拥有了世界上最高效、最机动的炮兵部队。步兵首次能够在所有作战阶段都得到野战炮的密切支援，这极大地增强了法军的打击能力。为数量庞大的野战部队提供补给，部分得益于法国大革命唯一一项打破十八世纪惯例的举措：强制士兵征用物资，其原则是“战争滋养战争”。拿破仑在其事业巅峰时期写道：“懂得如何从占领区获取各种补给，是战争艺术的重要组成部分。”
The most important of these innovations, whose French antecedents lay less in the practices of the monarchy than in the military and political literature of the late Enlightenment, was the gradual adoption by the Convention of a policy that at least in theory approached universal conscription. It produced a great increase in the number of soldiers, which lent new weight to French foreign policy, and enabled French commanders to fight more aggressive and costly campaigns, and to fight more of them. The expanding and increasingly sophisticated military administration of the last decades of the monarchy was available to equip, train, and maintain the new forces. The outcome of the intense debate on infantry tactics since the Seven Years' War, the “mixed” system of skirmishers, march and attack columns, and linear formations, was found by trial and error to suit the Revolutionary armies best. The reform of the royal artillery by Gribeauval, Du Teil, and others from the 1760s on gave Revolutionary France the most efficient and mobile artillery in the world. For the first time infantry could be closely supported by field guns in all phases of combat, which significantly increased the striking power of the French armies. Supplying the now very large number of troops in the field was made possible in part by the only break with eighteenth-century practice for which the Revolution was responsible: compelling the soldier to requisition, on the principle that la guerre nourrit la guerre. “To know…how to draw supplies of all kinds from the country you occupy,” Napoleon wrote at the apex of his success, “makes up a large part of the art of war.”2
这种“自给自足”的军事体系得益于一项可以追溯到七年战争时期的发展成果的制度化，而这项成果对拿破仑的战略和作战方式至关重要：将原本统一的军队拆分为常设师和军，并将步兵、骑兵、炮兵和支援部队整合在一起。在战役中，这些庞大的部队通常沿着不同的道路行军，各自负责自己的区域，但又能够相互支援。这种扩张的军队覆盖范围广，不仅便于后勤保障，更重要的是，它使各组成部分能够更快地移动，赋予其更大的灵活性，并增加了总司令的作战选择。在旧制度末期的战役中，总司令的参谋部规模不断扩大，下属参谋部也日益增多，这使得对规模越来越大、分布越来越广的部队进行有效控制成为可能。这些以及其他创新打破了欧洲几代士兵的固有观念、作战技巧和作战惯例。 1792 年至 1815 年间，他们彻底改变了战争的进行方式，并建立了在整个 19 世纪及以后仍然具有影响力的模式。
The system of living off the country was facilitated by the institutionalization of a development that reached back to the Seven Years' War, and was to be fundamental to Napoleon's strategy and his conduct of battle: the breaking up of the formerly unitary army into permanent divisions and corps, combining infantry, cavalry, artillery, and support services. On campaign these large subunits usually moved on separate roads, each responsible for its own area, but capable of mutual support. The extended army covered much ground, which made it easier to maintain, but also, and primarily, enabled its component parts to move more rapidly, gave them greater flexibility, and multiplied the commander in chief's operational choices. The expansion of his staff, and the proliferation of subordinate staffs, already under way in the last campaigns of the Old Regime, made possible the control of constantly larger and more widely dispersed forces. These and other innovations broke with the assumptions, techniques, and practices of generations of European soldiers. They radically changed the conduct of war between 1792 and 1815, and established patterns that remained influential throughout the nineteenth century, and beyond.
尽管战争革命对法国大革命战争的影响是巨大的，但其效果并非如人们所预想的那样立竿见影。面对那些仅动员了部分兵力，且在1792年布伦瑞克公爵的政治军事远征瓦尔米失败后，其作战目标也仅限于有限的对手，新生的法国却毫不逊色。不久，法军便占领了奥属尼德兰，并深入莱茵兰腹地。然而，由于法军的败绩几乎与胜利一样多，因此不能断言军事战果明显有利于新方法。部分原因是自1789年以来的政治事件严重扰乱了法国的军事体制。迅速扩充皇家军队，并将其改造为一支既高效又忠于新政府的军队，实属不易。要掌握军事革命的各个要素，并学会如何在战场上将其整合运用，需要大量的尝试和摸索。在此期间，法军的表现也参差不齐。 1796年，在意大利，新制度首次取得了决定性的、看似不可逆转的胜利。那时，普遍征兵制使法国军队成为欧洲规模最大、也最容易维持兵力的军队，许多军官和士兵都已适应了新的组织、管理和战术。然而，即便如此，战争方式的变革也并非一帆风顺。第二次反法同盟战争在地中海地区以拿破仑躲过英国舰队并在埃及登陆而拉开序幕，而在欧洲大陆，法国则接连遭遇失败。到1799年夏天，拿破仑在1796年的征服成果已荡然无存；除里维埃拉以外，整个意大利再次落入盟军之手，奥地利也重新控制了德国南部。如果说法国最终取得了胜利，那也是经过了艰苦卓绝的战斗。他们的作战方式无疑优于旧制度；但即便拥有十余场战役的经验，这种优势也只是有限的，而非绝对的。
But although the effect of the revolution in war on the Wars of the Revolution was dramatic, it was not as immediately conclusive as might be assumed. Against opponents who mobilized only a segment of their forces and who, after the failure of the Duke of Brunswick's politico-military expedition at Valmy in 1792, fought merely for limited aims, the new France more than held its own. Soon French armies had overrun the Austrian Netherlands and pushed far into the Rhineland. But since they suffered almost as many defeats as they gained victories, it cannot be said that the military results clearly favored the new methods. In part this was because the political events since 1789 had seriously disorganized the country's military institutions. It was difficult to expand the royal army quickly, and to transform it into a force that was both efficient and loyal to the new government. Much trial and error was needed to master the various elements of the military revolution and to learn how to integrate them in the field. In the meantime the performance of the French armies was uneven. It Italy in 1796 the new system for the first time scored a decisive and seemingly irreversible success. By then universal conscription had made the French army by far the largest in Europe and also the easiest to keep up to strength, and many of its officers and rank and file had become accustomed to the new organization, administration, and tactics. Yet even now the revolution in war did not sweep all before it. The War of the Second Coalition, which in the Mediterranean opened with Napoleon's evasion of the British fleet and his landing in Egypt, began on the European continent with a sequence of French defeats. By the summer of 1799 Napoleon's conquests of 1796 had been lost; all of Italy except the Riviera was again in Allied hands, and the Austrians again controlled southern Germany. If in the end the French triumphed, it was only after very hard fighting. Their conduct of war was undoubtedly superior to the old system; but even with the experience of a dozen campaigns it was a qualified, not an absolute, superiority.
革命在战争中表现的模棱两可，使我们有理由思考，如果拿破仑没有掌权，历史的走向又会如何。毫无疑问，此类推测的价值有限，但权衡那些最终未能实现的选项，有时或许能帮助我们更清晰地认识历史真相。我们对拿破仑最得力的同僚和对手——例如卡诺、茹尔当、霍什、马塞纳和莫罗——的了解表明，如果拿破仑在土伦战役前被杀，或者在前往埃及的途中于克里特岛海岸被俘，法国或许会停止或至少放缓其破坏欧洲力量平衡的行动。如果没有他坚持发动席卷全欧洲的战争，法国政府或许会满足于巩固其“天然”边界——这本身就是法国领土的一次重大扩张。如果继续发动战争——尤其是在远离法国的地区——法国高级将领的战绩表明，他们很可能屡战屡败。革命和战争的变革仍然会让法国成为欧洲最强大的国家，但法国会融入政治共同体，而不是主宰甚至几乎摧毁它。
The ambiguous efforts of the revolution in war justify our asking what might have been the course of subsequent events had Napoleon not assumed power. No doubt such speculations are of limited value, but weighing alternatives that did not come to pass may on occasion help us see the historical reality more clearly. All that we know of Napoleon's most competent colleagues and rivals—such men as Carnot, Jourdan, Hoche, Masséna, and Moreau—suggests that had Napoleon been killed before Toulon or captured off the coast of Crete on his way to Egypt, France would have ceased or at least slowed its efforts to destroy the European balance of power. Without his insistence on the immense exertions demanded by Europe-wide wars, the government would probably have been content with securing France's “natural” frontiers—in itself a very considerable expansion of French territory. Had further wars been waged—particularly if the fighting had taken place far from France—the record of the senior French commanders indicates that they would have been defeated as often as not. The Revolution and the transformation of war would still have left France the most powerful country in Europe, but a country integrated in the political community, rather than dominating and, indeed, almost abolishing it.
相反，拿破仑认识到革命在战争中的全部潜力，发现了如何使革命的各个组成部分协同运作——用克劳塞维茨的话来说，他纠正了此前限制其效能的技术缺陷——并通过将法国的资源投入到新体系中，使其在一段时间内获得了绝对优势。3
Instead Napoleon recognized the full potential of the revolution in war, discovered how its components could be made to work together—in Clausewitz's words, he corrected the technical imperfections of the innovations that until then had limited their effectiveness—and by placing the resources of France in the service of the new system for a time gave it absolute superiority.3
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拿破仑出身于一个地位较低的贵族家庭，在共和国军队中步步高升，他象征着军事革命，这场革命根植于旧制度，并在1789年后的事件中愈演愈烈。他本人并非改革者，而是利用了新领导人未能完全理解或充分利用的改革成果。举例来说：从执政府时期开始，征兵制度比1790年代初期更加普遍和规范。军队被划分为相对独立的指挥部，这在革命战争中往往意味着兵力分散，拿破仑延续了这一做法；但他对这些分散的指挥部实施了更为严格的中央控制，并将他对快速机动和进攻的信念灌输到他们之中。其结果是军队机动性得到了提升，使得在决定性地点集中优势兵力成为可能。
Napoleon, the scion of a minor noble family who rose in the army of the Republic, personifies the military revolution, with its roots in the Old Regime, and its intensification by the events after 1789. Not a reformer himself, he made use of the work of reformers that the new leaders had not completely understood or had not been able to exploit fully. To give two examples: from the Consulate on, conscription was applied more regularly and broadly than in the earlier 1790s. The separation of the army into largely self-sufficient commands, which in the Revolutionary Wars often meant the fragmentation of effort, was continued by Napoleon; but he imposed much firmer central control on the dispersed commands, and infused them with his faith in rapid movement and the offensive. The result was a new mobility, which made possible the concentration of superior force at the decisive point.4
如果说拿破仑运用了现有的制度和方法，那么从某种意义上说，他的战略也深受他人影响。正如对拿破仑战争研究最为博学深刻的让·科林所言（他的分析至今仍直接或间接地影响着该领域所有严肃的研究）：“如果我们把拿破仑最精妙的计划与他对手的相应计划进行比较，我们几乎看不出任何区别。” 他还说：“拿破仑的同代人与他一样，都明白迂回包抄或侧翼包抄对手的优势。” ⁵有时，决定胜负的关键并非拿破仑在战役或战斗中做了什么或试图做什么，而是他如何去做，以及他如何将战斗作为简单却影响深远的战略计划的焦点和高潮——而这些计划正是战争革命使他得以实施的。“战争的艺术很简单，”他直到生命的尽头仍然坚信，“一切都取决于执行。” ⁶
If Napoleon used existing institutions and methods, his strategy also, in one sense, owed much to others. In the words of the most knowledgeable and profound student of Napoleonic war, Jean Colin, whose analyses still directly or indirectly inform all serious work in the field: “If we take Napoleon's most brilliant projects, and compare them with the corresponding plans of his opponents, we shall hardly perceive a difference.” And again: “Napoleon's contemporaries understood as well as he did the advantage of turning or outflanking the opponent”5 At times it was not so much what Napoleon did or tried to do in a campaign or battle that made the difference, as how he did it, and how he used battle as the focus and climax of the simple but far-reaching strategic schemes that the revolution in war enabled him to carry out. “The art of war is simple,” he still believed at the end of his life; “everything is a matter of execution.”6
拿破仑从未就其战争思想撰写过完整的著作。要了解他对军队组织与管理、战役指挥以及战争在国家间关系中的作用的看法，我们必须考察其他方面的证据：他的政策和行动，以及他数量庞大却又内容丰富的著述，包括备忘录、命令、官方信函、回顾性评价、历史论述，以及他在圣赫勒拿岛上口述的各种回忆录——这些回忆录旨在向同时代人和后世证明他自身的合理性。随着他将回忆录转化为传奇，他对事件和人物的评价可能会发生显著变化，但他对战争本身的看法在第一次战役之后几乎没有改变。这种一致性并非总是体现在他用词的选择上。他可能会谈到战争的基本原则或基本要素——尽管这些概念本身也会因场合而异；但他所说的“原则”或“规则”并非指系统理论中明确定义的要素，而他本人也否认了这种理论的有效性。诸如“一般原则”或“战争大规则”之类的术语，只不过是为他基于经验和常识得出的认知增添了权威性。他行动中始终贯穿着一个理念：尽可能地增强自身实力以应对战斗，即便这意味着要放弃对次要基地和通信线路的严密保护。不可避免地，他常常会误解敌方在特定情况下的意图或行动，误判己方部队的能力，尤其是在晚年，他常常会被自己的希望和巨大的野心所蒙蔽。但这些错误和弱点丝毫没有限制或模糊他对战争的理解，他始终对战争的残酷现实有着深刻而残酷的认识。
Napoleon never wrote a comprehensive account of his ideas on war. To learn his thoughts on the organization and administration of armies, on the conduct of campaigns, and on the function of war in the relation between states, we must look to other kinds of evidence: his policies and actions, and his extensive if diverse writings, ranging from memoranda, orders, and official correspondence to retrospective appraisals, historical discussions, and the various memoirs he dictated on St. Helena to justify himself in the eyes of his contemporaries and of future generations. His evaluation of events and individuals could change markedly as he transformed his recollections into legend, but his views of war itself varied little after his first campaign. This consistency did not always extend to his choice of words. He might speak of first principles or of fundamental elements of war—though these themselves could differ according to the occasion; but by “principle” or “rule” he did not mean exactly defined elements in a systematic theory, the validity of which he denied in any case. Rather such terms as un principe général or une grande règle de la guerre simply lent added authority to a recognition arrived at by experience and inspired common sense. The one concept that invariably dominated his actions was to be as strong for battle as possible, even if this meant leaving secondary bases and his communications unguarded. Inevitably he often misinterpreted enemy intentions or actions in particular situations, misjudged the possibilities of his own troops, and especially in later years could be deceived by his hopes and gigantic ambition. But these errors and weaknesses did nothing to limit or blur his understanding of war, which was always distinguished by a profound and brutal appreciation of its reality.
要从拿破仑的行动和思考中找出他战争行为的显著特征，可以恰当地从政治背景和目的入手，进而分析战略和战斗，最后对拿破仑的个人领导素质做一些评论。
An attempt to draw the salient characteristics of Napoleon's conduct of war from his actions and reflections may appropriately begin with the political context and purpose, proceed to strategy and battle, and conclude with some comments on Napoleon's personal qualities of leadership.
所有战争都源于政治决策，并体现政治意图——无论这些政治意图是否现实，是否可取——但这并不意味着任何一场战争都必然适合其所服务的政策。历史上，各国政府及其军事顾问和指挥官都发现，在外交政策与战争的关系中，诸如动员资源的比例或资源的运用方式等问题，往往难以甚至无法做出决定。即便作为一名初级军官，拿破仑也比士兵训练或战术运用等纯粹的军事事务更关注这些根本性问题。德国历史学家汉斯·德尔布吕克认为，尽管拿破仑具有战略眼光和卓越的作战才能，但他与生俱来的才能更像是一位政治家而非军人。然而，他的政治手腕却异常激进，带有强烈的战争色彩。他并不把战争视为紧急措施，或是弥补外交失败的最后手段；相反，战争是他外交政策的核心要素。
The fact that all wars result from political decisions and express a political intent—whether or not the politics are realistic and may be regarded as desirable—does not mean that any particular war is necessarily appropriate for implementing the policy it serves. Historically, governments and their military advisors and commanders have found it difficult and often impossible to decide on such aspects of the relationship between foreign policy and war as the proportion of resources to be mobilized, or the manner in which they should be employed. Even as a junior officer these fundamental issues occupied Napoleon far more than did such purely military matters as the training of soldiers or their tactical employment. The German historian Hans Delbrück believed that despite Napoleon's strategic vision and his genius in the conduct of battles, his innate talents were those of a statesman even more than of a soldier.7 But his statesmanship was of an unusually aggressive, warlike kind. He did not regard war as an emergency measure, a measure of last resort with which to repair the failures of diplomacy; instead it was the central element of his foreign policy.
除非迫不得已，拿破仑从不在军事资源不足的情况下追求重大政策目标。他拒绝重蹈奥地利在1796年和1797年意大利战役中犯下的错误——奥地利人只动员了部分兵力，在第一批兵力战败后才动员第二批，然后是第三批。如果他们从一开始就全力出击，甚至可能击败他。相反，他坚信要充分利用一切可用手段。重大目标及其动员的资源总是尽可能地保持平衡。他的政治和军事战略存在另一个弱点。他发现难以用有限的资源进行有限的战争；例如1778年奥地利和普鲁士之间的战争，这场战争甚至没有发生一场真正的战斗，就违背了他的本性。在他手中，所有冲突都倾向于无限扩大，因为这些冲突或明或暗地威胁到对手的独立生存。
Unless compelled by circumstance, Napoleon never pursued major policy goals with inadequate military resources. He refused to fall into the error the Austrians committed against him in Italy in 1796 and 1797, mobilizing only a segment of the forces available, mobilizing, a second segment after the first had been defeated, and then a third. Had they operated in force from the beginning, they might have overpowered even him. On the contrary, he believed in the fullest employment of all means available. Major goals, and resources mobilized to achieve them, were always as well balanced as was possible. His political and military strategy suffered from a different weakness. He found it difficult to fight limited wars with limited means; a war such as that between Austria and Prussia in 1778, in which not a single battle was fought, went against his nature. In his hands all conflicts tended to become unlimited, because openly or by implication they threatened the continued independent existence of his antagonists.
在长达十五年的时间里，他既是国家元首又是最高统帅，几乎不受任何行动限制，这无疑有利于政策与战争的紧密结合。政治和军事权力的统一消除了高层不可避免的摩擦。最重要的是，它促进了决策的快速制定和执行，并使他能够以惊人的灵活性调整外交策略以适应不断变化的军事形势，根据情况提高要求或展现妥协的意愿。当然，统一指挥并不能保证政策的正确性。在拿破仑统治的后期，由于缺乏制衡机制，他的一人统治导致了一系列重大失误，最终导致了帝国的覆灭。但在入侵俄国之前，这位皇帝的全面权威使他相对于那些无法建立起一套能够适应现代战争节奏的政治军事指挥体系的对手而言，占据了优势。
That for fifteen years he was both head of state and supreme commander, with few if any restrictions placed on his freedom of action, was certainly conducive to the closest integration of policy and war. The unity of political and military authority eliminated the friction at the top that otherwise was inevitable. Above all it facilitated quick decisions and their rapid implementation, and made possible the startling flexibility with which he adjusted his diplomacy to the shifting military situation, increasing his demands or showing a willingness to compromise as he saw fit. Unity of command did not, of course, guarantee sound policy. In Napoleon's later years the absence of checks and balances in his one-man rule led to critical errors, and in the end brought down the Empire. But until the invasion of Russia, the emperor's comprehensive authority gave him an advantage over opponents who could not develop a system of politico-military command capable of matching the quickening pace of modern war.
拿破仑将外交手段与武力相结合的策略，在孤立潜在对手这一传统目标上体现得最为淋漓尽致。即便他无法阻止针对法国的联盟形成——很大程度上是因为他的最终意图过于明显——他仍然利用各方的特殊利益，拖延盟军在战场上的会师。1805年，外交使节配合大军从法国向巴伐利亚的惊人快速推进，使他得以俘获一支奥地利军队，而此时俄军仍在数百英里之外的东部。同年12月，在诱使普鲁士保持中立后，他击败了奥地利和俄国联军。1806年，英国和俄国眼睁睁地看着普鲁士军队被歼灭。次年春天，趁奥地利仍在备战之际，他又击败了普鲁士残部及其俄国盟友；1809年，奥地利再次战败，而潜在的支持者仍在犹豫是否出兵援助。
Nowhere was Napoleon's integration of diplomacy and violence more effective than in the manner in which he pursued the traditional goal of politically isolating a prospective opponent. Even if he could not prevent the formation of alliances against France—largely because his ultimate intentions were too transparent—he still played on the special interests of one or the other partner in order to delay the linkup of Allied forces in the field. In 1805 diplomatic representatives coupled with the astonishingly rapid advance of the Grande Armée from France to Bavaria enabled him to capture an Austrian army while Russian troops were still hundreds of miles to the east. In December of that year, having seduced Prussia into neutrality, he defeated the Austrians and Russians. In 1806 England and Russia watched as the Prussian army was destroyed. The following spring he defeated the Prussian remnants and their Russian allies while Austria was still arming; and in 1809 Austria was once more defeated while potential supporters were still debating whether to come to its aid.
如果拿破仑无法阻止两个或多个盟军在同一战区集结，那么他们的交汇点或潜在交汇点仍然为他提供了宝贵的机会，让他得以洞察政治和军事上的互动。不同国家的军队同时出现，加剧了指挥权分散所带来的政治和作战难题。“一个糟糕的将军胜过两个优秀的将军，”他在第一次意大利战役期间写信给卡诺时这样说道，在圣赫勒拿岛战役中，他几乎以相同的措辞重申了这一观点。1796年，他以一次深入的战略渗透拉开了奠定其声名的战役序幕，将自己的部队部署在撒丁王国和奥地利军队之间，阻止了他们的会师；随后，他采取了一些分析家所称的“中心位置战略”，先将撒丁王国军队逐出战场，然后转而攻击奥地利军队。在百日王朝时期，他沿用了同样的战略，在布吕歇尔和惠灵顿之间的内线作战，先消灭普鲁士军队，然后在他认为英荷联军已被孤立后立即发起进攻。在滑铁卢，就像二十年前的德戈和蒙多维一样，对立联盟的政治因素变成了行动的机会。
If it proved impossible for Napoleon to prevent the appearance of the forces of two or more allies in the same theater of operations, their point of junction or possible junction still afforded valuable opportunities to his recognition of political and military interaction. The presence of armies of different states raised all the political and operational difficulties of divided command. “One bad general would be better than two good ones,” he wrote to Carnot during the first Italian campaign, an opinion he reiterated in nearly identical words on St. Helena.8 In 1796 he opened the campaign that was to make his reputation with a deep strategic penetration, interposing his forces between the Sardinian and Austrian armies, and preventing their junction; this was followed by what some analysts have called a strategy of the central position, first knocking the Sardinians out of the war, and then turning on the Austrians. He adopted the same strategy in the Hundred Days, operating on interior lines between Blücher and Wellington to eliminate the Prussians before attacking the Anglo-Dutch army as soon as he believed it had been isolated. At Waterloo, as at Dego and Mondovi twenty years earlier, the political factor of the opposing alliance became an operational opportunity.
奥斯特里茨战役便是利用盟军固有弱点的一种复杂策略。拿破仑利用奥地利人想要重新占领维也纳的愿望，诱使奥俄联军主力——其指挥结构和各部队之间缺乏有效协作——不去等待从南北方向逼近的俄奥援军，而是提前发动进攻。这场进攻旨在切断拿破仑与维也纳的联系，其背后的考量更多地体现在政治而非军事层面。
A complex variant of playing on the inherent difficulties of an allied force may be found in the Austerlitz campaign. By exploiting the Austrians' wish to reoccupy Vienna, Napoleon induced the main Austro-Russian army, its command structure and units too poorly integrated for effective cooperation, not to wait for the Russian and Austrian reinforcements that were approaching from north to south, but to launch a premature offensive, the direction of which, designed to cut off Napoleon from Vienna, reflected political rather than military considerations.
他的战略始终具有明确的政治目的，但至少在他统治的最后几年之前，政策考量不允许妨碍他采取最有效的武力威胁或运用。相反，拿破仑认为，实现任何政治目标的最佳方法是尽可能削弱对手的抵抗能力。这意味着首先要击败敌军主力。攻占要塞、占领领土或首都，对敌军作战能力的影响远不及击败其野战军。一场惨败会创造新的局面——军事上，它会导致更多损失、撤退和投降；政治上，它迫使或迫使敌方政府在新的不利形势下进行谈判。
His own strategy always had a clear political purpose, but at least until the final years of his rule considerations of policy were not permitted to inhibit the most effective threat or application of force. On the contrary, Napoleon believed that the best method of reaching whatever political goal he sought was to reduce his opponent's power of resistance to the greatest extent possible. That meant above all to defeat the major enemy armies. The capture of fortresses, the occupation of terrain or of capitals only rarely had the same impact on the enemy's war-making potential as did the defeat of his field army. A severe defeat created a new situation—militarily by leading to further losses, withdrawals, and capitulations; politically, by maneuvering or forcing the opposing government into negotiations under newly unfavorable circumstances.
拿破仑的战略计划——或者更准确地说，由于他不喜欢“战略计划”一词所暗示的固定不变的设计，应该称之为他的战略准备——旨在取得压倒性的战术胜利，即歼灭敌军野战军的重大战役。在他最伟大的战役中，决战往往源于深入敌境的长期快速推进；但这些推进并非针对特定地点或地理目标。相反，它们将一支强大的军队推进到如此远的距离，以至于敌军无法忽视，必须与之交战。拿破仑战略的目标是制造决战的威胁或现实。战役本身可能从敌军中心或内部阵地发起或占据该阵地，从而逐步瓦解敌军；也可能采取包抄敌军后方、包围敌军阵地并威胁其交通线的策略。
Napoleon's strategic plans—or more correctly, since he disliked the term's implications of a fixed, unchanging design, his strategic preparations—aimed at an overwhelming tactical decision, the major battle or battles that eliminated the opposing field army. In his greatest campaigns the climactic battle emerges naturally from long and rapid advances deep into enemy territory; but the advances were never directed at a particular location, a geographic objective. Rather they pushed a strong army so far forward that it could not be ignored but had to be fought. The aim of Napoleonic strategy was to bring about the threat or reality of the decisive battle. The campaign itself might either be launched from, or occupy, a central, interior position that would permit the piecemeal defeat of the opposing forces, or it took the form of a maneuver against the rear that enveloped the enemy's position and threatened his lines of communication.
皇帝在决定性战役中所展现出的胆识和魄力，可以从1806年的短暂战役中得到体现。尽管直到战役接近尾声时，拿破仑仍无法确定普鲁士军队的阵地和意图，但这场战役最终仍取得了战略上的胜利。耶拿和奥尔施泰特这两场关键战役都是基于错误的假设而打响的，最终只能依靠战术上的随机应变才能取胜，这更加凸显了这一基本理念的强大之处。
An example of the daring and consequentiality with which the emperor pursued the decisive battle is the brief campaign of 1806, which proved to be a strategic triumph despite the fact that until nearly the end Napoleon remained uncertain of the Prussian army's position and intentions. That the two climactic battles of Jena and Auerstedt were fought on mistaken assumptions and could be won only by tactical improvisation underscores the strength of the basic concept.
拿破仑并不想与普鲁士开战。这场战争的爆发是因为法国在1805年的胜利之后，在中欧地区取得了如此巨大的优势，以至于该地区再出现另一个强权已不再现实。当普鲁士军队动员起来，从萨克森南下推进到图林根森林时，法军主力则驻扎在莱茵河沿岸和德国南部。10月初，拿破仑将兵力集中在班贝格和维尔茨堡之间，开始北上，却几乎完全放弃了通往莱茵河的补给线。他的作战计划本质上是尽可能地集结兵力，然后通过进攻柏林来创造机会。如果普鲁士军队发起进攻，他们会因为需要或想要保卫首都而分心，一旦两军交战，法军的兵力优势和机动性优势将决定胜负。考虑到法军远胜于普鲁士的实力，无论从哪个方向发起进攻，都有可能取得胜利。但是，从西面进攻会将普鲁士军队逼退到柏林，并有可能获得俄国的援助；而从南面进攻可以更快地发起，并有可能将普鲁士主力部队与其首都、补给基地和俄国边境隔离开来。
Napoleon did not want to fight Prussia. The war came about because after its victories in 1805 France had achieved such dominance in central Europe that the existence of another major power in the area was no longer a practical possibility. When the Prussians mobilized and advanced south through Saxony to the Thuringian Forest, the major part of the French army was stationed along the Rhine and in southern Germany. In the first days of October Napoleon concentrated his forces between Bamberg and Würzburg, and began to move north, incidentally leaving his lines of communication to the Rhine almost unprotected. Essentially his plan of campaign consisted of mobilizing the greatest force possible, and then creating an opportunity for its exploitation by advancing on Berlin. Should the Prussians take the offensive, they would be diverted by the need, or wish, to defend their capital, and once the armies met, French numerical superiority and greater mobility should decide the issue. Considering his far greater strength, an offensive from any direction promised success. But an advance from the west would have pushed the Prussians back on Berlin and toward possible Russian assistance, while an offensive from the south could be launched more rapidly and stood the chance of separating the main Prussian forces from their capital, supply bases, and the Russian frontier.
约18万人的法军大军分为三个纵队，每个纵队下辖两个军，在30至40英里的战线上推进，各纵队距离很近，必要时可以互相支援。到10月12日，这支庞大的“营级方阵”（拿破仑用这个词来强调这种阵型所体现的协调和相互支援的理念）已经绕过并超越了普鲁士军队的左翼，此时普鲁士军队正缓慢地向魏玛和耶拿之间的北方撤退，法军切断了普鲁士通往莱比锡、哈雷和柏林的交通线。13日，拿破仑将大部分兵力转向西进，攻击他认为驻扎在耶拿以北高地上的普鲁士主力部队，同时命令已在更北约15英里处的达武部队从敌军后方支援法军主力进攻。第二天，两场战役的战线互换，法军从东向西推进。与拿破仑的预想相反，他面对的只是普鲁士军队的一小部分，兵力几乎是普鲁士军队的两倍。而达武非但没有发动包围战，反而遭到了兵力远胜于他的普鲁士主力的攻击。普鲁士主力试图突破法军防线，夺回补给线。达武率领的26000名士兵坚守阵地后，普鲁士军队向西撤退，远离柏林。他们越过了在耶拿战役中战败的另一支军队的撤退线，随后遭到法军猛烈追击，最终被彻底击溃。
The Grande Armée, some 180,000 men, divided into three columns of two corps each, advanced on a front of thirty to forty miles, the columns near enough to support each other should the need arise. By October 12, this gigantic “battalion square,” the name Napoleon employed to emphasize the ideal of coordination and mutual support that inspired the formation, had moved around and beyond the left flank of the Prussians, now slowly withdrawing north between Weimar and Jena, and cut the Prussian lines of communication to Leipzig, Halle, and Berlin. On the 13th Napoleon wheeled the greater part of his forces west against what he believed to be the main Prussian army, stationed on the heights beyond Jena, while ordering Davout, already some fifteen miles further north, to support the main French assault by striking at the enemy's rear. On the following day the two battles were fought with the fronts reversed, the French advancing from east to west. Contrary to his assumptions, Napoleon faced only a small part of the Prussian army, which he outnumbered almost two to one, while Davout, far from carrying out an enveloping attack, was himself attacked by the far stronger Prussian main army, which was trying to regain its lines of communication by forcing its way through the French. When Davout's 26,000 men held, the Prussians withdrew west, away from Berlin. They crossed the line of retreat of their other army, which had been defeated at Jena, and a very energetic French pursuit completed their disorganization and virtual destruction.
拿破仑在普鲁士国中心附近部署的庞大军事力量构成了威胁，普鲁士人不得不应对。结果是普鲁士取得了一场规模空前的胜利。然而，即便经历了如此惨重的失败，普鲁士仍然继续战斗了八个月之久，这既表明战争革命带来的战争规模的扩大，也揭示了战争的新局限性之一。共和国和帝国为战争动员国家资源和精力，开始引发规模和强度相当的反制措施。
The enormous military power that Napoleon placed near the center of the Prussian state created a threat to which the Prussians had to respond. The result was a victory of exceptional magnitude. That after such a disaster Prussia nevertheless continued to fight for another eight months indicates both the expansion in warfare that the revolution in war had brought about, and one of its new limitations. The mobilization by the Republic and Empire of national resources and energies for war was beginning to evoke countermeasures of similar dimensions and intensity.
拿破仑时代的战略比今天更意味着在充满不确定性的环境中思考和行动，唯一最终可靠的参考点是指挥官对军队和国家力量的潜力和局限性的理解。拿破仑时代的战役同样充满不确定性；但与战略层面相比，指挥官对战役的许多组成部分——地形、兵力、己方和敌方部队的位置，甚至对方的意图——都拥有更确切的了解。与分散的军团向数百英里外的敌军推进，而敌军位置仅知其大致位置的情况相比，他对部队的控制也更加直接和全面。拿破仑生活的时期接近历史上一个漫长时期的末期，在这个时期，指挥官在战斗中能够真正看到己方的大部分部队，以及许多敌军。随着工业革命，战争的性质发生了变化：战场扩大了，部队转移到了地面作战，拿破仑和惠灵顿时期人们还认为理所当然地能够对军队进行目视控制，而如今，最多只有一名军士能够对他的少数士兵进行这种控制。
Strategy in the Napoleonic Era even more than today meant thinking and acting in an uncertain realm, in which the only ultimately reliable points of reference were the commander's understanding of the potentials and limitations of armed force and of national power. Napoleonic battle was also filled with uncertainty; but the commander possessed a surer knowledge than is possible in strategy of many of its components—terrain, strength, and position of his troops and the enemy's, often even the intentions of the other side. He also had direct and more comprehensive control over his forces than was possible during an advance of hundreds of miles by widely dispersed corps against an opponent whose position was known only in general terms. Napoleon lived near the end of the very long period in history in which during battle the commander might actually see most of his troops, as well as many of the enemy's. With the industrial revolution the character of battle changed: the battlefield expanded, the troops took to the ground, and the degree of visual control over their armies that Napoleon and Wellington still took for granted is exerted today at most by a sergeant over his few men.
如果对手在兵力上明显占优，拿破仑会采取正面交锋，尽可能选择有溪流等天然障碍物分割的地形，以限制敌人的横向移动。同时，他自己的部队会构筑坚固的防御阵地，并尽可能多地保留预备队。一旦敌人在整个战线上投入战斗，预备队（此时称为突击队）就会攻击战线的一部分，突破敌军防线后，再从侧翼和后方进攻其他战线。如果己方兵力与敌军相当或更优，他会尝试通过延伸战线来包抄敌人，或者派遣一个独立的军团发动侧翼攻击。后者由于其更深的渗透能力，有望取得更大的战果，但由于相距数英里以上的部队之间通信和协调能力有限，因此实施起来更加困难。在当时的战争中——事实上，在任何时代——包抄都是常见的战术。拿破仑的对手和他一样清楚这种战术的有效性。但对他而言习以为常的做法，他们却很少尝试：正面交锋在技术上更容易控制，也更少出现意外情况。在这方面，如同在许多其他方面一样，拿破仑与他的对手将领之间的真正区别往往在于侧重点和心理态度。
If his opponent was markedly superior in numbers, Napoleon waged a frontal battle, if possible on terrain divided by such natural obstacles as streams that would inhibit the enemy's lateral movements, while his own forces were placed in a strong defensive position, with as many troops as could be spared kept in reserve. Once the enemy was committed along the entire front, the reserves, now the masse de rupture, would attack one part of the front, and having broken through move against the flanks and rear of the other sectors. If his forces were equal or superior to those of the enemy, he would attempt to outflank him by extending his front, or launch a flank attack with a separate corps. The latter, because of its deeper penetration, promised greater results, but was more difficult to achieve since communication and coordination between units separated by more than a few miles was unreliable. Outflanking movements were nothing unusual in the warfare of that time—or, indeed, of any time. Napoleon's opponents were as aware of their effectiveness as he was. But what proved the norm for him was more rarely attempted by them: a frontal encounter was technically easier to control, and offered less scope for the unforeseen. In this regard, as in many others, the real difference between Napoleon and the generals opposing him tended to be one of emphasis and psychological attitude.
尽管拿破仑有时会采取守势，直到对手投入过多兵力后才发起进攻，但他更倾向于进攻。他厌恶纯粹的防御战；他深知主动权的价值，并害怕失去主动权。然而，无论是进攻、攻守兼备还是防御战，所有战役都面临着复杂的时空运用、兵力消耗、双方士气、资源差异、相互冲突的任务以及指挥官的性格和意志等问题。在十九世纪初，解决这些问题不仅需要分析二手资料——阅读报告和研究地图——还需要直接介入现实，调动视野范围内数万大军。部署这些军事力量，战胜并消灭那些透过炮火硝烟清晰可见的对手，这些具体的任务激发了拿破仑内心深处的关切，也唤起了他最强烈的精神和理智反应。正是他对政治和军事冲突的理解——将其视为另一种可以通过智力掌控的机制——“在战争中，时间……是重量和力量之间最重要的因素”——再加上他对战争中涉及的人类情感的认识和运用，使他成为那个时代最伟大的军事家。9
Although Napleon sometimes stayed on the defensive until his opponent had committed and overextended himself, he preferred the attack. He disliked purely defensive battles; he knew the value of the initiative, and feared losing it. But whether offensive, defensive-offensive, or defensive—all battles posed complex problems of the use of time and space, and of the expenditure of force; of the morale, different resources, and conflicting missions of the opposing sides; and of the character and will of the commanders. In the early nineteenth century these problems were still resolved not only by analyzing the secondary evidence—reading reports and studying maps—but by intervening in the directly perceived reality, by maneuvering the tens of thousands of men in one's field of vision. The concrete tasks of deploying these units of military energy, and of overcoming and destroying his opponents, whom he could see through the smoke of cannons and muskets, stimulated Napoleon's deepest concerns, and evoked his strongest psychic and intellectual responses. It was his sense of political and military conflict as another form of mechanics that could be mastered intellectually—“in war, time…is the great element between weight and force”—combined with his recognition and exploitation of the human emotions involved, that made him the greatest soldier of the age.9
他的个人魅力和绝对优越感的影响，不仅渗透到他的部队、军官和将领之中，也波及到他的对手。惠灵顿认为他的存在就相当于四万大军。远在他可能出现的地方，法军也被命令高呼“皇帝万岁！”，以使敌人误以为他正与他们正面交锋。1813年秋，中欧各盟军的作战计划明确建议，任何与他交战的军队都应撤退。克劳塞维茨坚信，任何战争理论若不包含指挥官和士兵的心理及其相互关系，都不能被认真对待。他甚至认为，拿破仑最伟大的成就并非一场胜利的战役或一次成功的战役，而是在1796年重振了意大利军队的士气。
The impact of his charisma and the belief in his absolute superiority extended from his troops and their officers and generals to his opponents. Wellington thought his presence was the equal of forty thousand soldiers. French troops miles from where he might be were ordered to shout Vive l'Empereur! to make the enemy believe he was facing them. In the fall of 1813 the war plan for the various allied armies in central Europe bluntly advised the withdrawal of any army against which he advanced. Clausewitz, who was convinced that no theory of war could be taken seriously unless it included the psychology of commanders and soldiers and their relations to one another, went so far as to state that not a victorious battle or successful campaign but restoring the morale of the army in Italy in 1796 was Napoleon's greatest achievement.10
三
III
拿破仑连战连捷的原因之一是他的对手难以理解他的作战方式，也难以制定有效的应对措施。他们这种不确定的认知很大程度上源于战争革命的本质。<sup> 11</sup>我们知道，这场革命在大多数重要方面并非在于突然的创新，而在于更普遍、更有力地运用那些已经存在数十年或在文献中被广泛讨论过的制度和方法。从长远来看，这导致了实质性的差异，催生了一种新型战争；但起初，人们很容易认为，无论发生什么变化，都只是对既有模式的扩展，因此无需在思想和行动上做出根本性的调整。有两个事实强化了这种观点：法国人屡战屡败，因此，效仿他们并非理所当然。而且，他们的一些方法——普遍征兵、公开招募军官，甚至系统地自给自足——几乎无法与旧制度的价值观和条件共存。人们普遍认为，采用这些方法意味着改变自身的社会和政治制度，这使得对这些方法进行客观的军事分析变得更加困难。
Among the reasons for Napoleon's long run of victories was the difficulty his opponents experienced in understanding his way of fighting and in devising effective responses. Their uncertain perception is in large part explained by the nature of the revolution in war.11 In most of its significant aspects this revolution, as we know, consisted not in sudden innovation but in the more general and forceful employment of institutions and methods that had existed for decades or had been extensively discussed in the literature. In the long run this led to differences in substance, to a new kind of war; but at first it was not unreasonable to think that whatever changes were taking place were merely the expansion of the already familiar, and therefore would not demand radical adjustments in one's thought and actions. Two facts reinforced this outlook: the French were often defeated, consequently it was not self-evident that they should be copied. And some of their methods—universal conscription, open access to commissions, even systematically living off the land—could scarcely coexist with the values and conditions of the Old Regime. An objective military analysis of these methods was made much more difficult by the belief that to adopt them meant changing one's social and political system.
然而，对于细心的士兵来说，战争至少在某些重要方面正在发生变化，这一点显而易见。在第一次和第二次反法同盟战争中，法国大规模地运用了新的战术，尽管在一段时间内，这些战术是否是国家政治动荡时期的临时应对措施尚不明确，一旦局势恢复正常，这些战术是否会被传统方法所取代。其他国家也在进行着类似的尝试——例如，尝试各种军团组织形式，扩充和重组总参谋部，建立新的军官教育体系；轻步兵的风潮席卷了欧洲大部分军事领域。在这一普遍的变革中，拿破仑起初并不显得特立独行。在1790年代，他仍然被视为一位精力充沛、能力出众且运气极佳的将军，他的作战方式与其他优秀指挥官并无显著差异。直到乌尔姆战役和奥斯特里茨战役，也就是在他首次以总司令身份亮相十年后，他的作战体系的核心要素才得到充分的记录和分析，并最终被世人所认可。
To the observant soldier it nevertheless became apparent that at least in some major respects warfare was changing. In the Wars of the First and Second Coalition the French employed new techniques on a grand scale, although for a time it remained unclear whether these were improvisations caused by the country's political turmoil, which would give way to traditional methods once conditions returned to normal. Other countries, too, were experimenting—with various forms of corps organization, for example, with enlarged and reorganized general staffs, with new systems of officer education; a vogue for light infantry swept much of military Europe. In this general turbulence, Napoleon did not at first stand apart. In the 1790s he could still be seen as an energetic, competent, and lucky general, whose manner of fighting did not significantly differ from that of other able commanders. It was not until Ulm and Austerlitz, a decade after his first appearance as a commanding general, that the essentials of his system were sufficiently documented and analyzed to become generally recognized.
为了应对拿破仑的成功，尤其是在1792年以来几乎连绵不断的战争中，欧洲大部分地区的军事机构都进行了不同程度的现代化改革。一些军队紧随法国模式——例如新成立的莱茵邦联以及荷兰和那不勒斯等卫星王国的军队——另一些军队则在本土传统的基础上发展，并受到法国挑战的刺激和影响——特别是哈布斯堡帝国和普鲁士的军队。这些改革必然伴随着社会和民政管理的一定程度的变革。但拿破仑帝国以及1807年后的普鲁士都表明，最激进的军事改革并不一定需要像1790年代初的法国那样，以社会和政治革命为支撑；它们可以由稳定且高度专制的政府推行和维持。英国军队是这一现代化进程的主要例外。尽管进行了多次组织变革，但它本质上仍然是一支十八世纪的军队，这得益于其规模小、依赖盟友和英国海军，以及——除西班牙外——其作战任务通常受到限制。
In reaction to his success, but even more so in the train of nearly constant warfare since 1792, military institutions in much of Europe modernized to varying degrees. Some closely followed the French pattern—the armies of the new Confederation of the Rhine, and of the satellite kingdoms of Holland and Naples—others built on native traditions, stimulated and influenced by the French challenge—in particular the armies of the Hapsburg Empire and of Prussia. These innovations necessarily implied some degree of change in society and civil administration. But both the Napoleonic Empire and, after 1807, Prussia revealed that the most radical military innovations need not be backed by a social and political revolution as they had been in France in the early 1790s; they could be imposed and maintained by stable, highly authoritarian governments. The main exception to this process of modernization was the British army. Despite numerous organizational changes, it remained essentially an eighteenth-century force, a condition made possible by its small size, its reliance on allies and on the British navy, and—except in Spain—its generally restricted operational assignments.
尽管制度和战术上的现代化早已扩展到法国以外的军队，但创新者与保守派之间始终存在着激烈的冲突。而战略理念和作战指挥方式的变革则进展缓慢。在作战技巧的精湛掌握和对彻底消灭对手的执着追求方面，无人能与拿破仑匹敌。然而，各地的人们都更加熟练地运用了新型或改进的军事工具。在普鲁士，一种新型总参谋部的引入——其成员被分配到各个部队，在总体战略规划的指导下享有一定程度的独立性——构成了一种早期但尚属原始的解决方案，旨在解决大型军队分散部署、难以进行快速持续通信的情况下，如何协调其行动和作战的问题。这些发展使得当拿破仑决定入侵俄国时，他的潜在对手和实际对手都已开始从战争方式的变革中获益。拿破仑曾享有的绝对优势也在悄然衰落。
If institutional and tactical modernization spread to armies far beyond France, though never without intense conflict between innovators and traditionalists, changes in strategic concepts and operational leadership were slower in coming. No one emerged to equal Napoleon in his mastery of operational techniques and his passion for the physical annihilation of the opponent. But everywhere men became more proficient in using the new or refurbished military instrument, and in Prussia the introduction of a new type of general staff, whose members, assigned to various units, acted with a measure of independence in the service of a comprehensive strategic design, constituted an early, still primitive solution to the problem of coordinating the movement and combat of large armies dispersed beyond the reach of quick, constant communication. The result of these developments was that by the time Napoleon decided on the invasion of Russia, his potential and actual opponents had begun to benefit from the revolution in war. The absolute superiority Napoleon had enjoyed for some years imperceptibly declined.
此前曾助他一臂之力的观点，如今却开始对他不利。年轻时，他便已洞悉打击对手核心力量的有效性。一旦敌军主力被击败，或许再加上其行政和经济中心被占领，其他一切便可能随之而来。拿破仑也认识到，实现这些目标最可靠的途径是集结最强大的力量，并将其集中于关键目标——这两点认知准确地把握了政治和军事现实的某些方面，同时也反映了拿破仑自身对征服和绝对统治的强烈心理需求。
A point of view that earlier had helped him now began to work to his disadvantage. As a young man he had perceived the effectiveness of striking at the core of his opponent's power. Once the enemy's main armies were defeated, and perhaps also once his administrative and economic centers were occupied, all else was likely to follow. Napoleon recognized as well that the surest means to reach these goals was to raise the strongest force possible and concentrate it on the essential objectives—two recognitions that accurately identified some aspects of political and military reality, while—not incidentally—reflecting Napoleon's own intense psychological need for conquest and absolute domination.
但这些见解不切实际地将他的战争范围缩小到以最大武力为最大目标而发动的冲突。一个国家的对外政策很少仅仅需要大规模战争，然而拿破仑却将目标明确的有限战争排除在他的政治和军事体系之外。如此一来，他不仅缩小了选择范围，还被迫卷入了连帝国自身资源都捉襟见肘的战争，这些战争刺激了他的对手付出了超乎寻常的努力，最终却在战术、战略和政治上都无法取胜。
But these insights unrealistically narrowed the range of his wars to conflicts waged with the greatest possible force for the greatest possible ends. It is rare that a state's foreign policy stands in need only of major wars, yet Napoleon excluded limited wars for circumscribed goals from his political and military system. In this way he not only reduced his options, he was driven into wars that were beyond the resources even of the Empire, that stimulated his opponents to extraordinary efforts, and that in the end could be won neither tactically, strategically, nor politically.
在战略层面，拿破仑的扩张野心除了兵力不足这一基本缺陷外，还造成了两个严重的弊端：在意大利北部和中欧行之有效的指挥体系，在西班牙和俄罗斯战争以及自1813年起对抗重组且日益强大的反法同盟的战役的重压下开始摇摇欲坠。反过来，这些压力和失败又打破了军事决策和措施与政治决策之间的平衡。
On the strategic level, Napoleon's tendency toward gigantism created two serious flaws beyond the basic defect of insufficient power: the command system that had functioned well in northern Italy and central Europe began to falter under the burden of the wars in Spain and Russia, and of the campaigns against the reconstituted and increasingly powerful coalition from 1813 on. In turn, these strains and defeats threw the relationship between military and political decisions and measures out of balance.
由于拿破仑不仅坚持一人统治，而且坚持一人指挥，他的参谋部核心部门始终只是一个收集他所需信息、传递报告和命令的机构。参谋部既没有制定战略计划，也没有建立起在战略和作战意图框架内独立决策的制度能力。只要军队（尽管分为军团）在同一大区域作战，这便不会造成太大危害；但随着军队规模的扩大以及被部署到相距遥远的战区，拿破仑的战略控制力开始崩溃。无论是在俄国，还是在1813年春秋两季的德国战役中，他的元帅们都无法根据不断变化的战局来解读他的命令。他绝不会容忍各个军区指挥部那种既独立又服从的特殊组合——这种组合或许能够成功地指挥数十万军队在广袤的战场上对抗强大的敌人。当然，即使是这样的体系，也会受到当时简陋的通讯手段的限制。拿破仑晚年庞大的军队以及他赋予军队的任务，使十九世纪初的技术能力达到了极限。
Because Napoleon insisted not only on one-man rule but also on one-man command, the operational core of his staff was never more than an organization for assembling information he required and for transmitting reports and orders. The staff neither generated strategic plans, nor developed an institutional capacity for independent decision making within the context of his strategic and operational intentions. As long as the army, though divided into corps, fought in the same general area this caused little harm; but as the size of the armies increased and as they were committed in widely separated theaters of war, Napoleon's strategic control broke down. Neither in Russia nor in the spring and fall campaigns of 1813 in Germany could his marshals be counted on to interpret his orders in accord with the constantly changing situation. He would never have tolerated the peculiar combination of independence and subordination on the part of separate army commands that might have successfully directed hundreds of thousands of troops against strong opposition over vast distances. Even such a system, to be sure, would have been handicapped by the crude means of communication of the time. The large armies of Napoleon's last years, and the missions he gave them, strained the technological capacity of the early nineteenth century to its limits.
随着他的胜利变得越来越不确定，军事和政治权力集中于他一人之手导致了灾难性的政策，而如果将责任分配给两个或多个人，或者至少设立能够被采纳的顾问，这些灾难或许可以避免。其他统治者，例如最近的腓特烈大帝，都曾掌握绝对权力，却并未导致国家衰败。但腓特烈虽然准备承担巨大的风险，却无法限制自己的野心。拿破仑入侵俄国完全是无稽之谈；充其量，这是一场孤注一掷且毫无必要的赌博，就像在俄军野战军尚未被歼灭的情况下仍决定进军莫斯科一样。在莫斯科坚守到十月中旬意味着牺牲整个大军，寄希望于亚历山大最终会进行谈判，但这希望最终是徒劳的。1813年夏天拒绝达成妥协和平协议，迫使法国在秋季以极其不利的形势展开战役。在更低的作战层面，为了维护萨克森联盟而在十月放弃德累斯顿，导致圣西尔军团无法参与莱比锡战役——当时莱比锡战役急需这支部队——而且最终也未能保住萨克森联盟。“政策在决定性战役之前就介入，结果一败涂地。”<sup> 12</sup> 1814年的战役通常被誉为拿破仑的杰作之一，但尽管其辉煌壮举，却是一场毫无意义的流血牺牲，因为这场战斗发生在政治真空之中。在盟军进入法国之前，尽管盟军的军事实力已达到盟军的两到三倍，拿破仑仍然放弃了进一步分化盟军、谈判达成可容忍和平的机会。在布吕歇尔即将抵达巴黎之际，沙蒂永谈判开始，但法国代表并未以当时形势所要求的紧迫感和决心推进谈判。整个战役展现的不是政治和军事指挥统一的辉煌，而是其带来的悲剧。毫不夸张地说，由于缺乏理性的政治目的，拿破仑在 1814 年前几个月的军事行动让人想起希特勒在伦德施泰特攻势失败后，在 1945 年春季绝望的形势下仍然坚持保卫西德的做法。
As his victories became more equivocal, the unity of military and political authority in his person led to disastrous policies, which a division of responsibilities among two or more individuals, or at least the existence of advisors who would be heard, might have avoided. Other rulers, most recently Frederick the Great, had assumed absolute authority without ruining the state. But Frederick, though prepared to take great risks, could limit his ambition. Napoleon's invasion of Russia went beyond the bounds of reason; at best it was a desperate and unnecessary gamble, as was the decision to advance on Moscow even though the Russian field army had not been destroyed. To stay in Moscow until the middle of October meant sacrificing the Grande Armée to the vain hope that Alexander would, after all, negotiate. The refusal to make a compromise peace in the summer of 1813 imposed on the French a fall campaign against very unfavorable odds. On a lower, operational level, not to give up Dresden in October for the sake of the Saxon alliance removed St. Cyr's corps from the battle of Leipzig where it was urgently needed, and failed to preserve the Saxon alliance anyway. “Policy intervened before the decisive battle, and lost all.”12 The campaign of 1814, generally extolled as one of Napoleon's masterpieces, was, while brilliant, a pointless bloodletting, because the fighting occurred in a political vacuum. Before the Allies crossed into France Napoleon had rejected a further chance to divide them politically and negotiate a tolerable peace, despite the fact that the military odds now favored the Allies by two or three to one. The talks at Châtillon, opened when Blücher was nearly halfway to Paris, were not pressed by the French representatives with the urgency and determination the situation seemed to demand. The entire campaign reveals not the grandeur but the misery of the unity of political and military command. It is not too much to say that in their absence of a rational political purpose, Napoleon's operations in the first months of 1814 are reminiscent of Hitler's insistence after Rundstedt's offensive had failed, to continue defending western Germany in the hopeless situation of spring 1945.
第四
IV
在拿破仑的最后几场战役之前，与法国国力保持一定合理联系的政治因素一直是其战略不可或缺的一部分。然而，同时代人以及后世对他的战争的分析几乎完全集中于其纯粹的军事层面。绝大多数研究过他战役的军人将其视为现代战争的巅峰之作；他们试图探寻这位皇帝战略思想和作战技巧的奥秘，与其说是为了理解他究竟做了什么，不如说是为了更好地应对未来的战争。他的统治和战争对欧洲的影响如此广泛而深远，以至于他晚年的一系列失败并未削弱他的地位。事实上，最终战胜他这一事实甚至可能促使他昔日的敌人更加坦然地承认他的伟大。一种以拿破仑为代表的传统或学派逐渐形成，强调兵力优势、深入的战略渗透以及在决定性地点迅速集中兵力。在18世纪90年代，这些概念和实践还很陌生；但在工业革命蓬勃发展的背景下，它们变得合情合理。
Until Napoleon's last campaigns, politics that stood in some reasonable relationship to French power were an integral part of his strategy, but the analyses of his wars by contemporaries and by the following generations focused almost entirely on their purely military aspects. The great majority of soldiers who studied his campaigns regarded them as the acme of modern war; they tried to discover the secrets of the emperor's strategic thought and operational technique, less to understand what he had done than to prepare themselves for future wars. The impact on Europe of his reign and his wars had been so broad and deep that the sequence of defeats in his last years did little to reduce his stature. The fact that in the end they had beaten him might even have helped his former enemies to acknowledge his greatness more freely. A Napoleonic tradition or school developed, which emphasized numerical strength, deep strategic penetration, and rapid concentration of force on the decisive point. In the 1790s these had still been alien concepts and practices; in the gathering industrial revolution they made sense.
在许多士兵的印象中，拿破仑作为大规模军事行动的代表，具有一种永恒的典范特质，其本质不受技术发展的影响。相反，铁路、电报和后膛步枪等创新似乎最终使这位皇帝最大胆的计划成为可能，而这些计划在构思之初或许超前于时代。同样，19世纪末蓬勃发展的民族主义最终为新兴的大规模军队提供了可靠的动力，而皇帝此前对这种动力的了解还只是雏形。
In the thinking of many soldiers, Napoleon as the exponent of mass and mobility assumed a timeless, paradigmatic quality, which in its essentials was not affected by technological development. On the contrary, it could appear that such innovations as railroads, the telegraph, or breechloading rifles at last made feasible the emperor's most daring projects, which at their conception might have been ahead of their time. In the same manner, the full-blown nationalism of the late nineteenth century at last provided the new mass armies with a reliable motivating force, which the emperor had known only in rudimentary form.
为了说明拿破仑战争对军事思想的影响之深远和持久，只需引用三部在第一次世界大战前夕出版的著作和一部战后成书的作品即可。1910年，一位在战争期间晋升至高级指挥岗位的德国上校出版了《拿破仑的统帅之道及其对我们时代的意义》一书，并在引言中宣称：“尽管拿破仑时代的许多事物如今已过时，但研究他的战争对我们仍然具有极其重要的价值，因为这些战争的经验教训构成了当今军事思想的基础。”<sup> 13</sup>两年后，德国总参谋部历史部门负责人指出，拿破仑在1813年秋季战役期间的命令和官方信函“即使在今天……仍然是理解各种军事活动的取之不尽的宝贵资料，也是十九世纪军事理论的基石之一。” 14这场战役最终以拿破仑的彻底失败告终，这使得弗里德里希将军的评价更加引人注目，尽管他的读者中恐怕很少有人对此感到惊讶。与此同时，在法国，让·科林在比较拿破仑的侧翼攻击与日俄战争中的类似行动时写道：“虽然我们无法完全复制拿破仑的实际行动，但我们仍然应该从中汲取灵感。”他接着说：“对于那些懂得不盲目模仿的人来说，拿破仑战争仍然能够提供值得借鉴的模式、值得思考的主题以及可以应用于二十世纪的理念。” 15
To indicate the strength and duration of the impact of Napoleonic war on military thought, it may suffice to quote from three works that appeared on the eve of the First World War, and from one that was written in its aftermath. In 1910 a German colonel who rose to senior command during the war published a book entitled Napoleon's Generalship and Its Significance for Our Time, declaring in the introduction that “while much from the Napoleonic Era is now outdated, the study of his wars remains of the greatest value to us, because the lessons of these wars form the basis of military thought today.”13 Two years later the head of the historical section of the German general staff stated that Napoleon's orders and official correspondence during the fall campaign of 1813 remain “even today…an inexhaustible source of insights into every kind of military activity, one of the foundations for the military theories of the nineteenth century.”14 That the campaign ended in an unmitigated disaster for Napoleon makes General Friederich's appraisal only more noteworthy, although it is most unlikely that many of his readers were surprised by it. In France at the same time, Jean Colin, in a comparison of Napoleonic flank attacks with similar operations in the Russo-Japanese War, wrote: “While we cannot copy Napoleon's actual maneuver, we should nevertheless be inspired by it.” He went on to say that “for those who know better than to copy forms slavishly, it will still be Napoleonic war that offers models to inspire, subjects to reflect on, ideas to be applied to the twentieth century.”15
第一次世界大战西线的僵局使得许多人对上述论断的字面解读显得荒谬；事实上，在1918年后的相互指责中，将双方指挥官对堑壕战现实的盲目归咎于对“拿破仑式”机动性的执着并不罕见。为了捍卫这一如今已成为经典的理念，法国总参谋部军官兼历史学家休伯特·卡蒙将军发表文章，重申拿破仑战略的持续有效性，并且——更重要的是——他坚持认为，该战略直接影响了战争中最成功的几场战役：“堑壕战直到德军最初的机动（即通过比利时入侵法国北部）被遏制后才占据主导地位，而这一机动正是受到拿破仑1812年早期战役的启发。如果说这一机动被挫败，并非因为1914年可用的手段使拿破仑式机动体系过时，而是因为其执行不力。”卡蒙继续指出，鲁登道夫在东线的作战行动是“拿破仑式的策略”。另一方面，如果说德军在俄国未能取得全面胜利，那是因为“法尔肯海因对拿破仑的作战模式不够熟悉，不相信这种策略能够成功”。鲁登道夫“1918年3月的攻势无疑受到了拿破仑1815年比利时战役初期阶段的启发”。最后，“如果我们从战略策略转向实战，就会发现马恩河战役是一场新拿破仑式的战役。法军唯一欠缺的就是最终的决战要素：大规模的溃败。” <sup>17</sup>
The stalemate on the western front during the First World War made a literal interpretation of this last assertion absurd to many; indeed, blaming a fixation on “Napoleonic” mobility for the blindness of commanders on both sides to the realities of trench warfare was not uncommon in the recriminations after 1918. In defense of the now classic ideal, the French general staff officer and historian General Hubert Camon published a reaffirmation of the continuing validity of Napoleonic strategy, and—what was more—insisted that it had directly influenced the most successful operations of the war: “Trench warfare did not become dominant until the initial German maneuver [the invasion of northern France through Belgium] had been checked, a maneuver that was inspired by Napoleon's initial operations in 1812. If this maneuver was blocked it was not that the means available in 1914 rendered the system of Napoleonic maneuver out of date, but because it was poorly executed.”16 Ludendorff's operations on the eastern front, Camon continues, were “Napoleonic maneuvers.” If, on the other hand, the Germans failed to gain total victory in Russia, it was because “Falkenhayn, insufficiently familiar with the Napoleonic pattern, did not believe in the possibility of its success.” Ludendorff's “offensive in March 1918 was undoubtedly inspired by the opening phase of Napoleon's campaign in Belgium in 1815.” Finally, “if we move from strategic maneuvers to battle, we recognize that the Battle of the Marne was a neo-Napoleonic battle. The only thing missing [on the French side] was the ultimate element: the masse de rupture.”17
这些以及许多其他类似作品都表明，滑铁卢战役一个世纪后，拿破仑在军事思想领域仍然具有影响力。但这种影响力究竟体现在哪些方面呢？正如引文所示，我们应该区分灵感和影响。灵感源于历史的启发性，它可以激发、强化和拓展我们对当下的思考。而影响，如果要说它有什么意义，就必须包含一定程度的具体性，在这种情况下，指的是拿破仑的战略与后世战略之间的联系。在战争领域，计划和决策受到诸多因素的影响，并且必须在一个不断变化、残酷无情的环境中考虑各种各样的因素，因此，要确凿地证明这种联系在五十年甚至一百年间的存在是困难的，或许是不可能的。回到卡蒙将军举的一个例子：毫无疑问，施利芬对拿破仑的某些战役进行了深入研究——例如，拿破仑1806年入侵德国中部，这或许可以被视为一个反向的施利芬计划；但他对汉尼拔的战争研究得更为深入，而要断言1914年德军的攻势受到了两千年前迦太基在普利亚的战役的影响，则需要一种异乎寻常的浪漫主义式的大胆。施利芬所做的——尽管他的大部分历史研究都出自退休之后，但这或许并不重要——是尽可能地让自己置身于另一个时代的士兵之中，并思考他们所面临的问题以及他们最终找到的解决方案。这些智力和心理上的练习或许使他与自己时代的战略问题和解决方案保持了一定的距离，甚至可能让他以一种略有不同的视角看待这些问题和解决方案：通过暂时沉浸于过去，他的思维或许能够发现当下新的可能性，或者为已有的观点找到佐证。但这与卡蒙将军所断言的——几乎是想当然地认为的——粗暴的因果关系以及战略模式的重复截然不同。
These and many other works of similar cast make it apparent that a century after Waterloo Napoleon remained a force in military thought. But what did this force actually consist of? As the quoted passages suggest, we should distinguish between inspiration and influence. Inspiration derives from the suggestive quality of the past, which may stimulate, strengthen, and extend our thinking about the present. Influence, on the other hand, if it is to mean anything at all, must connote a degree of specificity, in this case a link between Napoleon's strategy and the strategies of later generations. To demonstrate conclusively the existence of such connections over fifty or a hundred years would be difficult, probably impossible, in a field such as war, in which plans and decisions are fed by many sources, and must take account of the greatest variety of factors in a constantly changing, unforgiving context. To revert to one of General Camon's examples: undoubtedly Schlieffen studied certain Napoleonic campaigns in great detail—for example, Napoleon's invasion of central Germany in 1806, which might be called a Schlieffen plan in reverse; but he studied Hannibal's wars even more closely, and it would require a peculiarly romantic boldness to hold that the German offensive in 1914 was influenced by Carthaginian operations in Apulia some two thousand years earlier. What Schlieffen did—and it may not even be relevant that most of his historical studies date from the years after he retired—was to put himself as best he could in the position of soldiers of another age, and to work through the problems they faced and the solutions they reached. These intellectual and psychological exercises probably afforded him some distance from the strategic problems and solutions of his own time, which he might even have come to see in a somewhat different perspective: by being for a time diverted to the past, his mind might have recognized new possibilities in the present, or found confirmation for ideas already held. But that is very different from the crude cause and effect, and the repetition of strategic patterns, asserted—almost taken for granted—by General Camon.
事实上，即使是最极端的影响力论断，如果认真探究，几乎总是会发现其本质远没有那么具体：即拿破仑在战争中发现了某些永恒的价值，并通过他的战役和著作将其传递给了现代士兵。人们将拿破仑视为永恒真理的灵感诠释者，他以格外清晰的方式向我们传达了其他人也可能拥有的洞见和理解。在十九世纪，甚至到了1914年，这种信念之所以能够被接受，是因为拿破仑时代仍然保留着某种时代感；与腓特烈或古斯塔夫·阿道夫相比，拿破仑站在了当时人们眼中现代的开端。然而，对于我们今天而言，他生活和战斗的环境与十七、十八世纪一样遥远。但即便如此，只有当我们以最普遍的方式解读那些永恒真理时，这种对拿破仑的看法才算合理：集中兵力（通常情况下）是可取的，节约资源的优势，士气的重要性——这些大多是常识性的观察，在拿破仑时代及其后时代被转化为各种各样的清单，被称为“战争原则”。在实践中，这些原则常常相互冲突，并且随着形势的变化而呈现出新的、有时甚至令人意想不到的形式。
Actually, even the most extreme claims of influence, when seriously pursued, almost always reveal themselves to be something far less specific: the claim that Napoleon had uncovered certain permanent values in war, which his campaigns and writings transmitted to the modern soldier. Napoleon is seen as the inspired interpreter of eternal verities, conveying to us in especially clear form insights and understandings that other men might also have had. In the nineteenth century, and even in 1914, this belief could be facilitated by a certain contemporaneity the Napoleonic Era still possessed; compared to Frederick or Gustavus Adolphus, Napoleon stood at the beginning of what men then regarded to be the modern age. To our own day, the conditions in which he lived and fought are as remote as those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But even this view of Napoleon is justified only if we interpret the timeless verities in the most general sense: the desirability (usually) of the concentration of force, the advantage of economy of effort, the importance of morale—largely common-sense observations, which the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic Age turned into varying checklists, called “principles of war.” In practice these principles often clash, and with changing circumstances tend to assume new, sometimes very surprising forms.
每个时代都有其自身的战略。1806年、1870年和1914年的战略都是各自时代的产物，它们固然会关注历史，但主要还是试图在不同程度上利用并应对当时的经济、社会、技术和政治条件。通常情况下——例如第一次世界大战的某些重要阶段——战略会滞后于当时的现实。相比之下，拿破仑制定的战略与他所处的时代机遇相契合，并在几年内成功地充分利用了这些机遇。随着他所理解和掌握的条件开始发生变化，有时甚至是由于他自身的行动而发生变化，他的战略理念也必须随之改变或过时。真正引人关注的并非他对后世战略和作战思想产生的难以捉摸的影响，而是19世纪及以后众多军人深信这种影响。拿破仑真正的影响或许在于其他方面。他对大规模武力积累和运用的信任，他对绝对胜利的坚持，他对为有限目标而发动的有限战争的摒弃——这些理念和政策似乎为当时正在西方世界迅速兴起的某些观念增添了一定的历史权威性和佐证。这或许是他被誉为现代战争大师的一个未被充分认可的原因。但这仅仅是推测。
Each age has its own strategy. The strategies of 1806, of 1870, of 1914 were the products of their own times, certainly paying some attention to history, but primarily attempting with varying degrees of success to use and respond to the economic, social, technological, and political conditions of their day. Often—as in significant phases of the First World War—a strategy lags behind contemporary reality. Napoleon, by contrast, developed strategies that were attuned to the possibilities of his age, and for some years succeeded in exploiting them fully. As the conditions that he understood and had mastered began to change, sometimes in response to his own actions, his strategic concepts, too, had to change or become outdated. It is not so much the elusive influence he exerted on the strategic and operational thought of later generations that is of real interest, as the fact that so many soldiers throughout the nineteenth century and later believed in this influence. Napoleon's true impact may be elsewhere. His trust in the massive accumulation and use of force, his insistence on absolute victory, his rejection of limited wars for limited goals—these ideas and policies seem to have added a measure of historical authority and confirmation to attitudes that were in any case rapidly emerging throughout the Western world. Here may be an unacknowledged reason for the claims that he is the master of modern war. But these are speculations.
可以确定的并非拿破仑对后世的影响，而是他一生中所取得的成就和未能取得的成就。作为一名在旧制度下幸存并在革命中崛起的军人，他的教育和经历体现了战争中的革命，融合了创新与延续。他比其他人更准确地认识到正在发生的变革所蕴含的军事潜力，并将它们整合为一个无与伦比的破坏力体系。他一度凌驾于历史之上，塑造并推动着历史的进程，直到晚年，他又回归到历史发展的洪流中，以及西方文明走向战争进一步扩张的长期趋势之中。
What can be determined with certainty is not the impact Napoleon might have had on later generations, but what he achieved and failed to achieve in his lifetime. As a soldier of the Old Regime who survived and rose in the Revolution, he reflects in his education and experience the revolution in war, with its mixture of innovation and continuity. More accurately than others he recognized the military potential of the changes taking place, and brought them together into a system of unexcelled destructive power. For a time he rose above events, shaping and driving them forward, until in his later years he sank back again into the stream of general historical development and the long-range tendencies of Western civilization toward the further expansion of war.
1卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特译注，修订版（普林斯顿，1984 年），第 6 卷，第 30 章，第 518 页。
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans, and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1984), bk. 6, ch. 30, p. 518.
2 拿破仑一世书信集（巴黎 1857–70 年），第 12 卷，第 9944 号，致约瑟夫·波拿巴，1806 年 3 月 8 日。“战争滋养（或‘必须滋养’）战争”这一表述在法国大革命期间经常使用，也可以在拿破仑的著作中找到；例如，《意大利军队备忘录》（1795 年 7 月），书信集，第 1 卷，第 49 号。
2 Correspondance de Napoléon Ier (Paris 1857–70), vol. 12, no 9944, to Joseph Bonaparte, March 8, 1806. The formulation “war feeds [or ‘must feed’] war,” used frequently during the Revolution, can also be found in Napoleon's writings; for instance, “Mémoire sur l'armée d'ltalie” (July 1795), Correspondance, vol. 1, no. 49.
3克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，第 8 卷，第 3B 章，第 592 页。
3 Clausewitz, On War, bk. 8, ch. 3B, p. 592.
4在《圣赫勒拿岛》一书中，拿破仑批评了一位法国将军在 1799 年瑞士战役中的行为，他谴责分散兵力是一种恶劣的习惯，使取得重要战果成为不可能。他补充道：“但当时的风气就是如此：总是以小股部队作战”（查尔斯·特里斯坦·德·蒙托隆，《拿破仑皇帝被俘记》 [巴黎，1847 年]，第 2 卷，第 432-33 页）。
4 On St. Helena, criticizing the actions of a French general during the 1799 campaign in Switzerland, Napoleon condemned the dispersal of forces as a vicious habit that made it impossible to achieve important results. He added, “But that was the fashion in those days: always [fight] in little packets” (Charles Tristan de Montholon, Récits de la captivité de l'empereur Napoléon [Paris, 1847], 2:432–33).
5 Jean Colin，《战争的转型》，LHR Pope-Hennessy 译（伦敦，1912 年），第 253、290 页。由于原英文译文生硬且不准确，我重新翻译了引用的段落。
5 Jean Colin, The Transformations of War, trans. L. H. R. Pope-Hennessy (London, 1912) 253, 290. I have retranslated the quoted passages, since the original English version is both stilted and inexact.
6 “圣海伦的作品，1799 年六位首演的事件”，《通讯》，30:263。另见同上，289。
6 “Oeuvres de Sainte-Hélène, Événements des six premiers mois de 1799,” Correspondance, 30:263. See also ibid., 289.
7汉斯·德尔布吕克，《战争史》，新版。 （柏林，1962 年），4：494。
7 Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, new ed. (Berlin, 1962), 4:494.
8 通讯，卷。 1、没有。 421，致卡诺，1796 年 5 月 14 日； “Oeuvres de Sainte-Hélène，Campagnes d'Italie”，同上，29:107。
8 Correspondance, vol. 1, no. 421, to Carnot, May 14, 1796; “Oeuvres de Sainte-Hélène, Campagnes d'Italie,” ibid., 29:107.
9拿破仑对战争和机械的比较见于“Notes sur la défense de l'Italie”（1809 年 1 月 14 日），同上，第 1 卷。 28、没有。 14707.
9 Napoleon's comparison of war and mechanics occurs in “Notes sur la défense de l'Italie” (January 14, 1809), ibid., vol. 28, no. 14707.
10卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨 (Carl von Clausewitz)， 1796 年意大利《Hinterlassene Werke》中的)，10 卷。 （柏林，1832-37），4:15。
10 Carl von Clausewitz, Der Feldzug von 1796 in Italien in Hinterlassene Werke, 10 vols. (Berlin 1832–37), 4:15.
11关于感知问题，请参阅作者的《战争中的革命：早期一代的诠释者》，载于《国家安全与国际稳定》 ，伯纳德·布罗迪、迈克尔·D·英特利加托和罗曼·科尔科维茨编（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1983 年）；以及《拿破仑作为敌人》，载于《第十三届革命欧洲联盟会议论文集》，克拉伦斯·B·戴维斯编（佐治亚州雅典，1985 年）。
11 On the problem of perception, see this author's “Revolutions in Warfare: An Earlier Generation of Interpreters,” in National Security and International Stability, ed. Bernard Brodie, Michael D. Intnligator, and Roman Kolkowicz (Cambridge, Mass., 1983); and “Napoleon as Enemy,” Proceedings of the Thirteenth Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, ed. Clarence B. Davis (Athens, Ga., 1985).
12科林，《战争的转型》，264。
12 Colin, Transformations of War, 264.
13 Hugo von Freytag-Lormghoven, Die Heerführuttg Napoleons in ihrer Bedeutung für unsere Zett (柏林，1910)，v. 该书献给施利芬，“根据拿破仑和毛奇进行的战争的赞助人”。
13 Hugo von Freytag-Lormghoven, Die Heerführuttg Napoleons in ihrer Bedeutung für unsere Zett (Berlin, 1910), v. The work was dedicated to Schlieffen, “the patron of warfare conducted according to Napoleon and Moltke.”
14鲁道夫·弗里德里希， 《1813-1815 年战争战争》（柏林，1911-13），2:413。
14 Rudolf Friederich, Die Befreiungskriege 1813–1815 (Berlin, 1911–13), 2:413.
15科隆， 《战争的转型》，167、226。
15 Coln, Transformations of War, 167, 226.
16休伯特·卡蒙，《拿破仑战争体系》（巴黎，1923 年），第 1-2 页。卡蒙关于拿破仑战争的众多研究在第一次世界大战前后都广为流传。
16 Hubert Camon, Le système de guerre de Napoléon (Paris, 1923), 1–2. Camon's numerous studies on Napoleonic warfare were widely read both before and after the First World War.
17同上，第 3 页。
17 Ibid., 3.
6. 约米尼*
6. Jomini*
T在现代军事思想的形成时期，有三个名字格外引人注目：拿破仑、克劳塞维茨和若米尼。拿破仑和克劳塞维茨的名字即使是对历史一无所知的人也耳熟能详，但若米尼却鲜为军事专家所熟知，尽管他对军事理论和大众战争观念的影响都极其巨大。至今为止，还没有哪部专著深入研究他的思想及其影响，也没有哪部传记是基于他未发表的论文撰写的，能够将他从逐渐被遗忘的境地中拯救出来。<sup> 1</sup>他的巨大影响力与我们对此普遍缺乏了解之间的巨大反差，正是理解自法国大革命以来他在西方历史上的重要地位的关键之一。<sup> 2</sup>
THREE NAMES stand out in the formative period of modern military thought: Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini. Napoleon and Clausewitz are names known even to those ignorant of history, but Jomini is familiar only to military specialists, although his influence on both military theory and popular conceptions of warfare has been enormous. No book-length study of his ideas and their influence, no adequate biography based on his unpublished papers, has rescued him from the obscurity into which his reputation has slowly sunk.1 The great disparity between his influence and our general unawareness of it is one key to understanding his important place in Western history since the French Revolution.2
与同时代的拿破仑和克劳塞维茨一样，安托万-亨利·若米尼也是1789年席卷法国乃至整个西方世界的伟大革命的产物。他出生于1779年，是瑞士人。十九岁时，他显然——尽管不情愿——注定要从事银行或商业工作。但从十岁起，他就对法国大革命的消息感到兴奋不已。十七岁时，他在法国边境的巴塞尔当银行学徒，近距离目睹了法军。接下来的两年里，在巴黎，他亲眼见证了果月政变，并研读了来自意大利的关于波拿巴将军辉煌军事胜利的报道。1798年，在法国军事干预下，瑞士爆发了革命，年轻的若米尼放弃了原本可能辉煌的银行事业，将接下来的七十年生命奉献给了战争及其研究。
Like his contemporaries Napoleon and Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini was a product of the great Revolution that shook France and the whole Western world from 1789 on. He was Swiss, born in 1779. At nineteen he was clearly—if reluctantly—headed for a career in banking or commerce. But from the age of ten he had been excited by news of the French Revolution. As a banker's apprentice of seventeen in Basel, on the French frontier, he had seen French troops at close range. During the next two years, in Paris, he had witnessed the coup d'état of Fructidor and had studied reports from Italy of General Bonaparte's spectacular military victories. Then, in 1798, the Swiss had their own revolution, assisted by French military intervention, and young Jomini gave up what might have been a brilliant career in banking to devote the next seventy years of his life to war and its study.
在1789年至1815年的大动荡中，战争与革命紧密相连；法国大革命的性质深刻地影响了其后继者拿破仑战争。然而，若米尼毕生致力于将深受拿破仑经验影响的西方战争理论与其实际历史情境割裂开来，这项工作始于他十几岁时。他以“科学化”战争为名，将战争研究简化为对“战略”的关注——一套用于军事分析和规划的规范性技术，至今仍主导着该领域的思考。他通过有效地切断拿破仑与法国大革命之间显而易见的联系来实现这一点。若米尼的许多具体观点——例如关于“内部战线”的理论——如今仅具有历史意义，但他对战争问题的总体处理方法却出人意料地经久不衰。这种方法将战争从其政治和社会背景中抽象出来，强调决策规则和作战结果，将战争视为一场大型的国际象棋博弈。约米尼比克劳塞维茨更配得上“现代战略之父”这个略带争议的称号。
War and revolution were closely connected in the great upheaval of 1789–1815; the nature of the French Revolution powerfully shaped its Napoleonic sequel. But it would be Jomini's life work, begun when still in his teens, to divorce Western theories of warfare, so strongly shaped by the Napoleonic experience, from the actual historical situations in which those theories operate. In the name of making warfare “scientific,” he reduced its study to a preoccupation with “strategy”—a set of prescriptive techniques for military analysis and planning that has continued to dominate thinking on the subject, and he did it by effectively breaking the obvious link between Napoleon and the French Revolution. Many of Jomini's specific ideas—on “interior lines” of operation, for example—are now of only historical interest, but his general approach to the problem of war, abstracting it from its political and social context, emphasizing decision-making rules and operational results, turning warfare into a huge game of chess, has been surprisingly durable. Jomini, more than Clausewitz, deserves the dubious title of founder of modern strategy.
历史学家普遍认为，1790年代后期法国革命军队对抗欧洲大部分地区盟军的显著胜利，依赖于法国社会同样惊人的动员。1789年以后，法国南部和西部大片地区的王室、大多数贵族和教会人士以及许多普通民众对革命的抵制日益加剧，他们试图争取外国支持以发动反革命。到1792年，战争全面爆发。在革命领导人看来，战争很快演变成一场为生存而进行的殊死搏斗，他们的抗战几乎不可避免地导致了君主制的覆灭、王室成员的处决以及针对“内部敌人”的恐怖统治。战争也带来了军事混乱。整个军团叛逃到敌军，许多王室军官——由于出身贵族，因此被怀疑叛国——被迫流亡。巴黎方面不断号召志愿者保卫革命，虽然部分人响应，但协约国的攻势仍在继续，革命最终转向征兵制。3 1793年8月著名的全民征兵运动只不过是将这一早已开始的趋势戏剧化地呈现出来而已：
Historians are in general agreement that the remarkable success of Revolutionary armies against the allied forces of much of the rest of Europe during the later 1790s depended on the equally remarkable mobilization of French society. Growing resistance to the Revolution after 1789 by the royal court, by most aristocrats and churchmen, and by many ordinary people in large areas of southern and western France brought with it efforts to gain foreign support for a counterrevolution. By 1792 there was open war. In the eyes of the Revolutionary leadership, war soon became a desperate, ideological struggle for survival, and their efforts to fight it almost inevitably led to the overthrow of the monarchy, the execution of the royal family, and the Reign of Terror against “internal enemies.” War also brought military chaos. Entire regiments defected to the enemy and many royal officers—nobles and therefore suspected of treason—emigrated. Successive calls from Paris for volunteers to defend the Revolution were partially obeyed, but the Allied advance continued and the Revolution turned to conscription.3 The famous levée en masse of August 1793 simply dramatized a move already well under way:
从现在起，直到我们的敌人被驱逐出共和国领土，所有法国人都将被永久征召服兵役。
From this moment until our enemies have been driven from the territory of the Republic, all Frenchmen are permanently requisitioned for military service.
青年男子将奔赴战场；已婚男子将锻造武器、运送军需品；妇女将制作帐篷和衣物；儿童将用旧亚麻布制作绷带；老人们将被带到广场上，鼓舞士兵的士气，同时宣扬共和国的团结和对君主的憎恨。4
Young men will go forth to battle; married men will forge weapons and transport munitions; women will make tents and clothing; children will make bandages from old linen; and old men will be brought to the public squares to arouse the courage of the soldiers, while preaching the unity of the Republic and hatred against kings.4
当然，并非所有法国人都拿起武器，但在一年之内，超过一百万人的法国军队（在约两千五百万人口中）——一支规模空前的武装力量——就阻止了反革命联盟，并转而采取了进攻行动。
Not all Frenchmen sprang to arms, of course, but within a year French armies of more than a million men (in a population of about twenty-five million), an armed force of unprecedented size, had stopped the counter-Revolutionary coalition and had gone over to the offensive.
在这支庞大的临时组建的军事力量中，也存在着以拉扎尔·卡诺、亚历山大·贝尔蒂埃和拿破仑·波拿巴为代表的坚实的军事专业化核心——这是旧制度的军事遗产。历史学家们至今仍对这一专业遗产对法国生存和最终胜利的相对重要性，以及新革命军队的规模和士气究竟有多大存在争议。旧军队中的大多数初级军官和士官以及许多普通士兵都加入了革命；来自“技术”部队——工兵和炮兵——的支持尤为重要。但只有兵力的大幅增长和士气的显著提升（这两者都是革命带来的成果）才能完全解释其惊人的军事成就。5无可争议的是，法国在战争中取得了突破性进展；法国将领们大胆而日益精湛地运用新组建的军队，屡次击败敌人，使其士气低落。从 1794 年开始，在少年若米尼寻求职业的那些年里，法国军队击溃了反法联盟，开始改变欧洲的政治结构，并将他们自己的领导人之一——拿破仑·波拿巴——推上了法国的最高权力宝座。
Within this gigantic mass of improvised military power, there was also a solid core of military professionalism represented by men like Lazare Carnot, Alexander Berthier, and Napoleon Bonaparte—the military legacy of the Old Regime. Historians still disagree about the relative importance to French survival and eventual victory of this professional legacy on the one hand, and about the sheer size and enthusiasm of the new Revolutionary army on the other. From the old army most junior and noncommissioned officers joined the Revolution, as did much of the rank and file; support from the “technical” arms—engineers and artillery—was especially important. But only a great rise in numbers and new levels of motivation, both results of the Revolution, can fully explain the amazing military results.5 What is not disputed is that the French achieved a breakthrough in warfare; using their new forces with daring and increasing skill, French generals repeatedly left their enemies beaten and demoralized. From 1794 on, in the years when the adolescent Jomini was seeking a career, French armies shattered the anti-French coalition, began to transform the political structure of Europe, and brought to supreme power in France itself one of their own leaders—Napoleon Bonaparte.
他们是如何做到的？若米尼最大的成就便是能够令人信服且极具影响力地解答这个问题。法国大革命和拿破仑战争为他提供了大量乐于接受的、清晰简洁且令人安心的解释。若米尼的解答表面上借助了“科学”的威望，但其对永恒真理的执着追求却近乎宗教般的虔诚，似乎驱散了法国军事胜利带来的困惑和恐惧。滑铁卢战役之后，拿破仑战败，革命的军事力量遭受重创，他的解答更显其说服力，并得到了不言自明的历史结果的印证。几十年来，他解答的基本前提几乎没有改变；他声称自己在十八岁时就领悟到了这一点，直到九十岁高龄去世，他仍然坚持这些基本理念的正确性，而这些理念最初于1803年提出。
How had they done it? Answering this question, persuasively and influentially, would be Jomini's great achievement. The wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon generated a vast, receptive audience for the kind of clear, simple, reassuring explanation that he would offer. Drawing overtly on the prestige of “science” and yet almost religious in its insistent evangelical appeal to timeless verities, Jomini's answer to this troubling question seemed to dispel the confusion and allay much of the fear created by French military victories. After Waterloo, Napoleon defeated and the military power of the Revolution humbled, his answer was all the more persuasive, confirmed by the self-evident historical outcome. And the underlying premise of his answer changed little through the decades; he claimed that it had come to him when he was eighteen, and he died at ninety insisting on the validity of the same basic ideas, first set down in 1803:
这种战略是战争的关键；
That strategy is the key to warfare;
所有战略都受不变的科学原理控制；
That all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and
这些原则规定，如果战略要取得胜利，就必须在某个决定性时刻，以大量兵力对较弱的敌军采取进攻行动。6
That these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory.6
因此，约米尼的答案是，在近二十年的时间里，拿破仑和法国人比他们的对手更好地理解和运用了这些原则。这便是约米尼战争理论的核心。为了理解这些看似简单的理念的深远影响，我们可以从考察它们的形成和传播方式入手。
Jomini's answer, then, was that for almost two decades Napoleon and the French had grasped and applied these principles better than had their opponents. This was the core of Jomini's theory of warfare. To understand the ramifications and influence of these deceptively simple ideas, we can begin by examining how they were formulated and promulgated.
我
I
约米尼家族是瑞士的一个古老家族，通过联姻与其他古老家族紧密相连，在日内瓦和伯尔尼之间的沃州帕耶讷镇这个小镇举足轻重。沃州是法语区，但在1798年之前，它在宪法上隶属于德语区的伯尔尼州。伯尔尼州曾在14世纪领导了沃州摆脱勃艮第统治的“解放”运动。1790年代，沃州亲法倾向不难理解，但同时也支持革命，渴望结束与伯尔尼的“封建”关系。约米尼的父亲本杰明，如同他的祖父一样，曾担任帕耶讷镇的镇长。在1798年的瑞士革命中，本杰明·约米尼当选为沃州议会的议员，后来又在新成立的瑞士共和国大议会中任职。但约米尼的外祖父与伯尔尼有着重要的经济联系，他强烈反对瑞士的“爱国运动”。尽管家族中的这种政治分歧预示了约米尼日后的人生走向，但他本人在1798年却是一位热忱的革命者。在巴黎，他与流亡的瑞士激进分子交往密切，尤其是拉哈普。当瑞士革命的消息传来时，他立即赶回国，希望在新政权中谋得一职。他担任瑞士陆军部长秘书约三年，晋升为上尉，后又升任营长，经历了数次政治政变，并于1802年返回巴黎，想必是为了寻求更广阔的发展空间，以发挥自己的才能和抱负。
The Jominis were an old Swiss family, closely tied by marriage to other old families, important people in a small place: the town of Payerne in the pays of Vaud, between Geneva and Berne.7 The Vaud is French-speaking, but before 1798 it was constitutionally subordinated to the German-speaking canton of Berne, which had led the fourteenth-century “liberation” of the Vaud from Burgundian rule. During the 1790s the Vaud was understandably pro-French, but it was also for the Revolution in its desire to end its “feudal” relationship with Berne. Jomini's father, Benjamin, like his father before him, had served as mayor of Payerne. In the Swiss Revolution of 1798 Benjamin Jomini became a deputy in the provincial assembly of the Vaud, and later served on the Grand Council of the new Helvetian Republic. But Jomini's maternal grandfather, who had important financial ties to Berne, strongly opposed the Swiss “patriot movement.” Although this political split in the family foreshadows later aspects of Jomini's life, in 1798 he himself was an eager revolutionary. In Paris he associated with émigré Swiss radicals, notably LaHarpe, and when news arrived of the Swiss Revolution he hurried home to find employment in the new regime. For about three years he served as secretary to the Swiss minister of war, acquired the military rank of captain and later chef de bataillon, survived several political coups, and in 1802 returned to Paris, presumably to seek wider scope for his talent and ambition.
现存的早期史料展现出一种极度紧张的政治氛围，以及年轻人对革命的狂热，这与司汤达在其自传中描述的颇为相似；亨利·“布鲁拉尔”在格勒诺布尔时也怀有同样的少年恐惧，害怕在他逃离省监狱之前，“世界黄金时刻”就会逝去。晚年，若米尼以自己的方式回忆了这段往事。他声称，尽管当时年纪尚轻，但他却是最早在1798年签署拉哈普致法国督政府请愿书的人之一，该请愿书呼吁法国保障沃州人民免受伯尔尼人的压迫。但事实上，请愿书上并没有他的签名。此外，若米尼似乎忘记了，正是由于他向军需品供应商索要贿赂以偿还其在伯尔尼的赌债而引发的丑闻，他才辞去了瑞士国防部的职务，返回巴黎。但他无法掩盖自己于1804年向拿破仑请愿，要求法国直接吞并瑞士的举动。愤怒的瑞士政府要求驱逐约米尼——他被描述为“流氓”和“臭名昭著的雅各宾派”。法国外交部长塔列朗却无动于衷——或许是因为年仅25岁的约米尼已被认为是一个狡猾而狂妄的人，并且受到了第六军军长内伊将军的庇护。
The surviving evidence for these early years evokes a superheated political atmosphere and a youthful intoxication with revolutionary excitement not unlike that described by Stendhal in his autobiography; there is the same boyish fear felt by Henry “Brulard” in Grenoble that a “golden moment in the great world” will have passed before he can escape his provincial prison.8 Late in life, Jomini would remember the story his own way. He claimed to have been one of the first, despite his youth, to have signed LaHarpe's petition in 1798 to the French Directory, which called for a French guarantee of the rights of the Vaud against Bernese oppression. In fact his signature is not on the petition. Again, Jomini seems to have forgotten that it was in the aftermath of scandal, arising from his request for a bribe from a military supplier to pay his gambling debts in Berne, that he resigned from the Swiss war ministry and returned to Paris. But he could not conceal his petition in 1804 to Napoleon for outright French annexation of Switzerland. A furious Swiss government demanded the expulsion of Jomini—described as a “rogue” and a “notorious Jacobin.” Talleyrand, the French foreign minister, did nothing—perhaps because Jomini, at twenty-five already reputed to be a slippery and presumptuous character, had been taken under the protective wing of General Ney, commander of the Sixth Corps.9
1803年，内伊资助出版了若米尼的第一本书。内伊很快就以“勇者中的勇者”之名闻名遐迩，但他并非一个书生气十足的军人。1802年反法起义期间，他曾担任法国驻瑞士总督，当时沃州坚定地支持法国。正是这段瑞士渊源，让这位才华横溢、勤奋努力、雄心勃勃的年轻人引起了内伊的注意。若米尼回忆说，正是1796年至1797年间，拿破仑将军率领的法军在意大利的战绩，使他成为了一名军事理论家。在短短一年内，拿破仑迫使皮埃蒙特媾和，将奥地利人逐出波河谷，挟持意大利其他地区，击退了奥地利的四次大规模反攻，最终攻克了维也纳山口。在这种情况下，没有理由质疑若米尼的记忆，因为在1803年之前的五六年里，他不知何故抽出时间阅读和撰写了大量关于战争的书籍。他不仅痴迷于军事荣耀的幻想，渴望效仿比他年长十岁的拿破仑的惊人崛起，而且正如若米尼回忆的那样，他当时就深受“原则之感”（le sentiment des principes）的驱使——这是一种柏拉图式的信念，认为现实隐藏在历史瞬间表面的混乱之下，存在着永恒不变的原则，例如引力和概率。<sup> 10</sup>正是为了把握这些原则，以及满足更原始的情感需求——雄心壮志和年轻人的急躁——驱使他投身于战争研究。他如饥似渴地阅读军事史，并从中推导出理论，最终揭示了法国胜利的秘密。
In 1803 Ney subsidized publication of Jomini's first book. Soon to be legendary as “the bravest of the brave,” Ney was hardly a bookish soldier, but he had been French viceroy in Switzerland during the anti-French uprising of 1802, when the Vaud had solidly supported France, and it was this Swiss connection that brought the bright, diligent, ambitious young man to Ney's attention. Jomini remembered that it was the exploits of the French Army of Italy under General Bonaparte in 1796–1797 that had made him a military theorist. In a single year, Bonaparte had forced Piedmont to make peace, driven the Austrians out of the Po Valley, held the rest of Italy to ransom, defeated four massive Austrian counteroffensives, and ended by advancing through the mountain passes on Vienna itself. In this case, there is no reason to question Jomini's memory, because somehow in the five or six years before 1803 he had found time to read and write a great deal about war. Not only was he obsessed by visions of military glory, with himself imitating the incredible rise of Bonaparte who was only ten years his senior, but in a telling phrase Jomini remembered being possessed, even then, by “le sentiment des principes”—the Platonic faith that reality lies beneath the superficial chaos of the historical moment in enduring and invariable principles, like those of gravitation and probability.10 To grasp those principles, as well as to satisfy the more primitive emotional needs of ambition and youthful impatience, was what impelled him to the study of war. Voracious reading of military history and theorizing from it would reveal the secret of French victory.
据约米尼所述，他最大的思想启迪者是亨利·劳埃德将军。<sup> 11 </sup> 劳埃德是威尔士人，曾卷入1745年的叛乱，逃离英国，在欧洲大陆的几支军队服役，最终在1783年去世前与英国政府媾和。他很可能是一名英国间谍或双重间谍。七年战争期间，他曾在奥地利军队担任要职，并著有包括七年战争德国战役史在内的多部作品。他对腓特烈二世作为战略家的批评引起了广泛关注，他于1781年出版的所谓《军事回忆录》也同样如此，该书系统地探讨了战争及其基本原则。<sup> 12</sup>这些回忆录于1798年被翻译成法文并在巴塞尔再版。几乎可以肯定的是，正是这种版本给年轻的约米尼留下了深刻的印象。劳埃德为这位年轻人提供了一个榜样，同时也提出了挑战，他试图将十八世纪末战争的奇幻世界简化为某种理性的秩序。
According to Jomini, he owed his greatest intellectual debt to General Henry Lloyd.11 A Welshman, Lloyd had been implicated in the 1745 Rebellion, fled England, and served in several armies on the Continent before making peace with the British government sometime before his death in 1783. He may, indeed, have been a British spy or a double agent. He held an important field command in the Austrian army during the Seven Years' War and he wrote, among other works, a history of the German campaigns of that war. His criticism of Frederick II as a strategist excited considerable interest, as did his so-called Military Memoirs, published in 1781, in which he offered a systematic discussion of warfare and its underlying principles.12 These memoirs were translated into French and republished in Basel in 1798. Almost certainly it was in this form that they made their strong impression on the young Jomini. Lloyd provided both a model and a challenge in the young man's efforts to reduce the fantastic world of war at the end of the eighteenth century to some kind of intellectual order.
战争艺术建立在“某些确定且固定的原则之上，这些原则本质上是不变的……” ¹³这句话出自劳埃德之口，但类似的话也曾被约米尼及其弟子反复提及。当我们翻阅劳埃德的著作，试图探究这些“不变的原则”的具体内容时，却发现寥寥无几。一切似乎都归结为一点：只有一支未分兵的军队，沿着一条尽可能短且安全的单一作战线行进，才能避免战败。当然，只有当敌人鲁莽地分散兵力，并将其部署在一条漫长而脆弱的战线上时，劳埃德才能取得胜利。劳埃德在探寻战争原则的过程中，对法国大革命前欧洲战争中普遍存在的谨慎、防御型的机动战略进行了合理化——几乎是一种戏仿。约米尼在劳埃德的著作中找到了他自己尚不成熟的“战争科学”理念的清晰表达，但他却几乎找不到任何解释，说明意大利军团如何在漫长而脆弱的战线上，不仅取得胜利，而且打破了欧洲的军事平衡。劳埃德对启蒙运动的吸引力显而易见；他的战争科学，如果被所有人理解和遵循，将使战争几乎不可能，甚至有望终结战争。但更难理解的是，劳埃德的理论如何能为革命和军事革新的时代带来任何启示。拿破仑本人阅读并批注了劳埃德的著作；他的批注值得引用：“无知……无知……荒谬……荒谬……不可能……错误……糟糕……非常糟糕……多么荒谬……多么荒谬！”<sup> 14</sup>然而，正是在劳埃德所构建的知识框架下，约米尼或多或少地重塑了拿破仑的军事传奇。
The art of war is founded on “certain and fixed principles, which are by their nature invariable….”13 The words are Lloyd's, but words like them were repeated again and again by Jomini and his disciples. When we turn to Lloyd's books for the specific content of these “invariable principles,” there is surprisingly little. It all seems to come down to a single point: only an undivided army, moving on a single line of operations kept as short and safe as possible, can hope to avoid defeat. It can win, of course, only if the enemy is rash enough to divide his forces and extend them on a long and vulnerable line. Lloyd, in his search for principles, produced a rationalization—almost a parody—of the cautious, defensive-minded maneuver strategy that characterized much of European warfare before the French Revolution. Jomini found in Lloyd the clear expression of his own still inchoate “ideal” of war as a science, but he could have found little or nothing to explain how the Army of Italy, at the end of a long and vulnerable line of operations, had not only won victories but had upset the military balance of Europe. Lloyd's appeal to the Enlightenment is easy to see; his science of war, if understood and observed by all, made battle virtually impossible and even promised an end to war. But it is more difficult to see how Lloyd could offer anything to an age of revolution and dramatic military innovation. Napoleon himself read and annotated Lloyd; his marginalia deserve to be quoted: “Ignorance…Ignorance…Absurd…Absurd…Impossible…False…Bad…Very Bad…How absurd…What absurdity!”14 And yet it was in the intellectual mold created by Lloyd that Jomini would recast, more or less definitively, the military legend of Napoleon.
这里存在一个明显的矛盾：若米尼钦佩劳埃德作为军事评论家和理论家的贡献，并以劳埃德为范本研究革命战争和拿破仑战争；但拿破仑显然认为劳埃德的理论荒谬可笑，事实上，劳埃德对七年战争的批判性研究中没有任何迹象表明1790年代法国军事突破的可能性。简单地说若米尼在解读拿破仑时使用了旧制度的军事范畴未免过于片面；包括拿破仑本人在内的许多博学多识、经验丰富的军人都赞赏若米尼的著作，而这些著作实际上反复强调了1789年前后欧洲战争的深刻差异。<sup> 15 </sup> 这不仅仅是一个智力上的难题。通过解决这一明显的矛盾，我们可以朝着理解若米尼的真正意图以及他的思想在当时和后世产生影响的原因迈出重要一步。
There is an obvious contradiction: Jomini admired Lloyd for his work as a military critic and theorist, and used Lloyd as a model for his own work on Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare; but Napoleon clearly regarded Lloyd's theorizing as a pathetic joke, and indeed nothing in Lloyd's critical study of the Seven Years' War suggests that anything like the French military breakthrough of the 1790s is possible. It is too easy simply to say that Jomini used the military categories of the Old Regime in his interpretation of Napoleon; too many intelligent and experienced soldiers, including Napoleon himself, admired Jomini's work, which in fact repeatedly emphasized the profound differences between European warfare before and after 1789.15 More is involved here than an intellectual puzzle. By resolving the apparent contradiction we can take an important step toward understanding exactly what Jomini was saying and why, then and later, his message was influential.
劳埃德对战争原则的探寻与他对七年战争的历史研究以及他对腓特烈作为统帅的批判密不可分；据称，他的批判是基于将科学原理应用于这一历史事件。在劳埃德之前，启蒙运动时期几乎所有严肃的战争著作都是用法语或德语写成的——英国人几乎没有对这场讨论做出任何有价值的贡献。劳埃德的著作不仅在这一点上具有创新性，而且他对腓特烈的批判还引发了普鲁士陆军上校格奥尔格·弗里德里希·滕珀尔霍夫的长篇德语反驳。他们的争论在法国引起了广泛关注，因为七年战争的惨痛教训在法国引发了激烈的辩论，劳埃德的著作也因此在欧洲广为人知。当年轻的若米尼开始他的军事研究，试图探寻法国大革命如何发动战争的秘密时，劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫的著作便唾手可得。这两份记录是两位资深军官近期撰写的，内容详实且颇具争议，讲述了他们最相关的军事经历。他还发现，劳埃德和他的主要批评者都拥有深深吸引他的“普遍原则”信念。最后，在他们关于1756年至1762年战略可能性的辩论中，劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫都未曾预料到1793年至1801年间发生的惊人军事事件。站在劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫的肩膀上，约米尼得以拓展他们对战争本质的认知。
Lloyd's search for principles of war was inextricably linked to his history of the Seven Years' War and to his critique of Frederick as a commander; his criticism was purportedly based on the application of scientific principles to the historical event. Before Lloyd, almost all serious writing on war during the Enlightenment was in French or German—the English had contributed virtually nothing of value to the discussion. Not only was Lloyd's work in that sense novel, but his criticism of Frederick produced an extended German rebuttal by Colonel Georg Friedrich Tempelhof of the Prussian army.16 Their controversy aroused interest in France, where the bitter lessons of the Seven Years' War were a subject of intense debate, and thus Lloyd's work came to be widely known in Europe. When the young Jomini began his military studies to find the secret of how the Revolution waged war, the works of Lloyd and Tempelhof came readily to hand. They were recent, detailed, and controversial accounts of the most relevant military experience by two veteran officers. He also found in both Lloyd and his chief critic the faith in “general principles” that attracted him so strongly. And, finally, in their debate on the strategic possibilities of 1756–1762, neither Lloyd nor Tempelhof had imagined anything like the astonishing military events of 1793–1801. Standing on the shoulders of Lloyd and Tempelhof, Jomini could extend their limited vision of the true nature of warfare.
一个案例便足以说明他的方法。约米尼在其第一部著作《七年战争主要军事行动论》（前两卷于1805年出版）中，对1756年的战役进行了详尽的论述。 <sup>17</sup>他总结了劳埃德对每次行动的描述以及滕珀尔霍夫的应对措施，以此为基础构建了他自己对七年战争的解读，以及他对战争永恒原则及其正确应用的理解。当然，1756年至1762年的战役——如同所有战争一样——揭示了这些原则，但约米尼也借鉴了法国大革命战争的战役，以纠正劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫在理解和正确应用这些原则方面的不足。对于1756年的战役，劳埃德曾赞同腓特烈入侵萨克森，认为这是在与奥地利开战之初保护其侧翼的明智之举。但劳埃德也曾建议，入侵波西米亚或摩拉维亚或许更好，因为这将直接威胁维也纳，前提是腓特烈能抽调一支部队掩护其萨克森侧翼。滕珀尔霍夫批评了这一想法，他计算了后勤需求，认为这根本不可能。此外，滕珀尔霍夫还补充说，这种冒险的直接行动违背了保持作战线短而安全的基本原则。
A single case can serve to illustrate his method. Jomini discussed the campaign of 1756 at length in his first book, the Treatise on Major Military Operations of the Seven Years' War, whose first two volumes appeared in 1805.17 He summarized Lloyd's account of each operation and Tempelhof's response to provide a basis for his own version of the Seven Years' War, as well as for his own vision of the timeless principles of war and their correct application. Of course the campaigns of 1756–1762—like all warfare—revealed these principles, but Jomini also drew on the campaigns of the French Revolutionary Wars to correct the imperfect efforts of Lloyd and Tempelhof to discern and apply the principles correctly. For the campaign of 1756, Lloyd had approved of Frederick's invasion of Saxony as a prudent operation to protect his flank at the outset of a war with Austria. But Lloyd had also suggested that an invasion of Bohemia or Moravia, which would have threatened Vienna directly, might have been even better as long as Frederick had detached a force to cover his Saxon flank. Tempelhof had criticized this idea by calculating its logistical requirements, which he argued would have made it impossible. Furthermore, Tempelhof added, the risky direct move would have violated the basic principle of keeping the line of operations short and safe.
年轻的约米尼批评他的两位前任都过于胆怯。劳埃德直接进攻维也纳的想法固然不错，但他对萨克森威胁的担忧却削弱了这一策略。约米尼认为，普鲁士军队应该以全速向维也纳方向的奥尔穆茨进发，而不是像腓特烈那样入侵萨克森而疏远萨克森人，或者像劳埃德提议的那样抽调一支部队掩护萨克森而削弱主力。萨克森人因免遭普鲁士入侵的蹂躏而松了一口气，恐怕会因为恐惧而不敢行动。约米尼指出，这显然正是拿破仑在1756年会采取的策略，正如他在四十年后在意大利屡次所做的那样。至于滕珀尔霍夫基于后勤计算和战争原则的批评，约米尼则毫不留情地予以驳斥。将所有军事计划和行动都与补给列车和坚固的弹药库捆绑在一起的做法，恰恰证明了十八世纪“战争艺术已经倒退了一步”。凯撒曾说过战争会滋生战争，他是对的。波西米亚和摩拉维亚的八百万到一千万人口完全可以供养一支九万人的普鲁士军队。在1811年版的《军事理论》中，约米尼引用了“拿破仑皇帝1809年的不朽战役”作为确凿的证据，证明这种战役在1756年是完全可以实现的，而且拿破仑比腓特烈更胜一筹。针对滕珀尔霍夫提出的保持作战路线短而安全的原则，约米尼呼吁采取更明智的判断和更大胆的行动。滕珀尔霍夫对这一原则的字面解读意味着任何军队都不可能越过自己的边境。约米尼写道：“所有军事行动中总会存在一些缺陷或薄弱环节；但在评判行动时，我们必须牢记目标并运用相关原则，并扪心自问：某项行动是否提供了取得胜利的最佳机会？”<sup> 18</sup>
The young Jomini criticized both his predecessors for their timidity. Lloyd had a good idea in moving directly against Vienna, but weakened it by his concern for the Saxon threat. Rather than alienate the Saxons by invading their country, as Frederick had actually done, or weakening the main army by detaching a force to cover Saxony, as Lloyd had proposed, Jomini argued that a united Prussian army should have driven at maximum speed for Olmütz on the road to Vienna. The Saxons, relieved at being spared the horrors of Prussian invasion, would have been too frightened to move. Clearly, Jomini argued, this is what Napoleon would have done in 1756, as he had repeatedly done in Italy forty years later. As for Tempelhof's critique, based on logistical calculations and the principles of war, Jomini was scathing. The habit of tying all military plans and operations to supply trains and fortified magazines simply proved that during the eighteenth century “the art of war had taken a step backwards.” Caesar had said that war could feed war, and he was right. The eight to ten million people of Bohemia and Moravia could have easily supplied a Prussian army of ninety thousand men. In the 1811 edition of the Treatise, Jomini cited the “immortal campaign of the Emperor Napoleon in 1809” as positive proof that it might have been done in 1756 and that Napoleon was a better strategist than Frederick. In response to Tempelhof's invocation of the principle of keeping the line of operations short and safe, Jomini called for better judgment and more daring. Tempelhof's literal-minded application of the principle would mean that no army would ever cross its own frontier. “In all military operations,” Jomini wrote, “there is always some imperfection or weak point; but in judging operations we must apply principles with the objective in mind, and ask whether a given operation offers the best chance for victory.”18
约米尼的第一本书很快就被翻译成多种语言，并引发了广泛的讨论。书中没有任何内容表明他未能认识到1790年代战争的新面貌，或者他以某种障眼法将腓特烈和拿破仑的战役混为一谈，归为同一种不加区分的战争艺术。恰恰相反，他看到了这种新型战争方式，并对其赞赏有加。这种战争方式不计人力和补给的限制，所有精力都集中在胜利这一唯一目标上。他以腓特烈战争的犹豫和局限性为背景，衬托出拿破仑的辉煌，正如他以劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫费尽心思的党派斗争来展现自己高瞻远瞩的普世主义一样。
Nothing in Jomini's first book, which was quickly translated and widely discussed, suggests that he failed to recognize the new face of warfare in the 1790s or that by some sleight of hand he was conflating the campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon into an undifferentiated art of war. On the contrary, he saw and vastly admired the new style of warfare, reckless of manpower and the constraints of supply, all energies focused on the sole aim of victory. He used the hesitations and limitations of Frederician warfare as a background to set off the brilliance of Bonaparte, much as he used the labored partisanship of Lloyd and Tempelhof to display his own clear-sighted universalism.
在《战争论》的第七、十四、三十四和三十五章（后两章最初发表于1809年第四卷）中，约米尼从军事史的具体细节转向了战争的普遍真理。他的引言与劳埃德的非常相似：“将战争体系简化为其基本组合，其他一切都依赖于此，这将为简洁而准确的理论奠定基础，这一理念具有诸多优势：它将使教学更容易，作战判断更可靠，错误更少。我认为指挥官们应该尽可能地理解这一概念，并使其指导他们的所有计划和行动。”<sup> 19</sup>当他转向从历史证据中得出更具体的结论时，约米尼似乎仍然遵循着劳埃德的观点：单一统一的作战路线是最佳选择。20但从这一点来看，若米尼更像是一位法国大革命的代表人物，他提出了一种全新的、激进的战争理论：所有战略“组合”，如果不符合“以最大力量联合攻击决定性目标”这一基本原则，都是有缺陷的（ vicieuses ） 。21决定如何进攻——正面进攻还是侧翼进攻——取决于具体情况，但进攻本身至关重要；绝不能将主动权拱手让给敌人。一旦决定采取行动，指挥官就绝不能犹豫。他和他的军官必须以他们的胆识和勇气激励士兵们全力以赴。如果战败，必须毫不留情地追击敌人。如果由于某种原因，指挥官未能取得胜利，他不能指望通过其他任何战术取胜，而必须运用可靠的原则——集结兵力、发起进攻、坚持不懈——再次尝试。若米尼的战争图景与旧制度谨慎的、有限战争的战略截然不同。他最后的几句话无需翻译即可理解：“ Voilà la science de la guerre en peu de mots.”忽视这些原则导致了奥地利在1793-1800年和1805年的战败，法国在1793年失去了比利时，以及法国在德国（1796年）和意大利及施瓦本（1799年）的失败。相比之下，“Le système de l'Empereur Napoléon présente une application constante de ces principes invariables .” 22 .
In chapters 7, 14, 34, and 35 of the Treatise (the last two chapters first appearing in 1809, in Volume IV), Jomini moved from the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. His introductory language was very like that of Lloyd: “The idea of reducing the system of war to its fundamental combination, on which all else depends, and which will provide the basis for a simple and accurate theory, offers numerous advantages: it will make instruction easier, operational judgment sounder, and mistakes less frequent. I believe that commanders cannot do enough to absorb this concept, and that it ought to guide all their plans and actions.”19 When he turned to more specific conclusions from the historical evidence, Jomini seemed still to be following Lloyd: a single unified line of operations is best.20 But beyond this point, Jomini appears as a man of the French Revolution, offering a new, radical theory of warfare: all strategic “combinations” are faulty (vicieuses) if they do not conform to the basic principle “of operating with the greatest possible force in a combined effort against the decisive point.”21 Deciding how to attack—frontally or on the flank—will depend on the specific situation, but attack itself is essential; the initiative must not be left to the enemy. Once committed to action, the commander must not hesitate. He and his officers must, by their boldness and courage, inspire their troops to the greatest possible effort. If beaten, the enemy must be pursued relentlessly. If victory for some reason should elude the commander, he must not expect it from any other system, but must try again, using sound principles—massing, attacking, persisting. Jomini's picture of warfare could hardly differ more from the cautious, limited-war strategies of the Old Regime. His closing words can stand without translation: “Voilà la science de la guerre en peu de mots.” Ignoring these principles led to the defeats of the Austrians in 1793–1800 and again in 1805, to the French loss of Belgium in 1793, and to French failures in Germany (1796) and in Italy and Swabia (1799). By contrast, “Le système de l'Empereur Napoléon présente une application constante de ces principes invariables.”22.
自1805年加入内伊的参谋部到1813年离开法军加入俄军，若米尼在服役期间仍坚持写作和出版。到1811年，他的《战争论》已完成六卷，内容涵盖七年战争到革命战争最初两年。他完成了关于1794年至1797年战役的后两卷，并于1816年出版。此外，他还发表了多篇文章和小册子，其中三篇阐述了他关于战争原则的思想。作为内伊和拿破仑的参谋军官，他晋升为准将，并参加了乌尔姆战役、耶拿战役、埃劳战役、西班牙战役和俄国战役。在1813年的包岑战役中，他表现出色。在他离开法国军队不久后，年仅34岁的他便在包岑战役中败北，但此时他已是国际公认的现代战争史学家和理论家，享有盛誉。尽管他最著名的著作还要过几年才会问世。毫不夸张地说，他在军事研究这个相对封闭的领域中，凭借着充沛的精力、坚定的决心以及些许运气，迅速崛起，堪比拿破仑的传奇。
Jomini continued to write and publish while on active service from 1805, when he joined Ney's staff, to 1813, when he left the French army to join the Russians. By 1811 he had carried his Treatise to six volumes, from the Seven Years' War through the first two years of the Revolutionary Wars. He had completed the next two volumes, on the campaigns of 1794–1797, and would publish them in 1816. He had also published a number of articles and pamphlets, three of which distilled his ideas on the principles of war.23 As an officer on the staff of Ney and of Napoleon himself, he had risen to the rank of général de brigade and had served in the Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Spanish, and Russian campaigns. At the battle of Bautzen in 1813, he had distinguished himself. When he left French service shortly after Bautzen, at the age of thirty-four, he had achieved an international reputation as the preeminent historian and theorist of modern warfare, although the book for which he is best known still lay years in the future. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that his rapid rise, by sheer energy and determination plus a little luck within the somewhat constricted world of military studies, had been Napoleonic.
从1813年到1869年去世，约米尼作为一名俄国将军，笔耕不辍，不断著述，捍卫并阐述他的军事理论，进一步提升了他的声望。<sup>24</sup>他曾担任沙皇在维也纳会议、亚琛会议和维罗纳会议上的顾问，并在1828-1829年的俄土战争和克里米亚战争期间发挥了重要作用。他参与创建了一所新的俄国军事学院，并担任未来的亚历山大二世的导师。然而，在他生命的最后五十六年里，他的学术发展却出人意料地缓慢。他主要居住在巴黎，完成了他的法国大革命战争史，这部十五卷本的著作与《战争艺术论》分开出版。他还用了四卷本撰写了拿破仑的军事传记。1830年，在沙皇尼古拉一世的建议下，他匆忙地将自己关于战争原则的章节和论文汇编成一部《战争艺术概要》。 1837-1838年出版的两卷本增订版《孙子兵法概要》是他最著名的著作。这部概要表明，他读过克劳塞维茨的遗作《战争论》，并在中年晚期受到启发，重新思考了自己的一些观点。然而，这部已被翻译成多种语言的概要中所包含的新内容，就其影响力而言却如同胎死腹中。约米尼的读者早已接受了他的基本思想，除非伴随根本性的重点转变，甚至彻底放弃对规范性原则的强调，否则任何新的主题或章节都无法改变他对军事界和战争学研究者的影响方向。
From 1813 until his death in 1869 as a Russian general, Jomini continued to write and publish, defending and elaborating his military theory, and enhancing his considerable reputation.24 He served as advisor to the czar at the Congresses of Vienna, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Verona, as well as during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829 and the Crimean War. He took part in establishing a new Russian military academy and served as tutor to the future Alexander II. But in the last fifty-six years of his life there is surprisingly little intellectual development. Living mostly in Paris, he completed his history of the French Revolutionary Wars, published separately from the Treatise, in fifteen volumes. He devoted four more volumes to a military biography of Napoleon. In 1830, at the suggestion of Czar Nicholas I, he hastily combined his various chapters and essays on the principles of war into a Synoptic Analysis of the Art of War. An expanded two-volume edition, published in 1837–1838 as the Summary of the Art of War, was his most famous book. The Summary shows that he had read the posthumously published On War of Clausewitz and had been moved by it, in late middle age, to reconsider some of his own ideas. But the new material incorporated into the Summary, which has since been translated into many languages, was stillborn in terms of its influence. Jomini's audience had received his basic message long before, and no new subjects or chapters, unless accompanied by a radical change of emphasis, or perhaps even a virtual abandonment of his stress on prescriptive principles, could have shifted the direction of his influence on the military profession and on students of warfare.
约米尼思想最成熟、最具影响力的表达形式，是在其著作《战争艺术概要》中，在不改变其早期出版作品基本要点的前提下，对其进行了详细阐述。书名便明确指出，约米尼的研究对象并非“战争”，而是“战争艺术”。这门艺术蕴含着永恒的原则，对凯撒和拿破仑都同样适用。在探寻这些原则的奥秘的过程中，约米尼未能从早期作家的理论“体系”中找到答案，却在腓特烈二世的军事史中发现了它们。腓特烈二世的胜利之道在于将己方主力投入到对敌军的局部进攻。这种战术被提升到战争的最高境界，其本质便是战略的秘诀，所有其他原则都由此衍生而来。像克劳塞维茨这样的批评家，质疑任何战争理论的有效性，却未能区分体系理论和原则理论。原则是行动的指南，而非绝对可靠的数学计算。原则的具体应用会随着战争中无数变幻莫测的物理和心理因素而变化，正是这些因素使战争成为一场“伟大的戏剧”。天才能够战胜军事上的迂腐之人，正如天赋和经验能够胜过笨拙的新手一样。但是，军事原则本身——其真理已在所有军事经验中得到验证——不容忽视，否则将招致危险；而遵循这些原则，几乎总是能够带来胜利。
The most mature and influential expression of his ideas, in the Summary, elaborates without altering the basic points made in his earliest published work. The title tells the reader that his subject is not “war,” but “the art of war.” For this art there are timeless principles, as valid for Caesar as for Napoleon. In searching for the secret of these principles, Jomini had failed to find them in the theoretical “systems” of earlier writers but had discovered them in the military history of Frederick II. Frederick had won by throwing the mass of his army against only a part of the enemy army. That technique, raised to the highest level of war making, was in essence the secret of strategy from which all other principles derived. Critics like Clausewitz, who doubted the validity of any theory of war, failed to distinguish between a theory of systems and a theory of principles. Principles were guides to action, not infallible mathematical calculations. The specific application of principles would vary with the thousand changing physical and psychological factors that made war “a great drama.” Genius would defeat the military pedant, just as talent and experience would outdo the bumbling novice. But the principles themselves, whose truth is demonstrated by all military experience, could not be ignored without peril and, when followed, had “almost invariably” (presque en tout temps) brought victory.
约米尼承认，调动大军威胁战场上的“决定性要点”，然后集中所有可用兵力攻击防守这些要点的敌军一小部分，这一原则非常简单。但他的批评者问道，什么是“决定性要点”？约米尼回答说，它是能够危及或严重削弱敌军的地点。它可以是道路交汇处、河流渡口、山口、补给基地，甚至是敌军的侧翼。拿破仑作为战略家的伟大之处不仅在于调动兵力以获取有限的优势，更在于识别出那些一旦失守就会“瓦解并摧毁”敌军的关键点。年轻的波拿巴充分了解情况，迅速调动部队向决定性要点集结，并追击溃败的敌人，从而建立了自己的声誉。在更大的战场或目标不同的战争中，这一原则的运用方式可能会有所不同，或许会更加谨慎。但基本原则从未改变。几乎毫无例外，敌军侧翼和补给线将决定进攻的关键点；军队没有补给就无法生存，威胁其基地将迫使其作战，无论情况多么不利。尽管承认拿破仑战争的特殊性，但若米尼在其《概要》的理论论述中，通过一系列历史案例强调，在现代战争的混乱变化之下，蕴藏着战略上的普遍性。25
The principle of maneuvering the mass of an army so as to threaten the “decisive points” in a theater of war and then to hurl all available forces against a fraction of the enemy force defending those points is, Jomini admitted, very simple. But what, his critics had asked, is a “decisive point”? It is a point, answered Jomini, whose attack or capture would imperil or seriously weaken the enemy. It could be a road junction, a river crossing, a mountain pass, a supply base, or an open flank of the enemy army itself. The great merit of Napoleon as a strategist lay in not simply maneuvering for some limited advantage, but in identifying those points that, if lost, would “dislocate and ruin” the enemy. Informing himself fully, moving his forces quickly to converge on the decisive point, and pursuing a beaten foe à outrance, the young Bonaparte had established his reputation. In a larger theater or in a war with different aims, the principle might be applied differently, perhaps more cautiously. But the basic principle never changed. Almost without exception the enemy flanks and supply line would define the decisive points for attack; an army could not survive without supply and to threaten its base would compel it to fight, no matter how unfavorable the circumstances. Although acknowledging the special nature of Napoleonic warfare, Jomini, by a variety of illustrative historical cases deployed throughout his theoretical discussion in the Summary, stressed that beneath the chaotic changes in modern warfare lay strategic universality.25
二
II
这位革命时期的人物是如何将法国在战争方面的突破与其革命根源割裂开来的呢？我们已经看到，他充分意识到新旧战争方式之间的巨大差异，并且他的观点是在参与拿破仑战争期间形成的。若米尼并非复辟时期那种躲在书房里空想未经检验的理论的空想家，而是一位身经百战的老兵，对席卷欧洲长达十年的激烈战争有着敏锐的观察力。要理解他如何在著作中，尤其是在其影响下，将他对战争的理解从战争发生的实际环境中剥离出来，需要从多个层面进行考察。
How did this man of the Revolution disconnect the French breakthrough in warfare from its Revolutionary roots? We have already seen that he was fully aware of the dramatic differences between the old and the new ways of waging war and that his views were fully developed while serving in the very midst of Napoleonic campaigns. Jomini was no armchair strategist of the Restoration, spinning out untested theories in his library, but a veteran of many campaigns, remarkably well placed to observe a decade of intense warfare across the face of Europe. Understanding how he came, in his work and still more in his influence, to abstract his conception of warfare from the environment in which wars take place requires consideration at several different levels.
约米尼的个性和职业生涯为我们提供了一个最容易理解的切入点，让我们得以探究他思想和作品的独特发展方向。他从小就桀骜不驯，聪明却令人讨厌，而且这种性格从未改变。他总是与人纠缠不清，而且极其敏感，从不放过任何争吵的机会。他年轻时在大军团担任军官的画像充满了傲慢，而照片中的老人则像一只愤怒的鹰隼。所有认识他的人，甚至包括他的仰慕者，都证实他始终保持着好争吵、不善交际的性格。26没有什么比他自己用拿破仑的口吻说出的那些话更能体现他的性格了。在1827年匿名出版的《拿破仑传》中，若米尼描述了自己在1813年战役中担任内伊参谋长的经历。书中引用拿破仑的话说，若米尼在包岑战役中指挥了一次“完美”的战术，取得了“不可估量”的胜利。他还说，若米尼后来投奔俄军（事实上，拿破仑当时称之为“逃兵”）是一大损失，“因为他是最了解我作战体系的军官之一”。若米尼在这些话中流露出的自负令人瞠目结舌，但也完全符合他的性格。更具启发性的是，据称是拿破仑为若米尼投奔敌军辩解的那句话：“若米尼是个敏感的人，性情暴躁，脾气急躁，但他为人正直，不可能参与任何预谋的阴谋。” 27因此，根据约米尼在四十多岁时所写并发表的自述，他脾气暴躁、虚荣，而且过于敏感。
Jomini's own personality and career offer the most accessible level at which to consider the peculiar direction taken by his mind and work. As a boy he was troublesome, bright but obnoxious, and he never changed. He was always embroiled with someone about something, and he was too sensitive ever to pass up the chance to quarrel. His portrait as a young officer in the Grande Armée is all arrogance, and the old man looks out from his photograph like an angry hawk. That he remained a quarrelsome, tactless personality is confirmed by all who knew him, even his admirers.26 Nothing expresses his character better than his own words, disguised as the words of Napoleon. In his Life of Napoleon…as told by himself, published anonymously in 1827, Jomini was able to describe his own role as Ney's chief of staff in the campaign of 1813. Napoleon is made to say that Jomini was responsible at the battle of Bautzen for a “perfect” maneuver of “incalculable” benefit, and that his subsequent departure for Russian service (in fact, Napoleon at the time had called it “desertion”) was a serious loss “because he was one of the officers who understood best my system of war.” Jomini's vanity in these remarks is breathtaking but perfectly in character. More revealing are Napoleon's purported words excusing his defection to the enemy: “Jomini was a sensitive man, violent, quick-tempered [mauvaise tête], but too honest [franc] to have been part of a premeditated intrigue.”27 Thus by his own account, written and published in his forties, Jomini was irascible, vain, and sensitive to a fault.
在敏感易怒的外表下，隐藏着更深层次的性格根源——野心、挫败感、不安全感，甚至可能还有抑郁。少年时期，若米尼曾被拿破仑的崛起所震撼和兴奋，19岁时，他便立志要追求荣耀、名望和权力。他依附于内伊，甚至一度赢得了拿破仑本人的赏识，因此晋升迅速，但始终未能达到目标。他从未被委以重任指挥军队，他那自负的知识分子作风也令一些与他共事的铁腕将领感到不满。如果说内伊和拿破仑是他的指路明灯，那么拿破仑的参谋长贝尔蒂埃就是他的眼中钉。贝尔蒂埃曾多次阻挠他的晋升，在包岑战役后，内伊推荐他晋升时，贝尔蒂埃却以他未能按时提交作为内伊参谋长的定期报告为由，下令逮捕了他。28正是这件事促使他加入了俄国军队，事后看来，这似乎是一个绝佳的时机，就在拿破仑政权走向灭亡的斗争之前。
Behind the sensitivity and irascibility lay the deeper sources of personality—ambition, frustration, insecurity, and possibly depression. As an adolescent, Jomini had been stunned and thrilled by the rise of Bonaparte, and he had set out himself, at nineteen, to find glory, fame, and power. By attaching himself to Ney and for a while even gaining the favorable attention of Napoleon himself, he had risen fast, but not far enough. He had never been trusted with the command of troops and his presumptuous intellectuality had grated on some of the hard-bitten generals with whom he had served. If Ney and Napoleon were his lodestars, Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff, was his bête noire. Berthier had blocked him more than once, and when Ney recommended him for promotion after Bautzen, Berthier ordered his arrest for failing to submit his periodic report as Ney's chief of staff.28 It was this incident that led to his joining the Russian army at what, in retrospect, appears an opportune moment, just before the death struggle of the Napoleonic regime.
在俄国，他曾担任亚历山大一世的军事顾问，亚历山大一世于1825年去世后，他又成为尼古拉一世的顾问。但俄国宫廷过于复杂，关系错综复杂，约米尼始终无法深入或稳固地渗透其中；他始终在寻找庇护者——起初是亚历山大本人，后来是尼古拉一世，最后是改革派大臣米柳京——但总有一个像贝尔蒂埃这样的人，一个阻挠他提议的恶棍。29
In the Russian service he had attached himself as military advisor to Alexander I, and after his death in 1825 to Nicholas I. But the Russian court was too complex and too involuted for Jomini ever to penetrate very far or very securely; always there was the same quest for a patron—Alexander himself for a while, then Nicholas, and at the end the reformist minister Miliutin—but there was also always a Berthier, some villain blocking his proposals.29
种种迹象表明，尽管他声名显赫，但实际上却在苦苦挣扎——他苦苦维系着自己在内伊参谋部中那个不寻常的职位，维系着与沙皇或皇帝的私人关系，维系着自己作为俄国将军的军衔和薪水。他曾因家族遗产与兄弟姐妹发生争执，尽管他的书仍在畅销，但他所表达的经济担忧似乎并非空穴来风。<sup> 30</sup>种种迹象也表明，他内心深处觉得自己是个失败者。他从未担任过军事指挥职务，也永远无法从撰写战争题材的书籍中获得真正的满足感。士兵们或许会赞扬他，甚至对他毕恭毕敬，但他本身就是一名军人，他很清楚这个群体是如何看待那些只写战争的人的。约米尼既虚荣到不愿坦然承认，又聪明到不可能对此一无所知，在他自己看来，他似乎是一个失败者。他的自我沉溺，以及他对自己在残酷世界中岌岌可危且最终无法令人满意的地位的深刻感受，这种感受源于他早年令人兴奋但又令人不安的经历，并在他的余生中得到强化，塑造了他对战争本身的看法。
The evidence suggests a man who, for all his reputation, was hanging on desperately—to his irregular position on Ney's staff, to his personal relationship with the emperor or the czar, to his rank and pay as a Russian general. He had quarrelled with his brother and sister over the family inheritance, and his expressed financial fears, despite the continued sale of his books, seem genuine.30 The evidence also suggests a man who felt, deeply, that he had failed. He had never held military command, and could never find complete satisfaction in writing books about war. Soldiers might praise him and even pay court to him, but he was too much the soldier himself not to know what the profession thought of those who only wrote about war. Too vain to admit it freely, too intelligent not to know it, Jomini in his own eyes seems to have been a failure. And his self-absorption, the deep sense of his own precarious and ultimately unsatisfactory place in a harsh world, a sense arising from the exciting but troubling experiences of his early years and reinforced by the rest of his life, shaped his thinking about war itself.
战争，至少在他看来，唯一真正让他感兴趣的，是最高统帅——腓特烈或拿破仑——玩弄着血腥战争游戏，凭借着过人的智慧和意志力驾驭着麾下的将领，并利用他们击败敌人。这就是约米尼，这位总部参谋军官所经历的战争——以及人生。在总司令部，个人因素的影响往往令人难以招架，成败似乎取决于少数人的能力和怪癖——统帅及其参谋——而他们又承受着巨大的压力。在约米尼所经历的那种战争环境下，人们很容易忽略那些塑造事件的更宏大、更客观的力量。
War, at least the only part of it that truly interested him concerned the supreme commander, the Frederick or Napoleon who played the great bloody game, who by sheer intellect and will dominated the men who served him and used them to defeat his enemies. This was war—and life—as experienced by Jomini, the headquarters staff officer. At general headquarters, the play of personality often seems overwhelming, success or failure appearing to depend on the abilities and quirks of a few men—the commander and his staff—who are under great pressure. Perspective on the larger, impersonal forces shaping events is notoriously easy to lose in just those circumstances under which Jomini had experienced war.
无需夸大约米尼作品中的心理因素，就能看出他的思想是如何自然地反映了他自身的经历。从早年起，他的人生就充满了疯狂的竞争，他努力给一些关键人物留下深刻印象——新任瑞士战争部长、内伊、拿破仑、沙皇，或者在他生命的最后阶段是米柳京——同时还要超越一些竞争对手和敌人——贝尔蒂埃、车尔尼雪夫、克劳塞维茨，或者任何可能阻挡他的人。<sup> 31</sup>约米尼就像一个在竞争激烈的丛林中闯荡的年轻新秀，始终带有一种局外人的特质。他所处的世界与其说是强大力量的碰撞，不如说是野心勃勃的人们不断交锋的场所。
There is no need to exaggerate the psychological element in Jomini's work to see how naturally his thinking reflected his own personal experience. From early on, his life had been a frantic scramble to succeed by making an impression on some key man—the new Swiss war minister, Ney, Napoleon, the czar, or at the end of his life Miliutin—and at the same time to out-do some rival and enemy—Berthier, Chernyshev, Clausewitz, or whoever might be blocking his way.31 Jomini had operated as a young upstart in a competitive jungle, and was always something of an outsider. His world was less one of great forces clashing than of the constant collision of ambitious men.
在这方面，将约米尼与克劳塞维茨进行比较颇具启发意义。克劳塞维茨比约米尼晚出生一年，他出身卑微，凭借自身才华和抱负，以及沙恩霍斯特的提拔，在普鲁士军队中步步高升。但除了这一相似之处，两人之间还存在着巨大的差异——普鲁士与法国、沙恩霍斯特和内伊作为赞助人、克劳塞维茨和约米尼自身——这些差异塑造了他们对现代战争的不同理解。克劳塞维茨和普鲁士饱经磨难，经历过失败和屈辱；直到1806年耶拿战役惨败之后，普鲁士军队才进行重大改革，最终找到了应对拿破仑法国强大力量的方法。克劳塞维茨在耶拿战役中被俘，是改革派中的一员。滑铁卢战役后，拿破仑被安全流放，克劳塞维茨和其他普鲁士改革者也因此蒙上了一层怀疑的阴影。保守的君主制和贵族阶层从未忘记或原谅他们在1806年后提出的自由化改革要求，到了19世纪20年代，克劳塞维茨几乎可以肯定，他已被边缘化，沦为柏林战争学院的行政人员。克劳塞维茨深知失败的滋味；约米尼或许有所察觉，但他却终其一生都在宣扬自己思想的成功。克劳塞维茨性格更为坚强稳重，他撰写战争著作是为了满足自己，或许也是为了安抚1813年阵亡的沙恩霍斯特的亡灵。沙恩霍斯特为他的年轻门生们树立了个人和学术操守的最高标准。相比之下，内伊给了约米尼一份工作、金钱和宝贵但断断续续的支持，却在厌倦了他桀骜不驯的性格后抛弃了这个年轻人。约米尼写作是为了发表作品，他发表作品是为了给人留下深刻印象，因为只有给人留下深刻印象，他才能指望晋升或保住自己的地位。从他们截然不同的心理角度来看，克劳塞维茨将战争视为一个复杂的整体，以悲剧的视角看待战争，认为战争总是有可能脱离人类的控制，而约米尼则主要以个人英雄主义的视角看待战争，认为战争由杰出的指挥官控制，这并不令人惊讶。
It is instructive to compare Jomini in this respect with Clausewitz. Born a year later, Clausewitz rose in Prussian service from modest origins to high rank, partly through talent and ambition, partly through the patronage of Scharnhorst. But beyond this similarity there were great differences—between Prussia and France, Scharnhorst and Ney as patrons, Clausewitz and Jomini themselves—that marked each man's perception of modern war. Clausewitz and Prussia knew adversity, defeat, and humiliation; only after major reforms carried out in the aftermath of the military catastrophe of Jena in 1806 did the Prussian military system find means to cope with the power of Napoleonic France. Captured in the Jena campaign, Clausewitz was a junior member of the reform group. After Waterloo, Napoleon safely exiled, Clausewitz and the other Prussian reformers fell under a cloud of suspicion. A conservative monarchy and aristocracy never forgot or forgave their demands for liberalizing changes after 1806, and by the 1820s Clausewitz could hardly doubt that he had been relegated to the professional shelf as administrator of the Berlin War College. Clausewitz knew failure; Jomini might suspect it, but spent a long life proclaiming the success of his own ideas. A stronger, stabler person, Clausewitz wrote on war to satisfy himself and perhaps the ghost of Scharnhorst, killed in 1813, who had set he highest standard of personal and intellectual integrity for his young protégés. Ney, by contrast, had given Jomini a job, money, and valuable but sporadic support, abandoning the young man when he tired of his obstreperous personality. Jomini wrote to publish, and he published to impress, for only by impressing could he hope to move up or hang on. From the perspective of their contrasting psychologies, it should not be surprising that Clausewitz approached war as a complex totality, seeing it in what may be called tragic terms, always threatening to escape human control, and that Jomini saw war largely in personal, heroic terms, controlled by the masterful commander.
约米尼对统帅科学的探索究竟能走多远，1793-1794年的战役便是最好的例证。这一年被称为“恐怖之年”，法军在北部和东部的战线终于扭转了败局。在重建的同时，法军在多条战线上展开了全面战争。兵变频发，战败的法军将领甚至被斩首示众。这是一个疯狂拼搏、孤注一掷的时代。约米尼正是从这一时期选取了1794年的战役，在其著名的《军事理论》第十四章中阐述了他的“作战路线”理论。他很少谈及政治、情感和组织状况，而是着重分析了1757年和1794年之间的相似之处。在这两场战役中，两支军队都朝着同一个目标“同心圆”推进——1757年，腓特烈从萨克森和西里西亚入侵波西米亚；1794年，法军从弗兰德斯和默兹河谷向布鲁塞尔推进。约米尼很清楚，其他人对1794年的战役有不同的看法。“但将（1794年的战役）描述为一种新的军事体系，某种史无前例的战争奇迹，未免有些夸大其词。法军无需夸大其词，那样只会掩盖他们胜利的真正本质。” 32约米尼认为，法国胜利的真正原因在于战略机动。法军本可以改进战略机动，从而取得更加决定性的胜利；而奥军的失败则是一个典型的未能利用“内线”的例子，即没有集中全部兵力先攻击一支法军，然后再攻击另一支法军（正如奥军在1757年对抗腓特烈大帝时所犯的错误一样）。奥军未能按照战争原则进行机动，正是法国在1794年取得胜利的直接原因。
How far his quest for a science of commanding generalship could carry Jomini is exemplified by the campaigns of 1793–1794. This was the Year of the Terror, when French forces in the north and east finally turned defeat into victory. While being rebuilt, the French army fought an all-out war on several fronts. Mutinies were frequent, and the heads of defeated French generals literally rolled. It was a time of frenzied effort and desperate innovation. From this period Jomini chose the campaign of 1794 to illustrate his theory of “lines of operation” in the famous fourteenth chapter of his Treatise. He said little about political, emotional, and organizational conditions, but dwelt instead on the similarities between 1757 and 1794. In both campaigns two separate armies moved “concentrically” on a single objective—Frederick in 1757 invading Bohemia from Saxony and Silesia, French armies in the 1794 advancing on Brussels from Flanders and the Meuse Valley. Jomini was well aware that others saw the 1794 operations in a different light. “But there has been exaggeration in presenting [the campaign of 1794] as a new military system, as some kind of miracle unprecedented in the annals of warfare. French armies do not need exaggeration, which only obscures the true nature of their victory.”32 The true nature of French victory lay, according to Jomini, in strategic maneuver, which on the French side might have been improved to secure a still more decisive victory, and which on the Austrian side was a classic case of the failure to exploit “interior lines,” of not concentrating all forces first against one French army, then against the other (just as the Austrians had failed to do against Frederick in 1757). This Austrian failure to maneuver according to the principles of war was the proximate cause of French victory in 1794.
但导致法国在1794年征服比利时的战役，实际上远比奥地利人轻易被击败的一系列棋局复杂得多。几乎所有当时的或现代的记载都强调了法军攻势的持续性，不断有援军补充损失，卡诺和圣茹斯特的亲自指挥更是激励着他们奋勇向前。<sup> 33</sup>历史证据清楚地表明，法军在战役中的数量和素质都起到了决定性作用。若米尼选择强调奥地利未能利用所谓的“内线作战”优势对抗法军的“同心圆作战”，这充其量是一种简化。他竟然进一步明确否认制度、政治和心理因素在这场战役中的解释力，这显得匪夷所思，几乎令人难以置信。然而，无论他用这个具体例子来阐明其总体观点的做法多么值得商榷，他的理论方法的影响，以及他的军事史版本被广泛接受，都是不容否认的。
But the operations that led to the French conquest of Belgium in 1794 were in fact far more complex than a set of game-like moves at which the Austrians were simply outplayed. Virtually every account, contemporary or modern, stresses the relentless character of the French offensive, supported by a stream of reinforcements to replace heavy losses and whipped on by the personal presence of Carnot and Saint-Just.33 The historical evidence points clearly to the decisive importance of both the quantity and the qualities of the French forces engaged in the campaign. That Jomini would choose to emphasize the Austrian failure to exploit the supposed advantage of an “interior line of operations” against the French “concentric lines of operations” is at best a simplification. That he would go further by explicitly denying the explanatory value of institutional, political, and psychological factors in this campaign seems bizarre and barely credible. But however questionable his use of the specific example to illustrate his general point may be, the influence of his theoretical method, like the general acceptance of his version of military history, can hardly be denied.
约米尼的读者给予的压倒性好评赋予了他的作品重要性。如果没有这种反响，他或许只会像同时代的比洛一样，成为一个历史奇观。但研究拿破仑时代及其后战争史的学者们，在他的《战争论》、美国革命战争史、拿破仑传，尤其是他的《孙子兵法概要》中，找到了他们所寻求的答案。约米尼显然满足了读者的需求。
The overwhelmingly positive response of Jomini's readers is what gives his work its importance. Without that response he would have become little more than a historical curiosity, like his contemporary Bülow. But students of warfare during and after the Napoleonic epoch found what they were seeking in the Treatise, in his history of the Revolutionary Wars, in his life of Napoleon, and above all in his Summary of the Art of War. Jomini had given his audience what it obviously wanted.
他的著作，无论在叙事还是理论方面，都遵循着古老的军事史学传统：约书亚、凯撒、亚历山大、腓特烈、拿破仑——这些拥有超凡能力的战士君王，带领人民走向胜利的传奇故事。这个故事与文学一样古老。约米尼完美地融入了这一传统，在这一传统中，军队是面目模糊的群体，装备和补给的方式神秘莫测，他们在战场上的行为似乎反映了其种族、国家和指挥官的既定性格。最终，评判的标准通常是伟大的统帅及其敌人的表现。<sup> 34</sup>虽然约米尼最优秀的分析性著作超越了这种军事史学范畴，但他出版的大部分作品都是战役叙事，侧重于指挥决策。即使在今天，这些叙述仍然提供了清晰、相当详细，并且在教学范围内可靠的关于 1756 年至 1815 年欧洲军事行动的描述。但它们也强有力地强化了看待战争的传统方式，以及其中所有带有评判性和非历史性的倾向。
His books, in both their narrative and theoretical aspects, conformed to an ancient tradition of military historiography: Joshua, Caesar, Alexander, Frederick, Napoleon—the saga of the warrior-king who, possessed of superhuman qualities, leads his people to victory. The story is as old as literature. Jomini fit comfortably into this tradition, in which armies are faceless masses, armed and fed in mysterious ways, whose behavior in battle appears to reflect the ascribed character of their race, their nation, and their commander. In the end, judgment is traditionally passed on the performance of the Great Captain and his enemies.34 Although the best of Jomini's analytical writing rises above this kind of military historiography, most of his published work is campaign narrative, focused on command decisions. Even today these narratives offer clear, fairly detailed, and—within their didactic limits—reliable accounts of military operations in Europe from 1756 to 1815. But they also powerfully reinforced the traditional way of seeing warfare, with all its judgmental and ahistorical tendencies.
其他一些更为活跃、更具历史针对性的因素也促成了约米尼与他的听众之间的联系。在约米尼生活的年代，现代军事职业在西方社会兴起，其征兵、教育、晋升、退休、参谋系统等都趋于理性化——所有这些都构成了一个独立的、专业化的技术人员阶层，他们与它所服务的平民世界以及军事角色与贵族和绅士阶层的传统联系日益疏远。1792年至1815年的长期战争极大地促进了这一新兴职业的发展和自信，约米尼赋予了它科学的声望，并为其争取职业自主权提供了理论依据。新兴军事职业渴望使其专业知识“科学化”，这只是19世纪职业化进程中的一个篇章，当时每个职业都在试图定义和捍卫其独特的“科学”。但军队还面临着另一个问题：它与权力和权威的关系。只要军官是贵族或绅士，这种关系就必然由他们的社会出身所决定。当民主、官僚主义和精英统治开始改变军队时——到1800年，这种现象几乎在各地都显而易见——政治关系变得复杂起来。35军队不再是君主制和贵族共享权力的契约的一部分，它是否就应该仅仅成为国家机器的附属部分呢？
Other more active, historically specific forces also helped bring Jomini and his audience together. During Jomini's own lifetime the modern military profession emerged in Western societies, with rationalized recruitment, education, promotion, retirement, staff systems—all the features of a separate, specialized priesthood of technicians, increasingly distinct both from the civilian world that it presumably served and from the traditional identification of the military role with the aristocracy and gentry. To this emergent profession, whose growth and confidence were greatly stimulated by the long wars of 1792–1815, Jomini gave the prestige of science as well as a rationale for the professional claim to autonomy. The desire of the new military profession to make its expertise “scientific” is merely one chapter in the larger story of nineteenth-century professionalism, in which every profession was seeking to define and defend its own special “science.” But the military faced another problem: its relationship to power and authority. As long as officers were aristocrats or gentlemen, the relationship was implicitly defined by their social origins. When democracy, bureaucracy, and meritocracy began to transform the military—as was perceptibly happening almost everywhere by 1800—the political relationship became problematical.35 No longer a part of the contract by which monarchy and aristocracy shared authority, was the military to be simply a subordinate part of the state apparatus?
1799年拿破仑发动军事政变夺取政权，1812年危机中普鲁士军官出于政治动机的叛逃，以及1825年由俄国军官领导的十二月党人起义，这些重大事件使得这一政治问题不再局限于学术层面。保守派和自由派都担心军队过于专业化会使其与国家和社会脱节，而军队则寻求规避这些担忧可能带来的外部控制。在约米尼的著作中，军人们找到了他们想要的：反对严格服从政治权威的有力论据。他重点研究了腓特烈和拿破仑，这两位君主集政治和军事权力于一身。这些都是特例，即使在最专制的国家也难以借鉴，因为在位君主绝不会再以大元帅的身份亲自上阵作战，但约米尼并没有直接探讨这个问题。相反，他选择着重分析奥地利的反面案例。奥地利在1756年至1815年间屡战屡败，由此，他强烈表达了对政治军事关系的深刻见解。约米尼写道，奥地利军事指挥官经常受到“奥利克委员会”的“干预”，该委员会的战略幼稚和至高无上的政治权力常常导致哈布斯堡王朝遭遇军事灾难。<sup> 36</sup>
The military coup that brought Napoleon to power in 1799, the politically motivated defection of Prussian officers in the crisis of 1812, and the Decembrist revolt of 1825 led by Russian officers were major incidents that made this political question more than academic. Conservatives no less than liberals feared a military so professionalized that it would be alienated from state and society, and the military in turn sought means to avoid the external controls that these fears might impose. In Jomini, soldiers found just what they wanted: good arguments against strict subordination to political authority. He focused his studies on Frederick and Napoleon, who combined political and military authority in their own persons. These were unique cases, irrelevant even to the most autocratic states where never again would the reigning monarch actually take the field as generalissimo, but Jomini did not explicitly confront the problem. Instead he chose to dwell on the opposite case of Austria, which had lost so many of the major campaigns from 1756 to 1815, and thereby he conveyed a strong message on this subject of the political-military relationship. Austrian military commanders, wrote Jomini, were frequently crippled by “interference” from the “Aulic Council,” whose strategic naiveté and supreme political power had often led the house of Hapsburg to military disaster.36
教训很明确：政府应当选出最能干的军事统帅，然后放手让他按照科学原则指挥战争。政府不应忽视军队，但绝不能干预只有受过良好教育、经验丰富的军官才能理解的事务。军界自然将这一教训铭记于心，传授给新兵，并在受到政治“干预”威胁时援引这一原则，并且——追随他们的导师约米尼——从未觉得有必要深入探究这种简单化表述所带来的种种难题。这些难题是《战争论》的核心主题，但士兵们却能以某种方式解读克劳塞维茨，将其曲解回约米尼那套令人感到舒适的公式。37
The lesson was clear: a government should choose its ablest military commander, then leave him free to wage war according to scientific principles. Governments should not neglect their armed forces, but they must not meddle in matters that only educated and experienced officers understand. The military profession, naturally, took this lesson to heart, taught it to their recruits, invoked it whenever threatened by political “interference,” and—following Jomini, their mentor—never felt much need to explore the difficulties such a simplistic formulation created. These difficulties were a central theme of On War, but soldiers managed to read even Clausewitz in ways that twisted his meaning back into the comfortable Jominian formula.37
更广泛的舆论和情感潮流也为若米尼的作品创造了易于接受的读者群。他为饱受法国大革命和拿破仑统治之苦，却又对这段历史充满好奇的欧洲而写作。一代人的动荡以及法兰西帝国对西方世界的巨大影响不容忽视。与此同时，人们普遍渴望将这个令人不安的时代纳入某种理性的秩序，试图通过某种方式将法国的“精灵”重新装回瓶子里，从而使之正常化。若米尼以其对战略、传记和科学的重视，回应了这种渴望。
Still broader currents of opinion and feeling helped create a receptive audience for Jomini's work. He wrote for a Europe shaken by the Revolution and Napoleon, and yet also fascinated by that experience. A generation of upheaval and the remarkable impact of the French Empire on the Western world could not be ignored. At the same time the desire was widespread to bring this disturbing epoch into some kind of intellectual order, to normalize it by somehow returning the French genie to its bottle. Jomini, with his emphasis on strategy, biography, and science, responded to this desire.
约米尼认为，拿破仑的伟大之处不在于利用革命的能量达到军事目的，而在于洞察并运用战争的科学真理。从这个意义上讲，拿破仑并非史无前例的革命力量，而是现代社会中反复出现的天才领袖这一现象的典型代表。法国大革命促成了他的迅速崛起，但并非其权力的源泉；他的权力源于他强大的智慧和意志，而这首先需要遏制革命带来的破坏性离心效应，才能建立帝国。约米尼始终保持着他对拿破仑年轻时的崇拜，这使得他的理论和历史著作带有一种暧昧性，而这种暧昧性正是其在滑铁卢战役后的欧洲吸引读者的重要原因之一。保守派人士在约米尼的著作中发现，他巧妙地将革命的政治和社会动荡与拿破仑军事胜利的原因和后果割裂开来；他们得以在不被战争与革命之间可能存在的联系所困扰的情况下思考战争。约米尼自身的政治立场也支持这种对其著作的解读。约米尼因其在1827年出版的四卷本拿破仑传记中对拿破仑的偏袒态度而受到批评，这令他感到尴尬。于是，他借着撰写一部篇幅较长的“补充和修正”传记的机会，对传记中关于1815年战役的简短描述进行了阐述，并借此机会宣扬君权神授的优点。<sup> 38</sup>他早已远离了青年时代的雅各宾主义，但他在研究战争的方法上却几乎没有任何明显的改变。
The greatness of Napoleon, said Jomini, lay not in exploiting the energies of the Revolution for military ends, but in discerning and applying the scientific truths of warfare. In that sense, Napoleon had not been an unprecedented revolutionary force, but a supreme modern case of a recurrent phenomenon—the leader of genius. The French Revolution had made possible his rapid rise, but it had not been the source of his power; that had come from his powerful intellect and will, which first had to stop the destructive, centrifugal effects of the Revolution before building the Empire. Jomini never lost his youthful admiration for Napoleon, and this gave his theoretical and historical work an ambiguity that was an important part of its appeal in post-Waterloo Europe. Conservatives found in Jomini a skillful disconnecting of the political and social upheaval of the Revolution from the causes and consequences of Napoleonic military victories; they were able to think about warfare without being troubled by its possible relationship to revolution. Jomini's own politics support such a reading of his work; after being embarrassed by criticism of the favorable treatment he had given to Napoleon in his four-volume biography published in 1827, Jomini used the occasion of a book-length “supplement and rectification” of the biography's brief account of the 1815 campaign to preach the virtues of divine-right monarchy.38 He had come a long way from the Jacobinism of his youth, but he had done so without any perceptible shift in his approach to the study of war.
不出所料，约米尼身上有一种纯粹的推销技巧；他深谙读者所需，并迎合他们的需求。在他的一些已出版作品中，不乏对如何说服读者接受其论点的技术性探讨。如果说他早期的著作是站在劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫的肩膀上，那么在此基础上，他便开始抨击不幸的海因里希·迪特里希·冯·比洛，后者的著作在本卷的前文中已有论述。约米尼确信，比洛的理论晦涩难懂，除了数学家之外，无人能够理解，无论其理论本身多么优秀，这都是一个错误。起初，约米尼曾尝试通过对劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫的研究进行逐条批判来阐明战争原理，但当他意识到这种方法会造就一部冗长乏味的作品时，便放弃了。枯燥乏味、晦涩难懂、悲观悲观——在约米尼看来，这些也是克劳塞维茨的主要缺点，尽管他承认《战争论》中也蕴含着一些不错的想法。<sup>39</sup>因此，问题不在于正确与否，而在于找到一种能够吸引和说服读者的形式。
There is in Jomini, not surprisingly, an important element of pure salesmanship; he knew what his readers wanted, and he gave it to them. In some of his published work, there are revealing digressions on the technical problem of persuading the reader to accept his argument. If in his earliest book he had stood on the shoulders of Lloyd and Tempelhof, from this position he had opened fire on the hapless Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow, whose work is discussed in an earlier essay in this volume. Bülow, he was sure, had made himself incomprehensible to all but math ematicians, which was a mistake no matter what the merits of his theory might be. At first Jomini had tried to use a running critique of the studies by Lloyd and Tempelhof to elucidate the principles of war, but gave up when he saw that this method would produce a long, boring work. Tedious, obscure, pessimistic—these were also the great faults of Clausewitz in Jomini's view, although he admitted that there were some good ideas buried in On War.39 The problem, then, lay less in being right than in finding the format that would attract and persuade.
约米尼似乎过于自信，认为发现真相远比包装和推销真相容易得多。他坚信自己掌握着对士兵和战略家而言唯一重要的真理，并为此竭尽全力地使他所撰写的军事史版本和军事理论尽可能地吸引人。他力求信息清晰、简洁且反复出现，并严格遵循既定的军事史学规范。尽管他迎合了士兵和保守派的口味，但他通过对日益壮大的拿破仑传奇做出自己的贡献，避免了任何偏见的指责。为了增添多样性和一丝科学气息，他引入了示意图和少量数学知识，但并未过度使用，从而避免了比洛犯下的错误。40
Jomini seems all too modern in his confidence that discovering the truth is a less demanding task than packaging and marketing it. Never shaken in his faith that he had a firm grip on the only truth that mattered to soldiers and strategists, he worked hardest at making his versions of military history and his formulation of military theory as attractive as possible. He kept the message clear, simple, and repetitive. He stayed well within the established canon of military historiography. Although telling soldiers and conservatives what they wanted to hear, he escaped any charge of bias by making his own contribution to the growing Napoleonic legend. For variety and a touch of scientific patina, he introduced schematic diagrams and a little mathematics, but not too much, avoiding Billow's mistake.40
从本质上讲，若米尼融合了十九世纪早期两大文化潮流：一种无限的浪漫情怀和对科学力量的痴迷，这种痴迷被简化为程式化的陈述和规范性的训诫。若米尼笔下的拿破仑，其原型是腓特烈大帝，是一位军事天才，他超凡的思想和意志如同宗教启示般领悟了科学之美与力量——即科学的浪漫。若米尼的影响必须放在当时其他一些有影响力的思想家的背景下理解，这些人以大致相同的方式看待现实，尽管他们的具体结论或纲领可能有所不同：例如边沁、孔德、马克思，以及如今已被遗忘的科普作家维克多·库赞，仅举几例。与库赞一样，但与边沁和马克思不同，若米尼并不沉迷于解决他所选择的理论问题本身；他在很年轻的时候就已经令人满意地解决了这个问题。<sup> 41</sup>相反，他渴望被倾听，渴望说服他人，渴望确立人们对战争的思考方式；他将漫长的一生和永不停歇的精力都投入到这项事业中。在这项事业中，无论他内心深处可能怀有怎样的失败感和无力感，他都取得了独一无二的成功。
In essence, Jomini fused two of the great cultural currents of the early nineteenth century: a boundless romantic sensibility and an obsession with the power of science, reduced to formulaic statements and prescriptive injunctions. Jomini's Napoleon, prefigured by Frederick, was a military genius whose transcendent mind and will grasped, as in religious revelation, the beauty and power of science—the romance of science. Jomini's influence must be understood in the context of influential contemporaries who saw reality in much the same way, however their specific conclusions or programs might diverge: Bentham, Comte, Marx, and the now-forgotten popularizer Victor Cousin, to choose only a few examples. Like Cousin, but unlike Bentham and Marx, Jomini was not absorbed by the solution of his chosen intellectual problem as such; he had solved that satisfactorily as a very young man.41 Rather, he wanted to be heard, to convince, to establish the way that men think about war; and to this task he devoted his long life and restless energy. And in this task, whatever secret feelings of failure and futility he may have had, he was uniquely successful.
三
III
他的思想，尤其是在二十世纪战争这面巨大的棱镜下审视时，很容易被戏仿和嘲讽。许多反战小说家，以及一些历史学家，都将约米尼的陈词滥调强加于现代军事指挥官身上，这些指挥官被描绘成愚蠢、残暴，或两者兼具。他坚持认为，即使是军事技术最激进的变革也无法改变战争的原则，这似乎解释了为什么有人会下令骑兵攻击机枪阵地，或者将核能描述为“只不过是另一种武器”。同样令人沮丧的是，他对军事职业与政治权威之间令人痛心的鸿沟的加剧，似乎已成为现代世界的顽疾。约米尼将战略从其政治和社会背景中剥离出来，助长了一种至今仍困扰着我们的战争思维模式。但如果我们因此而将我们后来的军事困境归咎于他，那就大错特错了。如同任何一套影响深远的思想体系一样，他的思想清晰地表达了当时已经盛行的思想、态度和情感，就他而言，这些思想、态度和情感是在拿破仑战争期间及之后形成的。如果我们能够设身处地地理解这些思想，并尽可能地抱持同情心，就能更好地理解它们。
His actual ideas, particularly when seen through the monstrous prism of twentieth-century warfare, lend themselves readily to parody and ridicule. A host of antiwar novelists, and some historians as well, have put Jominian banalities into the mouths of modern military commanders, who are variously depicted as stupid, sadistic, or both. His insistence that not even the most radical changes in military technology can alter the principles of war seems to explain a mentality that could order cavalry to attack machine guns or describe nuclear energy as “just another weapon.” Equally dismaying is his contribution to the lamentable gulf between the military profession and political authority that appears to be a chronic malady of the modern world. By isolating strategy from its political and social context, Jomini helped to foster a mode of thinking about war that continues to haunt us. But we would be mistaken to blame him for our subsequent military troubles. Like any set of powerfully influential ideas, his gave clear expression to thoughts, attitudes, and feelings already prevalent, in his case during and after the Napoleonic wars. We can understand more if, mustering all possible sympathy, we take these ideas seriously.
如今，若米尼主要因其著作《孙子兵法概要》而闻名，该书已被翻译成多种语言，但经常遭到删节、摘录和抄袭。这正是他所希望的。他自诩为军事理论界的哥白尼或哥伦布，并喜欢说他所有的著作，包括约三十卷军事史，都不如他那篇写于1804年、出版于1807年的关于战争原则的短文有价值。<sup> 42</sup>这篇短文经过扩展和阐述后，构成了《孙子兵法概要》的核心。从他那个时代的克劳塞维茨到我们这个时代的伯纳德·布罗迪，许多批评者都抱怨若米尼试图将战争简化为一套简单的规则。<sup> 43</sup>在这一点上，他自己也无可辩驳。但他这种说教式的强调——其目的令批评者们如此恼火——可能掩盖了他著作的其他重要方面。
Today Jomini is known chiefly through his Summary of the Art of War, translated into many languages and often abridged, extracted, and plagiarized. This is as he hoped. Describing himself as the Copernicus or the Columbus of military theory, he liked to say that all his books, including some thirty volumes of military history, were less valuable than his single short essay on the principles of war, written by 1804 and published in 1807.42 This essay, expanded and elaborated, was the core of the Summary. Critics of Jomini from Clausewitz in his time to Bernard Brodie in ours have complained that he tried to reduce warfare to a simple set of rules.43 On this point, he could claim no misunderstanding. But his very didactic emphasis, whose aim so exasperates his critics, may have obscured other important aspects of his work.
他的军事史学著作值得深入研究。他最早的作品是关于七年战争的，这是一次严肃的尝试，旨在超越该领域普遍存在的明显的党派偏见。军事史常常被用来歌颂某个领袖或某个民族，将其作为君主权力的附属品或民族自豪感的表达，因此，约米尼力求对战争进行更客观、更批判性的描述，这一点令人印象深刻。甚至他的导师劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫也明显带有党派色彩；劳埃德曾担任奥地利一方的将军，而滕珀尔霍夫则受到腓特烈的鼓励，反驳劳埃德的批评。当然，约米尼的偏见在于他相信战争原则确实存在，并且这些原则的运作可以从实际的战争行为中辨别出来。但至少他树立了一个新的标准，在这个标准中，赞扬和谴责远不如在某种现实的基础上确立历史可能性的范围重要。他后期关于革命战争和拿破仑战争的著作无疑被低估了。约米尼曾有机会查阅法国、俄国和奥地利的档案，他亲自参与了许多战役，并在1815年后质询了高级指挥官——例如在维罗纳会议上质询了威灵顿公爵。任何关注这一时期军事史的历史学家都会发现，这些著作因其细节、清晰度和总体准确性而仍然极具价值。通过探究每个交战方的行动，他试图摆脱至今仍困扰着军事史写作的片面研究。44尽管如此，我们必须将注意力转移到他本人坚持认为是其著作中更重要的部分——战略理论。
His military historiography deserves more than a passing glance. The earliest work, on the Seven Years' War, was a serious attempt to transcend the evident partisanship that consistently afflicted the genre. Military history was used so often to celebrate a leader or a people as an adjunct of monarchical power or an expression of national pride, that Jomini's quest for a less partial, more critical account of warfare is impressive. Even his mentors Lloyd and Tempelhof were obvious partisans; Lloyd had served as a general on the Austrian side, and Tempelhof was encouraged by Frederick to refute Lloyd's criticisms. Jomini's bias, of course, lay in believing that principles of war actually existed and that their operation could be discerned in the actual conduct of warfare. But at least he exemplified a new standard, in which praise and blame were less important than establishing, on some realistic basis, the range of historical possibilities. His later work on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has surely been underrated. Jomini had some access to French, Russian, and Austrian archives, he took a personal part in many campaigns, and after 1815 he questioned senior commanders—the Duke of Wellington at the Congress of Verona, for example. Any historian concerned with the military history of the period will find these volumes still valuable for their detail, clarity, and general accuracy. By trying to explore the actions of each belligerent, he tried to escape from the one-sided research that still plagues the writing of military history.44 All this said, our attention must shift to what he himself insisted was the more important part of his work, the theory of strategy.
约米尼认为战争存在永恒不变的“原则”，这些原则对凯撒和亚历山大、腓特烈和拿破仑都同样适用，而他强调“作战路线”正是这一论点的核心。<sup> 45</sup>对于现代批评约米尼的学者而言，他们对约米尼对西方军事思想的长期影响深感遗憾，认为这些“作战路线”仅仅反映了其理论的伪科学性质；充其量，这些术语只是狭隘的技术术语，而且早已过时，或许在近代以前的战争中还有意义，但除了应用于特定的历史战争形式之外，它们本身并无其他价值。如此看待“作战路线”，就忽略了约米尼试图表达的关键部分。
Central to Jomini's argument that there are immutable “principles” of war, as valid for Caesar and Alexander as for Frederick and Napoleon, is his emphasis on “lines of operations.”45 For modern critics of Jomini, who deplore his long-term influence on Western military thought, these “lines of operations” are simply reflections of the pseudoscientific nature of his theorizing; at best they are narrowly technical, certainly obsolete terms that might have meant something in premodern warfare but are of no serious interest except as they apply to a particular historical form of warfare. To see “lines of operations” in this way is to miss a vital part of what Jomini was attempting to say.
约米尼从劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫那里继承了“作战线”（lignes d'opérations）这一术语，并认为正是他们启发了他对战争的严肃思考。但他同时也意识到，前人对这一术语的使用含糊不清，需要进一步阐释和澄清。或许他早些放弃这一术语是个错误，因为它使他、他的读者和批评者陷入了更深的困惑，引发了毫无意义的争论，最终——甚至在他去世之前——沦为笑柄。他没有从头开始，而是像一位在法国军队中鲁莽的年轻参谋军官那样，兴致勃勃地纠正劳埃德、滕珀尔霍夫和比洛对这一核心概念的误解。一旦他决定发表自己的观点，到1805年，他便被自己好斗的天性所困，终其一生都无法摆脱自己精心设计的思想陷阱。
Jomini inherited the term lignes d'opérations from Lloyd and Tempelhof, to whom he gave credit for the origins of his own serious thinking about warfare. But he also saw that the term had been used by his predecessors in a confusing, unclear way and that it needed elaboration and clarification. Perhaps he made a mistake in not dropping the term altogether at some early stage, because it led him, his readers, and his critics to new levels of confusion, to sterile polemics, and—eventually, even before his death—to ridicule. Instead of beginning afresh, he took obvious delight, as a brash young staff officer in French service, in correcting the errors of Lloyd, Tempelhof, and Bülow in their misunderstanding of this centrally important concept. And once committed to the published word, by 1805, he was caught for the rest of his life by his own combative nature in an intellectual trap of his own design.
这位雄心勃勃的年轻人一旦设下陷阱，便会落入其中，而这个陷阱从未改变。如果将作战路线理解为武装力量作战的地点、作战目标以及相对于国家全部可用军事力量的兵力投入，那么约米尼坚持认为必须做出根本性的区分；他认为，作战路线有两种。第一种是“自然”的——河流、山脉、海岸线、海洋、沙漠以及军事行动必须穿越、跨越和环绕的广阔距离。但不仅如此：限制战争的相当永久性的、人为的环境也是“自然”或可用作战路线的一部分——防御工事、政治边界、海军基地和道路网络。他的观点或许看似老生常谈，但由于军事历史学家和理论家模糊了战争中环境可行与实际发生之间的界限，因此这一点值得强调。第二类作战路线，一旦识别并排除环境限制因素，就完全关乎战略选择；在战前环境允许的选择范围内，在哪里作战？为了什么目的？投入多少兵力？这些问题，无论在今天还是在拿破仑战争时期，都不是无关紧要或容易回答的问题。
The trap, once built and sprung on himself by the ambitious youth, never changed. If lignes d'opérations are understood to mean where an armed force fights, for what objective, and in what force relative to the total available military power of the state, then Jomini insists that a fundamental distinction must be made; there are, he argued, two kinds of lignes d'opérations. First is the “natural” kind—the rivers, mountains, seacoasts, oceans, deserts, and sheer distances through, over, and around which military operations must be conducted. But there is more: the fairly permanent, man-made environment constricting warfare is also part of the “natural,” or available, lignes d'opérations—fortifications, political boundaries, naval bases, and road networks. His point may seem banal, but insofar as military historians and theorists had blurred the distinction between what in warfare was environmentally possible and what was actually done, the point was worth making. The second kind of lignes d'opérations, once the environmentally constricting factors are recognized and set apart, is concerned exclusively with strategic choice; within the range of choice allowed by the prewar environment, where to fight? To what purpose? In what force? These, today as in the Napoleonic Wars, are not trivial or easy questions.
令人遗憾的是，约米尼一开始就使用了不同的词语来区分这些概念：战略选择的自然或环境限制被归类为“领土”作战线，而实际的战略选择则被归类为“机动”作战线。当更详细的历史讨论不可避免地将这些类别与“基地”、“区域”或“战区”等作战概念混淆时，混乱不仅没有消除，反而加剧了。一代又一代急躁的士兵和不苟言笑的批评家都对这些看似晦涩难懂、抽象的新词感到困惑和恼火，这些新词的本质含义——而且是重要的含义——远不如一位自诩务实、直白、简洁、清晰的作者所能表达的那样容易理解。
Jomini unhappily began by using different words to make the distinction: the natural or environmental constriction of strategic choice was categorized as “territorial” lines of operations and the actual strategic choices became “maneuver” lines of operations. When the more detailed, historical discussion inevitably mixed these categories with references to “bases” and “zones” or “theaters” of operations, confusion was not eliminated but compounded. Generations of impatient soldiers and unsympathetic critics have been puzzled and exasperated by what seems an elusive, abstract use of these neologisms, whose essential—and important—meaning is much less comprehensible than it might have been from an author who claimed to be above all realistic, direct, simple, and clear.
约米尼进一步将“机动”作战路线细分为多达十个子类别，最后竟然还包括一个令人难以置信却又合情合理的“意外”类别，这无疑加剧了误解的可能性。然而，即使是“意外作战路线”这一术语也蕴含着一个至关重要的信息：在战争中，必须预料到意外情况的发生——瞬息万变的局势可能需要新的作战路线。我们将在后续讨论中再次提及这些子类别，但在此只需了解，年轻的约米尼——雄心勃勃、敏感而又鲁莽——竟然在内伊第六军驻扎西里西亚的战事间隙，于格洛高匆忙出版了他的《战争艺术总论》的第一部完整版本，并将五百册中的大部分寄给了柏林和布雷斯劳的书商，其余的则寄给了拿破仑和其他他希望能够打动的人。主要结果是，他关于战争中一个至关重要方面的宝贵思想，被用误导性和晦涩难懂的语言过早地扼杀了。46
Jomini compounded the chances for misunderstanding when he further divided “maneuver” lignes d'opérations into no fewer than ten sub-categories, ending with the implausible category of “accidental.” But even the term “accidental line of operations” contains a vital point: in warfare the unexpected must be expected—rapidly changing circumstances might require a new line of operations. We must return to some of these subcategories later in the discussion, but here it is enough to recognize that a very young Jomini—ambitious, sensitive, and brash—rushed the first full statement of his “principes généraux de l'art de guerre” into print at Glogau, of all places, during a lull when Ney's Sixth Corps was garrisoned in Silesia, sending most of the five hundred copies off to booksellers in Berlin and Breslau, the rest to Napoleon and others he hoped to impress. The chief result was to freeze prematurely, in misleading and obscurantist language, his valuable thought on a vital aspect of all warfare.46
即使在微电子、核能以及太空本身被用于军事目的的时代，从时间和空间角度来看，战略选择仍然是一个基本问题。约米尼认为，这正是拿破仑战争成功、腓特烈二世那些不那么辉煌的胜利以及过去和未来所有战争结果的核心所在。他试图区分“领土”作战线，或者说可以在地图上规划的战争，以便将其搁置一边，使自己能够更清晰地专注于战略本身。同样地，随着他思想的阐述，他认识到，军事行动的最高层和最低层——价值观、情感、武器和技术都发挥作用的层级，他分别称之为“政治和道德”层级以及“战术”层级——是影响军事结果的重要因素。但他认为，这些“政治”和“战术”层级与“战略”层级有着本质的区别；政治制度和情感氛围千差万别，而战术则主要取决于现有的——以及不断变化的——武器装备。两者都不受任何根本的、一成不变的原则约束；战争中唯一能够进行科学分析的方面是战略。47因此，尽管他一再否认有任何此类意图，但他的工作的长期影响却是将战争问题简化为战时指挥官的专业考量。
Strategic choice, regarded in time and space, remains a basic problem even in an age of microelectronics, nuclear energy, and the exploitation of “space” itself for military purposes. This was the problem that Jomini saw at the heart of Napoleonic success, the less spectacular victories of Frederick II, and the outcome of all warfare past and future. He tried to distinguish “territorial” lines of operations, or warfare as it can be planned on a map, in order to set it aside and allow himself to focus more clearly on strategy itself. Similarly, as he elaborated his ideas, he recognized that the highest and lowest levels of military action, where values and emotions, and weapons and techniques, came into play, levels that he called “political and moral” and “tactical,” respectively, were important factors in military results. But these “political” and “tactical” levels were qualitatively different, he argued, from the “strategic”; political systems and emotional climates varied greatly, while tactics were narrowly determined by existing—and changing—weaponry. Neither was subject to underlying, unchanging principles; the only aspect of warfare susceptible to scientific analysis is strategy.47 The long-term effect of his work, then, although he repeatedly denied any such intention, was to reduce the problem of war to the professional concerns of the wartime commander.
他的战争“原则”过去是，现在以各种现代版本形式依然是制定战略选择的指导方针。他所说的“战略”涵盖了从对特定敌人发动战争的政治决策到战斗本身（但不包括战斗本身）的所有军事行动层面。在每个层面上，指挥官都必须决定在何处、何时以及如何调动部队，以完成任务并在最佳条件下作战。约米尼声称，他在十几岁时通过研究拿破仑1796-1797年的意大利战役就得出了这一结论：大多数指挥官之所以做出错误的选择，是因为他们不理解战略原则。这些原则可以用最简洁的语言概括：将优势兵力集中于敌人薄弱且容易遭受重创的地点。
His “principles” of war were, and still are in their various modern versions, prescriptions for making strategic choices. “Strategy,” as he used the term, applied to all levels of military action below the political decision to wage war against certain enemies down to, but not including, combat itself. At every level the commander must decide where, when, and how to move his forces in order to carry out his mission and to fight under the best conditions. In Jomini's judgment, which he claimed to have reached when still in his teens by considering Bonaparte's Italian campaign of 1796–1797, most commanders made the wrong choices because they did not understand the principles of strategy. Those principles can be summarized in the fewest words as bringing superior force to bear on a point where the enemy is both weaker and liable to crippling damage.
如果忽略若米尼强调这一点的缘由，他的观点似乎就显得平庸：大多数指挥官之所以做出糟糕的战略选择，是因为他们被“常识”（若米尼本人并未使用这个词，但他对历史案例的无休止讨论却强烈暗示了这一点）所误导。为了保卫领土或较弱的军队，他们让敌人决定在何时何地以及如何进攻。由于不确定如何保护或利用几条“天然”的作战路线，他们便将兵力分散到多个可能的地点，以求稳妥。若米尼指出，拿破仑、腓特烈以及所有胜利的指挥官的非同寻常的智慧在于——集中兵力攻击某个被认为是“决定性”的敌方据点。正确理解后，这种看似鲁莽的战略——它会使某些地区变得薄弱或易受攻击——实际上是一种审慎。积极的进攻行动剥夺了敌人思考和行动的时间，而战场上的优势兵力才是最终胜利的最佳保障。用约米尼最喜欢的一个词来说，任何其他的战略方法都是“有害的”。这些表述虽然简单，但他却在著作中反复强调，因为在实际战争中，这些原则常常被忽视，并导致灾难性的后果。
Again, Jomini seems banal if we fail to see why he emphasizes the point: most commanders make bad strategic choices because they are misled by “common sense” (a phrase not used by Jomini, but strongly implied by his endless discussions of historical cases). Attempting to defend territory or a weaker army, they let the enemy decide where, when, and how to attack. Uncertain how to protect or exploit several “natural” lines of operations, they hedge their bets by dispersing force among several possibilities. The uncommon sense of Napoleon and usually of Frederick and of all victorious commanders had always been—says Jomini—to attack with massed forces against some enemy point judged to be “decisive.” Properly understood, the apparent recklessness of such strategy, which leaves some areas weakened or vulnerable, is actually prudence. Aggressive, offensive action deprives the enemy of time to think and act, while superior force at the time and place of battle is the best guarantee of ultimate victory. Any other approach to strategy is, in one of Jomini's favorite words, “vicieuse.” As simple as these formulations may seem, he reiterated them throughout his writings because in the actual conduct of warfare they were so often ignored, with disastrous consequences.
对约米尼而言，历史既是他理解这些原则的来源，也是他在真实的军事行动中验证和阐明这些原则的途径。由此引出一个问题：约米尼的历史叙述在多大程度上仅仅是为了反映他自身的理论预设？克劳塞维茨就强烈反对约米尼的一些具体历史判断，并指责他存在理论偏见和知识不足的双重缺陷。<sup> 48</sup>但毫无疑问，在对抗革命时期和拿破仑时期法国的各种军事联盟中，以及在七年战争中对抗普鲁士时，做出正确的战略选择是多么困难。
History for Jomini was both the source of his own grasp of these principles, and their confirmation and elucidation in the real world of military action. A question arises about the degree to which Jomini's historical accounts were simply shaped to reflect his theoretical preconceptions. Clausewitz, for one, disagreed sharply with a number of Jomini's specific historical judgments, and charged him with both faults—theoretical bias and inadequate knowledge.48 But the enormous difficulty in making the right strategic choices within the various military coalitions against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, as against Prussia during the Seven Years' War, is clearly beyond the slightest doubt.
例如，最近一项基于对英国档案馆详尽研究的关于第二次反法同盟末期（1799-1802年）英国战略的研究显示，当时的战时内阁拥有强大的海军和财政权力，以及相当可观的陆军，却完全无法决定在何处或是否发动进攻——是在地中海？在美洲？还是直接进攻法国本土，或者在佛兰德斯和比斯开湾之间的某个地方？如果参与这场重大战略失败的不是威廉·皮特、亨利·邓达斯和格伦维尔勋爵，而是能力稍逊一筹的人，我们或许会认为他们像约米尼在其对军事失败更为直白的描述中所说的那样愚蠢。<sup> 49</sup>战略选择的制定和执行之难，无论事后看来多么简单和有限，都在一次又一次的战争中得到证实，直至今日。而难点的核心正如约米尼所定义的那样，在于如何正确权衡风险、收益和概率，并得出足以执行的坚定结论。大规模进攻行动是否总是或通常是正确的做法，这是一个完全不同的问题，但至少我们必须赞扬约米尼，因为他给予了战略决策问题应有的关注，包括其历史和后果。
A recent study, for example, of British strategy at the end of the Second Coalition (1799–1802), based on exhaustive research in British archives, shows a war cabinet with vast naval and financial powers and a considerable land force at its disposal completely unable to decide where or whether to attack—in the Mediterranean? in America? against France itself, somewhere between Flanders and the Bay of Biscay? Had men less capable than William Pitt, Henry Dundas, and Lord Grenville been involved in this gross strategic failure, we might think them the fools that Jomini, in his more unqualified accounts of military defeat, suggests losers usually are.49 The difficulty of making and implementing strategic choices, however simple and limited they may appear in retrospect, is confirmed in war after war, down to the present. And the core of the difficulty is as Jomini defined it, in correctly weighing risks, benefits, and probabilities, and in reaching some conclusion firm enough to be carried out. Whether massed offensive action is always or usually the right prescription is an altogether different question, but at least we must credit Jomini for giving the problem of strategic decision making the attention its history and consequences deserve.
在他的分析中，最受关注的战略概念是“内线”或“内侧”作战线。它指的是这样一个简单的想法：一方可以占据敌军分散兵力之间的“内部”位置。凭借这样的“内部”位置，可以先攻击敌军的一部分，再攻击另一部分，逐一击败敌军，即使敌军如果联合起来，可能实力更强。约米尼不厌其烦地论证，像腓特烈或拿破仑这样的将领指挥的小规模军队，如何通过采取“单一”或统一的作战线，击败规模更大、实力更强的敌军，而敌军则采取“多条”或“同心”作战线。像1796年的拿破仑那样技艺高超的指挥官，可以通过快速机动，利用敌军的分散，形成针对对手“外部”防线的“内部”作战线，从而取得决定性的胜利。
The strategic concept that received most attention in his analysis is that of the “inner” or “interior” line of operations. It refers to the simple idea that one side may have a position between—“inside”—separated enemy forces. With such an “interior” position, it is possible to strike first one part of the enemy force, then the other, defeating each in turn, although the enemy—if united—might be the stronger side. Jomini never tired of demonstrating how a smaller army commanded by a Frederick or a Napoleon could defeat a larger, presumably stronger army by operating on a “single” or united line of operation when the enemy was operating on “multiple” or “concentric” lines of operation. A skillful commander, like Bonaparte in 1796, by rapid maneuver could exploit enemy dispersion, achieve an “interior” line of operation against the “exterior” lines of his opponent, and win a decisive victory.
约米尼声称，他是在研究腓特烈1757年在洛伊滕的胜利时萌生了这一想法。在那场战役中，腓特烈成功地将他的主力部队集中攻击奥地利军队的一个侧翼。约米尼发现，拿破仑在意大利也以更大的战略规模运用了同样的策略，并在他后来的战役中以某种形式重复了这一策略。在滑铁卢战役中，除了普鲁士拒绝配合之外，没有任何其他因素阻止拿破仑再次使用这一制胜法宝。普鲁士军队与惠灵顿指挥的英军脱节，在利尼战役中战败，但他们惨痛地吸取了教训：绝不能给拿破仑足够的时间和空间来击败他们的盟友。在滑铁卢战役的关键时刻，普鲁士军队没有沿着自己的作战路线撤退，而是重返战场，击溃了法军的右翼，将一场势均力敌的战斗扭转为盟军的决定性胜利。
Jomini claimed that the idea had first struck him in studying Frederick's victory of 1757 at Leuthen. There Frederick had managed to bring the mass of his army to bear against a single Austrian flank. Jomini saw that Bonaparte had done the same thing on a much larger strategic scale in Italy, to be repeated, in one form or another, in his later campaigns. At Waterloo, nothing but Prussian refusal to play the game kept Napoleon from using the victorious formula once again. Separated from the British army under Wellington, the Prussians had been defeated at Ligny, but they had painfully learned never to give Napoleon the time and space needed to defeat their ally. At the critical moment at Waterloo, the Prussians, instead of retreating along their own line of operation, returned to the fighting zone, crushed the French right flank, and changed a drawn battle into a decisive Allied victory.
“内线”作战路线是约米尼对其“集中兵力攻击敌军薄弱环节”这一总体原则最具体、最实用的阐述。因此，它引起了寻求实用战略思路的军人的极大兴趣。当然，正如滑铁卢战役所展现的那样，它的运用取决于对时间和空间的精确计算以及对敌军行为的把握。如果敌军保持其兵力统一，或者留给敌军攻击和击败其分散兵力的时间和空间太少，那么胜利就可能无从谈起。约米尼并未深入探讨这个问题，只是指出一位杰出的将领会通过迷惑和欺骗来诱使对手分散兵力，正如1805年奥地利人和1806年普鲁士人所经历的那样。在这方面，约米尼承认战争的科学性始终是一门艺术。
The “interior” line of operation was the most specific, practical form given by Jomini to his general principle of massing force against some vulnerable part of the enemy force. As such, it aroused much interest among soldiers seeking useful strategic ideas. Of course its application depended, as it had at Waterloo, on exact calculations of time and space as well as on enemy behavior. If the enemy kept his own forces united or left too little time and space for his divided forces to be attacked and defeated, then victory might not be possible. Jomini did not deal with this problem except to say that a Great Captain would induce his opponent, by confusing and deceiving him, to divide his forces, as had been done to the Austrians in 1805 and to the Prussians in 1806. In that respect Jomini conceded that the science of war would always be an art.
在若米尼成熟的战略著作中，他承认大规模进攻单一目标这一基本原则存在一个重大例外。他将这种例外称为内战、宗教战争、民族战争或舆论战争。这些战争双方并非正规军，而是全体民众被唤醒并积极参与的战争。法国大革命战争中最激烈的阶段，即全民征兵和恐怖统治时期，就属于此类。若米尼本人也曾参与过另外两场类似的战争：法国入侵西班牙和俄国。在这些战役中，集结兵力实际上毫无意义，因为没有决定性的攻击目标；敌人无处不在，通常隐藏在民众的敌意背后，使入侵者目盲。若米尼回忆起在西班牙西北部一个可怕的夜晚，方圆六十英里内都没有西班牙军队的踪迹，内伊军团的一个炮兵连却全军覆没。唯一的幸存者说，袭击者是受神父领导的农民。约米尼写道，墨西哥所有的黄金都买不到法军在西班牙所需的作战情报。<sup> 50 </sup> 同样，约米尼在1812年贝雷西纳河的生死渡河中丢失了所有文件，他仍然记得俄国游击队是如何骚扰撤退的法军纵队的。在他看来，这样的战争“危险而可悲”——“它们总是激起强烈的激情，使战争变得充满恶意、残酷和可怕”。任何士兵都宁愿选择“忠诚而骑士精神”的战争，也不愿选择内战、民族战争和意识形态战争中“有组织的暗杀”。<sup> 51</sup>
In his mature writing on strategy, Jomini admitted one great exception to the fundamental principle of massed, offensive action against a single point. The exception he variously called civil, religious, or national war, or wars of opinion. These were armed struggles not with regular armies on both sides, but wars in which an entire people was aroused and active. The most intense phase of the Wars of the French Revolution, at the time of the levée en masse and the Reign of Terror, had been of this nature. Jomini himself had taken part in two other such wars: the French invasions of Spain and Russia. In these campaigns it was literally pointless to mass forces because there was no decisive point to attack; the enemy was everywhere, usually concealed behind a screen of popular hostility that blinded the invader. Jomini remembered a horrible night in northwestern Spain, with no Spanish troops reported within sixty miles, when an entire artillery company of Ney's corps had been wiped out. The sole survivor said that the attack had come from peasants led by priests. All the gold in Mexico, Jomini wrote, could not buy the combat intelligence needed by French forces in Spain.50 Similarly Jomini, who had lost all his papers at the desperate crossing of the Beresina River in 1812, remembered how Russian partisans had harassed the retreating French columns. Wars like these, in his view, were “dangerous and deplorable”—“they always arouse violent passions that make them spiteful, cruel, terrible.” Any soldier prefers warfare “loyale et chevaleresque” to the “organized assassination” of civil, national, and ideological wars.51
对于此类“危险而令人痛心”的战争，他几乎没有提及任何指导正确战略的原则（如果有的话）。以武力征服一个民族必然意味着兵力分散；集结兵力作战总是存在在薄弱地区失去控制的风险，而这些薄弱地区可能会被西班牙农民和俄罗斯游击队等叛军所控制。唯一的解决办法似乎是同时拥有一支机动性强的野战军和独立的领土“师”，分别驻守和控制每个被征服的地区。这些师的指挥官需要具备智慧和经验（instruit），因为他们的政治作用与武装力量在确保胜利方面同样重要。52这种务实的建议，虽然没有声称具有科学依据，却忽略了他关于集中兵力进攻单一目标的基本主张，但这似乎并没有让他、他的听众，甚至他的批评者感到困扰。相反，他强烈暗示整个问题令他感到厌恶，并明确指出任何军事强权都应该避免卷入民族战争或内战。
He had little to say about the principles, if any, that informed the correct strategy for such “dangerous and deplorable” wars. Conquering a people in arms inevitably meant dividing forces; massing troops for battle would always run the risk of losing control in weakened areas to insurgent forces like Spanish peasants and Russian partisans. The only answer seemed to be in having both a mobile field army and separate territorial “divisions” to garrison and control each conquered district. The commanders of these divisions would need to be intelligent and experienced (instruit) because their political role would be as important as armed force in securing victory.52 That this pragmatic advice, which claimed no scientific authority, meant ignoring his fundamental prescription of massed offensive action against one point, does not appear to have troubled him, his audience, or even his critics. Instead, he left a strong suggestion that the whole subject sickened him, and the clear implication that any military power would do well to avoid involving itself in national or civil wars.
无论从军事角度还是防御角度来看，民众战争都过于具有破坏性、代价过高且难以控制，因此无法纳入任何科学的战略研究范畴。对于未来战争将会——或者应该——像1793-1794年那样成为“民族战争”的建议，若米尼回应说，战略如同政治，必须在职业军队参与的过去战争与革命引发的既新又旧的野蛮战争之间找到某种“恰当的平衡点”。他认为，折衷之道在于将民众的热情转化为一支训练有素、组织严密的军事后备力量，以便在战时迅速加入正规军。<sup> 53</sup>从这个意义上讲，他的建议被证明是具有预见性的。但最终，他动摇了，并提出了一个假设情景。如果法国入侵比利时，而德国军队为了阻止法国吞并佛兰德斯而占领莱茵地区作为报复，那么法国政府是否应该发动大规模征兵来保卫其东部边境？当然不应该；显然，双方的目标都有限，不值得付出民众战争带来的惨痛代价。但如果德军在东线取得胜利，又有什么能阻止他们欣喜若狂地决定吞并被占领的法国领土呢？这种局势升级的风险又会如何改变法国最初的算计？他承认，这是一个棘手的问题；讨论就此结束。54
Viewed either as a military problem or as a means of defense, people's war was too destructive, too costly and uncontrollable to be part of any scientific study of strategy. To the suggestion that future wars would—or should—be “national wars,” as in 1793–1794, Jomini replied that strategy, like politics, must find some “juste milieu” between wars of the past fought by professional armies and the new yet old barbaric warfare unleashed by the Revolution. The middle way, he argued, lay in channeling popular passions into a trained, organized military reserve that could quickly join the regular army in time of war.53 To that extent, his prescription proved to be prophetic. But in the end he wavered, using a hypothetical scenario. If France should invade Belgium and in retaliation German troops occupied Rhenish territory to prevent French annexation of Flanders, should the French government unleash a levée en masse to defend its eastern frontier? No, of course not; clearly, aims on both sides were limited and not worth the horrors of popular war. But if German forces achieved victory in the east, what could stop a euphoric decision to annex the occupied French territory? How might the risk of such escalation alter the original French calculation? It was, he admitted, a difficult question; and there ended the discussion.54
随着年龄的增长，若米尼似乎越来越关注战争的政治和心理层面，而这些层面此前被他自己的理论所忽略。在他早期的著作中，对政治因素的探讨零星且不频繁。1830年匆匆编纂的《战争战略概要》中，关于战争外交（politique de la guerre）和军事战略的政治层面（politique militaire）的论述仅约有五十页。七年后出版的《战争战略概要》则包含篇幅更长、论述更为严谨的章节，专门探讨战争的政治维度。克劳塞维茨的未完成巨著《战争论》很可能是若米尼在1837年扩展论述这一主题的重要因素。克劳塞维茨曾批评若米尼的理论狭隘、简单化和肤浅，并强调应将战争视为政治的延伸。正是在这部著作中，若米尼增加了关于“舆论战”的长篇章节，以及关于最高统帅和士气的新内容。但即便他更全面地探讨这些主题，也无法突破既有的论述模式。他处处描述利弊，劝诫读者追求良策、规避弊端，并提供各种方法来实现这一目标。例如，如果最高统帅像腓特烈或拿破仑那样，能够同时掌握政治和军事权力，那自然是理想的。但如果必须由君主任命最高统帅，那么问题就变成了如何避免摩擦和阴谋，以及如何在最高统帅执行战略计划时给予其一切可能的政治支持。55除了将其视为人性弱点的体现之外，他很少关注政治权威与军事指挥之间为何会产生摩擦。同样，民族军事精神被认为是一件好事；但他并未对这种现象进行分析，而只是呼吁人们尊重和敬重军队。
As he grew older, Jomini seemed more concerned with the political and psychological aspects of war that his own theorizing had pushed into the background. In his early work discussion of political factors, as such, was sporadic and infrequent. The hastily compiled Synoptic Analysis of 1830 has about fifty pages on the diplomacy of warfare (politique de la guerre) and the political aspects of strategy (politique militaire). The Summary, published seven years later, has much longer, more carefully considered sections on the political dimension of warfare. It seems likely that reading On War, the unfinished masterpiece of Clausewitz, who had criticized Jomini as narrow, simplistic, and superficial and who himself had stressed the need to see war as an extension of politics, was an important factor in this expanded treatment of the subject in 1837. It was here that Jomini added a long chapter on “wars of opinion” as well as new sections on supreme command and morale. But in giving these subjects fuller treatment, he could not break out of his established mode of discourse. At every point he described good and bad results, exhorted his readers to pursue the good and avoid the bad, and offered various techniques for doing so. For example, it was ideal if a supreme commander, like Frederick or Napoleon, combined political and military power. But if the monarch had to appoint a supreme commander, then the problem was one of avoiding friction and intrigue and of giving the supreme commander all possible political support in carrying out his strategic plans.55 There is little attention to the question of why friction arises between political authority and military command, except as a symptom of human weakness. Similarly, national military spirit is reckoned to be a good thing; but there is no analysis of the phenomenon, simply a call for the military to be honored and respected.
尽管若米尼并未声称其政治论述基于任何科学原理，但他对规范而非分析的强调却同样令人窒息。他对理想最高统帅的描述，体现了他在《概要》中对非战略事务的全部处理方式：他应当是一位拥有卓越道德和勇气的人，但未必学识渊博；“他必须精通一些事情[ il faut savoir peu mais bien ]，尤其是统帅原则。” ⁵⁶即使若米尼试图拓宽其战争观，他仍然无法摆脱对战略及其原则的执着。
Although Jomini did not claim to base his discussion of politics on any scientific principles, there is the same stultifying emphasis on prescription rather than analysis. His description of the ideal supreme commander epitomizes his entire treatment of nonstrategic matters in the Summary, he should be a man of great moral and physical courage, but not necessarily of great learning; “he must know a few things very well [il faut savoir peu mais bien] especially the regulating principles.”56 Even as Jomini tried to broaden his approach to war, he failed to escape his obsession with strategy and its principles.
对约米尼最基本的批评显而易见，即他坚持还原论和规范化。但他对此的回应是：“正是如此！” 将战争的复杂性简化到最少的关键因素，并制定最有可能取得胜利的行动方案，是他一贯的宗旨。⁵⁷他会反问批评者，他们是否认为战争无法通过分析来简化，或者分析无法识别各种方案的可能结果。对约米尼的批评不应仅仅停留在坚持认为他应该以另一种方式研究他的主题；而应该从他自身的出发点出发，然后探究他的作品在哪些方面未能达到其自身目标。
The basic criticism of Jomini is obvious, that he was committed to reductionism and prescription. But his response to this criticism would be, “Exactly!” To reduce the complexity of warfare to the smallest number of crucial factors and to prescribe those lines of action that make victory most likely were his consistently held intentions.57 He would ask his critics whether they think that warfare cannot be simplified by analysis or that analysis cannot identify the probable outcomes of various options. Criticism of Jomini must do more than insist that he ought to have approached his subject in another way; it must take him on his own terms and then ask where the work falls short of its own aims.
有四点内在缺陷显而易见。其一是，他未能像一位优秀的科学家那样检验“零假设”——即那些实际军事经验与基于其理论的预测不符的历史案例。事实上，他确实讨论过这类案例——1794年的战役便是其中之一，当时法军分散兵力，使奥地利人获得了“内线”的潜在优势，却最终取得了胜利——但约米尼显然过于热衷于解释这些案例，而对这些案例可能如何拓展或丰富其理论却漠不关心。简而言之，这些案例被视为对其理论的威胁，他讨论它们仅仅是为了先发制人，消除疑虑和批评。
Four such internal weaknesses suggest themselves. One is that he failed to test, as a good scientist should, the “null hypothesis”—the historical cases in which actual military experience did not conform to prediction based on his principles. Indeed he discussed such cases—the campaign of 1794 was one of them, when the French won despite dividing their forces and giving the Austrians the potential advantage of “interior lines”—but Jomini was too evidently concerned to explain such cases away, too little interested in the ways that they might have broadened or enriched his theory. These cases were, in short, treated as a threat to his position, and he discussed them only to preempt doubts and criticism.
第二个弱点与他的还原论方法密切相关。为了减少分析中的相关因素，他假设规模相当的军事单位本质上是相同的——装备、训练、纪律、补给和士气都一样。<sup> 58 </sup> 他只关注最高层的差异，即指挥官的能力和战略决策的质量。就像棋手或兵棋推演玩家一样，指挥官们操控的部队“价值”或多或少是已知的，并非像克劳塞维茨所说的那样是变量，而是战争方程式中的常量。这一假设在其有效范围内便于分析，但超出这些范围就会成为进一步分析的严重障碍。约米尼假设一类重要的战争是在武装力量现代化且实力大致相当的国家之间进行的，这并非不合理。如果差距过大，较弱的一方就不会冒战争的风险。 1815 年以后的欧洲战争与 1789 年以前一样，完全符合这一模式，因此约明的假设在 19 世纪欧洲的国际体系中似乎是现实的。
A second weakness is closely related to his reductionist method. To reduce relevant factors in his analysis, he made the assumption that military units of equivalent size were essentially equal—equally well armed, trained, disciplined, supplied, and motivated.’58 Only differences at the top, in the capacity of commanders and the quality of their strategic decisions, were of interest. Like chess players or war gamers, commanders play with units of force whose “values” are more or less known, not variables as Clausewitz would suggest, but constants in the equation of warfare. This assumption facilitates analysis within its own limits of validity but beyond these limits becomes a crippling impediment to further analysis. It was not unreasonable of Jomini to assume that an important class of wars were fought between states whose armed forces were modern and of roughly equal strength. Too much inequality, and the weaker side would not risk war. European warfare after 1815 fit this model neatly, as it had before 1789, so that Jominian assumptions seemed realistic within the international system of nineteenth-century Europe.
但还有另一类战争，其重要性在约米尼的时代日益凸显，这类战争中交战双方武装力量的不对称性对于任何充分的分析都至关重要。正是这种对称力量的假设，导致约米尼在处理西班牙和俄国等民众战争时举步维艰，并且几乎完全忽略了联盟战略固有的问题，例如在对抗拿破仑的战役中，即使面对一个团结而危险的敌人，盟国之间相互冲突的目标也根本无法调和。也正是这种假设，使得约米尼的理论教条地忽视了那些导致普鲁士在1866年和1870年取得胜利、1914-1918年和1939-1945年欧洲遭受重创，以及现代解放战争和革命战争在欧洲以外取得一些显著成果的技术和组织变革。所有这些战争的成败都取决于参战双方武装力量的不平衡或性质变化；但约米尼理论特别不适合定性分析——战略决策除外。
But there was another class of wars, whose importance was growing in Jomini's own lifetime, in which the asymmetrical character of the armed forces in conflict is critical to any adequate analysis. It is this assumption of symmetrical forces that causes Jomini to flounder in his treatment of popular wars, like those in Spain and Russia, and virtually to ignore the inherent problems of coalition strategy, as in the campaigns against Napoleon, when the conflicting aims of allied states simply could not be reconciled even in the fact of a united and dangerous enemy. It is this same assumption that makes Jominian theory dogmatically insensitive to the kinds of technological and organizational changes that brought Prussian victories in 1866 and 1870, European disaster in 1914–1918 and 1939–1945, and some spectacular results outside Europe from modern wars of liberation and revolution. All of these wars have hinged on imbalances or changes in the qualities of the armed forces engaged; but Jominian theory is peculiarly unsuited to qualitative analysis—except of strategic decision making.
第三个弱点与第二个弱点相关；约米尼本人曾指出，无论是战争发生的政治领域，还是战争所使用的军事技术，都无法像他应用于战略和战略决策那样进行科学分析。政治过于依赖于不断变化的环境以及政治领导人与政治力量之间瞬息万变的关系。同样，军事战术的细节也取决于不断变化的武器装备和其他因素，这些因素很容易超出固定原则的适用范围。然而，在他成熟的著作中，尤其是在其《概要》的主要部分，约米尼对区分哪些领域可以进行科学分析以及哪些领域不能进行科学分析显得非常轻率。他常被认为是现代“战略”（区别于“政治”和“战术”）概念的创始人，但他却在政治和战术之间随意切换，引用原则并提出行动方案，仿佛他自己忘记了这三个领域都受不同的规律支配。最严重的缺陷在于战术领域，而他的大多数专业读者自然会希望从中获得有用的指导。他最早的理论研究以洛伊滕战役为基础，而战场——在那里“永恒原则”并不适用——始终吸引着他的兴趣。<sup> 59</sup>他制定了作战方案，尽可能地运用集中兵力攻击单一目标的原则，强调“内线”的重要性，并警告人们在攻击敌方后方时切勿暴露自身后方。其结果是模糊了军事行动层级之间的关键区别——彻底混淆了下级部队在执行更大、更完善的战略计划时，完全可以合理地采取被动防御、分散兵力或暴露后方的情况。
The third weakness is related to the second; Jomini himself had stated that neither the political realm in which wars take place nor the military technique with which wars are fought is susceptible to the kind of scientific analysis that he brought to strategy and strategic decision making. Politics depend too much on varying conditions and on the ever-changing relationship between political leaders and political forces. Similarly, the details of military tactics depend on changing weaponry and other factors that readily escape the operation of fixed principles. But in his own mature work, notably in the main part of his Summary, Jomini is very careless about the location and importance of this distinction between what is and what is not susceptible to scientific analysis. Often acknowledged as the inventor of the modern concept of “strategy” (as distinct from “politics” and “tactics”), he wanders freely up into the one and down into the other, citing principles and prescribing action as if he himself had forgotten that all three zones were regulated by different laws. The worst faults are in the tactical zone, where most of his professional readers would naturally have sought useful instruction. He had based his earliest theorizing on the battle of Leuthen, and the battlefield—where “timeless principles” did not apply—always attracted his interest.’59 He developed schematic options for battle, invoking wherever possible the principle of massed force against a single point, noting the value of “interior lines,” warning against the danger of exposing one's rear while attacking that of the enemy. The effect was to blur the vital distinction between levels of military operation—to confuse hopelessly the situation in which a subordinate unit may, quite reasonably, defend passively, divide its forces, or expose its rear while operating as part of a larger, well-founded strategic plan.
就其自身而言，约米尼著作的最后一个缺陷在于他对战争原则的适用范围含糊不清。这种缺陷源于一种普遍存在的歧义，使得读者，包括学术评论家，对这部著作的理解截然不同，有时甚至相互矛盾。克劳塞维茨的著作也充满了歧义，但《战争论》却有意引发争议，反映了作者自身对战争的理解——复杂、动态且常常充满歧义。约米尼追求简洁明了，但如果仔细阅读，而非草率或选择性地阅读，就会发现约米尼的论述是模棱两可的。有时，胜利取决于对战略原则的严格遵守；有时，指挥官运用这些原则的才能（或判断何时可以安全地忽略这些原则的判断力）才是关键因素。战争是科学的，或者说可以被科学化；然而，战争本身也是一场充满偶然性和非理性力量的混乱戏剧。约米尼的论述重点似乎常常随着其论战路线的转变而变化，无论是抨击比洛及其所有将战争机械化的极端科学主义，还是反驳克劳塞维茨等人对规范性作战原则价值的质疑。从这个意义上讲，他的这种模糊性既不令人惊讶，也不特别令人担忧。但在战略决策这一关键领域，这种模糊性严重削弱了他的论点。攻击敌方武装力量是战略的本质，但其最终目的是什么？尽管约米尼强调对战败敌人的持续追击，但他的许多论述都表明，领土控制才是武装冲突的真正目标。与克劳塞维茨不同，约米尼主要从空间角度看待战争，这种倾向在他后期更具影响力的著作中愈发明显。与他关于战略行动目标究竟应是控制领土还是摧毁敌方力量的模糊立场密切相关的，是进攻性和安全性之间相互冲突的需求的模糊性。他毫不含糊地指出，只有进攻才能带来胜利，但他也坚持认为，这种行动必须在不使友军遭受反击的情况下进行。正如约米尼所熟知的，在真实的战争世界中，几乎不可能在不冒反击风险的情况下发动进攻，但他再次回避了这个问题。“进攻”和“安全”这两个相互冲突的原则没有得到令人满意的解决，而第三个原则——“目标”——的具体含义尚不明确，更使它们之间的关系变得模糊不清。
A final weakness of his work, judged on its own terms, is illustrated by his vagueness about where the principles of war do and do not apply. The weakness lies in a pervasive ambiguity that leaves readers, including scholarly commentators, to understand the work in quite different, sometimes contradictory ways.60 Clausewitz is also full of ambiguity, but On War is consciously provocative, reflecting the author's own perception of war—complex, dynamic, often ambiguous. Jomini sought simplicity and clarity, but when read carefully and not hastily or selectively, the Jominian message is ambiguous. At one time victory depends on strict adherence to strategic principles, at another the genius of the commander in applying them (or in knowing when he can safely ignore them) is the crucial element. Warfare is, or can be made, scientific; yet war is a chaotic drama, full of chance and irrational forces. The varying emphasis often seems to follow the shifting line of Jomini's polemical attack, whether he is disparaging the extreme scientism of Bülow and all those who would make warfare a mechanical operation or refuting Clausewitz and others who questioned the value of prescriptive operational principles. To this extent his ambiguity is neither surprising nor especially troubling. But in the critical area of strategic decision, ambiguity seriously blunts the point of his argument. Attacking the enemy armed force is the essence of strategy, but to what end? Despite his emphasis on relentless pursuit of a beaten foe, there is much in Jomini to indicate that territorial control is the true objective of armed conflict. Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini conceived of warfare in largely spatial terms, and this predilection grew more pronounced in his later, more influential work. Closely related to his ambiguity, whether the control of territory or the destruction of enemy power should be the aim of strategic action, is an ambiguity about the competing demands of aggressiveness and security. He left no doubt that only offensive action could bring victory, but he also insisted that this action must be taken without exposing friendly forces to counteroffensive action. In the real world of warfare, as Jomini well knew, it is rarely possible to attack without risk of counterattack, but once again he did not directly confront the issue. The competing principles of “offensive” and “security” were left without satisfactory resolution, their ambiguous relationship exacerbated by uncertainty about the operational meaning of a third principle, that of the “objective.”
回顾这些批评——这些批评针对的是约米尼自身的战争方法，因此并非针对其方法本身——我们或许会得出这样的结论：约米尼思维浅薄或缺乏自律，或者在心理上无法控制其基本思想立场的影响范围，而他似乎也无法扩展或修正这一立场。如果不加深推论，所有这些似乎都属实。尽管他易怒且自恋的性格很容易使人将他本人及其著作漫画化，但无论从哪个角度来看，从他自己的著述来看，约米尼都拥有敏锐而深刻的思维。在他著作中反复出现的论战性论述中，隐藏着许多宝贵的见解、富有启发性的想法，以及一个关于战略的论点——至少在其模糊的适用范围内，这个论点无疑是正确的。
In reviewing these criticisms, which are internal to his own approach to warfare and thus are not an attack on the approach itself, we might conclude that Jomini had a shallow or undisciplined mind or was psychologically incapable of controlling the reach of his basic intellectual position, which in turn he seemed unable to expand or modify. All of this seems true enough if not pressed too far. Although his irascible, narcissistic personality makes it easy to turn the man and his work into caricature, Jomini by every account and on the evidence of his own writing had a quick, penetrating mind. Buried in the repetitive polemics of his books are valuable observations, stimulating ideas, and a single argument about strategy that, at least within the hazy limits of its applicability, is surely correct.
在他最后发表的一篇关于1866年普奥战争的文章中，他思考了铁路运输这项新技术。<sup> 61</sup>他想知道，战前铁路网对战略选择的限制——用他自己的话说，就是新的“领土”作战线对机动作战线的限制——是否会在未来增加偶然性在决定胜负中的作用。但这种有趣的推测很快就被一种意料之中的坚持所取代，即蒸汽动力或其他任何东西都无法改变战略原则，“这些原则是永恒不变的”。<sup> 62</sup>他只是不愿，或许也无法放弃他几十年来一直遵循的思维模式。但这不仅仅是他个人的怪癖；它深深地吸引了一代又一代的军人。他们属于一个本质上保守的职业，他们对忠诚、服从和秩序价值观的坚持，与约米尼对一个永恒真理的坚持产生了强烈的共鸣，这个真理本质上很简单，而且一旦理解，就非常有用。他对军事现实的看法使他们和其他战争研究者能够消除类似1866年战争经历所引发的疑虑，并抵御对军事政策的不受欢迎的批评。约明思想的这种持续吸引力需要进一步探讨。
In one of his last published essays, on the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, he pondered the new technique of railway transport.61 He wondered whether the constricting effect of prewar rail networks on strategic choice—of the new “territorial” lines of operation on maneuver lines of operation, to use his own terminology—might actually increase the role of chance in determining victory or defeat in the future. But this interesting speculation quickly gave way to a predictable insistence that neither steam power nor anything else could change the principles of strategy, “which remain immutable.”62 He simply would not, probably could not, give up the pattern in which his mind had worked for decades. But that pattern was more than a personal quirk; it appealed deeply to generations of soldiers. They belonged to a profession, conservative by nature, whose commitment to the values of loyalty, obedience, and order responded strongly to Jomini's insistence on an unchanging truth, essentially simple, and—once grasped—of great utility. His view of military reality enabled them and other students of warfare to stifle doubts provoked by experiences like that of 1866 and to fend off unwelcome criticism of military policy. This continuing appeal of Jominian thought requires some further discussion.
第四
IV
约米尼在十九世纪及之后的影响力令人印象深刻。早在1808年，他对劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫的评论就被翻译成英文，他关于战争原则的文章也出版了，并在德国广受好评。<sup> 63</sup>到1811年，他的整部《战争论》都以德文和俄文出版。滑铁卢战役后，他的声誉与日俱增，这得益于他关于法国大革命战役的著作定期出版，以及人们普遍认为他的建议在1813年盟军对抗拿破仑的战役中发挥了至关重要的作用。1821年拿破仑去世后，他对约米尼关于1796-1797年意大利战役的记述的评论得以发表；这位流亡的皇帝赞扬了这部著作，并在1813年赦免了约米尼的叛国罪（毕竟他是瑞士人，而不是法国人），只就战役中的一些事实提供了新的信息，“供新版出版”。在流放期间的另一次场合，拿破仑曾设想，如果他未来执政，他会任命约米尼负责军事教育。64
Evidence of Jomini's influence during the nineteenth century and after is impressive. As early as 1808 his commentary on Lloyd and Tempelhof was translated into English and his essay on the principles of war was published and favorably received in Germany.63 By 1811 the entire Treatise was being published in German and Russian. After Waterloo his reputation grew, enhanced by the regular appearance of each new volume on the campaigns of the Revolution and by a widespread belief that his advice had been crucially important in the Allied campaign of 1813 against Napoleon. After Napoleon's death in 1821, his comments on Jomini's account of the Italian campaign of 1796–1797 were published; the exiled emperor praised the work, absolved Jomini of treason in 1813 (he was, after all, Swiss, not French), and offered new information only on a few matters of fact concerning the campaign, “for a new edition.” On another occasion during his exile Napoleon mused that in a future regime he would put Jomini in charge of military education.64
尽管约米尼一生都流露出某种程度的仇英情绪，但英国作家对他的推崇丝毫不减。半岛战争史的权威历史学家威廉·纳皮尔就是一位公开的约米尼信徒。<sup> 65 </sup> 1825年，皇家炮兵中尉J.A.吉尔伯特出版了《根据约米尼著作汇编的军事联合与行动大全》。即使在大西洋彼岸，约米尼也是拿破仑的主要诠释者和军事理论家的领军人物。在规模很小的美国西点军校，学员们主要学习技术人员——炮兵和工程师——的训练，他们使用的教材是盖伊·德·弗农的《战争与防御科学论》的译本。但书中还附有一篇关于战争原则的附录，主要取材于约米尼的著作。美国编辑盛赞约米尼的著作“堪称杰作，是最高权威。事实上，任何人若未研习并深思约米尼提出的原则，都不应妄称自己有能力指挥任何规模的军队。”<sup> 66</sup>约米尼的这些典型论断出现在《战争的概要分析》（1830年）和《孙子兵法概要》 （1837-1838年）出版之前。年轻的、后拿破仑时代的军官们和他们的前辈一样，都对将战争简化为少数几条战略格言的价值印象深刻。因此，后期著作的主要作用在于将约米尼的思想镌刻于历史的磐石之上。
Although Jomini betrayed throughout his life a certain Anglophobia, English writers were no less admiring. William Napier, leading historian of the Peninsular campaigns, was an avowed Jominian.65 In 1825 Lieutenant J. A. Gilbert of the Royal Artillery published An Exposition of Grand Military Combinations and Movements compiled from…Jomini. Even across the Atlantic, Jomini was the leading interpreter of Napoleon and the dean of military theorists. In the tiny American military academy at West Point, where the emphasis was on the training of technicians—artillerists and engineers—cadets used a translation of Gay de Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification. But added to it was an appendix on the principles of war drawn chiefly from Jomini, whose work was praised by the American editor as “a master-piece, and as the highest authority. Indeed no man should pretend to be capable of commanding any considerable body of troops, unless he have studied and meditated on the principles laid down by Jomini.”66 These characteristic judgments of Jomini appeared before he publication of the Synoptic Analysis (1830) and the Summary of the Art of War (1837–1838). The younger, post-Napoleonic generation of officers was as impressed as its seniors by the value of reducing warfare to a handful of strategic maxims. The chief effect of the later works, then, was to etch the Jominian message in granite.
如果军事史上真有笑话可言，那其中之一便是人们普遍认为，克劳塞维茨的《战争论》在19世纪30年代死后出版后，便成了普鲁士军队的圣经，是他们1866年和1870年取得伟大胜利的源泉，并很快成为西方世界的主要军事理论。但事实是，大多数德国军事学者都觉得克劳塞维茨的著作晦涩难懂，实用性也令人怀疑，而大多数非德国学者读的克劳塞维茨著作也同样如此，而且大多是质量低劣的译本。德国著名军事作家威利森于1840年出版了自己的《第一次世界大战理论》，他自称是约米尼的“忠实学生”。年轻的普鲁士军官兼军事理论家弗里德里希·威廉·吕斯托则是一个极端例子，他挑战了约米尼的影响力遍及全球这一普遍论断。吕斯托是一位政治激进分子，1848年革命后逃离普鲁士，曾担任加里波第的参谋长，与马克思和恩格斯相识，人们或许会认为他会抨击约米尼是“资产阶级”理论家。但他并没有。与维利森一样，吕斯托也被描述为约米尼的“坚定拥护者”，他本人于1857年和1872年发表的战略研究重申了新式武器永远无法改变战略原则的教条。一些不太知名的德国作家也持相同观点。<sup> 67 </sup>
If there can be such a thing as a joke in military history, surely a small one is the belief that with the posthumous publication of Clausewitz in the 1830s, On War became the bible of the Prussian army, the source of their great victories of 1866 and 1870, and soon thereafter the chief military theory of the Western world. The truth is that most German students of war found Clausewitz no less difficult, obscure, and of doubtful utility than did non-Germans, most of whom read Clausewitz in poor translations. Willisen, a leading German military writer who published his own Theory of Great War in 1840, described himself as an “ardent pupil” of Jomini. A younger Prussian officer and military theorist, Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, was an extreme case who tests the generalization that the influence of Jomini was pervasive. Rüstow was a political radical who fled Prussia after the Revolution of 1848, served as Garibaldi's chief of staff, was well known to Marx and Engels, and might be expected to attack Jomini as a “bourgeois” theorist. But he did not. Like Willisen, Rüstow is described as “really a staunch adherent” of Jomini, and his own studies of strategy published in 1857 and 1872 reiterated the dogma that new weapons can never change the principles of strategy. A number of lesser German writers took the same position.67
普法战争之后，当法英两国的军事学者“发现”克劳塞维茨是普鲁士的秘密武器之一时，一些有影响力的德国作家仍然坚持约米尼的理论。1880年，普鲁士军队的阿尔布雷希特·冯·博古斯拉夫斯基仔细地重新编辑并翻译了约米尼的《战争理论概要》。博古斯拉夫斯基在解释约米尼与克劳塞维茨的关系时断言，他认为完全没有理由将这两位“博学思想家”的战争理论和概念对立起来——这一论断如果让约米尼和克劳塞维茨在世时，一定会感到震惊。<sup> 68</sup>到了世纪末，另一位普鲁士军官约克·冯·瓦滕堡出版了他的传记《拿破仑将军传》；该书的思想完全是约米尼式的，其译本在20世纪50年代仍然是西点军校的基本教材。尽管普鲁士和德国军队内部就军事理论展开了激烈的辩论，但证据证实了彼得·帕雷特对维多利亚时代、威廉时代以及世纪末战争学研究者“发现”克劳塞维茨的判断：“本质上，主导军事思想的是约明式的而非克劳塞维茨式的态度，在当时高度注重实证的氛围下，《战争论》几乎不可能不被视为一种作战手册。”<sup> 69</sup>
After the Franco-Prussian War, when French and British students of warfare were “discovering” Clausewitz as one of the secret weapons in the Prussian arsenal, influential German writers kept the Jominian faith. In 1880, Albrecht von Boguslawski of the Prussian army carefully reedited and translated Jomini's Summary. Explaining the relationship of Jomini to Clausewitz, Boguslawski asserted that he saw no reason whatsoever for setting the theories and conceptions of war of these two “erudite thinkers” in opposition to one another, a judgment that would have startled both men.68 At the end of the century, another Prussian officer, Yorck von Wartenburg, published his biographical Napoleon as a General; its message is pure Jomini, and in translation was still being used as the basic text at West Point in the 1950s. Although there was lively debate over military theory in the Prussian and German armies, the evidence confirms the judgment of Peter Paret on the “discovery” of Clausewitz by Victorian, Wilhelmine, and fin-de-siècle students of warfare: “Essentially it was a Jominian rather than a Clausewitzian attitude that dominated military thinking, and in the intensely empirical atmosphere of the times, On War could hardly avoid being considered as a kind of operational manual.”69
如果将《战争论》视为一本作战手册，它只不过强化了约米尼对大规模、侵略性武力使用的强调。但两者理论之间的巨大差异在于：克劳塞维茨坚持认为，战争在现实中极其复杂（无论理想情况下多么简单）；理论只能阐明这种复杂性，识别和澄清各种关系（但不能规定行动方案）；而且战争本质上是政治性的，必须从政治角度来看待（它并非发生在相对固定的政治边界内的独立活动）。1870年以后，克劳塞维茨的名字成为德国军事实力的象征，这实际上已经赢得了这场论战，约米尼的理论实际上已经使读者对克劳塞维茨思想的核心部分麻木不仁。
Considered as an operational manual, On War simply reinforced Jomini's emphasis on the massive, aggressive use of force. But the enormous difference between the two theories lay in Clausewitz's insistence that war was extremely complex in reality (however simple ideally); that theory could only illuminate this complexity, identifying and clarifying relationships (but not prescribe action); and that warfare was intrinsically political and must be approached as such (and was not an autonomous activity occurring within more or less fixed political boundaries). As the name of Clausewitz, after 1870, became a universally known symbol of German military prowess, Jomini had already won their personal duel, in effect desensitizing their audience to the vital parts of Clausewitz's message.
约米尼的追随者和仰慕者名单很长，甚至连他为数不多的十九世纪批评者也接受了他研究战争的基本方法。但大约在1890年，阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉的著作使他的影响力实现了质的飞跃。<sup> 70</sup>与克劳塞维茨不同，约米尼也关注战争的海洋层面，尽管主要将其视为殖民和两栖作战的手段。克劳塞维茨和约米尼主要关注的是几个军事强国在狭小空间内并存所构成的经典欧洲问题。马汉是一位美国海军军官。他的父亲丹尼斯·哈特·马汉在西点军校教授“军事艺术（或科学）”多年，可以说是约米尼思想在美国的主要倡导者和传播者。71 19世纪80年代，年轻的马汉厌倦了海军和平时期单调乏味的日常工作，转而投身学术研究。他有意识地决定，要像约米尼在陆战领域那样，在“海权”领域有所建树。由此产生的著作《海权对历史的影响，1660-1783》（1890年出版）对现代世界产生了深远的影响，不仅影响了现代帝国主义理论，也影响了海军政策和战略。本书其他章节将对马汉进行论述；在此只需指出，他如何运用六项“原则”来构建其分析框架，以及他如何反复强调通过进攻性的、集中的海军行动来掌控海洋，使他成为海事领域的约米尼——马汉本人也会欣然接受这一评价。
The list of Jomini's disciples and admirers is very long, and even his few nineteenth-century critics accepted his basic approach to the study of war. But about 1890 his general influence made a quantum leap upward through the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan.70 Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini had given some attention to the specifically maritime dimension of warfare, although chiefly as a medium for colonial and amphibious operations. Both Clausewitz and Jomini were primarily concerned with the classic European problem posed by several great military powers coexisting in a constricted space. Mahan was an American naval officer. His father, Dennis Hart Mahan, taught “military art (or science)” at West Point for many years and was arguably the leading American exponent and purveyor of Jominian ideas.71 When the younger Mahan, bored in the 1880s by the peacetime routine of naval service, turned to scholarship, he consciously decided to do for “sea power” what Jomini had done for land warfare. The resulting Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, published in 1890, left a deep mark on the modern world, on modern imperialist doctrine as much as on naval policy and strategy. Mahan is treated elsewhere in this volume; here it is enough to note how his use of six “principles” to frame his analysis and his reiterated stress on the need to command the sea through offensive, concentrated naval action make him a maritime counterpart of Jomini—a description that Mahan himself would have accepted with pleasure.
简化、精简、规范——这些已成为世纪之交西方军事思想无可避免的主导特征。而且，几乎无一例外，这些特征共同推崇拿破仑式的集结兵力、发起进攻并迅速取得决定性胜利的模式。任何低于或不同于此的策略都被视为失败。防御战、消耗战、持久战和有限战争等非拿破仑式、非约米尼式的军事行动形式，在原则上遭到谴责，在实践中也注定失败。克劳塞维茨代表的另一种方法——他更意识到复杂性和多样性，强调暴力的动态性，并且更注重分析而非规范——虽然存在，却鲜有人关注。同样，人们对约米尼著作的解读也带有很强的选择性；很少有人注意到，“舆论战”并不在其战略基本原则之内。重点可能会像福煦和其他法国军事作家的作品那样，从战争的物质和机械层面转向心理层面，但这种转变是在约米尼正统思想的框架内发生的。72
Simplifying, reducing, prescribing—these had become the inescapably dominant qualities of Western military thought at the turn of the century. And, almost invariably, these qualities combined to extol the Napoleonic model of massing, attacking, and quickly winning decisive victories. Anything less or different was reckoned as failure. Defensive, attritional, protracted, and limited warfare were among those non-Napoleonic, non-Jominian forms of military action that were condemned in principle, doomed in practice. An alternative approach, represented by Clausewitz, who was more aware of complexity and variety, insistent on the dynamic character of violence, and less concerned with prescription than with analysis, lay at hand but went largely unheeded. Similarly, the reading of Jomini's own work was highly selective; few noticed that “wars of opinion” stood outside his fundamental principles of strategy. The emphasis might shift, as it did in the work of Foch and other French military writers, from the physical and mechanical aspects of warfare to the psychological, but the shift took place within the framework of Jominian orthodoxy.72
在追溯约米尼的影响超越1914年那场血腥的战争之前，我们可以先概括一下他经久不衰的魅力所在。拿破仑战争对西方后世关于战争的思考——包括战争的本质、潜在威胁和作战方式——产生了巨大的冲击，其影响之深远，无与伦比。约米尼几乎立刻就确立了自己作为拿破仑战争权威诠释者的地位。他对拿破仑战争经验的解读不仅令人信服，而且在其局限性范围内，也颇具洞察力和合理性，不容那些对其提出异议的人轻易否定，这一点与比洛截然不同。约米尼认为，拿破仑凭借集中兵力猛攻薄弱环节，迅速取得了决定性的胜利。对约米尼最严重的批评并非在于他的观点错误，而在于他通过遗漏和夸大，对1796年至1815年间发生的事情做出了一个过于简单化的描述，从而构建了一个严重不足的理论，其后果可能不堪设想。但1914年之前的这种批评，都基于对未来战争的推测。长达一个世纪的时间里，西方军事经验有限，约米尼理论的潜在缺陷也未被察觉。1859年、1866年和1870年的速胜，以及旷日持久的美国内战和克里米亚战争的惨败，都可以用作战路线、集中兵力并采取进攻性策略的必要性，以及分散兵力和被动防御的危险性来解释。如果俄军在1905年与日军的战争中陷入消耗战和堑壕战的泥潭，那么原因在于俄军的无知和低效。“殖民地”军事行动与传统的欧洲军事问题在诸多方面截然不同，因此可以忽略不计。滑铁卢战役之后，直到1914年，几乎没有什么事情动摇约米尼理论的范式。
Before tracing his influence beyond the bloody divide of 1914, we can summarize what lay behind Jomini's enduring appeal. Nothing could match the Napoleonic Wars in their traumatic effect on subsequent Western thinking about war—its nature, its potential, and its method. Jomini had established himself almost instantly as the authoritative interpreter of Napoleonic warfare. Not only was his version of the Napoleonic experience persuasive, it was—within its limits—perceptive and sound, not to be brushed aside by those who found fault with it, and in that respect quite unlike Bülow. Napoleon, said Jomini, had won quick, decisive victories by the ferocious application of concentrated military force against weak, sensitive points. The most serious criticism of Jomini was not that what he said was wrong, but that by omission and exaggeration he had produced a grotesquely simple account of what happened from 1796 to 1815 and thereby a grossly inadequate theory, whose consequences were potentially disastrous. But this criticism, before 1914, rested on speculation about future war. For a long century Western military experience was limited, and the potential weaknesses of his theory went unrealized. The quick victories of 1859, 1866, and 1870, as well as the protracted American Civil War and the debacle of the Crimean War could be readily explained in terms of lines of operation, of he need to concentrate force and use it offensively, and of the dangers of dividing forces and defending passively. If the Russian army bogged down in attritional, trench warfare in 1905 against the Japanese, the explanation lay in Russian ignorance and inefficiency. “Colonial” military operations, so different in so many ways from the classical European military problem, could be safely ignored. After Waterloo little or nothing happened to shake the paradigm of Jominian theory until 1914.
第一次世界大战摧毁了许多事物，其中最严重的莫过于军事理论。经历了堑壕战的惨烈和惨败之后，“军事科学”的概念显得荒谬可笑。交战各方的军事指挥官都曾高调地用约米尼的简单战略格言来为自己明显的无能辩护，而约米尼的声誉也从此急剧下滑，至今未能恢复。现代武器、经济和社会的全面动员，以及消耗战及其带来的革命性后果，似乎都让约米尼对作战路线和战略机动简图的执着显得毫无意义。
The Great War shattered many things, and none more than military theory. After the horrors and fiascos of trench warfare, the very idea of “military science” seemed laughable. On all sides military commanders had vocally defended their own apparent ineptitude with simple strategic maxims drawn from Jomini, whose reputation began a steep decline from which it has never recovered. Modern weapons, the total mobilization of economies and societies, and attritional warfare with its revolutionary consequences seemed to make nonsense of his preoccupation with lines of operations and little diagrams of strategic maneuvers.
但第一次世界大战也催生了新的军事发展，其中至少有两项重塑并延续了约米尼的战争观。在所有对战时战略进行批判的军事家当中，英国人利德尔·哈特上尉的论述最为精辟且最具影响力。他直接触及了所有那些对西线毫无意义的屠杀感到震惊，并决心让欧洲人永远不再以这种方式作战的人们。利德尔·哈特并非和平主义者，他对永久和平的前景也持悲观态度。他认为现代战争的核心问题在于对“大战”的自杀式迷恋，即主力部队或舰队的直接交锋，并将胜利定义为肉体上的存活。他将这种迷恋归咎于克劳塞维茨而非约米尼。 1870 年以后，对德国军队的盲目崇拜和模仿，尤其是对普鲁士先知“大众的马赫迪”（利德尔·哈特称克劳塞维茨为“大众的马赫迪”）的影响，是欧洲战争理论和实践可怕堕落的根源。
But out of the Great War also came new military developments, at least two of which had the effect of recasting and thus perpetuating the Jominian vision of warfare. No military critic of wartime strategy was more articulate and influential than the Englishman, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. He spoke directly to all those who were horrified by the pointless carnage of the western front, and who were determined that never again would Europeans fight in this way. No pacifist, and pessimistic about the chances for permanent peace, Liddell Hart identified the central problem of modern war as the suicidal obsession with the Great Battle, the direct clash of main armies or fleets with victory defined as physical survival. He blamed the obsession not on Jomini but on Clausewitz. Blind admiration and imitation of the German military after 1870 and particularly the influence of its Prussian prophet, “the Mahdi of Mass” as Liddell Hart called Clausewitz, lay behind the terrible degeneration of the theory and practice of European warfare.
与克劳塞维茨式的战争观——即大规模军队的碰撞，胜负取决于绝对的数量和意志力，但其造成的人员伤亡却远超任何可想象的“胜利”所能证明的合理性——相反，利德尔·哈特呼吁重新强调机动性、胆识和技巧。他在一系列历史和理论著作及文章中阐述的间接战术战略，主张通过机动战，以最小的风险和代价，在心理和地理上智取并包抄敌人。这种战略需要的与其说是一个武装强大的国家，不如说是一支规模较小、高度专业化且装备最新技术的部队。尽管利德尔·哈特几乎没有公开宣称自己是约米尼的追随者，但他对约米尼最尖锐的批评者的讽刺以及他自身对战略作为一套技术的强调，实际上复兴了约米尼著作中那种说教式、规范式和还原论的方法。73即便不夸大利德尔·哈特本人的影响，我们也能发现，像他这样的思想在两次世界大战之间的几十年里，在同时代重要军事家的思想中引起了共鸣：例如JFC·富勒、夏尔·戴高乐、年轻的乔治·巴顿，尤其是像海因茨·古德里安这样的年轻德国军官，他们发展出了快速取得有限胜利的战术——闪电战。74
Against a Clausewitzian conception of warfare—the collision of mass armies, the outcome decided by sheer numbers and will power, but the human cost higher than any imaginable “victory” could justify—Liddell Hart called for renewed emphasis on mobility, audacity, and skill. His strategy of the indirect approach, elaborated in a series of historical and theoretical books and articles, advocated the war of maneuver to out-think and out-flank the enemy, psychologically as well as geographically, at minimum risk and minimum cost. It was strategy that called less for a nation in arms than for a fairly small, highly professional force equipped with the latest technology. Although hardly proclaiming himself a Jominian, Liddell Hart, by his caricature of Jomini's sharpest critic and his own emphasis on strategy as a set of techniques, in effect revived the didactic, prescriptive, reductionist approach that characterized Jomini's work.73 Without exaggerating the influence of Liddell Hart himself, we find that ideas like his resonate during the interwar decades in the military thinking of important contemporaries: J. F. C. Fuller, Charles de Gaulle, the young George Patton, and above all young German officers, like Heinz Guderian, who developed techniques for quick, limited victories—the blitzkrieg.74
比间接进攻和闪电战战略更具长远意义的是战略轰炸这一新兴概念。它与约米尼的传统也有着明显的联系。20世纪20年代，朱利奥·杜黑和其他早期“空中力量”理论家对飞机所做的，正如马汉在19世纪90年代对军舰所做的那样；他们发展出一套关于如何最佳运用飞机的战略理论，这与约米尼版本的拿破仑战争非常相似。75飞机，如同军舰和军队一样，应该集中兵力攻击决定性目标。这个目标并非位于敌军的武装力量，而是位于其经济和行政中心，这些中心极易受到空中打击。
Of still greater long-term significance than the strategies of indirect approach and blitzkrieg was the emerging concept of strategic bombing. Here too there was a clear link with the Jominian tradition. In the 1920s Giulio Douhet and other early theorists of “air power” did for the airplane what Mahan in the 1890s had done for the warship; they developed a doctrine for its optimal strategic employment that closely resembled the Jominian version of Napoleonic warfare.75 Airplanes, like warships and armies, should be massed against the decisive point. That point was located not in the armed force of the enemy, but in his economic and administrative centers, which were so vulnerable to aerial attack.
在“决定性点”的这一定义下，战略轰炸理论似乎与约米尼和阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉的旧有正统观点有所不同，后者强调的是陆军与陆军、舰队与舰队之间的对抗。然而，仔细审视后会发现，二者之间的分歧远没有表面看起来那么大。约米尼和马汉都强调了目标的军事经济性。对于陆军而言，目标指的是战线后方至关重要的区域，那里是补给和通信的中心。对于海军而言，目标指的是港口和贸易，它们赋予了海权以存在的意义。打击甚至威胁这些中心都会迫使敌人进行防御，而且往往是在不利的条件下。战略轰炸利用新技术攻击比约米尼和马汉所描述的目标更为重要也更为脆弱的目标，从这个意义上讲，空中力量有望成为终极战略形式；但在概念上，这三套军事思想体系却非常相似。
In this definition of “decisive point,” strategic-bombing doctrine seems to diverge from the older orthodoxies of Jomini and Alfred Thayer Mahan, who had stressed the army-to-army and fleet-to-fleet confrontation. Closer examination, however, shows less divergence than there might seem. Both Jomini and Mahan had stressed what may be called the military economy of the target. For armies, it was the vital zone behind the fighting front, where supply and communications were centered. For navies, it was the ports and trade that gave sea power its rationale. To strike at or even to threaten these centers would force the enemy to defend them, often under unfavorable conditions. Strategic bombing used new technology to attack targets at once more vital and more vulnerable than those described by Jomini and Mahan, and in that sense air power promised to be the ultimate form of strategy; but conceptually the three sets of military ideas were much alike.
这三种理论都共同强调运用武力攻击敌方力量的神经系统和循环系统。它们都假定这些系统由非战斗人员组成，因此在暴力面前相当无助，从而反映了西方经典的士兵与平民二元对立。士兵构成坚固的防御体系，而平民则构成柔软的核心；突破这层防御体系就能取得胜利，因为非士兵被认为几乎没有或根本没有军事抵抗能力。然而，即使是军队也有作战前线和由平民组成的薄弱易受攻击的后方区域。这种二元对立看似是对现实的直接、不言自明的描述，但实际上更像是一种未经审视且带有行为主义色彩的隐喻。大量的历史经验，以及从克劳塞维茨到马克思再到当代革命理论的另一种思路，都支持相反的观点：即使在复杂的社会中，普通民众，即“平民”，也能在面对暴力时展现出强大的韧性和顽强的生命力。约明主义的进路再次回避了这个问题。 1940年至1945年战略轰炸的结果表明了一些可能的后果。76
In all three there is a common emphasis on using armed force to attack the nervous and circulatory systems of enemy strength. By assuming that these systems consist of people who are not primarily fighters and are thus fairly helpless in the face of violence, all three theories reflect the classic Western distinction between soldier and civilian. A hard shell of soldiers defends, while being supported by a soft nucleus of civilians; breaking the shell thus produces victory, because nonsoldiers are assumed to have little or no capacity for military resistance. But even armies have fighting fronts and weak, vulnerable rear areas manned by civilianized soldiers. Presented as a straightforward, self-evident description of reality, this dichotomy is better seen as a metaphor, unexamined and behaviouristic in nature. A great deal of historical experience, as well as an alternative line of thought from Clausewitz through Marx to contemporary theories of revolution, supports the opposite idea: that ordinary people, “civilians,” even in complex societies can display great resilience and toughness in the face of violence. Once again, the Jominian approach forecloses the question; the results of strategic bombing in 1940–1945 indicate some of the possible consequences.76
追溯约米尼的军事理论在1945年以后的发展轨迹变得更加困难且充满争议，但这种努力仍然具有价值。“战争原则”至今仍是几乎所有现代军队（包括苏联集团国家）军事理论官方声明的一部分。<sup> 77</sup>尽管这种仪式化的理论宣示的实际影响和作用自然会引发质疑——其效果或许并不比教士兵列队行进更深刻——但毫无疑问，这些原则虽然在不同军队之间略有差异，但都直接源自约米尼。
Tracing the Jominian line beyond 1945 becomes more difficult and debatable, but the effort to do so has value. “Principles of War” continue to be part of the official statements of military doctrine in virtually every modern armed force, including those in the Soviet bloc.77 Although a question naturally arises as to the actual influence and function of this ritualistic assertion of doctrine, which is possibly no more profound in effect than teaching soldiers to march in step, there is no doubt that these principles, although varying slightly from one armed force to another, derive directly from Jomini.
更重要的是，也远比这复杂得多的是1945年以来军事思想的本质。78声称两者之间存在直接联系是愚蠢的；当代战略并非某种军事理论谱系的产物。主导现代战略研究的社会科学家们并不阅读约米尼的著作，或许只是将其视为一种历史奇观，而且没有人会承认自己受到如此明显过时的著作的影响。然而，约米尼方法在1945年后的延续性在对当代战略思想的批判中体现得最为明显。那些不否认战争作为政策工具的批评者，反复提出与对约米尼的标准批判非常相似的观点，来批评当前的思想。这种批评认为，核时代的战略家们运用模型构建和系统分析等抽象方法，将战争简化为作战演习，从而将其变成一场不切实际却极其危险的游戏。批评者认为，危险不仅在于现代武器将死亡和破坏提升到了惊人的程度，更在于方法本身。这种方法将“战略”脱离了现实世界的背景，显著增加了重大误判的风险。这种风险的增加源于方法本身：时间、空间、兵力水平和能力，以及对国家“利益”和“目标”的概括性描述，被视为战略分析的关键变量，而所有其他因素或可能性都被置于次要地位。当然，这些因素或可能性可以进一步考虑，但在使用和控制暴力方面，它们基本上被视为无关紧要。对这些少数选定变量的分析将得出少量可用的战略选项，然后根据成本、收益和概率对这些选项进行评估。即使当代战略家得出的结论不像约米尼本人那样具有严格的指导性，但两者的思维过程仍然存在根本的相似之处。为了反驳这种批评，当代战略家们呼应了约米尼（在反驳克劳塞维茨时）的观点，坚持认为批评者未能满足战略本身对清晰性、严谨性和实用性的迫切需求。这里的问题不在于谁在这场争论中占据上风，而在于约米尼对拿破仑的描述所催生的战争思维方式，为何没有随着铁路、机枪和空中轰炸的出现而消亡。它之所以没有消失，是因为它始终能够回应一种紧迫且不可避免的需求。
More important, and much less simple, is the nature of military thought since 1945.78 It would be foolish to claim direct links; contemporary strategy is not the product of some genealogical chain of military theory. The social scientists who have dominated modern strategic studies do not read Jomini, except perhaps as a historical curiosity, and none would admit to being influenced by work so obviously antiquated. The persistence of the Jominian approach after 1945, however, is most visible in criticism of contemporary strategic thought. Those critics who do not reject war as an instrument of policy repeatedly make points about current thinking that are very like the standard critique of Jomini. The criticism is that strategists in the nuclear age employ abstract methods like model building and systems analysis that reduce war to an operational exercise, transforming it thereby into an unrealistic but extremely dangerous game. The danger, argue the critics, lies not only in death and destruction, which modern weaponry has raised to fantastic levels, but in the method, which lifts “strategy” out of its real-world context, demonstrably increasing the risk of major miscalculation. The increased risk is inherent in the method: time, space, force levels and capabilities, plus some general description of national “interests” and “objectives” are taken to be the crucial variables for strategic analysis, with all other factors or possibilities relegated to the background, available of course for further consideration but essentially regarded as negligible in the business of using and controlling violence. Analysis of this small number of selected variables will yield a small set of available strategic options, which are then evaluated in terms of costs, benefits, and probabilities. Even when the conclusions reached by contemporary strategists are less rigidly prescriptive than Jomini himself tended to be, there is a fundamental similarity in the two intellectual processes. In defending themselves against this criticism, contemporary strategists echo Jomini (in his defense against Clausewitz) by insisting that the critics fail to meet the urgent demand of strategy itself for clarity, rigor, and utility. The question here is not one of who, in this argument, has the better position, but of how and why a way of thinking about warfare that emerged with Jomini's account of Napoleon did not wither away with the appearance of railroads, machine guns, and aerial bombardment. It did not disappear because it remained responsive to a pressing, inescapable need.
改变现代世界的最强大力量之一，便是这样一种观念：在看似混乱的宇宙表象之下，存在着支配宇宙的法则，这些法则可以被发现和理解。在人类活动的几乎每一个领域，对支配法则的探索永无止境，因为一旦发现这些法则，就能为控制和塑造存在提供新的手段。这种探索的热情日益高涨，是十八世纪启蒙运动的显著特征（当然也是其最吸引人之处），因为对支配自然界运行法则的确凿发现，使许多人相信，类似的法则必然支配着所有人类活动。战争是最后才受到支配法则理念影响的活动之一。士兵们早已熟知各种军事“格言”——基于个人经验的实用建议——但直到十八世纪后期，人们才开始认真探寻战争的法则或原则。人们原本怀疑暴力——这种看似与理性世界理念背道而驰的行为——能否被法律所约束，但当面对普鲁士国王腓特烈二世令人瞩目的军事成就时，这种怀疑逐渐消散；而当法国军队在世纪末横扫欧洲时，这种怀疑更是彻底瓦解。约米尼在1800年成年之际皈依了这一信仰，他加入了拿破仑的阵营，并很快领导了成千上万以同样新颖而激动人心的方式看待战争的人。拿破仑的每一次胜利都强化了这一信仰的教条，到了19世纪三四十年代，只有像克劳塞维茨这样的少数异端分子才能设想出另一种不那么教条和功利主义的战争观。对这一教条最激烈的批评者并非持不同政见的军事理论家，而是和平主义者和其他出于道德原因反对战争的人，这表明约米尼及其追随者已经牢牢确立了他们这门学科不可动摇的信条。
One of the most powerful forces changing the modern world has been the idea that underlying the apparent disorder of existence are laws regulating the universe, principles that can be discovered and understood. In virtually every sector of human activity the quest for regulating principles, which once discovered offer new means to control and shape existence, is endless. The growing excitement of this quest is the distinguishing characteristic of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment (and certainly its most appealing feature), as the undoubted discoveries of laws regulating the action of the natural world convinced many that comparable laws must govern all human activities. War was among the last of these activities to be touched by the idea of regulating laws. Soldiers had long known of various military “maxims”—useful advice based on personal experience—but not until the later eighteenth century did a serious search for the laws or principles of war begin. Doubts that violence, seemingly so antithetical to the idea of a rational world, could be governed by laws gave way when confronted by the impressive military feats of Frederick II of Prussia, and yielded completely as French armies swept through Europe at the end of the century. Converted to the faith just as he reached manhood in 1800, Jomini joined and would soon lead thousands of others who saw war in the same new, exciting way. Every Napoleonic victory hardened the dogma of this faith, and by the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century only an occasional heretic, like Clausewitz, could imagine another, less prescriptive and instrumental, way of seeing the subject. That the most vocal critics of the dogma have not been dissenting military theorists, but pacifists and others who oppose war on moral grounds, indicates how securely Jomini and his followers had established the unassailable tenets of their science.
尽管战争的本质发生了重大变化，且存在缺陷，但这种战争思维模式却经久不衰，因此似乎不可能对其进行最终定论。近两个世纪以来，它已深深植根于西方意识之中，以至于许多信奉者拒绝承认其为一种“思维模式”，而是坚持认为，如果理解正确，约米尼及其后继者所阐述的仅仅是关于战争，或者至少是关于战略的真理。约米尼本人及其著作或许已逐渐淡出学术界，但他的基本思想虽然鲜为人知，却流传至今。或许，对约米尼的研究，没有比承认约米尼主义信仰的持续存在及其非凡的韧性更恰当的总结方式了。
No final word on a mode of thinking about warfare that has proved so durable, despite its flaws and momentous changes in the nature of war, seems possible. It has become, during almost two centuries, so deeply imbedded in Western consciousness that many adherents refuse to accept it as a “mode” of thinking at all, but insist that—correctly understood—Jomini and latter-day Jominians simply offer the Truth about war, or at least about strategy. The man himself and his published work may have receded into the shadows of academic scholarship, but his basic ideas, though seldom acknowledged, have survived. Perhaps there is no more appropriate way to end a study of Jomini than in recognizing the continued existence and remarkable tenacity of this Jominian faith.
*注：在撰写本文的过程中，我得到了约翰·鲍迪奇、罗伯特·卡明斯、乔纳森·马维尔以及密歇根大学军事研究小组成员的宝贵批评。
* NOTE: In preparing this essay, I have had the valuable criticism of John Bowditch, Robert Cummins, Jonathan Marwil, and members of the Military Studies Group at the University of Michigan.
1关于约米尼最有价值的论述仍然是克莱恩·布林顿、戈登·A·克雷格和费利克斯·吉尔伯特四十多年前发表在《现代战略的缔造者》一书中的文章。关于约米尼的较新文章列于参考文献中。
1 The most valuable account of Jomini remains the essay by Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert published more than forty years ago in the original Makers of Modern Strategy. More recent essays on Jomini are listed in the bibliographical note.
2基本传记仍由约米尼的弟子费迪南·勒孔特撰写，他参考了与约米尼的长期谈话以及他大量的论文：《约米尼将军，其生平及其著作》（巴黎，1860 年；第三版，洛桑，1888 年）。
2 The basic biography remains that of Jomim's disciple, Ferdinand Lecomte, who drew on long conversations with Jomini as well as his voluminous papers: Le général Jomini, sa vie at ses écrits (Paris, 1860; 3d ed., Lausanne, 1888).
3路易·哈特曼的《皇家军队军官与革命》（巴黎，1910年）描述了革命对军队的影响。R·R·帕尔默的《十二位统治者》（普林斯顿，1941年）则生动地描述了战争中的革命。
3 The effects of the Revolution on the array are described in Louis Hartmann, Les officiers de l'armée royale et la Révolution (Paris, 1910). R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled (Princeton, 1941) contains a graphic account of the Revolution at war.
4 1787 年至 1860 年议会档案，第一辑，LXXII（巴黎，1907 年），688–90。
4 Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, Ist ser., LXXII (Paris, 1907), 688–90.
5塞缪尔·F·斯科特，《皇家军队对法国大革命的反应》（牛津，1978 年）和让-保罗·贝尔托，《武装革命》（巴黎，1979 年）。
5 Samuel F. Scott, The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution (Oxford, 1978) and Jean-Paul Bertaud, La Révolution armée (Paris, 1979).
6 Antoine-Henri Jomini， Traité des grandes opérations militaires，contenant l'histoire des Campagnes de Frédéric II，comparées à celles de l'empereur Napoléon；战争艺术的基本原理，第 2 版，第 4 卷。 （巴黎，1811 年），2:312n。这是第一个完整版本，全文将作为 Traité 引用。约米尼并不总是给出他第一篇关于原则的文章的写作日期，但 1803 年似乎得到了其他证据的最好支持。
6 Antoine-Henri Jomini, Traité des grandes opérations militaires, contenant l'histoire des campagnes de Frédéric II, comparées à celles de l'empereur Napoléon; avec un recueil des principes généraux de l'art de la guerre, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Paris, 1811), 2:312n. This is the first complete edition, and will be cited throughout as Traité. Jomini did not always give the same date for the writing of his first essay on principles, but 1803 seems best supported by other evidence.
7 Jean-Pierre Chuard，“Les années d'enfance et de jeunesse”，载于Le général Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869)：传记贡献，Bibliothèque Historique Vaudoise，第 7 期。 41（洛桑，1969 年），11-24； RR Palmer，《民主革命时代，1760-1800 年》，2 卷。 （普林斯顿，1959，1964），1：358-64，2：395-421。
7 Jean-Pierre Chuard, “Les années d'enfance et de jeunesse,” in Le général Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869): Contributions à sa biographie, Bibliothèque Historique Vaudoise, no. 41 (Lausanne, 1969), 11–24; R. R. Palmer, Age of the Democratic Revolution, 1760–1800, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1959, 1964), 1:358–64, 2:395–421.
8司汤达比约米尼小四岁，他记得在 1796 年听闻拿破仑在洛迪和阿尔科拉取得胜利，以及在 1799 年从埃及凯旋，并希望这位英俊的年轻将军能够成为法国国王（《亨利·布鲁拉尔传》，亨利·马蒂诺编辑，2 卷 [巴黎，1949 年]），1:388–89。
8 Stendhal, four years younger than Jomini, remembered hearing of Bonaparte's victories at Lodi and Arcola in 1796 and of his return from Egypt in 1799, and hoping that the handsome young general would make himself king of France (Vie de Henry Brulard, ed. Henri Martineau, 2 vols. [Paris, 1949]), 1:388–89.
9 Jean-Charles Biaudet，“Jomini et la Suisse”，载于Le général Antoine-Henrt Jomini (1779-1869)：传记贡献，Bibliothéque Historique Vaudoise，第 1 期。 41（洛桑，1969 年），25-52。
9 Jean-Charles Biaudet, “Jomini et la Suisse,” in Le général Antoine-Henrt Jomini (1779–1869): Contributions à sa biographie, Bibliothéque Historique Vaudoise, no. 41 (Lausanne, 1969), 25–52.
10 Antoine-Henri Jomini，战争原理组合分析表（巴黎，1830 年），vii。
10 Antoine-Henri Jomini, Tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la guerre (Paris, 1830), vii.
11迈克尔·霍华德（见注37）最早强调了劳埃德对约米尼的影响；参见“约米尼与古典传统”。弗朗哥·文图里所著的《亨利·劳埃德将军的冒险》（“Le avventure del Generale Henry Lloyd”）一文，基于大量新证据，对劳埃德的生平进行了最全面的阐述，该文发表于《意大利历史杂志》 91（1979），第369-433页。马克斯·耶恩斯所著的《克尔特格斯沃茨森沙夫滕史》（Geschichte der Krtegswtssenschaften），共3卷（慕尼黑，1889-91），第3卷，第2102-2114页，对于研究劳埃德的军事著作也颇具价值。
11 Michael Howard (see n. 37) first emphasized the influence of Lloyd on Jomini; see “Jomini and the Classical Tradition.” The fullest account of Lloyd, based on much new evidence, is Franco Venturi, “Le avventure del Generale Henry Lloyd,” Rivista storica italiana 91 (1979), 369–433. Max Jähns, Geschichte der Krtegswtssenschaften,3 vols. (Munich, 1889–91), 3:2102–2114, is also valuable for Lloyd's military writing.
12通常被认为是劳埃德军事回忆录的作品最初以《德国后期战争史续篇》 （伦敦，1781 年）为名出版。它号称是《德国后期战争史》的第 11 部分，但实际上是一篇约 200 页的关于“战争的一般原则”的文章（vi）。
12 What is often cited as Lloyd's Military Memoirs was published originally as Continuation of the History of the Late War in Germany…(London, 1781). It purported to be Part 11 of The History of the Late War in Germany, but is in fact an essay of about two hundred pages on “the General Principles of War” (vi).
13 Lloyd，《德国后期战争史续篇》，第六章。
13 Lloyd, Continuation of the History of the Late War in Germany, vi.
14 拿破仑一世皇帝在劳埃德将军的军事回忆录中的注释，编辑。 Ariste Ducaunnès-Duval（波尔多，1901 年）。
14 Notes inédites de l'Empereur Napoleon Ier sur les mémoires militaires du Général Lloyd, ed. Ariste Ducaunnès-Duval (Bordeaux, 1901).
15 “归根结底，对约米尼这样的人来说，真正的大战是十八世纪的战争……”（布林顿等人，《约米尼》，92页）是典型的历史论断，强调了他对旧制度的同情。撰写本文使我确信，这种强调是片面的，忽略了他本人在多大程度上是法国大革命的产物，他是拿破仑的狂热崇拜者，也是拿破仑战争的资深老兵。
15 “In the last analysis, the great wars for a man like Jomini were those of the eighteenth century…” (Brinton et al., “Jomini,” 92) is fairly typical of historical judgments that stress his empathy with the Old Regime. Writing this essay has persuaded me that this emphasis is one-sided and neglects the degree to which he himself was a product of the Revolution, a fervent admirer of Napoleon, and an experienced veteran of the Napoleonic Wars.
16 Jahns，《战争史》，3：1873–75。
16 Jahns, Geschichte der Kriegswtssenschaften,3:1873–75.
17 Traité ,1:iv, 24–43 和 85。前两卷的原始版本以Traité de grande tactique为标题……（巴黎，1805 年）。
17 Traité,1:i-v, 24–43, and 85. The original edition of the first two volumes appeared under the title Traité de grande tactique…(Paris, 1805).
18 《论著》，1:35。在这个1811年出版的版本中，他对滕珀尔霍夫的批评比1805年版本更为严厉。在前一个版本中，他请求读者谅解（40n）他在“第一篇论文”中的错误，因为当时他对战争的经验尚浅。
18 Traité, 1:35. In this edition, published in 1811, he was more critical of Tempelhof than he had been in the 1805 edition. In the former, he asked (40n) the indulgence of his readers for erring in his “first essay,” when he had had less experience with war.
19 Traité，1:288。
19 Traité, 1:288.
20同上，2:271。
20 Ibid., 2:271.
21同上，4:275。
21 Ibid., 4:275.
22同上，4:286。
22 Ibid., 4:286.
23约翰·I·阿尔杰 (John I. Alger) 的宝贵小册子《安托万-亨利·约米尼：书目调查》（纽约州西点，1975 年）澄清了一份经常令人困惑的出版物清单。
23 The invaluable pamphlet by John I. Alger Antoine-Henri Jomini: A Bibliographical Survey (West Point, N.Y., 1975), clarifies an often confusing list of publications.
24大英图书馆收藏着他晚年的三捆论文（Egerton MSS. 3166-3168）。 Daniel Reichel 对他在俄罗斯的服役经历进行了深刻的描述，“Laposition du général Jomini en tant qu'expert militaire à la cour de Russie”，Actes du Symposium 1982，Service historique，Travaux d'histoire militaire et de polémologie，第 1 卷。 1（洛桑，1982 年），59-75。
24 Three bundles of papers from his later year are in the British Library (Egerton MSS. 3166–3168). A perceptive account of his Russian service is Daniel Reichel, “La position du général Jomini en tant qu'expert militaire à la cour de Russie,” Actes du Symposium 1982, Service historique, Travaux d'histoire militaire et de polémologie, vol. 1 (Lausanne, 1982), 59–75.
25安托万-亨利·若米尼，《战争艺术概要》，新版，两卷本（巴黎，1855年；奥斯纳布吕克，1973年重印，由H.R.库尔茨作德文导言），是该领域的权威之作。参见1:5–10、16、21–22、27、159、191–205及其他相关章节。（以下简称《战争艺术概要》）
25 Antoine-Henri Jomini, Précis de l'art de la guerre, new ed., 2 vols. (Paris, 1855; repr. Osnabrück, 1973, with an introduction in German by H. R. Kurz) is the ultimate statement. See 1:5–10, 16, 21–22, 27, 159, 191–205, et passim. (Hereafter cited as Précis.)
26这段评价的措辞或许显得严厉，但勒孔特（Lecomte）的传记却印证了这一点。勒孔特与若米尼（Jomini）相识多年，对其赞赏有加。《安托万-亨利·若米尼将军，1779–1869》（Payerne，1969）是为纪念若米尼逝世一百周年而举办的若米尼纪念品展览的图录，其中收录了他的肖像画复制品。乔治·B·麦克莱伦将军（General George B. McClellan）于1868年拜访了若米尼，他形容若米尼的脸“很像一只饱经风霜的老鹰”（《银河》 7 [1869年6月]，887）。
26 The language of this judgment may seem harsh, but it is readily confirmed by the admiring biography of Lecomte, who was close to Jomini for many years. Général Antoine-Henri Jomini, 1779–1869 (Payerne, 1969) is a catalogue of an exhibition of Jomini memorabilia on the centenary of his death, and includes reproductions of his portraiture. General George B. McClellan visited Jomini in 1868; he described his face as “much like that of an old worn-out eagle” (The Galaxy 7 [June, 1869], 887).
27 [Antoine-Henri Jomini]，《拿破仑的政治和军事》，《凯撒、亚历山大和弗雷德里克的法庭》，4 卷。 （巴黎，1827 年），4:305, 368–70。
27 [Antoine-Henri Jomini], Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon, racontée par lui-même, au tribunal de César, d'Alexandre et de Frédéric, 4 vols. (Paris, 1827), 4:305, 368–70.
28约米尼对自己行为的解释（他始终试图为自己的行为辩解）见于同上，第370页脚注。对他持较轻态度的版本比比皆是；其中一篇近期的版本是弗朗索瓦-盖伊·乌尔图勒的《内伊：勇士中的勇士》（巴黎，1981年），第140-143页，其中提到内伊的另一位幕僚暗示，约米尼在包岑战役中表现堪称典范的说法毫无根据，他后来的过激行为可能是药物所致。一篇对约米尼表示同情的详细记述发表于《沃州历史评论》第1卷（1893年），第65-80页，其起因是1890年马尔博将军的回忆录出版，马尔博将军在回忆录中指责约米尼向盟军泄露了拿破仑的计划。
28 Jomini's version of his action, which he never ceased trying to justify, is in ibid., 370n. Less sympathetic versions abound; a recent one is François-Guy Hourtoulle, Ney, les braves des braves (Paris, 1981), 140–43, which includes the suggestion by another member of Ney's staff that Jomini's claim to exemplary conduct at Bautzen was unfounded, and that his extravagant behavior subsequently may have been induced by medicinal drugs. A detailed account of the affair, sympathetic to Jomini, appeared in Revue historique vaudoise 1 (1893), 65–80, prompted by the publication in 1890 of the memoirs of General Marbot, who accused Jomini of betraying Napoleon's plans to the Allies.
29约米尼晚年写给儿子亚历山大的信中（亚历山大当时已在俄国外交部身居要职），他声称自己在1813-1814年间以及后来的俄土战争中为沙皇提供了至关重要的建议，但车尔尼雪夫领导的“阴谋”破坏了他建立俄国军事学院的计划，而且在克里米亚战争中，他只不过是“一个幕后推手”（ un souffleur de comédie）。约米尼致亚历山大，1867年4月30日，埃格顿手稿3167，第78-79页，大英图书馆。更早的信件，写于1864年，讲述了军事学院的故事（埃格顿手稿3166，第91-93、112、115、122和126页）。关于约米尼在俄国的处境，参见赖歇尔的《约米尼将军的处境》（La position du général Jomini）。
29 In letters written in old age to his son Alexander, who had risen high in the Russian foreign ministry, Jomini claimed to have given crucial advice to the czar in 1813–1814 and later in the war with Turkey, but that a “plot” led by Chernyshev had ruined his plan for a Russian military academy and that in the Crimea he had been no more than “a prompter at the play” (un souffleur de comédie). Jomini to Alexander, April 30, 1867, Egerton MSS. 3167, ff. 78–79, British Library. Earlier letters, written in 1864, tell the story of the military academy (Egerton MSS. 3166, ff. 91–93, 112, 115, 122, and 126). On Jomini's situation in Russia, see Reichel, “La position du général Jomini.”
30从他已发表的个人文件摘录中，我们能窥见他内心深处的愤怒和不满，而这些文件大部分至今仍为私人所有。1823年回到帕耶讷后，他将其描述为“这间肮脏的小屋”（ cette terrible bicoque）。他威胁要将十几岁的儿子亨利送入海军当普通水手，因为他“执迷于会毁掉他的恶习”。（亨利·佩罗雄，《若米尼作家》，载于《安托万-亨利·若米尼将军[1779-1869]：其传记文集》，沃州历史图书馆，第41号[洛桑， 1969年]，73-87页。）
30 There are glimpses of great anger and unhappiness in published extracts from his personal papers, most of which are still held privately. Returning to Payerne in 1823, he wrote of it as “this nasty hovel” (cette horrible bicoque). He threatened to send his teenage son Henry into the navy as a common seaman for his “perseverance in the vice which will destroy him.” (Henri Perrochon, “Jomini écrivain,” in Le général Antoine-Henri Jomini [1779–1869]: Contributions à sa biographie, Bibliothèque Historique Vaudoise, no. 41 [Lausanne, 1969], 73–87.)
31在1864年写给俄国陆军部长米留京的几封关于军事教育改革的长篇私人信件草稿中，他讲述了自己早先建立俄国军事学院的计划如何被车尔尼雪夫破坏的故事（埃格顿手稿3168，第43-57页）。他还划掉了赞扬法国教育体系以及为巴黎综合理工学院辩护，驳斥其为煽动叛乱窝点的段落。
31 In drafts of long private letters to Russian minister of war Miliutin in 1864 concerning the reform of military education, he told the story of how his earlier plans for a Russian military academy were ruined by Chernyshev (Egerton MSS. 3168, ff. 43–57). He also crossed out passages in which he had praised the French system of education and had defended the Ecole Polytechnique against allegations of being a nest of sedition.
32 Traité，2:305。
32 Traité, 2:305.
33 “Observations sur l'armée française de 1792 à 1808”一文于 1808 年匿名发表，后重印于《军事观察家》第五辑第 47 卷（1902 年），第 25-34 页、93-103 页，体现了当时人们对这场战役的看法；史蒂文·T·罗斯的《追求胜利：法国军事战略1792-1799》（纽约，1973 年），第 58-87 页，是该主题现代学术研究的一个不错的例子。
33 “Observations sur l'armée française de 1792 à 1808,” published anonymously in 1808, reprinted in Spectateur militaire, 5th series, vol. 47 (1902), 25–34, 93–103, exemplifies contemporary views of the campaign; Steven T. Ross, Quest for Victory: French Military Strategy 1792–1799 (New York, 1973), 58–87, is a fair example of modern scholarship on the subject.
34约翰·基根，《战争的面貌》（伦敦，1976 年），第 1 章，对军事史学的传统进行了很好的讨论。
34 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London, 1976), ch. 1, is a good discussion of traditions in military historiography.
35在十八、十九世纪众多关于军事职业的著作中，杰出的有塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿的《士兵与国家》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1957 年）；戈登·A·克雷格的《普鲁士军队的政治，1640-194 年》（纽约，1964 年）；以及拉乌尔·吉拉尔代的《当代法国的军事社会，1815-1939 年》（巴黎，1953 年）。
35 Among numerous works on the military profession in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, outstanding are Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1957); Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–194; (New York, 1964); and Raoul Girardet, La société militaire dans la France contemporaine, 1815–1939 (Paris, 1953).
36 Précis，1:135–136。
36 Précis, 1:135–136.
37 Peter Paret，“克劳塞维茨与十九世纪”，载于迈克尔·霍华德编， 《战争的理论与实践》（伦敦和纽约，1965 年），第 21-41 页。
37 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz and the Nineteenth Century,” in The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (London and New York, 1965), 21–41.
38 181 年战役政治与军事概要；，“par le général J***”（巴黎，1839 年），3, 15–41, 88ff。约米尼声称，在撰写他最初的拿破仑传记时，1815 年的手稿被遗忘了（同上，1-4）。
38 Précis politique et militaire de la campagne de 181;, “par le général J***” (Paris, 1839), 3, 15–41, 88ff. Jomini claimed that in writing his original biography of Napoleon, the manuscript for 1815 had been mislaid (ibid., 1–4).
39 Traité，1：iii-vi；概要，1:17-18, 21-22。
39 Traité, 1:iii-vi; Précis, 1:17–18, 21–22.
40参见《概要》1:180, 183，其中他用 ABCD 矩形来解释他关于“作战基地”的想法，或 2:25（图版），用图表表示他的十二个进攻和防御作战序列。
40 See Précis, 1:180, 183, where he used an ABCD rectangle to explain his ideas about the “base of operations,” or 2:25 (plate), diagramming his twelve offensive and defensive orders of battle.
41 DG Charlton，《法国的世俗宗教，1815-1870》（伦敦，1963 年），第 3 章，“科学崇拜”。
41 D. G. Charlton, Secular Religion in France, 1815–1870 (London, 1963), ch. 3, “The Cult of Science.”
42 表格分析，vii； Lecomte， La général Jomini，第 3 版，xxxi。
42 Tableau analytique, vii; Lecomte, La général Jomini,3rd ed., xxxi.
43 Peter Paret，《克劳塞维茨与国家》（纽约，1976 年；普林斯顿，1985 年重印），第 152-53 页及其他章节；Bernard Brodie，“战略作为一门科学”，《世界政治》 1（1949 年），第 467-88 页，以及在《社会科学百科全书》（纽约，1968 年）第 15 卷第 281-88 页中的简要论述。
43 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (New York, 1976; repr. Princeton, 1985), 152–53 and passim; Bernard Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” World Politics 1 (1949), 467–88, and more briefly in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), 15:281–88.
44受所谓的约明军事史学观念影响的优秀现代历史学家的例子有：大卫·G·钱德勒的《拿破仑的战役》（纽约，1966 年）和休·斯特拉坎的《欧洲军队与战争行为》（伦敦和波士顿，1983 年）。
44 Examples of good modern historians strongly influenced by what might be called the Jominian conception of military historiography are David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, 1966) and Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London and Boston, 1983).
45《论战争》 （Traité）第 14 章的标题是“关于作战路线的一般观察。关于战争艺术中这一重要分支的格言”。约米尼在章节标题的注释中说，他一直不确定该把这关键的一章放在哪里，最终决定不把阐述他所有历史判断所依据的思想的章节放在作品的结尾。
45 The title of chapter 14 of the Traité (2:269–32.8) is “Observations générales sur les lignes d'opérations. Maximes sur cette branche importante de l'art de la guerre.” In a note to the chapter title Jomini said that he had been uncertain where to place this key chapter, finally deciding against leaving to the end of the work his statement of the ideas on which all his historical judgments were based.
46阿尔及尔，安托万-亨利·若米尼，22 n. 20 指出，尚未找到 1807 年原版小册子的副本。但该文章曾重印于《帕拉斯》杂志1 (1808)，第 31-40 页。它作为第 35 章出现在《论著》 4:275-86 中。
46 Alger, Antoine-Henri Jomini, 22 n. 20, indicates that no copy of the original 1807 pamphlet has been found. But the essay was reprinted in the journal Pallas 1 (1808), 31–40. It appears as chapter 35 of the Traité, 4:275–86.
47这一点在他处理政治和策略的《概要》 1:42–147 和 2:195–97 中都有所体现，但如下文所述，他经常忽略自己所作的分类区分。
47 The point is implicit in his treatment of both politics and tactics in the Précis, 1:42–147 and 2:195–97, but as pointed out below he often ignored his own categorical distinctions.
48 Paret，《克劳塞维茨与国家》，148-49。
48 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 148–49.
49皮尔斯·G·麦克西，《没有胜利的战争：皮特的垮台，1799-1802》（牛津，1984 年）。
49 Piers G. Mackesy, War Without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt, 1799-1802 (Oxford, 1984).
50 Précis，1:77–78。
50 Précis, 1:77–78.
51同上，1:83。
51 Ibid., 1:83.
52这条具体的建议很早就出现在他的作品中；参见《论著》 4:284–85n。
52 This specific bit of advice appeared in his work very early; see Traité, 4:284–85n.
53 Précis，1:81–82。
53 Précis, 1:81–82.
54同上，1:80–81。
54 Ibid., 1:80–81.
55同上，1:121–36。在这一部分，他还对“战争会议”的有害影响表示遗憾。
55 Ibid., 1:121–36. In this section he also deplored the baneful effects of “councils of war.”
56同上，1:128。
56 Ibid., 1:128.
57他在攻击克劳塞维茨时最明确地表达了这一目的；参见《概要》 1:21ff。
57 He was most explicit about this aim in his attacks on Clausewitz; see Précis, 1:21ff.
58他在《论战斗部队的组建》一文中清楚地表达了对称性和等效性，该文作为《概要》的第二个附录发表， 2:375–401，他在文中试图评估线膛步兵武器对战术的影响。
58 His assumptions of symmetry and equivalence appear clearly in his essay, “Sur la formation des troupes pour le combat,” published as the second appendix to the Précis, 2:375–401, in which he attempts to assess the impact on tactics of rifled infantry weapons.
59 概要，1:16。
59 Précis, 1:16.
例如，在约翰·古奇（John Gooch）的《克利俄与玛尔斯：历史的运用与滥用》（载于《战略研究杂志》第3卷第3期（1980年），第26页）一文中，出现了如下表述：“约米尼并不希望人们从规范的角度看待他的作品。” 当然，古奇和我肯定都弄错了。但更重要的是，约米尼的著作很容易被误读。
60 For example, in John Gooch, “Clio and Mars: The Use and Abuse of History,” Journal of Strategic Studies 3, no. 3 (1980), 26, the following statement appears: “Jomini did not intend his work to be regarded in a normative light.” Surely, Gooch or I must be mistaken. But the more important point is that Jomini is easily misread.
61 “波希米亚人战争亲属的战略问题”， Revue militaire suisse 11 (1866), 577-86，署名“Un invalide quasi nonagénaire”。
61 “Questions stratégiques relatives aux événements de la guerre de Bohéme,” Revue militaire suisse 11 (1866), 577–86, signed by “Un invalide quasi nonagénaire.”
62同上，580。他向儿子亚历山大重申了这一点，以回应米柳京对文章副本的感谢（1866 年 10 月 4 日，埃格顿手稿 3167，第 54-55 页）。
62 Ibid., 580. He repeated the point to his son Alexander, in response to Miliutin's thanks for a copy of the essay (October 4, [1866], Egerton MSS. 3167, ff. 54–55).
63著名军事作家贝伦霍斯特虽然对约米尼已发表的耶拿战役记述持批评态度，但他对1808年发表在《帕拉斯》杂志上的关于战争原则的文章给予了积极评价（ 《贝伦霍斯特遗稿》，爱德华·冯·比洛编辑，第二部分[德绍，1847年]），第286页。英国陆军上尉查尔斯·汉密尔顿·史密斯翻译了劳埃德和滕珀尔霍夫将军的《德国七年战争史》，并附有摘自约米尼将军《大军事行动论》的观察和格言，第一卷（伦敦，无出版日期[约1808年]）。第81页的注释指出，约米尼的《大军事行动论》其余部分也值得翻译。
63 The noted military writer Berenhorst, although critical of Jomini's published account of the battle of Jena, commented favorably on his essay on the principles of war published in Pallas in 1808 (Aus dem Nachlasse von Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst, ed. Eduard von Bülow, part 2 [Dessau, 1847]), 286. Captain Charles Hamilton Smith of the British army translated The History of the Seven Years War in Germany by Generals Lloyd and Tempelhof, with Observations and Maxims Extracted from the Treatise of Great Military Operations of General Jomini, vol. 1 (London, n.d. [c. 1808]). A note on page 81 says that the rest of Jomini's Traité deserves translation.
64蒙托隆伯爵，拿破仑时期的法国历史回忆录，6 卷。 （巴黎，1832 年），1:1。
64 Comte de Montholon, Mémoire pour servir à l'histoire de France sous Napoléon, 6 vols. (Paris, 1832), 1:1.
65 Jay Luvaas，《军队的教育：英国军事思想，1815–1940》（伦敦，1964 年），第 25–28 页。
65 Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815–1940 (London, 1964), 25–28.
66 Simon François Gay de Vernon，《战争与防御科学论》，John Michael O'Connor 译，2 卷（纽约，1817 年），1:V。第 2 卷，第 386 页，也称赞 Jomini “超越了所有战争作家”。
66 Simon François Gay de Vernon, A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification…, trans. John Michael O'Connor, 2 vols. (New York, 1817), 1:V. Vol. 2, p. 386, also praises Jomini for having “transcended all writers on war.”
67鲁道夫·冯·凯默勒，《19 世纪战略科学的发展》（伦敦，1905 年），第 135、142-143 和 221 页。
67 Rudolph von Caemmerer, The Development of Strategical Science during the 19th Century (London, 1905), 135, 142–143, and 221.
68 Antoine-Henri Jomini， Abriss der Kriegskunst，编辑。和反式。阿尔布雷希特·冯·博古斯拉夫斯基（Albrecht von Boguslawski，柏林，1881 年），IV。
68 Antoine-Henri Jomini, Abriss der Kriegskunst, ed. and trans. Albrecht von Boguslawski (Berlin, 1881), IV.
69 Paret，“克劳塞维茨与十九世纪”，31。
69 Paret, “Clausewitz and the Nineteenth Century,” 31.
70 Russell F. Weigley，《美国战争方式：美国军事战略和政策史》（纽约和伦敦，1973 年），第 173-191 页。
70 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York and London, 1973), 173–91.
71 Stephen E. Ambrose，《责任、荣誉、国家：西点军校史》（巴尔的摩，1966 年），第 99-102 页。
71 Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore, 1966), 99–102.
72费迪南·福煦，《战争原则》（巴黎，1903 年），第 3-4 页。福煦以若米尼对战争的描述——一场伟大的“戏剧”——作为其关于“战争原则”著作的出发点。
72 Ferdinand Foch, Des principes de la guerre (Paris, 1903), 3–4. Foch took Jomini's description of war as a great “drama” as the point of departure for his work on the “principles of war.”
73 Brian Bond，《利德尔·哈特：军事思想研究》（伦敦和新泽西州新不伦瑞克，1977 年），第 80 页。
73 Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (London and New Brunswick, N.J., 1977), 80.
74请参阅本书中关于二十世纪的文章。
74 See the essays on the twentieth century in this volume.
75 Brodie，《导弹时代的战略》，71-106。
75 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 71–106.
76同上，107-144，以及肯特·罗伯茨·格林菲尔德，《第二次世界大战中的美国战略：重新思考》（巴尔的摩，1963 年），85-121。
76 Ibid., 107–144, as well as Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore, 1963), 85–121.
77约翰·I·阿尔杰的《追求胜利：战争原则的历史》（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特，1982 年）收录了一部杰出的汇编（第 195-270 页）。
77 John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War (Westport, Conn., 1982) includes a remarkable compendium (pp. 195–270).
78有用的论述有劳伦斯·马丁主编的《核时代的战略思想》（巴尔的摩，1979 年）和约翰·贝利斯等人的《当代战略》（伦敦，1975 年）。
78 Useful accounts are Laurence Martin, ed., Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age (Baltimore, 1979) and John Baylis et al., Contemporary Strategy (London, 1975).
7. 克劳塞维茨
7. Clausewitz
T克劳塞维茨在其著作中最终试图解答的问题——我们如何分析战争？战争是什么？——在核时代的重要性远超他那一代人。从1792年到1815年，暴力浪潮席卷欧洲，给数百万人带来死亡或苦难，改变了疆界，也改变并开放了社会。然而，当战火退去后，人们并没有迫切地想要研究和解释这场灾难。如同以往的战争一样，人们记录下自己的经历，并从中汲取他们认为对未来有益的教训；但很少有人有兴趣深入探究战术和战略的表象之下，去探索战争本身的现象，去研究它的结构、内在动力，以及它与其他社会因素的联系——这些因素可能是战争的起因，也可能在战争的影响下发生改变或遭到破坏。战争仍然被视为人类生活中一种永恒的力量，其技术层面或许会随着时间而改变，但始终可以被掌控。克劳塞维茨也曾进行过他那非同寻常的创新性研究，却丝毫没有意识到当时的文化或历史危机。而如今，在核扩散的阴影下，我们无法摆脱这种危机感，而对我们所处危机的认知不仅影响着我们对未来战争的思考，也影响着我们对历史战争的思考。它加深了我们对早期试图理解国家间暴力本质的尝试的兴趣。克劳塞维茨最重要的理论著作《战争论》如今的读者比自19世纪30年代首次出版以来的任何时候都要多。这或许不仅是因为这本书逐渐获得了经典的光环，它是一项独特的成就，融合了歌德时代的思想和美学特质，以及一种毫不妥协的现实主义——即便在今天，这种现实主义也实属罕见，或许可以称之为现代现实主义；人们阅读这本书，也是因为我们希望从中汲取有益的思想。
THE QUESTIONS that Clausewitz ultimately sought to answer in his writings—How can we analyze war? What is war?—have come to assume greater importance in the nuclear age than they possessed for his generation. From 1792 to 1815 waves of violence swept across Europe, brought death or suffering to millions, shifted frontiers, but also changed and opened societies. But when the flood receded, no urgent desire to study and explain the cataclysm was left behind. As after every war, men wrote about their experiences and drew what they took to be the lessons for the future; but there was little interest in delving beneath the surface of tactics and strategy to explore the phenomenon of war itself, to study its structure, its internal dynamic, its links with other elements of social existence that might be its causes and that were altered or destroyed under its impact. War continued to be accepted as a permanent force in human existence, whose technical aspects might change over time, but could always be mastered. Clausewitz, too, proceeded on his unusually innovative course of inquiry without a sense of cultural or historical crisis. Today, in the shadow of nuclear proliferation, we cannot escape that sense, and the awareness of the crisis in which we live affects not only our thinking about war in the future but also about war in history. It intensifies our interest in early attempts to understand the nature of violence between states. Clausewitz's most important theoretical work, On War, is read more widely today than at any time since it was first published in the 1830s. Probably that is so not only because the book has gradually acquired the aura of a classic, a unique achievement that combines intellectual and aesthetic attributes of the age of Goethe with an uncompromising realism that might be termed modern if such realism were not rare even now; the book is also read because we hope to find its ideas useful.
战争是否能够被理解，进而能否在理智上被驾驭和控制，仅仅是我们可能提出的几个相关问题之一。其他问题还包括：战争是否是合乎伦理的外交政策工具？战争能否被限制，甚至被消除？或者，反过来，如何才能最有效地进行战争？在《战争论》中，克劳塞维茨几乎没有提及前两个问题。他意识到了其中的伦理问题，但他处理这个问题的方式与我们不同。他认为战争是政策的一种极端但自然的体现，并且从未后悔自己参与过七次战役。他认为，他参与的第一场战争——对抗法兰西共和国——虽然在政治和战略上并不成功，但却是捍卫普鲁士和德国利益的正当之战。而他坚信，其他几场对抗拿破仑的战争不仅是正当的，更是一种伦理上的必然。关于第三个问题——如何有效地进行战争——他有很多话要说，其中很多内容如今已不再适用，至少不再直接适用。但在拿破仑的威胁消退之后，他认为分析比制定作战方案更为重要。对他而言，制定有效的战略方案和战术措施远不如识别战争的永恒要素并理解其运作方式重要。正因如此，《战争论》对于那些因工业革命和二十世纪军事巨变而与作者相隔甚远的读者来说，至今仍具有战争与和平议题的现实意义。
Whether war can be understood and, by implication, intellectually mastered and controlled, is merely one of several related questions we might ask. Others are: Is war an ethical instrument of foreign policy? Can war be limited, even eliminated? Or, on the other hand, how can war be waged most effectively? In On War Clausewitz scarcely addresses the first two of these questions. He was conscious of the ethical problem, but dealt with it differently than we would. He regarded war as an extreme but natural expression of policy, and never regretted that he himself had fought in seven campaigns. His first war, against the French Republic, he thought a justified if politically and strategically inept defense of Prussian and German interests. The others, against Napoleon, he believed passionately to have been not merely justified but an ethical imperative. On the third question—how to fight effectively—he had a great deal to say, much of it no longer relevant, at least not directly so. But after the Napoleonic threat receded, he regarded prescription as secondary to analysis. To devise effective strategic schemes and tactical measures mattered far less to him than to identify the permanent elements of war and come to understand how they function. It is for this reason that On War may still be relevant to issues of war and peace facing readers who are separated from the author by the industrial revolution and the military cataclysms of the twentieth century.
然而，这部著作的意义具有其特殊性，这与那些在与我们截然不同的条件下形成的理论不无关系。克劳塞维茨喜欢将战争研究与绘画研究相比较；两者都涉及需要特定技术专长的活动，但其过程和结果都不可预测，如果我们想要取得重要的成果，就不能机械地重复这些活动。如今，很少有艺术家会去阅读十九世纪早期的绘画论著来帮助他们进行艺术创作，甚至不会去从中获得理论上的理解。然而，对绘画史和绘画理论感兴趣的艺术家可能会阅读这部论著，从中汲取一些或许具有永恒价值的观察和概念，这些观察和概念可以用来构建他自己的理论，甚至可能影响他自身思想的应用。
The work's relevance is, however, of a particular kind, to be expected of theories that were formulated under conditions very different from our own. Clausewitz liked to compare the study of war with the study of painting; both concern activities that demand specific technical expertise, but whose processes and outcome are not predictable, and cannot be mechanically pursued if we strive for important results. Few artists today would read an early nineteenth-century treatise on painting to help them practice their art, or even to gain a theoretical understanding of it. An artist interested in the history and theory of painting may nevertheless read the treatise for its observations and concepts, some perhaps of permanent validity, which he can use to construct his own theories, and which might even influence the application of his ideas.
再举一个例子或许能更好地说明这一点。拿破仑战争结束后几年，克劳塞维茨开始撰写一部关于战略的著作。他后来评论道：“我最初的意图是，用简短、精确、精炼的语句，将我对这一主题主要要素的结论记录下来，而不考虑系统性或形式上的联系。孟德斯鸠处理这一主题的方式在我脑海中隐约可见……” ¹当他意识到这种方法并不适合他系统而全面的分析倾向时，他修改了这部著作；但修改后仍然不满意，于是他放弃了这部著作，并将其中的一些部分作为素材，创作了一部篇幅更长的新著作—— 《战争论》。但他选择孟德斯鸠作为范本，既揭示了他的意图，也引出了一个关于读者意图和期望的问题。今天，我们阅读《论法的精神》是否并非出于寻求一套可以据为己有的、全面的政府理论，而是出于其他一些不那么直接的功利目的呢？一方面，我们渴望了解一部两百多年来一直吸引着读者的作品；另一方面，我们阅读它是为了增进对政治基本问题的思考，并从孟德斯鸠的思想和论证中汲取灵感。在战争领域，《战争论》也要求我们采取类似的方法。
A further example may clarify the point. Some years after the Napoleonic Wars had ended, Clausewitz began work on a manuscript on strategy. “My original intention,” he commented later, “was to set down my conclusions on the principal elements of this topic in short, precise, compact statements, without concern for system or formal connection. The manner in which Montesquieu dealt with his subject was vaguely in my mind….”1 When he realized that this approach did not suit his tendency of systematic and expansive analysis, he revised the manuscript; when it still left him dissatisfied he abandoned it, and used parts as building blocks for a new, longer work, On War. But his choice of Montesquieu as a model tells us something of his intentions, and also raises a question about the intentions and expectations of his readers. Is it not the case that today we read The Spirit of the Laws not with the hope of encountering a comprehensive theory of government that we can make our own, but for different, less immediately utilitarian reasons? On the one hand, we want to become acquainted with a work that has held the interest of readers for more than two centuries; on the other, we read it to advance our thinking on basic issues of politics, to be stimulated by Montesquieu's ideas and arguments. In the sphere of war, On War calls for a similar approach.
与《论法的精神》一样，克劳塞维茨的著作也是一部高度个人化的作品，在某些方面几乎带有自传性质，这一特点使其与现代各种理论更加迥然不同。这两部著作都反映了作者的背景、社会地位、职业、人生转折点（例如孟德斯鸠在英国的经历和克劳塞维茨在法国的经历）、历史观和政治信仰。两人都通过思考和回应自身境遇和经验的具体细节，发展出赋予其作品持久价值的概括性论述和高度抽象的理论，而这些细节在他们的作品中清晰可见。如果我们能够关注克劳塞维茨所处的历史环境和个人命运，将有助于我们理解他的思想。
Like The Spirit of the Laws, Clausewitz's work is a highly personal, in some respects almost autobiographical document, a characteristic that removes it even further from modern varieties of theory. The two books reflect their authors' antecedents, their position in society, their professions, such turning points in their lives as Montesquieu's sojourn in England and Clausewitz's in France, their views of history, their political beliefs. Both men develop the generalizations, the high levels of abstraction that give their works lasting value, by pondering and reacting to the specifics of their condition and experience, specifics that are clearly apparent in their work. It will help our understanding of Clausewitz's ideas if we remain alert to his historical environment and to his personal fate.
我
I
卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨于1780年出生于柏林西南七十英里的小镇布尔格，是家中最小的儿子，父母是资产阶级，凭借家族传统自称贵族。他的父亲是一位退休中尉，曾在当地税务局任职，其父是一位神学教授，而教授的祖辈和父系都是路德教牧师；他的外祖父则管理着一座皇家农场。直到腓特烈大帝去世后，军队才接纳克劳塞维茨和他的两个兄弟为军官候补生。腓特烈大帝晚年一直竭力确保军官队伍中没有平民出身。他们三人最终都晋升为将军，并于1827年获得皇家法令的正式认可。与当时许多其他家族一样，克劳塞维茨家族通过教会服务以及在不断扩张的普鲁士国家的军队或官僚机构中任职而跻身贵族行列。
Carl von Clausewitz was born in 1780 in the small town of Burg, seventy miles southwest of Berlin, the fourth and youngest son of bourgeois parents, who claimed nobility on the strength of family tradition. His father, a retired lieutenant who served in the local tax office, was the son of a professor of theology, himself son and grandson of Lutheran pastors; his mother's father managed a royal farm. It was only after the death of Frederick the Great, who in his later years took great pains to keep his officer corps free of commoners, that the army accepted Clausewitz and two of his brothers as officer cadets. All became generals, and in 1827 their noble status was at last attested to by royal order. Together with many other families during this period, the Clausewitzes entered the nobility by way of the Church and service in the army or bureaucracy of the expanding Prussian state.
克劳塞维茨十二岁时便首次参战，参与了1793年冬春两季将法军逐出莱茵兰的战役。七月美因茨被收复后，他所在的团南下孚日山脉，在那里主要以小队突袭和伏击为主。1795年军队解散后，克劳塞维茨带着对小规模战斗和小队战术的理解回到普鲁士，这与大多数步兵军官截然不同，后者在战斗中的主要职责几乎就是维持士兵的紧密队形和快速齐射。起初，他的职业生涯悄然走上了一条略显非同寻常的道路。接下来的几年里，他驻扎在一个小型驻军中，尽管如此，这个驻地却也给他带来了一些不同寻常的优势。他的团长是普鲁士军事教育的先驱，为士兵子女、士官和少尉子女开办学校，并鼓励年轻军官学习专业科目、文学和历史。在这种虽略显偏僻但却充满支持的环境中，克劳塞维茨进步显著，足以申请进入柏林军事学院。1801年夏天，在他刚过完21岁生日不久，他便被录取，开始了为期三年的学习。
Clausewitz first saw combat as a twelve-year-old, in the campaign that drove the French out of the Rhineland in the winter and spring of 1793. After Mainz had been recaptured in July, his regiment marched south to the Vosges Mountains, where it fought a war primarily of detachments, raids, and ambushes. When the army was demobilized in 1795, Clausewitz returned to Prussia with some understanding of skirmishing and small-unit tactics, in contrast to the majority of infantry officers whose main, almost sole duty in combat was to maintain the close alignment and rapid volleys of their men. Imperceptibly at first, his career began to take a somewhat atypical course. For the next few years he was stationed in a small garrison, a post that nevertheless provided some unusual advantages. His regimental commander was a pioneer of military education in Prussia, who organized schools for the children of the rank and file and for the noncommissioned officers and ensigns of his regiment, and who encouraged his junior officers to study professional subjects, literature, and history. In this supportive if provincial environment, Clausewitz progressed sufficiently to apply for admission to the military school in Berlin, and in the summer of 1801, soon after his twenty-first birthday, was accepted to the three-year course.
这所学校不久前由一位新入伍的军官格哈德·冯·沙恩霍斯特进行了重组，此人日后将在普鲁士历史和克劳塞维茨的一生中扮演重要角色。沙恩霍斯特的父亲是一位退役骑兵军士，他自十六岁起便从军，先是在德国的一个小公国服役，后加入汉诺威军队，并在那里凭借其炮兵军官和军事著作而声名鹊起。1793年汉诺威对法宣战后，沙恩霍斯特展现出他作为一名杰出将领的卓越才能。他的声望为他赢得了普鲁士授予的上校军衔和贵族爵位，并于1801年正式加入普鲁士军队。在众多职务中，他担任了柏林军事学校的校长，并很快将其打造成为他向普鲁士军队引入现代战争理念的众多渠道之一。沙恩霍斯特是最早一批客观地认识并分析革命战争中军事创新与社会政治变革相互依存关系的人之一。在他看来，远逊于法国的中欧列强面临的问题是如何及时掌握现代化的关键要素，以避免被共和国吞并。他自信地认为自己能够在普鲁士扭转乾坤。对于克劳塞维茨而言，没有比这位博学的军人更好的导师了。沙恩霍斯特鼓励了这位年轻人的理论兴趣，同时也加深了他对普鲁士军队传统主义的不满。
The school had recently been reorganized by a newcomer to the army, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who was to play a major role in the history of Prussia and in Clausewitz's life. Scharnhorst, the son of a retired cavalry sergeant, had been a soldier since his sixteenth year, first in a small German principality, then in the Hanoverian army, where he made a name for himself as a gunnery officer and writer on military affairs. After Hanover entered the war against France in 1793, Scharnhorst revealed himself to be an exceptionally enterprising fighting soldier as well. His reputation led to an offer from Prussia of a colonelcy and a patent of nobility, and he transferred to the Prussian service in 1801. Among numerous other duties, he assumed the directorship of the military school in Berlin, soon turning it into one of several channels through which he hoped to introduce modern ideas on war to the Prussian army. Scharnhorst was among the first anywhere to recognize and analyze objectively the interdependence of military innovation and social and political change in the Revolutionary Wars. As he saw it, the problem facing the central European powers, far weaker than France, was how to appropriate essential components of modernization in time to prevent being overrun by the Republic, and he had the self-confidence to believe that he could make the difference in Prussia. No one could have been a better teacher for Clausewitz than this scholarly soldier, who encouraged the young man's theoretical interests while reinforcing his dissatisfaction with the traditionalism of the Prussian army.
1804年，克劳塞维茨以优异的成绩毕业，并被任命为普鲁士奥古斯特亲王的副官。他的社交和职业视野由此拓展。他经常出入宫廷，在那里结识了王太后的侍女玛丽·布吕尔伯爵夫人，几年后两人结为伉俪。沙恩霍斯特向德国最重要的军事期刊的编辑推荐了他，该期刊于1805年发表了他的第一篇文章，一篇长文驳斥了当时德国最畅销的拿破仑战争研究学者海因里希·迪特里希·冯·比洛战略理论的文章。
In 1804 Clausewitz graduated at the top of his class, and was appointed adjutant to Prince August of Prussia. His social and professional horizons expanded. He was frequently at court, where he met Countess Marie Brühl, lady-in-waiting to the Queen Mother, whom he was to marry some years later. Scharnhorst recommended him to the editor of the most important military journal in Germany, which in 1805 published his first article, a lengthy refutation of the strategic theories of Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow, in those years the most widely read German interpreter of Napoleonic warfare.
比洛的伟大之处在于他认识到战争的近期变化构成了一场革命。但他未能理解这场革命的本质；尤其未能把握战争新的重要性。他不像其他一些作家那样，将这些新方法斥为权宜之计或无政府状态；相反，他试图寻找数学原理，以揭示看似混乱的表面之下的理性结构。他提出的一个典型观点是，军事行动的合理性很大程度上取决于其地理目标与其基地之间的几何关系。克劳塞维茨对战争的看法截然不同。他的文章提出了三项主要批评，这些批评值得关注，因为它们揭示了即使是像比洛这样一位才华横溢的启蒙后期理论家（他试图将战争变成一种应用数学）的著作，与克劳塞维茨试图发展的既务实又方法论严谨的战争理论之间存在的差距。
Bülow had the great merit of recognizing that the recent changes in war constituted a revolution. But he failed to understand the nature of this revolution; in particular, he could not grasp the new importance of battle. He refused to dismiss the new ways as temporary expedients or anarchy, as some other writers did; instead he searched for mathematical principles that would reveal the rational structure beneath the seemingly chaotic surface. Typical of this effort was his assertion that the appropriateness of a military operation was largely determined by the geometric relationship between its geographic objective and its base. Clausewitz saw war very differently. His article raised three main criticisms, which are worth noting for the light they throw on the distance that separates even the work of an unusually gifted late-Enlightenment theorist like Bülow, who wanted to turn war into a kind of applied mathematics, from the realistic, yet methodologically rigorous approach that Clausewitz was trying to develop.
首先，克劳塞维茨反对比洛的方法，认为它存在缺陷。例如，比洛将战略定义为“所有超出敌方炮火射程或视野范围的军事行动”，而将战术定义为“所有在此范围内的行动”。克劳塞维茨认为这种区分肤浅、具有时效性（因为它会受到技术变革的影响），而且无关紧要，因为这两个概念的目的没有明确说明。相反，他提出了更具实用性且适用于过去、现在和未来所有战争的定义：“战术构成了武装力量在战斗中运用的理论；战略构成了为战争目的而运用战斗的理论。” ²毋庸赘言，对克劳塞维茨而言，“运用”一词也意味着“运用的威胁”。
Above all, Clausewitz objected, Bülow's method was flawed. For example, Bülow defined strategy as “all military movements out of the enemy's cannon range or range of vision,” and tactics as “all movements within this range.” Clausewitz rejected this distinction as superficial, timebound—because it would be affected by technological change—and irrelevant, because the purpose of the two concepts was left unstated. Instead he proposed definitions that were functional and applied to every war, past, present, and future: “Tactics constitute the theory of the use of armed forces in battle; strategy forms the theory of using battle for the purposes of the war.”2 It hardly needs adding that for Clausewitz the term “use” also meant “threat of use.”
其次，克劳塞维茨认为比洛的战争观不切实际。比洛的分析基于地理和数学，忽略了敌人的行动以及战争带来的身心影响。“然而，没有战争，战略就毫无意义，因为战争是战略运作的原材料，是战略所采用的手段。” ³
Second, Clausewitz considered Bülow's view of war unrealistic. By basing his analysis on geography and mathematics, Bülow ignored the actions of the enemy and the physical and psychological effects of the fighting. “Strategy, however, is nothing without battle, for battle is the raw material with which it works, the means it employs.”3
最后，克劳塞维茨坚持认为，任何有意义的理论都应该能够涵盖——而比洛的理论却未能做到这一点——与其研究对象相关的所有要素。比洛急于理解暴力的运用，将其变成一门科学，并使其可预测，却忽略了战争的本质组成部分。战争理论不仅要关注“能够进行数学分析”的要素，例如距离和接近角度，还要关注士兵士气和指挥官心理等难以捉摸的因素。4
Finally, Clausewitz insisted that any meaningful theory should be able to accommodate—as Bülow's does not—all elements pertaining to its subject. In his urge to understand the use of violence, turn it into a science, and make it predictable, Bülow excluded essential parts of war. A theory of war must address not only elements “that are susceptible to mathematical analysis,” distances and angles of approach, for instance, but also such imponderables as the soldiers' morale and the commanders' psychology.4
尽管克劳塞维茨急于扬名立万，并不吝于指出比洛的混乱和错误，但他最关心的是构建一种可靠的方法来检验比洛和其他人的理论，并以此为基础，发展出一套在理论上站得住脚的战争分析。即使在早期阶段，他的论证也建立在可观察的现实与关于战争永恒现象的假设之间的相互作用之上，而这些假设是通过历史研究、常识和逻辑发现的。他承认比洛关于作战基地与其目标之间存在几何关系的观点很有意思，甚至可能有助于解释某些拿破仑战役。但是，如果历史表明，一些战役的胜利来自比洛认为不充分的基地，而一些战役的失败却来自符合他要求的基地；如果逻辑、常识、历史和当时的现实都表明，目标不一定是静止的，而可以是敌军，那么比洛的观点就站不住脚了。
Although Clausewitz, eager to make a name for himself, was not reluctant to show up Billow's confusions and errors, his major concern was to construct a reliable method with which to test Billow's and other men's theories, and with which he himself could develop an analysis of war that was intellectually defensible. Underlying his arguments even at this early stage is the interplay between the observable present and hypotheses concerning timeless phenomena of war, which are discovered by historical study, common sense, and logic. He agreed that Billow's idea of the significance of the geometric relationship between the base of operations and its objective was interesting, and might even help explain this or that Napoleonic campaign. But if history demonstrated that campaigns had been won from bases that Bülow thought inadequate, and lost with bases that met his requirements, and if logic and common sense as well as history and contemporary reality suggested that an objective need not be stationary, but might be the enemy army, then Bülow's idea could not stand.
克劳塞维茨在1806年欢迎战争，认为这是遏制拿破仑称霸欧洲的唯一途径；但他对胜利并没有十足的把握。普鲁士军队兵力处于劣势，其领导层内部也存在分歧，以至于主力参谋长沙恩霍斯特难以贯彻自己的理念；此外，普鲁士军队的组织、行政、后勤以及战术理论都限制了其快速作战的能力。在奥尔施泰特战役中，奥古斯特亲王率领一个掷弹兵营，与克劳塞维茨试图用类似的战术来对抗法军的灵活性，克劳塞维茨甚至将三分之一的普通士兵改编为散兵。战败后，该营成为撤退军队的后卫，直到弹药耗尽才投降。作为国王的侄子，奥古斯特亲王对拿破仑来说颇具价值。亲王和他的副官被派往法国，在那里他们获得了相对的行动自由。但直到 1807 年秋天，他们才获准返回普鲁士。
Clausewitz welcomed war in 1806 as the only means to check Napoleon's drive to dominate Europe; but he was not confident of victory. The Prussian army was outnumbered, its leadership too divided for Scharnhorst—now chief of staff of the main force—to impose his views; and its organization, administration, and supply, as well as its tactical doctrine, precluded rapid operations. At the battle of Auerstedt, Prince August, in command of a grenadier battalion, and Clausewitz tried to oppose the flexibility of the French with similar tactics, Clausewitz turning one-third of the rank and file into skirmishers. After the battle was lost, the battalion formed part of the rear guard of the retreating army, until it ran out of ammunition and surrendered. As a nephew of the king, Prince August was of some value to Napoleon. The prince and his adjutant were ordered to France, where they were given relative freedom of movement; but it was not until the fall of 1807 that they received permission to return to Prussia.
除了1812年在俄国的逗留之外，这十个月是克劳塞维茨一生中唯一一段在德国以外长期居住的时期。这使他得以直接了解法国的社会和文化，并有机会从全新的理性和情感视角审视普鲁士的状况。他对导致战败的种种态度和政策进行了严厉的批判：政府没有将战争作为外交政策的工具，反而让自己与潜在的盟友隔绝，然后又给士兵布置了不可能完成的任务。尽管军队陈旧低效，但如果其领导人能够主动出击，而不是过分依赖迂回取胜，或许能够取得更大的成就。最重要的是，普鲁士社会一直处于被动状态；整个国家都认为战争仅仅是军队的事情。由于政府让社会处于一种消极和绝对服从的状态，因此在危机来临时，它无法激发民众的潜在能量和理想主义。只有革命性的变革才能拯救这个国家。
Apart from his stay in Russia in 1812, these ten months were the only long period in his life that Clausewitz spent outside Germany. It gave him some direct knowledge of French society and culture, and the opportunity to see conditions in Prussia from a new intellectual and emotional perspective. His criticism of the attitudes and policies that he blamed for the defeat was harsh: the government had not used war as an instrument of foreign policy, but allowed itself to be isolated from prospective allies, and then gave its soldiers an impossible task. The army, although antiquated and inefficient, might have achieved more if its leaders had sought battle instead of relying far too long on the efficacy of maneuvering into and out of strong positions. Above all, Prussian society had been inert; the country regarded the war as a matter for the army alone. Because the government had kept society in a condition of passivity and total obedience, it could not tap the population's potential energy and idealism when the crisis came. Only revolutionary changes could now save the state.5
在战争后期，沙恩霍斯特再次展现了他作为一名作战将领和战略规划者的价值，因此，当战争结束后，他自然而然地成为领导军队重组计划起草委员会的不二人选。沙恩霍斯特很快将该委员会打造成为一场旨在实现国家军事机构现代化的新运动的核心，其内容涵盖从人力资源政策到滑膛枪设计，再到最新作战战术理论的制定。反对之声立即而强烈。沙恩霍斯特提出的改革方案影响深远，不仅会彻底改变军队，还会影响国家的社会和经济，打破贵族对军官职位的近乎垄断，并将普通士兵从旧有的、往往不人道的训练和纪律制度的束缚中解放出来。这场关于改革的冲突，实际上是一场关于普鲁士国家性质的斗争，在接下来的五年里愈演愈烈。 1808 年春天，克劳塞维茨离开被占领的柏林前往普鲁士政府的临时所在地柯尼斯堡，很快便被纳入改革者的核心圈子，并在保守派中获得了可能具有危险性的激进主义的名声，这种名声伴随了他一生。
During the later phases of the war, Scharnhorst had again demonstrated his worth as a fighting soldier and strategic planner, and he became an obvious choice to head a commission to draft plans for the reorganization of the army when the fighting ended. Scharnhorst soon made the commission the center of a new campaign to modernize the country's military institutions, from its manpower policies to the design of muskets and the development of up-to-date operational and tactical doctrines. Opposition was immediate and powerful. Reforms as far-reaching as those Scharnhorst proposed would not only transform the army but affect the country's society and economy, break the nobility's near monopoly on officer positions, and release the rank and file from the bondage of the old, often inhumane system of drill and discipline. The conflict over reform, which really was a struggle over the character of the Prussian state, raged for the next five years. When in the spring of 1808 Clausewitz left occupied Berlin for Königsberg, the temporary seat of the Prussian government, he was soon drawn into the inner circle of reformers, and among conservatives acquired a reputation of possibly dangerous radicalism, which he was to retain for the rest of his life.
沙恩霍斯特最初聘用克劳塞维茨担任私人助理。他协助组织秘密的重整军备措施，并撰写文章解释和捍卫一些具有社会敏感性的改革，例如在选拔和晋升初级军官时采用竞争性考试。政府迁回柏林后，克劳塞维茨成为沙恩霍斯特办公室主任，这一职位使他处于改革运动的核心地位。在沙恩霍斯特的影响下，他被任命为总参谋部成员和新成立的军事学院的教员，在那里讲授战略和游击战。1810年10月，他成为皇太子的军事导师，几个月后，他加入了起草步兵和骑兵新作战战术条例的委员会。这些年来，克劳塞维茨的职责范围之广，使他有机会深入了解从零开始重建军队所涉及的理论、技术、组织和政治问题。
At first Scharnhorst employed Clausewitz as a personal assistant. He helped organize secret rearmament measures, and wrote articles to explain and defend such socially sensitive innovations as competitive examinations in the selection and promotion of junior officers. When the government returned to Berlin, Clausewitz became the head of Scharnhorst's office, a position that placed him at the center of the reform movement. Through Scharnhorst's influence he was appointed to the general staff and to the faculty of the new war college, where he lectured on strategy and on partisan warfare. In October 1810 he became military tutor to the crown prince, and a few months later joined the commission that drafted new operational and tactical regulations for the infantry and cavalry. The range of his duties over these years gave Clausewitz a rare opportunity to come to know the intellectual, technical, organizational, and political problems of rebuilding an army almost from the ground up.
这些新的职责并未削弱他早先对战争科学分析的兴趣。在这些年的文章和笔记中，他阐明了自己关于处理战争这类复杂活动的理论的适当目标和方法。他区分了理论的认知、教育和实用潜力。首先，理论的功能在于从理性层面构建过去和现在的现实，展现“事物之间的关联，并将重要与不重要区分开来”；触及战争现象的本质要素，并发现将它们联系在一起的逻辑和动态联系，从而构建出可理解的结构。一个逻辑严密、历史可靠且反映当下现实的理论，具有教育功能，能够帮助学生组织和发展他们从经验、学习和历史中汲取的关于战争的观点——对过去的探索拓展了任何个体所能体验的现实。理论永远无法带来完全的理解，这是不可能的，但它可以强化和完善判断。理论的首要任务并非在于产生教条、规则或行动法则。知识与实践截然不同；但有效的理论却能带来实用价值。
These new responsibilities did not lessen his earlier interest in the scientific analysis of war. In essays and notes during these years he clarified his ideas on the appropriate goals and procedures of a theory that deals with a complex activity such as war. He distinguished between the cognitive, pedagogic, and utilitarian potential of theory. In the first instance, the function of theory is to structure past and present reality intellectually, to show “how one thing is related to another, and keep the important and unimportant separate”; to reach the irreducible elements of the phenomenon of war, and to discover the logical and dynamic links that bind them into comprehensible structures. A theory that is logically and historically defensible, and that reflects present reality, has the pedagogic function of helping the student organize and develop his ideas on war, which he draws from experience, study, and from history—the exploration of the past extends the reality that any one individual can experience. Theory can never lead to complete understanding, which is an impossibility, but it can strengthen and refine judgment. It is not the primary task of theory to generate doctrine, rules, or laws of action. Knowledge and performance are different; but utilitarian benefits may flow from valid theories.
理论必须是全面的，也就是说，它必须能够涵盖其研究对象的所有方面，无论这些方面是当下的还是其他时代的。它必须基于其研究对象的常量或绝对性，而不是基于可能只是暂时的现象，即便这些现象目前似乎主导着战争。拿破仑战争就是一种暂时的现象。战争的社会和政治性质以及指挥官的心理都是绝对性的例子。绝对性是理论的组织原则。所有其他现象都依赖于它们，并且彼此之间——通常是间接的——相互联系，而理论必须揭示这些联系。克劳塞维茨在1808年指出，与这种为每一个当前或后续的观察和见解都留有逻辑位置的智力结构相反的是像比洛或约米尼这样的作家，他们围绕着偶然获得的思想和认知构建最终的教条——从只有有限或暂时有效性的观念中进行概括。
Theory must be comprehensive, that is, it must be able to accommodate all aspects of its subject, whether of the present or of other times. It must be based on the constants or absolutes of its subject, not on phenomena that may be temporary, even if currently these phenomena seem to dominate war. Napoleonic warfare is a temporary phenomenon. Examples of absolutes are the social and political nature of war, and the psychology of the commander. Absolutes serve as the organizing principles of theory. All other phenomena depend on them, and are linked—often indirectly—to each other, links that theory must reveal. Clausewitz noted in 1808 that the opposite of such an intellectual structure, in which a logical place is left for every current or subsequent observation and insight, is the practice of writers like Bülow or Jomini to construct definitive doctrines around thoughts and recognitions haphazardly arrived at—to generalize from ideas that have only limited or temporary validity.
理论必须不断经受现实的检验。它不能以逻辑之名，坚持那些已被现实证伪的论断。在任何特定时刻，现实似乎都比理论更为狭隘；例如，十八世纪的战争并不能穷尽战争的所有可能性，拿破仑的战役也同样如此。另一方面，由于现实不断变化，且充满不可估量和不可预见的因素，任何理论都无法完全反映现实，更遑论解释现实。理论必须足够灵活开放，能够考虑到这些不可估量因素，并且必须具备进一步发展的潜力。6
Theory must constantly pass the test of reality. In the name of logic it cannot insist on something that is disproved by reality. At any given moment, reality appears narrower than theory; eighteenth-century war-fare, for example, does not exhaust all possibilities of war, nor do the campaigns of Napoleon. On the other hand, since reality constantly changes and is marked by imponderables and the unforeseen, no theory can ever completely reflect, let alone explain it. Theory must be sufficiently flexible and open to take account of imponderables, and it must have the potential for further development.6
这些思想大多借鉴自德国唯心主义哲学和当时的科学思想，但这并不意味着克劳塞维茨精通哲学。年轻时，他曾听过康德的普及者约翰·戈特弗里德·基塞韦特讲授的逻辑学和伦理学入门课程，之后又阅读了数学、哲学和美学理论方面的书籍和文章，他逐渐认为这些内容与战争分析有一定的关联——例如，在对才能和天才的探讨方面。最重要的是，他从自身所处的文化环境中间接地汲取思想：例如，他运用极性概念——将主动与被动、正与负进行分离和联系，以此分析进攻与防御的关系——以及他通过正题和反题进行辩证发展，这些都是当时受过教育的德国人的普遍做法。但是，尽管他在改革时期构建的理论体系的组成部分是衍生性的，但他独特之处在于系统地将这些思想应用于先验哲学不会视为“真实”或仅在幼稚意义上视为真实的现象。克劳塞维茨想要理解的现实并非纯粹理性的抽象现实，而是政治和军事存在中实际存在的物质、智力和心理组成部分。7
Many of these ideas were borrowed from the philosophy of German Idealism and from the scientific thought of the time, which is not to say that Clausewitz was deeply versed in philosophy. As a young officer he attended introductory lectures on logic and ethics by Johann Gottfried Kiesewetter, a popularizer of Kant, and then and later read books and articles on mathematics, philosophy, and on aesthetic theory, which he came to believe had some relevance to the analysis of war—for instance in its treatment of talent and genius. Above all he drew ideas at second and third hand from his cultural environment: his use of the concept of polarity, for instance—the separation and connection of active and passive, positive and negative, which he employed to analyze the relationship of attack and defense—and his dialectical development of ideas through thesis and antithesis were the common property of educated Germans at the time. But if the components of the theoretical system he formulated during the years of reform were derivative, he was unique in systematically applying these ideas to phenomena that transcendental philosophy would not have regarded as “real,” or real only in a naive sense. The reality that Clausewitz wanted to understand was not the abstract reality of pure reason but the actual physical, intellectual, and psychological components of political and military existence.7
1809年法奥战争爆发，克劳塞维茨燃起了希望，认为拿破仑终于得逞了。他申请加入奥地利军队，但瓦格拉姆战役后法军的突然停战才使他留在普鲁士。在接下来的几年里，他从未完全放弃在德国发动武装起义的可能性。1811年底，拿破仑强迫普鲁士将其领土划为入侵俄国的集结地，并向大军派遣两万兵力。克劳塞维茨是反对这种他称之为既不英勇也不明智的投降的最直言不讳的人之一，他与其他三十名军官一起辞去了军职，这一举动巩固了他“将个人价值观置于国王政策之上”的声誉。
The outbreak of war between France and Austria in 1809 raised Clausewitz's hopes that Napoleon had at last overreached himself. He applied for an Austrian commission, and only the sudden armistice after the French victory at Wagram kept him in Prussia. Throughout the next years he never entirely renounced the possibility of armed insurrection in Germany. When at the end of 1811 Napoleon forced Prussia to make its territory available to him as a staging area for the invasion of Russia, and to contribute twenty thousand men to the Grande Armée, Clausewitz was among the most outspoken opponents of what he called a surrender that was both unheroic and politically unwise, and with some thirty other officers resigned his commission, a step that confirmed his reputation as a man who put his own values above the policies of the king.
在1812年战争期间，克劳塞维茨在俄国军队中担任上校，历任多个参谋职务，但由于他几乎不会说俄语，因此实际上只能算是一个观察员。然而，在战役后期，他抓住机会打击法军，帮助说服普鲁士辅助军团司令冯·约克将军脱离普鲁士大军，从而削弱了法军的实力。约克与俄国维特根斯坦伯爵（克劳塞维茨当时是维特根斯坦伯爵的参谋）签订的所谓《陶罗根协定》不仅阻止了法军在俄国边境重整旗鼓，而且传递了一个革命性的信息：在某些情况下，普鲁士军官的良心或政治判断可以凌驾于其效忠誓言之上。
During the war of 1812 he served as a Russian colonel in various staff positions, little more than an observer because he hardly spoke the language. Toward the end of the campaign, however, he grasped the opportunity to strike a blow against the French by helping to persuade the commander of the Prussian auxiliary corps, General von Yorck, to defect from the Grande Armée and neutralize his force. The so-called Convention of Tauroggen that Yorck concluded with the Russian Count Wittgenstein on whose staff Clausewitz served not only prevented the French from regrouping at the Russian border but carried the revolutionary message that under certain conditions a Prussian officer's conscience or political judgment took precedence over his oath of obedience.
克劳塞维茨随约克返回东普鲁士，在那里他制定了一项组建地方民兵的计划——这又是一项具有潜在革命意义的举措，因为两万名士兵未经国王许可便获得了武装。1813年3月，普鲁士最终加入对法战争，腓特烈·威廉三世拒绝了克劳塞维茨重返普鲁士军队的请求，以此回报他此前的独立精神。克劳塞维茨仍身着俄军制服，非正式地担任沙恩霍斯特的助手，直到沙恩霍斯特在格罗斯格尔申战役中身负重伤而亡。1813年秋，他担任一支小型国际部队的参谋长，该部队负责将法军从波罗的海沿岸清除出去。最终获准重返普鲁士军队后，他在百日王朝期间被任命为第三军参谋长。该军在瓦夫尔战役中牵制住了格鲁希的军团，使其无法增援滑铁卢战役中的拿破仑。
Clausewitz returned with Yorck to East Prussia, where he drew up a plan for raising the provincial militia—a further act of potential revolutionary import, because twenty thousand men were armed without the king's permission. When Prussia at last joined the war against France in March 1813, Frederick William III repaid Clausewitz for his independence by turning down his request to reenter the Prussian service. Still in Russian uniform, he acted unofficially as Scharnhorst's assistant, until Scharnhorst was fatally wounded in the battle of Grossgörschen. In the fall of 1813 he served as chief of staff of a small international force that cleared the French from the Baltic coast. After being at last readmitted to the Prussian army, he was appointed chief of staff of the third corps during the Hundred Days, which by tying down Grouchy's corps at the battle of Wavre prevented it from reinforcing Napoleon at Waterloo.
克劳塞维茨在宫廷和军队中受到保守派的怀疑，无疑使他无法担任朋友们希望他担任的更重要的职务；然而，随着拿破仑战争接近尾声，很少有像他这样年纪的军官能够拥有如此丰富多彩的经历，从作战和参谋工作到战略规划，再到参与意义重大的政治军事决策，无所不包。他曾积极参与改革运动，尽管并非领导者，但这场改革运动在短短几年内就成功地使普鲁士军队从旧制度下较为臃肿的军事组织之一，转变为在许多方面都优于法国军队的强大力量。社会变革与这些改革息息相关，但并未达到改革者们的预期。随着普鲁士回归日益僵化的保守主义，克劳塞维茨因个人和政治上的失望而放弃了他曾经对理想化的改革国家的过高期望。他二十多岁到三十岁出头时那种强烈却又常常带有批判性的爱国情怀，逐渐被一种更为平衡的爱国观所取代——早在1814年，他就反对一位朋友提出的以报复为目的的和平方案。他认为，法国不应被削弱到一定程度，因为这对于维护欧洲的权力平衡至关重要。在政治上，他也逐渐从一名党派人士转变为一名理论家。
The suspicion in which Clausewitz was held by conservatives at court and in the army undoubtedly kept him from the more important assignments in which his friends wanted to place him; nevertheless as the Napoleonic Wars drew to a close, few officers his age could look back on experiences as varied as his, ranging from combat and staff duties to strategic planning and participation in politico-military decisions of the highest significance. The reform movement of which he had been an active though not leading member had succeeded in a few years in revitalizing the Prussian army from one of the more cumbersome military organizations of the Old Regime to a force that in many respects now was superior to that of the French. Social change was linked to the innovations, but it did not go as far as the reformers had hoped. As Prussia returned to an increasingly rigid conservatism, Clausewitz reacted to his personal and political disappointments by renouncing the excessive expectations he had once placed in the idealized reformed state. The intense if often critical patriotism of his twenties and early thirties gave way to a more balanced view of his country—as early as 1814 he disagreed with a friend who called for a vindictive peace. France, he argued, should not be weakened beyond a certain measure because it was needed to maintain the balance of power in Europe. In politics, too, he was becoming more of a theorist than a partisan.
在和平初期，克劳塞维茨担任普鲁士驻莱茵兰军队的总参谋长。1818年，38岁的他受邀担任柏林军事学院院长，虽然这份行政职位他并不热衷，但还是接受了，并晋升为少将。他曾一度寻求出任驻圣詹姆斯宫廷大使，但由于他独立自主和政治上的不可靠，再次错失良机。1816年，他重拾对军事史和军事理论的深入研究，此前因与拿破仑的决战而中断。在他生命的最后十五年里，他撰写了大量战争史和战役史，还撰写了沙恩霍斯特的传记（后由兰克出版）、一些极具原创性的政治论文，以及一部关于1806年战败前后普鲁士历史的著作，这部著作至今仍是研究这一时期的重要著作之一。 1819年，他开始撰写《论战争》，并在接下来的八年中完成了计划八部分中的前六部分，以及第七卷和第八卷的草稿。但到了1827年，他意识到手稿未能清晰地阐述他在二十岁出头时就已提出的两个恒定不变的原则，而这两个原则正是他理论的关键要素：战争的政治本质，以及战争的两种基本形式。在一份解释需要进行大量修订的说明中，他写道：
During the first years of peace, Clausewitz served as chief of staff of the Prussian forces in the Rhineland. In 1818, at the age of thirty-eight, he was offered the directorship of the war college in Berlin, an administrative position he accepted without enthusiasm, and promoted to the rank of major general. For a time he sought the appointment of ambassador to the Court of St. James, but once again his reputation for independence and political unreliability ruined his chances. In 1816 he had returned to the intensive study of military history and theory, which the climactic struggle against Napoleon had interrupted. In the remaining fifteen years of his life he wrote numerous histories of wars and campaigns, but also a biographical study of Scharnhorst, subsequently published by Ranke, some political essays of exceptional originality, and a history of Prussia before and during the defeat of 1806, which remains one of the notable interpretations of these years. In 1819 he began the writing of On War, and in the next eight years completed the first six of eight planned parts, as well as drafts of Books VII and VIII. But by 1827 he had come to realize that the manuscript did not bring out with sufficient clarity two constants that he had first identified in his early twenties and that were key elements in his theory: the political nature of war, and the two basic forms that war assumes. In a note explaining the need for extensive revisions, he wrote:
我认为前六本书（目前已有干净的复印件）只是一堆相当杂乱无章的文字，需要再次彻底修订。修订后的版本将使两种战争类型在各个方面都更加清晰地展现出来……
I regard the first six books, which are already in a clean copy, merely as a rather formless mass that must be thoroughly reworked once more. The revision will bring out the two types of war with greater clarity at every point….
战争可以分为两种：一种是旨在推翻敌人——使其政治上无能为力或军事上丧失力量，从而迫使其签署我们想要的任何和平协议；另一种则仅仅是占领其部分边境地区，以便将其吞并或在和平谈判中以此作为筹码。当然，在我的论述中，这两种战争类型之间的转换会反复出现；但必须始终明确指出，这两种战争类型的目标截然不同，并且必须阐明它们之间的不可调和之处。
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the enemy—to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations. Transitions from one type to the other will of course recur in my treatment; but the fact that the aims of the two types are quite different must be clear at all times, and their points of irreconcilability brought out.
这两种战争之间的区别是客观存在的。但另一个同样重要的事实也必须明确指出，那就是战争只不过是政策的延续，只不过手段不同。如果始终牢记这一点，将极大地促进对这一主题的研究，并使整体分析更加容易。8
This distinction between the two kinds of war is an actual fact. But no less practical is the importance of another point that must be made absolutely clear, namely that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means. If this is firmly kept in mind throughout, it will greatly facilitate the study of the subject and the whole will be easier to analyze.8
在开始修改之前，克劳塞维茨撰写了拿破仑意大利战役和滑铁卢战役的历史，以便更清楚地了解他关于战争的二元形式和政治性质的思想在现实中是如何运作的。因此，在1830年被任命为炮兵监察官之前，他只来得及修改几个章节，就被迫搁置了《战争论》的手稿。同年晚些时候，法国大革命和波兰反抗俄国的起义使欧洲爆发战争的可能性增加，普鲁士动员了部分军队，克劳塞维茨被任命为普鲁士总参谋长。1831年，霍乱疫情从俄国蔓延到波兰，然后扩散到中欧和西欧，最终导致克劳塞维茨于1831年11月去世，享年51岁。
Before beginning the changes, Clausewitz wrote histories of Napoleon's Italian campaigns and of the Waterloo campaign, to understand more clearly how his ideas of the dual form of war and of the political character of war worked in reality. Consequently he could revise only a few chapters before he received a new assignment in the artillery inspectorate in 1830, and was forced to put the manuscript of On War aside. Later that year when the French Revolution and the Polish revolt against Russia raised the possibility of a European war, Prussia mobilized part of its army, and Clausewitz was appointed its chief of staff. The great cholera epidemic of 1831, which spread from Russia to Poland and then to central and western Europe, caused his death at the age of fifty-one in November 1831.
二
II
《战争论》分为128章，分为八卷。第一卷“论战争的性质”界定了战争在社会和政治领域的一般特征，并指出了战争中始终存在的要素：危险、身心消耗、心理因素以及阻碍意图实现的诸多障碍，克劳塞维茨将这些障碍归纳为“摩擦”的概念。第二卷“论战争理论”概述了理论的可能性和局限性。第三卷“论一般战略”不仅包含关于武力、时间和空间的章节，还对心理因素进行了更详细的论述——克劳塞维茨认为，所有这些因素都是“战争中的有效要素”。第四卷“交战”讨论了“基本的军事活动——战斗，它通过其物质和心理效应，以简单或复合的形式构成了战争的总体目标”。本书第五卷“军事力量”、第六卷“防御”和第七卷“进攻”——这三部分最具传统军事色彩——阐释并扩展了前文的论点。最后，第八卷“战争计划”再次探讨了第一卷最重要的主题，考察了理论上的“绝对”战争与现实战争之间的关系，并在一系列极具原创性的理论和历史论文中，分析了战争的政治性质以及政治与战略的互动。
On War is divided into 128 chapters and sections, grouped into eight books.9 The first, “On the Nature of War,” defines the general characteristics of war in the social and political world, and identifies elements that are always present in the conduct of war: danger, physical and mental effort, psychological factors, and the many impediments to carrying out one's intentions, which Clausewitz collected under the concept of “friction.” Book II, “On the Theory of War,” outlines the possibilities and limitations of theory. Book III, “On Strategy in General,” includes not only chapters on force, time, and space, but also a more detailed treatment of psychological elements—all, according to Clausewitz, “the operative elements in war.”10 Book IV, “The Engagement,” discusses “the essential military activity, fighting, which by its material and psychological effect comprises in simple or compound form the overall object of the war.”11 Book V, “Military Forces,” Book VI, “Defense,” and Book VII, “The Attack”—the three most conventionally military parts of the work—illustrate and elaborate earlier arguments. Finally, Book VIII, “War Plans,” again takes up the most important themes of the first book, explores the relationship between “absolute” war in theory and real war, and in a sweep of theoretical and historical essays of great originality analyzes the political character of war and the interaction of politics and strategy.
除了第五卷“军事力量”（其在整部著作中的位置似乎并不完全合适）之外，其余章节的编排逻辑严密。开篇第一章对全书进行了概述，随后探讨了战争的本质以及战争理论的目的和难点。第三卷至第七卷论述了战略和军事行动的实施。全书最后分析了政治和军事领导在战争中最重要的作用，并将战争更充分地融入到社会和政治互动之中。
Except perhaps for Book V, “Military Forces,” for which no completely satisfactory place exists in the sequence, the material is arranged logically, beginning with a survey of the whole in the opening chapter, proceeding to the nature of war and to the purpose and difficulties of theory. Books III through VII discuss strategy and the conduct of military operations. The work ends with an analysis of the most important functions of political and military leadership in war, and more fully integrates war into social and political intercourse.
即使是这简短的概述也能表明，克劳塞维茨为自己设定了两个主要目标：一是通过逻辑分析深入探究绝对战争的本质，即当时哲学界所说的“理想”战争；二是理解战争作为一种社会和政治现象的各种实际形式，以及其战略、作战和战术层面。但对他而言，这一哲学和学术目标远非简单的智力游戏，也并非与现实几乎无关的抽象概念游戏。克劳塞维茨坚信，唯有理论分析才能提供理解现实战争及其惊人多样性的途径。反过来，对现实战争的分析又不断检验着理论的有效性。正如克劳塞维茨所言：“正如有些植物只有长得不高才能结果一样……理论的枝叶也必须修剪，使其紧贴着它合适的土壤——经验。”<sup> 12</sup>
Even this brief outline will indicate that Clausewitz set himself two primary goals: one, to penetrate by means of logical analysis to the essence of absolute war, “ideal” war in the language of the philosophy of the time; the other, to understand war in the various forms it actually takes, as a social and political phenomenon, and in its strategic, operational, and tactical aspects. But the philosophic, scholarly aim meant far more to him than an intellectual exercise, a play with abstractions that had little bearing on reality. Theoretical analysis alone, Clausewitz was convinced, could provide the means by which actual war in its incredible variety might be understood. In turn, the analysis of real war continually tests the validity of theory. According to Clausewitz's simile: “Just as some plants bear fruit only if they don't shoot up too high, so…the leaves and flowers of theory must be pruned and the plant kept close to its proper soil—experience.”12
然而，将全书分为八个主要部分并不能为读者提供可靠的指导。各部分之间的区别远不如将它们联系起来的主题和论证网络重要。一个观点被以极其清晰、片面的方式定义，之后却会随着章节的推进而发生变化，有时甚至在与其他论点和观察的融合中被赋予新的维度。正题之后紧跟着反题；一种现象的特征最终是通过分析其对立面来确定的。对战争本质的抽象探讨与将诸如目的和手段理论、摩擦和天才等主要概念、以及诸如攻防关系等次要论点应用于实际战争的分析方法交替出现，同时还穿插着详细的作战和战术观察——所有这些都建立在历史证据之上。<sup> 13</sup>文本的特点是行文流畅，相互引用和典故不仅指向本书的其他部分，也指向作者及其同时代人的经历。贯穿整部作品，形成了一种超越其外部设计的内在统一性，贯穿了两种辩证关系，这两种关系都在开篇章节中提出：战争理论与现实战争之间的关系；以及构成战争的三个因素——暴力、偶然性和概率性以及理性之间的关系。
The organization of the work into eight main parts does not, however, constitute a sure guide for the reader. The distinctions between the parts are less important than is the network of themes and arguments that links them. An idea is defined with extreme, one-sided clarity, to be varied, sometimes chapters later, and given a new dimension as it blends with other propositions and observations. Thesis is followed by antithesis; the characteristics of one phenomenon are ultimately fixed by analyzing its opposite. Discussions of the nature of war in the abstract alternate with the application to real war of such analytic devices as the theory of purpose and means, of the major concepts of friction and genius, of propositions of lesser magnitude such as those concerning the relationship of attack to defense, and with detailed operational and tactical observations—all embedded in historical evidence.13 The text is characterized by movement, cross-references, and allusions, not only to other parts of the book, but also to the experiences of the author and of his generation. Through the entire work, creating an internal unity surpassing that of its external design, run two dialectical relationships, both introduced in the opening chapter: the relationship between war in theory and real war; and the relationship between the three factors that together make up war—violence, the play of chance and probability, and reason.
有组织的群体暴力是战争区别于所有其他人类活动的唯一特征。战争是“一种武力行为，而且这种武力的使用没有任何逻辑上的限制”。它并非“一股生命力量作用于无生命群体（完全不抵抗根本就不是战争），而始终是两股生命力量的碰撞”。任何一方都无法完全控制自己的行动，而且每个对手都在左右着另一方；因此，当他们试图超越对方时，他们的行动就会升级。“自由行动且不受任何法律约束的力量之间的冲突”，最终会走向极端——绝对战争，即绝对的暴力，最终导致一方被另一方彻底摧毁。<sup> 14</sup>
Organized mass violence is the only feature that distinguishes war from all other human activities. War is “an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.” It is not “the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all), but always the collision of two living forces.” Neither side is wholly in control of its action, and each opponent dictates to the other; consequently as they seek to outdo each other, their efforts escalate. “A clash of forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their own,” eventually reaches the extreme—absolute war, that is, absolute violence ending in the total destruction of one side by the other.14
总体战是理想战争的论点之后，紧接着是反论点：战争，即使在理论上，也总是受到外部力量的影响。战争受到冲突国家的具体特征以及时代普遍特征——包括其政治、经济、技术和社会因素——的影响。这些因素可能会抑制全面暴力的升级。此外，如果一场战争并非旨在彻底击败敌人，而是追求较小的目标，那么即使在理论上，战争也不必然升级到极端程度。暴力仍然是战争的本质和规范理念，即使是为有限目标而进行的有限战争也是如此，但在这种情况下，暴力的本质并不要求其完全展现。绝对战争的概念和有限战争的概念共同构成了战争的双重性质。
The thesis of total war as the ideal war is followed by the antithesis that war, even in theory, is always influenced by forces external to it. War is affected by the specific characteristics of the states in conflict, and by the general characteristics of the time—its political, economic, technological, and social elements. These may inhibit the escalation to total violence. Furthermore, if a particular war does not seek the enemy's total defeat but a lesser goal, then even theory does not demand escalation toward extremes. Violence continues to be the essence, the regulative idea, even of limited wars fought for limited ends, but in such cases the essence does not require its fullest expression. The concept of absolute war and the concept of limited war together form the dual nature of war.
在现实世界中，绝对真理总是会受到修正，尽管有时它会被无限接近，例如拿破仑的某些战役，或者一个原始部落试图灭绝另一个原始部落。战争绝非孤立事件，而是其他力量共同作用的结果，这些力量会影响战争，并可能改变其暴力程度。战争也并非由单一的决定性行动或一系列同时发生的行动构成。如果战争是一次短暂而持续的打击，那么备战工作就会趋于全面，因为“任何疏忽都无法弥补”。但实际上，战争总是由一系列或长或短的暴力行动组成，其间穿插着计划、集中精力、恢复体力的停顿——所有这些都由两个或多个交战方进行互动。敌对社会内部的各种因素、领导层的“自由意志”（这种意志可能符合也可能不符合客观现实）以及战争的政治动机，都将决定军事目标和投入的兵力规模。“战争只不过是政策的另一种延续。”<sup> 15</sup>
In the real world, the absolute is always modified, although sometimes it is closely approached, as in certain Napoleonic campaigns or in the attempt of one primitive tribe to exterminate another. War is never an isolated act, but the result of other forces, which affect it and may modify its violence. Nor does it consist of a single, decisive act, or of a set of simultaneous acts. If war were one short, uninterrupted blow, preparations for it would tend toward totality, because “no omission could ever be rectified.” But in reality war is always a longer or shorter succession of violent acts, interrupted by pauses for planning, the concentration of effort, the recovery of energy—all on the part of two or more antagonists, who interact. A variety of elements within the opposing societies, the “free will” of the leadership, which may or may not conform to the objective realities, and the political motives of the war, will determine the military objective and the amount of effort to be expended. “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”15
克劳塞维茨关于战争二元性的论述为分析所有有组织的群体暴力行为奠定了基础，从灭绝战争到武装示威——后者与其他外交策略的区别仅仅在于其直接的暴力威胁。这一论述使得任何一种战争类型都无法被视为指导政策的准则，也无法成为衡量所有战争的标准。
Clausewitz's thesis of the dual nature of war creates a basis for the analysis of all acts of organized mass violence, from wars of annihilation to armed demonstrations that differ from other diplomatic maneuvers solely by their direct threat of violence. The thesis makes it impossible to consider any one type of war as the norm that should determine policy, the standard by which all wars are measured.
克劳塞维茨对战争政治性质的认识，强化了战争二元性的观点，即战争并非独立或孤立的行为。击败敌方武装力量及其使用武力的意志本身并非目的，而是实现政治目标的手段。暴力应当体现政治目的，并且应当以理性、功利的方式体现；它不应取代政治目的，也不应抹杀政治目的。
Clausewitz's recognition of the political character of war reinforces the point expressed in the dual nature of war that war is not an autonomous or isolated act. The defeat of the enemy's armed power and of his will to use it is not an end in itself but a means to achieve political goals. Violence should express the political purpose, and express it in a rational, utilitarian manner; it should not take the place of the political purpose, nor obliterate it.
因此，政治领导层最终应当控制和指导战争的进行。但这并不意味着政治领导层应该取代士兵参与作战计划和实施。政治领导层应当谨慎行事，避免提出不可能的要求，并与高级指挥官合作制定总体政策；但军队的存在并非为了自身，而是作为工具而被使用。克劳塞维茨要求军队服从政治领导层，这绝非表达某种意识形态偏好；他只是从对战争的政治性质和目的的分析中得出了合乎逻辑的结论。
Consequently the political leadership should ultimately control and direct the conduct of war. That is not to say that it should displace soldiers in the planning and conduct of operations. It should take care not to ask the impossible, and collaborate with the senior commanders in developing overall policy; but the armed forces do not exist for their own sake. They are an instrument to be used. In demanding the subordination of the military to the political leadership, Clausewitz was far from expressing an ideological preference; he merely drew the logical conclusion from his analysis of the political nature and purpose of war.
因为战争是政策的延续，“对于重大的战略问题，不可能存在纯粹的军事评估，也不可能存在纯粹的军事解决方案。” ¹⁶如果政治目的需要，武装部队必须满足于部分动员资源和有限的成就；或者，另一方面，他们必须做好牺牲的准备，而如果这种牺牲是理性政策的体现，那么社会和政府都不应将其视为超出自身使命范围的行为。
Because war is the continuation of policy, “there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.”16 If the political purpose demands it, the armed forces must be content with the partial mobilization of resources, and with limited achievements; or, on the other hand, they must be prepared to sacrifice themselves, and neither society nor government should regard this sacrifice, if it is an expression of rational policy, as beyond their mission.
以上是克劳塞维茨关于战争二元性和战争政治性的理论对现实战争的一些更重要的意义。贯穿《战争论》八卷的第二个主要辩证关系体现在这样一个论断中：真正的战争是由三个要素构成的。克劳塞维茨宣称，战争的主导倾向“总是使战争成为一个非凡的三位一体”，这三位一体由暴力和激情、不确定性、偶然性和概率以及政治目的和效果组成。<sup> 17</sup>
These are some of the more significant implications of Clausewitz's theory of the dual nature of war and of the political nature of war for war in reality. The second major dialectical relationship that runs through the eight books of On War is encompassed in the assertion that real war is a composite of three elements. Its dominant tendencies, Clausewitz declared, “always make war a remarkable trinity,” composed of violence and passion; uncertainty, chance, and probability; and political purpose and effect.17
要分析战争的总体情况或理解一场具体的战争，乃至计划和指挥一场战争，都需要研究或运用这三个要素。任何理论或政策如果忽略其中任何一个要素，或者只关注其某些组成部分，都将存在缺陷——例如，只关注第二个要素的军事方面：即如何在充满不确定性的战胜敌人的过程中，通过计划、领导和努力取得成功。同样不足的是，如果主要关注战争的政治层面，或者关注战争中表达的或由战争引发的情绪。
To analyze war in general or to understand a particular war, but also to plan and conduct a war, requires the study or the exploitation of all three of these elements. A theory or policy would be flawed if it ignored any one of them, or paid attention only to some of their component parts—for instance, only to the military aspect of the second element: how planning, leadership, and effort might succeed in the uncertain process of defeating the enemy. Equally inadequate would be a view that had regard primarily to the political aspects of the war, or to the emotions that were expressed in the war, or were caused by it.
用克劳塞维茨的比喻来说，理论和领导力必须悬置在暴力、偶然性和政治这三个磁体之间，这三个磁体在每场战争中相互作用。
Theory and leadership must remain suspended, to use Clausewitz's metaphor, between the three magnets of violence, chance, and politics, which interact in every war.
克劳塞维茨确定了构成战争的三大要素，并将每一要素都指定为社会不同阶层的主要行动领域。他认为，总体而言，第一要素，暴力和激情，主要关乎民众；第二要素，不确定性和偶然性，主要考验指挥官及其部队的勇气、决心和才能；第三要素，政治，“则是政府的专属事务”。<sup> 18</sup>
Having identified the three areas that together make up war, Clausewitz assigned each as the main field for action to a different segment of society. On the whole, he thought, the first element, violence and passion, concerns mainly the people. The second, uncertainty and chance, provides scope primarily to the courage, determination, and talent of the commander and his forces. The third, politics, “is the business of government alone.”18
这些假设——或许是为了理论上的严谨性而作出的——当然带有很强的主观性。它们揭示了《战争论》作者的历史立场：他是一位军人，自视为普鲁士国家的仆人，也是社会的保护者，而社会的原始情感既需要被利用，也需要被控制。在他看来，政治领导层的任务是引导社会能量，同时又不屈服于其非理性力量：政府将心理能量转化为理性的政策，而军队则协助执行这些政策。
These assumptions—probably made in the interest of theoretical neatness—are, of course, highly subjective. They reveal the author of On War in his historical posture, a soldier who regards himself as the servant of the Prussian state and the protector of a society whose raw emotions must be exploited but also controlled. In his view it was the task of the political leadership to abstract the energies of society without succumbing to their irrational power: a government channels psychic energy into rational policy, which the army helps carry out.
即使在克劳塞维茨略显试探性的表述中，这些关联——仇恨和暴力主要与民众相关；偶然性和概率与军队及其指挥官相关；理性政策与政府相关——的有效性也值得商榷。以克劳塞维茨最常举的例子——拿破仑战争为例，皇帝的激情和暴力无疑比法国民众对欧洲其他地区的仇恨更具影响力；而且至少在帝国末期，常识——这种令人印象深刻的理性形式——更多地掌握在饱受战争蹂躏的民众手中，而非拿破仑手中。但克劳塞维茨提出的这些关联——显然是其个人经验作用于其心理、思想和政治观点的结果——并没有削弱三元定义的有效性和分析力：战争由暴力、偶然性和政治构成，并存在于这三个领域之中。
Even in Clausewitz's somewhat tentative formulations, these affinities—hatred and violence mainly identified with the people; chance and probability with the army and its commander; rational policy with the government—are of questionable validity. In the Napoleonic Wars, to draw on Clausewitz's favorite pool of examples, the passion and violence of the emperor certainly carried more weight than whatever hatred the French population might have felt toward the rest of Europe; and at least in the final years of the Empire, common sense, that particularly impressive form of rationality, rested more with the war-weary people than it did with Napoleon. But the affinities Clausewitz suggests—obviously the product of personal experience acting on his psychology and his intellectual and political outlook—do not diminish the validity and analytic power of the tripartite definition: war is composed of, and exists in, the realms of violence, chance, and politics.
三
III
暴力、偶然性和政治这三位一体涵盖了国家间暴力的演变过程，从敌对行动的准备和开始，到和平的缔结乃至和平之后。构成战争的行动和事件，往往在这三个要素中都占据着一席之地。但为了便于分析，识别它们之间的联系，并防止它们淹没分析框架，必须对大量的实践细节进行归纳和抽象。为此，克劳塞维茨发展出一系列概念，其范围从普遍意义到具体的操作特征。其中最全面的概念是摩擦和天才。
The trinity of violence, chance, and politics encompasses the progression of violence between states, from the preparation and beginning of hostilities to the conclusion of a peace and beyond. Within each of the three parameters, and often in all of them, the actions and occurrences that make up war find their place. But in order to render them susceptible to analysis, recognize their links, and prevent them from overwhelming the analytic framework, the mass of practical detail must be grouped and abstracted. For this purpose Clausewitz developed concepts ranging in magnitude from general significance to specific operational characteristics. Of these the most comprehensive are the concepts of friction and of genius.
摩擦指的是不确定性、错误、事故、技术困难、不可预见的因素，以及它们对决策、士气和行动的影响：
Friction refers to uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, the unforeseen, and to their effect on decisions, morale, and actions:
摩擦是唯一一个或多或少能对应区分真实战争与纸上战争因素的概念。军事机器……本质上非常简单，因此易于管理。但我们应该记住，它的任何组成部分都不是一体的：每个部分都由个体组成，而每个个体都具有潜在的摩擦力……一个营由个体组成，其中最不起眼的个体也可能偶然拖延时间或以某种方式导致行动出错。战争不可避免的危险以及战争所需的体力消耗……加剧了这个问题……
Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. The military machine…is basically very simple and therefore easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of friction…. A battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong. The dangers inseparable from war and the physical exertions [that] war demands…aggravate the problem….
这种巨大的摩擦力，无法像力学中那样被简化为几个点，它无处不在地与偶然性相关，并带来无法衡量的影响……例如，天气就是其中之一。雾会使敌人无法及时被发现，使大炮无法在应该开火的时候开火，使报告无法传达给指挥官。雨水会使一个营无法到达目的地，使另一个营行军时间从三个小时延长到八个小时，使骑兵冲锋因马匹陷入泥潭而失败，等等。
This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured…. One, for example, is the weather. Fog can prevent the enemy from being seen in time, a gun from firing when it should, a report from reaching the commanding officer. Rain can prevent a battalion from arriving, make another late by keeping it not three but eight hours on the march, ruin a cavalry charge by bogging the horses down in mud, etc.
战争中的行动就像在阻力较大的环境中行进。正如最简单、最自然的动作——行走——在水中难以进行一样，在战争中，即使依靠常规手段也很难取得哪怕是中等程度的成效。
Action in war is like movement in a resistant element. Just as the simplest and most natural of movements, walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results.
我们姑且称之为摩擦力，正是这种力使得看似容易的事情变得异常困难。19
Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.19
这段文字在抽象与具体之间穿梭，体现了克劳塞维茨的思维和表达方式，概述了摩擦的诸多心理和非人格层面的可能性。摩擦总是以某种形式存在。如果不加以创造性地运用智力和情感能量来对抗，摩擦将主导战争。至少在一定程度上，智慧和决心可以克服摩擦，甚至还能利用偶然性，将不可预测的因素转化为优势。反过来，这些力量也应该接受分析。正如理论不能忽视那些“区分真实战争与纸上战争的不可估量因素和事件的特殊性”一样，理论也必须关注那些对抗摩擦的、往往难以量化的力量：指挥官及其下属的智力和心理素质；军队的士气、精神和自信；以及社会中某些反映在士兵身上的暂时性和永久性特征——对战争的热情、政治忠诚和精力。
This passage, which in its shuttling between the abstract and the specific is characteristic of Clausewitz's manner of thinking and expression, outlines some of the many psychological as well as impersonal possibilities of friction. In one form or another, friction is always present. Friction would dominate war if it were not countered by the creative employment of intellectual and emotional energy. To a degree at least, intelligence and determination can overcome friction, and beyond that exploit chance, and transform the unpredictable into an asset. In turn, these forces should be subject to analysis. Just as theory must not ignore imponderables and the singularity of events, “which distinguish real war from war on paper,” so theory must address the often unquantifiable forces that combat friction: the intellectual and psychological strengths of the commander and of his subordinates; the morale, spirit, and self-confidence of the army; and certain temporary and permanent traits of society as reflected in its soldiers—enthusiasm for the war, political loyalty, energy.
《战争论》直接考察了这些特质，将其视为“道德或心理因素”，同时也通过“天才”这一概念间接地进行了探讨。若不认识到克劳塞维茨所说的“天才”不仅指杰出的个体，也指普通人行为所依据的能力和情感，那么在此语境下使用“天才”一词就毫无意义：“我们不能将讨论局限于天才本身，即超凡的才能……我们必须考察所有那些共同作用于军事活动的智力和性情天赋。这些特质共同构成了军事天才的本质。”<sup> 20 </sup> 克劳塞维茨正是利用将原创性和创造力提升到最高境界的特质——这正是启蒙运动后期和唯心主义哲学对天才的定义——来识别和阐释普遍的智力和心理特质，正如它们代表并有助于解释每个人身上都蕴含的意志和行动自由一样。伟人的心理构成——“天才”——旨在阐明所有人的情感，正如绝对战争的概念阐明了所有战争一样。
On War examines these qualities directly, as “moral or psychological elements,” and indirectly through the medium of “genius.” The use of genius in this context would make little sense unless we recognize that for Clausewitz the term applies not only to the exceptional individual, but also to abilities and feelings on which the behavior of ordinary men is based: “We cannot restrict our discussion to genius proper, as a superlative degree of talent…. What we must do is to survey all those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination bear on military activity. These, taken together, constitute the essence of military genius.”20 Originality and creativity raised to the highest power—which is how the late Enlightenment and idealist philosophy defined genius—were thus used by Clausewitz to identify and interpret general intellectual and psychological qualities, just as they represented and helped explain the freedom of will and action that was potentially present in every human being. The psychological configuration of the great man, “genius,” is meant to clarify the emotions of all men, much as the concept of absolute war illuminates all wars.
这种对心理特质进行概念化和讨论的方式或许显得过于复杂。克劳塞维茨之所以采用这种方式，是因为他所处的时代心理学学科尚处于萌芽阶段。在《战争论》的“论军事天才”一章中，他将心理学称为一个“晦涩的领域”，并在随后的章节中遗憾地指出，心理因素无法被学院派的智慧所解释。它们无法被分类或计数，必须通过观察或感受来理解。<sup> 21</sup>然而，尽管他的方法有其合理之处，但在某些方面，它必然存在不足。他对心理特征的列举仍然停留在传统层面；他对这些特征与战争相关性的推测，虽然充满了常识，也偶尔闪现出精辟的见解，但正如他自己所承认的，也存在着他在其他理论家的著作中所批判的那种印象主义缺陷。<sup>22</sup>克劳塞维茨将伟大领袖的心理特征视为解读普通人情感和能力的棱镜；但他对拿破仑或腓特烈这样的人物着迷，因为只有他们才能取得至高无上的成就，所以他的分析通常仅限于探索他们的非凡才能。
This manner of conceptualizing and discussing psychological qualities may appear needlessly complex. Clausewitz was driven to it by the primitive state of the discipline of psychology in his day. In the chapter “On Military Genius” in On War he refers to psychology as an “obscure field,” and in a subsequent chapter regrets that psychological elements will not yield to academic wisdom. They cannot be classified or counted. They have to be seen or felt.21 But although good reasons exist for his approach, in some respects it is bound to be unsatisfactory. His enumeration of psychological traits remains conventional; his speculations on their relevance to war, although full of common sense and marked by flashes of brilliance, suffer, as he himself admits, from the same impressionistic defect that he condemns in the writings of other theorists.22 The psychological characteristics of the great leader are the prism through which Clausewitz interprets the feelings and abilities of the average man; but in his fascination with a Napoleon or Frederick, who alone are capable of supreme achievements, his analysis usually limits itself to exploring their exceptional talents.
然而，这种片面性并不影响克劳塞维茨将心理学纳入其理论的重要意义。自古以来，作家们就强调了情感在战争中的重要性；但除了列举战争中可取和不可取的特征之外，他们对这一主题鲜有深入探讨。近代，随着美国独立战争的爆发，一些学者强调了非理性因素的重要性，将其与偶然性联系起来，并得出结论：士兵的心理过于晦涩难懂，或者战争过于混乱无序，无法进行科学分析。克劳塞维茨采取了决定性的一步，将心理力量的分析置于战争研究的核心。他秉承康德哲学，承认有些事物无法被完全理解；但这并不意味着它们应该被忽视。《战争论》将士兵、指挥官以及他们所服务的社会的心理作为战争理论的重要组成部分。二十世纪初，随着人类行为的更全面、更动态的理论的发展，克劳塞维茨理论结构的心理学内容得以加强，而不会损害他对战争的三部分定义，也不会损害他提出的“天才”（主动性和其他军事创造力的心理根源）与“摩擦”之间的辩证关系。
This one-sidedness, however, does not diminish the significance of the fact that Clausewitz incorporated psychology as a major component in his theory. Since antiquity writers had stressed the importance of emotion in war; but beyond listing desirable and undesirable characteristics, they had done little with the subject. More recently, in the train of the Revolutionary Wars, some authors had emphasized the importance of the irrational, linked it with the power of chance, and concluded either that the psychology of the soldier was too obscure or that war was too anarchic to be subject to scientific analysis. Clausewitz took the decisive step of placing the analysis of psychological forces at the very center of the study of war. In accord with Kantian philosophy he acknowledged that some things could not be fully understood; but that did not mean that they should be ignored. On War made the psychology of the soldier, his commander, and the society they served an essential part of the theory of war. As more comprehensive and dynamic theories of human behavior were developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, the psychological content of Clausewitz's theoretical structure could be strengthened without doing damage to his tripartite definition of war, or to the dialectical relationship that he posited between “genius”—the psychological roots of initiative and other kinds of military creativity—on the one hand, and “friction” on the other.
双方的互动决定了敌对双方之间的每一次冲突，战争过程中发生的每一次大大小小的战斗。克劳塞维茨将这些构成要素分类并概念化为一系列命题，尽管这些命题很重要，但其适用范围远不及摩擦和天才的概念。前文提到的两个论点——敌对双方的相互关系以及双方行动升级的倾向——引出了战略战术中攻防相互依存的论题。另一个论点认为，由于时间、空间和能量的限制，进攻会逐渐减弱，直至达到一个“临界点”——超过这个点，进攻方将难以抵御反击。第三个论点则认为，防御既包括反击也包括抵抗，正如进攻由进攻、停顿和抵抗构成一样。
Their interaction defines every clash between the antagonists, every incident of fighting, large or small, that occurs in the course of the war. Clausewitz categorized and conceptualized these constituent parts in a series of propositions, which despite their importance are of more limited relevance than are the concepts of friction and genius. The two theses, already mentioned, of the reciprocal relationship of the antagonists and of the tendency of their efforts to escalate, give rise to the thesis of the interdependence of attack and defense in strategy and tactics. Another proposition holds that for reasons of time, space, and energy the offensive gradually weakens until a “culminating point” is reached—the stage beyond which the attacker can no longer easily defend himself against a counterattack. A third argues that the defensive consists of counterattacks as well as of resistance, just as the offensive is made up of attack, pause, and resistance.
克劳塞维茨从分析战争的整体本质转向研究冲突的各种形式。这一次要的命题仍然适用于历史上所有的战争——进攻的最终高潮可能出现在两个部落之间的战斗中，正如1914年9月德军在马恩河的推进或1950年6月朝鲜入侵韩国一样。但克劳塞维茨对这些原则的讨论更多地反映了他那一代人的具体经验，而不是他对战争基本本质的思考。由于他的分析涉及战场上部队的行动，因此主要以革命和拿破仑时代——最近发生的重大大规模战争事件——为框架；而为了说明突袭和其他小规模作战的特点，克劳塞维茨经常提及他早年作为一名士兵的经历，即1790年代协约国对法作战的经历。
From analyzing the nature of war as a whole, Clausewitz has moved to the study of the various forms in which a conflict is waged. This secondary class of propositions continues to apply to all wars in history—the culminating point of an attack may be present in a fight between two tribes just as it was in the German advance on the Marne in September 1914 or in the North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950. But Clausewitz's discussion of these principles reflects the specific experiences of his generation far more directly than do his thoughts on the basic nature of war. Because it concerns the action of forces in the field, his analysis is couched largely in terms of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era—the most recent significant incidents of large-scale warfare—while to illustrate the character of raids and of other small-unit operations, Clausewitz often refers to his first years as a soldier, in the Allied campaigns against France in the 1790s.
这些命题以及由此衍生出的细节讨论构成了直接的现实，为克劳塞维茨的理论提供了大量素材。它们还具有另一项功能，这项功能直指他整个理论努力的核心。它们表明，尽管战争的高层——理性、情感和不可预测因素共同决定国家和社会的命运——给理论带来了巨大的困难，但战争中规模较大但相对次要的领域却很容易进行分析，从而证明了战争理论实际上是可能的。正如他在晚年所写：
These propositions and the discussion of detailed topics that grows from them constitute the immediate reality that provided much of the raw material for Clausewitz's theories. They also had another function that went to the core of his entire theoretical effort. They demonstrated that although the higher reaches of war, where reason, emotion, and the play of imponderables resolve the fate of states and societies, posed tremendous difficulties for theory, large if relatively subordinate areas of war were readily susceptible to analysis, and thus proved that a theory of war was in fact possible. As he wrote toward the end of his life:
构建一套科学的战争理论是一项极其艰巨的任务，无数尝试都以失败告终，以至于大多数人认为这是不可能的，因为它涉及的问题是任何永恒法则都无法涵盖的。如果不是因为一个显而易见的事实，人们或许会同意这种说法并放弃尝试：一系列命题都可以轻松证明，例如：防御是消极作战中更强的作战方式，而进攻则是积极作战中较弱的作战方式；重大胜利有助于取得较小的胜利，因此战略结果可以追溯到某些转折点；试探性进攻比真正的进攻使用武力更弱，因此必须有充分的理由；胜利不仅在于占领战场，还在于摧毁敌人的物质和精神力量……胜利的取得之处总是最大的……只有拥有绝对优势或比敌人拥有更好的交通线或撤退路线，才能证明转向的合理性；侧翼阵地的选择也遵循同样的原则；任何进攻都会随着战事的进行而逐渐失去动力。23
It is a very difficult task to construct a scientific theory for the art of war, and so many attempts have failed that most people say it is impossible, since it deals with matters that no permanent law can provide for. One would agree and abandon the attempt, were it not for the obvious fact that a whole range of propositions can be demonstrated without difficulty: that defense is the stronger form of fighting with the negative purpose, attack the weaker form with the positive purpose; that major successes help bring about minor ones, so that strategic results can be traced back to certain turning-points; that a demonstration is a weaker use of force than a real attack, and that it must therefore be clearly justified; that victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield but in the destruction of the enemy's physical and psychic forces…that success is always greatest at the point where the victory was gained…that a turning movement can only be justified by general superiority or by having better lines of communication or retreat than the enemy's; that flank positions are governed by the same consideration; that every attack loses impetus as it progresses.23
事实上，克劳塞维茨的许多主张并不像他希望读者认为的那样不言自明。例如，他关于防御是更强的战斗形式的论断，就被几代德国士兵误解和否定，因为他们的分析能力因德国的地缘政治形势而受到削弱。但对克劳塞维茨而言，行动与反作用的辩证逻辑——没有任何意识形态上的先入之见阻止他将其推演至必然的结论——为他鲜明的实用主义观点提供了他所渴望的保证：战术和作战层面的暴力，以及所有层面的暴力，都可以被理性地分析和驾驭。
Many of these propositions were not, in fact, as self-evident as Clausewitz hoped his readers would find them. For instance, his statement that defense was the stronger form of fighting was misunderstood and rejected by several generations of German soldiers, whose analytic capacities were dimmed by their country's geopolitical situation. But for Clausewitz the dialectical logic of action and reaction, which no ideological preconception prevented him from following to its necessary conclusion, provided the assurance that his pronounced pragmatic outlook craved: violence on the tactical and operation level, and therefore violence on all levels, could be analyzed and mastered intellectually.
为了总结《战争论》的主要论点，我们必须回到克劳塞维茨关于目的、目标和手段的功能及关系的观点，这些观点贯穿全书。战争的政治目的应当决定所采用的手段以及所需努力的种类和程度。政治目的也应当决定军事目标。有时两者是一致的——克劳塞维茨举例说明，战争是为了征服特定领土而进行的。在其他情况下，“政治目标无法提供合适的军事目标。在这种情况下，必须采取另一个能够服务于政治目的的军事目标……” <sup>24</sup>为了摧毁敌对者的政治制度，可能需要摧毁其武装力量，或者占领其政治和经济中心，或者两者兼而有之。为了防御攻击，或许只需击退进攻力量即可。或者，可能需要摧毁其基地，或者需要以其他方式提高进一步敌对行动的代价，直至敌方停止攻击。
To conclude this summary of the principal themes of On War, we must revert to Clausewitz's ideas on the function and relationship of purpose, objective, and means, which run through the entire work. The political purpose for which a war is fought should determine the means that are employed and the kind and degree of effort required. The political purpose should also determine the military objective. Sometimes the two are identical—Clausewitz gives the example of a war fought in order to conquer a particular territory. In other cases, “the political objective will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose….”24 To destroy the political system of an antagonist, it may become necessary to destroy his armed forces, or to occupy his political and economic centers, or both. To defend oneself against attack, it may be sufficient to ward off the attacking force. Or it is possible that its bases will have to be destroyed, or it may become necessary in other ways to raise the price of further hostilities to such an extent that the opponent will desist.
军事目标取决于政治目的，也取决于敌方的政治和军事政策，以及交战双方的条件和资源，并且应当与这些因素相称。战争手段在于运用武力或以武力相威胁。武力也应当与军事目标和政治目的相适应和相称。
The military objective is dependent on the political purpose, but also on the enemy's political and military policies, and on the conditions and resources of the two antagonists, and should be proportionate to these factors.25 The means of war consist in the application of force, or the threat of force. Force, too, should be suitable and proportionate to the military objective and the political purpose.
目的、目标和手段之间的关系，在战术和作战中与在战略和战争的整体进行中一样普遍存在。
The relationship between purpose, objective, and means exists in tactics and operations no less than it does in strategy and the overall conduct of the war.
如果一个营奉命将敌人从山头、桥梁等地驱逐出去，其真正目的通常是占领该据点。消灭敌军只是达到目的的手段，是次要的。如果仅仅是示威就能迫使敌人放弃阵地，那么目标就达到了；但通常情况下，占领山头或桥梁只是为了对敌人造成更大的打击。如果战场上尚且如此，那么在作战区域内就更是如此，因为那里对峙的不仅仅是两支军队，而是两个国家、两个民族、两个国家……不同指挥层级对目标的划分，将进一步拉大手段与最终目标之间的差距。26
If a battalion is ordered to drive the enemy from a hill, a bridge, etc., the true purpose is normally to occupy that point. Destruction of the enemy's force is only a means to an end, a secondary matter. If a mere demonstration is enough to cause the enemy to abandon his position, the objective has been achieved; but as a rule the hill or bridge is captured only so that even more damage can be inflicted on the enemy. If this is the case on the battlefield, it will be even more so in the theater of operations, where it is not merely two armies that are facing each other, but two states, two peoples, two nations…. The gradation of objects at various levels of command will further separate the first means from the ultimate objective.26
在战术和作战层面，政治因素通常较为隐蔽，但始终存在潜在影响。此外，任何具体的军事行动都可能产生直接或间接的政治影响。从少数士兵的搏斗到军队的冲突，再到宏大战略和最终政治决策中涉及的智力与情感博弈，目标、目的和手段构成的网络决定着事态发展，并应指导交战双方的思维和行为。
On the tactical and operational levels, the political element is usually remote, but it will always be potentially present. Furthermore, any particular military act may have immediate or indirect political implications. From the struggle of a few soldiers to the clash of armies and the intellectual and emotional battlefields of grand strategy and ultimate political decisions, the network of purpose, objective, and means determines events, and should guide the thinking and behavior of the antagonists.
第四
IV
《战争论》的许多内容，仔细研读后或许会发现，不过是些常识而已。即使是高度抽象的段落，经剖析后，通常也指向不言自明的真理，或者揭示出几乎必然由此推论而来的推论。这种对熟悉事物的密切关注，当然符合克劳塞维茨的写作目的。他研究的问题并非新颖，他也无意提出新的解决方案。他想要的是阐明众所周知的现象，并以一种理论能够处理的方式重新表述它们，而这些概念化的现象反过来又为整体理论结构做出了贡献。“摩擦”概念的提出就是一个例子。人人都知道，天气的意外变化、命令的误解以及事故都会影响事件的发生。克劳塞维茨将这些事件归入“摩擦”的概念之下，使它们从随意熟悉的观念转变为分析描述中一个坚实的组成部分，从而解释了其研究对象。
Much of On War may on closer reading appear to be mere common sense. Even highly abstract passages, when dissected, generally point to self-evident facts, or reveal implications that almost necessarily follow from them. The close focus on the familiar was, of course, in accord with Clausewitz's purpose in writing the book. The problems he studied were not new, and he was not interested in suggesting new solutions for them. What he wanted was to clarify well-known phenomena, and restate them in such a way that theory could deal with them, while in turn the conceptualized phenomena contributed to the overall theoretical structure. The invention of “friction” is an example. Everyone knows that unexpected changes in weather, misunderstood orders, and accidents may affect events. By grouping such occurrences under the concept of friction, Clausewitz turned them from ideas of haphazard familiarity into a firm component of an analytic description that seeks to explain its subject.
值得注意的是，他的描述并不完整，这不仅是因为手稿尚未完成。《战争论》对拿破仑战争的战略、作战和战术及其十八世纪背景进行了全面的分析。然而，大多数技术、行政和组织因素都被忽略了；尤其值得注意的是，即使是征兵制度——这一新型军事力量形成机制的主要杠杆——也没有得到深入研究，尽管书中经常提及征兵制度，并强调其在使战争更具活力和破坏性方面所起的作用。《战争论》几乎完全聚焦于克劳塞维茨眼中的根本问题：政治和战略规划以及战争的实施。
His description, it should be noted, is incomplete, and not only because the manuscript is unfinished. On War contains a comprehensive analysis of the strategy, operations, and tactics of Napoleonic war, and of their eighteenth-century background. Left out of account are most technological, administrative, and organizational factors; characteristically, even the institution of conscription, the major lever in the new machinery for generating military energy, is not thoroughly studied, even though it is often referred to and its share in making war more dynamic and destructive is emphasized. On War deals almost entirely with the ultimate issues, as Clausewitz saw them: political and strategic planning, and the conduct of hostilities.
由此产生的战争理论，以及与之相伴而生的战争理论，似乎同样不够完整。它不仅没有直接探讨战争中行政和制度因素的作用、技术变革，也没有阐明经济的根本意义；除了偶尔提及两栖作战之外，《战争论》几乎完全忽略了海战。克劳塞维茨常常因无法超越其作为内陆君主国士兵的经历，无法认识到他所处时代战争的另一面而受到批评。但这种批评混淆了他的理论及其所依据的经验。一个概念的阐述和分析并非不可能，无需穷尽所有例证。摩擦、升级、攻防互动在海陆空战争中同样存在。仅仅因为《战争论》的例证仅限于克劳塞维茨最熟悉、最感兴趣的冲突类型，就断言其理论结构不完整，这种观点是错误的。
The theory of war that emerges from, and accompanies, this partial view may seem equally incomplete. Not only does it not directly address the roles of administrative and institutional elements in war, technological change, or the fundamental significance of economics; barring a reference or two to amphibious operations, On War ignores naval warfare. Clausewitz has often been criticized for his inability to transcend his experiences as a soldier of a land-locked monarchy, and to recognize the other half of war of his time. But this criticism confuses his theory with the experiences from which it sprang. It is possible to develop and analyze a concept without illustrating it exhaustively. Friction, escalation, the interaction of attack and defense exist in war on and under the sea—and in the air—as much as they do on land. It is fallacious to consider the theoretical structure of On War incomplete on the ground that its illustrations are drawn only from the types of conflict that Clausewitz knew best and that interested him most.
对于战争中技术和经济的作用缺乏系统性的论述，也可以得出类似的结论。克劳塞维茨理所当然地认为，由经济、社会和政治变革带来的技术发展会不断影响战术和战略。《战争论》中多次提及这一基本事实。他也没有忽视军事机构和战争本身对经济资源和政策的依赖性，尽管他博学多识，不会将财富等同于军事实力。普鲁士的历史足以表明还有多少其他因素在起作用。<sup>27</sup>克劳塞维茨认为，一个国家的经济资源，连同其地理环境和社会政治条件，决定（或者说应该决定）其军事政策。只要理论能够容纳这一真理，并在其对战争的动态描述中为其提供适当的位置，就没有必要对经济学进行全面的论述。如果之后对经济与战争的关系进行了充分的探讨，那么可以将分析纳入现有的理论框架中。关于个人、群体和社会的动机和行为的理论不必，也永远不可能，能够涵盖其研究对象的每一个变量；只要该理论能够将新发现和新领域的研究成果纳入其中，而其基本假设又不被证明是不充分或错误的，那就足够了。
Much the same may be said about the absence of systematic treatments of the role of technology and of economics in war. Clausewitz took it as a matter of course that technological development, brought about by economic, social, and political change, constantly affects tactics and strategy. On War contains numerous references to this basic fact. Nor did he ignore the dependence of military institutions and of warfare as such on economic resources and policies, although he was too knowledgeable to equate mere wealth with military strength. The history of Prussia sufficed to indicate how many other factors might be at work.27 A state's economic resources, together with its geography and its social and political conditions, according to Clausewitz, determine, or should determine, its military policies. As long as theory accommodates this truth and provides an appropriate place for it in its dynamic representation of war, a comprehensive treatment of economics is not necessary. If subsequently the relationship of economics to war is fully explored, the analysis can be fitted into the already existing theoretical scheme. Theories concerning the motives and behavior of individuals and of groups and societies need not, and indeed never can, address every variable of their subject; it is enough that the theory has the capacity to incorporate the new findings and investigations of new areas as these are developed without its basic hypotheses being proved inadequate or false.
一些读者批评克劳塞维茨在《战争论》中忽视了伦理问题，没有深入探讨战争的起因，也没有质疑导致战争的政策的合理性。这些批评固然提出了重要的问题；然而，它们似乎再次源于未能理解克劳塞维茨的意图，也未能认识到他著作的逻辑框架。
Some readers have criticized Clausewitz for ignoring ethics in On War, for not thoroughly discussing the causes of war, and for not questioning the validity of policies that lead to war. These objections raise important issues; once again, however, they seem to derive from a failure to accept Clausewitz's intentions and to acknowledge the logical parameters of his work.
克劳塞维茨认为，发动战争的道德问题属于政治伦理范畴，而非战争理论范畴。战争是一种社会行为，而发动战争的决定超越了战争本身。即便这一决定受到军事领导层的影响，甚至完全由其决定，这一观点依然成立，因为在这种情况下，士兵们分享或承担了政治权力。他们超越了战争本身。
The morality of going to war, Clausewitz thought, was a question of political ethics, not one that concerned the theory of war. War is a social act, and the decision to resort to it lies beyond war itself. That remains true even if the decision is influenced, or wholly determined, by the military leadership, for in that case the soldiers share in, or assume, political authority. They step outside of war.
诉诸战争的伦理理由固然会影响战争的进行。但就其对交战国政府和国际社会的影响而言，这些理由也超出了战争理论的范畴。至于它们对实际参战士兵的影响（如果有的话），则已包含在克劳塞维茨关于士气、忠诚和士兵心理的论述之中。
Ethical justifications for resorting to war may certainly influence the conduct of operations. Insofar as they affect the governments of the warring powers and the international community, these justifications, too, lie outside the theory of war. Their impact, if any, on the soldiers actually engaged in the war is subsumed in Clausewitz's discussions of morale, loyalty, and the psychology of the fighting man.
战争伦理亦是如此。伦理准则及其遵守或违背都会影响士兵。它们是社会价值观的一部分，而根据克劳塞维茨的观点，社会价值观总是会影响战争。但他认为，这些准则本身并无实质内容：“武力附带着某些自我强加的、不易察觉的限制，几乎不值一提，这些限制被称为国际法和习惯……道德力量只有在国家和法律中体现出来才存在。”<sup> 28</sup>简而言之，该理论关注理想的程度仅限于这些价值观实际影响行为的程度。《战争论》旨在理解战争的现实，并揭示战争中各方力量的逻辑需求；它并不试图将这种现实与特定的伦理体系相契合。正如克劳塞维茨本人所承认的，他的立场远比那些试图定义正义战争和战争中正义行为的教父和伦理哲学家们的立场更接近马基雅维利。
That is also true of the ethics of behavior in war. Codes of ethics, their observance or transgression, may influence the soldier. They are part of the values of society, which according to Clausewitz always affect war. But in themselves, he thought, they have little substance: “Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations, hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom…moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law.”28 In short, the theory concerns itself with ideals only to the extent that these values actually influence behavior. On War seeks to understand the reality of war, and to lay bare the logical demands of the forces involved in war; it does not try to adjust this reality to a particular ethical system. Clausewitz, as he himself recognized, is far closer to Machiavelli's position than to that of the Church fathers and of moral philosophers who want to define the just war and just behavior in war.
在《战争论》中，“政策”（德语单词“Politik ”既可指政策，也可指政治）指的是那些导致战争、决定战争目的、影响战争走向并最终结束战争的政治行为。克劳塞维茨在其历史著作和政治论文中经常分析政策的失败，无论是普鲁士的政策还是其他国家的政策。但在《战争论》中，他着手进行不同的研究。这里，政策的实质内容并非重点；重要的是政府如何有效地运用其军事资源来实现政治目标。克劳塞维茨认为，这一目标通常是现实的、负责任的。他在第八卷中写道：“政策本身并无意义；它仅仅是代表所有……利益（包括特定社会的‘精神’价值观）对抗外部世界的受托人。政策可能会犯错，可能会服务于当权者的野心、私利和虚荣心，但这无关紧要。战争艺术绝不能被视为政策的指导原则，在这里，我们只能将政策视为社会所有利益的代表。” 29由于战争理论处理的是使用武力对抗外部敌人，克劳塞维茨不去探讨非理性或错误政策所造成的问题——这些问题他留给了政治理论——在逻辑上是正确的。当然，在他著作中那些具有例证意义的段落里，他本可以更详细地论述拿破仑和查理十二世等人的错误政策，而不会损害其理论结构。如果他能活到完成手稿的修订，他是否会这样做，我们无从得知。30
Policy in On War—the German word Politik may mean either policy or politics—refers to those political acts that lead to war, determine its purpose, influence its conduct, and bring about its termination. In his historical writings and political essays, Clausewitz frequently analyzed the failings of policy, whether those of Prussia or of other states. In On War he set himself a different task. Here the substance of policy is not at issue; what matters is the effectiveness with which the government directs its military resources to achieve the political purpose. That purpose Clausewitz assumes to be in general realistic and responsible. Policy, he wrote in Book VIII, “is nothing in itself; it is simply the trustee for all…interests [of a particular society, including its “spiritual” values] against the outside world. That it can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there. In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy, and here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community.”29 Because the theory of war deals with the use of force against external enemies, Clausewitz was logically correct in not exploring the problems caused by irrational or mistaken policies—questions he left to political theory. In the illustrative, exemplary passages of his work he might, of course, have expanded his brief references to the misguided policies of such men as Napoleon and Charles XII, without doing damage to the theoretical structure. Whether he would have done so, had he lived to complete the revision of his manuscript, it is impossible to say.30
V
V
在思想史上，一位作家的作品被广泛讨论并影响其主题（例如私人道德或政府形式）的思考，而主题本身却几乎不受其影响，这种情况并不罕见。克劳塞维茨就是这样一位作家。但或许是因为他所处的理论领域几乎完全是功利主义的，而非哲学或科学意义上的思辨，所以人们不遗余力地去探究他的思想对现实战争，以及对实际战争方式的影响——对于一位强调其作品非功利性的作家来说，这或许是一种奇怪的命运。
In the history of ideas it is not unusual for an author's work to be widely discussed and to influence thinking on its subject—private morality, for example, or forms of government—while the subject itself is hardly affected by the work. Clausewitz is such an author. But perhaps because he wrote in a field in which the theoretical literature was almost entirely utilitarian rather than speculative in a philosophic or scientific sense, there has been no lack of effort to discover the impact his ideas have had on war in reality, on the manner in which wars are actually fought—an odd fate, it may be thought, for a writer who stressed the nonutilitarian nature of his work.
一位理论家的主要著作并非旨在提出规范性建议，因此，要确定其影响或许尤其困难。克劳塞维茨的影响研究始于十九世纪下半叶，但其结果却混乱且无定论，这并不令人意外。即便《战争论》中的一两句话被广泛引用，或者其某些论点被曲解以迎合当时的军事潮流，也难以证明这些思想产生了真正的影响。相反，如果我们考察克劳塞维茨著作问世以来的战争实践，就会发现几乎没有证据表明士兵和政府曾运用过他的理论。战争反复证明了克劳塞维茨理论的现实意义，但要找到《战争论》中“经验教训”的实际应用，却难上加难。
The influence of a theorist whose intentions in his major work are not prescriptive is perhaps especially difficult to determine. It is not surprising that the search for Clausewitz's influence, which began in the second half of the nineteenth century, has been confused and inconclusive. That one or two sentences from On War have entered common usage, or that some of its arguments have been misinterpreted to support the military fashions of the day, scarcely proves that the ideas have had a genuine impact. On the contrary, if we examine the conduct of war since Clausewitz wrote, we will find little evidence that soldiers and governments have made use of his theories. Wars have repeatedly demonstrated the relevance of Clausewitz's theories, but nothing has proved more elusive to discover than an application of “lessons” learned from On War.
在讨论克劳塞维茨的影响时，或许可以暂时将两个相关的方面分开来看：他如何影响了人们对战争的思考方式；以及他如何以及在多大程度上影响了军人和政治家的行动。例如，阅读克劳塞维茨似乎帮助马克思、恩格斯和列宁澄清了他们对战争政治本质的看法；但是，他们与克劳塞维茨著作的接触是否对其思想的发展至关重要，这一点远未可知。其他政治人物是否从《战争论》中获得了他们可能从其他途径无法获得的见解，也尚不明确。观点可能一致，但彼此之间并无影响。战争与政治的密切互动，仅举一个最明显的例子，毕竟并非一种既定的方案，而是现实的一部分，一个在某些社会中更容易理解和更好地应对的过程。亚伯拉罕·林肯或乔治·克列孟梭无需阅读克劳塞维茨就能发现他们所参与的战争的军事目标与政治目的之间的关系。有些人甚至在没有阅读《战争论》的情况下，也得出了与克劳塞维茨类似的结论。另一方面，他的许多读者要么不理解他的观点，要么不同意他的观点。
The discussion of Clausewitz's influence may benefit from a temporary separation of two related aspects of the issue: how he has influenced the manner in which people think about war; and how and to what extent he has influenced the actions of soldiers and statesmen. Reading Clausewitz seems, for example, to have helped Marx, Engels, and Lenin to clarify their ideas on the political nature of war; but it is far from certain that their encounters with Clausewitz's work were essential to the development of their thought. Nor is it clear whether other political figures gained insights from On War that they might not have acquired elsewhere. Points of view may agree without one having influenced the other. The close interaction of war and politics, to give only the most obvious example, is after all not a program but a piece of reality, a process that in some societies is more readily understood and better managed than in others. Abraham Lincoln or Georges Clemenceau did not need to read Clausewitz to discover the relationship between the military objective and the political purpose of the wars they were fighting. Some people reached conclusions similar to Clausewitz's without reading On War; on the other hand, many of his readers either did not understand or did not agree with him.
在克劳塞维茨所处的德国社会，他理论中的政治层面恰恰受到了最多也只是模棱两可的评价。直到20世纪30年代，他最重要的德国读者要么不愿要么无法接受他关于政治与战争紧密结合以及政治考量在战争中至上的论点。相反，在整个19世纪和20世纪初，普鲁士-德国军队的参谋长和总司令们将战争视为一种本质上独立的活动，并竭尽全力保护军队、其战略和作战行动免受政治干预。即使是俾斯麦和毛奇之间的紧密伙伴关系，也曾因士兵们为维护自身自主权而做出的努力而动摇。兴登堡和鲁登道夫最终在第一次世界大战期间获得了相当大的自主权，直到1918年春夏攻势的失败迫使他们将责任推卸给当时已无能为力的政府。克劳塞维茨年轻时形成的关于政治与战争永恒互动关系的本能认知，以及这种认知贯穿了他的一生，但随着德国社会工业化并步入帝国主义时代，这种认知对德国人来说已不再那么容易理解。在一个日益被专家和技术官僚主导的文化中，一支自信却焦虑的军队不受政治领导的约束，克劳塞维茨在《战争论》中所表达的普世主义观点逐渐黯淡，最终消失殆尽。
In his own society it is precisely the political aspects of Clausewitz's theories that were given what was at best an ambiguous reception. Until the 1930s, his most significant German readers were either unwilling or unable to accept his thesis of the close integration of politics and war and of the primacy of political considerations even during the fighting. Instead, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the chiefs of staff and commanders in chief of the Prusso-German army thought of war, once it had broken out, as an essentially autonomous activity, and did everything in their power to protect the army, its strategy and its operations, from political interference. Even the close partnership between Bismarck and Moltke was at times shaken by the soldiers' efforts to preserve their autonomy. Hindenburg and Ludendorff finally achieved a very considerable measure of independence during the First World War, until the failure of the spring and summer offensives in 1918 caused them to drop responsibility into the lap of a now helpless government. The instinctual sense of the permanent interaction of politics and war that Clausewitz had developed as a young man, and that guided his thinking throughout life, was no longer as comprehensible to Germans as their society became industrialized and entered the era of imperialism. In a culture increasingly shaped by specialists and technocrats, with an assertive but anxious military unchecked by the political leadership, the universalistic outlook that Clausewitz expressed in On War dimmed and was lost.
克劳塞维茨留给德国士兵的或许最重要的两项遗产，也是贯穿二十世纪德国陆军理论的两大支柱，分别是他与拿破仑的共识——即一场重大胜利往往比许多小胜利更为重要——以及他提出的“不可预测因素”概念。为了不被不可预见的因素所压垮，战争的各个方面都需要灵活性，从宏观战略（尽管1914年坚持施利芬计划的决定不能被视为灵活性的体现）到战术层面皆是如此。其结果之一便是“指令战术”（Auftragstaktik）的形成，即发布指令阐明最高统帅部的总体意图，同时赋予下级部队高度的自主权和具体命令的下达权。在1914年之前不久，杰出的法国军官兼历史学家让·科林仍然认为克劳塞维茨的这一著作具有显著的实用价值：克劳塞维茨“将形式主义从军事教育中剔除”的功绩无人能及。31科林认为，克劳塞维茨在批评彪罗时首次表达的“行动理论不应该制定规则”的观点，本身就是一个意义极其重大的实践教训。
Perhaps the two most important legacies that German soldiers accepted from Clausewitz, two strands in the army's doctrine well into the twentieth century, were his agreement with Napoleon that a major victory was likely to be more important than many small successes, and his concept of imponderables. Not to be overwhelmed by the unforeseen demanded flexibility in all aspects of war, from grand strategy (though the decision to stay with the Schlieffen plan in 1914 cannot be regarded as an example of flexibility) to tactics. One result was the development of Auftragstaktik, the policy of issuing directives stating the overall intentions of the supreme command, while leaving a high degree of initiative and the issuance of specific orders to subordinate commands. Shortly before 1914, the distinguished French officer and historian Jean Colin still found a pronounced utilitarian benefit in this aspect of Clausewitz's writings: Clausewitz had “the incomparable merit of driving formalism out of military education.”31 In Colin's view, the belief that a theory of action should not lay down rules, which Clausewitz first expressed in his criticism of Bülow, was in itself a practical lesson of the greatest significance.
但除了这些例外情况，克劳塞维茨对战争准备和作战方式的影响难以辨别，更难以证实。他对于战争理论或历史思考的影响更容易被看到；尽管即便在学者中，也不能说他创立了一个学派。<sup> 32</sup>在许多学科和研究领域——伦理学或政治理论或许可以再次作为例证——论述性、思辨性的概括性分析并不少见；但战争这一主题仍然倾向于引发谴责或试图消除战争，或寻求提高战争手段和策略有效性的作品。或许，从克劳塞维茨的著作中汲取的最重要的教训是：我们可以用不同的视角来研究战争。他为我们提供了一个可以继续发展的基础。但对有组织的群体暴力进行脱离语境的解读，仍然是现代世界面临的最大难题。
But with such exceptions, Clausewitz's influence on the manner in which wars are prepared for and fought is difficult to discern and even harder to verify. It is easier to see his impact on more theoretical or historical thinking about war; although even among scholars he cannot be said to have founded a school.32 In many disciplines and fields of study—ethics or political theory may again serve as examples—general analyses of a discursive, speculative nature are not rare; but the subject of war still tends to evoke works that condemn or try to eliminate war, or that seek to improve the effectiveness of the means and strategies of conflict. That war can be studied in a different spirit is perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from Clausewitz's work. He has given us a base on which to build. But the detached interpretation of organized mass violence continues to pose the greatest difficulties to the modern world.
克劳塞维茨开创了将战争视为一种整体现象的非规范性、非评判性研究的先河，《战争论》至今仍是这一传统中最重要的一部著作。即使是马基雅维利——或许与他在对政治和战争实际运作的热情关注方面最为相似——也更倾向于倡导战争理论。《君主论》和《孙子兵法》都受到了意大利政治状况的影响，以及马基雅维利对当时状况的不满；但《战争论》的写作目的并非为了巩固普鲁士君主制。克劳塞维茨的视野远远超越了战略思想通常关注的成败范畴，转而探索战争的终极本质和动态。人们或许会欣慰地认为，这种理性的理解不仅构成了有效战略的基础，而且也有助于制定负责任的军事政策和治国之道。然而，克劳塞维茨从未做出过这样的假设，而他之前和之后的历史也表明，这种假设并非总是正确的。然而，无论作为当今时代的主导议题，还是作为过去一种尚未被完全理解的力量，战争都亟需更深入的探索。鲜有学者和军人能够秉持克劳塞维茨客观探究的精神，并运用他将现实与理论相结合的能力来研究战争，这绝非衡量其成就的最低标准。
Clausewitz stands at the beginning of the nonprescriptive, nonjudgmental study of war as a total phenomenon, and On War is still the most important work in this tradition. Even Machiavelli, whom he perhaps most resembles in his passionate interest in the actual functioning of politics and war, was more of an advocate. The Prince and The Art of War are informed by a view of the political conditions of Italy, and Machiavelli's dissatisfaction with them; but On War was not written to strengthen the Prussian monarchy. Clausewitz ranges far beyond the parameters of success and failure in which strategic thought moves to explore the ultimate nature and dynamic of war. It would be comforting to believe that this intellectual understanding not only forms the basis for effective strategy, but that it is also conducive to responsible military policy and statecraft. Clausewitz never made that assumption, and history before and since he wrote has demonstrated that the assumption would not invariably be correct. Nevertheless both as an issue that dominates our time and as a still imperfectly understood force in our past, war demands much further exploration. That so few scholars and soldiers have taken it up in something of Clausewitz's spirit of objective inquiry, and with his ability to combine reality and theory, is not the least measure of his achievement.
1卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《作者评注》[1818？]，《战争论》，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特译注，修订版（普林斯顿，1984 年），第 63 页。
1 Carl von Clausewitz, “Author's Comment” [1818?], On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1984), 63.
2 [卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨]，“Bemerkungen über die reine und angewandte Strategie des Herrn von Bülow”， Neue Bellona 9，no。 3（1805），271。
2 [Carl von Clausewitz], “Bemerkungen über die reine und angewandte Strategie des Herrn von Bülow,” Neue Bellona 9, no. 3 (1805), 271.
3同上。
3 Ibid.
4同上，第 276 页。
4 Ibid., 276.
5特别参见克劳塞维茨在 1806 年 12 月至 1807 年 10 月期间写给他未婚妻的信，载于《Karl und Marie von Clausewitz: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebuchblättern》，编辑。卡尔·林纳巴赫（Karl Linnebach，柏林，1917 年），67-149，以及他后来在这一时期的普鲁士历史，《Nachrichten uber Preussen in seinergrossen Katastrophe》，卷。德国总参谋部系列Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften的第 10 期（柏林，1888 年）。
5 See especially Clausewitz's letters to his fiancée between December 1806 and October 1807, in Karl und Marie von Clausewitz: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebuchblättern, ed. Karl Linnebach (Berlin, 1917), 67–149, and his later history of Prussia during this period, Nachrichten uber Preussen in seiner grossen Katastrophe, vol. 10 of the German general staff series Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften (Berlin, 1888).
6本概述取材于改革时期的一些著作，例如克劳塞维茨于1808年和1809年对其1804年撰写的战略论文的增补，该论文由埃伯哈德·凯塞尔以《战略》（汉堡，1937年）为题出版；以及瓦尔特·舍林在其克劳塞维茨文集《精神与行动》 （斯图加特，1941年）中发表的论文《论战争艺术理论的现状》。这些思想的后续重述和发展贯穿于《战争论》全书，尤其是在第1、2和8卷中。另请注意以下段落：“我们的目标不是提供新的战争原则和方法；而是考察长期存在的事物的本质内容，并将其追溯到其基本要素”（第6卷，第8章，第562页）。或者说：“我们不能制定原则、规则或方法……[然而]虽然历史可能无法提供公式，但它确实提供了判断的练习，在这里和其他地方一样”（第 6 卷，第 30 章，第 756 页）。
6 This summary is drawn from such writings during the Reform Era as Clausewitz's additions of 1808 and 1809 to an essay on strategy originally written in 1804, published by Eberhard Kessel under the title Strategie (Hamburg, 1937); and the essay “Über den Zustand der Theorie der Kriegskunst,” published by Walter Schering in his collection of Clausewitz's writings Geist und Tat (Stuttgart, 1941). Subsequent restatements and developments of these ideas can be found throughout On War, particularly in books 1, 2, and 8. Note also such passages as: “Our aim is not to provide new principles and methods of conducting war; rather we are concerned with examining the essential content of what has long existed, and to trace it back to its basic elements” (bk. 6, ch. 8, p. 562); or “We cannot formulate principles, rules, or methods…. [Nevertheless] while history may yield no formulae, it does provide an exercise for judgment, here as everywhere else” (bk. 6, ch. 30, p. 756).
7关于克劳塞维茨的思想与德国哲学的关系，我在《克劳塞维茨与国家》（牛津和纽约，1976 年；普林斯顿，1985 年重印）一书中进行了讨论，尤其参见第 147-208 页。
7 The relationship between Clausewitz's ideas and German philosophy is discussed in my Clausewitz and the State (Oxford and New York, 1976; repr. Princeton, 1985), see particularly pp. 147–208.
8克劳塞维茨，“1827 年 7 月 10 日的笔记”，《战争论》，第 69 页。原文强调。
8 Clausewitz, “;Note of 10 July 1827,” On War, 69. Emphasis in original.
9以下分析部分依赖于我对《克劳塞维茨与国家》中战争论的讨论，特别是第 356-381 页。
9 The following analysis relies in part on my discussion of On War In Clausewitz and the State, especially pp. 356–81.
10克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，第 4 卷，第 1 章，第 225 页。
10 Clausewitz, On War, bk. 4, ch. 1, p. 225.
11同上。
11 Ibid.
12克劳塞维茨， 《战争论》第61页，“作者序言”。
12 Clausewitz, “Author's Preface,” On War, 61.
13克劳塞维茨定义了历史例证的四种理论功能：“历史例证可以简单地用来解释一个观点……其次，它可以用来展示一个观点的应用……第三，人们可以诉诸历史事实来支持某个论断……以证明某种现象或结果的可能性。”最后，可以通过对历史事件的详细、具体的论述来推导出某个原则或命题。（《战争论》，第二卷，第六章，第171页。）
13 Clausewitz defines the four theoretical functions of historical examples: “A historical example may simply be used as an explanation of an idea…. Second, it may serve to show the application of an idea…. Third, one can appeal to historical fact to support a statement…to prove the possibility of some phenomenon or effect.” Finally, a tenet or proposition may be derived from the detailed, circumstantial treatment of a historical event. (On War, bk. 2, ch. 6, p. 171.)
14同上，第 1 卷，第 1 章，第 77-78 页。另见第 1 卷，第 2 章。
14 Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 1, pp. 77–78. See also bk. 1, ch. 2.
15同上，第 87 页。
15 Ibid., 87.
16卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战略两封信》，彼得·帕雷特和丹尼尔·莫兰译注（宾夕法尼亚州卡莱尔，1984 年），第 9 页。原文强调。另见《战争论》第 8 卷，第 6B 章，第 607 页。
16 Carl von Clausewitz, Two Letters on Strategy, trans. and ed. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Carlisle, Penn., 1984), 9. Emphasis in the original. Compare also On War, bk. 8, ch. 6B, p. 607.
17克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，第 1 卷，第 1 章，第 89 页。
17 Clausewitz, On War, bk. 1, ch. 1, p. 89.
18同上。
18 Ibid.
19同上，第 1 卷，第 7 章，第 119-121 页。
19 Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 7, pp. 119–21.
20同上，第 1 卷，第 3 章，第 100 页。
20 Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 3, p. 100.
21同上，第 106 页；同上，第 3 卷，第 3 章，第 184 页。
21 Ibid., 106; ibid., bk. 3, ch. 3, p. 184.
22同上，185。
22 Ibid., 185.
23同上，“未完成的笔记，据推测写于 1830 年”，第 71 页。
23 Ibid., “Unfinished Note, Presumably Written in 1830,” 71.
24同上，第 1 卷，第 1 章，第 81 页。
24 Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 1, p. 81.
25同上，第 8 卷，第 3B 章，第 585-86 页。
25 Ibid., bk. 8, ch. 3B, pp. 585–86.
26同上，第 1 卷，第 2 章，第 96 页。
26 Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 2, p. 96.
27克劳塞维茨对经济因素在战争中的作用的认识的一个很好的例子是他对十八世纪战争性质的讨论，该讨论以“这种军事组织是建立在金钱和征兵基础上的”（同上，第 8 卷，第 38 章，第 588-89 页）这句话开始。
27 A good example of Clausewitz's awareness of the role of economic factors in war is his discussion of the nature of eighteenth-century warfare that begins with the sentence “This military organization was based on money and recruitment” (ibid., bk. 8, ch. 38, pp. 588–89).
28克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，第 1 卷，第 1 章，第 75 页。
28 Clausewitz, On War, bk. 1, ch. 1, p. 75.
29同上，第 8 卷，第 6B 章，第 606-607 页。
29 Ibid., bk. 8, ch. 6B, pp. 606–607.
30詹姆斯·E·金在一次私人交流中指出，克劳塞维茨“将政治价值观（目标）为何以及如何控制武装力量及其在战争中的运用（手段）的分析问题留给了与他的战争理论一样复杂的政治理论来解答。这项任务至今尚未完成。”
30 James E. King, in a personal communication, observes that Clausewitz “left the analytic questions as to why and how political values (the objective) control the armed forces and their employment in war (the means) to be answered by a political theory as sophisticated as his theory of war. That task has still not been accomplished.”
31 Jean Colin，《战争的转型》（伦敦，1912 年），第 298-99 页。对克劳塞维茨的影响的探究具有一个特点，那就是即使是这位杰出的历史学家也理所当然地认为克劳塞维茨的思想对 1866 年和 1870 年普鲁士战略产生了影响（同上，第 303-304 页），这一假设会让普鲁士总参谋部和普鲁士军队的指挥官们感到困惑。
31 Jean Colin, The Transformation of War (London, 1912), 298–99. It is characteristic of the search for Clausewitz's Influence that even this brilliant historian simply took for granted the Impact Clausewitz's ideas had on Prussian strategy in 1866 and 1870 (ibid., 303–304), an assumption that would have puzzled the Prussian general staff and the commanders of the Prussian armies in these conflicts.
32一位深受克劳塞维茨思想影响的历史学家，在其《战争史的解释》中尝试应用和发展克劳塞维茨的思想，他就是汉斯·德尔布吕克，戈登·克雷格在本卷的另一篇文章中讨论了他。
32 A historian whose thinking was strongly Influenced by Clausewitz, and who tried to apply and develop Clausewitz's ideas in his Interpretations of war in history, was Hans Delbrück, whom Gordon Craig discusses in another essay In this volume.
8. 亚当·斯密、亚历山大·汉密尔顿、弗里德里希·李斯特：《军事力量的经济基础》
8. Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power
哦只有在最原始的社会中，经济权力和政治权力才有可能分离。在现代，随着民族国家的兴起、欧洲文明在全球的扩张、工业革命以及军事技术的稳步发展，我们始终面临着商业、金融和工业实力与政治和军事实力之间相互关联的问题。这种关联是政治家面临的最关键、最引人入胜的问题之一。它关乎国家安全，并在很大程度上决定着个人享有生命、自由、财产和幸福的程度。
ONLY IN THE most primitive societies, if at all, is it possible to separate economic power and political power. In modern times—with the rise of the national state, the expansion of European civilization throughout the world, the industrial revolution, and the steady advance of military technology—we have constantly been confronted with the interrelation of commercial, financial, and industrial strength on the one hand, and political and military strength on the other. This interrelationship is one of the most critical and absorbing problems of statesmanship. It involves the security of the nation and, in large measure, determines the extent to which the individual may enjoy life, liberty, property, and happiness.
当治国方略的指导原则是重商主义或极权主义时，国家权力本身就成为目的，所有关于国民经济和个人福祉的考量都服从于发展国家潜力以备战和发动战争这一单一目标——德国人称之为“国防经济”（Wehrwirtschaft）和“战争经济” （Kriegswirtschaft）。近三百年前，科尔伯特曾精辟地概括了路易十四时期法国君主制的政策，他指出“贸易是财政的源泉，财政是战争的命脉”。如今，戈林也曾指出，纳粹德国的政治经济目标是生产“枪炮，而非黄油”。而苏联为全面战争做准备时常用的一个口号是：与其有牛奶而没有社会主义，不如有没有牛奶的社会主义。另一方面，民主民族厌恶以战争和备战为基础的经济所固有的种种限制：军工经济与他们的生活方式格格不入，也超出了他们认为保障自身安全和繁荣所必需的范畴。他们更倾向于以个人福祉而非国家权力为基础的经济体系。他们对军事和经济力量的协调运用抱有根深蒂固的怀疑，认为这构成对其长期享有的自由的内在威胁。
When the guiding principle of statecraft is mercantilism or totalitarianism, the power of the state becomes an end in itself, and all considerations of national economy and individual welfare are subordinated to the single purpose of developing the potentialities of the nation to prepare for war and to wage war—what the Germans call Wehrwirtschaft and Kriegswirtschaft. Almost three hundred years ago Colbert epitomized the policy of the rising French monarchy of Louis XIV by saying that “trade is the source of finance and finance is the vital nerve of war.” In our day, Goering has indicated that the political economy of the Nazi garrison state was aimed at the production of “guns, not butter.” And a favorite device of Soviet preparation for total war was the slogan that it is better to have socialism without milk, than milk without socialism. Democratic peoples, on the other hand, dislike the restraints that are inherent in an economy based upon war and the preparation for war: Wehrwirtschaft is something alien to their way of life and beyond the bounds of what they consider necessary to their safety and prosperity. They prefer an economic system that is predicated upon individual welfare rather than upon the overweening power of the state. And they have a deep-rooted suspicion of coordinated military and economic power, as something that constitutes an inherent threat to their long-established liberties.
然而，无论一个国家秉持何种政治和经济理念，都不能忽视军事力量和国家安全的需求，因为这两者是政府所有其他问题的根本所在。亚历山大·汉密尔顿阐述了治国理政的一项基本原则，他指出，免受外部危险是“国家行为的最有力指导者”；即使是自由，如有必要，也必须让位于安全的需求，因为为了更加安全，人们愿意“承担失去自由的风险”。亚当·斯密认为，国家的物质繁荣建立在政府对个人自由干预最小的基础上，但他愿意承认，当涉及到国家安全时，这一普遍原则必须做出妥协，因为“国防远比富裕重要”。2弗里德里希·李斯特在大多数问题上与斯密意见相左，但在这一点上却与斯密完全一致：“权力比财富更重要……因为权力的反面——即软弱——会导致我们失去所有的一切，不仅是已获得的财富，还有我们的生产力、我们的文明、我们的自由，甚至我们的民族独立，最终落入那些比我们更强大的人手中……” 3
But whatever the political and economic philosophies that motivate a nation, it can ignore only at dire peril the requirements of military power and national security, which are fundamental to all other problems of government. Alexander Hamilton was enunciating a basic principle of statecraft when he said that safety from external danger is “the most powerful director of national conduct”; even liberty must, if necessary, give way to the dictates of security because, to be more safe, men are willing “to run the risk of being less free.”1 Adam Smith, who believed the material prosperity of the nation to be founded upon a minimum of governmental interference with the freedom of the individual, was willing to concede that this general principle must be compromised when national security is involved, for “defense is of much more importance than opulence.”2 Friedrich List, who disagreed with Smith on most subjects, found himself in perfect accord on this point: “Power is of more importance than wealth…because the reverse of power—namely, feebleness—leads to the relinquishment of all that we possess, not of acquired wealth alone, but of our powers of production, of our civilisation, of our freedom, nay, even of our national independence, into the hands of those who surpass us in might…”3
在亚当·斯密发表《国富论》之前的两百多年里，西欧一直受制于一种被称为重商主义的信念和实践。重商主义体系是一种权力政治体系。在内政方面，它力图增强国家权力，对抗中世纪遗留下来的地方主义机构。在外交方面，它力图增强国家相对于其他国家的实力。简而言之，重商主义的目标是实现民族国家的统一，并发展其工业、商业、金融、军事和海军资源。为了实现这些目标，国家干预经济事务，以便有效地引导公民或臣民的活动，使其转向能够增强政治和军事实力的领域。重商主义国家——如同我们这个时代的极权国家——具有保护主义、自给自足、扩张主义和军国主义的特征。
For more than two centuries before Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations western Europe was governed by beliefs and practices that, as a whole, are known as mercantilism. The mercantilist system was a system of power politics. In domestic affairs it sought to increase the power of the state against the particularist institutions that survived from the Middle Ages. In foreign affairs it sought to increase the power of the nation as against other nations. In short, the ends of mercantilism were unification of the national state and development of its industrial, commercial, financial, military, and naval resources. To achieve these ends the state intervened in economic affairs, so that the activities of its citizens or subjects might be effectively diverted into such channels as would enhance political and military power. The mercantilist state—like the totalitarian state of our time—was protectionist, autarkic, expansionist, and militaristic.
用现代术语来说，我们会说重商主义政策的主要目的是发展军事潜力，或者说战争潜力。为此，进出口受到严格控制；贵金属库存被积累和保护；军需品和海军物资的生产或进口都遵循溢价和奖励制度；航运和渔业被扶持，作为海军力量的来源；殖民地被建立和保护（并受到严格管制），作为对宗主国财富和自给自足的补充；人口增长被鼓励，目的是为了增加军事人力。<sup> 4</sup>这些措施以及其他措施，其主要目的，即便不是唯一目的，也是为了增强国家的团结和实力。
In modern terminology, we would say that the predominant purpose of mercantilist regulations was to develop the military potential, or war potential. To this end exports and imports were rigidly controlled; stocks of precious metals were built up and conserved; military and naval stores were produced or imported under a system of premiums and bounties; shipping and the fisheries were fostered as a source of naval power; colonies were settled and protected (as well as strictly regulated) as a complement to the wealth and self-sufficiency of the mother country; population growth was encouraged for the purpose of increasing military manpower.4 These and other measures were designed with the major, if not the single, purpose of adding to the unity and strength of the nation.
战争是重商主义体系的固有组成部分，正如在任何以权力为目的、经济活动主要服务于政治目的的体系中一样。奉行强权政策的人认为，与其增强自身经济实力，不如削弱他国的经济实力，这样即便不是更好，也能达到他们的目标。如果以财富为目标，这简直荒谬至极；但从政治权力的角度来看，这却合乎逻辑……任何试图通过自身努力实现经济进步的尝试，除非是通过掠夺他国的财产，否则都显得毫无意义。在重商主义哲学中，几乎没有其他因素比这更能影响经济政策乃至整个外交政策的形成。⁵这种逻辑对重商主义者而言毫不留情，并在很大程度上解释了从十七世纪中叶到十九世纪初在欧洲持续不断的战争——无论是公开的还是隐蔽的。拿破仑的大陆封锁体系和英国为报复而颁布的枢密令，只不过是一系列类似措施的最终结果。
War was inherent in the mercantilist system, as it is in any system in which power is an end in itself and economic life is mobilized primarily for political purposes. Representatives of a policy of power believe that their goals can be achieved “as well, if not better, by weakening the economic power of other countries instead of strengthening one's own. If wealth is considered as an aim, this is the height of absurdity, but from the point of view of political power it is quite logical…. Any attempt at economic advance by one's own efforts in one country must have appeared pointless, unless it consisted in robbing other countries of part of their possessions. Scarcely any other element in mercantilist philosophy contributed more to the shaping of economic policy, and even of foreign policy as a whole.”5 This logic was remorseless with the mercantilists and in large measure accounts for the almost continuous war—open or concealed—that raged in Europe from the middle of the seventeenth century to the early part of the nineteenth. Napoleon's Continental System and the retaliatory British Orders in Council were simply the culmination of a long series of similar measures.
在重商主义战争中，唯有英国最终获胜。它比任何其他欧洲强国都更早实现了国家统一，并享有其岛屿位置带来的安全保障，因此比其他国家更能“迅速、大胆且目标明确地运用其强大的舰队和海军力量、海关和航海法规体系，为国家和国家的经济利益服务”，从而在争夺商业和政治霸权的斗争中占据领先地位。到1763年，英国已经粉碎了西班牙、荷兰和法国的商业、殖民和海军野心。在大革命和拿破仑的领导下复兴的法国在滑铁卢战役中再次被击败。1815年，尽管失去了美洲殖民地，英国似乎已经以一种令人想起古代伟大帝国的方式和程度，登上了世界霸主的宝座。 “纵观古今，总有一些城市或国家在工业、商业和航海方面遥遥领先于其他所有国家；但像当今英国这样的霸主地位，世界前所未见。纵观古今，各国强权都曾努力称霸世界，但迄今为止，没有一个国家像英国这样，将自己的权力建立在如此广阔的基础之上。那些试图依靠军事力量建立世界统治的国家，与英国将整个领土打造成为一座庞大的制造业、商业和海事中心，并力图成为世界各国和王国中，如同大城市之于其周边领土那样，将所有工业、艺术和科学、所有商业和财富、所有航海和海军力量都囊括其中——成为世界之都的努力相比，显得多么徒劳啊！”一位德国民族主义者在1841年如此写道，既充满羡慕，又饱含敬佩。7
From the mercantilist wars, England alone emerged triumphant. Achieving national unification earlier than any other European power, and enjoying the security that its insular position afforded, it was better able than the others to put “the might of her fleets and admiralty, the apparatus of customs and navigation laws, at the service of the economic interests of the nation and the state with rapidity, boldness, and clear purpose,” and thereby to gain the lead in the struggle for commercial and political hegemony.6 By 1763 England had crushed the commercial, colonial, and naval aspirations of Spain, Holland, and France. The resurgent France of the Revolution and Napoleon was crushed again at Waterloo. In 1815, despite the loss of the American colonies, Great Britain seemed to have arrived at world power in a manner and degree reminiscent of the great empires of antiquity. “In all ages there have been cities or countries which have been pre-eminent above all others in industry, commerce, and navigation; but a supremacy such as that [of Britain] which exists in our days, the world has never before witnessed. In all ages, nations and powers have striven to attain to the dominion of the world, but hitherto not one of them has erected its power on so broad a foundation. How vain do the efforts of those appear to us who have striven to found their universal dominion on military power, compared with the attempt of England to raise her entire territory into one immense manufacturing, commercial, and maritime city, and to become among the countries and kingdoms of the earth, that which a great city is in relation to its surrounding territory; to comprise within herself all industries, arts, and sciences; all great commerce and wealth; all navigation and naval power—a world's metropolis….” Thus wrote a German nationalist in 1841, in envy and in admiration.7
正是在重商主义盛行、英国国力强盛的背景下，英国人斯密、美国人汉密尔顿和德国人李斯特才为各自国家制定了经济和政治政策。他们关于军事力量经济基础的论述，只有在他们所处的时代以及各自国家的精神和特殊条件下才能得到理解。
It was against the background of mercantilism and of a triumphant England that Smith the Briton, Hamilton the American, and List the German outlined economic and political policies for their respective countries. What they had to say concerning the economic foundations of military power can be understood only within the framework of their times and the spirit and special conditions of their respective countries.
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《国富论》于1776年出版时，英国正值对重商主义理论和实践进行批判性反思的良机。美洲殖民地的反抗使人们的注意力集中到英国殖民政策中涉及的整个贸易管制体系上。人们对持续一个多世纪的战争以及日益沉重的战争债务感到不满。此外，英国在七年战争（1756-1763）中战胜法国后，无论在商业还是海军实力上，都再无能敌。因此，人们对那种“教导各国以邻国贫困为自身利益”的政治经济哲学越来越持怀疑态度。随着英国世界强国地位的巩固，人们开始倾向于推行更为自由的政策，并认为“邻国的财富，无论在战争和政治上多么危险，在贸易中无疑是有利的”。8此外，人们越来越确信，现行制度存在弊端，使得根深蒂固的特权阶层能够利用其与国家真实或臆想利益的联系而获利。正是针对这些弊端，斯密猛烈抨击了商人阶级，特别是特许公司，指责他们垄断行为、篡夺政府权力以及煽动战争。9他说道：“在过去和上个世纪里，国王和大臣们反复无常的野心对欧洲的安宁造成的危害，远不及商人和制造商们肆无忌惮的嫉妒。统治者的暴力和不公正是一种古老的罪恶……但是，那些既不是也不应该是人类统治者的商人和制造商们的卑劣贪婪和垄断精神……很容易就能阻止他们扰乱除自身以外的任何人的安宁。” 10
When The Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, the time was ripe in Britain for critical reappraisal of the theories and practices of mercantilism. The revolt of the American colonies had focused attention upon the entire system of trade regulation that was involved in Britain's colonial policy. There was dissatisfaction with the wars that had been going on for over a century and with the mounting burden of war debts. Furthermore, after Britain's triumph over France in the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), there remained no serious rival to England in either commercial or naval power. Hence there was increasing skepticism concerning a political and economic philosophy by which “nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbors.” The feeling began to grow, now that Britain's position as a world power seemed assured, that a more liberal policy might be initiated and that “the wealth of a neighboring nation, however dangerous in war and politics, is certainly advantageous in trade.”8 There was a growing conviction, too, that there had been abuses in the prevailing system, which enabled entrenched privilege to benefit from its association with the real or imagined interests of the nation. It was against these abuses that Smith struck out in attacking the merchant class in general and the chartered companies in particular for monopolistic practices, usurpation of governmental authority, and the fomenting of war.9 “The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the present and the preceding century,” he said, “been more fatal to the repose of Europe, than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil…. But the mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are, nor ought to be, the rulers of mankind…may very easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquility of any body but themselves.”10
斯密对重商主义最尖锐的批判集中于其货币理论，包括国家必须积累大量金银储备作为战争资金的观点。他承认英国必须做好战争准备，因为“一个勤劳的国家，因而也是富裕的国家，在所有国家中最容易受到攻击”。他也清楚英国庞大的海外殖民和商业活动需要维持一支强大的军事和海军力量。但他否认战争资金对于有效防御国家至关重要，甚至毫无用处，因为“维持舰队和军队的不是金银，而是消耗品。一个国家如果能够凭借其国内工业的年产值、土地、劳动力和消耗品储备所产生的年收入，在遥远的国家购买这些消耗品，那么它就能在那里发动战争。”英国利用制造业扩张和对外贸易大幅增长带来的利润来支付七年战争“巨额开支”的经验证明了这一点。<sup> 11</sup>换句话说，斯密认为，衡量一个国家发动战争的能力最好以其生产能力来衡量，这一点后来被弗里德里希·李斯特有力地论证过。此外，他反对将战争基金和战争贷款作为战争的主要融资手段，而是倾向于征收重税。他认为，由政府支付的战争“通常会更快结束，也更不容易被随意发动”，而且“战争带来的沉重且不可避免的负担将阻止人们在没有真正或坚实利益的情况下随意发动战争”。<sup> 12</sup>
Smith's most trenchant criticisms of mercantilism were directed at its monetary theories, including the notion that the state must accumulate great stocks of bullion as a war chest. He admitted that Britain must be prepared to wage war, because “an industrious, and upon that account a wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to be attacked.” Nor was he unaware that Britain's vast colonial and commercial commitments overseas required the maintenance of a substantial military and naval establishment. But he denied that war chests were essential or even useful to the effective defense of the nation, for “fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, but with consumable goods. The nation which, from the annual produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, labour, and consumable stocks, has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars there.” This was proved by Britain's experience in defraying “the enormous expence” of the Seven Years’ War from the profits of its expanded manufactures and greatly increased foreign trade.11 In other words, Smith believed that the ability of a nation to wage war is best measured in terms of its productive capacity, as was later to be argued so effectively by Friedrich List. Furthermore, he objected to war chests, as well as to war loans, as the principal means of financing wars. He favored heavy taxes instead. Wars currently paid for “would in general be more speedily concluded, and less wantonly undertaken” by governments, and “the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people from wantonly calling for it when there was no real or solid interest to fight for.”12
尽管《国富论》成为十九世纪英国自由放任主义经济学派的圣经，亚当·斯密也被视为该学派的思想先驱，但事实上，亚当·斯密并没有真正否定重商主义理论的某些基本原则。他摒弃了重商主义的一些手段，但至少接受了其一个目标——国家干预经济事务的必要性，尤其是在这种干预对国家军事力量至关重要的情况下。他的追随者比斯密本人更加教条地拥护自由贸易，而且他们也更加热忱地拥护和平主义。他写道：“君主的首要职责是保护社会免受其他独立社会的暴力和入侵，而这只能通过军事力量来实现。”但是，在和平时期准备这支军队的方法，以及在战争时期运用这支军队的方法，会因社会的不同发展阶段而有所不同。随着社会在机械技术方面的进步，战争变得越来越复杂，代价也越来越高昂；因此，商业工业国家的军事机构性质及其支持方式与较为原始的社会截然不同。13换句话说，正如马克思和恩格斯后来指出的，经济组织形式在很大程度上决定了战争手段和军事行动的性质。因此，军事力量必然建立在经济基础之上。
Despite the fact that The Wealth of Nations became the bible, and Adam Smith the intellectual progenitor, of the laissez-faire school of nineteenth-century British economic theorists, the truth is that Adam Smith did not really repudiate certain fundamentals of mercantilist doctrine. He rejected some of its means, but he accepted at least one of its ends—the necessity of state intervention in economic matters insofar as it might be essential to the military power of the nation. His followers were more doctrinaire free traders than Smith was himself, and they certainly were more ardent pacifists. “The first duty of the sovereign,” he wrote, “that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force.” But the methods of preparing this force in time of peace, and of employing it in time of war will vary according to the different states of society. War becomes more complicated and more expensive as societies advance in the mechanical arts; hence the character of the military establishment and the methods of supporting it will be different in a commercial and industrial state from that in a more primitive society.13 In other words, as Marx and Engels later pointed out, the forms of economic organization in large measure determine what are to be the instruments of war and the character of military operations. It is inevitable, therefore, that military power be built upon economic foundations.
就英国而言，重商主义体系的核心——如同约柜一般——是《航海条例》。重商主义的其他方面在其发展早期或许至关重要，但到了十八世纪末，英国的工业已经高度发达，保护主义对其的重要性远不及法国和德意志诸邦。英国完全有能力在必要时免除大多数制成品的关税，因为它们在国内和海外市场都缺乏真正的竞争对手。事实上，英国后来出于自身利益放弃了早期的限制性政策，正如俾斯麦所言，“自由贸易是强者的武器”。但海权则另当别论，任何与之相关的事物都必须以不同的标准来评判。为了维护本土和帝国的安全，英国必须几乎完全掌控海上航线；任何胆敢如此行事的国家都必将招致英国毫不妥协的敌意。此外，英国工业、金融和商业的整个上层建筑都建立在海外市场和海外供应来源之上。因此，商船队既是经济资产，也是军事安全中不可或缺的组成部分，尤其是在商船很容易被改装成私掠船或军舰的时代。“你们的舰队和你们的贸易，”哈弗舍姆勋爵在英国上议院宣称，“彼此关系密切，相互影响，密不可分：你们的贸易是你们海员的养育之源；你们的海员是你们舰队的生命；你们的舰队是你们贸易的安全保障；而这两者共同构成了英国的财富、实力、安全和荣耀。”<sup> 14</sup>
Insofar as Great Britain was concerned, the heart of the mercantilist system—the ark of the covenant—was the Navigation Acts. Mercantilism in its other aspects may have been essential at an earlier period of its development, but by the end of the eighteenth century England was so far advanced industrially that protectionism was of much less importance to it than to France and the German states. The British could have afforded, if necessary, to dispense with duties on most manufactures because they were without serious competition in their domestic and overseas markets. Indeed, Great Britain was later, in self interest, to abandon its earlier restrictive policies because it had learned, as Bismarck said, that “free trade is the weapon of the strongest.” But sea power was another matter, and anything related to it had to be judged by different criteria. The safety of the homeland and the empire demanded that Britain have virtually unchallenged control of the ocean highways; any power that thought otherwise was certain to earn implacable hostility. Furthermore, the entire superstructure of British industry, finance, and commerce was founded upon overseas markets and overseas sources of supply. Hence, the merchant marine was both an economic asset and an absolutely indispensable element in military security, especially in an age when merchant vessels were readily converted into privateers or men-of-war. “Your fleet and your Trade,” declared Lord Haversham in the House of Lords, “have so near a relation and such mutual influence on each other, they cannot well be separated: your trade is the mother and nurse of your seamen: your seamen are the life of your fleet: and your fleet is the security and protection of your trade: and both together are the wealth, strength, security and glory of Britain.”14
正因如此，检验亚当·斯密关于重商主义和强权政治观点的真正试金石是他对《航海条例》和渔业问题的立场。他说：“英国的国防很大程度上取决于其水手和船只的数量。因此，《航海条例》理所当然地旨在赋予英国的水手和船只对其本国贸易的垄断权。”斯密继续说道：
For these reasons the real test of Adam Smith's view on mercantilism and power politics was his stand on the Navigation Acts and the fisheries. “The defense of Great Britain,” he said, “depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The act of navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country.” Smith continued:
《航海条例》颁布之时，尽管英荷两国并未处于战争状态，但两国之间却存在着极其强烈的敌意。这种敌意始于最初制定该条例的长期议会时期，并在护国公和查理二世统治时期爆发的荷荷战争中进一步加剧。因此，这部著名条例中的某些条款或许源于当时的民族敌意，这并非不可能。然而，这些条款却如同出自最深思熟虑的智慧之手，同样明智。当时的民族敌意所指向的目标，恰恰是任何深思熟虑的智慧都会建议的：削弱荷兰的海军力量——因为荷兰是唯一能够威胁英国安全的海军强国。
When the act of navigation was made, though England and Holland were not actually at war, the most violent animosity subsisted between the two nations. It had begun during the government of the long parliament, which first framed this act, and it broke out soon after in the Dutch wars during that of the Protector and of Charles the Second. It is not impossible, therefore, that some of the regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from national animosity. They are as wise, however, as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom. National animosity at that particular time aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of England.
航海行为不利于对外贸易，也不利于由此产生的财富增长……然而，由于国防远比财富重要，因此，航海行为或许是英国所有商业法规中最明智的一项。15
The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it…. As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.15
关于渔业，他的观点基本相同：“虽然对这些渔业的吨位奖励并不会增加国家的富裕程度，但或许可以认为，它们通过增加水手和船只的数量，有助于国家的国防。”<sup> 16</sup>斯密同样赞同那些授权向美洲殖民地生产海军物资支付奖励金，并禁止将这些物资从美洲出口到英国以外任何国家的法律。在斯密看来，这种典型的重商主义法规是合理的，因为它能使英国摆脱对瑞典和其他北方国家的依赖，从而获得军事必需品，并有助于帝国的自给自足。<sup> 17</sup>
As regards the fisheries he took essentially the same point of view: “But though the tonnage bounties to those fisheries do not contribute to the opulence of that nation, it may perhaps be thought that they contribute to its defence, by augmenting the number of its sailors and shipping.”16 Smith likewise approved of the laws that authorized the payment of a bounty for the production of naval stores in the American colonies and prohibited their export from America to any country other than Great Britain. This typical mercantilist regulation was justified, in Smith's view, because it would make England independent of Sweden and the other northern countries for the supply of military necessities and thus contribute to the self-sufficiency of the empire.17
此外，当出于军事安全需要时，斯密并不反对征收保护性关税。他说道：“当某些特定产业对国家防御至关重要时，为了鼓励国内产业发展，对外国征收一些负担通常是有益的。”《航海条例》就为航运业提供了这种保护。但斯密也愿意为了其他产业的利益，出于同样的公共目的，支付补贴或征收关税：“王国尽可能减少对邻国国防所需制造业的依赖至关重要；如果这些制造业无法在国内维持，那么对所有其他产业征税以支持它们也是合理的。”他虽然有些不情愿，但也赞成征收报复性关税，从而赞成后来所谓的“关税战”。<sup> 18</sup>
Furthermore, Smith was not averse to protective duties when they were required for reasons of military security. “It will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestic industry,” he said, “when some particular industry is necessary for the defense of the country.” Such protection was afforded the shipping industry by the Navigation Acts. But Smith was willing to pay bounties or to impose tariffs in the interest of other industries as well for the same public purpose: “It is of importance that the kingdom depend as little as possible upon its neighbours for the manufactures necessary for its defense; and if these cannot be maintained at home, it is reasonable that all other branches of industry be taxed in order to support them.” With some reluctance he also approved of retaliatory duties and hence of what came to be called “tariff wars.”18
亚当·斯密是一位真诚的自由贸易主义者。他彻底驳斥了重商主义的一些理论；在他所处的时代，大英帝国盛行的重商主义做法令他深恶痛绝。他怀疑国家干预私人创业，也并非盲目崇拜国家权力本身。然而，判断他与重商主义学派关系的关键问题，并非在于其财政和贸易理论是否合理，而在于国家经济实力是否应在必要时加以培养和运用，作为治国理政的工具。亚当·斯密对此问题的答案显然是肯定的——经济实力应当如此运用。
Adam Smith was a free trader by sincere conviction. He completely demolished some of the theories that underlay mercantilism; and mercantilist practices, as they existed in the British Empire of his day, were repugnant to him. He was suspicious of state interference with private initiative, and he was no worshiper of state power for its own sake. But the critical question in determining his relationship to the mercantilist school is not whether its fiscal and trade theories were sound or unsound but whether, when necessary, the economic power of the nation should be cultivated and used as an instrument of statecraft. The answer of Adam Smith to this question would clearly be “Yes”—that economic power should be so used.
这一点尚未被完全理解。斯密的追随者，尤其是在19世纪的英国，将他塑造成一位毫不妥协的自由贸易主义者。他的一些批评者，特别是德国人施穆勒和李斯特，让“自由贸易”的呼声淹没了斯密其他那些他们本应欣然接受的教义。因此，在某些人看来，斯密是个伪君子——一个英国爱国者，眼看着自己的国家摆脱了赖以崛起、独占鳌头的重商主义战略和策略，却又准备建议其他境遇较差的国家摒弃这种战略和策略。斯密是一位英国爱国者这一点毋庸置疑，但说他是伪君子则完全是无稽之谈。李斯特对斯密追随者的“学派”比对斯密本人更为熟悉，因此他不应该受到李斯特以下严厉的指责：
This has not been altogether understood. Smith's followers, particularly in nineteenth-century England, were responsible for presenting him as an uncompromising free trader. Some of his critics, particularly the Germans Schmoller and List, allowed cries of “free trade” to drown out the rest of Smith's teachings which would have been music to their ears. Thus in some quarters Smith has been considered a hypocrite—a British patriot who had seen his country outgrow the mercantilist strategy and tactics by which it rose to unchallenged power, and was then prepared to recommend the discarding of such strategy and tactics by other nations of lesser good fortune. That Smith was a British patriot need hardly be denied, but that he was a hypocrite is emphatically not true. He does not deserve the following withering indictment by List, who was more familiar with what he called “the school” of Smith's followers than with Smith himself:
这是一种非常常见的巧妙伎俩：当一个人攀上权力巅峰后，他会踢开自己赖以攀登的梯子，从而剥夺他人攀升的途径。这其中蕴含着亚当·斯密的世界政治学说的秘密，以及他同时代的伟大人物威廉·皮特和所有英国政府继任者的世界政治倾向的秘密。
It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrine of Adam Smith, and of the cosmopolitical tendencies of his great contemporary William Pitt, and of all his successors in the British Government administrations.
任何一个国家，如果通过征收保护性关税和限制航行，使其制造业和航运能力发展到如此高度，以至于其他国家无法与其进行自由竞争，那么它最明智的做法莫过于抛弃这些通往强大的阶梯，向其他国家宣扬自由贸易的好处，并以忏悔的语气宣布自己此前误入歧途，如今终于发现了真理。19
Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth.19
二
II
三百多年前，弗朗西斯·培根就指出，一个国家保卫自身的能力与其说是取决于其物质财富，不如说是取决于其人民的精神；与其说是取决于其黄金储备，不如说是取决于其政治体中钢铁般的意志。<sup> 20</sup>作为一位道德哲学教授，亚当·斯密必然熟悉培根的著作。无论如何，他认为“任何社会的安全或多或少都取决于广大人民的尚武精神……单凭尚武精神，而没有一支训练有素的常备军，或许不足以保障任何社会的防御和安全。但如果每个公民都拥有战士的精神，那么一支规模较小的常备军就必然是必要的。”史密斯更进一步认为，“即便民众的尚武精神对保卫社会毫无用处，但为了防止懦弱必然导致的那种精神残缺、畸形和痛苦在广大民众中蔓延，政府仍应给予最严肃的关注；正如防止麻风病或其他任何令人厌恶的疾病（即便不致命也不危险）在民众中传播一样……”。只有通过政府支持的“军事演习”，才能有效地保持尚武精神。<sup> 21</sup>十九世纪，史密斯的许多追随者，尤其是科布登和布莱特，都是坚定的和平主义者，也是热忱的自由贸易拥护者，他们不会赞同任何此类理论。
More than three hundred years ago, Francis Bacon pointed out that the ability of a nation to defend itself depended less upon its material possessions than upon the spirit of the people, less upon its stocks of gold than upon the iron of determination in the body politic.20 As a professor of moral philosophy, Adam Smith must have been acquainted with the works of Bacon. In any case, he believed that “The security of every society must always depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of the great body of the people…. Martial spirit alone, and unsupported by a well-disciplined standing army, would not, perhaps, be sufficient for the defence and security of any society. But where every citizen had the spirit of a soldier, a smaller standing army would surely be necessary.” And Smith went even further in the belief that “even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use towards the defense of the society, yet to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would still deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and offensive disease, though neither mortal nor dangerous, from spreading itself among them….” Only through “the practice of military exercises,” supported by the government, could the martial spirit be effectively maintained.21 During the nineteenth century many of Smith's followers, notably Cobden and Bright, were convinced pacifists, as well as ardent free traders, and would not have endorsed any such doctrine.
英美两国对“常备军”根深蒂固，由来已久。不列颠群岛的孤立位置使得议会在国防问题上得以“勉强应付”，而议会与王室之间旷日持久的斗争（军队是斯图亚特王朝的工具）更助长了这样一种观念：职业军队会危及公民自由。在欧洲大陆，英国的竞争对手都依靠庞大的常备军作为其力量的堡垒，并在职业军人的指挥下，在军事组织和战争艺术方面取得了长足的进步。然而，在和平时期，议会仍然维持着微不足道的军队规模，坚持低效且令人士气低落的军队驻扎在民众中的制度，并继续依赖民兵——德莱顿在《西蒙与伊菲革涅亚》中对此进行了辛辣的讽刺。
There is a long-standing and deeply rooted Anglo-American prejudice against “standing armies.” The insular position of the British Isles made it possible for Parliament to “muddle through” in questions of national defense, and the long contest between Parliament and the Crown (in which the army was an instrument of the Stuarts) fostered the belief that a professional army was dangerous to civil liberty. On the continent of Europe the rivals of Great Britain had resorted to large standing armies as the bulwark of their strength, and under professional soldiers had made great progress in military organization and the art of war.22. Nevertheless, Parliament continued during time of peace to maintain the army at inconsequential strength, persisted in the inefficient and demoralizing system of billeting of troops on the people, and continued its reliance on the militia, which Dryden had so effectively lampooned in Cymon and Iphigenia:
全国各地警报声此起彼伏。
The country rings around with loud alarms,
田野里，粗野的民兵成群结队地涌动；
And raw in fields the rude militia swarms;
没有手的嘴，需要花费巨资维护，
Mouths without hands, maintained at vast expense,
和平时期是进攻，战争时期是软弱的防守。
In peace a charge, in war a weak defence.
斯托特每月一次举行游行，这是一支气势汹汹的乐队。
Stout once a month they march, a blustering band,
而且总是，但在需要的时候，就在身边。
And ever, but in time of need, at hand.
十七世纪末，麦考利写道：“几乎所有有名望的公众人物都曾多次公开表示，我们的政策与常备军无法共存。辉格党人一直反复强调，常备军摧毁了邻国的自由制度。托利党人也同样反复强调，在我们自己的岛屿上，（克伦威尔统治下的）常备军颠覆了教会，压迫了乡绅，并谋杀了国王。任何一方的领袖，如果提议将这样一支军队作为王国的常设机构之一，都将面临严重的自相矛盾的指责。”<sup> 23</sup>
At the end of the seventeenth century, Macaulay wrote, “there was scarcely a public man of note who had not often avowed his conviction that our policy and a standing army could not exist together. The Whigs had been in the constant habit of repeating that standing armies had destroyed the free institutions of the neighboring nations. The Tories had repeated as constantly that, in our own island, a standing army [under Cromwell] had subverted the Church, oppressed the gentry, and murdered the King. No leader of either party could, without laying himself open to the charge of gross inconsistency, propose that such an army should henceforth be one of the permanent establishments of the realm.”23
1752年至1763年，斯密在格拉斯哥大学担任道德哲学教授，并发表了著名的关于正义、警察、税收和军队的演讲，当时的情况依然如此。<sup> 24</sup>在这些演讲中，斯密与他著名的老师弗朗西斯·哈奇森决裂。哈奇森反对常备军，理由是“军事技艺和美德是所有正直公民都应具备的卓越才能”，并且“因此，战争不应成为任何人的终身职业；而应轮流服役”。<sup> 25</sup>斯密认为这完全不切实际，因此他坚决支持建立职业军队。
This was still the situation when Smith was professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow, 1752–1763, and delivered his famous lectures on justice, police, revenue, and arms.24 In these lectures Smith broke with his famous teacher Francis Hutcheson, who had opposed a standing army on the ground that “the military arts and virtues are accomplishments highly becoming all honorable citizens” and that “warfare therefore should be no man's perpetual profession; but all should take their turns in such services.”25 This seemed to Smith an utterly impracticable program, and he took a categorical stand in favor of a professional army.
斯密承认，常备军可能对自由构成威胁——毕竟，克伦威尔曾“将长期议会赶到户外”。但他相信，只要采取适当的预防措施，军队就能支持而非削弱宪法的权威。无论如何，安全需要一支训练有素、纪律严明的武装力量；只有这样，国家才能将命运托付给战争之神。任何民兵，无论训练多么精良、纪律多么严明，都无法取代职业军人，尤其是在火器发展日新月异的时代，组织和秩序的重要性远胜于个人技能、勇气和灵巧。因此，军事防范最基本的要求是，对民兵的历史依赖以及对职业军队的传统怀疑，必须让位于时代的需要。此外，劳动分工这一合理的经济原则也要求战争成为一项事业，而非副业。斯密写道：
Smith admitted that a standing army might be a menace to liberty—after all, Cromwell had “turned the long parliament out of doors.” But he believed that with proper precautions the army could be made to support, rather than undermine, the authority of the constitution. In any case, security demanded a well-trained and well-disciplined armed force; only then could the nation commit its fate to the god of battles. No militia, however trained and disciplined, could take the place of professional soldiers, especially in an age when the development of firearms put a greater premium on organization and order than on individual skill, bravery, and dexterity. The most elementary requirements of military precaution, therefore, demanded that the historic reliance upon the militia, and the traditional suspicion of the professional army, give way to the exigencies of the times. Furthermore, the sound economic principle of the division of labor demanded that war be made a vocation, not an avocation. Smith wrote:
战争艺术，作为所有技艺中最崇高的，在发展进步的过程中，必然成为最复杂的技艺之一。机械技术以及其他一些与其密切相关的技艺的发展水平，决定了战争艺术在任何特定时期所能达到的完善程度。然而，为了使其达到这种完善程度，它必须成为特定阶层公民的唯一或主要职业，而劳动分工对于战争艺术的进步，如同对于其他任何技艺的进步一样必不可少。在其他技艺中，劳动分工的引入自然源于个人的审慎，他们发现，与其从事多种职业，不如专注于某一特定行业，这样更有利于自身利益的实现。但是，只有国家的智慧才能使军人这一职业成为一种与其他所有职业截然不同的独特职业。一位普通公民，在和平年代，若没有公众的特别鼓励，将大部分时间用于军事训练，无疑既能大大提升自身技能，又能从中获得极大的乐趣；但他绝不会增进自身利益。唯有国家的智慧才能使公民将大部分时间投入这项特殊活动符合自身利益：而国家并非总是具备这种智慧，即便在国家生存发展到必须如此的地步时，也未必如此。26
The art of war, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so in the progress of improvement it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them. The state of the mechanical, as well as of some other arts, with which it is necessarily connected, determines the degree of perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time. But in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is necessary that it should become the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens, and the division of labour is as necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art. Into other arts the division of labour is naturally introduced by the prudence of individuals, who find that they promote their private interest better by confining themselves to a particular trade, than by exercising a great number. But it is the wisdom of the state only which can render the trade of a soldier a particular trade separate and distinct from all others. A private citizen who, in time of profound peace, and without any particular encouragement from the public, should spend the greater part of his time in military exercises, might, no doubt, both improve himself very much in them, and amuse himself very well; but he would certainly not promote his own interest. It is the wisdom of the state only which can render it for his interest to give the greater part of his time to this peculiar occupation: and states have not always had this wisdom, even when their circumstances had become such that the preservation of their existence required that they should have it.26
1776年恰好是《国富论》和《独立宣言》出版的年份，这虽是巧合，但对英语国家而言却意义重大。斯密在书中详尽论述了英国与其美洲殖民地的关系，他的论述对任何研究美国或英国历史的学生都至关重要。然而，就我们目前的目的而言，我们只需考察斯密对帝国主义的态度。他显然认为，殖民政策在重商主义意义上是“无利可图的”。尽管他认为美国人实际上并未遭受宗主国施加的限制，但这些限制仍然是“对人类最神圣权利的公然侵犯”，也是英国官僚和商人强加于美国的“无耻奴役标志”。在他看来，殖民地在帝国体系中的价值应该以其为帝国防御提供的军事力量和为帝国整体运转提供的财政收入来衡量。按照这些标准判断，美洲殖民地对英国而言是负担而非资产；它们不仅对帝国防御毫无贡献，反而需要英国军队前往美洲，而且不久前还使英国本土卷入了一场代价高昂的与法国的战争。27从商业和金融角度来看，英国如果没有这些殖民地会更好。
It is a coincidence, but a coincidence of significance to the English-speaking peoples, that 1776 was the date of publication of both The Wealth of Nations and the Declaration of Independence. Smith dealt at length with the relations of Great Britain with its American colonies, and what he had to say is of moment to any student of American or British history. For our present purposes, however, it is necessary to consider only Smith's attitude toward imperialism. He clearly believed that a colonial policy did not “pay” in the mercantilist sense. And although he thought that the Americans had not suffered, in fact, from the restrictions imposed by the mother country, such restrictions were nevertheless “a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind,” as well as “impertinent badges of slavery” imposed upon America by the official and mercantile classes of England. The value of colonies in an imperial system should be measured, in his judgment, by the military forces they provided for imperial defense and by the revenue that they furnished for the general support of the empire. Judged by these criteria, the American colonies were a liability, not an asset, to Great Britain; they not only contributed nothing to imperial defense, but they required British forces to be dispatched to America and they had involved the homeland only recently in a costly war with France.27 Stated in terms of a commercial and financial balance sheet, England would be better off without the colonies.
这是一种狭隘的帝国观，让人联想到内维尔·张伯伦。但史密斯并没有提议英国接受美国的独立要求；这样做“就好比提出一项世界上任何国家都从未采纳、也永远不会采纳的措施。没有任何一个国家会自愿放弃对任何省份的统治权，无论统治该省份多么麻烦，无论其带来的收入与支出相比多么微不足道。这样的牺牲，虽然可能常常符合利益，但总是会损害每个国家的尊严，而且或许更重要的是，它们总是与统治者的私人利益相悖，因为他们将因此失去许多有利可图的职位，失去许多获取财富和声望的机会，而这些机会，即使是最动荡不安、对大多数民众而言最无益的省份，也往往能够提供。”<sup> 28</sup>
This is a parochial view of empire, which will be suggestive of Neville Chamberlain. But Smith did not propose that England accede to the American demand for independence; this would be “to propose such a measure as never was, and never will be adopted, by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it, and how small soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion to the expence which it occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they might frequently be agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying to the pride of every nation, and what is perhaps of still greater consequence, they are always contrary to the private interest of the governing part of it, who would thereby be deprived of the disposal of many places of trust and profit, of many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction, which the possession of the most turbulent, and, to the great body of the people, the most unprofitable province seldom fails to afford.”28
斯密敏锐地预见到美国独立战争将是一场漫长而代价高昂的战争。他甚至设想了身处困境的殖民者们可能取得胜利，这些人“从店主、商人、律师变成了政治家和立法者，致力于为一个幅员辽阔的帝国设计一种新的政府形式，他们自认为，这个帝国将会成为，而且实际上极有可能成为，世界上最伟大、最强大的帝国之一。”<sup> 29</sup>斯密的预言是正确的，在这些从律师转型为政治家的群体中，就包括亚历山大·汉密尔顿，他是缔造美利坚合众国的众多伟人中的一位杰出人物。
Smith shrewdly foresaw that the American War of Independence would be a long and costly war. He even visualized a possible victory for the embattled colonists, who, from “shopkeepers, tradesmen, and attornies are become statesmen and legislators, and are employed in contriving a new form of government for an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves, will become, and which, indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the greatest and most formidable that ever was in the world.”29 Smith was right, and among the attorneys who became statesmen was Alexander Hamilton, a giant among that remarkable galaxy of truly great men who brought into being the United States of America.
三
III
除了1764年至1766年间在欧洲大陆游历的两年，亚当·斯密的一生都致力于学术研究。他曾在格拉斯哥大学和牛津大学求学，在爱丁堡大学任教，并先后担任格拉斯哥大学的逻辑学教授和伦理哲学教授。从欧洲返回后，他全身心投入到巨著《国富论》的写作中，该书在他去世前十四年出版。
With the exception of two years of travel on the Continent (1764–1766), Adam Smith's life was devoted entirely to academic pursuits. He was a student at Glasgow and Oxford, lectured at Edinburgh, and was successively professor of logic and professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow. After his return from Europe, he devoted himself to his great work, The Wealth of Nations, published fourteen years before his death.
另一方面，亚历山大·汉密尔顿自幼便展现出行动力。他出生于西印度群岛的尼维斯岛，家境并不富裕。他的父亲家境贫寒；1768年，年仅十一岁的汉密尔顿的母亲去世后，他不得不自谋生路。他曾在一家杂货店当店员，但很快便前往纽约，并于1773年进入国王学院（现哥伦比亚大学）学习。不到一年，他就投身于美国独立战争前的宣传运动，并在十几岁时就确立了自己作为同时代最活跃的作家之一的地位。1776年初，他应征入伍，获得军官委任，并跟随华盛顿在长岛、白原、特伦顿和普林斯顿等地作战。1777年3月，年仅二十岁的他被任命为总司令的军事秘书，军衔为中校。因此，他不仅是华盛顿的密友和顾问，还撰写了一系列关于军队组织和管理的精彩报告。<sup> 30 </sup> 后来，他在拉法耶特军团指挥一个步兵团，并在约克镇战役中以英勇作战而声名鹊起。美国独立战争结束后，他继续从事军事工作。1798年，他被任命为陆军少将兼总督察，成为华盛顿的副手，负责为可能与法国开战做准备。
Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, was a man of action from his earliest youth. His life began inauspiciously on the tiny West Indian island of Nevis. His father was impecunious; and after the death of his mother in 1768, when he was only eleven years old, Hamilton had to make his own way in the world. He served as clerk in a general store, but soon went to New York, where he entered Kings College (now Columbia) in 1773. Within a year he became involved in the war of pamphlets that preceded the American Revolution and, while still in his teens, established a reputation as one of the most vigorous writers of his generation. He entered the army early in 1776, received a commission, fought with Washington on Long Island and at White Plains, Trenton, and Princeton. In March 1777, at the age of twenty, he was made military secretary to the commander in chief, with the rank of lieutenant colonel; as such, he was not only a confidant and advisor of Washington, but the author of a series of brilliant reports on army organization and administration.30 Later he commanded an infantry regiment in Lafayette's corps, distinguishing himself by conspicuous bravery at Yorktown. He continued his military career long after the Revolution when, in 1798, he was commissioned major general and inspector general of the army, second in command to Washington, for the purpose of preparing for a threatened war with France.
汉密尔顿在促成安纳波利斯和费城制宪会议上的作用，尤其是在确保宪法获得批准方面做出的卓越贡献，已是众所周知，无需赘述。撇开他其他重要的国家文件不谈，仅凭他撰写了《联邦党人文集》一半以上的篇幅，就足以使他在政治作家中占据崇高地位。他是华盛顿内阁中最具影响力的成员，其影响力远远超出了他作为财政部长的职责范围。在1789年至1797年间，他或许比任何人都更有效地塑造了美国早期的国家政策，其中一些政策后来成为具有约束力的传统。<sup> 31</sup> 1804年，年仅47岁的他不幸去世，这无疑是一场国家灾难。
Hamilton's role in bringing into being the Annapolis and Philadelphia conventions and, above all, his brilliant services in securing ratification of the Constitution, are too well known to need extensive comment. Quite aside from his other great state papers, his authorship of more than half of The Federalist would alone entitle him to high rank among political writers. He was the most influential single member of Washington's cabinet, roaming far afield from his own duties as secretary of the Treasury. During the years 1789–1797 he probably did more than any other single person to formulate the early national policies of the United States, some of which came to have the binding force of tradition.31 His tragic death in 1804, when he was only forty-seven, was a national disaster.
对于军事研究者而言，汉密尔顿是亚当·斯密和弗里德里希·李斯特之间的桥梁。汉密尔顿熟知《国富论》，并在与滕奇·考克斯合作撰写其著名的《制造业报告》时，就参考了该书。<sup> 32</sup>他赞同斯密关于职业军队的智慧和必要性，以及与国防相关的某些经济政策问题。汉密尔顿对弗里德里希·李斯特的影响在其许多著作中都有所体现。鉴于李斯特与美国保护主义团体（包括经济学家马修·凯里）的联系，毫无疑问，李斯特将《制造业报告》视为政治经济学的教科书。事实上，他曾多次援引汉密尔顿的观点，而且在李斯特的著作中，处处可见汉密尔顿的思想在其“国家体系”中占据重要地位。<sup> 33</sup>
For the student of military affairs, Hamilton is a link between Adam Smith and Friedrich List. Hamilton was familiar with The Wealth of Nations and had it before him when, with the assistance of Tench Coxe, he wrote his famous “Report on Manufactures.”32 He agreed with Smith on the wisdom and necessity of a professional army, as well as on certain questions of economic policy related to national defense. Hamilton's influence on Friedrich List is evident in much of what the latter wrote. And in view of List's association with the protectionist groups in the United States, including the economist Mathew Carey, there can be little doubt that List considered the “Report on Manufactures” a textbook of political economy. Indeed, he invoked the support of Hamilton from time to time, and there is strong internal evidence throughout List's writings that Hamilton's ideas had a prominent place in his “national system.”33
威廉·格雷厄姆·萨姆纳是一位热忱的自由贸易主义者，因此也是一位不苟言笑的批评者。他曾说，汉密尔顿的国家政策理念是“英国学派的旧重商主义体系，只不过是换了个角度，根据美国的国情进行了调整”。<sup> 34</sup>这种说法不无道理，但并非意味着汉密尔顿是重商主义教条的盲目追随者或崇拜者。正如前文所述，欧洲重商主义者关注的是两个既独立又密切相关的问题：一是国家统一，而非地方主义；二是国家资源的开发，尤其关注其军事潜力。<sup> 35</sup>汉密尔顿无疑是一位民族主义者，他坚信经济政策应成为国家统一和增强国家实力的工具。他几乎所有的言行和信念，都或多或少地与这一核心主题相关。他倡导发展包括制造业在内的全面国民经济，他对公共债务（特别是承担各州债务）的建议，他对国家银行的信念，他对外交政策和安全的理念，他对联邦政府“隐含权力”的理论，他认为应该鼓励并必要时由国家控制军需品的生产，他对军事政策的报告，他对海军的热情拥护，甚至他对民主政府的态度——所有这些都最好地从以下两个方面来理解：首先，他对国家统一的热情；其次，他对国家政治和经济实力的珍视。
William Graham Sumner, an ardent free trader and hence an unsympathetic critic, said that Hamilton's concept of national policy was “the old system of mercantilism of the English school, turned around and adjusted to the situation of the United States.”34 There is some merit to the statement but not in the sense that Hamilton was a blind follower or admirer of mercantilist doctrines. As has been indicated above, European mercantilists were concerned with two distinct but closely related things: national unification, as opposed to particularism; development of the resources of the nation, with special reference to its military potential.35 Hamilton was certainly a nationalist and he certainly believed in using economic policy as an instrument of both national unification and national power. Almost everything he said and believed can be related, in some manner, to this central theme. His advocacy of a well-rounded national economy which would include manufactures, his recommendations as regards the public debt (particularly the assumption of the debts of the states), his belief in a national bank, his concepts of foreign policy and security, his doctrine of the “implied powers” of the federal government, his conviction that the manufacture of munitions of war should be encouraged and if necessary controlled by the nation, his reports on military policy, his ardent espousal of the navy, even his attitude toward democratic government—all these can best be understood in relation first to his passion for national unity and second his jealous regard for the political and economic power of the nation.
另一方面，即使是亚当·斯密，恐怕也难以写出比汉密尔顿于1791年12月5日提交国会的《制造业报告》中对自由贸易的论述更为公正或雄辩的总结。<sup> 36</sup>此外，汉密尔顿指出，如果工业和商业自由体系“比现在更普遍地指导各国的行为，那么我们有理由相信，它或许能比各国奉行截然相反的准则更快地引领它们走向繁荣和伟大。” 如此一来，便能实现真正惠及所有人的国际分工。然而，贸易和交换的自由并未得到贯彻；事实上，情况恰恰相反，欧洲各国，特别是那些发展了制造业的国家，“为了徒劳地出售一切而不购买任何东西，而牺牲了互惠互利的交往利益。”因此，“美国在某种程度上处于被排除在对外贸易之外的境地”，并且无力与欧洲进行平等贸易。汉密尔顿继续说道，这一事实陈述“并非出于抱怨。至于那些受其规章制度约束的国家，它们是否因为目标过大而得不偿失，则应由它们自行判断。美国则应考虑如何才能最大程度地减少对其他国家外交政策（无论对错）的依赖。”<sup> 37</sup>
On the other hand, it is doubtful if even Adam Smith could have written a fairer or more eloquent summary of the case for free trade than that which appears in Hamilton's “Report on Manufactures,” submitted to the Congress December 5, 1791.36 Furthermore, if a system of industrial and commercial liberty, said Hamilton, “had governed the conduct of nations more generally than it has done, there is room to suppose that it might have carried them faster to prosperity and greatness than they have attained by the pursuit of maxims too widely opposite.” There then would and could be a genuine international division of labor to the benefit of all. But liberty of trade and exchange has not prevailed; in fact, precisely the opposite is the case, and the nations of Europe, particularly those that had developed manufactures, “sacrifice the interests of a mutually beneficial intercourse to the vain project of selling everything and buying nothing.” As a result, “the United States are, to a certain extent, in the situation of a country precluded from foreign commerce” and rendered impotent to trade with Europe on equal terms. This statement of the facts, continued Hamilton, is “not made in a spirit of complaint. It is for the nations whose regulations are alluded to, to judge for themselves, whether, by aiming at too much, they do not lose more than they gain. It is for the United States to consider by what means they can render themselves least dependent on the combinations, right or wrong, of foreign policy” of other states.37
汉密尔顿在其《制造业报告》中提出的纲领表明他是一位经济民族主义者。他说，他的目标是促进制造业的发展，“以使美国在军事和其他必需品方面摆脱对外国的依赖”。<sup> 38</sup>他认为
The program set forth in his “Report on Manufactures” stamps Hamilton as an economic nationalist. His aim, he said, was to promote such manufactures “as will tend to render the United States independent of foreign nations for military and other essential supplies.”38 He believed that
一个国家的财富、独立和安全似乎都与制造业的繁荣息息相关。为了实现这些宏伟目标，每个国家都应该努力拥有维持国家运转所需的一切基本要素，包括生活必需品、住房、衣物和国防用品。
not only the wealth but the independence and security of a country appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of manufactures. Every nation, with a view to those great objects, ought to endeavor to possess within itself, all the essentials of national supply. These comprise the means of subsistence, habitation, clothing, and defense.
这些对于政治体制的完善、社会的安全和福祉都至关重要。缺乏其中任何一项，都意味着政治生活和运动的重要工具的缺失；在国家即将面临的各种危机中，任何此类缺陷都必将造成严重后果。美国在上次战争中因缺乏自给自足能力而遭受的巨大困境，至今仍令人记忆犹新；未来的战争很可能再次凸显这种自给自足能力不足所带来的危害和危险，除非及时采取有力措施加以改变。为了尽快实现这一改变，我们的公共机构必须全力以赴，投入全部精力：这是我们亟待完成的下一项伟大任务。
The possession of these is necessary to the perfection of the body politic; to the safety as well as to the welfare of the society. The want of either is the want of an important organ of political life and motion; and in the various crises which await a state, it must severely feel the effects of any such deficiency. The extreme embarrassments of the United States during the late war, from an incapacity of supplying themselves, are still matter of keen recollection; a future war might be expected again to exemplify the mischiefs and dangers of a situation to which that incapacity is still, in too great a degree, applicable, unless changed by timely and vigorous exertion. To effect this change, as fast as shall be prudent, merits all the attention and all the zeal of our public councils: ‘t is the next great work to be accomplished.
缺乏海军来保护我们的对外贸易，在这种情况持续下去，必然会使对外贸易在必需品供应方面变得格外脆弱，并极大地加强了支持制造业的论点。39
The want of a navy, to protect our external commerce, as long as it shall continue, must render it a peculiarly precarious reliance for the supply of essential articles, and must serve to strengthen prodigiously the arguments in favor of manufactures.39
汉密尔顿认为，像美国这样的年轻国家无法与英国这样制造业历史悠久的国家竞争。“在一个国家的新兴产业与另一个国家的成熟产业之间，维持公平竞争……在大多数情况下是不切实际的。”因此，新兴国家的产业应该享有“政府的特殊援助和保护”。<sup> 40</sup>这种援助和保护应该以进口关税（在某些情况下甚至禁止进口）、限制原材料出口、提供经济奖励和补贴、退税、豁免某些重要原材料的进口关税以及其他措施的形式体现。这就是“幼稚产业”论，同时也是典型的重商主义自给自足论。
Hamilton believed that a young country like the United States could not compete with countries like Great Britain that had been long established in manufacturing. “To maintain, between the recent establishments of one country, and the long-matured establishments of another country, a competition upon equal terms…is in most cases, impracticable.” Hence the industries of the newer country should enjoy the “extraordinary aid and protection of the government.”40 This aid and protection should be extended in the form of import duties (to the point of prohibition in some instances), restraints on export of raw materials, pecuniary bounties and premiums, drawbacks exemption of certain essential raw materials from import tariffs, and other devices. This is the “infant industry” argument, but it also is the characteristic mercantilist case for autarky.
在确定为鼓励国内制造业发展而对哪些商品征收关税以及关税额度时，应重点考虑“国防这一重大因素”，甚至将其作为首要考虑因素。因此：
In determining the commodities on which duties are to be levied, and the amount of such duties, for the purpose of encouraging domestic manufactures, important and perhaps primary consideration should be given to “the great [factor] of national defense.” Thus:
可以设想，将枪支和其他军用武器归入税率为15%的物品类别，这样做并无不妥。目前已有此类物品的生产厂家，只需一定的需求刺激，就能使其产量足以满足美国的供应。
Fire-arms and other military weapons may, it is conceived, be placed without inconvenience, in the class of articles rated at fifteen per cent. There are already manufactories of these articles, which only require the stimulus of a certain demand to render them adequate to the supply of the United States.
如果每年采购一定数量的国产军用武器，以确保建立军火库，并随时补充消耗的武器，从而始终储备足够数量的各类武器，那么这将对这类制造业提供实质性的帮助，同时也是公共安全的手段。
It would also be a material aid to manufactures of this nature, as well as a means of public security, if provision should be made for an annual purchase of military weapons, of home manufacture, to a certain determinate extent, in order to [assure] the formation of arsenals; and to replace, from time to time, such as should be drawn for use, so as always to have in store the quantity of each kind which should be deemed a competent supply.
但今后或许值得立法机关考虑，是否应当为了政府自身的需要而设立所有必要武器的生产工厂。此类机构符合各国惯例，而这种惯例似乎也基于充分的理由。
But it may, hereafter, deserve legislative consideration, whether manufactories of all the necessary weapons of war ought not to be established on account of the government itself. Such establishments are agreeable to the usual practice of nations, and that practice seems founded on sufficient reason.
将这些至关重要的国防物资交给个人冒险家随意投机，似乎是一种不明智的做法——在这种情况下，这种投机行为的可靠性远低于其他情况；因为这些物资并非普通且不可或缺的私人消费或使用物品。一般而言，政府直接委托的工厂应当避免；但这似乎是该规则允许的少数例外之一，具体取决于非常特殊的原因。” 41
There appears to be an improvidence in leaving these essential implements of national defence to the casual speculations of individual adventure—a resource which can less be relied upon, in this case, than in most others; the articles in question not being objects of ordinary and indispensable private consumption or use. As a general rule, manufactories on the immediate account of government are to be avoided; but this seems to be one of the few exceptions which that rule admits, depending on very special reasons.”41
《制造业报告》也强调了这样一个观点——弗里德里希·李斯特对此进行了详尽的阐述——即一个经济多元化的国家，包括农业、制造业和商业，在国内会更加团结，在与其他国家的关系中也会更加牢固。但汉密尔顿对这一论点的最佳阐述，是他于1796年夏天撰写的华盛顿《告别演说》初稿。汉密尔顿设想，在这样的国家里，各地区的经济将相互交织，形成一个共同的国民经济和利益体系。农业发达的南方不仅会为国家财富贡献自己的一份力量，还会分享北方工业实力带来的益处。西部地区，尤其是在交通运输发展完善之后，将为东部的制造业产品和对外贸易提供市场，反过来，西部地区也将从“大西洋沿岸各州的实力、影响力和海洋资源”的开发中获益。此外，“当每个地区都对联邦抱有特殊利益时，我国所有地区都将因土壤和气候的多样性而获得更大的独立性，从而拥有更丰富的物产和更多样化的产品。”一个因共同经济利益而团结起来的国家，其整体实力将在各个重要方面得到增强。美国通过发展多元化的经济，将享有更强的“免受外部威胁的安全保障，更少的与外国的和平冲突，以及更重要的，免于因分裂而导致的各部分之间的纷争和战争——这些纷争和战争必然是由外国阴谋煽动的，而这些纷争和战争又必然会发生。”因此，国家将受益于“免于建立大规模军事机构的必要性，因为大规模军事机构在任何国家都对自由构成威胁。”汉密尔顿正是通过这种方式将他的经济体系与国家安全联系起来。
The “Report on Manufactures” also emphasizes the idea—to be developed at great length by Friedrich List—that a country with a diversified economy, including agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, will be more unified at home and stronger in its relations with other powers than it otherwise would be. But Hamilton made his best statement of this thesis in his first draft of Washington's “Farewell Address,” which he wrote during the summer of 1796.42 Hamilton visualized a nation in which sectional economies would interweave themselves into a common national economy and interest. The agricultural South would not merely contribute its own share to the national wealth but would share in the benefits of the industrial strength of the North. The West, especially after the development of adequate transportation, would offer a market for the manufactures and foreign commerce of the East and, in turn, would profit from the development of the “weight, influence, and maritime resources of the Atlantic States.” Furthermore, “where every part finds a particular interest in the Union, all parts of our Country will find greater independence from [i.e., by reason of] the superior abundance and variety of production incident to the diversity of soil and climate.” The aggregate strength of a nation thus united by a common economic interest would be increased in every essential respect. The United States, by developing a diversified economy, would enjoy enhanced “security from external danger, less frequent interruption of their peace with foreign nations, and, what is more valuable, an exemption from those broils and wars between the [several] parts, if disunited, which their own rivalships, fomented by foreign intrigue…would inevitably produce.” In consequence, the nation would profit from “exemption from the necessity of those military establishments upon a large scale which bear in every country so menacing an aspect towards Liberty.” Thus did Hamilton link his economic system with national security.
汉密尔顿关于美国海军和商船队的论证同样融合了政治和经济因素。他坚信美国注定会成为一个伟大的海上强国。美国人远航世界各地——“这种无与伦比的进取精神……本身就是取之不尽的国库”——已经“引起了欧洲人的不安”，他们“似乎担心我们对航运贸易的过度干预，而航运贸易正是他们航海的支柱和海军力量的基石”。一些欧洲国家通过限制性立法，决心“剪断我们飞向强大彼岸的翅膀”。但是，通过牢固的联盟、繁荣的商船队、兴旺的渔业（作为海员的摇篮）、适当的反制性航海法规以及一支强大的海军，“我们就能挑战那些小政客的权术，让他们无法控制或改变自然不可抗拒的必然进程”。美国海军或许无法“与海上强国的海军相匹敌”，但至少“若置于交战双方的天平之上，也具有相当的分量”，尤其是在西印度群岛。因此，即便我们只有几艘战列舰，我们的地位也“极其稳固”，这将使我们能够“在商业特权方面进行有利的谈判”。此外，一旦外国列强之间爆发战争，“我们的中立和友谊将具有价值”。因此，“只要我们坚定地维护联邦，我们或许就能在不久的将来成为欧洲在美洲的仲裁者，并能够根据自身利益左右该地区的权力平衡。”<sup> 43</sup>这无疑是高水平的现实政治，表明共和国的缔造者们已经为美国在世界政治中的角色制定了战略。
Hamilton's argument for an American navy and merchant marine was a similar amalgam of politics and economics. He was convinced that the United States was destined to become a great maritime power. The adventurous voyages of Americans to all quarters of the earth—“that unequalled spirit of enterprise…which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth”—had already “excited uneasy sensations” among Europeans, who “seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength.” Some European states, by restrictive legislation, were resolved upon “clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness.” But by a firm union, a flourishing merchant marine, prosperous fisheries (as a nursery of seamen), appropriate retaliatory navigation acts, and a navy “we might defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.” The navy of the United States might not “vie with those of the great maritime powers.” but it would at least “be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties,” particularly in the West Indies. Our position, even with a few ships of the line, is therefore “a most commanding one,” which would enable us to “bargain to great advantage for commercial privileges.” Furthermore, “a price would be set on our neutrality and our friendship” in the event of a war between foreign powers. Hence, “by a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, ere long, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of power in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.”43 Surely, this is Realpolitik of a high order and shows that a strategy for America in world politics was evolved by the fathers of the republic.
汉密尔顿认为，美国必须拥有一个一体化的国民经济。海军将为实现这一伟大目标做出贡献，正如政治和经济联盟将促进海军的发展一样：
It is imperative, Hamilton claimed, that the United States have an integrated national economy. To this great object, a navy would contribute, just as political and economic union would contribute to the growth of the navy:
一支能够汇集全美资源的美国海军，远比任何单一州或部分邦联的海军更易于实现，后者只能依靠其一部分地区的资源。事实上，美国各邦联的不同地区在建立这支至关重要的海军方面，各自拥有独特的优势。南部各州盛产某些类型的海军物资，例如焦油、沥青和松节油。它们用于造船的木材也更加坚固耐用。如果海军舰艇主要采用南部木材建造，那么其使用寿命的差异将对海军实力和国民经济产生显著影响。南部和中部的一些州出产更多、质量更好的铁矿石。海员则主要来自北部地区。海军保护对外贸易或海上贸易的必要性无需赘述，正如此类贸易对海军繁荣的促进作用一样。44
A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores—tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater plenty of iron ore, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy.44
汉密尔顿的财政政策同样具有政治内涵。通过为公共债务融资、承担各州债务以及建立国家银行，他希望将“国家利益与属于国家的富裕个人的利益紧密联系起来”，并将“双方的财富和影响力转化为互惠互利的商业渠道”。因此，国债或许是一种“国家福祉”，因为它将成为“我们联邦的强大纽带”。<sup> 45</sup>他希望获得商人和有产阶级的支持，因为他深知他们在英国政府颁布重商主义立法时是如何施加影响的，而且他认为，政治的经济动机几乎存在于任何社会之中。46此外，只要各国普遍继续将信用作为战争资源，建立稳固的国家信用基础就至关重要。一个国家如果不能与其他国家平等地利用这一重要资源，就不可能在公平的条件下与之竞争，也不可能抵御其他国家的侵略；对于一个非常年轻、资金有限、产业结构单一的国家来说，信用比那些在资金和产业方面都更发达的国家更为必要。人们“不禁会得出这样的结论：没有信用的战争不仅仅是一场巨大的灾难，而是一场毁灭。”尽管他承认战时没收私人财产的合法性，但他反对这种做法，理由之一是这会阻碍外国对美国证券的投资。47总之，他建议我们“珍惜信用，将其作为实力和安全的保障” 。48
Hamilton's fiscal policy likewise had its political connotations. By funding the public debt, assuming the debts of the states, and founding a national bank, he hoped to link “the interest of the State in an intimate connection with those of the rich individuals belonging to it” and to turn “the wealth and influence of both into a commercial channel, for mutual benefit.” Hence, a national debt might be a “national blessing” since it would be “a powerful cement to our Union.”45 He wanted the support of the merchant and propertied classes because he knew how they had been able to influence the government in England in the enactment of mercantilist legislation, and he believed that the economic motivation of politics was inherent in almost any society.46 Furthermore, the establishment of the national credit on a firm basis was essential “as long as nations in general continue to use it as a resource in war. It is impossible for a country to contend, on equal terms, or to be secure against the enterprises of other nations, without being able equally with them to avail itself of this important resource; and to a very young country, with moderate pecuniary capital, and a not very various industry, it is still more necessary than to countries more advanced in both.” One “cannot but conclude that war, without credit, would be more than a great calamity—would be ruin.” Although admitting the legality of sequestration of private property in wartime, he opposed it on grounds, among other valid reasons, that it would discourage foreign investment in American securities.47 In short, he recommended that we “cherish credit as a means of strength and security.”48
第四
IV
国家安全是汉密尔顿极为关注的问题，他对影响国家安全的因素有着清醒的认识。他明白，美国远离欧洲，领土辽阔，这些都是巨大的优势，因为这使得外国势力难以征服，甚至不可能征服。但他同时也意识到，美国是一个年轻、不发达、政治不成熟的国家，需要时间来巩固自身地位。因此，他反复强调国家团结，严厉反对派系斗争和地方主义，告诫人们不要对其他国家抱有“过分的依恋”或“根深蒂固的偏见”，并建议不要在国外做出政治承诺。因此，他坚信“如果我们保持团结，拥有高效的政府，那么我们就能抵御外敌入侵，避免遭受实质性的损害。” <sup>49</sup>但没有实力，安全无从谈起，因为“一个国家如果软弱无能，甚至连中立的权利都丧失了。” 50只有当我们强大时，我们才能“根据正义指导下的自身利益选择和平或战争”。51但力量取决于团结，正如杰伊所说，“取决于政府、武器和国家的资源” 。52
National security was a problem of absorbing interest to Hamilton, and he had a realistic appreciation of the factors that were pertinent to it. He understood that the distance of the United States from Europe and the vast extent of our territory were great assets to us, since they would make conquest by a foreign power difficult if not impossible. But he knew also that we were a young, undeveloped, and politically immature country, needing time to consolidate our position. Hence his reiterated emphasis upon national unity, his strictures against factionalism and sectionalism, his injunctions against “passionate attachment” or “rooted prejudice” as regards other nations, and his advice against political commitments abroad. Hence also his belief that “if we remain a united people under an efficient government the period is not distant when we may defy material injury from external annoyance.”49 But security is not possible without power, for “a nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.”50 Only if we are strong can we “choose peace or war as our interest guided by justice shall dictate.”51 But strength depends on union and, as Jay said, “on government, the arms, and the resources of the country.”52
汉密尔顿也清楚地认识到，只要欧洲列强在这片大陆上拥有大片领土，我们就永远无法真正安全。他反对将美洲领土从一个非美国列强转让给另一个非美国列强；因此，他支持购买路易斯安那，尽管这笔交易是由他的对手杰斐逊促成的。他似乎甚至预见到了后来被称为门罗主义的政策。<sup> 53</sup>他亲英，不仅因为他憎恶法国大革命的激进原则，还因为他认为我们实力太弱，无法与英国进行决定性的武力较量，而且我们过于依赖英国对我们日益增长的商业实力的容忍。
Hamilton saw clearly, too, that we would never be altogether secure while European powers had substantial territories on this continent. He was opposed to transfers of American territory from one non-American power to another; consequently, he favored the purchase of Louisiana, even though it was effected by his opponent Jefferson. He even seems to have visualized the policy that came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine.53 He was an Anglophile, not only because he detested the radical principles of Revolutionary France, but also because he believed that we were too weak for a definitive test of arms with Great Britain, as well as too dependent upon British toleration of our growing commercial strength.
汉密尔顿赞同宪法序言中关于更完善的联邦、共同防御、公共福利和自由保障密不可分的观点。在《联邦党人文集》第八篇中，他以深刻的理解和详尽的论述探讨了如何调和军事力量与基本政治自由这一微妙问题——这篇文章与亚当·斯密关于同一主题的一些观点有着惊人的相似之处。他还指出，政府仅仅拥有在战时征兵的权力是不够的；它必须在和平时期也保持充足的军队。否则，“我们将不得不把我们的财产和自由置于外国侵略者的摆布之下……因为我们害怕，由我们选举产生、受我们意志支配的统治者，可能会滥用维护自由所必需的手段，从而危及我们的自由。”<sup> 54</sup>此外，在战时，尽管美国人历来惧怕中央集权，但行政权力必须足以“指挥共同力量”。<sup> 55</sup>
Hamilton agreed with the preamble of the Constitution that a more perfect union, the common defense, the general welfare, and the preservation of liberty were inextricably interwoven. In No. 8 of The Federalist he wrote at length and with keen understanding on the delicate problem of reconciling military power with basic political liberties—a paper that shows striking resemblances to some of Adam Smith's ideas on the same subject. He pointed out also that it was not enough for a government to have authority to raise armies in time of war; it must maintain adequate forces in time of peace. Otherwise “we must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders…because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.”54 In time of war, furthermore, the power of the executive must be adequate for “the direction of the common strength” despite the traditional fear of Americans for centralized authority.55
与亚当·斯密一样，汉密尔顿也认为职业军队应当是国防的基础。正如他在《联邦党人文集》中所写： “只有同样正规且训练有素的军队才能成功地对付一支正规且训练有素的军队。经济性、稳定性和活力等因素都证实了这一点。在最近的战争中，美国民兵凭借其英勇事迹，多次为他们的功绩树立了永恒的丰碑；但他们中最勇敢的人也深知，无论他们的努力多么伟大和宝贵，国家的自由都不可能仅凭他们自身的力量而建立。战争，如同其他大多数事物一样，是一门需要通过勤奋、毅力、时间和实践来掌握和完善的科学。”<sup> 56</sup>
Like Adam Smith, Hamilton believed that the professional army should be the basis of national defense. As he wrote in The Federalist: “The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice.”56
十八世纪后期，人们普遍认为议会制政府，尤其是那些由商业阶层主导的议会制政府，比君主制政府更不容易卷入战争。汉密尔顿认为这种观点违背常识和已知的历史事实。他坚信，民众集会与其他政体一样（甚至可能更甚）容易受到“愤怒、怨恨、嫉妒、贪婪以及其他不正常和暴力倾向”的影响。他也不同意重农学派的观点，即——借用孟德斯鸠的话来说——“商业的自然结果是促进和平”。相反，在他看来，商业更有可能成为战争反复爆发的根源。 “迄今为止，商业除了改变战争的目标之外，难道没有带来其他影响吗？对财富的贪婪难道不和对权力或荣耀的贪婪一样，是一种支配欲和进取心吗？自从商业成为国家普遍体系以来，由商业动机引发的战争难道不和以前由领土或统治的贪婪引发的战争一样多吗？在许多情况下，商业精神难道没有为这两种欲望都提供了新的刺激吗？”他认为这些问题的答案显然是肯定的。战争无论以何种形式改变，都深深植根于人类社会，因此，人们无法相信和平与安全能够得到保障。57
During the latter part of the eighteenth century there was a widespread belief that parliamentary governments, especially those dominated by a commercial class, were less likely to be involved in war than monarchies. Hamilton thought any such opinion contrary to the dictates of common sense and the known facts of history. He was persuaded that popular assemblies were just as subject as other forms of government (perhaps more so) to “the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and other irregular and violent propensities.” He also disagreed with the view of the physiocrats that—to quote Montesquieu—“the natural result of commerce is to promote peace.” On the contrary, in his judgment, commerce was more likely to be a cause of recurring wars. “Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other?” He thought the answer to these questions clearly to be in the affirmative. War was too deeply rooted in human society, however changing its forms, to warrant belief in undisturbed peace and security.57
令人惊讶的是，托马斯·杰斐逊竟然同意汉密尔顿的观点，认为商业是战争的潜在根源。1785年8月，他从巴黎写信给约翰·杰伊说：“我们的人民一致认为，我们必须参与海洋的开发利用，他们根深蒂固的习惯促使他们要求海洋对他们保持开放，并要求奉行尽可能让他们充分利用海洋资源的政策。我认为，那些受托管理他们事务的人有责任顺应选民的明确选择；因此，我们应该在任何情况下（即使几乎肯定会引发战争）都维护他们在商品运输、捕鱼权以及其他海洋用途方面的平等权利。”<sup> 58 </sup> 杰斐逊将这种信念付诸实践，尽管他本人信奉和平主义，但他作为总统还是对巴巴里海盗发动了战争。
Surprisingly enough, Thomas Jefferson agreed with Hamilton that commerce was a potential cause of war. “Our people are decided in the opinion,” he wrote John Jay from Paris in August 1785, “that it is necessary for us to take a share in the occupation of the ocean, and their established habits induce them to require that the sea be kept open to them, and that that line of policy be pursued, which will render the use of that element to them as great as possible. I think it a duty in those entrusted with the administration of their affairs, to conform themselves to the decided choice of their constituents; and that therefore, we should, in every instance, [even at the cost of almost certain war] preserve an equality of right to them in the transportation of commodities, in the right of fishing, and in the other uses of the sea.”58 And Jefferson gave practical effect to this belief when, as President, he waged war against the Barbary pirates, his pacifist convictions to the contrary notwithstanding.
事实上，要进一步了解汉密尔顿的地位，我们可以观察一下他最激烈的对手杰斐逊在经济和国防问题上与他达成共识的程度。杰斐逊是自由贸易的拥护者，也是制造业的死敌。他憎恶汉密尔顿的保护主义政策。但在亲身经历了禁运以及目睹了1812年英法战争的后果之后，他勉强承认，强权政治的现实或许需要他改变之前的观点。正如他在1815年3月写给法国经济学家、自由贸易主义者让·巴蒂斯特·萨伊的信中所说：
Indeed, some measure of Hamilton's stature may be taken by observing further the extent to which Jefferson—his most bitter opponent—came to agree with him as regards economics and national defense. Jefferson was a free trader and an avowed enemy of manufactures. He detested Hamilton's protectionist program. But after his own experiences with the embargo and after observing the consequences of the War of 1812 with Great Britain, he reluctantly came to the conclusion that the realities of power politics might require a change in the views which he had previously held. As he wrote the French economist and free trader Jean Baptiste Say in March 1815:
……我当时（早些时候）曾说服自己，一个远离欧洲纷争的国家，只要避免冒犯其他列强，也不急于报复他们的冒犯，公正对待所有国家，忠实履行中立义务，尽一切友好义务，并通过贸易惠及他们的利益，那么，我认为，这样的国家就可以期望生活在和平之中，并仅仅将自己视为人类大家庭的一员；在这种情况下，它可以致力于生产自己最擅长的产品，并确保以和平的方式交换剩余产品，换取其他国家更有利可图的产品，就像法国各郡之间那样。但经验表明，持续的和平不仅取决于我们自身的公正和审慎，也取决于其他国家的公正和审慎；当被迫卷入战争时，截获必须跨越广阔海洋的贸易往来，便成为敌方手中的强大武器，而敌方又控制着海洋。除了战争带来的其他苦难之外，我们还面临着所有必需品的匮乏，包括武器和衣物，而这些必需品我们一直以来都依赖他人。因此，这一事实从根本上解决了这个问题：一个国家的首要利益究竟是利润还是生存？因此，我们已经成为了制造业的主体，其程度之高，令那些对此视而不见、只看到我们被英国自取灭亡的政策逼迫到依赖外国产品这一短时间的人难以置信。我们对所有出于审慎考虑而需要在国内生产的外国产品征收禁止性关税，并且每个爱国公民都决心不计价格差异，坚持使用任何可以在国内生产的外国产品，这确保了我们不会再次陷入对外国的依赖。59
…I had then [earlier] persuaded myself that a nation, distant as we are from the contentions of Europe, avoiding all offences to other powers, and not over-hasty in resenting offence from them, doing justice to all, faithfully fulfilling the duties of neutrality, performing all offices of amity, and administering to their interests by the benefits of our commerce, that such a nation, I say, might expect to live in peace, and consider itself merely as a member of the great family of mankind; that in such case it might devote itself to whatever it could best produce, secure of a peaceable exchange of surplus for what could be more advantageously furnished by others, as takes place between one county and another of France. But experience has shown that continued peace depends not merely on our own justice and prudence, but on that of others also; that when forced into war, the interception of exchanges which must be made across a wide ocean, becomes a powerful weapon in the hands of an enemy domineering over that element, and to the other distresses of war adds the want of all those necessaries for which we have permitted ourselves to be dependent on others, even arms and clothing. This fact, therefore, solves the question by reducing it to its ultimate form, whether profit or preservation is the first interest of a State? We are consequently become manufacturers to a degree incredible to those who do not see it, and who only consider the short period of time during which we have been driven to them by the suicidal policy of England. The prohibiting duties we lay on all articles of foreign manufacture which prudence requires us to establish at home, with the patriotic determination of every good citizen to use no foreign article which can be made within ourselves, without regard to difference of price, secures us against a relapse into foreign dependency.59
尽管杰斐逊从未完全支持汉密尔顿关于常备军的观点，但他最终还是认为，必须更加认真地思考如何维持一个基于普遍服役义务的军事体系。1813年，他在评论战争部长的一份回忆录时写信给詹姆斯·门罗说：“令人欣慰的是，我们现在正规军中像现代正规军那样不择手段的人物如此之少。但这更有力地证明了强制每个公民服役的必要性；古希腊和古罗马就是如此，每个自由州也必须如此……我们必须训练和分类所有男性公民，并将军事训练纳入大学教育的常规内容。只有做到这一点，我们才能确保安全。”<sup> 60</sup>
And although Jefferson never quite came to support Hamilton's views concerning a standing army, he did come around to believe that much more thought must be given to the maintenance of a military establishment based upon universal liability to service. Commenting on a memoir of the secretary of war, he wrote James Monroe in 1813: “It is more a subject of joy that we have so few of the desperate characters which compose modern regular armies. But it proves more forcibly the necessity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier; this was the case with the Greeks and Romans, and must be that of every free State…. We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can not be safe till this is done.”60
亚历山大·汉密尔顿作为经济学家很难被高估，或许只有一点例外——他对“幼稚产业”保护制造业论点的有效阐述。在这一论点中，他几乎把所有能说的都说了出来，而且表达得非常精辟。在他那份著名的报告中，这一部分得到了财政部助理部长滕奇·考克斯的积极协助。考克斯是费城学派的保护主义者之一，对汉密尔顿产生了显著的影响。然而，他呼吁发展美国工业的历史意义远大于其本身的价值，因为美国经济政策的架构正是建立在他所著述的基础之上。汉密尔顿将经济学、政治和治国之道融会贯通，堪称近代最伟大的政治家之一。事实上，他是美国的科尔伯特、皮特或俾斯麦。他的思想的力量和影响深深地烙印在后世美国人的心中，以至于在政府和工业领域，他的影响力仅次于杰斐逊，超过了同时代的任何一位政治家。<sup> 61</sup>
Alexander Hamilton can hardly be rated high as an economist, except, perhaps, in one respect—his effective statement of the “infant industry” argument for the protection of manufactures, in which he said with great effectiveness virtually all that can be said. In the formulation of this part of his famous report he had the active collaboration of Tench Coxe, his assistant secretary of the Treasury and one of the Philadelphia school of protectionists who had so marked an influence on Hamilton. But the historical significance of his plea for the development of American industry is greater than its inherent worth, for upon what he wrote was built the structure of American economic policy. As one who combines economics with politics and statecraft, however, Hamilton ranks with the great statesmen of modern times. He is, in fact, an American Colbert or Pitt or Bismarck. The power and effect of his ideas was indelibly impressed upon succeeding generations of Americans, so that in the realm of government and industry his influence is more marked than that of any of his contemporaries except Jefferson.61
V
V
历史的一大讽刺之处在于，汉密尔顿的政治对手杰斐逊和麦迪逊，在落实其保护主义和民族主义经济政策方面，比汉密尔顿本人做得更多。杰斐逊于1807年12月发起的禁运、《不交往法案》以及随后麦迪逊不情愿地卷入的与英国的战争，实际上关闭了几乎所有对外贸易渠道，使美国在制造业和军需品方面完全依赖自身资源。在1808年至1815年间，在经济困境和迫切需求下诞生的产业，正是1816年以及之后一系列关税法案中受到国家保护的萌芽阶段。
It is one of the ironies of history that Hamilton's political opponents Jefferson and Madison did more than Hamilton himself to give effect to his protectionist and nationalist views of economic policy. The embargo, which Jefferson initiated in December 1807, the Non-Intercourse Act, and the succeeding war with Great Britain, upon which Madison reluctantly embarked, had the practical result of closing virtually all avenues of foreign trade and making the United States dependent upon its own resources for manufactures and munitions of war. The industries that were born under the stress and necessity of the years 1808 to 1815 were the infants to which the nation gave protection in 1816 and in a succession of tariff acts thereafter.
尽管美国人仍在为拿破仑统治下的法国和英国对美国的侮辱耿耿于怀，但在政府保护制造业方面，他们似乎达成了相当一致的共识。麦迪逊和杰斐逊，以及1812年的“鹰派”克莱和卡尔霍恩，都站在了同一阵营。1816年1月，杰斐逊发表了一篇措辞极其激烈的谴责文章，抨击那些引用他以往自由贸易观点的人，称其为“幌子，掩盖他们企图让我们永远臣服于一个不友好的外国民族（英国）的背信弃义的企图”。他呼吁所有美国人“与我保持一致，在能够获得国产同等产品的情况下，无论价格差异如何，都不要购买任何外国产品”，因为“经验告诉我，制造业如今对于我们的独立和舒适生活都至关重要”。为了确保我们免受他国侵略，“我们现在必须将制造业与农业并驾齐驱”。62汉密尔顿本人也无法说得更多了。
While Americans were still smarting from the indignities inflicted upon the United States by Napoleonic France and Great Britain, there seemed to be substantial agreement upon governmental protection of manufactures. Madison and Jefferson, on the one hand, and the “war hawks” of 1812, Clay and Calhoun, on the other, found themselves in the same camp. Jefferson in January 1816 wrote an exceedingly bitter denunciation of those who cited his former free-trade views as “a stalking horse, to cover their disloyal propensities to keep us in eternal vassalage to a foreign and unfriendly people [the British].” He called upon all Americans to “keep pace with me in purchasing nothing foreign where an equivalent of domestic fabric can be obtained, without regard to difference of price,” for “experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort.” For the sake of securing independence from others, “we must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist.”62 Hamilton himself could not have said more.
但随着时间的推移，旧有的分歧再次出现，围绕保护主义的激烈斗争愈演愈烈，直到1846年的沃克关税法案才暂时平息了这一问题。弗里德里希·李斯特正是作为这场辩论的参与者出现在美国政坛，并提出了不仅在美国，而且在德国都产生了深远影响的经济理论。李斯特于1789年出生于符腾堡，在图宾根大学学习（他后来曾在此短暂担任政治学教授），并以关税同盟的积极拥护者身份步入政坛。他的自由主义和民族主义思想使他与家乡的反动政府关系紧张，最终导致他在1825年流亡美国，定居在宾夕法尼亚州雷丁的德裔社区。他成为《雷丁雄鹰报》的编辑，这是一份在宾夕法尼亚事务中颇具影响力的德裔美国人周刊。他对商业政策的兴趣很快使他与宾夕法尼亚制造业和机械艺术促进协会建立了联系。该协会由马修·凯里、查尔斯·贾里德·英格索尔和皮埃尔·杜·庞索等人领导，他们精力充沛、能力卓越。<sup>63</sup>虽然马修·凯里是一位更有效的宣传家，但李斯特凭借其更广泛的经济和政治经验进行写作，并在他旅居美国期间成为保护主义最重要的文学和学术宣传家。他受到宾夕法尼亚州实业家的推崇，会见了当时大多数美国著名政治家，并被邀请担任拉斐特学院院长。1832年，他最终返回德国，并以归化公民的身份，经安德鲁·杰克逊任命为美国领事官员。他曾任巴登-巴登领事（至 1834 年）、莱比锡领事（1834-1837 年）和斯图加特领事（1837-1845 年）。1846 年，他因病结束了公职生涯，最终自杀身亡。
But as time went on, the old cleavages reappeared, and a bitter struggle over protectionism raged until the Walker Tariff of 1846 temporarily settled the issue. It was as a participant in this debate that Friedrich List made his appearance on the American scene and formulated the economic theories that were to have influence not only in the United States but, even more, in Germany. List was born in Württemberg in 1789, studied at the University of Tübingen (where he later served briefly as professor of politics), and entered public life as an ardent exponent of the Zollverein. His liberal and nationalist ideas kept him in constant hot water with the reactionary government of his native state, leading finally to his exile in 1825, when he came to America and settled among the Pennsylvania Germans of Reading. He became the editor of the Reading Adler, a German-American weekly with an influential voice in the affairs of Pennsylvania. His interest in commercial policy soon brought him into contact with the Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Mechanic Arts, which was under the vigorous and able leadership of Mathew Carey, Charles Jared Ingersoll, and Pierre du Ponceau, among others.63 Although Mathew Carey was the more effective pamphleteer, List was able to write with a wider experience of economics and politics and became the foremost literary and scholarly propagandist of protectionism during his residence in America. He was lionized by Pennsylvania industrialists, met most of the prominent American statesmen of the day, was offered the presidency of Lafayette College, and, when he finally returned to Germany in 1832, did so as a naturalized citizen and as a member of the consular service of the United States by appointment of Andrew Jackson. He was consul at Baden-Baden until 1834, at Leipzig (1834–1837), and at Stuttgart (1837–1845). He died by his own hand in 1846, after illness had terminated his public service.
李斯特的思想历程很容易追溯。年轻时，他“目睹德国的民生跌至谷底”，便决定学习政治经济学，并向同胞传授如何通过国家政策“提升德国的福祉、文化和国力”。他最终得出结论：解决德国问题的关键在于民族性原则。 “我清楚地看到，两个高度文明的国家之间的自由竞争只有在两国工业发展水平几乎相当的情况下才能互惠互利；任何因不幸而落后于其他国家工业、商业和航海的国家……首先必须增强自身实力，才能与更先进的国家进行自由竞争。总之，我认识到了世界政治和政治经济学之间的区别。我认为德国必须废除国内关税，并通过对外国采取统一的商业政策，努力达到其他国家通过商业政策所取得的商业和工业发展水平。”
List's intellectual history is fairly easy to trace. In his youth, “seeing to what a low ebb the well-being of Germany had sunk,” he decided to study political economy and also to teach his fellow citizens the means, in terms of national policy, by which “the welfare, the culture, and the power of Germany might be promoted.” He came to the conclusion that the key to the solution of Germany's problems was the principle of nationality. “I saw clearly that free competition between two nations which are highly civilized can only be mutually beneficial in case both of them are in a nearly equal position of industrial development, and that any nation which owing to misfortunes is behind others in industry, commerce, and navigation…must first of all strengthen her own individual powers, in order to fit herself to enter into free competition with more advanced nations. In a word, I perceived the distinction between cosmopolitical64 and political economy. I felt that Germany must abolish her internal tariffs, and by the adoption of a common uniform commercial policy towards foreigners, strive to attain to the same degree of commercial and industrial development to which other nations have attained by means of their commercial policy.”
上述观点与重商主义的核心主题——通过经济政策实现国家统一和发展国家实力——的相似之处显而易见。
The similarity of the foregoing views to the central themes of mercantilism—national unification and the development of national power through economic policy—is obvious.
“后来我访问美国时，”李斯特继续说道，“我把所有的书都扔到一边——它们只会误导我。在那片现代土地上，你能读到的关于政治经济学的最佳著作就是真实的生活。在那里，你可以亲眼目睹荒野变成富饶强大的国家；在欧洲需要几个世纪才能实现的进步，在那里却在你眼前发生……我认真勤奋地研读了这本关于真实生活的书，并将其与我之前的研究、经验和思考进行了比较。最终的结果（我希望如此）是提出了一套体系，这套体系……并非建立在无底线的世界主义之上，而是建立在事物的本质、历史的教训以及各国的需求之上。”<sup> 65</sup>
“When afterwards I visited the United States,” continued List, “I cast all books aside—they would only have tended to deceive me. The best work on political economy which one can read in that modern land is actual life. There one may see wilderness grow into rich and mighty States; and progress which requires centuries in Europe, goes on there before one's eyes…. That book of actual life, I have earnestly and diligently studied, and compared with my previous studies, experience, and reflections. And the result has been (as I hope) the propounding of a system which…is not founded upon bottomless cosmopolitanism, but on the nature of things, on the lessons of history, and on the requirements of the nations.”65
有理由相信，李斯特的政治和经济观点并非如他所说，是在年轻时于德国形成，而是在他抵达美国之后才最终形成。他的《美国政治经济学纲要》（一系列写于1827年夏天、写给查尔斯·贾里德·英格索尔的信件，后以小册子形式印发，并由宾夕法尼亚州的保护主义者广泛散发）无疑包含了十四年后出版的《国家政治经济学体系》中所阐述的所有基本思想。《纲要》如此清晰地展现了汉密尔顿和马修·凯里的影响，以至于几乎可以肯定，美国的国情和思想在李斯特经济理论的发展中占据主导地位，甚至可以说是决定性的。<sup> 66</sup>
There is reason to believe that List formulated his views on politics and economics not, as he said, while a young man in Germany but only after his arrival in the United States. Certainly his Outlines of American Political Economy (a series of letters written to Charles Jared Ingersoll during the summer of 1827, subsequently printed in pamphlet form and widely distributed by the Pennsylvania protectionists) contains all the essential ideas elaborated in The National System of Political Economy, which appeared fourteen years later. The Outlines so clearly show the influence of Hamilton and Mathew Carey that there can be little reasonable doubt that American conditions and ideas were predominant, if not decisive, in the development of List's economic theories.66
然而，李斯特首先、其次、最重要的是，他是一个德国人。他始终是一个在美国郁郁不得志的流亡者，加入美国国籍的部分原因是为了逃避在故土上曾遭受的种种琐碎迫害。他钦佩并羡慕美国广袤的未开发资源、国家的青春活力、政治统一的成功、汉密尔顿的现实政治、杰克逊的澎湃民族主义、美国人对铁路和运河的热情，以及美国作为世界强国看似无限的未来可能性。67但所有这些都与他对祖国的希望和抱负息息相关，而他的祖国当时正处于悲剧性的分裂之中。他那个时代的德国甚至足以让像科尔伯特这样的人也感到沮丧。普鲁士，这个北德意志的主导邦国，在其领土内实行着超过67种不同的关税制度，近3000种商品需要缴纳关税，而征收这些关税的却是一支庞大的海关官员队伍；它的疆界蜿蜒近千英里，横跨德国其他地区，触及二十八个不同的州。尽管困难重重，李斯特依然怀揣着梦想，憧憬着一个崭新而强大的德国：通过内部自由贸易、外部保护以及全国性的邮政和铁路系统实现统一；最终，德国将崛起成为欧洲强国。他只亲眼见证了部分计划的实现。关税同盟的建立，其消除的内部贸易和政治统一障碍之多，“甚至超过了美国和法国革命政治风暴所清除的障碍”，部分归功于他孜孜不倦的努力。他对铁路建设的不懈宣传，在他精疲力竭、英年早逝之前，也取得了一些实质性的成果。他未能亲眼目睹1848年的革命、俾斯麦的胜利以及德意志帝国的最终建立。但随着时间的推移，人们越来越认识到，他是现代德国的缔造者之一。令人遗憾的是，他也是那个已成为文明世界噩梦的“大德意志”的早期倡导者之一。68
Nevertheless, List was first, last, and above all a German. He was always an unhappy exile in America and acquired American nationality partly to avoid the petty persecutions that had been his previous lot in his native land. He admired and envied the vast undeveloped resources of the United States, the youthful vigor of the country, its success in achieving political unification, the Realpolitik of Hamilton, the lusty nationalism of Jackson, the American enthusiasm for railways and canals, and the seemingly unlimited possibilities for the future of the United States as a world power.67 But all of these things he related to his hopes and aspirations for his own country, then so tragically disunited. The Germany of his day might well have frustrated the determination of even a Colbert. Prussia, the dominant North German state, had more than sixty-seven different tariffs within its own territories, with almost three thousand articles subject to duties, to be collected by an army of customs officials; it had boundaries meandering almost a thousand miles through the rest of Germany, touching twenty-eight different states. Notwithstanding the seemingly insuperable difficulties, List dreamed dreams and saw visions of a new and greater Germany, unified by internal free trade, external protection, and a national system of posts and railways; and, finally, rising to the stature of a great European power. He lived to see only part of his program realized. The Zollverein, which destroyed more obstacles to internal commerce and political unity “than had been swept away by the political whirlwinds of the American and French Revolutions,” was partly the result of his untiring efforts. His ceaseless propaganda for railways had some material results before it wore him out and hastened his death. He did not live to see the revolutions of 1848, the successes of Bismarck, and the final creation of a German empire. But that he is one of the makers of modern Germany has come to be more and more appreciated with the passage of time. And he is also, alas, one of the earlier exponents of that Greater Germany which has become the nightmare of the civilized world.68
六年级
VI
李斯特的政治和经济政策的首要关注点是权力，尽管他将权力与福利联系起来。在这方面，尽管他一再否认，但他实际上是在回归重商主义。他写道：“一个国家是由个人组成的独立社会，这些个人拥有共同的政府、共同的法律、权利、制度、利益、共同的历史和荣耀，共同的国防和对其权利、财富和生命的保障，构成一个自由独立的整体，在对待其他独立实体时，只遵循自身利益的指引，并拥有权力来规范构成该整体的个人的利益，以便在内部创造最大的共同福利，并在对待其他国家时创造最大的安全。”
The primary concern of List's policies, both political and economic, was power, even though he linked power with welfare. In this respect, despite all his denials to the contrary, he was reverting to mercantilism. “A nation,” he wrote, “is a separate society of individuals, who, possessing common government, common laws, rights, institutions, interests, common history, and glory, common defense and security of their rights, riches and lives, constitute one body, free and independent, following only the dictates of its interest, as regards other independent bodies, and possessing power to regulate the interests of the individuals, constituting that body, in order to create the greatest quantity of common welfare in the interior and the greatest quantity of security as regards other nations.
他继续说道：“这个机构的经济目标不仅是个人和世界政治经济学中的财富，更是权力和财富，因为国家财富的增加和保障依赖于国家权力，而国家权力的增加和保障又依赖于国家财富。因此，其主要原则不仅是经济的，也是政治的。个人可能非常富有；但如果国家没有能力保护他们，那么国家和个人都可能在一天之内失去他们几代人积累的财富，以及他们的权利、自由和独立。”
“The object of the economy of this body,” he continued, “is not only wealth as in individual and cosmopolitical economy, but power and wealth, because national wealth is increased and secured by national power, as national power is increased and secured by national wealth. Its leading principles are therefore not only economical, but political too. The individuals may be very wealthy; but if the nation possesses no power to protect them, it and they may lose in one day the wealth they gathered during ages, and their rights, freedom, and independence too.”
此外，“正如权力保障财富，财富增进权力，权力和财富同样受益于国家范围内农业、商业和制造业的和谐发展。若缺乏这种和谐，一个国家就永远无法强大或富裕。” 因此，生产力是国家安全的关键。“先生，政府不仅有权，而且有义务促进一切能够增加国家财富和权力的事物，如果个人无法实现这一目标的话。因此，政府有责任通过海军保护商业，因为商人无法保护自己；因此，政府有责任通过航海法规保护航运贸易，因为航运贸易支撑着海军力量，正如海军力量保护着航运贸易一样；因此，航运利益和商业必须依靠防波堤来支撑——农业和其他所有行业必须依靠收费公路、桥梁、运河和铁路来支撑——新发明必须依靠专利法来保护——因此，如果外国资本和技术阻碍了个人从事制造业，就必须通过保护性关税来发展制造业。” 69
Furthermore, “as power secures wealth, and wealth increases power, so are power and wealth, in equal parts, benefited by a harmonious state of agriculture, commerce and manufactures within the limits of the country. In the absence of this harmony, a nation is never powerful or wealthy.” Hence productive power is the key to national security. “Government, sir has not only the right, but it is its duty, to promote every thing which may increase the wealth and power of the nation, if this object cannot be effected by individuals. So it is its duty to guard commerce by a navy, because the merchants cannot protect themselves; so it is its duty to protect the carrying trade by navigation laws, because carrying trade supports naval power, as naval power protects carrying trade; so the shipping interest and commerce must be supported by breakwaters—agriculture and every other industry by turnpikes, bridges, canals and rail-roads—new inventions by patent laws—so manufactures must be raised by protecting duties, if foreign capital and skill prevent individuals from undertaking them.”69
如果没有“国家的团结和力量”，财富毫无用处。因此，现代德国由于未能实现政治统一或“强劲而统一的商业政策”，在很长一段时间里都无法维持其文明应有的地位，反而“沦为他人的附属品（如同殖民地）”。德国曾多次“因与外国的自由竞争而濒临破产，并由此警醒世人，在当今世界形势下，每个大国都必须首先寻求自身持续繁荣和独立的保障，而这保障就在于独立、均衡地发展自身的实力和资源。”
Wealth is of no avail without the “unity and power of the nation.” Thus modern Germany, failing to achieve either political unification or a “vigorous and united commercial policy,” was for many generations unable to maintain the position among the nations to which its civilization entitled it and was “made a convenience of (like a colony).” Germany was several times “brought to the brink of ruin by free competition with foreigners, and thereby admonished of the fact that under the present conditions of the world every great nation must seek the guarantees of its continued prosperity and independence, before all other things, in the independent and uniform development of its own powers and resources.”
关税和其他旨在发展此类实力和资源的限制性手段，与其说是空想家的发明，不如说是利益多元化以及各国追求独立或绝对优势的必然结果——换言之，是战争体系的产物。“战争或战争的可能性使得建立制造业实力成为任何一流国家的必要条件。”正如一个国家在现代世界“解散军队、摧毁舰队、拆毁堡垒”是愚蠢至极一样，一个国家如果将经济政策建立在自由贸易学派臆想中那种永恒和平与世界联邦的不切实际的假设之上，那将是灾难性的。一个国家的战争能力以其创造财富的能力来衡量，而国家统一和保护主义的目标正是尽可能地发展生产力。保护主义政策或许会在一段时间内——但仅仅是一段时间内——导致生活水平下降，因为关税必然导致物价上涨。然而，那些认为消费品价格低廉是衡量对外贸易利弊的重要考量因素的人，“却很少关心国家的实力、荣誉或荣耀”。他们必须意识到，受保护的产业是德国人民不可分割的一部分。“谁会因为知道自己买的衬衫便宜了百分之四十而感到安慰，即使他失去了一条胳膊呢？” 71
Tariffs and other restrictive devices designed to develop such powers and resources” are not so much the inventions of mere speculative minds, as the natural consequence of the diversity of interests, and of the strivings of nations after independence or overpowering ascendancy”—in other words, the war system. “War or the very possibility of war makes the establishment of a manufacturing power an indispensable requirement for any nation of first rank.” Just as it would be the height of folly for a state to “disband its armies, destroy its fleets, and demolish its fortresses” in the modern world, so it would be ruinous for a nation to base its economic policy on an unwarranted assumption of a state of perpetual peace and world federation that exists only in the minds of the free-trade school.70 The ability of a nation to wage war is measured in terms of its power to produce wealth, and it is the greatest possible development of productive power that is the goal of national unification and protectionism. Protectionist policies may for a time—but only for a time—result in a lower standard of living, because tariffs necessarily involve higher prices. But those who argue that cheapness of consumers’ goods is a major consideration in weighing the advantages of foreign commerce “trouble themselves but little about the power, the honour, or the glory of the nation.” They must realize that the protected industries are an organic part of the German people. “And who would be consoled for the loss of an arm by knowing that he had nevertheless bought his shirts forty per cent cheaper?”71
生产力越强，国家在外交关系中就越强大，在战争时期就越独立。因此，经济原则不能脱离其政治含义：“在技术和机械科学对战争方法产生如此巨大影响的时代，在所有战争行动都如此依赖于国家财政状况的时代，在成功防御在很大程度上取决于国民的贫富、智慧、活力或冷漠，取决于国民的同情心是完全属于祖国还是部分属于外国，取决于国民能够召集多少保卫国家的战士——在这样的时代，比以往任何时候都更需要从政治角度来评估制造业的价值。” 72
The greater the productive power, the greater the strength of the nation in its foreign relations and the greater its independence in time of war. Economic principles, therefore, cannot be divorced from their political implications: “At a time where technical and mechanical science exercise such immense influence on the methods of warfare, where all warlike operations depend so much on the condition of the national revenue, where successful defence greatly depends on the questions, whether the mass of the nation is rich or poor, intelligent or stupid, energetic or sunk in apathy; whether its sympathies are given exclusively to the fatherland or partly to foreign countries; whether it can muster many or but few defenders of the country—at such a time, more than ever before, must the value of manufactures be estimated from a political point of view.”72
李斯特对影响军事潜力的各种因素有着敏锐的认识。他写道：“各国的现状，是历代先民所有发现、发明、改进、完善和努力积累的结果；……每个国家的发展水平，都取决于它如何善用前人的成就，并在此基础上通过自身的发展而不断提升。在这个过程中，它必须充分发挥自身领土的自然条件、面积和地理位置、人口和政治实力，尽可能全面、均衡地开发境内所有财富来源，并将其道德、知识、商业和政治影响力扩展到欠发达国家，尤其是在世界事务中。”<sup> 73</sup>
List had a keen appreciation of the factors that enter into the military potential. “The present state of the nations,” he wrote, “is the result of the accumulation of all discoveries, inventions, improvements, perfections, and exertions of all generations which have lived before us;…and every separate nation is productive only in the proportion in which it has known how to appropriate these attainments of former generations and to increase them by its own acquirements, in which the natural capabilities of its territory, its extent and geographical position, its population and political power, have been able to develop as completely and symmetrically as possible all sources of wealth within its boundaries, and to extend its moral, intellectual, commercial, and political influence over less advanced nations and especially over the affairs of the world.”73
从任何此类信念出发，很容易就会走向在欧洲大陆扩张领土和在海外进行殖民扩张的政策，而李斯特毫不犹豫地迈出了这一步。他想要一个统一的德国，其疆域从莱茵河延伸到维斯瓦河，从巴尔干半岛延伸到波罗的海。他认为，“庞大的人口和拥有多样化自然资源的广袤领土是正常民族的必要条件；它们是一个民族精神结构、物质发展和政治力量的根本……一个人口和领土受限的民族，尤其是一个拥有独特语言的民族，其文学发展只能是残缺的，促进艺术和科学发展的机构也只能是残缺的。一个小国永远无法充分开发其多样化的生产资源。” 因此，小国维持独立将极其困难，它们只能依靠大国的容忍和结盟才能生存，而结盟则意味着对国家主权的根本性牺牲。74
From any such beliefs it is an easy step toward a policy of territorial expansion on the continent of Europe and colonial expansion overseas, and List did not hesitate to take the step. He wanted a unified Germany to hold sway from the Rhine to the Vistula and from the Balkans to the Baltic. He believed that “a large population and an extensive territory endowed with diversified natural resources are essential requirements of normal nationality; they are the fundamentals of the spiritual structure of a people, as well as of its material development and political power…. A nation restricted in population and territory, especially if it has its distinctive language, can possess only a crippled literature, only crippled institutions for promoting the arts and sciences. A small state can never bring to the fullest state of development its diversified productive resources.” Hence small nations will maintain their independence with the greatest difficulty and can exist only by tolerance of larger states and by alliances that involve a fundamental sacrifice of national sovereignty.74
上述内容与当今德国对“生存空间”（Lebensraum）的定义并无太大差异，这一点从李斯特的“大德意志”纲领中便可看出。他主张将丹麦、荷兰、瑞士和比利时并入统一的德国——前三个国家是基于种族和语言因素，以及经济和战略考量。至于丹麦、比利时和荷兰，之所以需要它们，是因为德国必须控制德国各河流的入海口，以及从莱茵河口到东普鲁士的整个海岸线，从而确保德意志民族“拥有其目前所需的一切，即渔业和海军力量、海上贸易和殖民地”。此外，吞并这三个国家，连同瑞士，将确保德国拥有至关重要的海洋和山脉自然边界，这在经济和军事上都至关重要。德国还应开始和平地渗透多瑙河地区和欧洲土耳其。这些地区是德国的天然边界，即腹地，德国“有不可估量的利益去确保那里的安全与秩序得到牢固的维护” 。76
The foregoing is not very different from present-day German definitions of Lebensraum, as will be obvious from List's program for a Greater Germany. He advocated the inclusion in a unified Germany of Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium—the first three on grounds of race and language, as well as on grounds of economics and strategy. As regards Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands, they were required because it was essential that Germany control the mouths of German rivers, plus the entire seacoast from the mouth of the Rhine to East Prussia, thus assuring the German nation “what it is now in need of, namely fisheries and naval power, maritime commerce and colonies.” The acquisition of these three countries, together with Switzerland, furthermore, would assure Germany the natural boundaries of seas and mountains that are essential on both economic and military grounds.75 Germany should likewise begin peaceful penetration of the Danubian territories and European Turkey. These areas were Germany's natural frontier, or Hinterland, and it had “an immeasurable interest that security and order should be firmly established” there.76
一个国家应当“拥有对欠发达国家的文明产生有益影响的能力，并能利用自身剩余人口及其精神和物质资本建立殖民地，孕育新的国家”。当一个国家无法建立殖民地时，“所有从该国流向未开化国家的剩余人口、精神和物质资源，都将流失到其他民族手中，从而损害其自身的文学、文明和工业”。德国移民美国就是一个典型的例子。“即便移居北美的移民再怎么富裕，又有什么用呢？就其个人关系而言，他们永远失去了德国民族性，而且德国也只能从他们的物质生产中获得微不足道的回报。如果有人认为居住在美国内陆的德国人能够维持德语，或者认为过一段时间后有可能在那里建立德意志国家，那纯粹是痴人说梦。” 因此，德国必须在东南欧以及中南美洲拥有自己的殖民地，这是不可避免的结论。而这些殖民地应当得到国家所有资源的支持，包括国家资助的殖民公司和“强有力的德国领事和外交体系” 。77
A nation should “possess the power of beneficially affecting the civilisation of less advanced nations, and by means of its own surplus population and of its mental and material capital to found colonies and beget new nations.” When a nation cannot establish colonies, “all surplus population, mental and material means, which flows from such a nation to uncultivated countries, is lost to its own literature, civilisation, and industry, and goes to the benefit of other nationalities.” This is notoriously true as regards German emigration to the United States. “What good is it if the emigrants to North America become ever so prosperous? In their personal relation they are lost ever to German nationality, and also from their material production Germany can expect only unimportant fruits. It is a pure delusion if people think that the German language can be maintained by the Germans who live in the interior of the United States, or that after a time it may be possible to establish German states there.” Hence the conclusion is inescapable that Germany must have colonies of its own, in southeastern Europe and in Central and South America. And such colonies should be supported by all the resources of the nation, including state-sponsored colonization companies and “a vigorous German consular and diplomatic system.”77
李斯特非常清楚，他的欧洲大陆扩张和海外殖民地计划很可能无法在不发动战争的情况下实现。他在一篇抨击《泰晤士报》的激烈论战文章中写道，德国民族制度的倡导者们意识到，未来可能会爆发民族战争，但这反而让他们更加坚定地动员德国人民的道德和物质资源，以支持民族经济的发展。78
List knew full well that his program for Continental expansion and overseas colonies could not, in all probability, be realized without war. The advocates of a national system for Germany were aware, he wrote in a bitter polemic against the Times of London, that the future might bring national wars but they were therefore the more determined to mobilize the moral and material resources of the German nation in support of a national economy.78
当然，阻碍德国野心的正是英国。它是权力平衡政策的主要倡导者，该政策旨在动员“弱国制衡强国的扩张”。英国凭借制造业的发展，几乎稳坐帝国霸主之位，无人能及。因此，“如果其他欧洲国家也想参与开垦荒地、教化野蛮民族（或曾经文明但如今又重归野蛮的国家）的有利可图之业，就必须首先发展自身的制造业、商船队和海军力量。如果它们在这些努力中受到英国制造业、商业和海军霸权的阻碍，那么联合起来便是将这种不合理的野心转化为合理野心的唯一途径。” 79
It was England, of course, which stood in the way of German ambitions. It was the leading exponent of the balance-of-power policy that mobilized “the less powerful to impose a check on the encroachments of the more powerful.” England stood virtually unchallenged in its position as an imperial power, which it had achieved by the development of manufactures. Hence, “if the other European nations wish also to partake of the profitable business of cultivating waste territories and civilising barbarous nations, or nations once civilised but which are again sunk in barbarism, they must commence with the development of their own internal manufacturing powers, of their mercantile marine, and of their naval power. And should they be hindered in these endeavours by England's manufacturing, commercial, and naval supremacy, in the union of their powers lies the only means of reducing such unreasonable pretensions to reasonable ones.”79
同样，英国也像巨人般屹立于世界海上航线之上，使得其他任何国家都难以获得实现其命运所必需的海上力量。李斯特在一篇论述英国对海洋的控制的文章中写道（这篇文章堪称马汉海军上将的杰作）：
It was England, also, which stood like a colossus astride the sea lanes of the world, making it difficult for any other nation to achieve the sea power that was necessary to the fulfillment of its destiny. In a statement on British control of the seas which would do credit to Admiral Mahan, List wrote:
英国已掌握了所有海洋的钥匙，并在每个国家都安插了哨兵：对德国人，是黑尔戈兰岛；对法国人，是根西岛和泽西岛；对北美洲居民，是新斯科舍省和百慕大群岛；对中美洲，是牙买加岛；对所有地中海沿岸国家，是直布罗陀、马耳他和爱奥尼亚群岛。她占据了通往印度航线上所有重要的战略要地，唯独苏伊士地峡除外，她正竭力夺取该地峡；她通过直布罗陀控制地中海，通过亚丁控制红海，通过布什尔和卡拉奇控制波斯湾。她只需再夺取达达尼尔海峡、海峡以及苏伊士和巴拿马地峡，便可随心所欲地开启和关闭所有海洋和所有海上通道。80
England has got into her possession the keys of every sea, and placed a sentry over every nation: over the Germans, Heligoland; over the French, Guernsey and Jersey; over the inhabitants of North America, Nova Scotia and the Bermudas; over Central America, the island of Jamaica; over all countries bordering on the Mediterranean, Gibralter, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. She possesses every important strategical position on both the routes to India with the exception of the Isthmus of Suez, which she is striving to acquire; she dominates the Mediterranean by means of Gibraltar, the Red Sea by Aden, and the Persian Gulf by Bushire and Karachi. She needs only the further acquisition of the Dardanelles, the Sound, and the Isthmuses of Suez and Panama, in order to be able to open and close at her pleasure every sea and every maritime highway.80
鉴于英国压倒性的海军、商业和殖民实力，任何一个国家若没有其他国家的强力援助，都无法成功挑战它。“海上实力较弱的国家只有联合起来，才能在海上与英国抗衡”；因此，每个这样的国家“都与所有其他国家的海军力量的维护和繁荣息息相关”；而且，它们应该共同“组建一支统一的海军力量”，其目的之一就是防止英国对世界海上航线（尤其是地中海航线）的绝对控制。81明智的做法是，欧洲大陆各国组成一个欧洲集团来制衡英国的势力：“如果我们仔细考虑欧洲大陆各国与英国海上霸权之间巨大的共同利益，我们就会确信，对这些国家而言，没有什么比联合更重要，也没有什么比欧洲大陆战争更有害。上个世纪的历史也告诉我们，欧洲大陆列强之间发动的每一场战争，其无一例外地都促进了英国的工业、财富、航海、殖民地以及其在岛屿上的霸权。” 82
In view of Great Britain's overwhelming naval, commercial, and colonial strength, no single nation could successfully challenge it without powerful assistance from others. “The nations which are less powerful at sea can only match England at sea by uniting their own naval power”; hence every such nation “has an interest in the maintenance and prosperity of the naval power of all other nations”; and, together, they should “constitute themselves into one united naval power” for the purpose, among other things, of preventing undisputed control by Great Britain of the sea lanes of the world (especially those of the Mediterranean).81 The part of wisdom would be for the Continental nations to form a European bloc to check British power: “If we only consider the enormous interests which the nations of the Continent have in common, as opposed to the English maritime supremacy, we shall be led to the conviction that nothing is so necessary to these nations as union, and nothing is so ruinous to them as Continental wars. The history of the last century also teaches us that every war which the powers of the Continent have waged against one another has had for its invariable result to increase the industry, the wealth, the navigation, the colonial possessions, and the power of the insular supremacy [of Britain].”82
但李斯特的战略思维从未局限于狭隘的地域，甚至也从未局限于大陆范围。他目光长远地展望未来，预见到有一天，飘扬在海洋上的将是星条旗，而不是米字旗；届时，世界其他国家必须采取有效措施来遏制美国的实力。
But List's strategical thinking never had parochial, or even continental, limits. Gazing far into the future, he saw the day when the Stars and Stripes, not the Union Jack, would wave over the seas, and when effective measures would have to be taken by the other nations of the earth to curb the power of the United States.
正是那些将英国推向如今崇高地位的因素，也将（很可能在下一个世纪）将美利坚合众国提升到远超英国的工业、财富和实力水平，正如英国目前超越荷兰的程度一样。顺其自然，美国人口将在这一时期增长到数亿；他们将把人口、制度、文明和精神传播到整个中美洲和南美洲，正如他们最近将这些传播到邻近的墨西哥省份一样。联邦将囊括所有这些广袤的领土，数亿人口将开发这片在面积和自然资源方面都远远超过欧洲大陆的大陆的资源。西方世界的海军力量将超越英国，正如其海岸线和河流的规模和长度远超英国一样。
The same causes which have raised Great Britain to her present exalted position, will (probably in the course of the next century) raise the United States of America to a degree of industry, wealth, and power, which will surpass the position in which England stands, as far as at present England excels little Holland. In the natural course of things the United States will increase their population within that period to hundreds of millions of souls; they will diffuse their population, their institutions, their civilisation, and their spirit over the whole of Central and South America, just as they have recently diffused them over the neighboring Mexican province. The Federal Union will comprise all these immense territories, a population of several hundred millions of people will develop the resources of a continent which infinitely exceeds the continent of Europe in extent and in natural wealth. The naval power of the western world will surpass that of Great Britain, as greatly as its coasts and rivers exceed those of Britain in extent and magnitude.
因此，在不久的将来，如今迫使法国和德国建立大陆联盟以对抗英国霸权的自然需要，也将迫使英国建立欧洲联盟以对抗美国的霸权。届时，英国将被迫寻求并最终在欧洲列强的领导下获得保护、安全和补偿，以对抗美国的统治，并弥补其失去的霸权。
Thus in a not very distant future the natural necessity which now imposes on the French and Germans the necessity of establishing a Continental alliance against the British supremacy, will impose on the British the necessity of establishing a European coalition against the supremacy of America. Then will Great Britain be compelled to seek and to find in the leadership of the united powers of Europe protection, security, and compensation against the predominance of America, and an equivalent for her lost supremacy.
因此，对英国而言，尽早学会顺从是好事；通过及时放弃某些东西来赢得欧洲大陆列强的友谊；尽早习惯于在平等国家中位居首位的观念。83
It is therefore good for England that she should practise resignation betimes, that she should by timely renunciations gain the friendship of European Continental powers, that she should accustom herself betimes to the idea of being only the first among equals.83
弗里德里希·李斯特对英国的看法是心理学研究的一个有趣案例，或许更能体现德国心理学的精髓。李斯特极其钦佩和羡慕英国及其自由制度，鲜少有人能像他那样对英国给予如此雄辩的赞誉。另一方面，他又对英国充满恐惧甚至憎恨。他本人患有被迫害妄想症——源于他曾遭受德国官方的种种琐碎骚扰——因此，他认为英国积极阻挠关税同盟和其他德国统一进程也就不足为奇了。他生性固执，与英国人——尤其是早已去世的亚当·斯密及其在世的追随者——展开了激烈的争论。然而，在他生命的最后阶段，他却徒劳地前往英国，试图为英德联盟铺平道路。他为此准备了一份详尽的备忘录，并呈递给了阿尔伯特亲王、罗伯特·皮尔爵士（首相）、克拉伦登勋爵（外交大臣）和普鲁士国王。普鲁士驻伦敦大使德·本森和一些英国人士也鼓励他这样做。但皮尔无法同意这项计划，李斯特于秋季返回德国，身心俱疲——他几乎就要自杀了，最终于1846年11月30日自杀身亡。84
Friedrich List's views on England are an interesting study in psychology, perhaps more especially of German psychology. List enormously admired and envied Britain and British liberal institutions, and few men of any nationality have ever paid Britain more eloquent tributes. On the other hand, he feared and even hated Britain. He himself suffered from a persecution complex—arising out of petty ways in which he was harassed by official Germany—and it was therefore not surprising that he believed that Britain was actively engaged in frustrating the Zollverein and other steps toward German unification. Always cantankerous, he became involved in particularly vitriolic controversies with Englishmen—especially, of course, with the long-deceased Adam Smith and his living followers. At the very end of his life, on the other hand, he went to England in the vain hope of paving the way for an Anglo-German alliance. He prepared an elaborate memorandum on the subject which he submitted to Prince Albert, Sir Robert Peel (the prime minister), Lord Clarendon (the foreign secretary), and the King of Prussia. He had encouragement from de Bunsen, the Prussian ambassador in London, and from some British sources. But Peel could not accede to the plan, and List returned to Germany in the autumn broken in health and in spirit—on the verge of the suicide that occurred November 30, 1846.84
李斯特的备忘录中关于英德联盟的价值和条件虽有一些不切实际的幻想，但它仍然展现了他对19世纪中期两国所面临的一些战略现实的敏锐洞察。首先，李斯特预见到了半个多世纪后哈尔福德·麦金德爵士所阐明的观点：英国的海上霸权并非永恒不变。他认为，蒸汽铁路和蒸汽航运的发展可能会使欧洲大陆列强获得当时英国所不具备的相对于不列颠群岛的优势。其他国家，特别是美国的崛起，有可能威胁到英国的海上控制权；一旦失去海上控制权，英国凭借其岛屿地理位置所享有的独特优势将成为严重的劣势。李斯特还预见到了拉丁民族和斯拉夫民族将通过法俄联盟而联合起来，并认为英国和德国应该通过领导日耳曼民族来制衡这种联盟。他深信，法俄联军不仅会威胁英国在欧洲和东方的利益，而且几乎肯定会击垮德国。英国需要一个欧洲大陆陆上强国的帮助，而德国则乐于接受一个近海强国的增援。德国对英国的要求仅仅是同情和理解，以及支持统一后的德国实行适度的保护性关税。在李斯特看来，这对于英国而言，是为德国的友谊付出的微不足道的代价。李斯特预见到，任何这样的让步都会遭到英国工业界既得利益者的抵制，但英国必须认识到，这样做将巩固甚至扩大其世界强国的地位。
There are some fantasies in List's memorandum on the value and the conditions of an Anglo-German alliance, but it nevertheless reveals an acute appreciation of some of the strategic realities facing both countries in the middle of the nineteenth century. To begin with, List foresaw what Sir Halford Mackinder was to elucidate more than half a century later, that there was nothing eternal about British maritime supremacy. The development of steam railways and steam navigation, he thought, might give the Continental powers advantages in relation to the British Isles that they did not then possess. The rising power of other nations, especially the United States, held the possibility that control of the seas might be threatened; without control of the seas, the unique advantages that Britain enjoyed from its insular position would become serious liabilities. List foresaw also the union of the Latin and Slavic races, through a Franco-Russian alliance, and believed that Britain and Germany should counterbalance any such combination by taking the lead of the Germanic peoples. He was convinced that Franco-Russian power would not only threaten Britain's interests in Europe and the east but would almost certainly crush Germany. Britain could use the help of a Continental land power and Germany would welcome reinforcement from an insular sea power. All that Germany asked of Britain was sympathetic understanding and support for a moderate protective tariff in unified Germany, which seemed to List a small price for Britain to pay for German friendship. Any such concession, List foresaw, would be resisted by the vested interests of British industry but, against these, Britain must set the fact that its position as a world power would be fortified and even extended.
李斯特和其他许多人一样，未能找到促成英德团结的方案，原因在于，无论好坏，两国从未就何为真正的利益共同体达成共识，而且诸多道德和心理因素也阻碍了彼此的理解。此外，他还无法在短短几个月内消除多年来他通过强硬的反英宣传所造成的损害。
List failed, as so many others have failed, to find a formula that would lead to Anglo-German solidarity because, for better or worse, there has never been any agreement between the two nations on what constitutes a true community of interest and because so many moral and psychological factors have stood in the way of mutual understanding. He failed, also, because he could not undo in a few months the harm that he had done over the years by strident anti-British propaganda.
第七章
VII
李斯特对现代战略的最大贡献在于他对铁路如何影响军事力量平衡的详尽论述。他最初对铁路产生兴趣是在美国居住期间，当时他是斯库尔基尔航运、铁路和煤炭公司（现今雷丁铁路系统的前身）的发起人之一。此后，铁路成为他毕生挚爱的事业之一。他关于铁路的著述足足有两卷，并在其文集索引卷中占据了近两页篇幅。1835年至1836年间，他创办了《铁路杂志》（Das Eisenbahn Journal），致力于推动德国的铁路建设。他对铁路事业的投入和精力超过了其他任何一项事业，因为他敏锐地预见到，一个最终融入真正国家体系的铁路网络，将成为巩固德国统一的力量之一。
The greatest single contribution that List made to modern strategy was his elaborate discussion of the influence of railways upon the shifting balance of military power. He first became interested in railways during his residence in America, when he was one of the promoters of the Schuylkill Navigation, Railroad and Coal Company, a forerunner of the present Reading System. Thereafter, railways were one of the passions of his life. His writings on railways fill two complete volumes and almost two pages of the index volume of his collected works. During the years 1835 and 1836 he published Das Eisenbahn Journal, a magazine devoted to forwarding railway construction in Germany. To no other single cause did he give more devotion or more energy, for he saw, correctly, that a network of railways, ultimately incorporated in a truly national system, would be one of the forces that would cement German unification.
他对铁路经济影响的关注并不令人意外，尽管他比大多数同时代的人更具远见。但他对蒸汽运输对德国战略意义的理解却令人惊讶，无论从哪个客观标准来看都堪称卓越。在铁路出现之前，德国的战略地位是欧洲最薄弱的，因此也成为了整个欧洲大陆的传统战场。李斯特比任何人都更早地意识到，铁路将使德国的地理位置成为其强大的优势，而不是其军事弱点的主要原因之一。通过加强政治统一并建立覆盖全国的铁路交通网络，德国可以成为欧洲中心地带的防御堡垒。快速动员、迅速将部队从国家中心调往边远地区，以及铁路“内陆线”运输的其他显而易见的优势，对德国而言比对任何其他欧洲国家都更为有利。简而言之，李斯特写道，一个完善的铁路系统可以将整个国家变成一座巨大的堡垒，其全部作战兵力都能轻易守卫，且所需开支最小，对国家经济生活的干扰也最小。战后，军队也能同样便捷迅速地返回家园。基于这些原因以及其他因素，李斯特预见到，他在1833年为德国构想的铁路网——其基本构成与今天的帝国铁路网（Reichsbahnen）相似——将使统一的德国军队在遭受入侵时，能够将部队从国内任何地点调往边境，从而成倍增强其防御能力，并阻止两百多年来持续不断的入侵。防御能力增强十倍后，如果德国发动进攻战争（李斯特认为这种可能性不大），其进攻能力也将增强十倍。85
His interest in the economic effects of railways was to be expected, although he was much more foresighted than most of his contemporaries. But his understanding of the strategic implications to Germany of steam transportation is surprising and by any objective standards quite remarkable. Before the advent of the railway the strategic position of Germany was the weakest in Europe, with the result that it was the traditional battleground of the entire Continent. List saw sooner than anyone else that the railway would make the geographical situation of Germany a source of great strength, instead of one of the primary causes of its military weakness. With political unification fortified by a nation-wide link of railway communications, Germany could be made into a defensive bastion in the very heart of Europe. Speed of mobilization, the rapidity with which troops could be moved from the center of the country to its periphery, and the other obvious advantages of “interior lines” of rail transport would be of greater relative advantage to Germany than to any other European country. In a word, List wrote, a perfect railway system would transform the whole territory of the nation into one great fortress, which could be readily defended by its entire combatant manpower, with a minimum of expenditure and with the least disorganization of the economic life of the country. And after the conclusion of the war, the return of the troops to their homes could be brought about with equal facility and expedition. For all of these reasons, and others, List foresaw that the network of railway lines that he visualized for Germany in 1833—which is substantially that of the present Reichsbahnen—would enable the army of a unified Germany, in the event of invasion, to move troops from any point in the country to the frontiers in such a way as to multiply many fold its defensive potential and thus prevent the recurrent invasions that had been going on for over two hundred years. Ten times stronger on the defense, Germany also would be ten times stronger on the attack, should it undertake offensive war—which List thought unlikely.85
李斯特在呼吁德国修建铁路时语气急迫。他写道：“邻国每比我们早修建一英里铁路，每多拥有一英里铁路，就意味着它比我们更有优势。” 因此，“我们是否应该利用进步带来的新型防御武器，已不再是我们所能决定的，正如我们的先辈们当初是否应该扛起步枪而不是弓箭一样。”<sup> 86</sup>考虑到以上所有论述都写于美国内战之前，而内战才是铁路军事价值首次得到确凿证明的先见之明，这确实展现了李斯特非凡的远见。
There was a note of urgency in List's pleas for railway construction in Germany. “Every mile of railway which a neighboring nation finishes sooner than we, each mile more of railway it possesses, gives it an advantage over us,” he wrote. Hence “it is just as little left in our hands to determine whether we shall make use of the new defensive weapons given us by the march of progress, as it was left to our forefathers to determine whether they should shoulder the rifle instead of the bow and arrow.”86 When it is considered that all of the foregoing was written before the American Civil War gave the first definitive proof of the military value of railways, it shows truly remarkable prescience.
利斯特提出的铁路和轮船航线，1820–1844 年
LIST'S PROPOSED RAILWAY AND STEAMSHIP LINES, 1820–1844
李斯特认为铁路能够使欧洲各国缩减军队规模，这种想法是错误的；恰恰相反，正如后来的普法战争所表明的那样，铁路简化了后勤问题，使得规模更大的军队及其数量惊人的弹药和补给得以调动，其规模之大，超乎以往任何人的想象。李斯特认为铁路建设会使进攻方付出高昂的代价，从而降低战争风险，这种想法也是错误的。但他关于铁路轨道和路权比许多其他永久性设施更不易被军事破坏的论断是正确的——德国对英国的轰炸以及英美对欧洲大陆的空袭，都充分证明了这一点。87
List was wrong in thinking that railways would enable European states to reduce the size of their armies; on the contrary, as the Franco-Prussian War subsequently showed, the railway simplified logistical problems and permitted the movement of larger armies, together with their astronomical quantities of munitions and supplies, than anyone had theretofore believed possible. List was also wrong in thinking that the construction of railways might render attack so costly to the attacker that the danger of war would be mitigated. But he was right in asserting that railway trackage and right of way were relatively less vulnerable to military destruction than many other permanent installations—a fact that has most recently been demonstrated in the German bombings of England and in Anglo-American aerial attacks on the Continent.87
甚至在德国拥有铁路系统之前，李斯特的梦想就已远远超越了国界，延伸至欧洲其他地区乃至亚洲。事实上，他似乎是巴格达铁路构想的最初提出者。在他提出的英德联盟方案中，他建议通过修建从英吉利海峡延伸至阿拉伯海的铁路，改善英国与印度和远东的交通联系。他写道，尼罗河和红海应该像拿破仑时代莱茵河和易北河那样靠近不列颠群岛；孟买和加尔各答应该像里斯本和加的斯那样便捷。这可以通过将规划中的比利时-德国铁路系统延伸至威尼斯来实现，然后经由巴尔干半岛和安纳托利亚到达幼发拉底河谷和波斯湾，最终抵达孟买。一条通往叙利亚的支线将把主干线与开罗和苏丹连接起来。一条电报线路将与铁路平行，这样唐宁街就能像与泽西岛和根西岛一样便捷地与东印度群岛保持联系。李斯特还设想修建一条从莫斯科到中国的横贯大陆铁路。88在他看来，这些项目与当时美国正在讨论的从大西洋到太平洋的铁路计划相比，似乎并不更具雄心或胆识。
Even before Germany itself had a railway system, List's dreams went far beyond its borders into the rest of Europe and into Asia. In fact, he seems to have been the originator of the Baghdad Railway idea. In his project for an Anglo-German alliance he proposed that British communications with India and the Far East should be improved by railway lines extending from the English Channel to the Arabian Sea. The Nile and the Red Sea, he wrote, should be brought as close to the British Isles as the Rhine and Elbe were at the time of Napoleon; Bombay and Calcutta should be made as accessible as Lisbon and Cadiz. This could be accomplished by the extension of the projected Belgian-German railway systems to Venice, thence via the Balkans and Anatolia to the Euphrates Valley and the Persian Gulf and, finally, to Bombay. A Syrian spur would link the main line with Cairo and the Sudan. A telegraph line would parallel the railway, so that Downing Street would be in as easy touch with the East Indies as with Jersey and Guernsey. List also visualized a transcontinental line from Moscow to China.88 None of these projects seemed to him any more ambitious or daring than the plans then being discussed in America for railways from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
为了确保拟建铁路沿线地区的政治安全，德国和英国应结成有效的联盟，明确各自的势力范围。德国对整个欧洲土耳其地区的统治扩张，将阻止任何敌视大英帝国的势力干涉——李斯特经常夸张地表示，“七八千万”德国人就足以构成局势所需的保障。另一方面，英国应控制整个小亚细亚、埃及、中亚和印度——这片广袤的领土足以抵消一个新兴的美国世界强权带来的威胁。89
To ensure political security for the territories through which the proposed railways would pass, Germany and Great Britain should enter into an effective alliance defining their respective spheres of interest. The expansion of German rule over all of European Turkey would prevent interference by any power hostile to the British Empire—speaking in hyperbole, as he so often did, List said that “seventy or eighty millions” of Germans would constitute the guarantee that the situation required. Great Britain, on the other hand, should control all of Asia Minor, Egypt, Central Asia, and India—a vast territory that would more than compensate for the threat of a nascent American world power.89
李斯特关于德国控制欧洲土耳其的提议，当然与他希望看到大规模移民涌入多瑙河地区和巴尔干半岛密切相关。事实上，他所有的铁路建设计划都与他对统一而强大的德国的热情有着某种联系。他写道：“德国铁路系统和关税同盟就像连体婴。它们同时诞生，在物质上紧密相连，拥有同一个精神和灵魂，彼此扶持，并为同一个伟大的目标而奋斗：将德意志各部族统一为一个伟大、文明、富裕、强大且不可侵犯的德意志民族。如果没有关税同盟，德国铁路系统甚至都不会被讨论，更不用说建造了。只有借助德国铁路系统，德国的社会经济才有可能走向民族伟大，也只有通过这种民族伟大，铁路系统才能充分发挥其潜力。” 90
List's proposal concerning German control of European Turkey was, of course, closely connected with his desire to see large-scale emigration to the Danubian region and the Balkans. Indeed, all of his plans for railway construction were in some way linked with his passion for a unified and greater Germany. “A German railway system and the Zollverein,” he wrote, “are Siamese twins. Born at the same time, physically knit together, of one spirit and one soul, they support each other and strive for the same great aim: the unification of the German tribes into one great, cultivated, wealthy, powerful, and inviolable German nation. Without the Zollverein no German railway system would ever have been even discussed, let alone constructed. Only with the aid of a German railway system is it possible for the social economy of the Germans to rise to national greatness, and only through such national greatness can a system of railways realize its full poentialities.”90
第八
VIII
1846年李斯特去世时，他毕生致力于的事业鲜有成功的希望。同年，英国废除了《谷物法》，美国通过了《沃克关税法》，这严重损害了自给自足和保护主义的原则，实际上是朝着自由贸易方向迈出的一步。德国的工业化进程缓慢，铁路系统仍停留在蓝图阶段。莱茵河以东地区依然保守，分离主义势力根深蒂固，德国的统一遥不可及。诚然，李斯特将关税同盟的辉煌成就带入了另一个世界，他理应为此获得高度赞誉。但关税同盟在日后德意志帝国的建立中所扮演的重要角色，仍需历史学家们进一步发掘。
When List died in 1846, few of the causes to which he devoted his life were within reasonable hope of success. In 1846 Britain repealed the Corn Laws and the United States adopted the Walker Tariff, which seriously compromised the principles of autarky and protectionism and were, indeed, a step in the direction of free trade. Industrialization had proceeded but slowly in Germany and a German railway system existed only in blueprints. Conservatism and separatism continued to rule east of the Rhine, with the result that German national unification was not quite within reach. To be sure, List carried with him into another world the comfort of the Zollverein, a solid achievement for which he could justly claim a large share of credit. But it remained for historians to appreciate fully the importance of the Zollverein in the creation of the later German Empire.
然而，李斯特的精神并未消逝。在他不幸去世两年后，革命运动席卷德国，燃起了德国人民在自由主义指导下建立民族国家的希望——李斯特生前定会对此表示热烈欢迎，因为他坚信自由主义、中产阶级、宪政政府，并致力于充分保障个人自由。然而，1848年的自由主义革命最终失败，取而代之的是铁腕统治。 “保守派和传统派的德国民族主义者能够也确实接受了李斯特的经济学理论，同时拒绝了他的政治主张（自由主义和个人权利）；越来越多的德国实业家，无论其民族主义或政治倾向如何，都预见到李斯特的民族纲领能够为他们摆脱英国竞争的困境带来令人欣喜的慰藉。即使是后来一代的自由民族主义者，尽管他们越来越倾向于民族主义而非自由主义，也逐渐认同了李斯特的观点。到1880年，在俾斯麦名义上的领导下，德国民族国家实际上已经走上了弗里德里希·李斯特开辟的经济道路。”<sup> 91</sup>
Nevertheless, List's soul went marching on. Two years after his tragic death revolutionary movements swept Germany, giving birth to the hope that the German people would become a national state under liberal auspices—an event that List would have welcomed with all his heart, for he was an ardent believer in liberal, middle-class, constitutional government with adequate guarantees of individual liberty. But the liberal revolutions of 1848 failed and gave way to the policy of blood and iron. “German nationalists of conservative and traditionalist stamp could and did accept the economic teachings of List, while rejecting his political counsels [of liberalism and individual rights]; and an increasing number of German industrialists, regardless of nationalist or political bias, foresaw delightful solace for the woes of British competition in List's national programme. Even liberal nationalists of an ensuing generation, growing more in the grace of nationalism than in that of liberalism, came gradually to agree with List's contentions. By 1880 the German national state, under Bismarck's nominal guidance, was actually treading the economic path which had been blazed by Friedrich List.”91
事实上，俾斯麦及其继任者在经济民族主义和自给自足方面走得比李斯特更远。李斯特一直反对对食品征收进口关税。但德意志帝国时期发展起来的关税体系是一个包罗万象的计划，它既保护了容克地主，也保护了工业家，从而使他们团结起来支持经济民族主义、军国主义、海军主义和殖民主义。无论李斯特对粮食关税有何看法，他恐怕都难以反对卡普里维总理于1891年12月10日在国会发表的声明的精神和目的：“当一个国家无法依靠自身供应来源时，它的生存就岌岌可危。我坚信，我们不能放弃足够的粮食生产，以便在紧急情况下养活我们不断增长的人口……尤其是在战争时期……我认为，德国依靠自身农业比依赖第三方在战争时期提供的不确定援助更为明智。我坚信，在未来的战争中，军队和国家的粮食供应可能发挥绝对决定性的作用。” 92
In fact, Bismarck and his successors went even farther than List would have gone in the direction of economic nationalism and autarky. List had always opposed import duties upon foodstuffs. But the German tariff system as it developed under the empire was an all-inclusive plan giving protection both to the Junkers and to the industrialists, who were thus drawn together in support of economic nationalism, militarism, navalism, and colonialism. Whatever List might have thought of tariffs on grain, he could hardly have objected to the spirit and purposes of chancellor Caprivi's statement to the Reichstag, December 10, 1891: “The existence of the State is at stake when it is not in a position to depend upon its own sources of supply. It is my conviction that we cannot afford to dispense with such a production of corn as would be sufficient in an emergency to feed our increasing population…in the event of war…. I regard it as the better policy that Germany should rely upon its own agriculture than that it should trust to the uncertain calculation of help from a third party in the event of war. It is my unshakable conviction that in a future war the feeding of the army and the country may play an absolutely decisive part.”92
第二帝国的许多经济政策都基于这样一个假设：德国迟早会卷入一场保卫国家、赢得国际地位的战争。为了应对这种情况，德国政治家们认为，他们应该依靠德国自身的实力，而不是依赖邻国的善意或海外通讯的不确定性。德皇的政治家们或许对李斯特的思想有所曲解，但如果李斯特还活着，他肯定能完全理解他们所说的话语。而且，尽管他会反对希特勒的种族主义思想和希姆莱对个人权利的漠视，但他也会理解纳粹国防经济的自给自足动机。
Much of the economic policy of the Second Reich was based upon the assumption that sooner or later Germany would be involved in a war to defend the realm and to win a recognized place in the sun. In preparation for such an eventuality German statesmen believed that they should depend upon Germany's inherent strength rather than upon the good will of neighbors or the uncertainty of overseas communications. The Kaiser's statesmen may have been guilty of some distortion of List's ideas, but had List lived he would have understood full well the language that they spoke. And he also would have understood the autarkical motivation of the Wehrwirtschaft of the Nazis, however much he would have disapproved of Hitler's racial ideas and Himmler's disregard of individual rights.
不幸的是，李斯特也为泛日耳曼主义和国家社会主义的某些其他基本概念奠定了基础，例如生存空间、向东扩张、海军和殖民扩张、边界的不稳定性、海外德意志人对祖国的永久效忠，以及建立一个对抗英美势力的大陆集团的必要性。
List also, unhappily, laid the foundation for certain other basic concepts of Pan-Germanism and National Socialism, such as Lebensraum, the Drang nach Osten, naval and colonial expansion, the impermanency of frontiers, the permanent allegiance of the Auslanddeutsche to the fatherland, and the desirability of a Continental bloc against Anglo-American power.
李斯特和汉密尔顿一样，是现代世界重商主义复兴的领军人物。无论十七、十八世纪的重商主义有何优点，其现代版本在一个高度易燃易爆的世界中都如同一股煽动性的力量。新重商主义之所以更加危险，是因为它在我们高度组织化、紧密一体化的社会中运作。它与战争体系密不可分。它甚至达到了令旧重商主义者都感到羞愧的程度，它利用国家权力进一步强化国家权力。所有旧有的手段都被一系列新手段所强化，例如配额、抵制、外汇管制、配给制、囤积物资和补贴。从1870年开始的五十年间，经济民族主义催生了极权主义经济、极权主义国家和极权主义战争，它们之间密不可分，以至于我们无法分辨孰因孰果。以国家安全的名义，政治权力已经扩展到人类活动的几乎所有领域。93
List, like Hamilton, was a leading figure in the revival of mercantilism in the modern world. Whatever may have been the virtues of mercantilism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its modern counterpart has been an incendiary force in a highly inflammable and explosive world. The new mercantilism is the more dangerous because it operates in our highly organized and closely integrated society. It is warp and woof with the war system. To a degree that would have shamed the mercantilists of old, it has enlisted the power of the state for the further enhancement of state power. All of the old, familiar devices have been reinforced by a host of new ones in the form of quotas, boycotts, exchange controls, rationing, stockpiles, and subsidies. Out of the economic nationalism of the fifty years beginning in 1870 have come totalitarian economics, the totalitarian state, and totalitarian war, which are so inextricably interconnected that it has become impossible to tell which is cause and which is effect. In the name of national security, political authority has been extended into almost every domain of human activity.93
这一切几乎不可避免地导致了1914年和1939年的两次世界大战。要理解这两次战争，就必须将其置于19世纪欧洲的权力概念框架下进行考察。亚当·斯密、亚历山大·汉密尔顿和弗里德里希·李斯特的思想深受其英国、美国和德国国籍的影响。但在某些治国理政的基本原则上，他们的观点却惊人地相似。他们都明白军事力量建立在经济基础之上，并且各自倡导一种最能满足本国需求的国民经济体系。世界因新重商主义而陷入困境，这未必是他们的过错。只要各国继续信奉不受约束的民族主义和主权，它们就会继续依赖任何它们认为最能保障独立和安全的措施。
As an almost inescapable consequence of all this came the explosions of 1914 and 1939. One can understand them only with reference to the power concepts of nineteenth-century Europe. The thinking of Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friedrich List was conditioned by the fact that they were, respectively, British, American, and German. But in certain fundamentals of statecraft their views were surprisingly alike. They all understood that military power is built upon economic foundations and each of them advocated a national system of economics that would best meet the needs of his own country. That the world has come to grief as a result of neomercantilism is not necessarily their fault. For so long as nations continue to place their faith in unbridled nationalism and unrestricted sovereignty they will continue to rely upon whatever measures will, in their judgment, best guarantee independence and security.
1 《联邦党人文集》（1787 年），第 8 篇（纽约，现代文库版，1937 年，E.M. Earle 作序），第 42 页。所有页码均出自此版本。全文亦收录于汉密尔顿文集第 11 卷和第 12 卷，见脚注 30。
1 The Federalist (1787), No. 8 (New York, Modern Library edition, 1937, with an introduction by E. M. Earle), 42. All page references will be to this edition. The full text also is in vols. 11 and 12 of Hamilton's collected Works, cited in footnote 30.
2亚当·斯密，《国富论》。初版于1776年。为方便起见，我使用了现代文库版（马克斯·勒纳作序），该版本是埃德温·坎南版（伦敦，1904年）的重印本。此处使用的短语出自第四卷第二章，第431页。
2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Originally published in 1776. For convenience I have used the Modern Library edition (introduction by Max Lerner), which is a reprint of the edition of Edwin Cannan (London, 1904). The phrase here used is to be found in bk. 4, ch. 2., p. 431.
3弗里德里希·李斯特，《国家政治经济学体系》（斯图加特，1841年），载《著作、言论、书信集》，10卷（柏林，1927-1935年），第6卷（阿图尔·索默编辑，柏林，1930年），第99-100页。这是李斯特著作的最佳版本，由德意志科学院合作出版。引文出自桑普森·S·劳埃德的英译本《国家政治经济学体系》 （伦敦，1885年），第37-38页。以下均以英译本中的“国家体系”为准
3 Friedrich List, Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie (Stuttgart, 1841) in Schriften, Reden, Briefe, 10 vols. (Berlin, 1927–3 5), vol. 6 (ed. Artur Sommer, Berlin, 1930), 99–100. This is the best edition of List's works, published in cooperation with the Deutsche Akademie. The quotation is from the English translation by Sampson S. Lloyd, The National System of Political Economy (London, 1885), 37–38. Hereafter cited as National System from the English translation.
4.鼓励人口增长的典型措施之一是禁止圈占牧场，转而扩大粮食作物的耕地面积。例如，1548 年英国的一项公告指出，“保卫王国……必须依靠人力和众多忠诚的臣民，而不是依靠羊群和牲畜。”引自 Eli Heckscher，《重商主义》，M. Shapiro 译，两卷本（伦敦，1935 年），第二卷，第 44 页。
4 A typical measure for encouraging population was prohibition of enclosure of pasture lands in favor of the extension of lands under cultivation of foodstuffs. A proclamation of 1548 in England, for example, stated that “the surety…of the Realm must be defended against the enemy with force of men, and the multitude of true subjects, not with flocks of sheep and droves of beasts.” Cited by Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, trans. M. Shapiro, 2 vols. (London, 1935), 2:44.
5同上，2:21, 24。
5 Ibid., 2:21, 24.
6这是古斯塔夫·施莫勒 (Gustav Schmoller) 《重商体系及其历史意义》(The Mercantile System and It Historical Significance)的释义，而不是引文，译。 WJ Ashley（伦敦和纽约，1896 年），72。德文文本收录于Das Merkantilsystem in seiner historischen Bedeutung 中，首次发表于1884 年的Schmollers Jahrbuch。
6 This is a paraphrase, not a quotation, from Gustav Schmoller, The Mercantile System and Its Historical Significance, trans. W. J. Ashley (London and New York, 1896), 72. The German text is in Das Merkantilsystem in seiner historischen Bedeutung, first published in Schmollers Jahrbuch for 1884.
7 List，国家系统，293。
7 List, National System, 293.
8亚当·斯密，《国富论》，460-461页。早在七年战争之前，大卫·休谟在一篇关于贸易嫉妒的文章中就已与所有重商主义思想背道而驰，他说道：“我不仅作为一个人，而且作为一个英国臣民，都祈祷德国、西班牙、意大利乃至法国的商业繁荣发展。”理由是，如果各国彼此之间的政策更加“宽容和仁慈”，所有国家都会繁荣昌盛。（大卫·休谟，《道德、政治和文学论文集》，T.H.格林和T.H.格罗斯编[伦敦，1898年]，第一卷，348页。）
8 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 460–461. Even before the Seven Years' War, David Hume in an essay on the Jealousy of Trade had gone counter to all mercantilist ideas in saying, “not only as a man, but as a British subject, I pray for the flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy, and even France itself,” on the ground that all nations would flourish were their policies toward one another more “enlarged and benevolent.” (David Hume, Essays Moral, Political and Literary, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose [London, 1898], 1:348.)
9关于特许公司，参见史密斯，《国富论》，第 595-606 页。
9 On the chartered companies, see Smith, Wealth of Nations, 595–606.
10同上，460。
10 Ibid., 460.
11关于战争基金的讨论见同书，第 4 卷，第 1 章，特别是第 398-415 页。此处引用的内容出自第 399、409、679 页。
11 The discussion concerning war chests is in ibid., bk. 4, ch. 1, especially pp. 398–415. The quotations here given are from pp. 399, 409, 679.
12同上，878-79。历史事实几乎不支持政府或人民在开战前仔细计算战争成本的论点。
12 Ibid., 878–79. The facts of history hardly support the thesis that governments or peoples carefully calculate the costs of war in advance of hostilities.
13同上，第5卷，第1章，第1部分，第653-669页。引文见第653页。赫克舍尔在其著作《重商主义》中充分理解了斯密在多大程度上接受了重商主义的一些基本原则。斯密的仰慕者威廉·坎宁安在其鸿篇巨著《近代英国工商业的发展》（两卷本，剑桥，1882年）中似乎未能完全理解斯密的观点，他认为斯密“在论述财富时并未直接提及权力”；斯密当然不会认同坎宁安的说法，即“民族竞争和民族权力终究是卑劣之物”，并且对财富的研究必须与这些“低级目标”脱钩（第一卷，第29页，第593-594页，尤其参见第594页的注释2）。斯密在七年战争结束后不久，正值法国大革命和美国革命前夕写作，他对权力政治的现实有着敏锐的认识；而坎宁安写作时已近一个世纪和平的中期，战争似乎遥不可及，他对局势的看法则截然不同。斯密的死敌李斯特和坎宁安一样，都严重误解了真相；他把斯密追随者的观点与斯密本人的观点混淆了，这一点稍后将要阐明。
13 Ibid., bk. 5, ch. 1, pt. 1, pp. 653–69. Quotation on p. 653. Heckscher, Mercantilism, understood fully the extent to which Smith accepted some of the basic tenets of mercantilism. Smith's admirer William Cunningham in his monumental Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1882) seems to have missed the whole truth when he said that Smith treated “wealth without direct reference to power”; certainly Smith would not have subscribed to Cunningham's statement that “national rivalries and national power are mean things after all” and that the study of wealth had to be dissociated from these “lower aims” (1:xxix, 593–94, especially note 2, p. 594). Smith, writing shortly after the Seven Years' War and on the eve of the French and American revolutions, was keenly aware of the realities of power politics; Cunningham, writing almost midway in a century of peace, when war seemed remote, saw the situation differently. Smith's bitter opponent List missed the truth just as badly as Cunningham; he mistook the views of Smith's followers from those of Smith himself, as will presently be shown.
14引自 GS Graham，《海上力量与英属北美》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1941 年），第 15 页。该书对《航海条例》在英国治国理政中的地位进行了精彩的论述，值得参考。尤其参见第 7-15 页。
14 Cited in G. S. Graham, Sea Power and British North America (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), 15. This work should be consulted for an excellent discussion of the place of the Navigation Acts in British statecraft. See especially pp. 7–15.
15史密斯，《国富论》，第 4 卷，第 2 章，第 430-31 页。斜体字为后加。
15 Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 4, ch. 2, pp. 430–31. Italics added.
16同上，第 4 卷，第 5 章，第 484-85 页。
16 Ibid., bk. 4, ch. 5, pp. 484–85.
17同上，545–46，609–10。484，注39。
17 Ibid., 545–46, 609–10. 484, n. 39.
18同上，429、434、484-89（尤其是注39）。
18 Ibid., 429, 434, 484–89 (esp. n. 39).
19列表，国家系统，295-96。参见 Schmoller 的类似但不那么具有报复性的评论， Mercantile System，79-80。最近的一位纳粹批评家在同样的方面也值得咨询：PF Schröder，“Wehrwirtschaftliches in Adam Smiths Werk über den Volkwohlstand”， Schmollers Jahrbuch，63，第 1 期。 3（1939），1-16。
19 List, National System, 295–96. See a similar, but less vindictive, comment by Schmoller, Mercantile System, 79–80. A recent Nazi critic is also worth consulting in this same connection: P. F. Schröder, “Wehrwirtschaftliches in Adam Smiths Werk über den Volkwohlstand,” Schmollers Jahrbuch, 63, no. 3 (1939), 1–16.
20弗朗西斯·培根，《论王国和阶层的真正伟大》，载《弗朗西斯·培根作品集》第7 卷，詹姆斯·斯佩丁编辑（波士顿，1840 年），第 7 卷，第 176 页及以下。
20 Francis Bacon, “Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,” no. 19 of Essays Civil and Moral, in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding (Boston, 1840), 7:176 ff.
21亚当·斯密，《国富论》，第5卷，第1章，第738-740页
21 Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 5, ch 1, pp. 738–40
22参见上文亨利·格尔拉克的文章。关于斯密对常备军的看法，请参阅已故哈佛大学查尔斯·J·布洛克教授的一篇特别有价值的文章《亚当·斯密对国防的看法》，载于《军事史学家和经济学家》 1（1917 年），第 249-257 页。
22 See the essay by Henry Guerlac, above. For further material on Smith's convictions regarding the standing army, see a particularly valuable article by the late Professor Charles J. Bullock of Harvard, “Adam Smith's Views upon National Defense,” Military Historian and Economist 1 (1917), 249–57.
23 Thomas Macaulay，《英格兰史》，Riverside 版（波士顿，无日期），4:186–87。
23 Thomas Macaulay, History of England, Riverside edition (Boston, n.d.), 4:186–87.
24亚当·斯密，《论正义、警察、税收和武器》，埃德温·坎南编辑（牛津，1896 年；纽约，1956 年重印），根据学生 1763 年的笔记整理而成。
24 Adam Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, ed. Edwin Cannan (Oxford, 1896; repr. New York, 1956) from notes taken by a student in 1763.
25 Francis Hutcheson，《道德哲学简明导论》，2 卷（格拉斯哥，1764 年），第 2 卷，第 348-49 页。
25 Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, 2 vols. (Glasgow, 1764), 2:348–49.
26斯密，《国富论》，第 5 卷，第 1 章，第 658-659 页。此外，参见《讲义》第4 部分“论武器”，前一章是对该讲义的阐述。
26 Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 5, ch. 1, pp. 658–659. In addition, see Lectures, part 4, “Of Arms,” of which the foregoing chapter is an elaboration.
27斯密显然错误地认为，七年战争的“全部费用”以及此前战争的费用都应该由殖民地承担。关于殖民地的讨论见《国富论》第四卷第七章和第八章。
27 Smith was clearly wrong in saying that the “whole expence” of the Seven Years' War, as well as the cost of the wars which preceded it, should be charged to the colonies. The discussion on colonies is in Wealth of Nations, bk. 4, chaps. 7 and 8.
28同上，581-82页。将斯密关于殖民地的观点与杰里米·边沁的观点进行比较很有意思，边沁是斯密最忠实的追随者之一。边沁同意保卫殖民地的代价过高，但他更进一步，主张英国放弃其现有殖民地，并放弃一切获取新殖民地的尝试。《国际法原理》，载于约翰·鲍林编，《著作集》（爱丁堡，1843年），第2卷，论文4，尤其见第548-550页。
28 Ibid., 581–82. It is interesting to compare Smith's views on colonies with those of Jeremy Bentham, one of the Smith's most faithful followers. Bentham agreed that the defense of colonies costs too much, but went farther and advocated the relinquishment by Britain of its existing colonies and the abandonment of all attempts to acquire new ones. Principles of International Law, in Works, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh, 1843), vol. 2, essay 4, esp. pp. 548–50.
29史密斯，《国富论》，587-88。
29 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 587–88.
30汉密尔顿的军事文件收录于他的全集《作品集》第 6 卷和第 7 卷中，由亨利·卡伯特·洛奇编辑，联邦版，共 12 卷（纽约和伦敦，1904 年）。
30 Hamilton's military papers are to be found in volumes 6 and 7 of his collected Works, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge, Federal Edition, 12 vols. (New York and London, 1904).
31请参阅艾伦·内文斯在《国家人物传记辞典》中关于汉密尔顿的文章。
31 See the article by Allan Nevins on Hamilton in the Dictionary of National Biography.
32这一事实由W.S. Culbertson的精彩论文《亚历山大·汉密尔顿》（纽黑文，1911年）第90、107-108、127-129页证实。另见亨利·卡伯特·洛奇的著作，第3卷，第417页，以及爱德华·G. Bourne的文章《亚历山大·汉密尔顿与亚当·斯密》，载于《经济学季刊》第8卷（1894年4月），第328-344页。关于滕奇·考克斯的作用，参见注释61。
32 This fact is established by W. S. Culbertson's admirable essay Alexander Hamilton (New Haven, 1911), pp. 90, 107–108, 127–29. See also Henry Cabot Lodge in Works, 3:417, and the article “Alexander Hamilton and Adam Smith,” by Edward G. Bourne, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 8 (April 1894), 328–44. Concerning the role of Tench Coxe see note 61.
33威廉·诺茨，《弗里德里希·李斯特在美国》，《美国经济评论》，16（1926年6月），240-265页。诺茨博士是上述李斯特著作集（见注释3）的编辑之一。他为该著作集第二卷（柏林，1931年）撰写的精彩导论（第3-61页）是对李斯特在美国的岁月及其对其整个职业生涯意义的最佳阐述。关于汉密尔顿对李斯特的影响，参见C.梅策尔在《国家科学手册》（1923年）第4卷第21页发表的关于汉密尔顿的文章，以及M.E.赫斯特的《弗里德里希·李斯特传》（伦敦，1909年），112-118页。
33 William Notz, “Friedrich List m America,” American Economic Review, 16 (June 1926), 240–65. Dr. Notz was one of the editors of the above-mentioned edition of the works of List (see note 3). His admirable introductory essay to vol. 2 (Berlin, 1931), pp. 3–61, is the best account of List's years in America and their significance to List's career as a whole. For estimates of Hamilton's influence on List see C. Meitzel, article on Hamilton in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, (1923), 4:21, and M. E. Hirst, Life of Friedrich List (London, 1909), 112–18.
34 WG Sumner，《亚历山大·汉密尔顿》（纽约，1890 年），第 175 页。
34 W. G. Sumner, Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1890), 175.
35参见本文的引言部分。
35 See introductory section of this essay.
36 Hamilton，“制造业报告”，载《著作集》4:70–198，尤其是第 71–73 页、100–101 页。该报告还收录于 Samuel McKee, Jr. 编辑的优秀文集《亚历山大·汉密尔顿论公共信贷、商业和金融论文集》（纽约，1934 年）。
36 Hamilton, “Report on Manufactures,” in Works, 4:70–198, esp. pp. 71–73, 100–101. The report also is included in an admirably edited volume by Samuel McKee, Jr., Papers on Public Credit, Commerce, and Finance by Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1934).
37 Hamilton，“制造商报告”，73，100-102。
37 Hamilton, “Report on Manufacturers,” 73, 100–102.
38同上，第 70 页。与华盛顿在 1790 年向国会发表的第一份年度咨文中的声明进行比较，该咨文指出，“自由人民的安全和利益要求他们促进那些有助于使他们在基本物资，特别是军事物资方面独立于他人的制造业发展。”
38 Ibid., 70. Compare with the statement in Washington's first annual message to Congress in 1790 that “the safety and interest [of a free people] require that they should promote such manufactories as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly military supplies.”
39 Hamilton，“制造商报告”，135-36。
39 Hamilton, “Report on Manufacturers,” 135–36.
40同上，105-106。
40 Ibid., 105–106.
41同上，167-68页。这并非汉密尔顿第一次就军需品提出此类建议。1783年，他作为国会特别委员会主席建议，“应当将确保我们能够获得战争中所有必需品作为一项严肃的政策目标”，并为此目的建造公共武器和军需品制造厂（同上，467页，475页）。
41 Ibid., 167–68. This is not the first occasion on which Hamilton made such a proposal as regards munitions. As chairman of a special committee of Congress he suggested in 1783 that “it ought to be made a serious object of policy, to be able to supply ourselves with all the articles of first necessity in war” and that to this end public manufactories of arms and munitions should be constructed (ibid., 467, 475).
42关于正文及其他所有细节，请参阅 Victor H. Paltsits的《华盛顿告别演说》（纽约，1935 年），尤其是第 184-185 页。华盛顿在多大程度上采纳了汉密尔顿在这方面的论点，可通过比较上述草稿和最终手稿（同上，第 143-144 页）来显而易见。为清晰起见，我在正文中添加了标点符号。
42 For the text and all other details see Victor H. Paltsits, Washington's Farewell Address (New York, 1935), esp. pp. 184–85. The extent to which Washington adopted Hamilton's argument in this respect will be evident by comparing the foregoing draft with the final manuscript (ibid., 143–44). For clarity, I have supplied punctuation in the text.
43前一段及后一段中的所有引文均出自《联邦党人文集》第n篇。需要指出的是，汉密尔顿并不希望我们在欧洲奉行权力平衡政策。参见，例如，《著作集》第9卷第327页；第10卷第397页。
43 All quotations in the preceding paragraph and the one that follows are from The Federalist, No. n. It should be noted that Hamilton did not wish us to pursue a balance-of-power policy in Europe. See, e.g., Works, 9:327; 10:397.
44将此与西奥多·罗斯福（他是汉密尔顿的忠实仰慕者）于 1910 年在中西部向听众发表的以下声明进行比较：“朋友们，海军不仅仅是沿海地区的事情。无论是生活在草原地区、畜牧地区、五大湖区还是密苏里河沿岸的人，都和生活在新英格兰海岸、墨西哥湾沿岸或普吉特海湾的人一样，对海军充满热情（9 月 2 日在奥马哈的演讲，转载于《新民族主义》（纽约，1910 年），第 147 页）。”
44 Compare this with the following statement which Theodore Roosevelt (who was a great admirer of Hamilton) made to a midwestern audience in 1910: “Friends, the Navy is not an affair of the seacoast only. There is not a man who lives in the grass country, in the cattle country, or among the Great Lakes, or alongside the Missouri who is not just as keenly interested in the Navy as if he dwelt on the New England Coast, or on the Gulf Coast, or on Puget Sound (speech at Omaha, Sept. 2, repr. in The New Nationalism [New York, 1910], 147).
45亚历山大·汉密尔顿，1780 年致罗伯特·莫里斯的信，载于《作品集》第 3 卷，第 338、387 页。
45 Alexander Hamilton, letter to Robert Morris, 1780, in Works, 3:338, 387.
46关于这一点，另请参阅麦迪逊所著的《联邦党人文集》第 10 篇。
46 On this point see also The Federalist, No. 10, written by Madison.
47 Alexander Hamilton，“关于公共信用的第二份报告”（1794 年 12 月），载于《作品集》第 3 卷，第 199-300 页。引文出自第 295-296 页。
47 Alexander Hamilton, “Second Report on the Public Credit” (December 1794), in Works, 3:199–300. Quotations are from pp. 295–96.
48汉密尔顿为华盛顿的“告别演说”所作的草稿。帕尔西茨，《华盛顿的告别演说》，193。
48 Hamilton's draft for Washington's “Farewell Address.” Paltsits, Washington's Farewell Address, 193.
49同上，193-96。
49 Ibid., 193–96.
50 《联邦党人文集》第11篇，第65页。
50 The Federalist, No. 11, p. 65.
51这句名言是汉密尔顿说的，不是华盛顿说的（帕尔西茨，《华盛顿的告别演说》，196）。华盛顿把“dictate”改成了“counsel”。
51 This famous phrase was Hamilton's, not Washington's (Paltsits, Washington's Farewell Address, 196). Washington changed “dictate” to “counsel.”
52 《联邦党人文集》第4篇，第65页。
52 The Federalist, No. 4, p. 65.
53关于不转移原则，参见亚历山大·汉密尔顿，《对美国总统提出的问题作出的答复》，1790年9月15日，载《著作集》第4卷，第338页。关于欧洲领土对美洲的威胁，参见《联邦党人文集》第24篇，第150-151页。消除欧洲对美洲大陆的影响是美国外交政策中一个相当稳定的因素；参见E·M·厄尔，《国家安全与外交政策》，载《耶鲁评论》第29卷（1940年），第444-460页。《联邦党人文集》第11篇，第69页指出，如果汉密尔顿在世，他会支持门罗主义。
53 For the nontransfer principle see Alexander Hamilton, “Answer to Questions Proposed by the President of the United States,” September 15, 1790, in Works, 4:338. Regarding the menace of European territories in America, see The Federalist, No. 24, pp. 150–51. The elimination of European influence on this continent is a fairly constant factor in American foreign policy; cf. E. M. Earle, “National Security and Foreign Policy,” Yale Review 29 (1940), 444–60. The Federalist, No. 11, p. 69, indicates that, had he lived, Hamilton would have supported the Monroe Doctrine.
54 《联邦党人文集》第25篇，第156页。关于这一点，参见同上，第4篇（杰伊著）、第23篇（汉密尔顿著）和第41篇（麦迪逊著）。《联邦党人文集》的这些篇章以及其他篇章，是军事政策和国家安全研究者的教科书。
54 The Federalist, No. 25, p. 156. On this same point see ibid., No. 4 (by Jay), No. 23 (by Hamilton), and No. 41 (by Madison). The Federalist, in these and other numbers, is a textbook for students of military policy and national security.
55同上，第 74 号，第 48 页。
55 Ibid. No. 74, p. 48.
56 《联邦党人文集》第25篇，第157页。早在之前，汉密尔顿就认真思考过美国的军事政策。参见他1780年写给詹姆斯·杜安的信，以及1783年代表国会特别委员会提交的报告（见《汉密尔顿著作集》第一卷第215-216页；第六卷第463-483页）。他认为军队的组织和效忠应是全国性的；防御体系的建设不应以州界为准；民兵在服役、训练和装备的统一性方面应由国家统一监督；应建立一所国家军事学院；军需品的生产应受到鼓励，甚至可能由联邦政府所有。汉密尔顿还信奉普遍兵役义务原则。（同上，第七卷第47页）
56 The Federalist, No. 25, p. 157. Even earlier, Hamilton had given serious thought to a military policy for the United States. See a letter to James Duane in 1780 and Hamilton's report on behalf of a special committee of the Congress in 1783, in Works, 1:215–16; 6:463–83. He believed that the army should be national in organization and loyalty; that a system of defenses should be built without reference to state lines; that the militia should be under national supervision as regards uniformity of service, training, and equipment; that there should be a national military academy; and that the manufacture of munitions should be encouraged and perhaps owned by the federal government. Hamilton also believed in the principle of universal liability to military service. (Ibid., 7:47.)
《联邦党人文集》第6篇详细讨论了战争的起因。引文出自第30页。关于重农主义者和其他一些人认为商业的影响有利于促进国际和平的观点，参见埃德蒙·西尔伯纳的《十六至十八世纪经济思想中的战争》（巴黎， 1939年）。在《联邦党人文集》第3、4和5篇中，约翰·杰伊也讨论了战争的起因，并在第4篇中做出了一个惊人的预言：与中国日益增长的贸易将使美国卷入远东的国际冲突。
57 The Federalist, No. 6, discusses the causes of war at length. Quotations are from p. 30. Concerning the view of the physiocrats and others that the influence of commerce was in the direction of promoting international peace see Edmond Silberner, La guerre dans la pensée économique du xvie au xviiie siècle (Paris, 1939). In Nos. 3,4, and 5 of The Federalist John Jay also discusses the causes of war and makes the remarkable forecast (in No. 4) that the growing trade with China would involve the United States in international conflict in the Far East.
托马斯·杰斐逊的58 部 著作（纪念版），安德鲁·A·利普斯科姆编辑，20 卷（华盛顿特区，1903-1904 年），第 5 卷，第 94 页。
58 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial Edition), ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb, 20 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1903–1904), 5:94.
59同上，14:258–60。重点为笔者所加。
59 Ibid., 14:258–60. Emphasis added.
60同上，13:261。
60 Ibid., 13:261.
61普林斯顿大学图书馆馆长朱利安·博伊德先生有幸查阅了滕奇·考克斯的信件和手稿，这些信件和手稿表明，考克斯积极参与了《制造业报告》的制定和起草。考克斯对最终文件的贡献程度，尚待考克斯家族公布考克斯文稿后才能确定。关于这份报告的批判性分析，其中指出了文件中存在的一些不一致和矛盾之处，请参阅弗兰克·A·费特在L·S·里昂和V·阿布拉姆森合著的《政府与经济生活》（两卷本，华盛顿特区，1940年）第二卷第536-540页中的文章。另一篇对同一主题论述更为详尽、对汉密尔顿持较为中立态度的文章是E·C·伦特的《汉密尔顿的政治经济学家》，载于《政治经济学杂志》 （1895年），第289-310页。有关费城学派的影响，请参阅费特教授的论文《美国政治经济学的早期历史》，载于《美国哲学学会会刊》 87 (1943)，第 51-60 页。
61 Mr. Julian Boyd, librarian of Princeton University, has had the privilege of examining correspondence and manuscripts of Tench Coxe which indicate that the latter had an active part in the formulation and drafting of the “Report on Manufactures.” The actual extent of Coxe's contribution to the final document must await release and publication of the Coxe papers by the Coxe family. For a very critical analysis of the report, pointing out certain inconsistencies and contradictions in the document, see Frank A. Fetter, in L. S. Lyon and V. Abramson, Government and Economic Life, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1940), 2:536–40. A longer treatment of the same subject, less unfavorable to Hamilton, is E. C. Lunt, “Hamilton as a Political Economist,” Journal of Political Economy (1895), 289–310. For the influence of the Philadelphia School see a paper by Professor Fetter, “The Early History of Political Economy in the United States,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 87 (1943), 51–60.
托马斯·杰斐逊著作集， 14:389–93。致本杰明·奥斯汀的信。
62 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 14:389–93. Letter to Benjamin Austin.
63这个协会似乎受到了汉密尔顿创立的早期费城促进国内工业协会的启发。宾夕法尼亚协会出版并发行了多个版本的《制造业报告》，以及马修·凯里的宣传册。凯里对所谓“美国体系”的贡献，仅次于汉密尔顿。该协会赞助了著名的1827年哈里斯堡会议，敦促国会支持提高关税（最终促成了1828年“可憎关税法”的颁布）。凭借其有效的宣传，该协会吸引了全国的关注，并最终使宾夕法尼亚州在美国政治中永久地站在了保护主义阵营。
63 This society seems to have been inspired by the earlier Philadelphia Society for Promotion of Domestic Industries, founded by Hamilton. The Pennsylvania Society published and distributed several editions of the “Report on Manufactures,” as well as pamphlets by Mathew Carey, who did more than any other American except Hamilton to bring about the so-called American System. It sponsored the famous Harrisburg Convention of 1827, memorializing Congress in favor of higher tariffs (which materialized in the “Tariff of Abominations” of 1828), attracted nationwide attention by its effective propaganda, and in general served to put the state of Pennsylvania permanently in the protectionist camp in American politics.
64 “世界政治学”是李斯特用来描述亚当·斯密、J·B·萨伊及其“学派”其他成员著作的术语。任何读过《国富论》和《国民政治经济学》的人都会发现，他经常曲解斯密的观点。李斯特完全混淆了“斯密主义”（即任何人声称斯密说过的话）和斯密本人的思想。关于这一点，请参阅J·S·尼科尔森教授为劳埃德1904年版《国民政治经济学》所作的精彩导言（见上文注释3）。
64 “Cosmopolitical” was the term by which List described the writings of Adam Smith, J. B. Say, and others of their “school.” That he frequently misrepresented Smith's views must be apparent to any reader of The Wealth of Nations and The National System of Political Economy. List hopelessly confused Smithianismus—which was what anybody said Smith had said—with Smith's own ideas. On this point see the admirable introduction by Professor J. S. Nicholson to the 1904 edition of Lloyd's translation of The National System (cited in note 3 above).
65作者为《那个国家体系》所作的序言，第 41、42 页。李斯特始终否认自己是重商主义者，尽管他承认自己接管了“那个备受谴责的体系中有价值的部分”（同上，第 42 页）。
65 Author's preface to That National System, xl, xlii. List always denied that he was a mercantilist, although he admitted that he had taken over “the valuable parts of that much-decried system” (ibid., xlii).
66这个问题曾引发激烈争论。参见K.T. Eheberg教授为《国家体系》（斯图加特，1853年）第七版所作的历史和批判性导论，其中认为汉密尔顿对李斯特的影响甚微或根本没有影响。反之，参见Hirst的《生活》，第111-118页，尤其是Ugo Rabbeno的《美国商业政策》 （伦敦，1893年），该书是《美国保护主义：商业政策史》 （米兰，1893年）的英文译本。Rabbeno著作的第三篇论文，第二章（关于汉密尔顿）和第二章（关于李斯特）或许是对这个问题最公正的总结。
66 This question has been debated with much heat. See Professor K. T. Eheberg's historical and critical introduction to the seventh edition of The National System (Stuttgart, 1853) for the viewpoint that Hamilton had little or no influence on List. Contra see Hirst, Life, 111–18 and, more especially, Ugo Rabbeno, American Commercial Policy (London, 1893), an English translation of Protezionismo americano: Saggi storizi di politico commerciale (Milan, 1893). Essay 3, chapters 2. (on Hamilton) and 2 (on List), of Rabbeno's work is perhaps the fairest summary of the question.
67李斯特坚信，美国将在一个世纪内超越英国的工业、财富、商业和海军力量（《国家体系》，40、77-86、339）。
67 List firmly believed that the United States would, within a century, surpass Britain in industry, wealth, commerce, and naval power (National System, 40, 77–86, 339).
68李斯特被扩张主义者、泛德意志主义者乃至纳粹奉为守护神。关于第一次世界大战的典型小册子，可参阅卡尔·库姆曼的《弗里德里希·李斯特：新德意志的先知》（图宾根，1915年）。关于当今，可参阅沃尔特·冯·莫洛的畅销小说《没有德意志的德国人：弗里德里希·李斯特的小说》（柏林、维也纳、莱比锡，1931年及后续版本）。这部小说的价值不在于其历史虚构性，而在于它展现了泛德意志主义和纳粹的思维模式——对英国和法国充满敌意，对美国抱有居高临下的态度（美国独立归功于施托伊本的军事才能），对奥地利则嗤之以鼻。冯·莫洛对李斯特对安德鲁·杰克逊、冯·毛奇等人的影响提出了许多未经证实的断言，其中一些本身就站不住脚。
68 List has been adopted by the expansionists, the Pan-Germans, and even the Nazis as a patron saint. For a characteristic pamphlet of the First World War see Karl Kumpmann, Friedrich List als Prophet des neuen Deutschland (Tübingen, 1915). For the present day see the best-selling novel Ein Deutscher ohne Deutschland: Ein Friedrich List Roman, by Walter von Molo (Berlin, Vienna, Leipzig, 1931 and subsequent editions). This novel is valuable not as historical fiction but as an example of the Pan-German and Nazi mentality—bitterly hostile to Britain and France, patronizing toward the United States (whose independence is accredited to the military genius of Steuben), contemptuous of Austria. Von Molo makes many unsupported assertions, some of them inherently improbable, concerning the influence of List on Andrew Jackson, von Moltke, and others.
69弗里德里希·李斯特，《美国政治经济学纲要》，载《著作、演讲与书信集》（柏林，1927-1935），第2卷，第105-106页（以下简称《著作集》）。和谐利益的思想与汉密尔顿对同一主题的观点之间的相似之处显而易见。另见同书，第374页脚注，其中编辑诺茨博士不仅将李斯特的学说与汉密尔顿联系起来，还与丹尼尔·雷蒙德、马修·凯里和约翰·C·卡尔霍恩联系起来。
69 Friedrich List, Outlines of American Political Economy, in Schriften, Reden, Briefe (Berlin, 1927–35), 2:105–106 (hereafter cited as Works). The similarity of the idea of harmonious interests to Hamilton's views on the same subject is obvious. See also ibid., p. 374n, in which the editor, Dr. Notz, relates List's doctrine not only to Hamilton but also to Daniel Raymond, Mathew Carey, and John C. Calhoun.
70弗里德里希·李斯特，《政治经济自然体系》（1837），第二章，载《著作集》第四卷，第186页。《国家体系》，第87、91-92、102-107页。读者无需赘述，亚当·斯密的体系并非建立在普遍和平或世界联邦的假设之上。李斯特本人也曾多次表示，所有社会的最终目标都是建立一个世界国家，尽管他过于民族主义，无法成为这一理念的积极倡导者。
70 Friedrich List, Le système naturel d'économie politique (1837), ch. 2, in Works, 4:186. The National System, 87, 91–92, 102–107. The reader need not be reminded that Adam Smith did not base his system upon any assumption of universal peace or a federation of the world. List himself, on some occasions, said that the ultimate goal of all society was a world state, although he was too much of a nationalist to be an evangelist for the idea.
71参见李斯特，《国家体系》，第119、140页。比较李斯特关于生产力的观点与亚当·斯密的论述，即发动战争的能力取决于“一个国家工业的年产值，即其土地、劳动力和消费品所产生的年收入”。（上文第一部分）另见杰斐逊关于价格的论述（第四部分）以及汉密尔顿关于战时自给自足的论述（上文第三部分）。
71 List, The National System, 119, 140. Compare List's idea of productive power with Adam Smith's statement that the power to wage war is measured by “the annual produce of [a nation's] industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, labour, and consumable goods. Above, section I. See also Jefferson as regards price, section IV, and Hamilton as regards self-sufficiency in war time, section III above.
72 List，《国家体系》，168-69；另见 118-19。
72 List, The National System, 168–69; also 118–19.
73同上，113-14。
73 Ibid., 113–14.
74同上，第142页。在此，劳埃德的译文似乎不够令人满意，我已在某些关键方面对其进行了改写。德文原文见《作品集》，第6卷，第210-211页。
74 Ibid., 142. In this instance Lloyd's translation seems unsatisfactory and I have rephrased it in certain essential respects. For the German original see Works, 6:210–11.
75 List，《国家体系》，142–43、216、327、332、346–47。出于某种无法解释的原因，List 对河流作为自然边界并不感冒。
75 List, The National System, 142–43, 216, 327, 332, 346–47. For some unexplained reason List was unimpressed by rivers as natural boundaries.
76同上，第347页。李斯特说，德国人移民到多瑙河比移民到伊利湖沿岸更好。关于边疆的引文，参见《著作集》，第5卷，第499-500页。
76 Ibid., 347. List said that it was better for Germans to emigrate to the Danube than to the shores of Lake Erie. For the frontier quotation see Works, 5:499–500.
77 List，《国家体系》，第142、216-17、345-47页
77 List, The National System, 142, 216–17, 345–47
78弗里德里希·李斯特 (Friedrich List)，“时代与德国安全体系”，关税同盟，4 (1846)，693-94。
78 Friedrich List, “Die Times und das deutsche Schutzsystem,” Zollvereinsblatt, 4 (1846), 693–94.
79 List，《国家体系》，第 216-17 页，第 330 页。
79 List, The National System, 216–17, 330.
80同上，38。关于巴拿马，当时英国正在与美国争夺巴拿马的所有权，李斯特提议在德国企业家的领导下修建一条国际化水道：“Der Kanal durch die Landenge von Pananama, ein Unternehmen für die Hansestädte, in Works , 7:234-36。
80 Ibid., 38. As regards Panama, for the possession of which Britain was then contending with the United States, List proposed an internationalized waterway under German entrepreneurs: “Der Kanal durch die Landenge von Panama, ein Unternehmen für die Hansestädte, in Works, 7:234–36.
81 List，《国家体系》，第 332、337 页。
81 List, The National System, 332, 337.
82同上，第 338 页。
82 Ibid., 338.
83同上，339-40。同样的主题在 1846 年李斯特去世前不久写的一份出色的文件中得到了相当长的阐述：“Über den Wert und die Bedingungen einer Allianz zwischen Grossbritannien und Deutschland”，《作品》，7：167-98。另请参见“Die vorige und die gegenwärtige Regierung von Nordamerika”， Staatslexikon (1841)，219ff。
83 Ibid., 339–40. The same theme is developed at some length in a remarkable document written shortly before List's death in 1846: “Über den Wert und die Bedingungen einer Allianz zwischen Grossbritannien und Deutschland,” Works, 7:167–98. See also “Die vorige und die gegenwärtige Regierung von Nordamerika,” Staatslexikon (1841), 219ff.
84关于英国使团，请参阅赫斯特的《生活》，第 97-106 页。关于拟议联盟的备忘录（将在下一段中讨论），请参阅注释 83。
84 For the English mission see Hirst, Life, 97–106. For the memorandum on the proposed alliance, to be discussed in the next paragraph, see note 83.
85对于 1833 年的计划，请参阅弗里德里希·李斯特 (Friedrich List)，“Über ein sächsisches Eisenbahnsystem als Grundlage eines allgemeinen deutschen Eisenbahnsystems”，《 Works》，卷。 3，点。 1，第 155–95 页。关于铁路的一般战略理论，请参阅“Deutschlands Eisenbahnsystem in militärischer Beziehung”，同上，260-70，后者写于 1834-1836 年。
85 For the 1833 plan see Friedrich List, “Über ein sächsisches Eisenbahnsystem als Grundlage eines allgemeinen deutschen Eisenbahnsystems,” in Works, vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 155–95. For the general strategic theory of railways see “Deutschlands Eisenbahnsystem in militärischer Beziehung,” in ibid., 260–70, the latter written in 1834–1836.
86列表，“德国铁路系统”，266-68。
86 List, “Deutschlands Eisenbahnsystem,” 266–68.
87除上述内容外，请参阅弗里德里希·李斯特 (Friedrich List)，“Über ein allgemeines Eisenbahnsystem in Frankreich”，《作品》，第 1 卷。 3，点。 2，第 564-73 页。
87 In addition to the foregoing see Friedrich List, “Über ein allgemeines Eisenbahnsystem in Frankreich,” in Works, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 564–73.
88参见地图，来自 Friedrich Lenz， Friedrich List: Der Mann und das Werk（慕尼黑和柏林，1936 年）。
88 See map, which is from Friedrich Lenz, Friedrich List: Der Mann und das Werk (Munich and Berlin, 1936).
89关于通往印度的铁路的讨论，参见 List 的《Über…einer Allianz zwischen Grossbrittannien und Deutschland》（脚注 83 中引用）。关于君士坦丁堡-巴格达-巴士拉-孟买线路的详细信息，参见《作品集》第 3 卷，第 2 部分，第 679 页。直到第一次世界大战前夕，德意志帝国的人口才接近七千万。
89 For discussion of the railway to India see List, “Über…einer Allianz zwischen Grossbrittannien und Deutschland” cited in footnote 83. For details concerning the route of the Constantinople-Baghdad-Basra-Bombay line see Works, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 679. The population of the German Empire did not approach seventy million until the eve of the First World War.
90 Friedrich List，“Das deutsche Eisenbahnsystem”，《作品》，第一卷。 3，点。 1，p。 347. 关于多瑙河地区的铁路扩建：“Die Transportverbesserung in Ungarn”，同上，第 434-60 页。
90 Friedrich List, “Das deutsche Eisenbahnsystem,” in Works, vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 347. Concerning railway expansion in the Danubian area: “Die Transportverbesserung in Ungarn,” in ibid., pp. 434–60.
91 CJH Hayes，《现代民族主义的历史演变》（纽约，1931 年），第 272-73 页。
91 C. J. H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1931), 272–73.
92引自 WH Dawson，《现代德国的演变》（纽约，1908 年），第 248 页。重点为后加。
92 Quoted by W. H. Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Germany (New York, 1908), 248. Emphasis added.
93有关这些思想的进一步发展，请参阅 EM Earle 的《新重商主义》，载《政治学季刊》 40 (1925)，第 594-600 页。此外，关于极权主义经济学，请参阅 AT Lauterbach 的《制服下的经济学：军事经济和社会结构》（普林斯顿，1943 年），特别是第1-4章。
93 For further development of these ideas see E. M. Earle, “The New Mercantilism,” Political Science Quarterly 40 (1925), 594–600. Also, with particular reference to totalitarian economics, A. T. Lauterbach, Economics in Uniform: Military Economy and Social Structure (Princeton, 1943), especially chap. 1–4.
9. 恩格斯和马克思论革命、战争与军队在社会中的作用*
9. Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society*
T“哲学家们只不过是用不同的方式解释世界，而问题在于改变世界。”卡尔·马克思在其早期著作《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中提出的这一信条，为我们理解马克思主义理论的动态提供了关键。马克思主义理论主要面向行动；理论分析只不过是为最终的革命冲锋做准备和铺垫。为了使无产阶级革命成为现实，马克思和恩格斯在其著作中始终不遗余力地关注战术问题和军事考量。
THE PHILOSOPHERS have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” This credo of Karl Marx in his Theses on Feuerbach, at the beginning of his literary career, provides a key to an understanding of the dynamics of Marxian theory. It is primarily directed toward action; theoretical analysis becomes nothing but spadework and preparation for the final revolutionary assault. To make the proletarian revolution a reality, Marx and Engels gave unremitting attention to tactical problems and military considerations in their writings.
在马克思主义文献中，他们研究的这一关键方面长期以来一直被忽视。这种疏漏部分源于这样一个事实：大量与军事问题相关的材料散布在他们的著作中，不像马克思主义经济理论的基础著作《资本论》那样，能够轻易地汇集在一部鸿篇巨制中。除了相关的历史概述之外，马克思与恩格斯的通信以及他们大量的报刊文章对于全面分析马克思和恩格斯的军事思想尤为重要。
This crucial side of their studies was long neglected in the literature on Marxism. The omission derived partly from the fact that the immense amount of material bearing upon military problems is scattered throughout their writings and is not easily available in one monumental work as is the case with Capital, the basic study of Marxian economic theory. Of special importance for a comprehensive analysis of Marx and Engels as military thinkers, apart from their pertinent historical sketches, are the Marx-Engels correspondence and their extensive journalistic writings.
对马克思和恩格斯思想的基本误解也是导致人们忽视他们军事关切的部分原因。军事战略和战术的概念似乎与这些激进思想家的精神格格不入，他们公开宣称的政策是敌视军事机器、军人阶层和军事国家；他们所期盼的社会主义秩序与和平主义的千年愿景相融合；他们作为“国家局外人”的立场也几乎不可能让人联想到对军事力量和具体战役计划的现实考量。此外，在恩格斯后期的著作中，他对未来世界大战的前景日益感到厌恶，因为这场战争不仅威胁到工人阶级和社会主义运动所取得的一切进步，而且威胁到西方文明本身。他认为，社会主义更有可能通过选举而非暴力动乱取得胜利。然而，将国际阶级斗争的主角视为和平主义者是完全错误的。
Basic misconceptions regarding the teachings of Marx and Engels are also in part responsible for the lack of attention to their military concerns. Concepts of military strategy and tactics may seem alien to the spirit of these radical thinkers, whose declared policy was one of enmity toward the military machine, the military caste, and the military state; whose anticipated socialist order merged with the pacifist millennium; and whose position as “outsiders of the state” would hardly suggest a realistic consideration of military power and the planning of specific campaigns. Moreover, in Engels's later writings, he expressed increasing revulsion at the prospect of a future world war, which threatened to destroy all the advances made not only by the working class and by socialist movements, but by Western civilization itself. He saw greater possibilities ahead for the triumph of socialism through the ballot, rather than through violent upheavals. And yet it would be utterly misleading to view the protagonists of the international class struggle as pacifists.
马克思主义不仅以一种全新的“科学”方法看待社会发展，而且以一种更为现实的视角评估政治力量，从而取代了19世纪20年代和30年代的空想主义。这种新的分析旨在追求高度的实用性，成为一门“应用科学”。战略考量是其政治理论的核心。尽管后世学者尤其钦佩卡尔·马克思和弗里德里希·恩格斯留下的理论体系，但具体的历史问题及其分析似乎也同样吸引着他们。正是通过对具体问题的分析，马克思和恩格斯构建了他们对战争和军事组织问题的理解。
Marxism superseded the earlier utopianism of the 1820s and 1830s not only in a new “scientific” approach to social development, but also in a more realistic evaluation of political forces. The new analysis was meant to be eminently practical, an “applied science.” Strategic considerations were the core of their political theory. Although succeeding generations were above all impressed by the theoretical edifice that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels left behind, specific historical problems and their analysis seem to have been of equal interest to them. And it is in their more concrete analyses that the two worked out their understanding of war and the problems of military organization.
随着二十世纪战争的模式和问题逐渐清晰和充分发展，马克思和恩格斯的著作也日益凸显其重要性和意义。马克思和恩格斯完全可以被视为现代总体战的先驱。国家社会主义意识形态家引以为豪的发现——现代战争具有四重性质：外交、经济、心理，只有在万不得已的情况下才诉诸武力——对恩格斯和马克思而言却是常识。他们充分意识到，战役的胜负可能在第一枪打响之前就已注定，实际上，经济战和心理战的战场早已决定了战争的走向。在1857年那场“充满希望”的危机期间，恩格斯写信给马克思说：“持续的经济萧条可以被巧妙的革命战略利用，作为一种持续施压的有效武器……以此来激发人民的斗志……就像骑兵冲锋时，如果战马在接近敌人之前先小跑五百步，就能使冲锋更加迅猛一样。”在马克思和恩格斯看来，战争在不同领域以不同的手段进行。正如激进的工团主义者乔治·索雷尔所言，总罢工可能演变成“拿破仑式的战役”，克里米亚战争也可能被视为大规模国际内战的前奏。马克思和恩格斯对历史现象的辩证分析方法，正是这种对现代世界社会政治力量的全面而动态的理解。这种视角使他们对军事事务及其对现代革命性质的影响有了远超前人的洞察力。
The writings of Marx and Engels gained in significance and perspective as the patterns and problems of twentieth-century warfare became clear and fully developed. Marx and Engels can rightly be classed among the ancestors of modern total war. The proud discovery of National-Socialist ideologues, that modern warfare is of a fourfold nature—diplomatic, economic, psychological, and only as a last resort military—was common knowledge to Engels and Marx. They were fully aware the campaigns could be lost long before the first shot was fired, that they would in fact be decided beforehand on the battlefronts of economic and psychological warfare. During the “promising” crisis of 1857, Engels wrote to Marx: “A continuing economic depression could be used by astute revolutionary strategy as a useful weapon for a chronic pressure…in order to warm up the people…just as a cavalry attack has greater élan if the horses trot five hundred paces before coming within charging distance of the enemy.” To Marx and Engels war was fought with different means in different fields. In the words of the militant syndicalist Georges Sorel, a general strike could become a “Napoleonic battle,” just as the Crimean War could be regarded as a prelude to great international civil strife. Marx's and Engels's dialectical approach to historical phenomena is nothing but this all-inclusive and dynamic view of the sociopolitical forces at work in the modern world. This perspective gave them an insight far superior to that of their forerunners into military affairs as they affected the character of modern revolutions.
对革命政治的发展而言，更为重要的是社会主义之父们转向对国际事务的研究。他们很快意识到，1848年德国革命在很大程度上失败的原因在于其国际影响。事实上，早在《新莱茵报》创办初期，马克思受邀担任主编，旨在“打造德国第一次革命中最激进、最有激情、最具个性的新闻事业”，两位好友就已认识到外交政策、战争和内政之间的密切联系。他们也意识到，欧洲革命的未来并非仅由一个国家的努力决定。正是这种认识促使他们认真思考社会主义、军事政策和外交事务之间的关系，因为若不理解这些关系，就不可能制定切实可行的革命战略。马克思和恩格斯的一项重要贡献（这一点常常被他们的诠释者所忽视）在于，他们将当时的社会变革问题从孤立的政变阶段提升到了世界政治层面。战争与革命——在我们这个时代已无可争议地确立为双重运动——在早期就被这些至今仍不为人知的世界革命理论家们所认识到，二者之间存在着根本的、持续的相互关系。
Even more significant for the development of revolutionary politics was the turning of the fathers of socialism toward the study of international affairs in general. They soon began to realize that the German revolution of 1848 had failed to a large extent because of its international implications. In fact, from the early days of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, to which Marx was called as editor “to produce the most radical, the most spirited, and the most individual journalistic enterprise of the first German revolution,” the two friends had realized how closely foreign policy, war, and internal affairs were connected. They also saw that the future of the European revolution would not be determined by the efforts of one country alone. This realization directed their attention to a serious consideration of the relationships between socialism, military policy, and foreign affairs, because without an understanding of these relationships a realistic revolutionary strategy could not be possible. It is a major contribution of Marx and Engels, often overlooked by their interpreters, that they raised the question of social change in their time beyond the insurrectionary stage of the isolated Putsch to the plane of world politics. War and revolution—unmistakably established as twin movements in our time—were at that early period seen in their fundamental and continuous interrelationship by these still obscure theorists of world revolution.
我
I
如果认识到现代社会主义本质上的战斗性和行动性，其领导人的角色重要性就会有所改变，弗里德里希·恩格斯的地位也会比他的朋友和伙伴卡尔·马克思更高。恩格斯不仅撰写了许多曾经被认为是马克思所著的历史研究，而且这位“未来革命的卡诺”对军事发展对历史的影响有着更为清晰的认识。恩格斯预见了重要的未来趋势，不仅在和平时期，也在战争时期，并以此方式，即便只是间接地，也对未来几十年军事战略的概念和技术做出了贡献。
If one recognizes the essentially militant and activist nature of modern socialism, the roles of its leaders somewhat change in significance, and Friedrich Engels gains in stature as compared with his friend and partner, Karl Marx. Not only did Engels actually write a good part of the historical studies once attributed to Marx, but the “Carnot of the future revolution” also had a much clearer understanding of the impact of military developments on history. Engels foresaw important future trends, not only in peacetime but in war as well, and in this way contributed, if only indirectly, to concepts and techniques of military strategy in decades to come.
马克思和恩格斯性格和气质截然相反，但他们的友谊却堪称经典。近四十年来，两人的学术成就相辅相成，分工自然而然。马克思在其深刻而富有探索性的著作中展现了其先辈严谨的知识传统，显然是一位更为系统化的思想家。没有马克思，恩格斯的著作将会缺乏方向性和综合性。马克思或许也是一位更优秀的政治战略家，他具有敏锐的洞察力，尤其擅长把握形势，尤其是在革命时期——这种特质常常使他这位毕生的合作者避免仓促下结论。然而，性格沉稳的马克思——他“如同雅各与天使搏斗一般与时代精神抗争，其著作也进展缓慢”——却对恩格斯的能力赞赏有加。“他一天中的任何时间都能工作，无论吃饱还是饿着；他的写作和作文流畅无比。”
In many respects the very opposite in character and temperament, Marx and Engels exemplify a friendship of almost classic nature. For a span of nearly forty years, the literary work of one complemented that of the other. Theirs was a natural division of labor. Marx, revealing in his profound and searching work the stern intellectual tradition of his forebears, was clearly the more systematic thinker. Without him, Engels's writings would have lacked direction and power of synthesis. Marx was probably also the better political strategist, with a certain gift for sizing up a situation, especially in revolutionary moments—a quality that often kept his lifelong collaborator from hasty conclusions. Nevertheless the somber Marx, who “struggled with the spirit of his time as Jacob wrestled with the angel and whose work came slowly to fruition,” admired Engels's power. “He can work at any hour of the day, fed or fasting; he writes and composes with incomparable fluency.”
尽管为人谦逊的恩格斯欣然接受退居二线，但他对他们整体工作的贡献却毫不逊色。早年在英国的学习，尤其是他那部开创性的著作《英国工人阶级状况》，为社会主义理论奠定了基础。他一生都在收集宝贵的资料，凭借敏锐的洞察力和丰富的常识，精心挑选并整合这些资料。他对时代脉搏和未来趋势有着敏锐的洞察力。他是一位务实的思想家。作为莱茵河畔一位实业家的儿子，他本人也在曼彻斯特这座熙熙攘攘的城市里从事了相当长一段时间的创业工作（尽管并非出于本意），因此他对新兴工厂制度的本质有着切身的了解，但他首先是一位行动派。
Although the genuinely modest Engels readily consented to play second fiddle, his contribution was no less significant to their work as a whole. With his early studies in England, and especially his groundbreaking book The Condition of the Working Class in England, he had helped to lay the foundations of socialist theory. All his life he brought together valuable material, selecting and combining it with a sure hand and a wealth of common sense. He had a feeling for what was in the air and for what promised results. His was a practical mind. Son of a Rhenish industrialist, and for a good part of his life an entrepreneur in his own right (though against his own inclination) in the teeming city of Manchester, he knew firsthand the nature of the rising factory system, but was above all a man of action.
恩格斯曾形容自己的文风如同炮火一般，“每一篇文章都像炮弹一样撞击、爆炸”。他那充满战斗气息的词汇并非玩弄文字游戏。即使在他最抽象的著作中，恩格斯也大量运用军事术语和经验，因为他自认为天生就是一名士兵和战士。他为自己早年在普鲁士军队的服役经历，尤其是他在1849年巴登起义中的积极作用而感到自豪，并在英国流亡的多年里致力于军事科学的研究，为即将到来的革命做准备。
Engels said of his own style that, as with artillery, “each article struck and burst like a shell.” His militant vocabulary was no mere play on words. Even in his most abstract writings, Engels made ample use of military terms and experiences, because he regarded himself as by nature a soldier and warrior. Proud of his early service in the Prussian army, and especially of his active role in the Baden insurrection of 1849, he turned his attention to the study of military science during his many years of exile in England, in order to prepare himself for the coming revolution.
恩格斯在军事领域的著述比他其他文学作品更为丰富。他撰写了关于战役的严谨论著、关于武器和战术的详尽研究、军事将领的简短传记，以及对战争和军事制度书籍的权威且往往尖锐的评论。在他的所有作品中，他都展现出对历史上伟大统帅的行动和著作的惊人熟悉。同时，他独立而独到的判断也令人叹服。在分析具体战役或技术发展时，他往往比公认的军事专家更具远见卓识，他发表在报刊上的军事文章至今仍具有价值。即使是与他同时代的军事批评家也尊重他的判断。他在《纽约论坛报》上发表的关于克里米亚战争的文章曾被误认为是当时正在竞选美国总统的温菲尔德·斯科特将军所写。他的小册子《波河与莱茵河》长期以来被认为是普鲁士将军冯·普富尔的作品。
Engels's writings in the field of military affairs are more extensive than the rest of his literary work. He wrote careful treatises on campaigns, detailed studies on weapons and tactics, thumbnail biographical sketches of military leaders, and authoritative arid often cutting reviews of books on war and military institutions. Throughout his work he shows a striking familiarity with the actions and writings of the great commanders in history. At the same time his independent and original judgment is surprising. In his analyses of specific campaigns or technical developments he was often more farseeing than recognized military experts, and his newspaper and periodical articles on military topics are still of value. Even his contemporary adversaries among military critics respected his judgments. His articles on the Crimean War in the New York Tribune were attributed to General Winfield Scott, who, at the time, was running for the American Presidency. His pamphlet Po and Rhine was long considered to be the work of the Prussian General von Pfuel.
人们或许可以像一位评论家评价克劳塞维茨那样评价他的军事著作：“他是一位评论天才。他的判断清晰而有力，如同黄金一般。他展现了战略思想的伟大之处在于其简洁性。”事实上，克劳塞维茨给恩格斯留下了深刻的印象。恩格斯在1857年9月写信给马克思说：“我最近在读克劳塞维茨的《战争论》。他的哲学论述方式很奇特，但对战争的论述却非常精辟。对于战争究竟应该被称为艺术还是科学这个问题，他的回答是，战争最像贸易。战斗之于战争，正如现金支付之于贸易，因为无论实际发生战争的概率有多低，一切都指向战争，最终战争必然发生，而且必然是决定性的。”
One may say of his military writings what a commentator once said about Clausewitz: “He is a genius in criticism. His judgments are as clear and weighty as gold. He shows how greatness in strategic thought consists in simplicity.” Clausewitz, in fact, greatly impressed Engels, who wrote Marx in September 1857: “Among other things I am now reading Clausewitz' On War. A strange way of philosophizing but very good on his subject. To the question whether war should be called an art or a science, the answer given is that war is most like trade. Fighting is to war what cash payment is to trade, for however rarely it may be necessary for it actually to occur, everything is directed towards it, and eventually it must take place all the same and must be decisive.”
克劳塞维茨强调果断行动，甚至在战略防御中也要采取战术进攻，这成为革命战略的基石。战斗精神和进攻准备对恩格斯而言仍然是不言而喻的，受其影响，马克思也同样如此。然而，除了这些基本概念之外，他们的军事思想显然发生了变化——这种发展使他们对当时的军事和政治事件的解读变得更加现实、更加谨慎，但也更加积极主动。
Clausewitz's emphasis on decisive action and on the tactical offensive even in the strategic defensive became the stock-in-trade of revolutionary strategy. Militancy and preparedness for offensive action remained axiomatic for Engels and, under his influence, also for Marx. Beyond these fundamental concepts, however, their military thought clearly changed—a development that led them to an increasingly more realistic, more circumspect, but also more dynamic interpretation of the military and political events of their time.
二
II
1848年的革命，如同历史上许多失败的事业一样，其精神和成果常常被误判和低估。1848年的激进主义具有鲜明的战斗性，它回响着1793年伟大传统的旋律，而且这种回响往往是自觉的。诚然，在欧洲大陆，1848年的运动最终以失败告终。革命力量在开局成功之后，很快就因无可挽回的分歧而分裂，政治上不成熟的中产阶级屈服于经验丰富的统治阶级。革命的势头逐渐消退，没有取得任何明显的成果。然而，这场欧洲内战却是一场意义重大的军事事件。它发生在街垒上，在德国和奥地利，它也发生在战场上。叛军的领导者往往是那些倒戈加入革命者的训练有素的军官，因为普鲁士和奥地利军队都未能摆脱在20世纪会被称为“布尔什维克”的影响。
The revolutions of 1848, as is so often the case with lost causes in history, have been misjudged and underestimated in their spirit and performance. The radicalism of 1848 was eminently militant. It was an echo, often self-consciously so, of the great tradition of 1793. On the Continent, to be sure, the movements of 1848 ended in defeat. After a successful beginning hopeless disagreements soon split the revolutionary forces, and the politically immature middle classes succumbed to an experienced ruling caste. The revolutionary momentum faded away without visible result. And yet this civil war in Europe was a military event of great import. It was fought on the barricades, and in Germany and Austria also on the battlefield. The rebels were often led by trained officers who had gone over to the revolutionaries, for the Prussian and Austrian armies were not free from what in the twentieth century would have been called “Bolshevik” influences.
在这些革命的军事先驱中，不乏像冒险家奥托·冯·科尔文这样个性鲜明的人物。乔治·魏德迈尔是马克思和恩格斯的早期追随者之一，他曾是普鲁士炮兵军官，移居美国后，在南北战争期间担任联邦军上校，战功卓著。弗里德里希·威廉·吕斯托，这位从普鲁士军官转变为革命者的人，后来成为国际知名的军事史学家、评论家和教师，并在加里波第征服西西里岛和进军那不勒斯的战役中担任参谋长。事实上，当时的军事文献表明，官方军事界将街垒战士视为一支重要而危险的力量，无论他们人数多少，都如同20世纪欧洲殖民军队面对里夫人时那样，令军事专业人士感到困惑不已。卡瓦尼亚克于1848年6月在巴黎首次成功打破了街垒战的神话，被誉为军事天才。当时认为需要超过53000名普鲁士士兵才能在野战中击败巴登起义者。
Among these military pioneers of the revolution were colorful soldiers like the adventurer Otto von Corvin. George Weydemeyer, one of the first followers of Marx and Engels, had been a Prussian artillery officer and, after his emigration to the United States, distinguished himself as a colonel in the Union army during the Civil War. Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, a Prussian officer turned revolutionary, won an international reputation as a military historian, critic, and teacher, and as chief of staff to Garibaldi in the conquest of Sicily and the march on Naples. In fact, official military circles, the contemporary military literature shows, looked upon the fighters of the barricades, however small their number, as a significant and dangerous power, as puzzling to the military professional as were the Riffs to the colonial armies of twentieth-century Europe. Cavaignac, who first succeeded at Paris, in June 1848, in breaking the myth of the barricades, was celebrated as a military genius. Over 53,000 Prussian troops were thought necessary to defeat the Baden insurrectionists in a field campaign.
1848年的革命，无论其失败与否，都成为了科学社会主义的起点。探究其意义——其历史背景和军事战略——是马克思和恩格斯流亡初期著作的核心主题。失败的教训揭示了未来起义战略的规律。这些规律最初在恩格斯撰写、马克思编辑的对1848-1849年中欧革命的精辟分析中得到阐述。1851-1852年，马克思以自己的名义在《纽约论坛报》上发表了一系列关于这一主题的文章。 “起义既是一门艺术，也是一场战争……并且要遵循一定的程序规则……首先，除非你已做好充分准备承担起义的后果，否则切勿玩弄起义……其次，一旦踏上起义之路，就必须以最大的决心和进攻性行动。防守是所有武装起义的致命弱点……出其不意地打击你的对手……保持第一次成功起义所赋予你的道德优势……正如迄今为止最伟大的革命政策大师丹东所说：‘大胆，大胆，再大胆！’”
The revolutions of 1848, in spite or because of their failure, became the starting point of scientific socialism. The inquiry into their meaning—their historical background and military strategy—was the central theme of the writings of Marx and Engels during the first years of their exile. The lessons of defeat revealed the laws of a future strategy of insurrection. These laws were first elaborated in the brilliant analyses of the revolutions of 1848–1849 in central Europe, written by Engels and edited by Marx, under whose name a series of articles on the subject was published in the New York Tribune in 1851–1852. “Insurrection is an art as much as war…and subject to certain rules of procedure…. Firstly, never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to face the consequences of your play…. Secondly, the insurrectionary career once entered upon, act with the greatest determination and on the offensive. The defensive is the death of every armed rising…. Surprise your antagonist…. Keep up the moral ascendancy which the first successful rising has given you…. In the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known, ‘De l'audace, de l'audace, encore de l'audace!’”
马克思和恩格斯有力地指出，一旦革命形势过去，任何重演革命的企图都是徒劳且危险的。他们反对沙佩尔和威尔里希——后者在19世纪50年代初鼓吹再次发动暴力冲突——并告诫工人不要发动政变，因为这只会让反动势力获利。在形势好转之前，他们坚持采取为最终斗争做准备的战略。尽管恩格斯迫不及待地盼望着再次投入“资产阶级和无产阶级之间那场生死决斗”，但他非常清楚，这种事业最大的危险在于鲁莽行事。耐心和时机把握成为制定合理战略的主要要素。
Once the revolutionary situation had passed, Marx and Engels vigorously pointed out, any attempt at playing at revolution was futile and dangerous. They opposed Schapper and Wilrich, who in the early 1850s were agitating for renewed violence, and cautioned the workers against attempting a Putsch, which would only benefit reactionary interests. Until conditions became favorable, they insisted on a strategy of preparation for the eventual struggle. However impatiently Engels awaited the time when he could saddle up again for “that great duel to the death between bourgeoisie and proletariat,” he knew too well that the greatest danger for such an enterprise lay in the rash desire for action. Patience and timing became the main requisites of sound strategy.
要更好地理解马克思和恩格斯革命策略概念的意义，需要将其置于他们基于唯物主义历史观的哲学体系的背景下。该体系强调，当时的经济状况是理解社会政治动态的关键。在《共产党宣言》中，这一理论被粗略地应用于整个近代史。在他们众多论述当代事务的文章中，也运用了这一理论。根据这一理论，1848年民众运动的兴衰归根结底是由经济原因决定和制约的。正如恩格斯在1895年重印的马克思著作《法国阶级斗争（1848-1850）》的序言中所写： “1847年的世界商业危机是二月革命和三月革命的真正原因，而1848年中期逐渐到来、并在1849年和1850年蓬勃发展的工业繁荣，是复兴的欧洲反动势力的活力所在。这是决定性的。”他同样指出：“新的革命只有在新的危机出现时才有可能发生，而且它也和新的危机一样确定无疑。”
The implications of Marx's and Engels's concepts of revolutionary tactics can be better understood against the background of their philosophic system, based upon the materialistic interpretation of history, and its emphasis on the prevailing economic conditions as a key to an understanding of sociopolitical dynamics. In the Communist Manifesto this theory had been applied in rough outline to all of modern history. It was also drawn on in their numerous essays dealing with contemporary affairs. According to the theory, the rise and fall of the popular movements of 1848 were in the last analysis determined and conditioned by economic causes. As Engels wrote in his introduction to a reprint in 1895 of Marx's The Class Struggles in France 1848–50: “The world commercial crisis of 1847 was the real cause of the February and March revolutions, and the industrial prosperity which arrived gradually in the middle of 1848, coming to full bloom in 1849 and 1850, was the vitalizing fact of the renascent European reaction. This was decisive.” By the same token, he stated, “A new revolution is possible only as a consequence of a new crisis, and it is also as certain as the latter.”
对马克思和恩格斯来说，新一轮经济危机的临近是革命的号角。因此，1857年的经济萧条使他们燃起了希望，认为欧洲的反动势力将会让位于新的革命形势。恩格斯欣喜若狂地想到，他或许很快就能离开商界，奔赴战场，告别办公室的凳子，骑马驰骋沙场。“现在，我们的时代来临了——这一次，它来势汹汹：一场生死搏斗。我的军事研究将立刻变得更加实用。我立刻投身于普鲁士、奥地利、巴伐利亚和法国军队的战术和组织研究。除此之外，我什么也不做，只骑马，也就是狩猎；因为狩猎才是真正的骑兵学校。”然而，这场“长期危机”最终既没有带来革命，也没有带来战争。
The approach of a new economic crisis was for Marx and Engels the clarion call of the revolution. Thus the depression of 1857 raised their hopes that the European reaction would give way to a new revolutionary situation. Engels was delighted by the thought that he might soon be able to leave business for the battlefield and his office stool for a horse. “Now our time is coming—this time it is coming in full measure: a life-and-death struggle. My military studies will at once become more practical. I am throwing myself immediately into the tactics and organization of the Prussian, Austrian, Bavarian and French armies. And apart from that I do nothing but ride, that is hunt; for hunting is a real cavalry school.” But the “chronic crisis” led to neither revolution nor war.
马克思和恩格斯有时克服重重困难，避免落入流亡生活的种种陷阱，反而将流亡生活转化为一段充满挑战且富有成效的经历。他们在伦敦流亡的第一个十年，成为了他们进入十九世纪中产阶级社会和文化的广阔世界，开启了“世界政治学习年”。如今，他们脱离了政治分裂的德国狭隘、地方性的特殊世界以及法国的政党政治，得以放眼更广阔的视野。“只有客观地描述一个社会中所有阶级之间一切相互关系的总体情况……才能作为先进阶级采取正确策略的基础。”
Sometimes with difficulty, Marx and Engels guarded themselves against the characteristic pitfalls of an émigré existence, and instead turned their exile into a challenging and productive experience. The first decade of their London exile became a period of weltpolitische Lehrjahre as they entered the larger world of nineteenth-century middle-class society and culture. Separated now from the local, particularistic, and limited world of politically fragmented Germany and from French party politics, the two could gaze upon a broader vista. “Nothing but an objective account of the totality of all mutual relationships of all the classes of a given society…can serve as the basis for the correct tactics of the advanced class.”
马克思在其杰作《雾月十八日》中对社会力量进行了这样一种“客观的描述”。他认为，第二次法国大革命在“小拿破仑”手中遭遇惨败的策略教训在于，必须发展农民的“民主能量”。马克思在给恩格斯的信中写道：“德国的一切将取决于能否通过某种形式的第二次农民战争来支持无产阶级革命。”恩格斯在其对德国农民战争的研究中也得出了同样的结论。从此以后，农民作为即将到来的社会革命的潜在盟友或推动力量，在他们的考量中占据了重要地位。尤其是在俄国，革命的前景几乎完全取决于农民的命运。他们将农奴解放视为政治史上的一个转折点，认为这将有助于形成新的革命力量。马克思以世界革命总司令的身份，从他伦敦那间破败的住所里发出拿破仑式的命令，写道：“在下一次革命中，俄国将欣然加入叛乱者的行列。” 从此，俄国革命成为他们政治考量中一个永恒的因素。
Such an “objective account” of social forces Marx offers in his masterful study The Eighteenth Brumaire. The tactical lesson of this great defeat of the second French Revolution at the hands of “Napoleon the Little” is seen by him in the need for developing the “democratic energy” of the peasantry. “The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War,” Marx stated in a letter to Engels. Engels came to the same conclusion in his study of the German Peasant War. From now on the peasantry as a possible ally or driving force in the coming social revolution played a major part in their considerations. Especially the prospects for revolution in Russia were almost exclusively measured in terms of the fate of the peasantry. They hailed the emancipation of the serfs as a turning point in political history that would contribute to a new lineup of revolutionary forces. “At the next revolution,” Marx wrote, as commander in chief of the world revolution, issuing Napoleonic commands from his wretched home in London, “Russia will kindly join the rebels.” Henceforth a Russian revolution became a permanent factor in their political speculations.
马克思和恩格斯从对1848年革命的研究中得出的最深刻的结论，建立在另一个基本的马克思主义假设之上——世界历史是阶级斗争的历史。任何社会都只处于相对的和平状态。这种和平的假象掩盖了持续不断的阶级斗争，以及统治阶级通过对被压迫阶级的武力、经济和意识形态胁迫来维持其暂时的权力垄断这一事实。在任何危机时期，这种脆弱而看似稳定的社会凝聚力都可能迅速瓦解，演变为内战，因为被压迫阶级会奋起反抗压迫者。因此，和平与内战之间的界限是虚幻的。
The most profound conclusions Marx and Engels were to draw from their studies of the revolutions of 1848 were grounded in another fundamental Marxian hypothesis—that world history is the history of class struggle. Every society exists in a state of only relative civil peace. The mask of civil peace conceals both a constant class struggle and the fact that the ruling class maintains its temporary monopoly on power by means of physical, economic, and ideological coercion of the oppressed classes. During any crisis this tenuous and seeming social cohesion could rapidly deteriorate into a state of civil war, as the oppressed classes rise up against their oppressors. Thus the boundaries separating civil peace from civil war are illusory.
从这个角度来看，任何社会中的阶级斗争都可以投射到国际舞台上，当统治阶级彼此宣战时，这种斗争就会显现出来。战争符合统治阶级的利益，直到它对支撑其生存的脆弱社会结构造成过大的压力。此时，战争可能成为革命的催化剂。恩格斯在革命初期的著作中，借鉴了1793年法国的模式。他认为，战争不仅能推动革命，革命还能迫使欧洲其他国家卷入战争。恩格斯希望革命能够提供必要的道德力量和物质力量，带领饱受战火蹂躏的人民走向胜利。尽管1848-1849年的革命证明了1793年革命的神话破灭，但战争与和平、内战与社会和平存在于一个渐进的连续体中这一教训，仍然是马克思主义分析的核心原则。
From this perspective, the class struggles in any society can be projected onto the international arena when ruling classes declare war on one another. War is in the interests of those ruling classes until it places too much strain on the fragile social fabric that supports it. At this point war could be a catalyst for revolution. Engels, in his first writings in the revolutionary years, looked to the model of France in 1793. Not only would war feed the revolution, but the revolution would also force the rest of Europe into war. Engels hoped that the revolution would provide the moral as well as physical force necessary to carry the embattled people through to victory. Though the 1848–1849 revolutions proved the failure of the legend of 1793, the lesson that war and peace, civil war and social peace, existed along a gradual continuum remained a central tenet in Marxian analysis.
三
III
正是在流亡的岁月里，这些侨民也发现了自身的民族认同感。恩格斯无疑在表达更深层次的忠诚和真挚的爱国主义时更为直言不讳；但即使是马克思，在抨击政治对手时，也常常不自觉地流露出明显的民族偏见。更重要的是，社会主义领导人开始全面审视民族特性及其在国际事务中日益增长的重要性。他们密切关注着中东欧民族主义的觉醒，事实上，他们期望这些独立运动能够重燃革命激情，从而打破1848年革命失败后出现的政治冷漠。恩格斯对路易·科苏特领导下的匈牙利革命寄予厚望，正是这种希望的典型体现。当时，恩格斯认为科苏特是“丹东和卡诺的结合体”，这与他后来的看法截然不同。有人认为，恩格斯为《新莱茵报》撰写的关于匈牙利战役的每日报道，激发了他对总参谋部军官工作的终生兴趣。
It is in the years of their exile that the expatriates also discover their own national ties. Engels, no doubt, is more outspoken in his expression of deeper loyalties and of sincere patriotism; but even Marx, often unconsciously, reveals definite national biases in his attacks on his political adversaries. What is more significant, the socialist leaders now begin to take full stock of national individuality and its growing importance in international affairs. They carefully note the awakening nationalism in central and eastern Europe and, in fact, expect from these independence movements a renewal of revolutionary impulses that would destroy the political apathy which had followed the collapse of the revolutions of 1848. Typical of such hopes were Engels's great expectations for the Hungarian revolution under the leadership of Louis Kossuth, whom at that time, in contrast to his later opinion, he regarded as “a combination of Danton and Carnot.” It has been suggested that the daily reports of the military campaign in Hungary that Engels wrote for the Neue Rheinische Zeitung awakened in him his lifelong interest in the tasks of the general staff officer.
尽管马克思和恩格斯自诩为国际主义者，但早在中产阶级政党的代言人摆脱纯粹的民族主义视角之前，他们就开始从国际强权政治的角度思考问题。无论在哪个国家发生任何政治行动，他们都会从更广阔的欧洲视角来看待。诚然，这种国际主义倾向起初是教条式的，对现实也只是粗略的理解。政治划分简单地按照“两个欧洲”的模式进行：反动派与革命派，沙皇主义与进步的西方。很长一段时间里，法国一直被视为革命的祖国。西方列强结盟对抗俄国，雅各宾派法国与神圣同盟之间爆发战争——这正是马克思和恩格斯在1848年极力倡导的国际政策。然而，当预期的“东西方冲突”最终在克里米亚爆发时，却是沙皇与篡位者拿破仑之间的战争，英国则支持法国。尽管如此，他们仍然抱有希望，认为战争最终会释放革命的力量。
Internationalists as they claimed to be, Marx and Engels began to think in terms of international power politics long before the spokesmen of the middle-class parties emancipated themselves from their purely national outlook. Every political action in whatever country it might occur was viewed in terms of the larger European issues. This international orientation, to be sure, was at first dogmatic and only a rough approach to reality. Political divisions were simply drawn according to the formula of the two Europes: reaction versus revolution, czarism versus the progressive West. For a long time France continued to be regarded as the revolutionary homeland. An alliance of the Western powers to fight Russia, a war between Jacobin France and the Holy Alliance—that was the international policy which Marx and Engels had strongly recommended in 1848. When the expected clash between East and West finally came in the Crimea, it was, however, a conflict between the czar and the usurper Napoleon, with Britain supporting France. Still, they were hopeful that in time the war would release the forces of revolution.
克里米亚战争为恩格斯提供了首次深入分析当时军事问题的机会。他甚至尝试成为一名职业军事分析家，但未能如愿在《伦敦每日新闻》找到理想的职位。恩格斯渊博的知识只能通过以卡尔·马克思的名义在《纽约论坛报》上定期发表的文章来展现。这些文章展现了他对技术资料的精通和敏锐的战略判断，深受美国读者的欢迎。
The Crimean War provided the first occasion for Engels to analyze in detail the military problems of the time. He even tried to become a professional military analyst, but failed to find a desired position with the London Daily News. The only outlet for Engels's extraordinary knowledge became the articles that regularly appeared under Karl Marx's name in the New York Tribune. They showed a mastery of technical material and keen strategic judgment, and were well received by their American readers.
战争初期，恩格斯对协约国军队在黑海以及与瑞典和丹麦联合在波罗的海采取迅速而有力的行动寄予厚望，认为这将摧毁俄国海军并夺取其沿海防御工事。“没有眼睛的巨人”将因此被强大的钳形攻势逼至跪地，一场迫在眉睫的内部革命也将很快推翻罗曼诺夫王朝。然而，普鲁士和奥地利的犹豫不决给协约国带来了困难。最终，奥地利的动员削弱了俄军的大部分力量，但对哈布斯堡王朝积极参战的期待却使协约国的重大行动推迟了五个月。恩格斯认为这种拖延是一个战术失误，但他和马克思一样，也怀疑帕默斯顿是“他的朋友沙皇尼古拉二世”的秘密盟友，在这方面，他效仿了备受关注的苏格兰偏执狂戴维·厄克特。
At the beginning of the war, Engels expressed great hopes for quick and energetic action on the part of the Allied forces in the Black Sea and, in combination with Sweden and Denmark, in the Baltic, which would lead to the destruction of Russia's navy and the capture of its coastal fortifications. “The giant without eyes” would thus be forced to his knees by a great pincer movement, and an impending internal revolution would soon bring down the Romanov dynasty. But the undecided attitude of Prussia and Austria created difficulties for the Allies. Eventually, Austria's mobilization neutralized a substantial part of the Russian army, but the hope for active Hapsburg participation delayed any major Allied action for five months. Engels regarded such a delay as a tactical blunder but, with Marx, also suspected Palmerston to be a secret ally of “his friend Czar Nicholas,” following in this respect the lead of the much-talked-about Scottish monomaniac David Urquhart.
然而，对交战双方军队的组织和战术特点进行仔细分析后，恩格斯确信协约国的优势毋庸置疑。到因克曼战役爆发时，协约国的炮兵和骑兵优势已得到充分证明。俄军步兵虽然在对抗土耳其人和波兰叛军时表现出色，但却暴露出其无法应对现代军事技术和小规模战斗的战术。多年后，恩格斯在与俄国经济学家丹尼尔森的谈话中，将克里米亚战争描述为“一个生产技术落后的国家与一个技术先进的国家之间毫无胜算的斗争”。尽管对协约国的胜利充满信心，恩格斯仍然严厉批评英军的组织，尤其是令人震惊的粮食、衣物和医疗物资匮乏，这也激起了英国民众的愤怒。
A careful analysis of the organization and tactical characteristics of the opposing armies, however, left Engels in no doubt about the superiority of the Allied powers. By the time the battle of Inkerman was fought, the supremacy of their artillery and cavalry had been proved. The Russian infantry, effective though it had been against Turks and Polish insurgents, showed its inability to cope with modern military techniques and the tactics of small detachments. Many years later, Engels characterized the Crimean War to the Russian economist Danielson as “a hopeless struggle between a nation with primitive techniques of production and others which were up-to-date.” Confidence to an Allied victory did not, however, prevent Engels from sharply criticizing the organization of the English army, and especially the scandalous lack of food, clothing, and medical care, which had also aroused the anger of the British public.
克里米亚战争的一个重要特征是防御工事和围攻战所发挥的作用。对于肤浅的观察者来说，这或许表明战争艺术发生了变化，从拿破仑时代“倒退”到了十七世纪。“事实并非如此，”恩格斯在塞瓦斯托波尔陷落后总结道，“如今，防御工事的意义仅仅在于作为野战军行动的集结点。它们的价值是相对的。它们不再是军事行动中独立的因素，而是值得坚守到底的宝贵阵地，是否应该坚守到底则取决于具体情况。”因此，他得出结论，俄国人避免正面交锋，并将军队安全置于要塞的抽象价值之上，同样是正确的。在克里米亚战争爆发前夕，恩格斯不仅阅读了拿破仑以来主要军事理论家的著作，还仔细研究了拿破仑在俄国的战役。他能预料到盟军在攻占克里米亚后，要与俄国打交道将会多么困难。在这个幅员辽阔的国家，后勤保障问题似乎难以克服，盟军渴望早日结束战争的心情也情有可原。
An important feature of the Crimean War was the role played by fortifications and siege warfare. To a superficial observer this fact might have indicated a change in the art of war, “slipping back” from the age of Napoleon to the seventeenth century. “Nothing could be less true,” Engels concluded after the fall of Sebastopol. “Today fortifications have no other importance than to be concentrated points in support of the movements of a field army. Their value is relative. They are no longer independent factors in military campaigns, but valuable positions which it might or might not be wise to defend to the last.” For this reason, he concluded, the Russians had been equally right in avoiding an open battle and in considering the safety of their army more important than the abstract value of a fortress. On the eve of the Crimean War, Engels had not only read the writings of the major military theorists since Napoleon, but had also closely studied Napoleon's campaign in Russia. He could predict how difficult it might be for the Allied forces after conquering Crimea to come to grips with Russia. The problems of logistics in this vast country seemed insurmountable, and the Allied desire for an early end of the war was understandable.
然而，面对这种僵局，恩格斯的答案是诉诸革命战略。“原则战争”在他看来是协约国和俄国的解决之道，一方面诉诸德国、波兰、芬兰、匈牙利和意大利日益高涨的民族主义革命力量，另一方面诉诸泛斯拉夫主义。克里米亚战争中的一些交战方无疑也考虑过这种意识形态战争的可能性。拿破仑三世后来向维多利亚女王坦言，如果战争继续下去，他将被迫号召那些争取独立的人民拿起武器。尽管恩格斯乐见这种转变，但无论是尼古拉二世还是拿破仑，都不愿释放民族主义运动那可怕的潜力——而这种潜力在二十世纪的冲突中起到了决定性作用。1856年克里米亚战争的结束粉碎了恩格斯对更大规模革命变革的希望，也使马克思和恩格斯对波拿巴主义的危险性更加坚定了认识。波拿巴主义和泛斯拉夫主义现在成为他们分析欧洲事务的主要主题。
To such an impasse Engels's answer, however, was an appeal to revolutionary strategy. “A war of principle” seemed to him the solution for both the Allies and Russia, appealing on one hand to the revolutionary forces of rising nationalism in Germany, Poland, Finland, Hungary, and Italy; and on the other, to Pan-Slavism. These possibilities of ideological warfare were certainly considered by some of the protagonists in the Crimean War. Napoleon III himself later confessed to Queen Victoria that a continuation of the war would have forced him to call to arms the peoples striving for independence. Much as Engels would have welcomed such a turn, however, neither Nicholas nor Napoleon was prepared to unloose the frightening potential of nationalist movements that became decisive in twentieth-century conflicts. The end of the Crimean War in 1856 shattered Engels's hopes for greater revolutionary upheavals. It also hardened the opinions of both Marx and Engels in respect to the danger of Bonapartism. Bonapartism and Pan-Slavism now became major themes in their analyses of European affairs.
他们对俄国日益扩张和民族野心的恐惧，当然与对俄国反动专制主义的憎恨密不可分，因为俄国的军事干预摧毁了1848年的革命。马克思与卡尔·福格特之间激烈而又充满个人恩怨的争论，耗费了马克思长达十八个月的精力，也表明了马克思和恩格斯反对这位“泛斯拉夫主义者”的根本原因，即德国的安全考量。福格特曾是法兰克福议会左翼的领袖，议会解散后，他移居瑞士。这场争论的直接原因是福格特在1859年法奥战争期间，在其流亡报纸上发表的一篇文章。他认为奥地利的战败将有利于德国；因此，德国的外交努力应该支持波拿巴。马克思散布谣言，称波拿巴资助福格特的报纸，而福格特本人也与热罗姆·波拿巴亲王秘密谈判，以推进法国扶持俄国沙皇之弟登上匈牙利王位的计划。马克思指责福格特根本不在乎“波西米亚，正位于德国腹地，是否会成为俄国的一个省份”。恩格斯也加入了这场争论。他认为，德国放弃波西米亚将意味着德国民族存在的终结，因为从柏林到维也纳的直接路线将穿过俄国。战略、文化和经济方面的考量使恩格斯确信，所有过去被德国征服的东欧和东南欧领土都应该继续属于德国。他强烈反对以民族自决的名义，瓦解伟大的文化民族，建立无法独立生存的分裂国家。
Their fear of the rising expansion and national ambitions of Russia was, of course, inextricably mixed with undiminished hatred for its reactionary absolutism, whose military intervention had helped destroy the revolutions of 1848. The bitter and intensely personal nature of the controversy between Marx and Karl Vogt, a quarrel that occupied Marx's energies for eighteen months, also showed to what extent thoughts of Germany's security were at the base of Marx's and Engels's fight against this “Pan-Slavist.” Vogt had been a leader of the left wing in the Frankfurt Assembly, who, after its dissolution, emigrated to Switzerland. The immediate cause of the controversy was an article Vogt wrote in his émigré newspaper during the Franco-Austrian War of 1859. He argued that Austria's defeat would benefit Germany; therefore, German diplomatic efforts should support Bonaparte. Marx publicized a rumor that Bonaparte was subsidizing Vogt's newspaper and that Vogt himself had entered into secret negotiations with Prince Jerome Bonaparte to advance the French plan to place the Russian czar's brother on the throne of Hungary. Marx charged that Vogt would not care if “Bohemia, right in the heart of Germany, should become a Russian province.” Engels too joined in the fray. A German renunciation of Bohemia, he contended, would mean the end of German national existence, for the direct way from Berlin to Vienna would thus run through Russia. Strategic, cultural, and economic considerations now convinced Engels that all those territories in eastern and southeastern Europe that in the past had been won by Germany should remain German. He vigorously opposed the dissolution of the great cultural nations and the creation of splinter states incapable of an independent national existence—and all that in the name of national self-determination.
波拿巴主义给恩格斯提出了不同的分析难题。他正确地认识到，波拿巴主义真正的力量和危险在于它煽动了不满的中产阶级潜在的经济扩张主义和革命群众的“爱国主义”。恩格斯在两本权威小册子《波河与莱茵河》和《萨伏伊、尼斯与莱茵河》中仔细审视了拿破仑野心的军事含义。在第一篇文章中，他抨击了当时流行的论点，这种论点在以冯·维利森将军在其《1848年意大利战役》一书中为代表的军事专家中盛行，即莱茵河应该在波河上进行防御，因此波河被视为德国不可分割的一部分。通过分析意大利上游河流的流向和意大利防御工事的战略位置，恩格斯证明，控制波河谷对于保卫德国南部边境并非必要。此外，他指出，在所谓军事论据的背后，这些战略的真正动机是复兴神圣罗马帝国的政治野心，以及德国自诩为欧洲仲裁者的地位。他特别警告说，要警惕德国奉行吞并政策，建立一个“大德意志”，因为德国“解放”弱小邻国只会使其成为欧洲最令人憎恨的国家。
Bonapartism posed different analytical problems to Engels. Its real strength and danger, he rightly recognized, were its demagogic appeal to the latent economic expansionism of a dissatisfied middle class and to the “patriotism” of the revolutionary masses. Engels carefully scrutinized the military implications of Napoleon's ambitions in two authoritative pamphlets Po and Rhine and Savoy, Nice and the Rhine. In the first essay, he attacked the popular thesis of his day, as it prevailed among military experts like General von Willisen in his Italian Campaign of the Year 1848, that the Rhine should be defended on the Po, which thus was regarded as an integral part of Germany. In an analysis of the courses of the upper Italian rivers and of the strategic position of the Italian fortifications Engels proved that control of the Po Valley was not required for the defense of Germany's southern frontier. Moreover, he suggested that, hidden behind so-called military arguments, the real motivations for such strategies were political ambitions for a renewal of the Holy Roman Empire and a German claim to become the arbiter of Europe. He specifically warned against an annexationist policy of a greater Germany, whose “liberation” of weak neighbors would make it the most hated nation in Europe.
恩格斯对西线战役可能战略的论述更引人入胜。他试图证明，法国在加固巴黎之后，可以放弃其对莱茵河左岸的传统主权声索。如同德奥两国对意大利北部的主权声索一样，恩格斯再次完全从军事角度驳斥了法国关于“天然边界”的主张。法国战役的战略主要围绕保卫巴黎展开，这无可厚非，因为法国的中央集权使得巴黎成为国家存亡的关键。首都的陷落意味着国家的失败。然而，随着巴黎防御工事的加固，沃邦设计的三重防御体系显得多余，只会徒劳地分散军事力量。恩格斯认为，法国安全真正的威胁在于其薄弱的比利时边境，因为尽管有欧洲条约，“历史尚未证明，一旦发生战争，比利时的中立立场不过是一纸空文。”基于这种务实的评估，恩格斯详细阐述了他成功的军事行动计划。巴黎固守之后，法国便可在比利时边境发起进攻。“如果这次进攻被击退，军队必须在瓦兹-埃纳河一线进行最后的抵抗；敌人再往前推进是徒劳的，因为从比利时入侵的军队实力太弱，无法单独攻克巴黎。在埃纳河后方，与巴黎保持畅通无阻的联系——或者至少在马恩河后方，左翼直指巴黎——法国北方军队可以发起进攻，等待其他部队的到来。”五十五年后，加列尼的反击应验了恩格斯关于马恩河奇迹的预言。
Even more interesting was Engels's discussion of the possible strategy of a western campaign. Here he tried to prove that France, having fortified Paris, could now abandon its traditional claim to the left bank of the Rhine. Again, as in the case of German-Austrian claims in northern Italy, Engels disproved, exclusively in terms of military evidence, the validity of the French plea for “a natural frontier.” The strategy of French campaigns was directed primarily toward the defense of Paris, and justifiably so because the centralization of France made Paris the key to the country's survival. The surrender of the capital would mean national defeat. With the recent fortification of Paris, however, Vauban's threefold ring of fortifications was superfluous and meant only a useless diversion of military forces. The real danger to French security Engels considered to be its weak Belgian frontier, because in spite of European treaties, “history has yet to show that in case of war Belgium's neutrality is more than a scrap of paper.” On the basis of such a realistic evaluation Engels elaborated his plan for a successful military campaign. With Paris fortified, France could defend itself offensively on the Belgian frontier. “If this offensive is repulsed the army must make a final stand on the Oise-Aisne line; it would be useless for the enemy to advance farther, since the army invading from Belgium would be too weak to act against Paris alone. Behind the Aisne, in unchallengeable communication with Paris—or at the worst behind the Marne with its left wing on Paris—the French northern army could take the offensive and wait for the arrival of the other forces.” Fifty-five years later Galliéni's counterattack fulfilled Engels's prophetic prediction of the miracle of the Marne.
在普法战争期间，恩格斯再次展现了他对战略发展的卓越分析能力。他在为伦敦《帕尔马尔公报》撰写的一系列文章中，预言了普鲁士军队在向沙隆进军时会突然转向比利时边境，因此，他是少数几位成功预测到毛奇在色当取得决定性胜利的欧洲观察家之一。
During the Franco-Prussian War, Engels once again demonstrated his analytic mastery of strategic developments. In a series of articles written for the London Pall Mall Gazette he suggested the sudden shift of the Prussian army marching on Châlons toward the Belgian frontier, and thus was among the few European observers to predict the moves that led to Moltke's decisive victory at Sedan.
萨伏伊、尼斯和莱茵河事件揭示了军事战略的另一个要素，其全部意义直到第一次世界大战才被人们所认识：法俄结盟可能导致两线作战的阴影。“莱茵兰除了被战争诅咒，好让俄国在维斯瓦河和多瑙河上畅行无阻之外，还有什么别的使命吗？”恩格斯惊呼道。俄国仍然是欧洲自由的主要威胁，尽管恩格斯当时还抱有一丝侥幸，认为革命的新盟友——获得解放的农奴——很快就能遏制这种危险。“现在俄国农村统治阶级和被统治阶级之间爆发的斗争，已经动摇了俄国外交政策的整个体系。这个体系只有在俄国没有内部政治发展的情况下才有可能存在；但那个时代已经过去了。”
Savoy, Nice and the Rhine pointed to another element of military strategy, the full meaning of which was not realized until the First World War: the specter of a two-front war resulting from a Franco-Russian alliance. “Has the Rhineland no other calling,” Engels exclaimed, “but to be cursed by a war in order to give Russia a free hand on the Vistula and the Danube?” Russia remained the main threat to European liberty, though Engels now harbored the vain hope that this danger would soon be checked by a new ally of the revolution, the liberated serfs. “The struggle that has now broken out in Russia between the ruling classes of the rural population and the ruled is already undermining the whole system of Russian foreign policy. The system was possible only so long as Russia had no internal political development; but that time is past.”
相反，拿破仑三世的计划却并非那么容易被忽视。恩格斯详细探讨了法国入侵英国以及保卫不列颠群岛的可能性。为此，他在两份专门刊登军事文章的期刊（《达姆施塔特日报》和《兰开夏郡和柴郡志愿兵杂志》）上发表了一系列文章，尤其关注志愿步枪兵。其中一些文章于1861年以小册子的形式出版，名为《致志愿兵的随笔》。尽管恩格斯同情步枪兵及其较为宽松的操练制度，但他最终认为他们无法与新扩充的法国军队匹敌，他称法国军队为“欧洲最好的军事组织”。
The plans of Napoleon III, on the contrary, were not so easy to dismiss. Engels explored in some detail the prospect of a French invasion of England and the defense of the British Isles. In this connection he published in two journals specializing in military affairs (the Darmstädter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Volunteer Journal of Lancashire and Cheshire) a number of articles dealing especially with the volunteer riflemen. Some of these articles were brought out in 1861 in pamphlet form: Essays Addressed to Volunteers. Despite his sympathy for the riflemen and their less rigid system of drill, Engels concluded that they were no match for the newly enlarged French army, which he called the “best military organization in Europe.”
接下来几年最重大的军事事件是美国内战。与当时大多数对这场漫长而残酷的战争漠不关心的欧洲士兵不同——据说毛奇曾说过他不想研究“武装暴民的运动”——恩格斯认为这是“军事史上无与伦比的戏剧”。这场战争不仅是一场革命性的战争，因为它首次在广阔的作战区域内战略性地运用了铁路和装甲舰，而且还因为它“彻底废除了奴隶制”。马克思在《资本论》第一版的序言中写道：“正如十八世纪的美国独立战争为欧洲中产阶级敲响了警钟，十九世纪的美国内战也为欧洲工人阶级敲响了警钟。”
The great military event of the following years was the American Civil War. Contrary to most European soldiers, who at the time showed little interest in this long, bitter struggle—Moltke is said to have stated that he did not care to study the “movements of armed mobs”—Engels regarded it as a “drama without parallel in the annals of military history.” It was a revolutionary war not only in its first strategic use of railways and armored ships over a vast area of operations, but also in its “world-transforming abolition of slavery.” In the preface of the first edition of Capital Marx wrote: “As in the eighteenth century the American War of Independence sounded the tocsin for the European middle class, so in the nineteenth century the American Civil War sounded it for the European working class.”
尽管恩格斯同情北方，但他对北方军队的“松懈管理”感到震惊，这与南方军队的死里逃生般的认真态度形成了鲜明对比。在1862年11月5日写给马克思的信中，他表示，对于一个在如此重大的问题上竟然任由自己四分之一的人口不断击败的民族，他“无法产生任何热情”。他甚至对战争的结局都持怀疑态度。正是马克思告诫他不要被片面的军事考量所误导。直到他一直钦佩李将军卓越战略的军队被包围，格兰特将军像拿破仑一样在耶拿战役中俘虏敌军，取得胜利时，恩格斯才真正认识到北方军队惊人的纪律性和士气，而他们当初参战时却是“昏昏欲睡、不情愿的”。
Although Engels's sympathies were on the side of the North, he was appalled by its “slack management” as contrasted with the deadly earnestness of the South. In a letter to Marx of November 5, 1862., he said that he could not “work up any enthusiasm for a people which on such a colossal issue allows itself to be continuously beaten by a fourth of its own population.” He was even doubtful about the outcome of the war. It was Marx who warned him not to be misled by a one-sided attention to military aspects. Only when Lee, whose superior strategy he had admired, was surrounded and Grant, like Napoleon, delivered his battle of “Jena” by capturing the whole of the enemy's army, did Engels recognize the remarkable discipline and morale of the northerners, who had entered the war “sleepily and reluctantly.”
在俾斯麦的领导下，普鲁士的崛起再次将恩格斯的目光转向欧洲战场。短暂的丹麦战争向恩格斯证明，正如他所预料的那样，德国步兵优于丹麦步兵，“普鲁士的火器，无论是步枪还是大炮，都是世界上最好的”。然而，他低估了普鲁士的军事打击能力。事实上，在克尼格雷茨战役前夕，他在《曼彻斯特卫报》上发表的一篇文章中，甚至预言普鲁士将在战争中战败。他猛烈抨击了毛奇的战役计划，但第二天却承认普鲁士人“尽管犯下了违反战争更高准则的罪行，但表现还算不错”。恩格斯的严重误判很大程度上源于他对普鲁士内部形势的错误评估。 19世纪60年代初围绕军队改革的激烈宪政斗争，被他（以及许多社会主义者）误认为是军队的瓦解和革命的前兆。“如果这次机会白白溜走……那我们就可以收拾行囊，放弃革命，转而研究纯粹的理论了。”他坦言道。的确，又一次革命的契机已经过去，而就在第二天，恩格斯就迅速意识到了这一点。
The rise of Prussia under Bismarck's leadership turned Engels's thoughts once again to European battlegrounds. The short Danish war proved to Engels that, as he had expected, the German infantry was superior to the Danish and that “Prussian firearms, both rifles and artillery, were the best in the world.” Still, he underestimated the military striking power of Prussia. Indeed, in an article in the Manchester Guardian written on the eve of the battle of Königgrätz, he went so far as to predict Prussia's defeat in the war. He sharply attacked Moltke's plan for the campaign, only to admit the following day that the Prussians, “in spite of their sins against the higher laws of warfare, had not done badly.” Engels's grave miscalculation was largely derived from his erroneous appraisal of Prussia's internal situation. The bitter constitutional struggle over the army reforms in the early 1860s had been mistaken by him, as by so many socialists, for a disintegration of the army and a prelude to revolution. “If this chance passes without being used…then we can pack up our revolutionary bags and turn to studying pure theory,” he confessed. Indeed, another revolutionary situation had passed, and the day after Königgrätz Engels was quick to recognize the fact.
恩格斯对普鲁士军队抱有毫无保留的敬意，同时也接受了普鲁士胜利所带来的政治后果。“事实很简单，”他写信给马克思说，“普鲁士拥有五十万门针式机枪，而世界其他国家加起来连五百门都不到。任何军队都不可能在两三年，甚至五年内装备上后膛装填机枪。在此之前，普鲁士占据着绝对优势。你认为俾斯麦不会利用这个机会吗？他当然会。”恩格斯此时认识到俾斯麦才是真正的波拿巴主义者，比拿破仑三世更加危险。他为德国统一进程“一度被普鲁士主义所淹没”而感到遗憾；但他同样反对像威廉·李卜克内西这样的社会主义领导人“不愿正视事实”的不切实际的做法。相反，恩格斯正是在普鲁士的胜利所奠定的基础上，重新开始了与俾斯麦的斗争。
With his unqualified respect for the Prussian army he also accepted the political consequences of its victory. “The simple fact is this,” he wrote to Marx, “Prussia has five hundred thousand needle guns and the rest of the world has not five hundred. No army can be equipped with breech loaders in less than two or three, or perhaps five, years. Until then Prussia is on top. Do you suppose that Bismarck will not use this moment? Of course he will.” Engels now recognized in Bismarck the real Bonapartist, more dangerous than Napoleon III, and he regretted that German unification had been “temporarily flooded with Prussianism”; but he equally rejected the unrealistic refusal of socialist leaders like Wilhelm Liebknecht “to look at the facts.” Instead, Engels renewed the struggle with Bismarck upon the very basis created by the Prussian successes.
马克思和恩格斯的历史辩证法的分析能力如今面临考验。在流亡的艰苦历练中，他们学会了将阶级和民族的具体发展置于更广阔的欧洲背景下看待，并将自身的革命战略建立在“对社会发展客观状况的描述”之上。然而，欧洲冲突、印度兵变和美国内战的结果，并未使人们对期盼已久的革命会很快爆发抱有希望。马克思，尤其是恩格斯，逐渐意识到，有限战争并非他们所期待的革命先兆；事实上，这些冲突的短期效应可能是反动的，正如马克思对1859年意大利战争的描述。随着欧洲列强军队实力和技术能力的增强，恩格斯开始担忧，或许只有大规模的世界大战才能带来人们所期盼的革命。但这样的世界末日并非恩格斯所乐见的结局。
The analytic power of the historical dialectics of Marx and Engels now faced a test. In the hard school of their exile they had learned to see the particular developments of classes and nations in their greater European context and to base their own revolutionary strategies on an “account of the objective state of social development.” The outcomes of the European conflicts, the Sepoy rebellion, and the American Civil War did not encourage belief in an early outbreak of the long-awaited revolution. Marx, and more particularly Engels, were coming to the conclusion that limited wars were not the harbingers they had counted on; in fact, the short-term effect of these conflicts could be reactionary, as Marx characterized the Italian War of 1859. As the armies of the major European powers gained in strength and technological capabilities, Engels began to consider the alarming prospect that only a large-scale world war would bring about the desired revolution. But such an Armageddon was not an outcome Engels could welcome.
即使是普法战争也让革命者陷入两难境地。法国和德国是欧洲工人阶级运动规模最大的两个国家。战争对社会主义运动而言风险太大。到1888年，恩格斯警告说，未来世界大战的破坏“将比任何蝗灾都更彻底地吞噬整个欧洲”，三十年战争的破坏与之相比都将黯然失色。战争被排除在实现革命目标的手段之外，但革命运动却因此失去了革命战略。
Even the Franco-Prussian War left the revolutionaries with a dilemma. France and Germany were the two countries with the largest working-class movements in Europe. War now carried with it too many risks for the socialist movement. By 1888 Engels warned that the destruction of a future world war “will eat all Europe more bare than any swarm of locusts” and make the devastation of the Thirty Years' War pale in comparison. War was ruled out as a desired means to the revolutionary end, but now the revolutionary movement was left without a revolutionary strategy.
第四
IV
面对革命运动未来走向的种种困境，恩格斯转而研究军队与社会关系的其他方面，其中包括军队在革命国家中的作用。诚然，恩格斯构想的未来革命国家的轮廓仍然十分模糊。此外，他的理论并未得到热烈欢迎，甚至遭到社会主义政党领导层的反对。然而，他众多且多元的提议在此阶段逐渐清晰起来，这不仅是他毕生战争研究的结晶，也塑造了欧洲激进主义的未来发展方向。恩格斯的军事政策此时建立在民主军队、武装民族以及对其逐步实现的信念之上。事实上，这一愿景早在恩格斯的《军事问题与德国工人阶级》一书中就已初见端倪。在接下来的三十年里，它成为了恩格斯的指导原则。
Faced with these quandaries about the future of the revolutionary movement, Engels turned to other aspects of the relationship between the military and society, among them the role of the military in a revolutionary state. The contours of the future revolutionary state as visualized by Engels remained only fragmentary, to be sure. Moreover, his concepts were given a tepid welcome, and were even opposed by the leadership of the socialist parties. Still, the direction of his many and diverse proposals became clear at this stage, crowning a lifelong study of war and shaping the future development of radicalism in Europe. Engels's military policy now was based on the doctrine of the democratic army, the nation in arms, and the belief in its progressive realization. Indeed, in Engels's pamphlet The Military Question and the German Working Class this vision had already appeared. It became his guiding principle during the next thirty years.
恩格斯在普鲁士保守派与新兴自由资产阶级宪政冲突最为激烈的时期发表了关于普鲁士军事问题的研究，其首要目的是为工人党提供指导。恩格斯建议为争取自身政治解放而斗争的无产阶级支持资产阶级反对反动势力（这些反动势力如今已在新型的波拿巴主义国家中形成，工人和资本家的一切政治权力都被剥夺殆尽）。这篇文章的特殊意义不仅在于它对中产阶级反对派的强弱进行了精辟的分析，并掌握了自拿破仑战争以来普鲁士军队组织历史的技术细节，还在于它鉴于普鲁士人口和财富的增长，特别是考虑到其邻国的军事潜力，对军队改革提出了务实的建议。事实上，恩格斯的抨击很大程度上针对的是资产阶级，因为资产阶级在这些关键时期失去了政治优势，也未能赢得军队的支持。恩格斯后来声称，这一根本性的失败是1870年后德国民主发展停滞不前的主要原因。在他看来，军队的发展是社会进步不可或缺的一部分。
The study of the military question in Prussia, published at the height of the constitutional conflict between the Prussian conservatives and the rising liberal bourgeoisie, was above all intended as a primer for the workers' party. Engels's advice to the proletariat, fighting for its own political emancipation, was to support the bourgeoisie against the forces of reaction (now fashioned in the new type of Bonapartist state in which every vestige of political power was withdrawn from both workers and capitalists alike). What gave this essay its special significance was not only its shrewd appraisal of the strength and weaknesses of the middle-class opposition and its command of technical details concerning the history of Prussian army organization since the Napoleonic Wars, but also its realistic support of the army reforms in view of Prussia's increase in population and wealth, and especially in view of its neighbors' military potential. In fact, Engels's attack was directed in large part against the bourgeoisie, which had lost its political advantage and had failed to win over the army during these critical years. This fundamental failure, Engels later claimed, was above all responsible for the stagnation of democratic development in Germany after 1870. The development of the army, in his judgment, was an integral part of social growth.
在早期的研究中，例如为《新美国百科全书》撰写的文章中，马克思和恩格斯强调了过去和现在军事组织的社会基础和前提条件。现在他们认识到，军队本身可以成为首要的社会机构；事实上，它可以成为民主社会出现的主要渠道。这个公式很简单，它遵循了法国大革命所带来的历史趋势。资产阶级和农民的解放为现代群众军队的建立铺平了道路。如果实行普遍征兵制，就能确保拥有最强大、最高效的军队来保卫国家免受外部世界的侵略。同样，它也必然会改变军队的性质，使其从一支由长期服役的职业军人或雇佣兵组成的队伍转变为一支人民军队。恩格斯在1891年自豪地宣称：“与表面现象相反，义务兵役制作为一种民主手段，其作用超过了普选权。德国社会民主党的真正力量不在于选民人数，而在于士兵人数。一个人25岁成为选民，20岁成为士兵；而党的追随者主要来自青年。到1900年，军队——曾经是这个国家最具普鲁士特色、最反动的组成部分——必将不可避免地成为社会主义的主体。”
In earlier studies, such as the articles written for the New American Cyclopaedia, Marx and Engels had emphasized the social basis and preconditions for military organization, past and present. Now they realized that the army itself could serve as a social agency of the first order; in fact, it could serve as the major channel through which a democratic society might emerge. The formula was simple and it followed the historical trends introduced by the French Revolution. The emancipation of the bourgeoisie and peasantry had opened the way for the modern mass army. General conscription, if practiced consistently, guaranteed the strongest and most efficient army for defense of the nation against the outside world. By the same token, it necessarily transformed the character of the armed forces, changing them from a force of long-serving professionals or mercenaries into a people's army. Proudly Engels could exclaim in 1891: “Contrary to appearance, compulsory military service surpasses general franchise as a democratic agency. The real strength of German social democracy does not rest in the number of its voters but in its soldiers. One becomes a voter at twenty-five, a soldier at twenty; and it is youth above all from which the party recruits its followers. By 1900, the army, once the most Prussian, the most reactionary element of the country, will be socialist in its majority as inescapably as fate.”
显然，恩格斯低估了既有制度的持久性和内在动力；他对历史巨变的节奏也同样判断失误。然而，他的观点源于他对民主与社会主义国家最终融合的乐观信念。恩格斯对民兵的拥护使他与许多十九世纪的自由主义者联系在一起。他们和恩格斯一样，都提出民兵作为常备军——十八世纪专制主义时期职业雇佣军——的替代方案。恩格斯捍卫民兵的背后，是他希望军队非职业化，使其成为一个真正民主且具有民主化作用的机构。
Obviously, Engels miscalculated the staying power and inner dynamics of established institutions; no less did he mistake the tempo of great historical transformations. Yet his view was part of his optimistic belief in the final confluence of democracy and the socialist state. Engels's advocacy of the militia army associated him with many nineteenth-century liberals. They as well as Engels proposed the militia as an alternative to standing armies—the professional mercenary armies of eighteenth-century absolutism. Behind Engels's defense of the militia lay his wish to deprofessionalize the army and render it a truly democratic and democratizing institution.
然而，这种信念并没有使恩格斯低估资本主义国家的军事需求，尤其是在一场“空前残酷和普遍”的世界大战的威胁下。他推测，在这样一场欧洲大战中，最终的决定权将掌握在英国手中，因为它可以封锁法国或德国，从而使其中一方因饥饿而屈服。1891年10月，他在写给奥古斯特·倍倍尔的信中说：“在战争危险依然存在的情况下，我们不能要求（德国的）现有军事组织彻底改变。”在一系列题为《欧洲能否裁军？》的文章中，他建议，为了防止战争，应该“通过国际协议逐步缩短兵役期限”，最初的兵役期限为两年。然而，他始终坚持自己的基本信念，并指出“我提出的建议仅限于任何现有政府在不危及国家安全的前提下都能接受的”。尽管他将民兵制度视为最终目标，但他还是赶紧告诫马克思：“只有共产主义社会才能真正接近完整的民兵制度，即使是这种方法也只是渐近线。”
This conviction, however, did not lead Engels to underestimate the military needs of the capitalist state, especially in view of a constantly threatening world war of “unexampled violence and universality.” The final decision in such a general European war, he surmised, would rest with England because it could blockade either France or Germany and so starve one or the other into submission. “We cannot demand that the existing military organization [of Germany] should be completely altered while the danger of war exists,” he wrote to August Bebel in October 1891. In a series of articles entitled Can Europe Disarm? he suggested, as a means of preventing war, the “gradual diminution of the term of military service by international agreement,” such service at first to be for two years. Yet consistent with his basic conviction, he stated that “I limit myself to such proposals as any existing government can accept without endangering the security of its country”; and although he regarded the militia system as a final goal, he hastened to caution Marx that “only a communist society could get really near the full Miliz and even that approach would only be asymptotic.”
恩格斯关于战争与革命的思想后期是否与其早期革命主张相矛盾，至今仍是一个悬而未决的问题。渐进式社会主义者和革命社会主义者，这对看似矛盾的孪生兄弟，都可以将他奉为精神导师。作为一名战士和军人，恩格斯难以接受缓慢而乏味的改革。与此同时，他又敏锐地意识到，任何冲突都取决于可用的武器，每个社会和每个历史时期都需要不同的方法和战略。恩格斯将军队视为一种社会组织形式。军队如同经济生产形式一样，受制于变革规律。正如马克思将生产方式的变革与社会关系的变革联系起来一样，恩格斯也研究了技术变革对军事组织的影响。尤其是在他的小册子《反杜林》中，恩格斯运用唯物主义历史的原理来探讨军事问题。即使恩格斯的著作对十九世纪军事思想本身的发展影响甚微，但他将军事问题视为经济和社会研究的一个分支的综合性方法，却对后世的军事思想产生了深远的影响。他在《反杜林》中写道：“并非天才将领的‘自由创造’改变了战争，而是更先进武器的发明和士兵等人力资源的变革；天才将领的作用至多仅限于使作战方法适应新的武器和作战人员。”社会和军事技术的变革改变了战争，而这又进一步要求革命性的战略变革。
Whether the final stage of Engels's thought on war and revolution contradicted the revolutionary appeals of his early days is an open question. Both evolutionary and revolutionary socialists, twin brothers in conflict, can claim him as their master. Fighter and soldier that he was, Engels found it difficult to reconcile himself to slow and tedious reforms. At the same time, he was too astute not to recognize that every conflict was dependent on the weapons available, and that every society and every historical period would demand different methods and strategies. Engels viewed armies as forms of social organization. Armies, just as forms of economic production, were subject to laws of change. And much as Marx related changes in modes of production to transformations in social relations, so Engels investigated the impact of technological change on military organization. Above all in his pamphlet Anti-Dühring, Engels applied the principles of materialist history to military questions. Even if Engels's writings had little impact on the development of nineteenth-century military thinking itself, his comprehensive approach to military questions as a subspecies of economic and social investigations has left its mark on subsequent military thought. “It is not the ‘free creations of the mind’ of generals of genius that have revolutionized war,” he wrote in Anti-Dühring, “but the inventions of better weapons and changes in the human material, the soldiers; at the very most the part played by generals of genius is limited to adapting methods of fighting to the new weapons and combatants.” Changes in society and in military technology altered warfare, and beyond that demanded changes in revolutionary strategy.
即使在生命的最后阶段，恩格斯也没有完全放弃革命的希望。他在新编的《1848-1850年法国阶级斗争》一书的引言中，注意到了革命战略的必要变革。他指出：“1848年的斗争方法，如今在任何方面都已经过时了。”街垒战、街头革命的时代已经一去不复返了。事实上，恩格斯指出，“即使在街垒战的黄金时期，街垒的作用也更多在于精神层面而非物质层面。”如果街垒能够坚守到动摇军队的自信心，胜利就已取得；反之，则意味着失败。但到了1849年，胜利的希望已经渺茫。 “街垒失去了往日的魅力；士兵们看到的不再是街垒后面的人民，而是叛军……军官们也逐渐熟悉了巷战的战术。他们不再像以前那样，在临时搭建的胸墙后排成直线行军，而是利用花园、庭院和房屋进行侧翼包抄。” 此后，情况发生了巨大的变化，一切都对军队有利，而起义者的处境却每况愈下。现代武器装备是先进技术和重工业的产物，再也无法临时搭建。自1848年以来，大城市新建的城区街道笔直宽阔，仿佛是为有效使用新型大炮和步枪而量身打造的。但是，统治阶级不应指望革命者在这些新兴的工人阶级聚居区构筑街垒。 “他们还不如要求下一场战争中的敌人以腓特烈二世式的直线阵型，或者像瓦格拉姆战役和滑铁卢战役那样以整个师的纵队来迎战。由少数人领导无知群众发动革命的时代已经过去了。当革命涉及到社会组织的彻底变革时，群众自身必须参与其中，必须明白其中的利害关系；过去五十年的历史已经充分证明了这一点。”
Even at the end of his life Engels did not abandon all hopes for a revolution. He paid attention to the necessary changes in revolutionary strategy in the introduction of the newly edited Class Struggles in France 1848–1850. “The fighting methods of 1848,” he stated, “are obsolete today in every respect.” Gone was the day of the barricades, of street-corner revolutions. In fact, Engels pointed out, “even during the classic period of street battles, the barricade had a moral rather than a material effect.” If the barricade held until it had shaken the self-confidence of the military, the victory was won; if not, it meant defeat. But already by 1849 the chances of success had diminished. “The barricade had lost its charm; the soldier saw behind it no longer the people but rebels…the officer in the course of time had become familiar with the tactical forms of street battles. No longer did he march in direct line and without cover upon improvised breastworks, but outflanked them through gardens, courts, and houses.” Since then much more had changed, all in favor of the military, while for the insurgents conditions had become worse. Modern armaments, the products of advanced technology and heavy industry, could no longer be improvised. The newly built quarters of the large cities erected since 1848 had been laid out in long, straight, and wide streets as though made to order for the effective use of the new cannon and rifles. But the ruling classes should not expect the revolutionary to build barricades in these new working-class districts. “They might as well ask of their enemies in the next war to face them in the linear formation of Frederick the Second or in the columns of whole divisions à la Wagram and Waterloo. The time is past for revolutions carried through by small minorities at the head of unconscious masses. When it gets to be a matter of the complete transformation of the social organization, the masses themselves must participate, must understand what is at stake; that much the history of the last fifty years has taught us.”
如今，合法征服国家已成为当务之急。遏制激进社会主义力量稳步增长的唯一途径，就是与军队发生大规模冲突，如同1871年昙花一现的巴黎公社那样血流成河。这第一次建立“社会主义共和国”的尝试，常被誉为此后几十年欧洲革命者的伟大教材。马克思本人在其著作《法国内战》中也对此进行了细致的分析。然而，这些对巴黎公社的研究，对恩格斯关于革命战略军事方面的思考几乎没有任何贡献。事实上，即便反动势力发动政变，巴黎公社的复兴也与恩格斯的理论相悖。在他漫长政治生涯的最后阶段，他期望社会主义的胜利能够通过选举权的民主进程实现，正如他设想民主的胜利将通过普遍兵役制来实现一样。
Now the legal conquest of the state was the order of the day. There was but one means by which the steady growth of the militant socialist forces could for the moment be stemmed—a collision on a large scale with the military, a bloodletting like that of 1871 in the short-lived Paris Commune. This first attempt at a “Socialist Republic” has often been praised as the great object lesson for the European revolutionaries of the following decades. Marx himself had analyzed it carefully in his Civil War in France. Yet these studies of the Commune contributed almost nothing to the development of Engels's thinking about the military aspects of revolutionary strategy. In fact, a renewal of a Paris Commune, though it might be provoked by a threatening coup d'état of reactionary forces, did not accord with his theories. In this last stage of his long career, he expected the triumph of socialism to come about through the democratic processes of the franchise, as he visualized the victory of democracy through the channels of universal military service.
“全民武装”已成为恩格斯公开宣称的军事理想。他认为在19世纪的欧洲社会摧毁军国主义是徒劳的。相反，他主张通过普遍义务兵役制来根除其封建传统，唤醒其民主倾向。有趣的是，他的思想与他的敌人——欧洲列强的战争部长和总参谋部——的思想不谋而合。这些人同样信奉全民武装，但始终担忧它容易受到社会主义的侵蚀。
“The nation in arms” had become the declared military ideal of Engels. He regarded as futile the campaign to destroy militarism in nineteenth-century European society. Instead, he advocated eradicating its feudal traditions and awakening its democratic tendencies by means of universal compulsory military service. It is interesting to see how his ideas coincided with those of his enemies, the ministers of war and the general staffs of the European powers, who also put their faith in the nation in arms, but always feared its susceptibility to socialist contamination.
毫无疑问，恩格斯会完全赞同他的一位杰出弟子，法国社会主义者让·饶勒斯的观点。饶勒斯在其著作《新军》中写道：“如果军队动员就是国家动员，那么各国政府就不会那么热衷于冒险政策……如果一个渴望和平的国家遭到掠夺成性、冒险主义的政府的攻击，这些政府企图掠夺巨额财富或转移国内的注意力，那么我们将面临一场真正的民族战争……‘全民武装’代表着最能实现最高尚、最充分的国防体系。全民武装的国家必然是一个以正义为动力的国家。它将为欧洲带来一个新时代，它将带来正义与和平的希望。”
No doubt, Engels would have fully agreed with one of his outstanding disciples, the French socialist Jean Jaurès, who in his Armée Nouvelle stated: “Governments will be far less ready to dream of adventurous policies if the mobilization of the army is the mobilization of the nation itself…. If a nation that wants peace is assailed by predatory and adventurous governments in quest of some colossal plunder or some startling diversion from their domestic difficulties, then we shall have a truly national war…the ‘nation in arms’ represents the system best calculated to realize national defense in its supreme and fullest form. The nation in arms is necessarily a nation motivated by justice. It will bring to Europe a new era, it will bring hopes of justice and peace.”
历史最终证明这种理想大错特错。恩格斯虽然夸大了社会主义意识形态对欧洲群众的影响，但他对征兵制和群众军队的运作机制却有着更为精准的理解。而且，他比同时代的其他保守派和自由派人士更深刻地认识到政治因素与军事因素、文职领域与军事领域的相互渗透，这种认识在二十世纪最后几十年里持续指导着革命思想和战略。
History was to prove that ideal terribly wrong. But if Engels exaggerated the power of socialist ideology over the European masses, he more accurately understood the dynamic of conscription and mass armies. And far better than his conservative and liberal contemporaries, he recognized the interpenetration of political and military factors and of the civilian and military spheres, a recognition that continues to guide revolutionary thinking and strategy in the last decades of the twentieth century.
*注：马克·冯·哈根对西格蒙德·诺伊曼发表在《现代战略的缔造者》一书中的文章进行了大幅修改。
* NOTE: Mark von Hagen has substantially revised the essay by Sigmund Neumann that appeared in the original Makers of Modern Strategy.
10. 普鲁士-德国学派：毛奇与总参谋部的崛起*
10. The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff*
F维也纳和约签订半个世纪后，普鲁士一直没有积极参与欧洲战争。19世纪60年代，普鲁士军队崛起成为欧洲大陆最强大的力量，但在此之前，它已经近两代人没有实战经验。在1848-1849年的革命期间，普鲁士军队曾进行过一些无关紧要的战役，并在1830年至1859年间多次被动员，以应对那些最终并未发生的冲突。而同期，俄国、奥地利、法国和英国的军队却一直在进行战争。普鲁士军队在19世纪60年代的优势，完全得益于其组织架构、和平时期的训练以及在柯尼格雷茨和色当战役前半个世纪里臻于完善的战争理论研究。
FOR HALF a century after the Peace of Vienna, Prussia abstained from active participation in European wars. When the Prussian army emerged in the 1860s as the most powerful force on the Continent, it had had for almost two generations no practical experiences of war. It had undertaken some insignificant campaigns during the revolution of 1848–1849 and had been mobilized repeatedly between 1830–1859 in anticipation of conflicts that did not materialize. In the same period the Russian, Austrian, French, and British armies had been fighting wars. The superiority of the Prussian army in the 1860s was made possible only by its organization, by its peacetime training, and by the theoretical study of war that had been brought to perfection in the half-century before Königgrätz and Sedan.
十九世纪的普鲁士军队是由四位人物缔造的：腓特烈大帝、拿破仑、沙恩霍斯特和格奈森瑙。腓特烈留下了胜利和逆境中坚韧不拔的宝贵记忆，这对于军队的骄傲和自立至关重要。此外，他还向他的军事继任者们灌输了这样的理念：即使在和平时期，军队的生活也充满了艰苦的劳作，而战斗的胜利首先是在训练场上取得的。毫无疑问，普鲁士军队曾过分强调军事生活的细枝末节，而这种过分之处最初被国王的战略才能所平衡。然而，他并没有培养年轻的战略家，是一位外国征服者让普鲁士人重新认识到战略在战争中的作用，两位非普鲁士裔的年轻军官不得不重塑普鲁士军队，而他们很大程度上是按照现代法国军队的模式进行的。因此，拿破仑成为普鲁士军队的第二任指挥官，继耶拿战役之后，沙恩霍斯特和格奈森瑙使普鲁士军队适应了这种新型战争。
The Prussian army of the nineteenth century was created by four men: Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau. Frederick bequeathed precious memories of victory and endurance in adversity, which are so essential for the pride and self-reliance of an army. In addition, he impressed upon his military successors the knowledge that even the peacetime life of an army consists of hard labor and that battles are won first on the training ground. There was undoubtedly in the Prussian army an overemphasis on the minutiae of military life, which was originally counterbalanced by the strategic genius of the king. He did not train younger strategists, however, and it was a foreign conqueror who reminded the Prussians of the role that strategy plays in warfare, and two young officers, both non-Prussian by birth, had to remold the Prussian army, which they did largely along the modern French pattern. Thus Napoleon became the second taskmaster of the Prussian army, and—after Jena—Scharnhorst and Gneisenau adapted the Prussian army to the new type of warfare.
普鲁士军事改革者深知，新的战争方式体现了法国大革命带来的深刻社会和政治变革。腓特烈大帝的军队是一支与平民社会隔绝的雇佣军。只有贵族出身的军官的荣誉感和忠诚感才受到推崇，而普通士兵则依靠残酷的纪律维系。普鲁士军事改革者致力于将专制时代的军队改造为一支国家军队。为此，他们推行了前所未有的、更为激进的普遍征兵制。拿破仑的《蒂尔西特条约》阻碍了沙恩霍斯特思想的立即实施，但在他的学生博延起草的1814年普鲁士军事法中，他的方案最终成为普鲁士军事制度的永久准则。
The Prussian military reformers knew that new methods of war were an expression of the profound social and political changes that the French Revolution had produced. The army of Frederick the Great had been a force of mercenaries isolated from civilian society. Only the noble-born officer's sense of honor and loyalty was glorified while the rank and file were kept together by brutal discipline. The Prussian military reformers undertook to transform the army of the age of despotism into a national army. To this end they introduced universal conscription of a more radical type than had ever been attempted before. Napoleon's Treaty of Tilsit hampered the immediate realization of Scharnhorst's ideas, but in the Prussian military law of 1814, drafted by his pupil, Boyen, his plan became the permanent order of Prussia's military system.
征兵制几乎成为欧洲大陆所有国家的惯例，但在普鲁士以外，征兵仅限于穷人，因为富人可以缴纳税款或购买替代品。在普鲁士，所有阶层的人口都实际服役。从这个意义上讲，普鲁士军队比其他任何国家的军队都更像一支公民军队。不幸的是，普鲁士人并非民主公民，而是官僚专制统治的臣民。普鲁士贵族在政府和军队中的特权地位也死灰复燃，容克阶级继续垄断军官职位。国民服役制度，作为美国和法国民族主义和自由主义思想的必然产物，在普鲁士却沦为巩固专制国家权力的工具。
Conscription became the rule in practically all countries on the Continent, but outside of Prussia it amounted merely to the conscription of the poor, since the well-to-do were allowed to make money payments or purchase substitutes. In Prussia, all groups of the population actually served. In this respect, the Prussian army was more clearly a citizens' army than that of any other country. Unfortunately, the Prussians were not democratic citizens, but remained subjects of a bureaucratic absolutism. There was also a recrudescence of the privileged position of the Prussian gentry in government and army, and the Junker class continued to monopolize the officers' positions. National service, the logical outcome of national and liberal thought in America and France, became in Prussia a device for strengthening the power of an absolutist state.
普鲁士军事改革者创建一支真正意义上的公民军队的梦想，在1815年后的政治反弹中破灭。他们的战略战术思想遗产则保存得更好，尽管即便如此，旧式军事思想也取得了一些成功。沙恩霍斯特和格奈森瑙的战略思想在普鲁士军队中并未被遗忘。
The dream of the Prussian military reformers of creating a true citizens' army was frustrated by the political reaction after 1815. The legacy of their strategic and tactical knowledge fared better, though even here the old school scored certain successes. Still Scharnhorst's and Gneisenau's strategic ideas were not forgotten in the Prussian army.
在同时代的将领中，这两位分别出身汉诺威和萨克森家族的军官，在军事才能上唯有能与拿破仑比肩。沙恩霍斯特于1813年夏早逝，未能亲身担任战场上的高级指挥官。格奈森瑙从1813年秋至1815年夏担任普鲁士军队总参谋长，他注定要证明，普鲁士新出现的军事思想不仅能孕育出新的理念，还能培养出能够将这种理念转化为实际行动的将领。
Among their contemporaries, these two officers from Hanoverian and Saxon families were the only equals to Napoleon in the art of war. An early death in the summer of 1813 kept Scharnhorst from ever assuming high command in the field. Gneisenau, as the chief of staff of the Prussian army from the fall of 1813 to the summer of 1815, was destined to prove that the new Prussian school of military thought could produce not merely a new philosophy, but also men able to translate their insight into action.
关于沙恩霍斯特和格奈森瑙谁更胜一筹，一直以来都存在着激烈的争论。克劳塞维茨既是两人的朋友，也是他们的学生，他认为沙恩霍斯特更胜一筹，因为他兼具深邃的沉思和强烈的行动热情。施利芬则认为格奈森瑙更胜一筹，因为他在战场上似乎拥有更高的洞察力和更坚定的决心。然而，从历史的角度来看，重要的是要认识到，沉着冷静的沙恩霍斯特和热情奔放的格奈森瑙，都代表了一种新型的将领。他们都是天生的领袖，沙恩霍斯特或许更擅长训练士兵作战，格奈森瑙则更擅长指挥战场，但这两位诞生于德国哲学时代——康德和歌德时代——的将领都坚信，思想应该为行动插上翅膀。
There has been much controversy about which of the two was the greater general. Clausewitz, friend and pupil of both, gave the crown to Scharnhorst because he combined a profound contemplative mind with a deep passion for action. Schlieffen found Gneisenau superior because he seemed to have higher perspicacity and determination on the battlefield. From a historical point of view, however, what matters is to realize that both, the calm and self-possessed Scharnhorst and the impetuous and generous Gneisenau, represented a new type of general. Both were born leaders of men, the one possibly greater in educating them for war, the other in directing them on the battlefield, but both these children of Germany's philosophical age, of the epoch of Kant and Goethe, believed that thought should lend wings to action.
普鲁士新战略源于对拿破仑战争艺术的独到解读。在柯尼格雷茨战役和色当战役之前，对于大多数十九世纪的战争研究者而言，若米尼的著作似乎是拿破仑战略的权威之作。拿破仑本人不是曾说过，这位来自瑞士的人泄露了他战略的核心秘密吗？然而，拿破仑虽然欣赏若米尼，但也指出他主要阐述的是原则，而天才的行动则依赖于直觉。<sup> 1</sup>若米尼冷峻的理性主义无法充分展现拿破仑行动中蕴藏的自发性力量。沙恩霍斯特发展并指导格奈森瑙指挥1813-1815年战役的拿破仑战略解读，是基于一种历史归纳法，充分肯定了统帅的创造性想象力和士兵的士气。在克劳塞维茨的著作《战争论》中，这种新哲学找到了其经典的文学表达。
The new Prussian strategy sprang from an original interpretation of Napoleon's art of war. To most nineteenth-century students of war before Königgrätz and Sedan, Jomini's writings seemed the last word on Napoleonic strategy. Had not Napoleon himself said that this man from Switzerland had betrayed the innermost secrets of his strategy? Napoleon, however, though admiring Jomini, had also remarked that he set down chiefly principles, whereas genius worked according to intuition.1 Jomini's cold rationalism was not capable of doing justice to the spontaneity that was the hidden strength of Napoleon's actions. The interpretation of Napoleon's strategy, which Scharnhorst developed and which animated Gneisenau's conduct of the campaigns of 1813–1815, was based on a historical and inductive method that gave full credit to the creative imagination of the commander and the moral energy of his troops. In Clausewitz's work On War, the new philosophy found its classic literary expression.
普鲁士新战略学派在普鲁士总参谋部内建立了自己的机构，使其成为军队的大脑和神经中枢。总参谋部的历史可以追溯到1806年以前，但直到沙恩霍斯特时期才确立其独特的地位。1809年，沙恩霍斯特重组陆军部时，设立了一个专门负责军队组织和动员计划以及和平时期军队训练和教育的部门。该部门还负责通过情报和地形研究来准备军事行动，并最终负责战术和战略的制定和指挥。作为陆军部长，沙恩霍斯特继续领导该部门，并通过军事演习和参谋演练，对部门军官的战术和战略思想施加了强大的影响。将这些军官任命为各部队的副官逐渐成为惯例，这极大地扩大了总参谋长对所有将领的影响力。
The new Prussian school of strategy created its own organ in the Prussian general staff, which became the brains and nerve center of the army. The origins of the general staff go back to the years before 1806, but not before Scharnhorst's time did it receive its characteristic position. When, in 1809, Scharnhorst reorganized the War Ministry, he created a special division that was charged with the plans for organization and mobilization and with the peacetime training and education of the army. Under the jurisdiction of this section came also the preparation of military operations by intelligence and topographical studies, and finally the preparation and direction of tactics and strategy. As minister of war, Scharnhorst retained the direction of this section and exercised a strong influence on the tactical and strategical thought of the officers in it by training them in war games and staff maneuvers. It became customary to assign these officers as adjutants to the various army units, which went far to extend the influence of the chief of staff over all generals.
在沙恩霍斯特统治时期，总参谋部仍是陆军部的一个部门，即便普鲁士拥有议会，它也依然如此。然而，普鲁士政府的专制体制使得在国王的最高指挥下划分军事责任成为可能。1821年，总参谋长被任命为国王在军事事务上的最高顾问，而陆军部则被限制在对军队的政治和行政管理职能范围内。这一决定意义深远，因为它使总参谋部能够逐步在军事事务中发挥主导作用，不仅在战争爆发后，而且在战争的准备和初期阶段也是如此。
Under Scharnhorst, the general staff was still a section of the War Ministry, under which it would have remained if Prussia had received a parliament. The absolutist structure of the Prussian government, however, made it possible to divide military responsibility under the supreme command of the king. In 1821, the chief of the general staff was made the highest advisor of the king in matters of warfare, while the War Ministry was restricted to the political and administrative control of the army. This decision was of far-reaching consequence, since it enabled the general staff gradually to take a leading hand in military affairs, not merely after the outbreak of war, but also in the preparation and initial phase of a war.
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毛奇注定要充分利用解放战争期间建立起来的传统思想和制度。与沙恩霍斯特和格奈森瑙一样，他并非普鲁士人，而是来自邻近的梅克伦堡。他的父亲是丹麦国王的一名军官，当时的丹麦国王是石勒苏益格-荷尔斯泰因公爵，仍是德国王子。毛奇在丹麦接受军校训练，并于1819年晋升为中尉。然而，他在学校的经历并不愉快；他与父亲的关系并不亲密；在丹麦军队服役也看不到什么好前途。1822年，毛奇申请加入普鲁士军队，他的父亲在转入丹麦军队之前，也曾在普鲁士军队开始过他的军旅生涯。
Moltke was destined to take full advantage of the traditional ideas and institutions that were created during the wars of liberation. Like Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, he was not a Prussian by birth, but came from neighboring Mecklenburg. His father was an officer of the king of Denmark, who, as the Duke of Schleswig and Holstein, was then still a German prince. Moltke was brought up as a Danish cadet, becoming a lieutenant in 1819. His experiences at school had been unhappy, however; his relations with his father were not close; nor did service in the Danish army hold out great prospects. In 1822, Moltke applied for a commission in the Prussian army in which his father had started his military career before transferring to the Danish army.
普鲁士人对这位年轻的中尉进行了严格的考核，让他从军衔的最底层重新开始。他的才华很快显露出来；1823年，他通过了陆军学院的入学考试，当时该学院由克劳塞维茨领导。然而，克劳塞维茨从未授课，毛奇直到克劳塞维茨的著作在他去世后出版，才接触到他的思想。在陆军学院的学习中，毛奇对地理、物理和军事史产生了浓厚的兴趣，这些学科在学院里都得到了充分的重视。1826年，毛奇回到他的部队，但两年后，他被调入总参谋部，并在那里工作了六十多年。
The Prussians put the young lieutenant through a stiff examination and made him begin at the very bottom of the military ladder again. His promise soon became apparent; in 1823 he passed the entrance examination to the War College, at that time under Clausewitz's direction. Clausewitz gave no lectures, however, and Moltke did not become acquainted with his ideas until Clausewitz's work was posthumously published. From his studies at the War College, Moltke gained his lasting interest in geography, physics, and military history, which were well represented at the school. In 1826 Moltke returned to his regiment, but after two years he was already assigned and then permanently transferred to the general staff, with which he was to be associated for more than sixty years.
除了在丹麦和普鲁士军队担任五年中尉外，毛奇从未在部队服役。在他六十五岁高龄，实际指挥普鲁士军队对抗奥地利时，他从未指挥过连队或任何更大的部队。但1835年至1839年间，他作为奥斯曼帝国的军事顾问在土耳其服役，在对抗埃及穆罕默德·阿里的徒劳战役中，他获得了一些实战经验。土耳其指挥官对这位年轻上尉的良策置若罔闻，毛奇在战败的军队中目睹了战争最残酷的一面。
With the exception of five years as a lieutenant in the Danish and Prussian armies, Moltke never served with the troops. He had never commanded a company or any larger unit when, at the age of sixty-five, he took virtual command of the Prussian armies in the war against Austria. But the years from 1835 to 1839, which he spent in Turkey as a military advisor of the Sublime Porte, gave him some actual war experiences in the futile campaign against Mehemet Ali of Egypt. The Turkish commander threw the good advice of the young captain to the winds, and Moltke saw war at its worst among defeated troops.
当他从土耳其返回柏林时，他一生中最艰难的时期已经过去。作为一名中尉，他从未有过任何多余的钱。极度的贫困迫使他创作短篇小说，并在一家颇受欢迎的杂志上连载。为了购买马匹——没有马匹他就无法在总参谋部任职——他翻译了吉本的《帝国衰亡史》六卷。令人印象深刻的是，年轻的毛奇如何在柏林这样简朴的环境中，克服贫困的困境，同时又接受了高雅的教育。
When he returned to Berlin from Turkey, the hardest period of his life was over. As a lieutenant he never had an extra penny to spend. Dire need compelled him to write short novels, which appeared in installments in a popular journal. In order to purchase mounts, without which he could not serve on the general staff, he translated six volumes of Gibbon's Decline and Fall. It is impressive to see the young Moltke wrestle with the problems of genteel poverty and yet acquire an Attic education in the Spartan setting of Berlin.
在总参谋部任职的最初几年，他的主要职责是绘制西里西亚的最新地图，但他很快便将研究范围扩展到地形学以外的其他地理领域，并深入钻研历史。随着学识的精进，他的表达能力也日益提升。毛奇成为一位杰出的德语散文作家，他从土耳其寄出的信件至今仍被视为文学作品。
In his first years of service with the general staff his main duties concerned preparing an up-to-date map of Silesia, but he soon went beyond topography to other aspects of geography, and penetrated deeply into history as well. As his education matured, so did his power of expression. Moltke became an excellent writer of German prose, whose letters from Turkey are still read as literature.
然而，他并未成为一位独具创见的政治思想家或政治家。沙恩霍斯特和格奈森瑙既是将军，也是政治家，他们的军事改革旨在改革整个国家的社会生活。这使得他们在普鲁士乃至奥地利和俄国宫廷的保守氛围中备受质疑。法国大革命和拿破仑战败后不久，格奈森瑙和年轻的改革者们便失去了影响力。毛奇深知将领才能与政治才能之间的天然联系，并对政治抱有浓厚的个人兴趣。然而，他并未积极参与政治事务，也鲜少质疑当权者。他坚信君主制政府的优越性，并认为其特殊之处在于，君主制允许军官在不受非专业人士干预的情况下管理军队事务。德国自由主义在 1848-1849 年革命和 19 世纪 60 年代的再次失败，令他非常欣慰。
He did not, however, become an original political thinker or a statesman. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been politicians as much as generals, and their military reforms aimed directly at a reform of the whole life of the nation. This had made them suspect in the conservative atmosphere of the Prussian or, for that matter, of the Austrian and Russian courts. Almost as soon as the French Revolution and Napoleon were defeated, Gneisenau and the younger reformers were neutralized. Moltke was conscious of the natural interrelationship of generalship and statesmanship, and took a lively personal interest in politics. He abstained from active participation in political affairs, however, and rarely questioned the powers that be. He was convinced of the superiority of monarchical government and found its special justification in the fact that it allowed officers to manage army affairs without interference from nonprofessional elements. The defeats of German liberalism in the revolution of 1848–1849, and again in the 1860s, were highly gratifying to him.
莫尔奇为人沉稳，政治观点温和，学识渊博，因此深受宫廷青睐。1855年，腓特烈·威廉四世任命他为侄子腓特烈·威廉王子（即后来的皇帝腓特烈三世）的副官。这一任命使莫尔奇得以结识王子的父亲，即后来的威廉一世，人称“士兵王子”。威廉一世显然发现了莫尔奇的才能，认为他完全有资格担任总参谋长一职。
An officer of his quiet manner, conforming political views, and wide learning was well received at court. In 1855, Frederick William IV made him aide-de-camp to his nephew, Prince Frederick William, the future emperor Frederick III. This appointment brought Moltke into contact with the prince's father, known as the Soldier-Prince, the future William I, who apparently discovered in Moltke talents that seemed to recommend him for the position of chief of the general staff.
威廉一世于1857年成为普鲁士摄政王后，首批举措之一便是任命毛奇担任摄政。然而，威廉一世更关注的是军队的政治和技术重组，陆军大臣罗恩在国务委员会中的影响力甚至盖过了沉默的参谋长。罗恩和威廉提出的方案显著提升了军队的效率，但同时也意味着彻底废除了军队中那些保留着较为自由精神的民兵式部队。民众拥护的国民卫队（或称地方卫队）被大幅削减，取而代之的是规模庞大的常备军。这使得保皇派的职业军官团对国家所有军事机构拥有了绝对的控制权。普鲁士议会对此举极力反对，但即便未经议会批准，重组也在俾斯麦的统治下生效。在柯尼格雷茨战役爆发时，由此引发的宪政冲突仍在持续。然而，随着俾斯麦政策和毛奇的胜利满足了德国人民对民族统一的渴望，议会反对派最终瓦解。因此，毛奇的成功战略决定了两个问题：第一，统一的德国在欧洲各国中崛起并凌驾于其上；第二，普鲁士王室通过维护普鲁士军队的威权体制，战胜了德国的自由民主反对派。
One of William's first actions when in 1857 he became regent of Prussia was to appoint Moltke to that post. Still William I was immediately more interested in the political and technical reorganization of the army, and the figure of the minister of war, Roon, overshadowed the silent chief of staff in the councils of state. What Roon and William proposed was a decided improvement in the efficiency of the army, but it meant at the same time the ultimate abolition of those militia-like sections of the army in which a more liberal spirit had survived. The popular Landwehr (territorials or national guard) was curtailed in favor of a greatly expanded standing army. This gave the professional royalist officer corps unchallenged control over all military institutions of the nation. The Prussian parliament fought this measure, but the reorganization became effective under Bismarck even without parliamentary consent. The ensuing constitutional conflict was still raging when the battle of Königgrätz was fought. The parliamentary opposition, however, broke down when the Bismarckian policy and Moltke's victories fulfilled the longing for German national unity. Moltke's successful strategy, therefore, decided two issues: first, the rise of a unified Germany among and over the nations of Europe; second, the victory of the Prussian crown over the liberal and democratic opposition in Germany through the maintenance of the authoritarian structure of the Prussian army.
鲁恩作为陆军大臣，在政治冲突的年代里扮演了重要角色，这使他成为1866年以前普鲁士军队中最具影响力的人物。威廉一世习惯于听取他的军事建议，以至于总参谋长几乎被人遗忘。为人谦逊的毛奇在军队中鲜为人知，甚至在克尼格雷茨战役期间，当一名军官将他的命令带给一个师的指挥官时，后者也问道：“这很好，但毛奇将军是谁？”毛奇在国王顾问中迅速崛起，这虽然出乎意料，但却是自沙恩霍斯特和格奈森瑙时代以来普鲁士军事史的必然结果。
The role that Roon, as minister of war, played in the years of political conflict made him the most influential figure in the army before 1866. William I was so used to taking military advice from him that the chief of the general staff was almost forgotten. The unpretentious Moltke was little known in the army, and even during the battle of Königgrätz, when an officer brought an order from him to the commander of a division, the latter replied, “This is all very well, but who is General Moltke?” Moltke's rise to prominence among the advisors of the king was sudden and unexpected, though it was the logical outcome of Prussian military history since the days of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
从1857年到1866年，毛奇远离政治舞台，得以全身心投入到未来军事行动的筹备工作中。1848-1849年的革命、法兰西第二帝国的崛起以及克里米亚战争都已表明，欧洲历史已进入一个军事力量被自由运用的新时代。毛奇立即着手修改普鲁士总参谋部制定的计划。他的前任雷赫尔将军是一位极具远见卓识的战略家，同时也是少数几位从基层晋升的普鲁士将领之一。毛奇深信普鲁士军官们能够为战争中的战术问题找到独到的解决之道。事实上，这些军官在1866年越过波西米亚边境后，便悄然抛弃了1847年制定的过于保守的官方服役条例，转而主要遵循他们自己的想法。
His aloofness from the political scene in the years from 1857 to 1866 allowed him to give his undivided attention to the preparation of future military operations. The revolutions of 1848–1849, the rise of the Second Empire in France, and the Crimean War had already shown that a new epoch of European history had opened in which military power was freely used. Moltke began at once to overhaul the plans that the Prussian general staff had drawn up. His predecessor, General Reyher, incidentally one of the few Prussian generals who had come up from the ranks, had been a man of great vision and a remarkable teacher of strategy. Molkte could count on the ability of the Prussian officer to find original solutions for the tactical problems of war. In fact, the officers silently dropped the official and overly conservative service regulations of 1847 as soon as they crossed the Bohemian frontier in 1866 and followed largely their own ideas.
普鲁士军队的和平时期编制体系比任何其他国家都更为完善。除近卫部队外，各团的兵员和预备役人员均来自其所在地区。哈布斯堡王朝由于其民族问题，无法采用这种体系。此外，1815年后，普鲁士军队保留了拿破仑在其战役中建立的军团编制，而法国在波旁王朝统治下放弃了这一编制。除普鲁士外，其他国家的军团都是在战前组建的，这再次阻碍了快速动员，也限制了部队和指挥官执行大规模作战的能力。
The peacetime formation of the Prussian army was a more highly developed system than that of any country. With the exception of the guard troops, the regiments drew their recruits and reservists from their local districts. The Hapsburg Empire with its nationality problems could not use such a system. Moreover, after 1815, the Prussian army had retained the division of the army into army corps that Napoleon had created during his campaigns, but which had been given up by France under the Bourbons. Except in Prussia, army corps were formed on the eve of war, which again acted as a brake upon rapid mobilization and upon the capacity of troops and leaders in the performance of large-scale operations.
尽管普鲁士军队的动员速度相对较快，但毛奇进一步加快了这一进程。当时普鲁士君主国的地理结构十分不利，其东西向疆域从亚琛延伸至蒂尔西特，却被汉诺威阻隔，这加剧了普鲁士的军事困境。铁路时代的到来为解决这一问题提供了契机，毛奇充分利用了这一点。早在德国修建第一条铁路之前，毛奇就开始研究铁路。他显然对铁路的未来充满信心，因为在19世纪40年代初铁路建设开始后，他甚至冒险将毕生积蓄投资于柏林-汉堡铁路。他对铁路的投机兴趣也源于他对婚姻的牵挂——他希望缩短与远在荷尔斯泰因的年轻妻子之间的距离！但他的军事思维始终活跃。1847年至1850年间，各国军队首次通过铁路运输。 1859 年，在意大利战争期间普鲁士动员即将开始之际，毛奇得以测试全军铁路运输设施，并进行重要改进。
Rapid as the mobilization of the Prussian army was, comparatively, Moltke accelerated it still further. The unhappy geographical structure of the Prussian monarchy of this period, with its far-flung east-west extension from Aix-la-Chapelle to Tilsit severed by Hanover, aggravated Prussia's military problems. The railroad age offered a remedy that Moltke exploited to the full. Moltke had begun to study railroads before a single line had been built in Germany. He apparently believed in their future, for when in the early 1840s railroad building got under way, he even risked his savings by investing in the Berlin-Hamburg railroad. His speculative interest was enhanced by his matrimonial concern, namely to cut down the distance that separated him from his young bride in Holstein! But his military thinking was always awake. In 1847–1850, troops of various nations were for the first time moved by rail. In 1859, when Prussian mobilization was pending during the Italian war, Moltke could test the facilities for the rail transportation of the whole army and could introduce important improvements.
铁路带来了新的战略机遇。军队的运输速度是拿破仑军队行军速度的六倍，所有战略的基本要素——时间和空间——也因此焕发出新的光彩。拥有高度发达的铁路交通系统的国家在战争中获得了重要且可能决定性的优势。军队动员和集结的速度成为战略考量中的关键因素。事实上，动员和集结的时间表，连同最初的行军命令，构成了未来军事参谋部为备战而制定的战略计划的核心。
The railroads offered new strategic opportunities. Troops could be transported six times as fast as the armies of Napoleon had marched, and the fundamentals of all strategy—time and space—appeared in a new light. A country that had a highly developed system of rail communications gained important and possibly decisive advantages in warfare. The speed of the mobilization and of the concentration of armies became an essential factor in strategic calculations. In fact, the timetable of mobilization and assemblage, together with the first marching orders, formed in the future the very core of the strategic plans drawn up by military staffs in expectation of war.
除了利用铁路，毛奇还提议利用工业革命期间发展起来的密集公路系统。拿破仑早已指明了方向，他将军队分列行军，并在1805年导致奥地利军队在乌尔姆投降的战役中，为分列行军的战略运用树立了经典范例。然而，军队纵队并不具备作战能力，部署一个三万人的军团需要整整一天的时间。因此，从行军到战斗阵型的转换是一个耗时的过程，军队必须在战斗前数天集结完毕。1815年以后，道路状况得到极大改善，新的战术成为可能。 1865年，毛奇写道：“军事单位规模越大，机动性就越差；同一天，一条路上最多只能运送一个军团。而且，越接近目标，机动性就越差，因为可用的道路数量有限。因此，军队的正常状态是分成若干军团，而没有明确目标就集结这些军团是错误的。持续集结，即使仅仅是为了补给，也会变得麻烦，而且往往是不可能的。这使得战斗势在必行，因此，如果时机尚未成熟，就不应该进行集结。集结的军队无法行军，只能在田野上移动。为了行军，军队必须先分散开来，这在面对敌人时非常危险。然而，由于所有部队的集中对于战斗是绝对必要的，因此战略的本质在于组织分批行军，但要确保在合适的时机进行集结。”
In addition to making use of railroads, Moltke proposed to employ the dense road system that had come into being in the course of the industrial revolution. Napoleon had already pointed the way by dividing his army on marches and in the campaign of 1805 that led to the surrender of the Austrian army at Ulm had set a classic example for the strategic use of advancing in separate columns. An army column is, however, not ready for battle, and it takes a full day to deploy a corps of thirty thousand. The changeover from marching to battle formation was accordingly a time-consuming process, and armies had, therefore, to be massed days before the battle. After 1815, road conditions improved greatly and new tactics became possible. In 1865, Moltke wrote: “The difficulties in mobility grow with the size of military units; one cannot transport more than one army corps on one road on the same day. They also grow, however, the closer one gets to the goal since this limits the number of available roads. It follows that the normal state of an army is its separation into corps and that the massing together of these corps without a very definite aim is a mistake. A continuous massing becomes, if merely on account of provisioning, embarrassing and often impossible. It makes a battle imperative and consequently should not take place if the moment for such a decision has not arrived. A massed army can no longer march, it can only be moved over the fields. In order to march, the army has first to be broken up, which is dangerous in the face of the enemy. Since, however, the concentration of all troops is absolutely necessary for battle, the essence of strategy consists in the organization of separate marches, but so as to provide for concentration at the right moment.”
莫尔特克很可能早已设想过在战场上集结军队的作战策略，从而摒弃了拿破仑在战前集结军队的原则。然而，在柯尼格雷茨战役前几周，莫尔特克的作战指挥并非从一开始就无视拿破仑的规则。他本可以在战前将各军集结起来，但他最终决定继续保持军队分散，并在战场上实现会师。在柯尼格雷茨之后，他总结了自己的观点：“如果能在战斗当天将部队从不同的地点调往战场，那就更好了。换句话说，如果作战行动能够以这样的方式进行指挥：从不同方向进行的最后一次短暂行军就能到达前线并包抄敌军侧翼，那么该战略就达到了其所能达到的最佳状态，必将取得重大胜利。任何预先设想都无法保证以分散的军队进行作战就能取得这样的最终结果。这不仅取决于可计算的因素，例如空间和时间，而且往往还取决于先前小规模战斗的结果、天气、虚假消息；简而言之，取决于人生中所有所谓的机遇和运气。然而，战争中的伟大胜利并非没有巨大的风险。”
It is probable that Moltke already envisaged operations in which the concentration of the army would take place on the battlefield itself, thus discarding the Napoleonic principle that the army should be concentrated well before the start of a battle. Still, Moltke's direction of operations in the weeks before Königgrätz did not disregard the Napoleonic rule from the very beginning. He could have drawn the armies together before the battle but he decided at a late date to continue their separation and to achieve their union on the battlefield. After Königgrätz, he summed up his ideas thus: “It is even better if the forces can be moved on the day of battle from separate points against the battlefield itself. In other words, if the operations can be directed in such a manner that a last brief march from different directions leads to the front and into the flank of the enemy, then the strategy has achieved the best that it is able to achieve, and great results must follow. No foresight can guarantee such a final result of operations with separate armies. This depends, not merely on calculable factors, space and time, but also often on the outcome of previous minor battles, on the weather, on false news; in brief, on all that is called chance and luck in human life. Great successes in war are not achieved, however, without great risks.”
最后几句话让我们得以窥见毛奇的战争哲学。毛奇自然渴望尽可能地运用理性来控制战争。但他与克劳塞维茨一致认为，战争中的政治和军事问题无法完全通过计算来解决。战争是政策的工具，尽管毛奇坚持认为指挥官在实际指挥军事行动方面应该拥有自由，但他承认，不断变化的政治目标和形势必然会随时调整战略。
The last remarks permit a glimpse at Moltke's philosophy of war. Naturally Moltke was eager to extend the control of reason over warfare as far as possible. But in agreement with Clausewitz he recognized that the political and military problems of war cannot be totally mastered by calculation. War is an instrument of policy and, though Moltke maintained that a commander should be free in the actual direction of military operations, he admitted that fluctuating political aims and circumstances were bound to modify strategy at all times.
尽管政治因素对战略的影响给将领带来了一定的不确定性，但毛奇认为，军队的动员和初期集结是可以预估的，因为这些准备工作可以在战争爆发前很久就开始进行。“军队初期集结的失误，”他说道，“在整个战役过程中几乎无法纠正。”然而，必要的命令可以提前很久就制定好，而且，只要部队做好了战争准备，运输安排妥当，这些命令就必然会带来预期的结果。
While the impact of politics on strategy confronted a general with an element of uncertainty, Moltke felt that the mobilization and initial concentration of the army was calculable since it could be prepared a long time before the outbreak. “An error,” he said, “in the original concentration of armies can hardly be corrected during the whole course of a campaign.” The necessary orders, however, can be deliberated long before and, assuming that the troops are ready for war and transportation is properly organized, they will inevitably lead to the desired results.
过了这个阶段，战争就变成了大胆与算计的结合。实际作战开始后，“我们的意志很快就会与敌人的独立意志相遇。诚然，如果我们做好准备并决心采取主动，我们可以限制敌人的意志，但除了战术之外，我们无法通过任何其他手段彻底摧毁它，换句话说，只能通过战斗。然而，任何大规模遭遇战的物质和精神后果都影响深远，由此会形成一个截然不同的局面，而这又成为采取新措施的基础。任何作战计划都无法确定地预见与敌军主力首次交锋之后的情况……在整个战役过程中，指挥官都被迫根据无法预测的情况做出决策。因此，所有连续的战争行动都不是预先计划的执行，而是由军事战术指导的自发行动。问题在于，如何在无数特殊情况下把握笼罩在不确定性迷雾中的实际情况，正确评估事实并预测未知因素，迅速做出决策，然后有力且毫不妥协地执行……显然，理论知识是不够的，而是需要实战经验。”在这里，思想和性格的品质得以自由、实用和艺术地表达出来，尽管它们受到军事训练的熏陶，并受到军事历史或生活经验的引导。
Beyond this stage, war becomes a combination of daring and calculation. After actual operations have begun, “our will soon meets the independent will of the enemy. To be sure, we can limit the enemy's will if we are ready and determined to take the initiative, but we cannot break it by any other means than tactics, in other words, through battle. The material and moral consequences of any larger encounter are, however, so far-reaching that through them a completely different situation is created, which then becomes the basis for new measures. No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy…. The commander is compelled during the whole campaign to reach decisions on the basis of situations that cannot be predicted. All consecutive acts of war are, therefore, not executions of a premeditated plan, but spontaneous actions, directed by military tact. The problem is to grasp in innumerable special cases the actual situation that is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements, to reach a decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully and relentlessly…. It is obvious that theoretical knowledge will not suffice, but that here the qualities of mind and character come to a free, practical, and artistic expression, although schooled by military training and led by experiences from military history or from life itself.”
毛奇否认战略是一门科学，也否认可以建立普遍原则，并由此逻辑地推导出作战计划。甚至像内线作战优势或侧翼保护这样的规则，在他看来也仅仅具有相对有效性。每一种情况都需要根据其自身情况进行界定，并需要将训练和知识与远见和勇气相结合的解决方案。在毛奇看来，这是从历史中汲取的主要教训。历史研究对于使未来的指挥官了解军事行动可能发生的各种复杂情况也至关重要。他认为，任何参谋部或军队演习，尽管对于参谋军官的训练必不可少，都无法像历史那样，将战争的各个重要方面如此真实地呈现在他们眼前。
Moltke denied that strategy was a science and that general principles could be established from which plans of operations could be logically derived. Even such rules as the advantages of the inner line of operation or of flank protection seemed to him merely of relative validity. Each situation called for a definition in terms of its own circumstances, and for a solution in which training and knowledge were combined with vision and courage. In Moltke's opinion, this was the chief lesson to be derived from history. Historical study was also of the greatest usefulness in acquainting a future commander with the complexity of the circumstances under which military actions could take place. He believed that no staff or army maneuvers, indispensable as they were for the training of staff officers, could put before their eyes as realistic a picture of the significant aspects of war as history was able to do.
军事史研究成为普鲁士总参谋部的核心职责之一，而非下属部门。毛奇以其关于1859年意大利战争的经典专著奠定了军事史研究的风格。该专著于1862年首次出版，旨在客观描述事件，以便从中得出有效的实践结论。在他的指导下，后来的1866年战争和1870-1871年战争史也以类似的方式撰写。
The study of military history was made one of the central responsibilities of the Prussian general staff and not left to a subordinate section. Moltke set the style by his classic monograph on the Italian war of 1859, first published in 1862, which aimed at an objective description of the events in order to draw from them valid practical conclusions. The histories of the wars of 1866 and 1870–1871 were later written in a similar manner under his direction.
毛奇认为，只要以正确的视角研究历史，战略就能从中获益匪浅。他自身的实践就体现了他从历史研究中获得的益处。他当然知道拿破仑偶尔会使用分散的军团攻击敌人的侧翼或后方。然而，这些分散部队的作战行动并没有削弱拿破仑对集中兵力和适时正面进攻威力的信念。这种战略在拿破仑时代优势显著，但最终也未能使他免于失败。莱比锡战役展现了单军同心圆式调动的可能性，沙恩霍斯特曾预言，军队不应漫无目的地集结，而应始终集中兵力作战。在毛奇看来，科技和交通的进步使得大规模的同心圆式作战成为可能，其规模远超半个世纪前。
Moltke took the view that strategy could benefit greatly from history, provided it was studied with the right sense of perspective. His own practice exemplifies the benefits that he derived from historical study. He knew, of course, of Napoleon's occasional use of detached corps for attacks against the flank or rear of the enemy. These operations with detached units, however, had not diminished Napoleon's belief in the value of concentrating one's forces and in the power of a well-timed frontal attack. The advantages of such a strategy had been great in the Age of Napoleon, but they had not shielded him against ultimate defeat. The battle of Leipzig had shown the possibilities of concentric movements of individual armies, which Scharnhorst had predicted in his advice that one should never keep an army aimlessly massed, but always fight with concentrated forces. In Moltke's opinion, the progress of technology and transportation made it possible to plan concentric operations on a much larger scale than had been used half a century before.
尽管历史对这位军官来说很重要，但莫尔特克指出，历史并不等同于战略。“战略是一套临时性的权宜之计；它不仅仅是知识，更是将知识应用于实际生活，是根据不断变化的环境发展出独创性的理念。它是在最艰难的条件下采取行动的艺术。”
Important as history was for the officer, Moltke pointed out that it was not identical with strategy. “Strategy is a system of ad hoc expedients; it is more than knowledge, it is the application of knowledge to practical life, the development of an original idea in accordance with continually changing circumstances. It is the art of action under the pressure of the most difficult conditions.”
因此，指挥组织在毛奇的战争思想中占据着重要地位。他在意大利战役史中对此进行了清晰的阐述。任何军事委员会都无权指挥军队，参谋长应是指挥官在作战计划方面的唯一顾问。即使是有缺陷的计划，只要执行得当，也胜过人为制定的方案。另一方面，即使是最好的作战计划也无法预料战争的变幻莫测以及必须在战场上做出的具体战术决策。在毛奇看来，教条地执行作战计划是不可饶恕的罪过，因此他非常重视鼓励所有指挥官，无论级别高低，发挥主动性。与普鲁士引以为傲的纪律截然不同，毛奇高度重视所有军官的独立判断。
Accordingly, the organization of command held a prominent place in Moltke's ideas on war. He treated the subject with great clarity in his history of the Italian campaign. No war council could direct an army, and the chief of staff should be the only advisor of the commander with regard to the plan of operations. Even a faulty plan, provided it was executed firmly, was preferable to a synthetic product. On the other hand, not even the best plan of operations could anticipate the vicissitudes of war, and individual tactical decisions that must be made on the spot. In Moltke's view, a dogmatic enforcement of the plan of operations was a deadly sin and great care was taken to encourage initiative on the part of all commanders, high or low. Much in contrast to the vaunted Prussian discipline, a premium was placed upon independent judgment of all officers.
毛奇只下达最必要的命令。“命令应包含指挥官自身无法完成的一切，除此之外，别无其他。”这意味着总司令几乎不应干预战术安排。但毛奇的做法远不止于此。如果下级将领能够取得重要的战术胜利，他甚至愿意容忍对其作战计划的偏离，因为正如他所说，“战术胜利之后，战略便可退居其次”。在普法战争初期，一些将领鲁莽行事，虽然有利可图，却破坏了他大部分的作战计划，而毛奇对此却毫不动摇。
Moltke refrained from issuing any but the most essential orders. “An order shall contain everything that a commander cannot do by himself, but nothing else.” This meant that the commander in chief should hardly ever interfere with tactical arrangements. But Moltke went beyond this. He was ready to condone deviations from his plan of operations if the subordinate general could gain important tactical successes, for, as he expressed it, “in the case of a tactical victory, strategy submits.” He remained unmoved when certain generals in the first weeks of the Franco-Prussian War by foolhardy, though gainful enterprises, wrecked much of his plan of operations.
毛奇并不想削弱军队的战斗精神，也不想限制下级指挥官的行动和反应的自发性。现代的发展赋予了他们比以往更大的责任。拿破仑将军队保持紧密部署的主要原因之一，就是他希望所有部队都在他的直接指挥之下。毛奇的横向部署体系使得对战役本身的中央指挥极其困难，尽管战前行军可以通过电报轻松安排。毛奇在1866年战争的大部分行动中都是在柏林的办公室指挥的，他在柯尼格雷茨战役开始前四天才抵达战场。他非常明智地将自己的指挥范围限制在总体战略命令上。为了确保战略构想得到充分（这意味着自由）的执行，他设立了陆军指挥部，而战术问题的指挥权则掌握在军和师的指挥官手中。
Moltke did not wish to paralyze the fighting spirit of the army or to cripple the spontaneity of action and reaction on the part of subordinate commanders. Modern developments had placed a greater responsibility upon them than was the case in former ages. One of the chief reasons why Napoleon kept his army close together was his wish to keep all troops within the reach of his direct orders. Moltke's system of disposition in breadth made the central direction of the battle itself extremely difficult, although the marches prior to the battle could be easily arranged by telegraph. Moltke directed most movements in the war of 1866 from his office in Berlin, and arrived at the theater of war just four days before the battle of Königgrätz. He confined himself very wisely to general strategic orders. To ensure an adequate, and this meant free, execution of strategic ideas, army commands were created while the authority in tactical questions rested with the commanders of corps and divisions.
毛奇的战略思想和实践在1866年的奥地利战役中经受了考验。在1864年奥地利和普鲁士对丹麦的战争中，他的作用并不突出。但在战争后期，他迅速制止了老元帅弗兰格尔执政时期常见的拙劣指挥，他提出的中肯建议使他在威廉一世眼中成为一位审慎的战略家。在对奥作战计划的讨论中，他的重要性日益凸显，以至于威廉一世于1866年6月2日下令，所有军队命令都必须通过他下达。由于国王此后几乎无条件地接受了毛奇的建议，这位原本打算退休的65岁将军，实际上成为了普鲁士军队的最高统帅。
Moltke's strategic thought and practice met its test in the Austrian campaign of 1866. His role in the war that Austria and Prussia conducted against Denmark in 1864 had been modest. In the latest phase of the war he had quickly stopped the bungling that characterized the regime of the old field marshal Wrangel, and his critical counsel established him in the eyes of William as a prudent strategist. In the discussion of war plans against Austria he became increasingly prominent so that William I, on June 2, 1866, directed that all orders to the army should be issued through him. Since the king henceforth accepted Moltke's advice almost unconditionally, the sixty-five-year-old general, who had thought of retirement, found himself the virtual commander in chief of the Prussian army.
他的首次军事才能考验，同时也是他军事生涯中最严峻的考验。与后来的普法战争相比，双方兵力更加均衡，毛奇必须克服更加棘手的地理和政治难题。1866年战争，尤其是波西米亚战役，比普法战争乃至大多数其他战争，更清晰地展现了战争的战略层面。
The first test of his generalship was at the same time the greatest one in his career. The forces were more evenly matched than later in the Franco-Prussian War, and Moltke had to overcome more obstinate geographical and political problems. The war of 1866 and particularly the Bohemian campaign also illustrate the strategic side of war in a much clearer form than the Franco-Prussian or for that matter most other wars.
威廉一世原本希望避免与奥地利开战，但俾斯麦最终还是将他拖入了这场战争。因此，普鲁士的动员开始得比奥地利晚得多，即便如此，能否说服国王宣战，从而使军队能够发起进攻，仍然是个未知数。最初的战略问题因此非常微妙。奥地利军队可以从波西米亚和摩拉维亚出发，进攻上西里西亚或中西里西亚，或者进军萨克森威胁柏林，甚至可能在与驻扎在北波西米亚或萨克森的巴伐利亚军队结盟之后发动进攻。这些可能性能否实现，完全取决于战争实际爆发的日期。毛奇自然支持俾斯麦敦促国王尽快采取行动，但他避免用军事手段干预政治——这与他的侄子截然不同，后者作为总参谋长，不得不在1914年8月告知威廉二世，总参谋部的战略计划已经剥夺了政府的行动自由。
William I wished to avoid the war with Austria into which Bismarck ultimately pushed him. The Prussians thus began their mobilization much later than the Austrians and even then it remained doubtful whether the king could be persuaded to declare war, thereby enabling the army to take the offensive. The original strategic problems were accordingly very delicate. From Bohemia and Moravia the Austrians could have operated against either Upper or Central Silesia or marched into Saxony to threaten Berlin, possibly after effecting a union with the Bavarian army in Northern Bohemia or Saxony. Whether one or the other of these possibilities could be realized depended entirely upon the date of the actual opening of war. Naturally enough, Moltke supported Bismarck in urging the king to act soon, but he avoided prejudicing the political issue by military measures—in contrast to his nephew, who as chief of staff had to inform William II in August 1914 that the strategic plans of the general staff had deprived the government of its freedom of action.
老毛奇此举的首要目的是为了弥补普鲁士动员启动过晚所造成的延误。此外，他还希望应对奥地利可能向萨克森和柏林，或向西里西亚中部的布雷斯劳推进的情况，因为上西里西亚最初并未得到有效保护。奥地利在摩拉维亚的动员只能利用一条铁路线，而毛奇则动用了五条铁路线，将普鲁士军队从普鲁士各地运送到战区附近。因此，到1866年6月5日，普鲁士军队已部署在从哈雷和托尔高到格尔利茨和兰德斯胡特之间，长达275英里的半圆形区域内。只要奥地利军队远在南方，普鲁士军队最初的部署就安全无虞。事实上，奥地利军队甚至不在毛奇预想的波西米亚境内，而仍在摩拉维亚。
The elder Moltke's moves were aimed in the first place at making up for the delay caused by the belated start of the Prussian mobilization. In addition, he wished to cope with a possible Austrian advance against Saxony and Berlin or against Breslau in Central Silesia while Upper Silesia remained originally unprotected. Whereas the Austrians could employ only one railroad line for their mobilization in Moravia, Moltke used five to transport the Prussian troops from all over Prussia to the neighborhood of the theater of war. As a consequence, on June 5, 1866, the Prussian armies were spread over a half-circle of 275 miles from Halle and Torgau to Görlitz and Landeshut. The original placement of the Prussian troops was safe as long as the Austrian forces were far to the south. In point of fact, they were not even in Bohemia, as Moltke assumed, but still in Moravia.
当然，毛奇从未打算让部队留在登陆点，而是立即开始将他们向格尔利茨附近的中心区域推进。然而，他始终拒绝像大多数普鲁士将领甚至他自己的参谋人员所主张的那样，下令在小范围内集中兵力。另一方面，当他最终得知奥地利主力集结在摩拉维亚而非波西米亚时，他也感到有些担忧，这似乎表明奥地利正计划向上西里西亚发动进攻。他勉强允许左翼向尼斯河方向延伸，从而再次将普鲁士军队分散在从托尔高到尼斯超过2.70英里的范围内。他的犹豫主要是出于对威廉一世政策的不确定，而非军事考量。在毛奇看来，如果他不错过将普鲁士军队沿最短路线最终集结的机会，一切都会好起来的，这意味着要向波西米亚推进。
Moltke, of course, never planned to leave his troops at their points of disembarkation but began at once to draw them closer toward the center around Görlitz. At all times he refused, however, to order a full concentration in a small area as was advocated by most Prussian generals and even by members of his own staff. On the other hand, he too felt somewhat worried when he ultimately learned that the main Austrian forces were assembling in Moravia and not in Bohemia, a fact that seemed to point to a contemplated Austrian offensive toward Upper Silesia. Reluctantly he allowed the left wing to extend toward the Neisse River, thus again spreading the Prussian armies over a distance of more than 2.70 miles from Torgau to Neisse. His hesitation was chiefly caused by uncertainty about the policy of William I and not by military considerations. In Moltke's opinion, everything would be well if he did not miss the opportunity of achieving the ultimate concentration of the Prussian armies along the shortest route, which meant by a forward move into Bohemia.
毛奇选择吉钦作为集结地，并非因为吉钦本身具有重要的战略优势，而仅仅是出于距离的考虑。吉钦与普鲁士的两大主力军——由皇太子腓特烈·威廉指挥的第二集团军（驻扎在西里西亚，构成左翼）和由腓特烈·卡尔亲王指挥的第一集团军（以格尔利茨为基地）——的距离大致相等。同时，吉钦与托尔高和奥尔穆茨的距离也大致相等，也就是说，它与普鲁士易北河军团和奥地利主力军的距离也大致相等。如果普鲁士军队能够与奥地利军队同时离开摩拉维亚，那么他们的集结应该会在奥地利军队抵达吉钦之前完成。
Moltke had chosen Gitschin as the point for such a concentration—not because it offered important strategic advantages of itself, but merely on account of distances. It was about equally close to the two main Prussian armies, the Second Army under the crown prince, Friedrich Wilhelm, which formed the left wing in Silesia, and the First Army under Prince Friedrich Karl, which had its base around Görlitz. At the same time, Gitschin was equally distant from Torgau and Olmütz, that is, from the Prussian Elbe Army and from the Austrian main army. Provided the Prussian armies could begin marching on the same day on which the Austrian army left Moravia their concentration should have been completed before the Austrians arrived at Gitschin.
直到 6 月 22 日，普鲁士先锋队的军官才将普鲁士宣战的通知递交给奥地利军官，但普鲁士早在 6 月 16 日就对其他德意志邦国发动了战争。因此，易北河军团开始占领萨克森的同一天，奥地利军队也从奥尔穆茨向易北河上游的约瑟夫施塔特进军。
It was not before the twenty-second of June that officers of the Prussian vanguard handed Austrian officers notification of the Prussian declaration of war, but Prussia had opened hostilities against other German states on June 16. Thus the Elbe Army began to occupy Saxony on the same day on which the Austrian army started its march from Olmütz to Josephstadt at the upper Elbe.
奥地利军队不负奥地利军事史上的优良传统。其士气高昂，士气高昂；军官们能力卓越，经验丰富，其中不乏当时最杰出的将领。某些兵种，例如骑兵和炮兵，明显优于普鲁士军队。普鲁士军队的优势在于其步兵，他们在战术和武器装备方面都表现出色。然而，单凭普鲁士的针式机枪无法取得胜利，这一点在对法战争中得到了证明，当时普鲁士军队面对的是装备精良步枪的步兵。正是奥地利步兵过时的突击战术及其老旧的武器装备，才使奥地利军队处于明显的劣势。
The Austrian army was worthy of the best traditions of Austrian military history. Its morale and enthusiasm were high; its officers, among them some of the best generals of the period, had great ability and practical experience. Certain branches of the services, namely cavalry and artillery, were definitely superior to those of the Prussian army. The strength of the latter was in its infantry, which excelled both in tactics and arms. The Prussian needle-gun by itself, however, could not have achieved victory, as was proved in the war against France where the Prussians fought against an infantry armed with superior rifles. It was the outmoded shock tactics of the Austrian infantry together with its old-fashioned weapons that put the Austrians at a decided disadvantage.
然而，奥地利最高统帅部战略能力的不足扭转了战局。贝内德克是一位优秀的军人，在哈布斯堡王朝的服役中战功卓著。他尤其擅长实战；在柯尼格雷茨战役中，他甚至无畏而正确地指挥了战败军队的撤退。但他成长于古典战略思想学派，而他首席战略顾问克里斯马尼克将军（并非他亲自挑选）则主要受十八世纪作战思想的影响。这些因素决定了奥地利最高统帅部在战争中的战略行动。这意味着纵深部署和对天然优势阵地的重点维护。而毛奇则证明，时间可以征服空间。
The scales were turned, however, by the lesser strategic ability of the Austrian High Command. Benedek was a fine soldier with a distinguished record of service to the Hapsburg Empire. He was at his best in battle; fearlessly and correctly he directed even the retreat of his beaten army on the battlefield of Königgrätz. But he had grown up in the classic school of strategic thought and his chief strategic advisor, General Krismanic, whom he had not selected, lived largely in the operational thought of the eighteenth century. These elements determined the strategic conduct of the war by the Austrian High Command. They meant formation in depth and emphasis upon the maintenance of naturally strong positions. Moltke, on his part, showed that space could be conquered by time.
奥地利军队从摩拉维亚出发，分成三路平行纵队行进。尽管这种行军方式压力巨大，但奥地利军队迅速且有序地抵达了目的地。然而，6月26日先头部队抵达约瑟夫城后，至少需要三天时间才能重新集结军队。这段时间的损失或许挽救了普鲁士军队。
The Austrian army moved from Moravia in three parallel columns. Though the strain of such marching arrangements was considerable, the Austrians reached their goal quickly and in good order. But after the arrival of the vanguards in Josephstadt on June 26, at least three days were needed to mass the army again. This loss of time probably saved the Prussian armies.
尽管毛奇不断发出警告，普鲁士第一集团军的推进依然缓慢，因为腓特烈·卡尔亲王希望等待易北河军团的到来。易北河军团占领萨克森后，将归入他的指挥之下。这给了贝内德克利用内线作战的机会。贝内德克究竟应该攻击实力相近的两支普鲁士军队中的哪一支，一直是军事史学者们津津乐道的争论话题。贝内德克主要考虑攻击第一集团军，他的判断或许是正确的。然而，他未能及时意识到，他只有一两天的时间可以对其中一支普鲁士军队发起进攻，而无需担心后方另一支军队的威胁。由于奥地利最高统帅部更看重坚固阵地的战术优势，而非时间的宝贵价值，再加上军队的早期集结限制了其机动性，因此，这次进攻机会最终错失。当本尼德克发现这个错误时，已经太晚了，无法撤退到约瑟夫城和柯尼格雷茨的易北河后方，他不得不接受以河流为后方作战的局面。
In spite of Moltke's continuous warnings, the Prussian First Army had made slow progress, since Prince Friedrich Karl wanted to wait for the Elbe Army, which, after occupying Saxony, was to be joined to his command. This gave Benedek an opportunity to use the inner line of operations. Which of the two about equally strong Prussian armies Benedek should have attacked has been an interesting controversy among students of military history. Probably Benedek's judgment was right when he considered chiefly an attack on the First Army. He failed, however, to recognize in time that he had only one or possibly two days in which he could have taken the offensive against one of the Prussian armies without having to fear the other in his rear. Since the Austrian High Command believed rather in the tactical advantage of strong positions than in the priceless value of time, and since the early concentration of the army hindered its mobility, the opportunity slipped by. When Benedek discovered the mistake, it was even too late to retreat behind the Elbe at Josephstadt and Königgrätz, and he had to accept battle with the river at his rear.
奥地利对普鲁士两军之一发动进攻的危险解除后，毛奇开始推迟两军的集结，使它们彼此保持一天的行军距离，以便在战场上实现会师。7月2日夜间，他下达了最后的命令。这些命令实际上比执行起来要大胆得多。根据毛奇的设想，第二集团军的左翼和第一集团军的右翼不仅要攻击敌军的侧翼，还要攻击敌军的后方。毛奇将柯尼格雷茨战役设想为一场包围战。但普鲁士将领们没有听从他的指示，奥地利军队成功逃脱——尽管损失了四分之一的兵力。由于第二集团军的部队已经冲入第一集团军的前线，导致各军部队混杂在一起，难以迅速理清，因此立即追击是不可能的。四年后的色当战役证明，普鲁士人已经吸取了教训。
The danger of an Austrian attack against one of the two Prussian armies having passed, Moltke began to delay the concentration of the armies, keeping them at one day's distance from each other in order to achieve their union on the battlefield. During the night of July 2, the last orders were given. They were actually bolder than their execution made them appear. According to Moltke, the left wing of the Second and the right wing of the First Army were supposed to operate not merely against the flanks but also against the rear of the enemy. Moltke conceived of Königgrätz as a battle of encirclement. But the Prussian generals did not follow him and the Austrian army got away—though losing a fourth of its strength. An immediate pursuit was impossible since the troops of the Second Army had run into the front of the First, thus causing a mix-up of all army units, which could not be easily disentangled. Four years later, the battle of Sedan proved that the Prussians had learned their lesson.
有人认为毛奇的成功反映了普鲁士当时强大的军事实力，但这种说法并非绝对正确。1866年，毛奇必须在波西米亚战场上建立起普鲁士军队的微弱优势，而这种优势并非体现在兵力上。他冒着损失普鲁士各省兵力的风险，只留下一支规模极小的军队来对抗奥地利的德意志盟友。如果波西米亚战役拖延太久或陷入僵局，拿破仑三世本可以利用这个机会夺取莱茵兰，从而决定欧洲大陆的命运。此外，在1870-1871年的战争中，外国干预的可能性也并非完全不存在。
It has been suggested that Moltke's success reflected the superior military strength which Prussia enjoyed at that time, but such a statement is true only within certain limitations. In 1866, Moltke had to create the slight superiority of the Prussian armies in Bohemia, which, incidentally, was not to be found in overall manpower. He took the risk of denuding all Prussian provinces of troops and of leaving only an extremely small army to deal with Austria's German allies. If the Bohemian campaign had dragged on or turned into a deadlock, Napoleon III could have used the chance to take the Rhineland and to settle the fate of the Continent. Nor were possibilities of foreign intervention entirely lacking during the war of 1870–1871.
毛奇在1866年的战略表明，备受推崇的内线作战优势仅仅具有相对意义。他用以下这段话总结了自己的经验：“内线作战的优势毋庸置疑，但前提是你必须保留足够的空间，以数个行军步兵向一个敌人推进，从而赢得时间击败并追击他，然后再转而攻击另一个敌人，而此时另一个敌人只是被你监视着。然而，如果这个空间被压缩到你无法攻击一个敌人而不冒着被从侧翼或后方攻击的风险，那么内线作战的战略优势就会变成战斗中被包围的战术劣势。”
Moltke's strategy in 1866 showed that the much-vaunted inner line of operations were merely of relative significance. He summed up his experiences in these words: “The unquestionable advantages of the inner line of operations are valid only as long as you retain enough space to advance against one enemy by a number of marches, thus gaining time to beat and to pursue him, and then to turn against the other who is in the meantime merely watched. If this space, however, is narrowed down to the extent that you cannot attack one enemy without running the risk of meeting the other who attacks you from the flank or rear, then the strategic advantage of the inner line of operations turns into the tactical disadvantage of encirclement during the battle.”
这些话常被解读为对内线作战的明确谴责和对同心圆式机动的提倡。但这并非毛奇的观点。在1870-1871年的普法战争中，他灵活运用了这两种战术理念，并取得了成功，其主要依据是敌军的行动。毛奇战略的特点在于其思想的开放性和战术策略的灵活变化。
These sentences have often been interpreted as a definite condemnation of operations along the inner line and a recommendation of concentric maneuvers. This was not Moltke's opinion. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, he used both concepts freely and successfully, depending chiefly upon the actions of the enemy. Moltke's strategy was characterized by his openness of mind and by the elastic changes from one device to the other.
*注：本文为哈约·霍尔本（Hajo Holborn）所著《现代战略的缔造者》（Makers of Modern Strategy）一书中的论文《毛奇与施利芬：普鲁士-德意志学派》（Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School）的前半部分，经编者略作修订。后半部分已由冈瑟·罗滕贝格（Gunther Rothenberg）撰写的新论文取代，该论文参考了二战后涌现的较新的学术文献和重要资料，特别是关于施利芬计划的资料。
* NOTE: This text constitutes the first half, somewhat revised by the editor, of Hajo Holborn's essay “Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School” from the original Makers of Modern Strategy. The second half has been replaced by a new essay by Gunther Rothenberg, which takes account of the more recent scholarly literature and of important documentation, particularly on the Schlieffen plan, that has become available since the Second World War.
1 Gen. Baron Gourgaud， Sainte Hélène，Journal inédit，1815 年至 1818 年（巴黎，1899 年），2:20。
1 Gen. Baron Gourgaud, Sainte Hélène, Journal inédit, 1815 à 1818 (Paris, 1899), 2:20.
11. 毛奇、施利芬与战略包围理论
11. Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment
T两位伟大的将领——老赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇和阿尔弗雷德·冯·施利芬——从19世纪中期到第一次世界大战及之后，主导了普鲁士-德国的军事思想。他们倡导并实践了一种进攻性战争模式，这种模式适应了工业时代拿破仑“以战斗迅速决胜，并在战斗中力求歼灭敌人”的理念。面对新式武器和不断延伸的战线带来的僵局，1857年至1887年担任总参谋长的毛奇发展出一种概念，即通过一个连续的战略作战序列来包抄敌人，该序列结合了动员、集结、机动和战斗。他希望通过从一开始就掌握主动权，迫使对手陷入部分或完全包围，并在决定性的歼灭战或包围战（即歼灭战或包围战）中摧毁其军队。为了控制这一序列的执行，毛奇在早期发展的基础上创建了现代总参谋部系统，并引入了任务战术，这是一种强调在整体战略设计中分散主动性的指挥方法。
TWO GREAT SOLDIERS, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder and Alfred von Schlieffen dominated Prusso-German military thinking from the mid-nineteenth century into the First World War and beyond. They taught and practiced a mode of offensive warfare that adapted to the industrial age Napoleon's precept to seek prompt decision by battle and in battle seek to destroy the enemy. Confronted with the deadlock imposed by new weapons and extended frontages, Moltke, chief of the general staff from 1857 to 1887, developed the concept of outflanking the enemy in one continuous strategic-operational sequence combining mobilization, concentration, movement, and fighting. By seizing the initiative from the outset, he intended to drive his opponent into a partial or complete envelopment, destroying his army in a great and decisive battle of annihilation or encirclement, the Vernichtungs- or Kesselschlacht. To control the execution of this sequence, Moltke built on earlier developments to create the modern general staff system and introduced the Auftragstaktik, mission tactics, a command method stressing decentralized initiative within an overall strategic design.
尽管毛奇在1866年和1870年就展现了其新方法的潜力，但他的继任者施利芬（1891年至1906年在位）却从未亲自指挥过军队作战。然而，他作为战略包围战术的倡导者和理论家，在历史上留下了浓墨重彩的一笔。他将这一战术描述并加以颂扬，称之为“坎尼战役”概念，并认为这是唯一真正有效的作战方法。他旨在迅速而果断地战胜法国的宏伟计划在1914年几乎取得了成功，尽管最终失败了。但在东线战场上，这一战术却带来了一系列辉煌的胜利。施利芬的思想影响了另一代德国战略家，他们对战略包围战术进行了改进，并在第二次世界大战的闪电战阶段取得了显著的成功。汉斯·冯·塞克特将军是1919年至1926年间德国陆军总司令，对德国陆军的形成产生了深远影响。他认为施利芬的理论仍然具有现实意义，因为对于一支规模较小的职业军队而言，德国取胜的唯一希望在于战争伊始便取得迅速而决定性的胜利。1933年至1938年担任总参谋长的路德维希·贝克完善了这一战略构想的战术框架，而海因茨·古德里安将军等人则将其转化为装甲机械化作战的形式。在这些部队的先锋作用下，并辅以战术空军，战略包围战术在波兰和法国战役中取得了迅速胜利。火力与机动性相结合的新策略使德国在1941年连续击溃了苏军。然而，闪电战随后开始出现衰退迹象。战略包围战术在对付准备不足且指挥不力的对手以及在有限的作战区域内有效，但无法在更远的距离上持续作战，也无法最终战胜那些能够以空间换取时间并拥有充足预备队的敌人。在战争后期，从1943年开始，战略包围的概念开始被用于对付德国，但由于固有的指挥、控制和后勤问题，再次未能取得完全成功。作为一种战略理想，它在二战后的一系列冲突中发挥了作用，但到了20世纪下半叶，新的技术、政治和社会发展共同削弱了它快速取得决定性胜利的能力。
Although Moltke had demonstrated the potential of his new methods in 1866 and 1870, Schlieffen, his eventual successor from 1891 to 1906, never commanded armies in battle. Nevertheless, he became historically significant as a teacher and an exponent of strategic envelopment, which he described and glorified as the Cannae concept and came to regard as the only really effective method of waging war. His great project for gaining a rapid and decisive victory against France came close to success in 1914, although it ultimately failed, while on the eastern front the concept produced a number of spectacular victories. Schlieffen's ideas influenced another generation of German strategists who updated the strategic envelopment concept and applied it with striking success during the blitzkrieg phase of the Second World War. General Hans von Seeckt, the head of the Heeresleitung and a formative influence on the German army between 1919 and 1926, believed that Schlieffen's teaching had continued relevance, because with a small professional army Germany's only chance of success lay in rapid and decisive victories at the very outset of a war. The tactical framework for this strategic conception was refined by Ludwig Beck, chief of the general staff from 1933 to 1938, and cast in its armored-mechanized form by General Heinz Guderian and others. Spearheaded by such forces, supported by tactical airpower, strategic envelopment achieved rapid victory in the Polish and French campaigns, and the new combination of firepower and maneuver enabled Germany to destroy a succession of Russian armies in 1941. But then the blitzkrieg began to falter. Effective against poorly prepared and often poorly commanded adversaries and within a limited theater of operations, it could not be sustained over longer distances or bring final victory against an enemy who could trade space for time and disposed of ample reserves. In the latter part of the war, from 1943 on, the concept of the strategic envelopment began to be used against Germany, though again falling short of total success because of inherent command, control, and logistics problems. Remaining a strategic ideal, it played a role in a number of post—World War II conflicts, but by the second half of the century new technical, political, and social developments combined to deprive it of its ability to achieve fast and decisive results.
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在拿破仑时代到第一次世界大战之间，毛奇或许可以被认为是欧洲最具洞察力和最重要的军事作家。克劳塞维茨的思想更为深邃，其他一些指挥官在战术和作战指挥方面也堪称翘楚，但毛奇的卓越之处不仅在于组织和战略规划，更在于作战指挥，他将这些能力与对战争中可能性的敏锐洞察力相结合。毛奇拥有广泛的文化兴趣，有人将其描述为“歌德之后的人文主义者”。¹或许这种说法有些夸大其词。毛奇的确具备许多德国古典主义的知识分子特征，但他首先是一位军人，对他而言真正重要的是在普鲁士君主制的统治下，有控制地运用武力。
Moltke may be considered the most incisive and important European military writer between the Napoleonic Era and the First World War. Clausewitz was a more profound thinker, and equal claims to greatness as tacticians and combat leaders could be advanced for a number of other commanders, but Moltke excelled not only in organization and strategic planning but also in operational command, abilities he combined with an acute awareness of what was and was not possible in war. Moltke had broad cultural interests and has been pictured as “essentially a humanist of the post-Goethe era.”1 Perhaps too much has been made of this. Moltke did indeed share many of the intellectual characteristics of German classicism, but above all he was a soldier and what truly mattered to him was the controlled application of force in the service of the Prussian monarchy.
和许多普鲁士军人一样，他将自己的一些思想归功于克劳塞维茨，并自诩为克劳塞维茨的门徒。然而，克劳塞维茨对普鲁士军事理论和实践的实际贡献难以估量。就毛奇而言，他在国家与军队的关系上或许与克劳塞维茨有一些共同之处，但在组织和作战方面则相去甚远。克劳塞维茨始终是一位哲学家，致力于探寻战争的普遍本质，并主要以具体事例作为例证；而毛奇本质上是一位战争语法学家，很少进行抽象的思辨。与他同时代的大多数军人一样，他认为战争不可避免，是神圣秩序中不可或缺的一部分，他最关注的是如何才能成功地进行战争。因此，他始终关注的是具体的政治军事形势，而非战争的一般性问题。
Like many Prussian soldiers, he attributed some of his ideas to Clausewitz and described himself as his disciple. Yet Clausewitz's actual contribution to Prussian military doctrine and practice is hard to estimate. In Moltke's case there may be some convergence with Clausewitz on the relationship of the state and the army, but much less agreement on organizational and operational matters. Where Clausewitz was ever the philosopher, seeking to discover the universal nature of war and using specific examples primarily as illustrations, Moltke was essentially a grammarian of war who engaged in very little abstract speculation. In common with most soldiers of his generation, he regarded war as inevitable, an essential element in the divinely ordained order and he looked, above all, for ways to conduct war successfully. Therefore he always was concerned with the specifics of the actual political-military situation rather than the general aspects of war.
莫尔特克并非一位伟大的理论家，在他浩瀚的著作中，从未构建出一套完整的战争或战略体系；因此，研究他的思想只能通过他的信件、训令和备忘录。他对政策、战争和战略最完整的阐述见于1869年的《高级部队指挥官训令》和1871年的论文《论战略》。<sup>2</sup>在这些领域，莫尔特克密切追随克劳塞维茨，并在一些关键论述中直接引用了这位大师的观点。《训令》宣称“战争的目标是以武力贯彻政府的政策”。尽管克劳塞维茨始终强调战略即使在战争中也必须服从政策，但他同时也强调政策必须切合实际：“战争艺术的首要职责和权利在于避免政策提出违背战争本质的要求。”<sup> 3 </sup> 莫尔特克对此也完全赞同。但他在对战争本质的解读上，远比克劳塞维茨走得更远。在与俾斯麦就巴黎炮击事件发生冲突后不久完成的《论战略》中，他认为，一旦军队投入战争，军事行动的方向就应该完全由士兵决定。他写道：“政治考量只有在不提出军事上不恰当或不可能的要求时才能被考虑。” ⁴莫尔特克因将政策排除在实际战争行为的任何实质性作用之外，而被指责宣扬了一种危险的理论。然而，坚持仅以军事手段追求胜利——他将胜利定义为“在现有手段下所能达到的最高目标”——并非像许多后世学者所认为的那样理所当然地应受谴责。莫尔特克将军队视为君主的工具，而君主在他看来代表着国家。国王的两位主要顾问，军事领域的总参谋长和政治领域的宰相，在各自的职权范围内地位平等，但有义务互相通报情况。5如果说，在后来的岁月里，对军事及其需求的纯粹技术层面的致命过分重视阻碍了负责任的政治和外交政策，这既是文官软弱的结果，也是军方自负的结果。6
Not a great theorist, Moltke never produced a single comprehensive system of either war or strategy in his prolific writings; it is necessary to study his ideas through his correspondence, instructions, and memoranda. His fullest statement on policy, war, and strategy can be found in his “Instructions for the Senior Troop Commanders” of 1869 and in his essay “On Strategy” dated 1871.2 In these general areas, Moltke followed Clausewitz closely and in some key statements he paraphrased the master. The “Instructions” declared that the “objective of war is to implement the government's policy by force.” Although Clausewitz always stressed the subordination of strategy to policy even in war, he also emphasized the need of policy to be realistic: “The first duty and the right of the art of war is to keep policy from demanding things that go against the nature of war.”3 With this statement, too, Moltke agreed completely. But he went much further than Clausewitz in his interpretation of what was or was not in accord with the nature of war. In “On Strategy,” completed soon after his confrontation with Bismarck concerning the shelling of Paris, he argued that once the army had been committed to war, the direction of the military effort should be defined by the soldiers alone. “Political considerations,” he wrote, “can be taken into account only as long as they do not make demands that are militarily improper or impossible.”4 Moltke has been accused of advancing a perilous doctrine when he excluded policy from any meaningful role in the actual conduct of war. Yet insistence on pursuing victory, which he defined as the “highest goal attainable with available means,” by military means alone was not so automatically censurable as many later writers have suggested. Moltke considered the army as an instrument of the sovereign, who to him represented the state. The king's two principal advisors, the chief of the general staff in the military and the chancellor in the political sphere, were coequal within their respective jurisdictions, though obliged to keep each other informed.5 If in later years a fatal overvaluation of the purely technical aspects of the military and its needs inhibited responsible political and diplomatic policies, this was as much due to civilian weakness as to military presumption.6
莫尔特克也赞同克劳塞维茨的观点，即战争的目标是取得令人满意的政治结果，而这需要灵活应变的战略。僵化的体系令莫尔特克深恶痛绝，他认为战争中没有什么是确定的。因此，他认为不可能制定任何固定的规则。“战争如同艺术，”他说道，“不存在普遍适用的规则；两者都不能用教条来取代才能。”鉴于战争的不确定性，他得出结论，战略只不过是一套“权宜之计”。<sup> 7</sup>他认为，战略的基本要素几乎超越了常识的范畴，但要正确执行这些要素，就需要坚强的意志和在压力下迅速做出决策的能力。腓特烈大帝和格奈森瑙是他的理想典范，但有趣的是，莫尔特克也将乔治·华盛顿——一位并非战功卓著的野战指挥官，但面对逆境意志坚定，且对战争的政治和心理层面有着深刻理解的人——列入了“世界上最伟大的战略家”之列。<sup> 8</sup>
Moltke also endorsed Clausewitz's contention that the objective of war was the achievement of a satisfactory political result and that this required flexible and adaptive strategy. Rigid systems were anathema to Moltke, who held that nothing in war was certain. Therefore he believed that it was impossible to lay down any firm rules. “In war as in art,” he stated, there “exist no general rules; in neither can talent be replaced by precept,” and given the uncertainties of war, he concluded that strategy could be no more than a “system of expedients.”7 The basic elements of strategy, he thought, hardly went beyond the propositions of common sense, but their correct execution required strength of character and the ability to make rapid decisions under stress. Frederick the Great and Gneisenau were his ideal models, though interestingly enough, Moltke also included George Washington, not a notably successful field commander, but resolute in adversity and with a profound sense of the political and psychological dimensions of war, among the “world's greatest strategists.”8
在较为有限的作战领域，毛奇最擅长的是认识到，火器、交通和通讯的极大改进，以及各国组建和维持规模日益庞大的军队的能力，都要求战略、战术、指挥和组织做出相应的改变。美国内战已经证明，这些新因素可能导致战术和作战僵局，而普鲁士始终面临着潜在的多线作战，无法承受旷日持久的战争。然而，迅速做出决策需要采取积极的进攻来摧毁敌军，但线膛枪杀伤力的大幅提升使得正面进攻的成本高得令人难以承受，而不断延伸的战线也使得战术侧翼包抄成为不可能。毛奇的解决方案是“战略包围”，它从最初的集结开始，直接展开，将作战和战术需求融为一体。他深知“任何作战计划都无法在与敌军主力部队的首次交锋中幸存下来”，但他仍然决心夺取并保持主动权，并通过将战略和作战整合为一个整体来构建决定性战役。9他意识到，技术进步不仅加强了防御，也有助于实施大规模的进攻计划。他灵活的“权宜战略”，在1866年采用外围防线，在1870年战争第一阶段采用内线防线，竭尽全力比敌人更快地集结数量占优的兵力。一旦集结完成，各军彼此处于支援范围内，便拥有了同时攻击敌军正面和侧翼并包抄歼灭敌军的强大力量。10这种机动与战斗相结合，最终导致多支军队会师决战的模式，成为毛奇战争的标志。
In the more restricted sphere of operations, Moltke was at his best in recognizing that the changes brought about by vastly improved firearms, transportation, and communications, together with the ability of states to raise and maintain ever larger armies, required corresponding changes in strategy, tactics, command, and organization. The American Civil War had demonstrated that these new factors could create a tactical and operational deadlock, and Prussia, always facing a potential multifront conflict, could not afford a protracted war. But rapid decision required an aggressive offensive to destroy hostile forces, while the great increase in killing power derived from rifled firearms had made frontal attacks prohibitively costly and extended frontages made tactical outflanking impossible. Moltke's solution, the “strategic envelopment” mounted directly from the initial concentration, fused operational and tactical requirements. Aware that “no plan of operations survives the first collision with the main enemy body,” he nonetheless was determined to seize and retain the initiative and to structure the decisive battle by combining strategy and operations into one sequence.9 Technical advances, he realized, not only strengthened the defensive but also helped to implement a large offensive scheme. His flexible “strategy of expedients,” using exterior lines in 1866 and interior lines during the first phase of war in 1870, made every effort to concentrate numerically superior forces more rapidly than the enemy. Once that was achieved and his armies were within supporting distance of each other, they had the strength necessary to simultaneously engage the front and the flanks of the adversary and destroy him by envelopment.10 This interaction of movement and combat, culminating in several armies converging for the decisive battle, became the hallmark of Moltke's wars.
在这一战略作战序列中，最困难的环节是最初的集结和部署（即“起动”），以及对沿不同路线汇聚到决战战场的各路军队进行统筹控制。其他问题，例如后勤保障——在马匹运输时代几乎是无法解决的难题——在毛奇的作战方案中优先级要低得多。<sup> 11</sup>计划和准备、铁路和电报可以加快动员速度，但野战军的最初集结和部署至关重要。“军队最初集结的错误，”毛奇写道，“在整个战役过程中几乎无法纠正。”<sup> 12</sup>显而易见的困境在于，最初的集结需要高度集中的控制，而各路军队在野战中的行动则需要分散的指挥。毛奇对现代战争的指挥方法，得益于他对1859年意大利北部战役的研究，他认为最高统帅部（在本例中指总参谋长）应仅限于向高级下级指挥官发布概述总体目标和具体任务的总体指示，而将细节交由下级处理。他指出：“战争不能在一张白纸上指挥。”<sup> 13</sup>
Within this strategic-operational sequence, the most difficult elements were the initial concentration and deployment (the Aufmarsch), and the control of the different armies converging over separate routes for the decisive battle. Other problems, such as logistics, an almost intractable subject in the age of horse-drawn operational transport, held a much lower priority in Moltke's operational scheme.11 Planning and preparation, railroads and telegraph could accelerate mobilization, but the initial concentration and deployment of the field armies was critical. “A mistake in the original concentration of the army,” Moltke wrote, “can hardly be rectified during the entire course of the campaign.”12 The apparent dilemma was that initial concentration required highly centralized control, while the movements of the separate armies in the field required decentralized command. Moltke's approach to directing modern war, reinforced by his study of the 1859 campaign in northern Italy, was that the High Command, in this case the chief of the general staff, should limit itself to issuing general instructions to the senior subordinate commanders outlining the general objective and specific missions, and allow the subordinates to handle the details. “War,” he observed, “cannot be conducted from a green table.”13
一些作家谴责毛奇的指挥体系。例如，JFC Fuller指出，拿破仑领导并控制军队，而“毛奇只是将军队带到出发点，然后放弃指挥权，任其自由行动。” ¹⁴乍看之下，这种指责似乎有一定道理。松散的指挥体系要求下级指挥官必须具备高素质，而普鲁士将领在1866年和1870年的战役中都表现出一种令人遗憾的倾向，即贸然发动正面进攻，而骑兵情报的不准确更是助长了这种做法。但考虑到普鲁士的军事体制——国王担任最高统帅，诸侯担任各军指挥官——毛奇的指挥权很难与拿破仑相提并论。毛奇常常不得不在下达的命令与他的总体计划相冲突后，临时做出调整。此外，毛奇指挥的军队比拿破仑军队规模大得多，分布也更广泛，虽然电报提供了一种战略指挥的工具，但它对于作战控制来说不够灵活。
Some writers have condemned Moltke's command system. J. F. C. Fuller, for instance, stated that whereas Napoleon led and controlled, “Moltke brought his armies to their starting point and then abdicated his command and unleashed them.”14 On the face of it, the charge appears to have some validity. The loose system of command required subordinate commanders of high quality, and both in 1866 and in 1870, Prussian generals revealed a deplorable propensity to blunder into frontal attacks, a procedure encouraged by their cavalry's failure to provide accurate intelligence. But given the Prussian military framework, with the king acting as commander in chief and with princes acting as army commanders, Moltke's powers of command could hardly be compared with those held by Napoleon. Often Moltke had to extemporize after orders had been issued that interfered with his overall scheme. Moreover the forces Moltke directed were much larger than the Napoleonic armies and more widely dispersed, and although the electric telegraph provided an instrument of strategic direction, it was not flexible enough for operational control.
为了弥补当时指挥体系的明显不足，毛奇将普鲁士总参谋部改造为一个独特的机构，它既具备地方层面的灵活性和主动性，又能遵循统一的作战理论和最高统帅部的意图。这项直到1873年才完成的改革，开启了参谋工作和组织的新纪元。改革后的普鲁士总参谋部于1871年后更名为大总参谋部，以区别于继续存在的巴伐利亚、萨克森和符腾堡参谋部。它既承担着集体职能，也承担着分散职能。作为核心机构，它是军队的智囊，负责制定战略计划和作战方法。其分散职能则由各级参谋人员——部队总参谋部（Truppen Generalstab） ——负责，这些参谋人员被分配到师、军和集团军各级。虽然在当时的其他国家军队中，这些参谋人员仅仅是技术顾问，但在德国，他们却成为了指挥体系中的初级成员。指挥官保留最终权力，但需与参谋长共同制定作战决策。参谋长有权，也确实有义务，对任何他认为不合理的作战判断提出异议。普鲁士总参谋部制度的最佳之处在于，它通过确保在特定情况下，接受过共同作战理论教育的不同参谋军官能够就如何最有效地运用现有兵力达成大致相同的解决方案，从而实现了作战效率的制度化。<sup> 15</sup>
To offset the evident constraints of the command system as he found it, Moltke transformed the Prussian general staff into a unique instrument combining flexibility and initiative at the local level with conformity to a common operational doctrine and to the intentions of the high command. This development, not completed until 1873, ushered in the modern era of staff work and organization. The reformed Prussian general staff, named the Great General Staff after 1871 to distinguish it from the Bavarian, Saxon, and Württemberg staffs, which continued to exist, performed both collective and decentralized functions. In its central role it was the brains of the army developing strategic plans and operational methods. Its decentralized functions were handled by the staff officers, the Truppen Generalstab, assigned at the division, corps, and army levels. Although in other contemporary armies these men were mere technical advisors, in Germany they became junior partners in command. The commander retained ultimate authority, but was expected to make operational decisions jointly with his chief of staff, who had the right, indeed the duty, to protest what he regarded as unsound operational judgments. At its best, the Prussian general staff system institutionalized combat efficiency by ensuring that in a given situation different staff officers, educated to a common fighting doctrine, would arrive at approximately the same solution for making the most effective employment of available forces.15
1857年时，普鲁士总参谋部仍是陆军部的下属部门。要将其转型为军队最重要的指挥机构，需要普遍认可毛奇的核心作用，并对参谋军官进行新的思想灌输和训练。尽管如此，考虑到其职责范围，参谋部的规模仍然不大。德国总参谋部各部门加起来的总人数从未超过几百人，这支队伍由精挑细选、自觉自强的精英组成，他们以卓越的智力、勤奋和奉献精神而著称。除了人员素质高之外，新的指挥控制系统还依赖于统一的作战理论和作战程序。这些理论和程序是通过陆军学院的教育来传授的，这是之后选拔参谋人员的先决条件，并通过持续的训练以及轮岗担任指挥职务来培养。毛奇深知，很少有士兵有机会经历各种各样的作战情况，因此他强调军事史的重要性，将其作为参谋军官应对各种突发事件的工具。在扎实掌握实际工作技能的同时，历史理论的深入学习也成为德国总参谋部军官培养的一大特色。到1870-1871年，毛奇的体系因其在战场上的卓越表现和令人印象深刻的专业性而广受赞誉。在接下来的三十年里，尽管经过了一些重要的修改，但该体系被所有主要军队所采纳。
Transformation of the Prussian general staff, still a subordinate department of the War Ministry in 1857, into the most important command agency of the army required general recognition of Moltke's central role as well as new indoctrination and training of staff officers. At that, considering the scope of its duties, the size of the staff remained modest. Never comprising more than a few hundred officers in all of its branches and departments, the German general staff constituted a highly selected, self-conscious elite, distinguished by outstanding intellectual capacity, hard work, and dedication. Next to the excellence of its personnel, the new command-and-control system depended on conformity to a common fighting doctrine and common operational procedures. These were imparted through education at the War Academy, a prerequisite for subsequent selection to the staff, and continued training, alternating with assignments to command positions. Aware that few soldiers ever have the opportunity to experience a wide range of operational situations, Moltke stressed military history as a tool to forearm staff officers against the many possible contingencies. Together with a thorough grounding in the practical aspects of their work, the didactic study of history became one of the hallmarks of the preparation of German general staff officers. By 1870–1871 Moltke's system was already widely recognized for both its spectacular performance in the field and its impressive professionalism. Within the next three decades, albeit with important modifications, it was adopted by all major armies.
二
II
1866年的战役在许多方面体现了毛奇的战争理想。决定性的战役在战争爆发后几周内就打响，其结果使敌方丧失了继续作战的手段和意志。即便如此，毛奇仍然认为对奥地利的战争是一场令人遗憾但又不可避免的兄弟相残的冲突。相比之下，他渴望与法国开战，他深深地不信任法国，并认为法国“不仅是最危险的敌人，也是准备最充分的敌人”。<sup> 16 </sup> 拿破仑三世的军队至今仍被广泛认为是欧洲最强大的军队，这是一支训练有素、经验丰富的职业老兵部队，拥有现代化的武器和经验丰富的指挥官。毛奇就任普鲁士总参谋长后不久，便制定了他第一个对法作战计划：沿美因河部署防御，以侧翼包抄法军向德国北部或南部的进攻。他采取防御姿态是因为当时普鲁士军队仍然实力较弱；但随着军队改革的推进，野战部队的集结范围扩大到莱茵河沿岸，他开始设想在该地区包围敌人的可能性。普奥战争改变了他的看法。普鲁士的胜利，加上新成立的北德意志邦联的实力，以及1867年后南德意志的支持预期，使他拥有了一支动员起来的精锐部队：十二个经验丰富的北德意志军团，约74万作战人员，另有超过20万的二线民兵和约8万南德意志军队作为后援。相比之下，职业化的法国军队最多只能集结约35万人。<sup> 17</sup>从1867年起，毛奇开始准备对法国发动进攻，甚至考虑先发制人。他的基本计划很简单：利用动员全国人力、周密计划和高度发达的铁路系统所带来的兵力优势，搜寻并消灭敌人。他在1868年写道：“对法作战计划很简单，就是找到敌军主力，然后无论在哪里攻击它。唯一的难点在于如何用如此庞大的兵力执行这个简单的计划。”<sup> 18</sup>
The campaign of 1866 in many ways represented the Moltkean ideal of war. The decisive battle was fought within weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, and its outcome deprived the adversary of the means and the will to fight further. Even so, Moltke regarded the war against Austria as a regrettable, if unavoidable, fratricidal conflict. By contrast, he desired war against France, a country he distrusted deeply and considered “not only the most dangerous but also the best prepared enemy.”16 Still widely believed to be the best in Europe, the army of Napoleon III was a professional veteran force, combat experienced, with modern weapons and seasoned commanders. Soon after becoming chief of the Prussian general staff, Moltke prepared his first war plan against France, a defensive deployment along the Main, flanking a French drive into either northern or southern Germany. He adopted a defensive posture because at the time the Prussian army was still weak; but as army reform progressed, concentration of the field forces was advanced to the Rhine, and he began to speculate about a possible envelopment of the enemy in that region. The Austro-Prussian War transformed his outlook. Prussian successes coupled with the strength of the new North German Confederation, and after 1867 the expectations of South German support, provided him with a mobilized strength of twelve seasoned North German corps, some 740,000 combatants, backed by over 200,000 second-line Landwehr troops and some 80,000 South Germans, against which the professional French army could at best muster some 350,000 men.17 From 1867 on Moltke prepared for offensive war against France, and even considered a preemptive strike. His basic scheme was simple. He intended to seek out and destroy the enemy with the numerically superior forces made available by mobilizing national manpower, careful planning, and a highly developed railroad system. “The plan of operations against France,” he wrote in 1868, “simply consists of locating the main enemy army and attacking it wherever it is found. The only difficulty is how to execute this simple plan with very large masses.”18
然而，法国确实拥有一个显著优势。至少在理论上，其职业军队的准备速度会比普鲁士的征召预备役部队更快，而毛奇担心法军会从莱茵河对岸发动突袭。但即便如此，他也能调动更多的兵力。他估计，在战争初期，法军最多只能集结25万人，而他的军队则有38万人；而且随着征召兵的到来，普鲁士的预备役部队最终会使可用兵力增加两倍。对法国铁路网的研究表明，为了迅速集结兵力，敌军必须集中在孚日山脉分隔的两个区域，一个在梅斯，另一个在斯特拉斯堡。为了防范法军的突袭，毛奇将他的三支军队集结在莱茵河沿岸，北至特里尔，南至兰道。这样，如果法军发动进攻，占据中心位置的三支军队可以比分散在洛林和阿尔萨斯的法军部队更快地相互增援。动员速度至关重要。1870年7月15日夜，国王下令军队进入战时状态，普鲁士总参谋部证明其已掌握了大规模组织和调动的诀窍。动员完成后，普鲁士军队将拥有超过一百万人；与此同时，在短短十八天内，六条干线和三条南德意志支线将42.6万人（十个军）运送至边境。7月19日，德军正式宣战，但法军未能及时集结兵力，直到8月4日德军集结完毕后才在萨尔地区发动了一次小规模进攻。
France, however, did possess one significant advantage. In theory at least, its professional army would be ready sooner than Prussia's conscript-reservist troops, and Moltke worried about a French spoiling attack across the Rhine. But even in this eventuality he would dispose of larger forces. He calculated that during the initial stages of the war the French could not muster more than 2.50,000 men against his 380,000, and with conscription Prussian reserves in time would triple available numbers. A study of the French railroad network revealed that to assemble rapidly, the enemy would have to concentrate in two areas divided by the Vosges Mountains, one group in Metz and the other at Strasbourg. To guard against a French spoiling offensive, Moltke massed his three armies on the Rhine between Trier in the north and Landau to the south, so that if the French did attack, the three armies holding the central position could reinforce each other more rapidly than could the separated French commands in Lorraine and Alsace. Speed of mobilization was all-important and when, on the night of July 15, 1870, the king ordered his army on a war footing, the Prussian general staff proved that it had mastered the problems of mass organization and movement. After mobilization was complete, the Prussian army would have over a million men; meanwhile in eighteen days six trunk lines and three additional lines for the South Germans transported 426,000 men, ten corps, to the frontier. War was declared on July 19, but the French were unable to assemble their forces in time and only launched a minor attack in the Saar on August 4 when German concentration was nearly complete.19
战斗暴露了毛奇不完全实施的指挥体系中仍然存在的缺陷。他的部下无视诱使法军进入可包围阵地的指令，反应过早且过于激进，将敌人击退至洛林。随后德军发起推进，期间“很少有指挥官会像他那样，打了这么多自己原本不想打的仗，或者在不该打的战场上、不该打的战场”。侦察工作再次失灵，将领们坚持贸然发起正面进攻。尽管如此，任务战术却卓有成效。邻近的部队循着炮声行进，不等命令便迅速集结到战场，提供了包抄法军阵地所需的兵力。到8月18日，法军两大主力之一已被逼入梅斯城内，在长期围攻后投降；而另一支试图解救梅斯要塞的军队则遭到拦截，被驱赶至比利时边境色当，并于9月1日被迫投降。包括随军的拿破仑三世在内，共有10.4万名士兵沦为战俘。英军凭借卓越的参谋工作、迅速的动员以及尽管存在一些失误但高效且积极的作战指挥（充分利用了大营的优势），最终击溃了法军。由于难以控制下级指挥官，最高统帅部不得不数次亲自指挥作战，而快速推进造成的后勤问题也通过临时应对得以解决。法军方面，过度自信、缺乏计划以及陈旧的组织架构都是导致这场惨败的原因。
Combat revealed that weaknesses remained in Moltke's partially implemented command system. Disregarding instructions to lure the French into positions where they could be enveloped, his subordinates reacted too soon and too vigorously, pushing the enemy back into Lorraine. A German advance followed, during which “few commanders can have fought more battles they did not intend to fight, or did not mean to fight in the way or at the time the battles occurred.”20 Reconnaissance, once again, was poor and generals insisted on rushing into frontal assaults. Still, the mission tactics proved effective. Marching to the sound of the guns, neighboring formations converged on the scene of action without waiting for orders, and provided the numbers needed to outflank French positions. By August 18, one of the two main French armies had been pushed into Metz, where it capitulated after a long siege, while the second, attempting to relieve the fortress, was intercepted, driven against the Belgian frontier at Sedan, and forced to surrender on September I. Together with Napoleon III, who had accompanied this army, 104,000 men became prisoners of war. Superior staff work, speedy mobilization, and despite some blundering, efficient and aggressive operational leadership exploiting the advantages of larger battalions had crushed the French imperial army. Difficulties in controlling subordinate commanders had compelled the High Command on several occasions to assume direct control, and logistic problems caused by the swift advance had been made good by improvisation. On the French side overconfidence, lack of planning, and an obsolete organization all contributed to the disaster.
这是一场辉煌的胜利，距离法国宣战不到七周，但摧毁法国的抵抗意志却又用了五个月的时间。当色当战役的消息传到巴黎时，一个临时国防政府成立，并在各省组建了四支军队，在首都巴黎组建了一支军队，并得到了众多非正规军的支持。9月18日，德军包围了巴黎，而法军则试图解除围困并切断德军的通讯。德军只控制了一条通往巴黎的狭窄通道。法军仍然拥有大量资源，并且凭借其制海权，可以从国外运送补给。他们需要的是时间，而俾斯麦担心德军士气低落以及外国干预的可能性，因此想要剥夺他们获得时间的权利。他要求立即炮轰巴黎，并因此与毛奇爆发了激烈的冲突。自战争伊始，俾斯麦就对毛奇未能及时向他汇报战况不满，直到国王的坚持，这位总参谋长才同意这样做。即便如此，他仍然拒绝让首相参与未来作战行动的计划。因此，炮击问题变得更加重要；它凸显了普鲁士指挥部内部的军民矛盾。21
It was a spectacular victory, achieved less than seven weeks after the French declaration of war, but it took five more months to break the French will to resist. When news of Sedan reached Paris, a provisional government of national defense was established, which managed to raise four armies in the provinces and one in the capital, supported by numerous irregular forces. The Germans invested Paris on September 18, while the French tried to raise the siege and interrupt their communications. The Germans held only a narrow corridor leading to Paris. The French still had significant resources, and their command of the sea enabled them to bring in supplies from abroad. What they needed was time, which Bismarck, alarmed about sinking German morale and the possibility of foreign intervention, wanted to deny them. He demanded an immediate bombardment of the city, and a major clash with Moltke erupted on this issue. Since the outset of the war Bismarck had resented Moltke's failure to keep him fully informed of the progress of operations, and only after the king insisted had the chief of the general staff agreed to do so. Even so, he still refused to include the chancellor in planning of future operations. Thus the question of the bombardment assumed greater importance; it highlighted civil-military tensions within the Prussian headquarters.21
士兵们视俾斯麦为外来者，认为他声称参与作战计划不过是企图在军中攫取影响力的幌子。毛奇则认为他缺乏足够的火炮来有效炮击巴黎，而软弱无力的炮击只会加剧抵抗。但由于补给仍然十分紧张，他认为用重型攻城列车运输铁路会适得其反。因此，俾斯麦的要求在军事上是“不恰当的，甚至是不可能的”。最终，国王再次站在了首相一边，尽管此时冲突已经平息。12月，补给状况有所缓解，重型火炮开始运抵。炮击于1871年1月5日正式开始。在此期间，法军多次向德军防线发起进攻，但由于训练不足、装备匮乏、缺乏指挥官，他们临时拼凑的部队根本无法与德军匹敌，所有进攻均以失败告终。1871年1月23日，在凡尔赛宫宣布成立新帝国五天后，停战谈判开始，巴黎于1月28日投降。
The soldiers regarded Bismarck as an interloper and his claim to be included in operational planning as merely a screen for designs to gain influence in the military. Moltke held that he lacked sufficient guns for an effective bombardment of Paris and that a weak effort would merely stiffen resistance. But with the supply situation still critical, he considered it counterproductive to overload the railroads with the transport of the heavy siege trains. Therefore, Bismarck was asking for something that was “militarily improper or impossible.” In the end, the king once again sided with the chancellor, though by this time the conflict had resolved itself. In December the supply situation eased and heavy artillery began to arrive. The bombardment opened on January 5,1871. In the meantime, the French repeatedly had mounted attacks against the German lines but, badly trained, lacking equipment and leaders, their improvised forces were no match for the Germans and none of these efforts succeeded. Armistice negotiations opened on January 23, five days after a new Reich had been proclaimed at Versailles, and Paris surrendered on January 28, 1871.
法国出乎意料的民众抵抗令毛奇感到不安，他一直将战争视为正规军之间的较量。他对临时组建的军队、非正规军以及诉诸民众激情的做法感到震惊，他称之为“野蛮的回归”。巴黎公社的血腥景象更令他感到不安，他竭力将法国的“全民武装”与普鲁士的征兵制度区分开来。前者不加区分地武装民众，引发了社会革命的阴影。他指出，“步枪分发迅速，但难以收回。”相比之下，普鲁士的制度则灌输了“纪律以及正确的军事美德”。<sup> 22</sup>民众战争和革命给毛奇留下了深刻的印象，使他陷入了困境。一方面，1871年后，当其他列强效仿普鲁士实行征兵制时，他担心德国会失去人力优势，并指出“只有从一开始就拥有兵力优势，才能取得持久的胜利”。另一方面，作为一名坚定的保守派，他担心社会主义会削弱产业工人的忠诚。因此，除非能提供充足的正规训练干部，否则他反对大幅增加年度征兵配额。<sup> 23</sup>他的观点在军界和社会精英中广为流传，结果就是，直到1914年战争爆发前两年，德国只征召了大约一半的适龄男性入伍。
The unexpected popular resistance in France was an unsettling experience for Moltke, who always had envisioned war as a contest between conventional forces. He was appalled by improvised armies, irregular elements, and appeals to popular passion, which he described as a “return to barbarism.” Futher perturbed by the bloody spectacle of the Paris Commune, he was at pains to distinguish the French “nation-in-arms” from the Prussian system of conscription. By indiscriminately arming the population, the former raised the specter of social revolution. “Rifles,” he observed, “are distributed quickly, but are difficult to withdraw.” The Prussian system, by contrast, instilled “discipline as well as proper military virtues.”22 Popular war and revolution made a lasting impression on Moltke, leaving him in a quandary. On the one hand, when after 1871 the other powers followed Prussia's lead and introduced conscription, he worried that Germany would lose its manpower advantage and noted that “lasting success can only be achieved when one enters the war from the outset with superior numbers.” On the other hand, as a staunch conservative, he feared that socialism was undermining the allegiance of the industrial workers. Therefore he opposed major increases in the annual recruit quotas unless adequate regular training cadres were made available.23 His views were widely shared within the military and social elites, with the result that until two years before the outbreak of war in 1914, Germany called only about half of its eligible men to the colors.
三
III
普鲁士一直惧怕多线作战，这种可能性始终令毛奇忧心忡忡。他被任命为总参谋长后不久，便设想“斯拉夫东方和拉丁西方联合对抗欧洲中心”。这种想法是他寻求速战速决的主要原因之一，也是1870年战役最初几周的主要担忧。即使在胜利的巅峰时期，这种潜在的危险依然令他忧心忡忡。巴黎陷落后三个月内，他将法俄联盟描述为“对新生的德意志帝国最危险的威胁”，并制定了详细的应对计划。<sup> 24 </sup>他承认政治分歧使得这种联盟的可能性微乎其微，但他认为为所有可能的突发情况做好准备是他的职责。直到1879年，总参谋部还在制定应对可能性更小的法俄奥三国联盟的作战计划。<sup> 25 </sup>
Prussia had always dreaded a multifront war and this possibility continued to preoccupy Moltke. Soon after he was named chief of the general staff he had speculated about a combination of the “Slav East and the Latin West against the centre of Europe.” Such reflections were among the main reasons of his search for a short and decisive war, and had been a major concern during the first weeks of the 1870 campaign. Even at the height of victory this potential danger continued to worry him and within three months after the fall of Paris he described a Franco-Russian alliance as the “most dangerous threat to the new German Empire” and made detailed plans to meet it.24 He recognized that political differences made such an alliance rather unlikely, but considered it his duty to prepare for all possible contingencies. Until 1879, the general staff also prepared plans for war against an even less likely Franco-Russian-Austrian coalition.25
法国战争也改变了毛奇的战略预期。在他1871年4月制定的第一份对法俄战争计划中，他就已经警告说，迅速取胜已变得不太可能。“德国不能指望通过在西线迅速取胜来摆脱一个敌人，然后转而对付另一个敌人。我们刚刚看到，即使是战胜法国的战争，结束起来也是多么困难。”他认识到防御的力量，也足够现实地意识到，寻求全面胜利只会招致长期的抵抗，因此他主张采取攻防兼备的战略。他不再寻求以决定性战役为标志的快速决胜，而是计划采取进攻策略，从东西两个方向入侵敌方领土，扰乱敌军的动员，占领易守难攻的防线，然后让敌军在徒劳地攻击德军防御火力时遭受惨重伤亡。为了实现这一目标，他打算在两个战线投入大致相等的兵力。他既不期望取得全面胜利，也不倾向于扩张领土，而是寄希望于外交手段使冲突得到双方都能接受的解决。
The war in France also modified Moltke's strategic expectations. In his first war plan against France and Russia, prepared in April 1871, he already warned that rapid victory had become unlikely. “Germany cannot hope to rid itself of one enemy by a quick victory in the west in order then to turn against the other. We have just seen how difficult it is to bring even the victorious war against France to an end.” Understanding the power of the defensive and realistic enough to recognize that the search for total victory would provoke prolonged resistance, he now advocated a strategy based on defensive-offensive operations. No longer seeking a rapid decision marked by decisive battles, he planned to operate offensively, moving into enemy territory west and east to disrupt mobilization and occupy easily defensible lines, and then have the enemy suffer heavy casualties in futile attacks against German defensive firepower. To achieve this he intended to allocate approximately equal forces to the two fronts.26 He neither expected total victory nor favored additional territorial acquisitions, but counted on diplomacy to bring the conflict to an acceptable conclusion.
基本上，毛奇后来的所有计划都源于这些攻防兼备的假设，尽管事态发展很快便使他东西部兵力大致均衡部署的设想失效。诚然，1873年后，俾斯麦的三皇同盟重申了君主制国家对抗共和制法国的团结，至少暂时降低了两线作战的风险。但即便首相拥有高超的外交手腕，也无法消除德国地理位置固有的危险。法国军事力量出人意料的迅速恢复加剧了毛奇的担忧。1872年，法国实行普遍兵役制，几乎五分之四的适龄公民都接受了兵役训练，同时建立了一套高效的参谋和动员体系。到1873年，毛奇宣称“必须加快动员进程”，并决定以牺牲东线兵力为代价，增加西线的兵力。他现在设想，一支动员速度更快的法国军队可能会击退德军。在这种情况下，他打算在莱茵河沿岸重整旗鼓，然后趁着法军再次集结成两股兵力之际，从其中央发起反击，将北线部队逼向巴黎，南线部队逼向卢瓦尔河。如果计划成功，法军将获得优厚的条件；即便法军拒绝这些条件，也会被削弱到足以让主力部队撤回东线的程度。<sup> 28</sup>然而，即便如此，拟议的兵力分配方案仍然没有严重偏向西线。直到1877年，毛奇仍然预计，如果真的爆发两线作战，决定性的战役将在动员后的第三周于洛林打响。但他再次强调，他并不追求彻底的胜利，而是强调“我们不能将追击范围扩大到巴黎。能否在这一战线上达成和平协议，必须交由外交途径。”<sup> 29</sup>
Basically, all of Moltke's later plans derived from these defensive-offensive assumptions, though developments soon invalidated his roughly equal deployment of forces east and west. To be sure, after 1873, Bismarck's League of the Three Emperors reaffirmed monarchical solidarity against republican France, and temporarily at least decreased the danger of a two-front war. But even the chancellor's immense diplomatic skill could not banish the danger inherent in Germany's geographic position. The surprisingly rapid French military recovery increased Moltke's concern. In 1872, France introduced universal service, training almost four-fifths of all eligibles, at the same time developing an efficient staff and mobilization system. By 1873 Moltke declared it “imperative to accelerate our mobilization process,” and decided to increase troop strength in the West at the expense of the East.27 He now envisaged the possibility that the Germans might be driven back by a more rapidly mobilized French army. In that eventuality, he intended to regroup on the Rhine and then, with the French again expected to mass in two groups, counterattack through their center, driving the northern group toward Paris and the southern to the Loire. If the plan succeeded, France would be offered generous terms, and even if these were refused, France would be so weakened that major forces could be returned to the East.28 At that, the proposed allocation of forces still was not heavily weighted toward the West and, as late as 1877, Moltke expected that in the event of a two-front war, a decisive battle would be fought in Lorraine in the third week after mobilization. Once again, however, he did not look for a complete victory, emphasizing that “we cannot extend our pursuit to Paris. It must be left to diplomacy to see if it can achieve a peace settlement on this front.”29
他对与法国开战抱有有限期望的另一个原因是，俄国在1877-78年俄土战争中展现出的军事能力的提升，以及法国边境坚固防御带的即将完工，使得西线的防御作战和东线的进攻作战更具前景，也更有必要。“如果我们必须打两线作战，”毛奇指出，“……我们应该利用莱茵河的防御优势和我们坚固的防御工事，并将所有非绝对必要的兵力（在西线）投入到对东线的大规模进攻中。”<sup> 30 </sup> 他的意思并非德国应该在西线保持被动。拟议的兵力分配相当均衡，36万人对俄，30万人对法。毛奇决定，应该从洛林和萨尔的前沿阵地发起进攻，以击退法军的攻势。如果撤退到莱茵河而不进行大规模战斗，将会危及士气，并造成棘手的战略局面。 “我认为，”他总结道，“即便面对兵力优势，我们也必须冒险在莱茵河前决一死战，然后再撤退到莱茵河以北。”<sup> 31</sup>在俄国前线，他计划发动一次有限的内线攻势，突袭集结在考纳斯和华沙之间的俄军西线，扰乱他们的动员。该计划与系统性地煽动被征服民族起义相结合，旨在扰乱俄国的阵型，迫使沙皇政府与德国进行合理的谈判。此外，自1871年以来，毛奇偶尔会考虑奥匈帝国支持对抗俄国的可能性，而1879年10月签署的奥匈帝国同盟则为从奥属加利西亚向北进攻波兰中部创造了条件。但从军事角度来看，1879年的条约存在一个重大缺陷：缺乏具体的军事承诺。俾斯麦设计该条约的主要目的是为了满足奥匈帝国对俄国的威慑需求，并赋予其纯粹的防御性质。条约承诺，如果任何一方遭到俄国攻击，双方将互相支援，但并未提供任何联合作战的计划机制。无论如何，毛奇始终对提前做出承诺持怀疑态度。他写道：“事先规定共同行动毫无用处，因为实际上这些行动根本无法执行。”<sup> 32</sup>基本上，他怀疑奥匈帝国军队实力相对较弱，动员速度也较慢，是否真的做好了发动大规模进攻的准备。
Another reason for his limited expectations for war against France was that Russia's improved military capabilities, demonstrated during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, coupled with the near completion of a strong French frontier fortification belt, made defensive operations in the West and offensive operations in the East more promising and necessary. “If we must fight a two-front war,” Moltke observed, “…we should exploit the defensive advantage of the Rhine and of our strong fortifications, and employ all forces not absolutely indispensable [in the west] for an imposing offensive against the east.”30 By this he did not mean that Germany should be passive in the West. The proposed distribution of forces was fairly balanced, 360,000 against Russia and 300,000 against France, and Moltke decided that an effort should be made to defeat the French offensive from forward positions in Lorraine and on the Saar. A retreat to the Rhine without a major fight would endanger morale and create a difficult strategic situation. “I am of the opinion,” he concluded, “that even facing superior numbers, we must risk a battle in front of the Rhine before withdrawing beyond it.”31 On the Russian front he intended to conduct a limited offensive on interior lines, driving between the western Russian armies assembling at Kovno and Warsaw to disrupt their mobilization. Combined with a systematic effort to promote insurrections among the subject peoples, the plan was designed to throw Russia off balance and induce the Czarist government to negotiate with Germany on reasonable terms. In addition, since 1871, Moltke occasionally speculated on the possibility of Austro-Hungarian support against Russia, and the Dual Alliance, signed in October 1879, created prospects for a complementary offensive north from Austrian Galicia into central Poland. But from the military point of view the treaty of 1879 had one major weakness. It lacked specific military commitments. Bismarck had designed it primarily to meet Austria-Hungary's need for reassurance against Russia, and had given it a purely defensive character. The treaty promised mutual support in the event that either of the partners was attacked by Russia, but it did not provide any mechanism for planning coalition warfare. In any case, Moltke remained skeptical about making advance commitments. “It is useless,” he wrote, “to stipulate common operations in advance, because in practice they will not be carried out.”32 Basically, he doubted that the Austro-Hungarian army, relatively weak and slow to mobilize was really prepared to undertake major offensive operations.
尽管如此，参谋部会谈还是在1882年启动，并在毛奇新任命的第一副手、军需官阿尔弗雷德·冯·瓦尔德西伯爵的推动下，断断续续地持续了十余年。毛奇曾于1881年提出退休，但皇帝威廉一世劝说他留任，并安排一位更年轻的军官与他分担重任。瓦尔德西是一位雄心勃勃、不安分的军官，他于1888年接替毛奇成为军需官。然而，他始终未能形成一套连贯的战略方针，并将大量精力投入到与俾斯麦公开宣称的与奥匈帝国和俄国都保持良好关系的阴谋诡计中。 1882年，在奥匈帝国新任总参谋长弗里德里希·贝克男爵的多次提议下，瓦尔德西与奥匈帝国会面。瓦尔德西承诺，一旦爆发两线作战，德国准备派遣约20个现役师和6个预备师协助奥匈帝国，对驻扎在波兰突出部的俄军进行双重包围。贝克对这一兵力部署计划感到失望，尤其因为他自己的军队准备就绪的时间比德军晚两周，而且他原本指望盟友承担大部分初期战斗。此后，毛奇与贝克多次会谈，但情况并未发生太大变化。瓦尔德西和毛奇正准备将德国主力调往法国作战。1886年底，贝克再次询问毛奇的立场，毛奇告诉他，一旦开战（当时开战的可能性很大），德国只会将三分之一的兵力投入东线战场。毛奇的最终计划于1888年4月1日生效，该计划预期在击退法军的最初攻势后，德军将以三分之二的兵力发动强有力的反击。东线仅保留18个师。<sup> 33</sup>尽管尚未达到施利芬后来设想的全面进攻的程度，但西线进攻的趋势在1887-1888年间已经显现。
Staff talks nonetheless were initiated in 1882. and continued on and off for over a decade at the instance of Moltke's newly appointed first deputy, Oberquartiermeister Count Alfred von Waldersee. Moltke had asked to retire in 1881, but Emperor William I had persuaded him to stay on with a younger man to share his burdens. An ambitious and restless officer, Waldersee, who in 1888 became Moltke's successor, never formed a consistent strategic policy and spent much of his effort in intrigues that ran counter to Bismarck's avowed purpose to stay on good terms with both Austria-Hungary and Russia. In 1882, following repeated suggestions by Baron Friedrich Beck, the new Austro-Hungarian chief of staff, the two men met and Waldersee promised that in case of a two-front war, Germany was prepared to assist Austria-Hungary with some twenty active and six reserve divisions to carry out a double envelopment of the Russian armies in the Polish salient. Beck was disappointed with the proposed forces, especially because his own army would be ready only two weeks later than the German and he had counted on his ally to assume a major share of the initial fighting. Additional conversations between Moltke and Beck produced little change. Waldersee and Moltke were about to shift the main German strength against France and when Beck asked for clarification at the end of 1886, Moltke told him that in the event of war, a distinct possibility at that point, Germany would engage only one-third of its army in the East. And Moltke's final plan, going into effect on April 1, 1888, expected that the repulse of the initial French offensive would be followed by a strong counterattack with two-thirds of the German army. Only eighteen divisions were to remain in the East.33 The tilt towards an offensive in the West, though not yet in the all-out manner later envisaged by Schlieffen, already was apparent in 1887–1888.
这种优先事项的转变也反映了俾斯麦的观点。这位首相始终认为法国而非俄国才是更大的威胁。1887年初，在回应维也纳的询问时，他曾表示，尽管德国将坚守盟约，但奥匈帝国应该避免挑衅俄国；如果陷入两线作战，德国将首先寻求解决法国问题。俾斯麦与俄国进行的秘密谈判最终促成了《再保险条约》的签订，而毛奇直到条约签署后才得知此事，这进一步加剧了这两个盟友之间的疏远。即便如此，1888年瓦尔德西接替毛奇后，奥匈帝国和德国参谋部之间的谈判仍在继续。尽管这位新任总参谋长在1887年曾倾向于对俄国发动先发制人的打击，但他现在却提议将主要作战力量放在西线。鉴于俄国日益增长的实力，部署到东线的德军兵力显然不足以应对哪怕是有限的进攻。1891年接替瓦尔德西的施利芬在1895年坦诚地告知贝克，德国已放弃原计划的对波兰的联合进攻。施利芬建议奥匈帝国向华沙方向发起独立进攻，这一提议显然超出了奥地利的能力范围，也印证了维也纳方面对德国意图的持续怀疑。鉴于此，参谋部会谈于1896年中断，直到1908年才恢复。即便如此，双方仍未就至关重要的初始部署达成明确协议。<sup> 34</sup>
This shift in priorities also reflected Bismarck's views. The chancellor always considered France rather than Russia to be the greater danger and, in response to inquiries from Vienna early in 1887, had stated that although Germany would stand by its alliance, Austria-Hungary should refrain from provoking Russia and that if it came to a two-front war, Germany would seek a decision against France first. Bismarck's secret negotiations with Russia, leading to the Reinsurance Treaty, about which Moltke was informed only after it had been signed, contributed to further estrangement between the two allies. Even so, when Waldersee succeeded Moltke in 1888, negotiations between the Austro-Hungarian and German staffs continued, but although the new chief of the general staff had favored a preemptive strike against Russia in 1887, he now proposed making the main effort in the West. Considering Russia's growing strength, German troops assigned to the eastern front were clearly inadequate even for limited offensives, and Schlieffen, who in 1891 replaced Waldersee, merely was candid when he informed Beck in 1895 that Germany had abandoned the projected joint offensive into Poland. Instead, Schlieffen advised that Austria-Hungary undertake an independent thrust in the general direction of Warsaw, a proposal clearly exceeding Austrian capabilities and confirming still lingering suspicions about German intentions in Vienna. On this note, staff talks lapsed in 1896 and were not resumed until 1908. Even then they achieved no clear agreement concerning the vital initial dispositions.34
盟军两大总参谋部之间摇摆不定，甚至混乱不堪的关系，至少在一定程度上反映了日益严重的作战困境。在任期的最后几年，年逾八旬的毛奇已无力解决德国的基本战略作战难题。他曾足够灵活地意识到进攻性战争的劣势日益加剧，并在1871年后发展出一种防御性进攻姿态，旨在取得有限的胜利并维持战略僵持。但随着法俄军队实力的增强，迅速战胜一个对手的必要性再次凸显。然而，毛奇已看不到任何实现这一目标并避免旷日持久、破坏性极强的战争的途径。1890年，在他最后一次公开讲话中，他警告国会，一旦民众情绪高涨，未来的冲突可能会持续“七年甚至三十年”，并彻底摧毁现有的社会秩序。<sup> 35</sup>
The fluid, even confused, relationship between the two allied general staffs reflected, at least in part, a mounting operational quandary. During his last years in office, the octogenarian Moltke no longer was able to find a solution for Germany's basic strategic-operational dilemma. He had been flexible enough to realize the mounting odds against offensive warfare, and after 1871 developed his concept for a defensive-offensive posture looking toward limited victories and a strategic standoff. But as both the French and Russian armies became more powerful, the need to attain an early victory against one adversary once again became apparent. Yet Moltke no longer saw a possible way to achieve this goal and to avoid a long and destructive war of exhaustion. In 1890, making his last public statement, he warned the Reichstag that with popular passions aroused, future conflicts could last “seven and perhaps thirty years” and shatter the established social order.35
当然，毛奇的预言颇具远见，但他却无法提供任何指导，阻止战争演变成旷日持久、血腥残酷的僵局。事实上，1871年之后，没有一位德国军事思想家能够解决进攻行动的必要性与拥有现代化武器的步兵在堑壕战中对进攻部队造成难以承受的伤亡之间的矛盾。1870年的经验，又被俄土战争、巴尔干战争和南非战争所强化。威廉·冯·布卢姆将军、克拉夫特·祖·霍亨洛厄-英格尔芬根亲王和科尔马·冯·德·戈尔茨等将领一致认为，只有通过改进的炮兵（包括伴随野战部队的机动重型火炮）来抵消步兵火力的增强，进攻才能取得成功。与此同时，这些年轻一代的将领们并没有完全接受毛奇对战争未来的悲观论调。尽管他们的作战理论并不僵化教条，但所有人都认为进攻仍然是最佳的作战方式，尽管他们也承认，进攻可能需要与初步防御相结合，以削弱敌军。他们认为，即使在现代条件下，战略包围，尤其是在西欧狭小的空间内，仍然是取得重大胜利的最佳途径，尽管规模可能不及色当战役。最后，他们都坚信兵力至关重要，并主张更多地利用德国的人力资源储备。<sup>36</sup>所有这些理念，尤其强调寻求快速决策，都得到了阿尔弗雷德·冯·施利芬的认同，他于1891年2月7日就任总参谋长。
Moltke was prophetic, of course, but he could provide no guidance to prevent war from deteriorating into a lengthy and bloody stalemate. For that matter, none of the German military thinkers after 1871 could resolve the conflict between the requirement for offensive action and the capacity of entrenched infantry with modern weapons to inflict unsupportable casualties on the attacking forces. The experiences of 1870 were reinforced by those of the Russo-Turkish War and the wars in the Balkans and in South Africa. There was agreement among writers like Generals Wilhelm von Blume, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, and Colmar von der Goltz that an attack could only succeed if increased infantry firepower was neutralized by improved artillery, including mobile heavy artillery to accompany the field forces. At the same time, these younger men did not fully accept Moltke's pessimistic views about the future of war. Without becoming rigidly dogmatic in their operational doctrines, all held that the offensive remained the superior mode of war, though they conceded that it might have to be combined with a preliminary defense to weaken the adversary. They felt that even under modern conditions strategic envelopment, especially in the restricted spaces of western Europe, still offered the best prospects for a major victory, though perhaps not on the scale of Sedan. Finally, they shared the conviction that numbers were of the utmost importance and advocated greater exploitation of German manpower reserves.36 All these concepts, with particular emphasis on the search for a rapid decision, were shared by Alfred von Schlieffen, who took office as chief of the general staff on February 7, 1891.
第四
IV
施利芬是普鲁士一个古老家族的后裔，1833 年 2 月 28 日出生于柏林。他接受了新教虔诚主义的教育，毕业于柏林的约阿希姆斯塔尔文理中学，并于 1853 年以一年志愿者的身份加入第二近卫乌兰骑兵团。一年之内，他转入正规军，并于1854年12月被授予军官军衔。他很早就被选入陆军学院深造，1865年加入总参谋部，先后担任过各种参谋和作战职务，包括1876年至1884年担任第一近卫乌兰骑兵团的指挥官。同年，他重返总参谋部任职，并在领导多个部门后，于1889年成为瓦尔德西的第一副手。瓦尔德西因试图干预政治而被勒令退位后，施利芬接任总参谋长一职，直至1906年1月1日将职位移交给小赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇。退休后，施利芬继续完善他旨在对西方进行决定性包围的宏伟计划，但他已不再对政策产生影响。他于1913年1月4日去世，距离第一次世界大战爆发还有19个月。<sup> 37</sup>
The descendant of an old Prussian family, Schlieffen was born in Berlin on February 28, 1833. Educated in the spirit of Protestant pietism, he was graduated from the Joachimsthaler Gymnasium in that city and in 1853 reported to the 2nd Guard Uhlans as a one-year volunteer. He transferred to the regular service within a year and was commissioned in December 1854. Selected early to attend the War Academy, he joined the general staff in 1865, and served in various staff and line assignments, including command of the 1st Guard Uhlans from 1876 to 1884. That year he returned to general-staff duty and after heading several sections became Waldersee's first deputy in 1889. When Waldersee was compelled to step down as the result of his attempts to meddle in politics, Schlieffen became his successor until he in turn handed over to Helmuth von Moltke the Younger on January 1, 1906. In retirement Schlieffen continued to perfect his great plan for a decisive western envelopment, but he no longer influenced policy. He died on January 4, 1913, nineteen months before the outbreak of the First World War.37
施利芬成为他那个时代最著名也最具争议的战略家。他代表了新一代的职业军事领导人，兼具一流的管理才能和扎实的教育背景，尽管他不像毛奇那样拥有广泛的文化兴趣。他是一位专家，更倾向于具体的计算而非抽象的推测；他为人严谨孤僻，妻子去世后便全身心投入到自己的事业中。埃里希·鲁登道夫将军称他为“有史以来最伟大的军事家之一”，他的众多追随者坚信他找到了解决德国战略困境的答案，足以使德国在第一次世界大战中取得早期胜利。<sup> 38</sup>他的批评者指责他“思想狭隘的军事学派”以及对更广泛的政治影响的漠视。他们声称，施利芬“似乎秉持着技术人员的观点，认为只要尽其所能，运用现有资源，并遵循职业惯例和规则，‘在糟糕的工作中做到最好’，就完成了自己的职责。” 39他对纯粹军事计划的依赖，而且这些计划本身就存在缺陷，这“无异于德国和欧洲不幸的开端”。40批评者和仰慕者都一致认为，施利芬的战略实践，即便不是他的基本理念，也与克劳塞维茨和毛奇的战略理念截然不同。一位仰慕者，威廉·格罗纳将军，赞许地指出，施利芬的著作与克劳塞维茨不同，它没有“冗长的理论推测……而是反映了生活和现实”，而施利芬努力消除作战行动中的“摩擦”因素，则被认为是“与克劳塞维茨截然相反的”。41施利芬在其职业生涯的最后阶段，也与毛奇有所不同：一方面，他决心指挥而非指挥军队作战；另一方面，他决心制定一项战略，以便在两线作战中尽早取得对一个敌人的决定性胜利。42
Schlieffen became the best-known and most controversial strategist of his time. He represented a new generation of professional military leadership, combining first-rate administrative talents with a solid education, though he lacked the broader cultural interests of Moltke. He was a specialist who favored concrete calculations over abstract speculations, an austere, solitary man who after the death of his wife devoted himself exclusively to his profession. General Erich Ludendorff called him “one of the greatest soldiers ever,” and his many disciples were convinced that he had found an answer to Germany's strategic dilemma that would have brought an early victory in the First World War.38 His critics have faulted him for his “narrow-minded military scholasticism” and reckless disregard of wider political ramifications. Schlieffen, they claim, “seems to have taken the technician's view that his duty was fulfilled when he did his utmost with the means available, and ‘made the best of a bad job’ in compliance with the customs and rules of his profession.”39 His reliance on purely military plans, and flawed ones at that, was “nothing less than the beginning of Germany's and Europe's misfortunes.”40 Critics and admirers alike agree that Schlieffen's strategic practices, if not his basic concepts, were a break in continuity from Clausewitz and Moltke. An admirer, General Wilhelm Groener, noted with approval that his writings, unlike those of Clausewitz, were free from “verbose theoretical speculations…but reflected life and reality,” while Schlieffen's efforts to remove the element of “friction” from operations had been called an “antithesis to Clausewitz.”41 Schlieffen also differed from Moltke in the last stage of his career both in his resolve to command rather than to direct the armies in war and in his determined search to develop a strategy for an early and decisive victory over one enemy in a two-front war.42
施利芬重新寻求速胜的主要原因是政治军事形势的变化。施利芬上任几个月后，假想中的两线作战的可能性大大增加。1891年至1894年间，一系列法俄参谋部会谈、协议和条约改变了欧洲的兵力格局。当时普遍认为德国是一座军备竞赛的堡垒；但法国每年都在训练更多的士兵，而规模庞大的俄军仍在持续扩张。协约国的实际或预期军事实力明显超过同盟国。兵力被视为至关重要。施利芬在1891年写道：“我们过去的胜利都是凭借兵力优势取得的。”他继续说道，“战略艺术的精髓在于如何运用兵力优势。如果一开始就实力更强，这相对容易；如果实力较弱，则较为困难；而当兵力悬殊时，则几乎不可能。” 43因此，他拒绝了防御-进攻作战计划中隐含的消耗战策略。如果采纳该策略，“德军将不得不在两线之间疲于奔命，时而击退敌人，时而又击退敌人……[而]战争将持续下去，我军的劣势和实力也将日益削弱。” 44在两线作战中，时间对德国不利，必须在战争伊始就消灭一个敌人。正面强攻无法实现这一目标，因为正面强攻充其量只能取得一场“普通”的胜利，随后便会陷入旷日持久的战争。必须进行一场歼灭战。“一辆索尔费里诺坦克对我们毫无帮助；它必须是一辆色当坦克，或者至少是一辆柯尼格雷茨坦克。” 45
The main reason behind this renewed search for a rapid victory was the changed political-military situation. A few months after Schlieffen assumed his post, the hypothetical two-front war became much more likely. Between 1891 and 1894, a number of Franco-Russian staff talks, agreements, and treaties shifted the manpower balance in Europe. Popular belief regarded Germany as an armed camp; but France trained more men annually, while the Russian army, already very large, continued to expand. The military strength of the Dual Entente, actual or projected, clearly outnumbered that of the Dual Alliance. Numbers were considered all-important. “Our past victories,” Schlieffen wrote in 1891, “were gained with superior numbers.” The “essential element of the art of strategy,” he continued, is “to bring superior numbers into action. This is relatively easy when one is stronger from the outset, more difficult when one is weaker, and probably impossible when the numerical imbalance is very great.”43 Therefore, he rejected the strategy of attrition implied in the defensive-offensive war plans. If adopted, the “German forces will have to shuttle between the fronts, pushing back the enemy here and there…[while] the war drags on with growing disadvantages and debilitation of our forces.”44 Time was not on Germany's side in a two-front war, and it was essential to destroy one enemy at the outset. This could not be achieved by a frontal assault, which at best produced an “ordinary” victory followed by a protracted war. A battle of annihilation was required. “A Solferino would not help us; it has to be a Sedan or at least a Königgrätz.”45
总参谋长本可以寻求外交手段来降低德国在军事上的劣势，但施利芬严格遵守了当时已成惯例的管辖权划分原则。瓦尔德西的例子或许可以作为前车之鉴。瓦尔德西曾涉足政策问题，并警告皇帝德国海军建设不合理，只会激怒英国，结果被迫下台。无论如何，施利芬始终恪守本职。1904年至1905年间，“当德国最有可能……通过先发制人的打击破坏法俄同盟时”，他没有积极争取。<sup> 46</sup>即使在诸如提高年度征兵配额以扩充军队规模这样的问题上，他也拒绝卷入政治斗争。当他的提议遭到作为法定主管机构的陆军部的反对时，他最终让步。在施利芬看来，和平时期总参谋长的恰当角色仅限于计划、改进作战理论和能力，以及在被询问时提供建议。
The chief of the general staff might have looked to diplomacy to reduce the military odds against Germany, but Schlieffen rigidly observed the by now traditional separation of jurisdictions. The example of Waldersee, who had ventured into policy questions, and cautioned the emperor that the German naval buildup was unsound and merely antagonized Great Britain, and who consequently had been forced from office, may have stood as a warning. In any case, Schlieffen confined himself to his own professional sphere. In 1904–1905, “when temptation was greatest for Germany to…disrupt the Franco-Russian alliance by a preemptive strike,” he abstained from pressing his case.46 And even on such matters as increasing the size of the army by raising the annual recruit quota, he refused to enter into a political fight. When his proposals encountered opposition from the War Ministry, the legally responsible agency, he gave way. In Schlieffen's view, the proper role of the chief of the general staff in peacetime was restricted to planning, improving combat doctrine and capabilities, and offering advice when asked.
V
V
施利芬致力于提升现有部队的作战效能。世纪之交，火力、机枪、速射野战炮和无烟火药的改进，以及通信、无线电和电话等新技术的进步，正在改变陆战的性质，尽管当时各国军队尚未完全理解这些创新。骑兵仍然偏爱骑乘作战，步兵战术过于强调突击，而野战炮兵的打击力不足。人们已经意识到重型机动炮兵的重要性，它将成为即将到来的战争的核心武器，甚至可能是决定性的武器，但施利芬必须顶住老派炮兵的反对，才能推动重型装备的引进。作为瓦尔德西的副手，他早在1888年就大力支持通过新的步兵条例，正式承认任务战术，并在新的岗位上努力提升骑兵的侦察能力。此外，他还增加了技术部队的数量，并支持引进机枪、现代通信设备和机动车辆。在总参谋部内，他特别注重培养年轻军官独立指挥的能力。总的来说，他的努力对德军未来几年的表现做出了巨大贡献。47
Schlieffen devoted considerable effort to making existing forces more effective. At the close of the century improvements in firepower, machine guns, quick-firing field artillery, and smokeless powder as well as new developments in communications, radio, and telephone were changing the nature of land warfare, though armies everywhere did not yet fully understand these innovations. Cavalry still favored mounted combat, infantry tactics retained too much emphasis on shock, and field artillery lacked striking power. The need for heavy mobile artillery, the central and perhaps the decisive weapon of the coming war, had been perceived, but Schlieffen had to push through the introduction of heavier matériel against the opposition of old-line gunners. As Waldersee's deputy he already had strongly supported adoption of new infantry regulations in 1888, formally recognizing the mission tactics, and in his new post he tried to improve cavalry reconnaissance capabilities. In addition, he increased the number of technical units and backed the introduction of machine guns, modern signal equipment, and motorized vehicles. Within the general staff, he paid special attention to preparing junior officers for independent command. Overall, his efforts contributed substantially to the performance of the German army in the years to come.47
这一切都是为了促成一场决定性的战役。施利芬认为，某些基本的战争原则，尤其是进攻、机动、兵力规模和兵力经济，同样适用于规模大小的战斗。与之前的拿破仑和毛奇一样，他认为，为了避免惨重的损失，必须包抄敌人，而作战的目标是歼灭敌军。他对军事史的研究使他确信，即使是实力较弱的军队，也可以通过集中兵力攻击敌军的一侧或两侧来实现这一目标。汉尼拔、腓特烈大帝、拿破仑和毛奇都曾在战斗和整个战役中证明了这一点，色当战役就是最近的例证。然而，施利芬担心，在压力之下，军队指挥官可能会忘记核心目标。毕竟，他声称，这些将领未能完全执行“毛奇简单而宏伟的包围歼灭敌军计划”，而且他怀疑自1870年以来，他们的理解和自制力是否有所提高。 “权宜之计”战略本身就是问题的一部分。他斥责毛奇认为总参谋长“只能指挥而非指挥”。<sup> 48</sup>施利芬的观点远超克劳塞维茨和毛奇，后者认识到“摩擦”和敌军“独立意志”的不可预测性，而施利芬则坚持认为，可以迫使对手基本按照己方的作战计划行事。他计划通过进攻来夺取主动权，并通过集结兵力攻击敌军侧翼，不仅要扰乱敌军的平衡，还要剥夺其可行的战略选择。这一方案要求从动员到决战的整个过程紧密衔接，包括严格遵守既定的计划和作战目标。他允许出现一些意外情况，但他所控制的战略体系——先验机动——力求通过预先计划和集中指挥来尽可能地排除这些意外情况。49施利芬意识到，现代军队规模可能过于庞大，以至于无法由一人掌控，但他寄希望于科技来解决这个问题。他在1909年写道，一位“现代的亚历山大”应该充分利用新的通讯手段，“电报、无线电、电话……汽车和摩托车”，以便从远方的指挥部进行指挥。50
All of this was meant to make a decisive battle possible. Schlieffen believed that certain basic principles of war, above all the offensive, maneuver, mass, and economy of force, applied equally to large and small actions. Like Napoleon and Moltke before him, he held that to avoid prohibitive losses one had to outflank the enemy and that the objective of operations was to destroy the opposing forces. His study of military history convinced him that even a weaker army could achieve this by concentrating against one or both flanks of the adversary. Hannibal, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Moltke had demonstrated this in battle as well as in entire campaigns, Sedan being the most recent example. Schlieffen, however, feared that under stress, army commanders might lose sight of the central objective. After all, he claimed, these generals had failed to fully implement “Moltke's simple and grand plan for a complete encirclement and annihilation of the enemy,” and he doubted that since 1870 their understanding and self-control had improved. The “strategy of expedients” had been part of the problem. He reproached Moltke for thinking that the chief of the general staff “could direct rather than command.”48 Going well beyond Clausewitz and Moltke, who recognized the unpredictable effects of “friction” and the enemy's “independent will,” Schlieffen maintained that one could compel the opponent to conform substantially to one's own operational design. By taking the offensive, he planned to seize the initiative, and by massing against the enemy's flanks, he intended not only to throw him off balance but deprive him of viable strategic options. The scheme required close integration of the entire sequence from mobilization through the climactic battle, including rigid adherence to schedules and set operational objectives. He allowed for some unexpected developments, but his controlled system of strategy, the manoeuvre a priori, sought to exclude them as far as possible by preplanning and centralized command.49 Schlieffen recognized that modern armies might become too large to be controlled by a single man, but looked to technology to provide the answer. A “modern Alexander,” he wrote in 1909, ought to make fullest use of the new means of communications, “telegraph, wireless, telephones…automobiles and motorcycles,” to command from a distant headquarters.50
施利芬的战术方法在总参谋部和高级指挥官中都并非无人批评。1896年之前担任近卫军参谋长的冯·施利希廷将军曾多次抨击固定作战模式和不惜一切代价进攻的理念，并强烈捍卫普鲁士军官自主行动的权利和义务，同时坚持个人责任。<sup> 51</sup>另一位颇具影响力的作家，当时担任大总参谋部军事史部门负责人的冯·伯恩哈迪将军也反对先验的机动概念。他抱怨说，这种非人格化的机械方法将战争艺术简化为一种行业技能，将战略家贬低为纯粹的技术人员。他质疑对兵力规模的过分强调，并坚持认为指挥官和部队的素质同样重要。此外，他认为，突破——即便不是战术上的突破，也是作战上的突破——并非一味依赖包围战术，而是仍然可行且有效的。施利芬的副手冯·比洛将军和当时驻扎在东普鲁士的冯·德·戈尔茨将军也反对施利芬的想法。<sup>52</sup>但施利芬对批评者不以为意。随着时间的推移，他越来越确信德国必须不惜一切代价赢得首战，于是他摒弃了所有可能妨碍他实施计划的因素，因为他认为只有这个计划才能带来胜利。
Critics of Schlieffen's approach were not lacking both within the general staff and among senior commanders. General von Schlichting, chief of staff of the Guard Corps until 1896, published several attacks against set-piece operations and the concept of the offensive at all costs, and strongly defended the right and duty of Prussian officers to act on their own initiative, accepting personal responsibility for their actions.51 Another influential writer, General von Bernhardi, the head of the military history section in the Great General Staff at that time, also opposed the manoeuvre a priori concept. Such a depersonalized, mechanistic approach, he complained, reduced the art of war to little more than a trade and the strategist to a mere technician. He questioned the emphasis on mass, and insisted that the quality of leadership and of troops counted as much. Moreover, instead of relying on envelopment alone, he claimed that breakthroughs, if not tactical then operational, still were possible and effective. General von Bülow, one of Schlieffen's deputies, and General von der Goltz, then commanding in East Prussia, also opposed Schlieffen's ideas.52 But Schlieffen shrugged off his critics. As time went on, he became more and more convinced that Germany would have to win the initial battle at any price, and pushed aside all considerations that might interfere with the execution of the project that alone, he thought, could lead to victory.
六年级
VI
他的宏伟计划是迅速彻底地击败法国军队，正如这位刚刚退休的总参谋长于1906年2月提交给继任者的备忘录（通常被称为“施利芬计划”）中所概述的那样。这只是施利芬制定的一系列战略计划中的最新一项。每年，总参谋部都会制定不同的应急计划，这些计划如果在参谋部巡视和兵棋推演中经过检验后被采纳，就会在次年4月1日生效。在施利芬的任期内，他总共制定了16项针对法国的计划、14项针对俄国的计划，以及19项针对两线作战的计划——而两线作战如今几乎已成定局。53最紧迫的问题是决定将主力投入哪个敌人，以及需要多少兵力来保卫另一条战线。内部战线便于重新部署，但人们认识到，一旦启动，最初的行动就很难，甚至可能不可能改变。因此，军事决策会产生巨大的政治影响，并严重限制外交选择。然而，那种认为1914年以前军方将他们的计划强加于文职当局的印象并不正确。施利芬与外交部一位极具影响力的高级官员弗里德里希·冯·霍尔斯坦保持着密切联系，而总理比洛和贝特曼·霍尔维格也了解战争计划的大致内容。即便如此，他们仍然不了解一些具体而关键的细节，例如从1912年起就计划对列日发动的政变。与俾斯麦不同，这些人并没有主动了解情况，而且由于当时缺乏协调战略规划和外交政策的正式机制，管辖权的划分导致了对军事计划的严重过度依赖，这种依赖甚至可能酿成致命的后果。
His grand scheme was the rapid and total overthrow of the French army, as outlined in the memorandum, usually called the “Schlieffen Plan,” that the recently retired chief of the general staff delivered to his successor in February 1906. It was only the latest in a series of strategic plans drawn up by Schlieffen. Each year the Great General Staff developed different contingency plans which, if adopted after being tested in staff rides and war games, became effective on April 1 the following year. During his term in office, Schlieffen formulated a total of sixteen plans against France, fourteen against Russia, and nineteen for a two-front war, which now was a near certainty.53 The most pressing issues were to decide against which enemy to launch the main strength and what force would be adequate to defend the other frontier. Interior lines facilitated redeployment, but it was recognized that once put in motion, the initial Aufmarscb was difficult, probably impossible, to change. Military decisions therefore had enormous political consequences and severely restricted diplomatic options. The persistent impression that in the years before 1914 the soldiers imposed their schemes on the civilian authorities is, however, incorrect. Schlieffen maintained close ties with Friedrich von Holstein, a very influential senior official at the Foreign Ministry, and both Chancellors Bülow and Bethmann Hollweg were informed of the general features of the war plans. Even so, they were not aware of some specific and crucial details, such as the coup de main planned against Liège from 1912 on. Unlike Bismarck, these men made no effort to be informed, and because there existed no formal mechanism to coordinate strategic planning and foreign policy, the division of jurisdictions resulted in a serious, possibly fatal, overreliance on military schemes alone.
施利芬就任总参谋长时，继承了毛奇起草、瓦尔德西略作修改的作战计划。然而，他对毛奇两线作战的攻防兼备策略的基本假设并不满意。他尤其担心德国无法承受在反击前抵挡住法军的攻势。与此同时，他对拟议的对俄国西部省份进行有限破坏性进攻的前景也持怀疑态度。1894年，他做出了一项根本性的改变。为了保持主动权并阻止法军的进攻，他决定将德军的初始集结地进一步西移，即使这意味着要冒遭遇战的风险。如果法军选择继续防守，他计划通过进攻弗鲁阿尔-南锡-圣文森特前沿阵地来突破其边境防御，最终夺取南锡高原。<sup> 54</sup>但他很快意识到，这并非一个令人满意的计划。即使成功，在此取得突破也既不能消灭法军，也不能使其主力部队调往东线。这需要漫长的后续行动，给了俄国完成动员所需的时间。而且，该计划也未能带来奇袭的效果；法军总参谋部早已预料到会在此发动进攻。55
On assuming the post of chief of the general staff, Schlieffen inherited plans drafted by Moltke and only slightly modified by Waldersee. However, he was not satisfied with the underlying assumptions of Moltke's defensive-offensive scheme for a two-front war. Above all he feared that Germany could not afford to ride out a French offensive before counterattacking. At the same time, he questioned the prospects of the proposed limited spoiling attack into Russia's western provinces. In 1894 he made a fundamental change. To retain the initiative and to forestall the French offensive, he decided to move the initial German concentration further west, even at the risk of an encounter battle. If the French decided to remain on the defense, he intended to rupture their frontier fortifications by an attack against the advanced Frouard-Nancy-St. Vincent position leading to seizure of the Nancy plateau.54 It was not, he soon recognized, a satisfactory plan. Even if successful, a breakthrough here neither eliminated the French army nor permitted the transfer of major elements to the East. It required lengthy follow-up operations, giving Russia the time needed to complete mobilization. Nor did the plan hold out the promise of surprise; an attack here was anticipated by the French general staff.55
但施利芬仍然坚信法国是必须通过毁灭性进攻才能消除的主要威胁，因此他停止了与奥匈帝国联合对抗俄国的进一步计划。到1897年，他曾考虑过在凡尔登以北发起突破，但随后放弃了这一方案。他认为战略包围需要更大的展开空间。“试图绕过凡尔登的进攻，”他总结道，“绝不能回避侵犯比利时和卢森堡的中立地位。”<sup> 56</sup>这一新方向在1899年的一份备忘录中得到阐述，该备忘录直到1904-1905年一直是应对两线作战的西线进攻的依据。总共七个集团军，三个在洛林，两个分别位于东西两翼，将在亚琛和巴塞尔之间集结。施利芬假定法军会率先发起进攻，无论是经由比利时还是进攻洛林，他计划以攻击法军左翼作为反击。“如果成功，”他指出，“我们将能够把整个法军从其防御工事中驱逐到上莱茵河地区。”如果法军采取防御姿态，他计划在贝尔福-凡尔登地区发动正面进攻，牵制法军，然后从比利时侧翼包抄击败他们。他预计不会遇到太大困难。“卢森堡，”他观察到，“没有军队，而相对薄弱的比利时军队会想要撤回其要塞。”<sup> 57</sup>尽管在接下来的几年里，施利芬反复考虑过其他方案，但他始终坚持从比利时发起进攻。<sup>58</sup>为了速度和集中兵力，他必须保持攻势紧凑，起初他设想的扫荡范围仅限于默兹河以南地区。但他质疑这种有限的行动是否足以将法军从其防御工事中驱逐出去。此外，1904年的参谋部巡视表明，德军计划部署的右翼兵力不足，而中央阵地则过于强大。而且，在夏末，俄军在满洲的战败暂时消除了来自东方的任何重大威胁。因此，施利芬进一步降低了东线的战力，并决定将当时可用的75%的动员野战兵力投入到凡尔登-里尔一线的大规模包围战中。<sup> 59</sup>
But Schlieffen remained convinced that France was the major threat that had to be eliminated by a crushing offensive, and therefore he discontinued further planning for joint operations with Austria-Hungary against Russia. By 1897 he contemplated, and then discarded, a breakthrough immediately north of Verdun. He decided that the strategic envelopment had to have more space to unfold. “An offensive that seeks to wheel around Verdun,” he concluded, “must not shrink from violating the neutrality of Belgium as well as that of Luxembourg.”56 This new direction was spelled out in an 1899 memorandum that, until 1904–1905, remained the basis for the offensive in the West in case of a two-front war. A total of seven armies, three in Lorraine and two on each wing, were to assemble between Aachen and Basel. Assuming that the French would be ready to advance first, either through Belgium or against Lorraine, Schlieffen intended to counter with an attack against their left wing. “If this succeeds,” he noted, “it will enable us to drive the entire French army away from its fortifications toward the Upper Rhine.” If the French stood on the defensive, he planned to pin them down by a frontal attack in the Belfort-Verdun sector and defeat them by an outflanking thrust through Belgium. No great difficulties were expected here. “Luxembourg,” he observed, “has no army, and the relatively weak Belgian army will want to withdraw into its fortresses.”57 Although during the next years Schlieffen repeatedly examined alternative options, he always returned to the wheel through Belgium.58 The need for speed and concentration demanded keeping the wheel tight, and at first he envisaged a sweep restricted to the area south of the Meuse. But he questioned whether such a limited maneuver would be enough to drive the French out of their fortifications. Moreover, the 1904 staff ride revealed that the right wing was too weak, while the center of the planned German deployment was too strong. In the late summer, moreover, Russian defeats in Manchuria for the time being eliminated any major threat from the East. Accordingly, Schlieffen further downgraded the eastern front and decided to assign 75 percent of the then-available mobilized field strength to an extended envelopment on the line Verdun-Lille.59
1905年俄国革命强化了施利芬将德军主力部署到以梅斯北部为枢纽的行军翼的决定。1905年10月，施利芬在向参谋人员讲话时，回顾了拿破仑的“营方阵”，并宣称他计划的包围战将遵循同样的模式，“只是规模更大、力量更强、部署更密集”。<sup> 60</sup>他在对1905年战争演习的最终评述中对此进行了详细阐述。他认为，通过范围广、兵力雄厚的包围战，再加上正面进攻和持续追击，可以避免像满洲那样的僵局。然而，他并没有完全忽视东线，并警告说：“认为在决定性战役后的第二天早上就能将军队调往东线的想法是不现实的。色当战役就是这样一场决定性的战役，但谁又能保证在9月2日那天，德军主力就能被调往东线呢？” 61他最后一份正式作战计划于1906年4月1日生效，为东线部署了三个军。尽管当时尚未达成任何正式协议，但预计奥匈帝国从加利西亚向北发起的攻势将提供额外的支援。然而，由于西线右翼已部署了大量兵力，该计划包含了1905年12月31日那份著名备忘录的基本内容（但直到次年2月才转交给他的继任者）。
The 1905 revolution in Russia reinforced his decision to allocate the bulk of the German army to the marching wing pivoting north of Metz. Lecturing to his staff in October 1905, Schlieffen recalled Napoleon's “battalion square” and declared that his projected envelopment would follow the same pattern, “only in a more concentrated, massive, and powerful form.”60 He elaborated on this in his final critique of the 1905 war games. A situation like the stalemate in Manchuria, he argued, could be avoided by a far-reaching, massive envelopment coupled with a frontal attack, followed by relentless pursuit. He did not, however, disregard the eastern front completely and cautioned that the “idea that on the morning following a decisive battle we can entrain the army for the east is not realistic. Sedan was such a decisive battle, but who can claim that on 2nd September the bulk of the German army could have been transported to the east?”61 His last official war plan, going into effect on April i, 1906, provided three corps for the eastern front, with the expectation that despite the absence of any firm agreement, an Austro-Hungarian offensive north from Galicia would offer additional relief. Still, with strength massively deployed on the right wing in the West, this plan contained the essentials of the famous memorandum dated December 31, 1905 (but not transmitted to his successor until the following February).
早在1903年末，施利芬就意识到自己即将退休，于是撰写了题为《对法战争》的备忘录，作为其战略遗嘱。这并非一份完整的战争计划，而是一份详细的阐述，也是对其继任者的指导。该备忘录省略了所有政治考量，也忽略了俄国，而是专注于作战层面。这体现了施利芬决心证明，面对日益强大的法国防御力量，发动一场决定性的进攻战争是可行的。这种寻求进攻的决心，而非关于假设计划如果按原样实施是否能够成功的争论，才是真正的问题所在，也是施利芬对战略思想发展最重要的遗产。<sup> 62</sup>
Conscious since late 1903 of his imminent retirement, Schlieffen composed the memorandum entitled “War against France” as his strategic testament. It was not a complete war plan, but rather a detailed exposition and a guide for his successor. Omitting all political considerations and ignoring Russia, it focused on operational aspects. These embodied Schlieffen's determination to establish the feasibility of a decisive offensive war against the increasing power of the defense. This determination to seek the offensive, rather than the much-debated question whether the hypothetical plan could have succeeded if carried out in its original form, is the real issue and Schlieffen's most important legacy to the development of strategic thought.62
备忘录将法国描述为一座巨大的堡垒，其与德国接壤的150英里长的边境线上布满了几乎坚不可摧的防线。为了绕过这些防线，施利芬希望德军右翼——由五个集团军组成的35个军——能够横扫从敦刻尔克延伸至比利时和荷兰南部的广阔战线。德军计划先在安特卫普投放兵力以掩护，然后绕过亚眠，在阿布维尔渡过索姆河，在巴黎以西渡过塞纳河，最后转向西南方向，将法军逼至孚日山脉和瑞士边境。这份备忘录设想的是一个规模巨大的坎尼战役，以中立边界和山脉取代了第二道包围线。效仿坎尼战役的模式，兵力薄弱的左翼（仅有五个军）的任务是引诱法军向东推进至莱茵河方向。一位军事作家将这种方案比作旋转门：一个人越用力推，门就会越用力地弹回来，打到他的后背。63
The memorandum described France as a great fortress with almost impregnable lines covering the 150-mile-long frontier with Germany. To outflank these positions, Schlieffen wanted the German right wing, thirty-five corps divided among five armies, to sweep on a broad front extending as far as Dunkirk, through Belgium and southern Holland. Dropping off troops to mask Antwerp, the wheel was to pass Amiens, cross the Somme at Abbeville and the Seine west of Paris, and then swing southwest to drive the French against the Vosges and the Swiss frontier. It envisaged a Cannae on a gigantic scale, with a neutral frontier and mountain ranges replacing the second envelopment wing. Conforming to the Cannae model, the weak left wing, five corps only, was supposed to lure the French eastwards toward the Rhine. One military writer compared the scheme to a revolving door: the more a man pushed on one side, the harder it would spring around to strike him in the back.63
右翼的持续推进至关重要，施利芬并不认为胜利唾手可得。一切都取决于德国军事态势的改善。作为中坚力量的梅斯要塞必须加固，需要更多机动性强的重炮来摧毁行军途中遇到的要塞，而最重要的是，军队必须拥有更多兵力。他对围攻“巴黎这座巨型要塞”所需的兵力感到担忧，并指出历史经验表明，进攻性战争“需要大量兵力，也消耗大量兵力”。他写道，进攻方的力量“随着防守方力量的增强而不断减弱”。至少需要增派八个军，否则德军“实力不足以应对这项挑战”。另一方面，他自信能够抵挡住英国远征军的干预，而且令人有些意外的是，他对部队疲劳和补给问题持乐观态度。他承认极右翼“必须付出巨大努力”，但显然他预期比利时和法国的铁路会基本完好无损地落入德军手中。尽管自1870年以来，部队能够远离铁路枢纽作战的距离几乎缩短了一半，但他仍然认为作战补给可以临时解决。“一位分析人士指出，他计划中的后勤保障部分‘似乎建立在极其不稳固的基础之上’。”<sup> 64</sup>
Uninterrupted momentum on the right wing was all-important, and Schlieffen did not foresee an easy victory. All depended on improvements in Germany's military posture. The fortress of Metz, the anchor, had to be strengthened, more mobile heavy artillery was needed to smash forts encountered on the march, and above all the army had to have more men. He was uneasy about the troops required to invest the “gigantic fortress of Paris” and noted the lessons of the past that offensive war “calls for much strength and also consumes much.” The attacker's strength, he wrote, “dwindles constantly as the defender's increases.” At least eight additional corps were needed, otherwise the German army was “too weak for this enterprise.” On the other hand, he was confident that an intervention by a British expeditionary force could be brushed aside and, somewhat surprisingly, he was sanguine concerning the problems of troop fatigue and supply. He conceded that the extreme right wing would “have to make great exertions,” but apparently he expected that the Belgium and French railroads would fall substantially intact into German hands. And even though the distances at which troops could operate away from their railheads had almost been halved since 1870, he assumed that operational supply could be improvised. “The logistic side of his intentions,” one analyst has observed, “appears to have rested on singularly shaky foundations.”64
卸任后，施利芬忙于修改他的备忘录，使文件变得更加僵化。几乎没有任何“摩擦”余地，整个行动实际上事先就变成了一场规模庞大的战略演习。施利芬坚信比利时和法国的大战才是最重要的，他无视俄国的军事复苏，并宣称东部各省的命运将由塞纳河而非维斯瓦河决定。在他1912年的最后一次修订中，施利芬提议将行动范围扩大到占领整个荷兰，同时将绕巴黎行军从一项危险的必要之举变成了僵化时间表的一部分。他不仅增加了风险，更糟糕的是，他还低估了对手。战略包围的成功几乎同样取决于敌人，而非德军。如果对手足够强大，能够保持冷静并投入预备队，那么这项行动将面临严重的危险。 1866年和1870年的胜利是施利芬构想的蓝本，这两场胜利的对手指挥体系薄弱、组织不健全、兵力不足。而这一次，敌军的指挥体系已大为改进，组织也与德军不相上下。即便在1912年陆军法颁布后，德意志帝国陆军新增了八个军，但在西线战场上，帝国陆军也并未获得决定性的兵力优势。利德尔·哈特称该计划为“拿破仑式的大胆构想”，此言不虚。但他同时指出，尽管在拿破仑时代，这一构想或许可行，但到了1914年，德军步兵行军的速度优势已被法国铁路运输的快速发展所抵消。他总结道：“这个计划在下一代将再次成为可能——届时，空中力量能够瘫痪防守方转移兵力的企图，而机械化部队的发展将大大加快包围行动的速度并扩大其范围。但施利芬的计划在构思之初成功的可能性微乎其微。”<sup> 65</sup>
Out of office, Schlieffen busied himself with revisions of his memorandum, making the document ever more rigid. There was little or no margin for “friction,” and the whole operation became virtually one enormous manoeuvre a priori. Convinced that the great battle in Belgium and France was all that mattered, Schlieffen disregarded Russia's military recovery and declared that the fate of the eastern provinces would be decided on the Seine and not on the Vistula. In his last revision, dated 1912, Schlieffen proposed expanding the scope of operations to include the occupation of all of Holland, while the march around Paris changed from a dangerous necessity to part of an inflexible timetable. He was compounding risks and, even worse, underestimating his adversaries. The success of the strategic envelopment depended almost as much on the enemy as on the Germans. Competent adversaries, who kept their heads and could commit reserves, would place the enterprise in grave jeopardy. The victories of 1866 and 1870, the models for Schlieffen's concept, were achieved against opponents with poor command systems, inadequate organization, and inferior numbers. This time the enemy's command system was much improved, its organization was equal to the German, and even with the additional eight corps available after passage of the 1912 army law, the Imperial Army enjoyed no decisive numerical advantage in the West. Liddell Hart was correct when he called the plan a “conception of Napoleonic boldness,” but noted that although it would have been feasible in the emperor's time, by 1914 the speed of marching German infantry could be countered by more rapid French rail movement. “The plan,” he concluded, “would again become possible in the next generation—when air-power could paralyse the defending side's attempt to switch its forces, while the development of mechanised forces greatly accelerated the speed of encircling moves, and extended their range. But Schlieffen's plan had a very poor chance of success at the time it was conceived.”65
当然，所有军事行动都存在风险；然而，断言该计划是“天才之作，是确保胜利的万无一失的秘诀，可惜落入了能力不足的继任者手中”是错误的。<sup> 66</sup>这些说法本质上基于德国军事优势、“训练和领导方面的巨大优势”以及“1914年帝国陆军的卓越实力”的假设。<sup> 67</sup>但即便这些优势确实存在，即便德军确实接近胜利，它们也不足以克服后勤和兵力上的劣势，以及一支虽遭重创但并未溃败的敌人的顽强抵抗。此外，即便最初的攻势成功，法国、英国和俄国似乎也不太可能放弃战斗。德军士兵仍在努力应对两线作战这一根本问题，即如何迅速击败一个敌人，这促使其高级将领断言施利芬计划本可以赢得战争。直到20世纪40年代，像伦德施泰特元帅这样冷静的战略家仍然认为，这场大战的失败是因为最初的计划被“淡化”了。路德维希·贝克将军也同意，寻求在西线迅速取胜的决定是正确的。然而，他确实批评了施利芬，认为他只从军事角度思考问题，忽视了整体的政治和经济因素。68
Of course, all military operations involve risks; nevertheless, assertions that the plan was the “work of a genius, an infallible formula for victory which unfortunately fell into the hands of an inadequate successor,” are off the mark.66 Essentially these claims rest on the assumption of German martial superiority, the “immense advantages of training and leadership,” and the “excellence of the Imperial Army of 1914.”67 But if these advantages did, in fact, exist and though the German army did come close to success, they were not sufficient to overcome logistic and numerical weakness and the determined resistance of a battered but unbroken enemy. Moreover, even if the initial offensive had succeeded, it seems unlikely that France, England, and Russia would have given up the fight. German soldiers continued to wrestle with the basic problem presented by the problem of a two-front war, the need to overthrow one enemy rapidly, and this induced its leading generals to assert that the Schlieffen Plan could have won the war. As late as the 1940s as sober a strategist as Field Marshal von Rundstedt held that the great battle was lost because the original design had been “watered down,” and General Ludwig Beck agreed that the decision to seek a speedy victory in the West had been correct. He did, however, blame Schlieffen for thinking in purely military terms, neglecting overall political and economic considerations.68
第七章
VII
赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇将军，这位伟大的陆军元帅的侄子，常被人诟病为无能胆怯的指挥官，未能妥善执行施利芬的宏伟计划。然而，他实际上是一位能干且尽职的军人。他曾在1870年服役并表现出色，以优异的成绩毕业于陆军学院，并担任过多个参谋和指挥职务。尽管他与柏林宫廷精英关系密切，但他已准备好行使总参谋长的职权；然而，他缺乏在战争中承受高级指挥压力所需的坚强性格、自信和强健体魄。
Frequently dismissed as an inept and timid commander who failed to execute Schlieffen's grand scheme properly, General Helmuth von Moltke, the nephew of the great field marshal, actually was an able and conscientious soldier. He had served with distinction in 1870, was graduated from the War Academy with high marks, and held a number of staff and command positions. Although on familiar terms with the court elite in Berlin, he was prepared to assert his prerogatives as chief of the general staff; however, he lacked the strength of character, self-assurance, and robust health needed to stand the stress of high command in war.
和平时期，小毛奇是一位能干的管理者，他为提升军队的作战能力做出了巨大贡献。尤其值得一提的是，他打破了施利芬的先例，积极推动了1912年5月的兵役法，将现役军人从62.4万人增加到65万人。他面临着日益恶化的军事形势：英国加入协约国，俄国迅速复苏，因此他有权也有义务修改其前任留下的战争计划。当然，他并不受1905年12月备忘录的约束。
In peacetime the younger Moltke was a competent administrator, who did much to upgrade the combat capabilities of the army. Above all, breaking with the precedent set by Schlieffen, he actively promoted the May 1912 service law, which increased the active army from 624,000 to 650,000 men. He was faced with a worsening military situation, England joining the Entente and Russia making a rapid recovery, and it was his right and duty to modify the war plans left behind by his predecessor. Certainly he was not bound by the concepts of the December 1905 memorandum.
毛奇对主要的战略问题有着深刻的理解，并且比施利芬更清楚地认识到德国所处境况的深远影响。或许正如拿破仑所说，他是一位“看得太远”的将军，不愿孤注一掷，而是力求保持选择的灵活性。他深信德国在东线的安全需要奥匈帝国的积极行动，因此欣然接受了弗朗茨·康拉德·冯·赫岑多夫男爵提出的重启参谋部联系的提议。经过一番犹豫之后，他承诺驻扎在东普鲁士的第八集团军（约有十到十二个师）将积极支援奥匈帝国从加利西亚发起的进攻。此外，他还表示，在法国战败后的“合理时间内”，将向东线调集主力部队。康拉德则将这一表述解读为四到六周的时间。然而，德奥两国重新建立的军事联系并未真正明确双方的义务，也未在最高层协调作战计划。69
Moltke had a good grasp of the major strategic problems and he was more aware than Schlieffen of the wider ramifications of Germany's position. Perhaps the type of general who in Napoleon's words “saw too much,” he was unwilling to gamble everything on one card, and tried to keep his options open. Convinced that Germany's security in the East required an active Austro-Hungarian effort, he welcomed an initiative by Franz Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf to reopen staff contacts and, after some hesitation, promised that the Eighth Army in East Prussia, some ten to twelve divisions strong, would actively support an Austrian offensive from Galicia. In addition, he indicated that within a “reasonable time” after France was eliminated, strong forces would be switched to the East, a statement that Conrad chose to interpret as meaning between four and six weeks. Nevertheless, the renewed German-Austro-Hungarian military contacts did not really clarify mutual obligations or coordinate plans at the highest level.69
毛奇深知德国发动闪电战将法国逐出战争的计划胜算渺茫，为了在不利局面下尽可能地扭转乾坤，他对作战方案进行了一些调整。他效仿叔父施利芬的做法，主张采用开放式战略体系，并倾向于指导而非指挥。1903年至1905年间，毛奇担任施利芬的副手，他反对施利芬坚持严格执行预先制定的作战计划，并且对预期的法比铁路爆破行动的有效性持有不同意见。事实上，毛奇认为西线战役的后勤保障不足。在他担任总参谋长后，他下令进行一系列后勤和通信演习，这些演习证实了他的观点。此后，与施利芬不同，毛奇高度重视后勤安排，并在1914年为向马恩河推进奠定了基础。
Moltke was aware of the great odds against Germany's plans to mount a lightning campaign to drive France out of the war and to make the best of a bad situation he introduced certain changes in the operational design. Following his uncle's example, he favored an open system of strategy and was prepared to direct rather than to command. As Schlieffen's deputy from 1903 to 1905, he had opposed his chief's insistence on rigid adherence to preplanned operations and had differed with him about the effectiveness of the expected French and Belgian railroad demolitions.70 In fact, Moltke believed that the logistic underpinnings for the western campaign were inadequate. After he became chief of the general staff he ordered a number of logistics and communication exercises, which confirmed his view. From then on, in contrast to Schlieffen, he paid considerable attention to logistic arrangements, and in 1914 his preparations helped to make the advance to the Marne possible.71
毛奇追随其叔父和施利芬的信念，认为德国的最佳战略是在战争初期就寻求决胜。歼灭战仍然是他的首要目标，但他愿意在实现这一目标的方式上更加灵活。“进军比利时，”他宣称，“本身并非目的，而只是达成目的的手段。”他强调，法军仍保留着防御或进攻的选择。因此，进军比利时仅仅是他战略计划的开端，使德军处于两种选择：要么继续进行大规模包围，要么从侧翼和后方攻击正在洛林进攻的法军。“当法军主力在洛林时，继续进军比利时毫无意义，”他解释道。“那时只有一个选择：全力进攻法军，无论其身处何处，都要予以打击。”他在1912年的参谋巡视中详细阐述了这一理念。他指出，一旦法军主力在梅斯和孚日山脉之间展开攻势，德军继续在比利时推进便不再具有任何战略意义。相反，“在德军左翼坚守防线的同时……所有无需牵制比利时人和英军的兵力都应向西南方向进军，沿一条穿过梅斯西侧的防线发起进攻。”<sup> 72</sup>
Moltke followed both his uncle and Schlieffen in the belief that Germany's optimal strategy was to seek a decision during the early stages of a war. The battle of annihilation remained his primary objective, but he was willing to be more flexible about the way to achieve it. “The march through Belgium,” he declared, “is not an end in itself, but only the means to an end.” He emphasized that the French retained the option of standing on the defensive or attacking. Therefore, the advance into Belgium merely constituted the opening move in his strategic design, placing the German armies in a position either to continue with the wide envelopment or to fall on the flank and rear of the French armies attacking in Lorraine. “There is no point,” he explained, “in continuing the march through Belgium when the main French army is in Lorraine. Then only one idea can be considered: to fall on the French army with all possible strength and strike it wherever it is found.” He elaborated this concept during the 1912 staff ride. As soon as it was evident, he stated, that the mass of the French army was engaged in an offensive between Metz and the Vosges, no further strategic purpose was served by a continued German advance in Belgium. Instead, “while the German left wing maintains the defensive…all forces not required to contain the Belgians and the British should march southwest to attack on a line passing through Metz to the west.”72
为了配合这一缩短的战略布局，毛奇和总参谋部作战处处长埃里希·鲁登道夫上校计划加强中央部队，使其既能牵制敌人又能进行反击，从而形成双重包围的可能。与此同时，加强中央部队也消除了法军深入莱茵河工业区和比利时右翼后方的不可接受的威胁。这种重新调整的兵力分配方案，即所谓的对施利芬方案的“削弱”，实际上并没有减少已分配给右翼的任何部队（右翼仍然保持着54个师的兵力），而是随着新部队的加入，加强了中央和左翼的兵力。此外，出于经济和战略的双重考虑，毛奇放弃了穿越荷兰南部的进军计划，从而将有时被认为比比利时军队更强大的荷兰军队从不断增长的敌军名单中剔除，这无疑减轻了右翼的作战难度。
To support this shortened wheel, Moltke and the head of the operations section of the general staff, Colonel Erich Ludendorff, planned to make the center strong enough both to pin down the enemy and to counterattack, creating the potential for a double envelopment. At the same time, reinforcing the center removed the unacceptable threat of a deep French penetration against the industrial Rhine region and the rear of the right wing in Belgium. The revised distribution of forces, the alleged “watering down” of Schlieffen's scheme, did not actually remove any troops already allocated to the right wing, which remained fifty-four divisions strong, but it augmented the center and left as new formations became available.73 Moreover, Moltke made the task of the right wing easier when, for economic as well as strategic reasons, he abandoned the march through southern Holland, thereby removing the Dutch army, sometimes considered more effective than the Belgian, from the growing list of adversaries.
将进攻的初始正面缩小至列日地区，造成了新的后勤问题，但只要对列日要塞地区发动突袭并成功确保铁路畅通，这些问题并非无法克服。总而言之，毛奇和鲁登道夫所做的调整，尤其是缩短北部侧翼包抄行动并在德意志边境附近对法军实施双重钳形攻势的方案，都令人鼓舞。最终形成了一份新的作战计划，诚然，该计划融合了施利芬早期方案中的许多重要元素，但它仍然是毛奇的计划，而不仅仅是施利芬计划的变种。7 4
Narrowing the initial frontage of the advance to the Liège sector created new logistic problems, but these were not insurmountable, provided a surprise attack on the Liège fortified region succeeded in securing the rail lines intact. Altogether, the changes made by Moltke and Ludendorff, above all the option of cutting the northern outflanking movement short and enveloping the French army in a double pincer operation near the German border, were promising. The result was a new war plan, admittedly incorporating major elements of Schlieffen's earlier schemes, but nonetheless Moltke's plan and not merely a version of the former.74
1914年8月战争爆发后，毛奇的计划虽然并非完全失败，但最终还是失败了。失败的原因在于速度、耐力和后勤方面的固有缺陷，以及毛奇无法在指挥和控制之间找到平衡。在第一阶段，法军完全被德军压制，英国远征军虽然被击退，但并未全军覆没。然而，到了9月的第一周，德军推进的极右翼——由冯·克卢克将军指挥的第一集团军——发现自己面临着被法军包围的危险。法军充分利用了从巴黎辐射出去的铁路，将一支仓促集结的军队投入到克卢克的侧翼，此时克卢克的部队只与冯·比洛的邻近部队保持着松散的联系。此时，身处卢森堡远方总司令部的毛奇已经与右翼部队失去了有效的联系，无法再协调作战行动。由于与最高统帅部失去联系，部队疲惫不堪且补给短缺，冯·克鲁克被迫停止进攻。随后，他根据德国作战指挥原则自行决定撤退，以躲避德军的包围。尽管他并未遭受严重的战术失败，但毛奇的计划却以失败告终。经过数月徒劳的迂回作战后，双方军队最终稳定了从英吉利海峡到瑞士阿尔卑斯山的战线。75
When war came in August 1914, Moltke's plan failed, even though it did not fall completely short of success. The failure was the result of the intrinsic problems of speed, endurance, and logistics, as well as of Moltke's inability to find a balance between command and control. During the first phase, the French were completely outmaneuvered, and the British Expeditionary Force was driven back, though not destroyed. By the first week of September, however, the extreme right wing of the German advance, the First Army under General von Kluck, found itself in danger of becoming in turn enveloped by the French, who, making good use of the railroads radiating out from Paris, threw a hastily assembled army against his flank, which by then was only in loose contact with von Bülow's neighboring army. By this time, in his distant general headquarters in Luxembourg, Moltke had lost effective communications with his right wing, and no longer was able to coordinate operations. Out of touch with the High Command, his troops exhausted and short of supplies, von Kluck was halted and then, making his own decision in accordance with German operational command doctrine, withdrew to escape the threatening envelopment. Although he did not suffer a serious tactical defeat, the reverse was the end of Moltke's plan, and after some months of unsuccessfully trying to outmaneuver each other, the armies of both sides stabilized their front lines from the Channel to the Swiss Alps.75
诚然，毛奇计划的失败部分是由于作战和技术细节问题，并不一定表明包围战略本身存在根本缺陷。事实上，东线战事表明这一概念是合理的。驻扎在东普鲁士的第八集团军凭借其秘密而迅速的行动，于八月下旬在坦能堡包围并歼灭了一支俄军。然而，从更宏观的角度来看，经典的德国战略存在根本性的缺陷，其根源在于认为日益增长的政治军事威胁可以仅凭军事手段消除。尽管毛奇父子和施利芬之间存在诸多分歧，但他们都认为德国的地缘战略地位要求迅速做出决策，并寄希望于以歼灭战作为最终手段的作战行动来解决问题。即使是老毛奇在1870年后采取的攻防兼备的战略姿态，也并未放弃这一前提，而只是对其进行了修正。然而，到了二十世纪初，战争的结局已无法再通过人力、铁路和作战设计等因素来预测。相反，技术上的进步使得速胜成为不可能，战争的走向日益受到国家士气、社会稳定和经济资源等因素的影响。尽管这一点并未被广泛认可，尤其是在军方，但战争的本质已经发生了改变。即便一支野战军因精心策划的作战方案而被歼灭，例如在色当和坦能堡战役中，一个意志坚定、拥有未开发资源的政府通常也能重新组建军队并继续作战。任何仅基于军事考量的战争计划都已不再适用，最高级别的政治军事合作变得至关重要。
To be sure, the failure of Moltke's plan was in part a question of operational and technical detail and did not necessarily demonstrate a basic flaw in the strategy of envelopment. In fact, operations in the East showed that the concept was sound. The Eighth Army in East Prussia, acting with secrecy and speed, was able to envelop and destroy one Russian army at Tannenberg in late August. In the larger perspective, however, fundamental shortcomings characterized the classic German strategy, deriving from the belief that a growing political-military threat could be removed by military means alone. For all their differences, the two Moltkes and Schlieffen shared the assumption that Germany's geo-strategic position demanded a rapid decision, and they looked to operations culminating in a battle of annihilation to provide the answer. Even the elder Moltke's defensive-offensive posture adopted after 1870 had not abandoned this premise, but merely modified it. By the early twentieth century, however, the outcome of war no longer could be predicted by calculations based on manpower, railroads, and operational design. Instead, the technologically determined impossibility of a rapid victory caused war to be increasingly dominated by such forces as national morale, social stability, and economic resources. Although it was not widely recognized, least of all by the military, the nature of war had changed. Even if by some masterpiece of operational planning a field army was destroyed, as happened at Sedan and at Tannenberg, a resolute government with untapped resources at its disposal normally could raise other forces and continue to fight. Any war plan based on military considerations alone had become inadequate, and political-military cooperation of the highest order was now essential.
过去，像古斯塔夫·阿道夫、腓特烈大帝和拿破仑这样的伟大统帅，曾将所有权力集中于一人之手，协调政策和战略。但到了十九世纪中叶，这种做法已不再可能。像俾斯麦这样杰出的政治家，凭借其对统治者的充分信任和支持，以及像老毛奇这样杰出的军事家，或许还能勉强达成共识，共同探讨战争中何为必要、何为可取、何为可行。然而，一旦这些人离世，德国乃至大多数欧洲国家的战略规划便完全由军事考量主导，不再接受任何严肃的政治评估和审查。有人认为，克劳塞维茨要求政府不应要求士兵去做不可能的事，而这反过来又要求士兵向政府阐明军事行动的局限性。因此，有人认为，如果德国总参谋部在1894年后承认军事手段已无法解决问题，必须通过外交途径至少部分解决日益严重的战略困境，那么它就能更好地为国家服务。这些观点不无道理，但却忽略了当时的具体情况。这样的承认不仅与参谋部高级将领对军队角色的基本认知相悖，而且还需要德国的内外政策发生重大转变。正是在这种情况下，尽管对最终成功的可能性越来越悲观，德国总参谋部仍然继续完善其战略包围构想，并最终在1914年孤注一掷地发动了这场战争。
In the past, great commanders like Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon had coordinated policy and strategy by combining all power in a single hand, but this had become impossible by the middle of the nineteenth century. An exceptional statesman like Bismarck, enjoying the full confidence and support of the ruler, and a soldier of the calibre of the elder Moltke still could arrive, albeit grudgingly, at a common understanding of what was necessary, desirable, and possible in war. But once these men were gone, strategic planning in Germany, and for that matter in most European states, was dominated by military appreciations alone and no longer was subject to any serious political appraisal and review. It has been suggested that Clausewitz's demand that governments should not ask their soldiers to do the impossible in turn required soldiers to inform their governments of the limitations of military actions. Therefore, so the argument continues, the German general staff would have served its nation better had it acknowledged after 1894 that the situation no longer could be solved by military means and that diplomacy would have to find at least a partial remedy for the mounting strategic dilemma. These suggestions make a valid point, but give too little attention to the prevailing circumstances of the period. Such admissions not only would have conflicted with the basic perceptions of the army's role held by leading general staff officers, but also would have required a major shift in Germany's foreign and domestic policies. Under these circumstances, though increasingly pessimistic about the chances of ultimate success, the German general staff continued to perfect its strategic envelopment concept and eventually launched its desperate gamble in 1914.
1 Gerhard Ritter，《剑与权杖》，4 卷（佛罗里达州珊瑚阁，1969-73 年），1:189。
1 Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, 4 vols. (Coral Gables, Fla., 1969–73), 1:189.
2格哈德·帕普克 (Gerhard Papke) 的摘录，“赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇 (Helmuth von Moltke)”，载于《Klassiker der Kriegskunst》，编辑。沃纳·哈尔维格（达姆施塔特，1960），311-16。
2 Excerpts in Gerhard Papke, “Helmuth von Moltke,” in Klassiker der Kriegskunst, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Darmstadt, 1960), 311–16.
3 Peter Paret，《克劳塞维茨与国家》（纽约和伦敦，1976 年；普林斯顿，1985 年重印），第 369 页。
3 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (New York and London, 1976; repr. Princeton, 1985), 369.
4 Papke，“赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇”，316。 Moltke：Ausgewählte Werke，编辑。费迪南德诉施默菲尔德（柏林，192.5），1:35。
4 Papke, “Helmuth von Moltke,” 316. Cf. Moltke: Ausgewählte Werke, ed. Ferdinand v. Schmerfeld (Berlin, 192.5), 1:35.
5 Gordon A. Craig 在其著作《普鲁士军队的政治 1640–1945》（纽约，1964 年）第 214–16 页中提出了不同的观点
5 A different view is presented in Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945 (New York, 1964), 214–16.
6 Ritter，《剑与权杖》，1:196；Eberhard Kessel，《毛奇》（斯图加特，1957 年），508-509。
6 Ritter, Sword and Scepter, 1:196; Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart, 1957), 508–509.
7 Oberkommando des Heeres， Gedanken von Moltke（柏林，1941 年），13；毛奇的军事工厂，载于Kriegslehren，编辑。 Grosser Generalstab，Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte（柏林，1892-1912），3:1。 （以下简称Kriegslehren。）
7 Oberkommando des Heeres, Gedanken von Moltke (Berlin, 1941), 13; Moltke's militärische Werke, in Kriegslehren, ed. Grosser Generalstab, Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte (Berlin, 1892–1912), 3:1. (Hereafter cited as Kriegslehren.)
8 Kessel， Moltke，507。
8 Kessel, Moltke, 507.
9 Kriegslehren，3:3。
9 Kriegslehren, 3:3.
10 Kessel， Moltke，514。
10 Kessel, Moltke, 514.
11 Martin Van Creveld，《战争补给：从瓦伦斯坦到巴顿的后勤》（剑桥，1977 年），79-82、91-96、103-08。
11 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge, 1977), 79–82, 91–96, 103–08.
12引自 Papke，“Helmuth von Moltke”，316。
12 Cited in Papke, “Helmuth von Moltke,” 316.
13 Kriegslehren，3:42–3。
13 Kriegslehren, 3:42–3.
14 JFC Fuller，《西方世界的军事史》，3 卷（纽约，1954 年），第 3 卷，第 134 页。
14 J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, 3 vols. (New York, 1954), 3:134.
15西奥多·罗普，《西方世界的战争》（达勒姆，1959 年），137-39 页。
15 Theodere Ropp, War in the Western World (Durham 1959), 137–39.
16 Kessel， Moltke，536。
16 Kessel, Moltke, 536.
17同上，534-38。
17 Ibid., 534–38.
18 Kriegslehren，1：98-99、106-107。
18 Kriegslehren, 1:98–99, 106–107.
19经典的记述是迈克尔·霍华德的《普法战争》（纽约，1961 年）。
19 The classic account is Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (New York, 1961).
20 Cyril Falls，《从拿破仑时代到现在的战争艺术》（纽约，1961 年），第 78 页。
20 Cyril Falls, The Art of War from the Age of Napoleon to the Present (New York, 1961), 78.
21 Howard，《普法战争》，第 325-26 页。
21 Howard, Franco-Prussian War, 325–26.
《赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇元帅的22封信》 ，克拉拉·贝尔和亨利·W·费舍尔编辑和翻译（纽约，1892年），第204、209页。
22 Letters of Field-Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, ed. and trans. Clara Bell and Henry W. Fischer (New York, 1892), 204, 209.
23 Kriegslehren，3：25-26；毛奇·凯塞尔，741–47。
23 Kriegslehren, 3:25–26; Kessel, Moltke, 741–47.
24 Gerhard Ritter，《谢芬计划》（伦敦，1958 年），18； Ferdinand v. Schmerfeld， Die deutschen Aufmarschpläne 1871–1890（柏林，1928 年）。
24 Gerhard Ritter, The Schheffen Plan (London, 1958), 18; Ferdinand v. Schmerfeld, Die deutschen Aufmarschpläne 1871–1890 (Berlin, 1928).
25施默菲尔德， Aufmarschpläne，62-67；毛奇·凯塞尔，649–50。
25 Schmerfeld, Aufmarschpläne, 62–67; Kessel, Moltke, 649–50.
26里特，谢芬计划，18。
26 Ritter, Schheffen Plan, 18.
27 Schmerfeld， Aufmarscbpläne，第 27 页。 19；里特，《剑与权杖》，1:227。
27 Schmerfeld, Aufmarscbpläne, p. 19; Ritter, Sword and Scepter, 1:227.
28施默菲尔德Aufmarscbpläne，21、29、38、52-55。
28 Schmerfeld Aufmarscbpläne, 21, 29, 38, 52–55.
29同上，64-66；Ritter，《施利芬计划》，19。
29 Ibid., 64–66; Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, 19.
30施默菲尔德， Aufmarscbpläne，77；克雷格，《普鲁士军队的政治》，274-75。
30 Schmerfeld, Aufmarscbpläne, 77; Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army, 274–75.
31毛奇·凯塞尔，651–52、672–75；施默菲尔德，毛奇，1:250。
31 Kessel, Moltke, 651–52, 672–75; Schmerfeld, Moltke, 1:250.
32 Schmerfeld，《毛奇》，1:44。参见 Dennis E. Showalter 的优秀调查，“东线与德国军事计划，1871–1914 年——一些观察”，《东欧季刊》 15 (1981)，163–80。
32 Schmerfeld, Moltke, 1:44. Cf. the excellent survey by Dennis E. Showalter, “The Eastern Front and German Military Planning, 1871–1914—Some Observations,” East European Quarterly 15 (1981), 163–80.
33里特，《剑与权杖》，1：232-34；施默菲尔德， Aufmarschpläne，144-45；毛奇·凯塞尔，708–09。
33 Ritter, Sword and Scepter, 1:232–34; Schmerfeld, Aufmarschpläne, 144–45; Kessel, Moltke, 708–09.
34 Gunther E. Rothenberg， 《弗朗西斯·约瑟夫的军队》（西拉斐特，1976 年），第 112-117 页、第 155 页；Gordon A. Craig，“奥德联盟的军事凝聚力，1914-1918 年”，载于其著作《战争、政治和外交》（纽约，1966 年），第 47-51 页。
34 Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (W. Lafayette, 1976), 112–17, 155; Gordon A. Craig, “The Military Cohesion of the Austro-German Alliance, 1914–18,” in his War, Politics, and Diplomacy (New York, 1966), 47–51.
35毛奇·凯塞尔，747–48；克里格斯勒伦，1:7。
35 Kessel, Moltke, 747–48; Kriegslehren, 1:7.
36 Heinz-Ludger Borgert，“Grundzüge der Landkriegsführung von Schlieffen bis Guderian”，《Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt》， Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte（慕尼黑，1979 年），9:435–37, 462–66。 （以下称为手册。）参见。杰伊·卢瓦斯（Jay Luvaas），“欧洲军事思想和学说”，《战争理论与实践》，编辑。迈克尔·霍华德（伦敦和纽约，1965 年），73-76，以及赫尔曼·特斯克、科尔马·弗赖赫尔·冯·德·戈尔茨（哥廷根，1958 年），32-56 页。
36 Heinz-Ludger Borgert, “Grundzüge der Landkriegsführung von Schlieffen bis Guderian,” in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte (Munich, 1979), 9:435–37, 462–66. (Hereafter cited as Handbuch.) Cf. Jay Luvaas, “European Military Thought and Doctrine,” in The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (London and New York, 1965), 73–76, and Hermann Teske, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (Göttingen, 1958), 32–56 passim.
37 Friedrich 诉 Boetticher， Schlieffen（哥廷根，1957 年）。
37 Friedrich v. Boetticher, Schlieffen (Göttingen, 1957).
38埃里希·鲁登道夫，《我的战争记忆 1914-1918》（伦敦，1920 年），24；威廉·格罗纳，《Lebenserinnerungen》（奥斯纳布吕克，1972 年），85–91。
38 Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914–1918 (London, 1920), 24; Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserinnerungen (Osnabrück, 1972), 85–91.
39 Ritter， Schlieffen Plan，v，vii。
39 Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, v, vii.
40同上，第 14 页。 88； Jehuda L. Wallach，《Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht》（法兰克福，1967 年），55–56。
40 Ibid., p. 88; Jehuda L. Wallach, Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht (Frankfurt a.M., 1967), 55–56.
41 Wilhelm Groener，《Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen》（柏林，1927 年），11；沃纳·哈尔韦格，克劳塞维茨（哥廷根，1957 年），95。
41 Wilhelm Groener, Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen (Berlin, 1927), 11; Werner Hahlweg, Clausewitz (Göttingen, 1957), 95.
42 Ritter，《剑与权杖》，2:198。
42 Ritter, Sword and Scepter, 2:198.
43阿尔弗雷德诉施利芬 (Alfred v. Schlieffen)，简报，编辑。艾伯哈德·凯塞尔（哥廷根，1958），296-97。
43 Alfred v. Schlieffen, Briefe, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Göttingen, 1958), 296–97.
44 Generalstab des Heeres， Dienstschriften des Chefs des Generalstabes der Armee General Feldmarschall Grafen von Schlieffen，2 卷。 （柏林，1937-38），1：86-87。
44 Generalstab des Heeres, Dienstschriften des Chefs des Generalstabes der Armee General Feldmarschall Grafen von Schlieffen, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1937–38), 1:86–87.
45同上，2:222–23。
45 Ibid., 2:222–23.
46 Ritter，《剑与权杖》，第 2 卷，第 194 页；LFC Turner，“施利芬计划”，载于《列强战争计划，1880-1914》，Paul M. Kennedy 编辑（伦敦，1979 年），第 207-210 页。另见 Craig，《普鲁士军队政治》，第 283-285 页。
46 Ritter, Sword and Scepter, 2:194; L. F. C. Turner, “The Schlieffen Plan,” in The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914, ed. Paul M. Kennedy (London, 1979), 207–10. But compare Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army, 283–85.
47施利芬·波蒂彻，57-60；手册，9：427-34。
47 Boetticher, Schlieffen, 57–60; Handbuch, 9:427–34.
48 Alfred v. Schlieffen， Gesammelte Schriften，2 卷。 （柏林，1913），1：163-84；施利芬，简报，312。
48 Alfred v. Schlieffen, Gesammelte Schriften, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1913), 1:163–84; Schlieffen, Briefe, 312.
49瓦拉赫，教条，90；手册，9:444。
49 Wallach, Dogma, 90; Handbuch, 9:444.
50施利芬，施里夫滕，1：15-16。
50 Schlieffen, Schriften, 1:15–16.
51总结见 Rudolph v. Caemmerer，《19 世纪战略科学的发展》（伦敦，1905 年），第 248-267 页；Herbert Rosinski，《德国陆军》（纽约，1966 年），第 135-156 页。
51 Summaries in Rudolph v. Caemmerer, The Development of Strategic Science during the 19th Century (London, 1905), 248–67; Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New York, 1966), 135–56.
52 手册，9：465-66；里特，施利芬计划，51-52。
52 Handbuch, 9:465–66; Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, 51–52.
53 Boetticher， Scheffen，61。
53 Boetticher, Scheffen, 61.
54 手册，9：447-48；里特，施利芬计划，38。
54 Handbuch, 9:447–48; Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, 38.
55 Ritter， Schlieffen Plan，38。
55 Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, 38.
56 同上，第 41 页。
56 Ibid., 41.
57 手册，9:449–51。
57 Handbuch, 9:449–51.
58施利芬·波蒂彻，63-65。
58 Boetticher, Schlieffen, 63–65.
59 Ritter，《施利芬计划》，44-45。
59 Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, 44–45.
60 Hans Meier-Welcker，“Graf Alfred von Schlieffen”，《 Klassiker》，编辑。哈尔韦格，335–36。
60 Hans Meier-Welcker, “Graf Alfred von Schlieffen,” in Klassiker, ed. Hahlweg, 335–36.
61同上；手册，9：451-53。
61 Ibid.; Handbuch, 9:451–53.
62 Ritter，《施利芬计划》，134-60。
62 Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, 134–60.
63 Basil H. Liddell Hart，《世界大战史 1914–18》（伦敦，1934 年），第 68–69 页。
63 Basil H. Liddell Hart, A History of the World War 1914–18 (London, 1934), 68–69.
64 Larry H. Addington，《闪电战时代与德国总参谋部，1865–1914》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克，1971 年），第 19–20 页；Van Creveld，《战争补给》，第 113、118 页。
64 Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865–1914 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1971), 19–20; Van Creveld, Supplying War, 113, 118.
65 Ritter，施利芬计划，vi-vii。
65 Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, vi-vii.
66同上，第 48 页。
66 Ibid., p. 48.
67 Rosinski，《德国陆军》，第 138 页；Walter Goerlitz，《德国总参谋部史 1657–1945》（纽约，1966 年），第 135 页。
67 Rosinski, German Army, 138; Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff 1657–1945 (New York, 1966), 135.
68 Günther v. Blumentritt， Von Rundstedt：士兵与人（伦敦，1952 年），22；路德维希·贝克， Studien，编辑。 H. Speidel（柏林，1955 年），63, 106–107。
68 Günther v. Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt: The Soldier and the Man (London, 1952), 22; Ludwig Beck, Studien, ed. H. Speidel (Berlin, 1955), 63, 106–107.
69罗滕贝格，《弗朗茨·约瑟夫的军队》，157-58；诺曼·斯通，“毛奇和康拉德：1909-1914 年奥匈帝国和德国总参谋部之间的关系”，载《战争计划》，肯尼迪编，225-228。然而，另见肖瓦尔特，“东线”，173-174。
69 Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 157–58; Norman Stone, “Moltke and Conrad: Relationships between the Austro-Hungarian and German General Staffs, 1909–1914,” in War Plans, ed. Kennedy, 225–2.8. Compare, however, Showalter, “Eastern Front,” 173–74.
70 手册，9:467–68。
70 Handbuch, 9:467–68.
71 Van Creveld，《战争补给》，119-21；Helmut Haeussler，《威廉·格罗纳将军和帝国军队》（麦迪逊，1962 年），34-36。
71 Van Creveld, Supplying War, 119–21; Helmut Haeussler, General William Groener and the Imperial Army (Madison, 1962), 34–36.
72 Wolfgang Foerster，《Aus der Gedankenwerkstatt des 德国将军》（柏林，1931 年），38、66；手册，9：470-73。
72 Wolfgang Foerster, Aus der Gedankenwerkstatt des deutschen Generalstabes (Berlin, 1931), 38, 66; Handbuch, 9:470–73.
73瓦拉赫，《教条》，113、136-37。
73 Wallach, Dogma, 113, 136–37.
74 手册，9:474。
74 Handbuch, 9:474.
75 Addington， 《闪电战时代》 ，第 17-22 页，对此有很好的总结。
75 There is a good summary in Addington, Blitzkrieg Era, 17–22.
12. 德尔布吕克：军事历史学家
12. Delbrück: The Military Historian
H安斯·德尔布吕克的一生几乎与德意志第二帝国的鼎盛时期完全重合，他既是军事史学家，又是向德国民众阐释军事事务的专家，同时也是总参谋部的文职批评家。他在所有这些角色中都对现代军事思想做出了显著贡献。他的《战争艺术史》不仅是德国学术的丰碑，也是当时军事理论家们的宝贵信息宝库。他发表在《普鲁士年鉴》上的军事评论文章，促进了德国民众的军事教育，尤其是在第一次世界大战期间，帮助人们理解总参谋部面临的根本战略问题。他在战争期间及战后对最高统帅部的批评，极大地推动了人们对自毛奇时代以来主导德军的战略思维模式的重新评估。
HANS DELBRÜCK, whose active life coincided almost exactly with that of the Second German Empire, was at once military historian, interpreter of military affairs to the German people, and civilian critic of the general staff. In each of these roles his contribution to modern military thought was noteworthy. His History of the Art of War was not only a monument to German scholarship but also a mine of valuable information for the military theorists of his day. His commentaries on military affairs, written in the pages of the Preussische Jahrbücher, contributed to the military education of the German public and, during the First World War especially, helped them comprehend the underlying strategic problems that confronted the general staff. His criticisms of the High Command, written during the war and in the period following it, did much to stimulate a reappraisal of the type of strategical thinking that had ruled the German army since the days of Moltke.
德国军事领导人历来都非常重视从军事史中汲取经验教训，尤其是在十九世纪。克劳塞维茨的理想是完全从历史实例中学习战争；毛奇和施利芬都将军事史研究列为总参谋部的职责之一。但是，如果历史要服务于士兵，就必须保证军事记录的准确性，并剔除围绕着过去的军事事件而产生的各种误解和神话。在整个十九世纪，得益于利奥波德·冯·兰克的影响，德国学者致力于清除掩盖历史真相的种种传说。然而，直到德尔布吕克撰写了《战争艺术史》，新的科学方法才被应用于过去的军事记录，而这正是德尔布吕克对军事思想的主要贡献。
The military leaders of Germany have always placed great emphasis upon the lessons that can be drawn from military history. This was especially true in the nineteenth century. It had been Clausewitz's ideal to teach war from purely historical examples; and both Moltke and Schlieffen had made the study of military history one of the responsibilities of the general staff. But if history was to serve the soldier, it was necessary that the military record be an accurate one and that past military events be divested of the misconceptions and myths that had grown up around them. Throughout the nineteenth century, thanks to the influence of Leopold von Ranke, German scholars were engaged in the task of clearing away the underbrush of legend that obscured historical truth. But it was not until Delbrück had written his History of the Art of War that the new scientific method was applied to the military records of the past, and it is this that constitutes Delbrück's major contribution to military thought.
然而，这并非他唯一的贡献。在十九世纪，政府的基础不断扩大，在西方世界，人民的声音在政府行政的各个部门都日益增强。军事事务的控制权不再是少数统治阶级的特权。1862年普鲁士围绕军费预算的激烈斗争表明，未来必须认真考虑人民及其代表在军事管理方面的意愿。因此，为了国家安全和维护军事机构，对公众进行军事问题方面的教育至关重要。总参谋部的军事出版物不仅供军队使用，也面向更广泛的读者。但是，职业军人的著作，由于侧重于对单一战争和战役的记述，通常过于专业，无法满足后者的需求。因此，需要以通俗易懂的方式普及军事知识，而德尔布吕克承担了这项任务。1在他的所有著作中，他都把自己视为德国人民的军事导师。这一点在第一次世界大战期间最为明显，当时他在《普鲁士年鉴》上每月撰写关于战争进程的评论，根据现有资料解释最高统帅部和德国对手的战略。
It was not, however, his sole contribution. In the course of the nineteenth century the basis of government was broadened and in the Western world generally the voice of the people was felt increasingly in every branch of governmental administration. The control of military affairs could no longer remain the prerogative of a small ruling class. In Prussia, the embittered struggle over the military budget in 1862 was an indication that the wishes of the people and their representatives with regard to matters of military administration would have to be given serious consideration in the future. It seemed important therefore for the safety of the state and the maintenance of its military institutions that the general public should be educated to a proper appreciation of military problems. The military publications of the general staff were designed not only for use in the army but also for more general consumption. But the writings of professional soldiers, devoted as they were to accounts of single wars and campaigns, were generally too technical to fulfill the latter function. There was a need for instruction in the elements of military affairs on a popular level, and Delbrück undertook to supply it.1 In all of his writings, he thought of himself as a kind of military preceptor to the German people. This was most marked during the First World War, when in the pages of the Preussische Jahrbücher, he wrote monthly commentaries on the course of the war, explaining on the basis of available materials the strategy of the High Command and of Germany's opponents.
最后，尤其是在晚年，德尔布吕克成为当时军事制度和战略思想的重要批评者。他对过去军事制度的研究使他认识到，在每个时代，战争与政治都存在着密切的联系，并让他明白军事战略和政治战略必须齐头并进。克劳塞维茨早已在其论断中阐明了这一真理，他指出“战争固然有其自身的语法，但没有其自身的逻辑”，并坚持认为战争是“国家政策以另一种手段的延续”。然而，克劳塞维茨的这句格言常常被一些人所遗忘，这些人误解了克劳塞维茨的主张，认为他主张军事领导层不受政治约束。德尔布吕克重拾克劳塞维茨的理论，认为战争的实施和战略的制定必须以国家政策的目标为导向，一旦战略思维变得僵化和自满，即使是最辉煌的战术胜利也可能导致政治灾难。在德尔布吕克的战争年代著作中，批评家的角色逐渐超越了历史学家。当他确信最高统帅部的战略思维已与国家的政治需求背道而驰时，他便成为谈判和平的最有力倡导者之一。战后，当国会着手调查1918年德国崩溃的原因时，德尔布吕克对鲁登道夫的战略提出了最有力的批评，而他的批评自然而然地源于他从历史中汲取的经验教训。
Finally, especially in his later years, Delbrück became a valuable critic of the military institutions and the strategical thinking of his time. His study of the military institutions of the past had shown him, in every age, the intimate relationship of war and politics, and had taught him that military and political strategy must go hand in hand. Clausewitz had already asserted that truth in his statement that “war admittedly has its own grammar, but not its own logic” and in his insistence that war is “the continuation of state policy by other means.” But Clausewitz's dictum was too often forgotten by men who misinterpreted Clausewitz as having argued for the freedom of military leadership from political restrictions.2 Delbrück returned to the Clausewitz doctrine and argued that the conduct of war and the planning of strategy must be conditioned by the aims of state policy and that once strategical thinking becomes inflexible and self-sufficient even the most brilliant tactical successes may lead to political disaster. In Delbrück's writings in the war years, the critic outgrew the historian. When he became convinced that the strategical thinking of the High Command had become antithetical to the political needs of the state, he became one of the foremost advocates of a negotiated peace. After the war, when the Reichstag undertook to investigate the causes of the German collapse in 1918, Delbrück was the most cogent critic of Ludendorff's strategy, and his criticism grew naturally from the precepts that he had drawn from history.
我
I
德尔布吕克的生平细节可以略过。3他本人在1920年曾简洁地概括道：“我出身于官场和学术圈，母亲来自柏林的一个家庭；我曾服役于军队，是一名预备役军官；我曾在皇太子腓特烈大帝的宫廷生活了五年；我曾是议员；作为《普鲁士年鉴》的编辑，我从事新闻工作；后来我成为了一名大学教师。”
The details of Delbrück's life may be passed over quickly.3 He himself summed them up tersely in 1920 with the words: “I derived from official and scholarly circles, on my mother's side from a Berlin family; I had war service and was a reserve officer; for five years I lived at the court of Emperor Frederick, when he was Crown Prince. I was a parliamentarian; as editor of the Preussische Jahrbücher, I belonged to the press; I became an academic teacher.”
德尔布吕克于1848年11月出生于卑尔根。他的父亲是一位地方法官，母亲是柏林大学一位哲学教授的女儿。他的祖先中有神学家、法学家和学者。他先在格赖夫斯瓦尔德的一所预科学校接受教育，后先后就读于海德堡大学、格赖夫斯瓦尔德大学和波恩大学。他从小就对历史表现出浓厚的兴趣，并经常聆听诺登、舍费尔和西贝尔的讲座。这三位学者都深受兰克对学术界贡献的新科学思潮的影响。22岁时，作为波恩大学的学生，他参加了对法战争，但因感染斑疹伤寒而退伍。康复后，他重返大学，并于1873年在西贝尔的指导下获得博士学位，其博士论文研究的是11世纪德国编年史家兰伯特·冯·赫斯菲尔德。他对赫斯菲尔德的著作进行了深刻的评述，首次展现了他贯穿其所有历史著作的批判性洞察力。4
Delbrück was born in November 1848 in Bergen. His father was a district judge; his mother, the daughter of a professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin. Among his ancestors were theologians, jurists, and academicians. He received his education at a preparatory school in Greifswald and later at the universities of Heidelberg, Greifswald, and Bonn, showing an early interest in history and attending the lectures of Noorden, Schäfer, and Sybel, all men deeply inspired by the new scientific tendency that was Ranke's contribution to scholarship. As a twenty-two-year-old Bonn student, he fought in the war against France, being invalided out as a result of an attack of typhus. After his recovery, he returned to the university and, in 1873, took his doctoral degree under Sybel with a dissertation on Lambert von Hersfeld, a German chronicler of the eleventh century, whose writings he subjected to a penetrating appraisal that revealed for the first time the critical acumen that was to distinguish all of his historical work.4
1874年，在巴登大臣弗朗茨·冯·罗根巴赫的协助下，德尔布吕克被任命为普鲁士王储之子瓦尔德马王子的家庭教师。他在这份工作上的五年不仅使他深入了解了当时的政治问题，也促使他将注意力转向军事事务。1874年春季符腾堡军事演习期间，他一边履行预备役军官的年度职责，一边阅读了弗里德里希·威廉·吕斯托的《步兵史》。吕斯托曾是普鲁士军官，因在1848年至1849年间参与政治活动而被迫流亡，1860年担任加里波第在西西里岛的参谋长，也是瑞士总参谋部制度的创始人之一。德尔布吕克后来表示，他对吕斯托的阅读决定了他职业的选择，但事实上，直到1877年，他才有机会完成格奥尔格·海因里希·佩尔茨未竟的格奈森瑙回忆录和文稿的编辑工作，并开始认真研究战争。当他沉浸于解放战争的历史时，他惊讶地发现拿破仑和格奈森瑙的战略思想与查理大公、惠灵顿和施瓦岑贝格的战略思想似乎存在根本性的差异。随着他在编辑工作完成后撰写格奈森瑙的传记，这种差异显得更加显著，他意识到19世纪的战略总体上与上个世纪截然不同。他第一次阅读了克劳塞维茨的著作，并与腓特烈宫廷的军官们进行了长时间的交谈。在此过程中，他的兴趣日益浓厚，决心探寻战略和军事行动的基本和决定性要素。
In 1874, with the assistance of the Badenese minister Franz von Roggenbach, Delbrück was appointed as tutor of Prince Waldemar of Prussia, the son of the crown prince, and his five years in this post not only gave him an insight into the political problems of his time but helped to turn his attention to military affairs. While he was performing his annual duties as a reserve officer, during the spring maneuvers in Württemberg in 1874, he read the History of the Infantry by Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, a former Prussian officer who had been forced to flee the country to escape punishment for political activity in 1848–1849, had served as Garibaldi's chief of staff in Sicily in 1860, and was one of the founders of the Swiss general staff system.5 Delbrück later said that his reading of Rüstow had determined his choice of career, although it was not, in fact, until 1877, when he was given the opportunity to complete the edition of Gneisenau's memoirs and papers that had been begun by Georg Heinrich Pertz, that he began the study of war in a serious way. As he immersed himself in the history of the War of Liberation he was struck by what seemed to be a fundamental difference in the strategical thinking of Napoleon and Gneisenau on the one hand and Archduke Charles, Wellington, and Schwarzenberg on the other. As he carried his investigations further in the biography of Gneisenau with which he followed his editorial task,6 the difference seemed more marked, and he sensed that nineteenth-century strategy in general was markedly different from that of the previous century. He read Clausewitz for the first time and held long conversations with the officers attached to Frederick's court. While he did so, his interest was heightened and he determined to seek the basic and determining elements of strategy and of military operations.
1879年瓦尔德马亲王去世后，德尔布吕克开始了学术生涯，尽管并非一帆风顺。他于1881年获得特许任教资格，但他在柏林的首次讲座——关于1866年战役——却因主题的时代性以及德尔布吕克当时并未获得教授军事史的授权而遭到大学院长的反对。这位年轻的学者坚持不懈，并将研究方向转向更为遥远的历史时期，首先讲授从封建制度初期开始的战争艺术史，随后将研究范围进一步推至波斯战争至罗马帝国衰落之间的时期。他开始系统地研究古代和中世纪的史料，并发表了关于波斯战争、伯里克利和克里昂的战略、罗马百人队的战术、早期德意志人的军事制度、瑞士与勃艮第之间的战争以及腓特烈大帝和拿破仑的战略等方面的短篇研究。与此同时，他鼓励学生们对特定时期进行同样深入的研究。德尔布吕克的《政治史框架下的战争艺术史》正是从这些讲座和专著中发展而来，其第一卷于1900年出版。7
After the death of Prince Waldemar in 1879, Delbrück embarked upon his academic career, although not without difficulty. His Habilitation took place in 1881, but his first lectures in Berlin, on the campaign of 1866, aroused the objections of the university dean because of the contemporary nature of the theme and because Delbrück had not been authorized to teach military history. The young scholar persisted but shifted his attention to more remote periods of history, lecturing first on the history of the art of war from the beginning of the feudal system, and then pushing his researches even further back into the period between the Persian Wars and the decline of Rome. He began a systematic study of the sources in the ancient and medieval periods and published short studies of the Persian Wars, the strategy of Pericles and Cleon, the tactics of the Roman maniple, the military institutions of the early Germans, the wars between the Swiss and the Burgundians, and the strategy of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Meanwhile, he encouraged his students to make equally detailed studies of special periods. Out of these lectures and monographs grew Delbrück's History of the Art of War in the Framework of Political History, the first volume of which appeared in 1900.7
德尔布吕克专注于一个在学术界并不受重视的课题，以及他积极参与政治和公共事务（1882年至1885年，他担任普鲁士州议会自由保守党议员；1884年至1890年，他担任德国国会议员；1883年至1890年，他担任《普鲁士年鉴》编辑委员会成员，之后担任该刊唯一编辑），这些活动往往对帝国政策持强烈批评态度，8这使得他未能获得与其学术成就相符的认可。直到1895年，普鲁士文化部负责大学事务的官员弗里德里希·阿尔托夫任命他为柏林大学新设立的“特聘教授”（ausserordentliche Professur） ，他才得以成为一名教授。一年后，他接替海因里希·冯·特赖奇克担任世界史教授，成为正式教授（Ordinarius） ，但他从未担任过大学校长，也从未当选为普鲁士科学院院士，尽管这些荣誉都授予了那些从未撰写或从事过任何与他主要为人称道的工作相媲美的著作的同事。9
Delbrück's preoccupation with a subject that was not highly regarded in academic circles, and his political and publicistic activities (from 1882 to 1885 he was a Free Conservative deputy in the Prussian Landtag and from 1884 to 1890 in the German Reichstag, and he was a member of the editorial board of the Preussische Jahrbücher from 1883 to 1890 and sole editor thereafter), which were often highly critical of imperial policy,8 robbed him of much of the recognition that his scholarship normally would have received. He did not become a professor until 1895, when the official in charge of university matters in the Prussian Kultusministerium, Friedrich Althoff, appointed him to a newly created ausserordentliche Professur at the University of Berlin. A year later he became Ordinarius when he succeeded Heinrich von Treitschke as Professor of Universal and World History, but he never became Rektor of his university and was never elected to the Prussian Academy of Sciences, although these distinctions fell to colleagues who never wrote or did anything comparable to the work for which he is chiefly remembered.9
二
II
自第一卷出版之日起，《战争艺术史》便饱受批评家的抨击。古典学者不满德尔布吕克对希罗多德的曲解；中世纪学者抨击德尔布吕克关于封建制度起源的论述；爱国的英国学者则对德尔布吕克轻视玫瑰战争感到愤怒。由此产生的诸多争议都被记录在本书后续版本的脚注中，学术界的怒火至今仍在燃烧。然而，本书的核心内容并未受到专家批评的影响，反而赢得了包括魏玛共和国时期国防军部长威廉·格罗纳将军和伟大的社会主义宣传家弗朗茨·梅林在内的众多读者的赞誉。格罗纳将军称其“独一无二”。10后者被誉为“新世纪德国资产阶级历史写作中最重要的一部作品”，K·博卡罗夫在苏联国防部出版的该著作全集译本第一卷的导言中也重复了这一评价，但措辞更为严厉（“就所用材料的庞大范围和研究的严谨性而言，这无疑是该领域迄今为止最伟大的作品”）。11
From the date of the publication of the first volume, the History of the Art of War was the butt of angry critics. Classical scholars resented the way in which Delbrück manhandled Herodotus; medievalists attacked Delbrück's section on the origin of the feudal system; patriotic English scholars were furious at his slighting of the Wars of the Roses. Many of the resultant controversies have been written into the footnotes of the later editions of the work, where the fires of academic wrath still smolder. But in its main outlines the book stands unaffected by the attacks of the specialists and it has received its meed of praise from such widely separated readers as General Wilhelm Groener, Reichswehr minister under the Weimar Republic, and Franz Mehring, the great socialist publicist. The former referred to it as “simply unique”;10 the latter as “the most significant work produced by the historical writing of bourgeois Germany in the new century,” a comment repeated with less qualification (“by far the greatest work in this field in view not only of the colossal scope of the materials used but also of the seriousness of the undertaking”) by K. Bocarov in his introduction to the first volume of the Soviet Defense Ministry's complete edition of the work in translation.11
德尔布吕克的四卷著作中，第一卷探讨了从波斯战争时期到凯撒时代罗马战争鼎盛时期的战争艺术。第二卷主要关注早期日耳曼人，同时也论述了罗马军事机构的衰落、拜占庭帝国的军事组织以及封建制度的起源。第三卷致力于中世纪战术和战略的衰落乃至近乎消失，并以瑞士-勃艮第战争中战术机构的复兴作结。第四卷则将战术方法和战略思维的发展历程延续至拿破仑时代。
Of the four volumes written by Delbrück, the first discusses the art of war from the period of the Persian Wars to the high point of Roman warfare under Julius Caesar. The second volume, which is largely concerned with the early Germans, treats also the decline of Roman military institutions, the military organization of the Byzantine Empire, and the origins of the feudal system. The third volume is devoted to the decline and near disappearance of tactics and strategy in the Middle Ages and concludes with an account of the revival of tactical bodies in the Swiss-Burgundian Wars. The fourth volume carries the story of the development of tactical methods and strategic thinking to the age of Napoleon.
在普鲁斯特的小说《盖尔芒特之路》中，一位年轻军官评论道：“在军事史学家的叙述中，最微小的事实，最琐碎的事件，都只是某种思想的外在表现，而这种思想需要被分析，并且常常像羊皮纸一样，揭示出其他思想。” 这段话相当准确地描述了德尔布吕克的军事史观。他感兴趣的是普遍的思想和趋势，而不是像以往的军事史那样充斥着细枝末节。在他的著作第一卷的引言中，他明确表示无意撰写一部全面详尽的战争艺术史。他指出，这样的著作必然会包含诸如“操练及其命令的细节、武器技术和马匹的照料，以及最终的整个海军事务——这些内容我要么没有什么新意可言，要么我根本一窍不通。” 这部历史著作的目的在其标题中就已阐明；它本应是一部置于政治史框架下的战争艺术史。12
In Proust's novel The Guermantes Way, a young officer remarks that “in the narrative of a military historian, the smallest facts, the most trivial happenings, are only the outward signs of an idea which has to be analyzed and which often brings to light other ideas, like a palimpsest.” These words are a reasonably accurate description of Delbrück's conception of military history. He was interested in general ideas and tendencies rather than in the minutiae that had crowded the pages of earlier military histories. In his introduction to the first volume of his work, he specifically disclaimed any intention of writing a completely comprehensive history of the art of war. Such a work, he pointed out, would necessarily include such things as “details of drill with its commands, the technique of weapons and of the care of horses, and finally the whole subject of naval affairs—matters on which I have either nothing new to say or which I don't for a moment comprehend.” The purpose of the history was stated in its title; it was to be a history of the art of war in the framework of political history.12
德尔布吕克在其第四卷的引言中对此进行了更详细的阐述。这部著作的基本目的是建立国家体制与战术和战略之间的联系。“认识到战术、战略、国家体制和政策之间的相互关系，反映了军事史与世界史之间的关系，并揭示了许多此前被掩盖或未被认识到的事物。这部著作的写作目的并非为了战争艺术，而是为了世界历史。如果军人阅读并从中受到启发，我将感到高兴，并视之为一种荣幸；但它是由一位历史学家为历史爱好者而作。”<sup> 13</sup>
In the introduction to his fourth volume, Delbrück explained this in greater detail. The basic purpose of the work was to establish the connection between the constitution of the state, and tactics and strategy. “The recognition of the interrelationship between tactics, strategy, the constitution of the state and policy reflects upon the relationship [between military history and] world history and has brought to light much that until now has been hidden in darkness or left without recognition. This work has been written not for the sake of the art of war, but for the sake of world history. If military men read it and are stimulated by it, I am pleased and regard that as an honor; but it was written for friends of history by a historian.”13
然而，与此同时，德尔布吕克也意识到，在对过去的战争得出任何普遍结论之前，历史学家必须尽可能准确地确定这些战争是如何进行的。正因为他致力于寻找其他历史学家感兴趣的普遍观点，德尔布吕克才不得不深入研究过去战役中的“琐碎事件”和“最小的事实”；而且，尽管他本人否认，但他对这些事实的重新评估不仅对历史学家，而且对士兵来说也具有重要价值。
At the same time, however, Delbrück realized that, before any general conclusions could be drawn from the wars of the past, the historian must determine as accurately as possible how those wars had been fought. It was precisely because he was intent on finding general ideas that would be of interest to other historians that Delbrück was forced to grapple with the “trivial happenings,” “the smallest facts” of past campaigns; and, despite his own disclaimer, his reappraisal of those facts was of great value not to historians alone but to soldiers as well.
“事实”本应存在于流传下来的海量史料之中。但许多军事史料显然不可靠，不过是“厕所闲聊和副官八卦”罢了。14现代历史学家该如何核实这些古代记录呢？
The “facts” were to be found in the great volume of source material that had been handed down by the past. But many of the sources of military history were obviously unreliable and were no better than “washroom prattle and adjutants' gossip.”14 How was the modern historian to check these ancient records?
德尔布吕克认为，这可以通过多种方式实现。如果历史学家了解过去战役发生的地形，他就可以运用现代地理科学的所有资源来核实流传下来的报告。如果他知道所使用的武器装备类型，他就可以合乎逻辑地重构战役战术，因为每种武器的战术规律都是可以确定的。对现代战争的研究将为历史学家提供更多工具，因为在现代战役中，他可以判断普通士兵的行军能力、普通战马的负重能力以及大规模部队的机动性。最后，通常可以发现一些战役或战斗，这些战役或战斗有可靠的报告，其条件几乎与早期战役完全相同。瑞士-勃艮第战争中留有确切记载的战役，以及马拉松战役（仅有希罗多德的记载），都是一方是骑兵和弓箭手，另一方是装备近战武器的步兵；在这两场战役中，步兵都取得了胜利。因此，应该可以从格朗松战役、穆尔滕战役和南锡战役中得出一些结论，并将其应用于马拉松战役。<sup> 15</sup>德尔布吕克将所有这些方法结合起来，称之为“事实批判”（Sachkritik）。<sup>16</sup>
Delbrück believed that this could be done in several ways. Provided the historian knew the terrain in which past battles were fought, he could use all the resources of modern geographical science to check the reports that were handed down. Provided he knew the type of weapons and equipment used, he could reconstruct the tactics of the battle in a logical manner, since the laws of tactics for every kind of weapon could be ascertained. A study of modern warfare would supply the historian with further tools, for in modern campaigns he could judge the marching powers of the average soldier, the weight-carrying capacity of the average horse, the maneuverability of large masses of men. Finally, it was often possible to discover campaigns or battles, for which reliable reports existed, in which the conditions of earlier battles were reproduced almost exactly. Both the battles of the Swiss-Burgundian Wars, for which accurate records exist, and the battle of Marathon, for which Herodotus was the only source, were fought between mounted knights and bowmen on the one side and foot soldiers armed with weapons for hand-to-hand fighting on the other; in both cases, the foot soldiers were victorious. It should be possible, therefore, to draw conclusions from the battles of Granson, Murten, and Nancy that could be applied to the battle of Marathon.15 The combination of all of these methods, Delbrück called Sachkritik.16
只需提及萨克里克提克的一些应用即可。德尔布吕克最令人震惊的成果来自他对古代战争中参战军队数量的研究。据希罗多德记载，公元前480年，大流士之子薛西斯率领波斯军队攻打希腊，军队人数达2,641,610人，此外还有至少同样数量的随军人员、仆役和随军人员。<sup> 17 </sup> 德尔布吕克指出，这一数据并不可靠。“按照德国的行军顺序，一个军团，即3万人，大约占地三英里，还不包括辎重队。因此，波斯军队的行军纵队长达420英里，当第一批部队抵达温泉关时，最后一批部队才刚刚从底格里斯河对岸的苏萨出发。”<sup> 18</sup>
Only a few applications of the Sachkritik need be mentioned. Delbrück's most startling results were attained by his investigations of the numbers of troops engaged in the wars of the past. According to Herodotus, the Persian army that Xerxes, son of Darius, led against Greece in 480 B.C. numbered 2,641,610 fighting men and at least as many crew members, servants, and camp followers.17 Delbrück pointed out that this could not be considered reliable. “According to the German order of march, an army corps, that is 30,000 men, occupies about three miles, without the baggage trains. The marching column of the Persians would therefore have been 420 miles long and as the first troops were arriving before Thermopylae the last would have just marched out of Susa on the other side of the Tigris.”18
即使这一令人尴尬的事实可以得到解释，但所有发生过战斗的战场都不足以容纳希罗多德记载中那样庞大的军队。例如，马拉松平原“面积如此之小，以至于大约五十年前，一位到访此地的普鲁士参谋军官惊讶地写道，一个普鲁士旅在那里几乎没有足够的空间进行演习。”<sup> 19</sup>根据现代对古希腊人口的研究，德尔布吕克估计公元前490年马拉松战役中，希腊军队在达提斯率领下与波斯军队交战时的兵力约为12000人。由于希罗多德声称希腊军队寡不敌众（尽管他没有给出敌军的具体人数，但他估计波斯军队的伤亡人数为6400人），<sup> 20</sup>这意味着参战的总兵力远远超过了普鲁士观察员估计的规模。
Even if this awkward fact could be explained away, none of the fields on which battles were fought was big enough to hold armies as large as those in Herodotus' accounts. The plain of Marathon, for instance, “is so small that some fifty years ago a Prussian staff officer who visited it wrote with some astonishment that a Prussian brigade would scarcely have room enough there for its exercises.”19 On the basis of modern studies of the population of ancient Greece, Delbrück estimated the size of the Greek army that faced the Persians under Datis at Marathon in 490 B.C. at about 12,000. Since Herodotus claimed that it was outnumbered (and, although not giving the size of the opposing army, estimated Persian casualties at 6,400),20 this would mean that total troops engaged far exceeded the limits set by the Prussian observer.
这些并非认为希罗多德总是夸大波斯军队实力的唯一原因。马拉松战役中的希腊军队是一支由公民组成的军队，他们训练有素，擅长以简陋的方阵作战，但缺乏战术机动能力。而波斯军队则是一支职业军队，其士兵的英勇在希腊人的记载中也得到了认可。“如果波斯军队的规模和军事勇气都属实，那么希腊人屡战屡胜就无法解释。两者只能有其一；因此，很明显，波斯人的优势不在于人数，而在于素质。”<sup> 21</sup>德尔布吕克由此得出结论：波斯军队远非希罗多德所描述的那般庞大，在整个波斯战争期间，波斯军队的人数实际上都逊于希腊军队。
Nor were these the only reasons for believing that Herodotus tended always to inflate Persian troop strength. The Greek army at Marathon was a citizen army trained to fight in a rude phalanx but incapable of tactical maneuver. The Persian army was a professional army, and the bravery of its soldiers was admitted even in the Greek account. “If both things were true, the size (of the Persian army) as well as its military bravery, then the ever-repeated victory of the Greeks would remain inexplicable. Only one of the two things can be true; hence, it is clear that the advantage of the Persians is to be sought not in numbers but in quality.”21 Delbrück concludes that, far from having the mass army described by Herodotus, the Persians were actually inferior in numbers to the Greeks throughout the Persian Wars.
希罗多德的记载长期以来备受质疑，德尔布吕克的批评也并非完全独创。但他真正的贡献在于，他将同样的系统方法应用于从波斯战争到拿破仑战争的每一场战争的数字记录。例如，在讨论凯撒在高卢的战役时，他清晰地论证了凯撒出于政治原因对敌军兵力的估计严重夸大。根据凯撒的说法，赫尔维蒂人在大迁徙中人数达36.8万人，并携带了三个月的补给。德尔布吕克认为这个数字简直是天方夜谭；但正是凯撒对赫尔维蒂人粮食供应的描述，使他得以证明这一点。他指出，运送如此庞大的补给需要大约8500辆马车，而以凯撒时代的道路状况来看，如此庞大的队伍根本无法行进。22德尔布吕克在论述匈奴入侵欧洲时，再次有效地驳斥了阿提拉拥有70万大军的说法。他描述了毛奇在1870年的战役中指挥50万大军所遇到的困难。“即使拥有铁路、公路、电报和总参谋部，统一指挥如此庞大的军队也是一项极其艰巨的任务……如果毛奇指挥50万大军走过同一条道路都如此困难，阿提拉又怎能率领70万大军从德国越过莱茵河进入法国，抵达沙隆平原呢？这两个数字正好相互制约。” 23
The account of Herodotus had long been suspect, and Delbrück's criticism was by no means wholly original. But his real contribution lay in the fact that he applied the same systematic methods to the numerical records of every war from the Persian Wars to those of Napoleon. Thus, in his discussion of Caesar's campaigns in Gaul, he clearly demonstrated that Caesar's estimates of the forces pitted against him were, for political reasons, grossly exaggerated. According to Caesar, the Helvetians, in their great trek, numbered 368,000 persons and carried three months' provisions with them. To Delbrück the numerical estimate smacked of the fabulous; but it was Caesar's remarks on the Helvetian food supply that enabled him to prove it so. He pointed out that some 8,500 wagons would be required to carry such provisions and, in the condition of roads in Caesar's time, it would be quite impossible for such a column to move.22 Again, in his discussion of the invasion of Europe by the Huns, Delbrück effectively disposed of the belief that Attila had an army of 700,000 men, by describing the difficulties that Moltke experienced in maneuvering an army of 500,000 men in the campaign of 1870. “To direct such a mass unitedly is, even with railroads, roads, telegraphs and a general staff an exceedingly difficult task…. How could Attila have led 700,000 men from Germany over the Rhine into France to the Plain of Chalons, if Moltke moved 500,000 with such difficulty over the same road? The one number acts as a check on the other.”23
德尔布吕克对数字的研究远不止于历史考证。在德军被教导要从历史中汲取教训的时期，这位“神话破除者”帮助他们避免得出错误的结论。在战争和战争研究中，数字至关重要。德尔布吕克本人指出：“1000人小队轻而易举就能完成的行动，对10000人来说却是一项艰巨的任务；对50000人来说堪称艺术；对100000人来说则完全不可能。” <sup> 25</sup>除非掌握准确的参战人数，否则无法从过去的战役中吸取任何教训。
Delbrück's investigations of numbers have more than a mere antiquarian interest. At a time when the German army was being taught to seek lessons in history, the destroyer of myths helped it avoid the drawing of false conclusions. In war and the study of war, numbers were of the highest importance.24 Delbrück himself pointed out that “a movement that a troop of 1,000 men executes without difficulty is a hard task for 10,000 men, a work of art for 50,000, an impossibility for 100,000.”25 No lessons can be drawn from past campaigns unless an accurate statement of the numbers involved is available.
萨克里克里蒂克还有其他用途。德尔布吕克正是凭借它，以逻辑的方式重构了单场战役的细节，而他在这方面的成功给德国总参谋部的历史部门留下了深刻的印象。格罗纳将军证实了德尔布吕克对斜线作战阵型起源的研究价值，正是这种阵型使得侧翼包抄成为可能；<sup> 26 </sup>众所周知，他对坎尼战役中包围战术的科学描述对施利芬伯爵的理论产生了重大影响。<sup> 27</sup>然而，他对马拉松战役的描述或许最能体现德尔布吕克重构历史战役细节的精湛技艺，尤其因为它最清晰地展现了他的信念：“如果了解交战双方的武器装备和作战方式，那么地形就是判断一场战役性质的重要且有力的依据，因此，只要对战局结果没有疑问，就可以大胆地重构战役的大致进程。” 28
Sachkritik had other uses. By means of it, Delbrück was able to reconstruct the details of single battles in a logical manner, and his success in doing so made a profound impression upon the historical section of the German general staff. General Groener has attested to the value of Delbrück's investigation of the origins of that oblique battle order that made flanking possible;26 and it is well known that his scientific description of the encircling movement at Cannae strongly influenced the theories of Count Schlieffen.27 But it is his account of the battle of Marathon that is perhaps the best example of the skill with which Delbrück reconstructed the details of past battles, the more so because it most clearly illustrates his belief that “if one knows the armament and the manner of fighting of the contending armies, then the terrain is such an important and eloquent authority for the character of a battle, that one may dare, provided there is no doubt as to the outcome, to reconstruct its course in general outline.”28
马拉松战役中的希腊军队由全副武装的步兵组成，他们采用原始的方阵阵型，机动性仅限于缓慢的前进。他们的对手波斯军队虽然人数较少，但却拥有训练有素的弓箭手和骑兵。希罗多德曾记载，希腊人通过冲锋穿越马拉松平原，行进约5480英尺（约1650米），击溃了波斯军队的中路，最终赢得了这场战役。德尔布吕克指出，这在物理上是不可能的。根据现代德国的操练手册，负重行军的士兵最多只能跑两分钟，大约1080到1150英尺（约330到350米）。雅典人的装备并不比现代德国士兵轻便，而且他们还面临两个额外的劣势：他们并非职业军人，而是平民，而且许多人的年龄超过了现代军队的年龄限制。此外，方阵是由密集排列的士兵组成，这使得任何形式的快速移动都成为不可能。如此远的距离发起冲锋，只会让方阵溃不成军，波斯职业军人可以毫不费力地将其歼灭。29
The Greek army at Marathon was composed of heavily armed foot soldiers, formed in the primitive phalanx, the maneuverability of which was restricted to slow forward movement. It was opposed by an army inferior in numbers but made up of highly trained bowmen and cavalry. Herodotus had written that the Greeks had won the battle by charging across the plain of Marathon some 5,480 feet and crushing the center of the Persian line. Delbrück pointed out that this was a physical impossibility. According to the modern German drill book, soldiers with full pack could be expected to run for only two minutes, some 1,080 to 1,150 feet. The Athenians were no more lightly armed than the modern German soldier and they suffered from two additional disadvantages. They were not professional soldiers, but civilians, and many of them exceeded the age limit required in modern armies. Moreover, the phalanx was a closely massed body of men that made quick movement of any kind impossible. An attempted charge over such a distance would have reduced the phalanx to a disorganized mob that would have been cut down by the Persian professionals without difficulty.29
希罗多德所描述的战术显然是不可能的，尤其考虑到希腊方阵侧翼薄弱，一旦在开阔地带交战，就可能被波斯骑兵包围。德尔布吕克认为，这场战役显然并非发生在马拉松平原，而是在东南方向的一个小山谷中，那里群山环绕，森林密布，希腊军队得以免受侧翼攻击。希罗多德记载双方军队将交战拖延了数日，这表明雅典统帅米尔提亚德选择了一个有利的阵地；鉴于希腊军队的战术布局，布拉纳山谷的阵地是唯一可行的选择。此外，该阵地扼守着通往雅典的唯一道路。波斯人若想攻入雅典，要么消灭米尔提亚德的军队，要么放弃整个战役，他们选择了前者。因此，这场战役唯一合理的解释是，波斯人尽管人数处于劣势且无法使用侧翼战术，却率先发起了进攻；而米尔提亚德斯在关键时刻由守转攻，击溃了波斯军队的中央防线，横扫了整个战场。30
The tactics described by Herodotus were obviously impossible, the more so because the Greek phalanx was weak on the flanks and, in any encounter on an open field, could have been surrounded by Persian cavalry. It seemed obvious to Delbrück that the battle was not fought on the plain of Marathon proper but in a small valley to the southeast where the Greeks were protected by mountains and forest from any flanking movement. The fact that Herodotus speaks of the opposing armies delaying the engagement for days shows that Miltiades, the Athenian commander, had chosen a strong position; given the tactical form of the Greek army, the position in the Brana Valley was the only one possible. Moreover, that position dominated the only road to Athens. To reach the city, the Persians were forced to dispose of Miltiades' army, or give up the whole campaign, and they chose the former alternative. The only logical explanation of the battle, then, is that the Persians, despite their numerical inferiority and inability to use flanking tactics, made the initial attack; and Miltiades, shifting at the crucial moment from the defensive to the offensive, crushed the Persian center and swept the field.30
对于普通读者而言，《孙子兵法史》如同之前的许多著作一样，不过是一系列战役的汇编。但德尔布吕克对战役的细致重构，对于他的主要目的而言至关重要。他认为，通过研究关键战役，学生可以了解一个时代的战术，并以此为基础，进一步探究更广泛的问题。<sup> 31</sup>因为关键战役的重要性不仅在于它们是特定时代的典型特征，更在于它们是军事科学发展历程中的里程碑。从某种意义上说，德尔布吕克如同普鲁斯特笔下的年轻军官一样，认为过去的战役是“当今战役的文学、学问、词源和精英”。通过重构单个战役，他寻求军事史的连续性，因此他的《事实批判》使他能够发展出三个主要主题，赋予他的作品意义和统一性，这是以前任何关于该主题的书籍都找不到的：即从波斯人到拿破仑的战术形式的演变，战争与政治在历史上的相互关系，以及所有战略分为两种基本形式。
To the casual reader, the History of the Art of War, like many a work before it, is a mere collection of such battle pieces. But the care with which Delbrück reconstructed battles was necessary to his main purpose. He felt that by the study of key battles the student could acquire a picture of the tactics of an age and from that could proceed to the investigation of broader problems.31 For the key battles are important not only as typical manifestations of their age but as mileposts in the progressive development of military science. In a sense, Delbrück, like Proust's young officer, believed that past battles were “the literature, the learning, the etymology, the aristocracy of the battles of today.” By reconstructing single battles he sought continuity in military history, and thus his Sachkritik enabled him to develop the three major themes which give his work a meaning and a unity found in no previous book on the subject: namely, the evolution of tactical forms from the Persians to Napoleon, the interrelationship of war and politics throughout history, and the division of all strategy into two basic forms.
德尔布吕克对战术阵型演变的描述被誉为他对军事思想最重要的贡献之一。<sup> 32</sup>他的研究使他确信，罗马人的军事优势直接源于其军队战术组织所带来的灵活性和协调性。他进一步论证，正是原始希腊方阵逐渐演变为罗马人所使用的精妙协调的战术阵型，构成了“古代战争艺术的本质意义”。<sup> 33 </sup> 他还认为，此类阵型在十五世纪瑞士-勃艮第战争中的复兴，以及在拿破仑征服欧洲时期的改进和完善，是近代军事史上的显著发展。
Delbrück's description of the evolution of tactical bodies has been called one of his most significant contributions to military thought.32 Convinced by his researches that the military supremacy of the Romans was the direct result of the flexibility and articulated movement that resulted from the tactical organization of their forces, he went on to argue that it was the gradual evolution of the primitive Greek phalanx into the skillfully coordinated tactical formations used by the Romans that comprised “the essential meaning of the ancient art of war,”33 and that the revival of such formations in the Swiss-Burgundian Wars of the fifteenth century and their improvement and perfection in the period that ended with Napoleon's mastery of Europe was the salient development of modern military history.
古代战争史上的转折点是公元前34年的坎尼战役，汉尼拔率领的迦太基军队以史上最完美的战术击败了罗马军队。罗马人是如何从这场灾难中恢复过来，战胜迦太基人，并最终在整个古代世界确立军事霸权的呢？答案在于方阵的演变。在坎尼战役中，罗马步兵的部署方式与马拉松战役中的希腊步兵如出一辙，这使他们落入了汉尼拔的圈套。由于侧翼暴露，且后方无法独立于主力部队进行机动，罗马步兵根本无法抵挡迦太基骑兵的包围战术。但在坎尼战役之后的几年里，罗马的作战形式发生了显著的变化。 “罗马人先是构筑了方阵，然后将其分割成纵队（Treffen），最终又将其细分为众多小型战术单位。这些单位既能紧密地凝聚成坚不可摧的整体，又能灵活地改变阵型，彼此分离，并向各个方向转向。”<sup> 35</sup>对于现代战争研究者而言，这种发展似乎如此自然，以至于几乎不值一提。然而，实现这一目标却极其困难，在所有古代民族中，只有罗马人成功做到了。罗马人之所以能够做到这一点，是因为他们经历了长达一百年的试验——在此期间，军队从平民军队转变为职业军队——以及罗马体系中对军事纪律的重视。<sup> 36</sup>
The turning point in the history of ancient warfare was the battle of Cannae,34 where the Carthaginians under Hannibal overwhelmed the Romans in the most perfect tactical battle ever fought. How were the Romans able to recover from that disaster, to defeat the Carthaginians and eventually to exercise military supremacy over the whole of the ancient world? The answer is to be found in the evolution of the phalanx. At Cannae the Roman infantry was ordered as the Greeks had been at Marathon, and this delivered them into Hannibal's arms, for their exposed flanks and the inability of their rear to maneuver independently of the mass of the army made it impossible for them to prevent the encircling tactics employed by the Carthaginian cavalry. But in the years following Cannae, striking changes were introduced into the Roman battle form. “The Romans first articulated the phalanx, then divided it into columns [Treffen] and finally split it up into a great number of small tactical bodies that were capable, now of closing together in a compact impenetrable union, now of changing the pattern with consummate flexibility, of separating one from the other and of turning in this or that direction.”35 To modern students of warfare this development seems so natural as to be hardly worthy of notice. To accomplish it, however, was extremely difficult and only the Romans, of all the ancient peoples, succeeded. In their case it was made possible only by a hundred years of experimentation—in the course of which the army changed from a civilian to a professional army—and by the emphasis upon military discipline that characterized the Roman system.36
因此，罗马人征服世界，并非因为他们的军队“比所有对手都更勇敢，而是因为他们纪律严明，战术更为强大。” <sup>37</sup>唯一成功避免被罗马人征服的民族是日耳曼人，他们的抵抗得益于其政治制度中固有的纪律性，以及日耳曼人的战斗纵队——格维尔特豪夫（Gevierthaufe）——高效的战术阵型。<sup> 38</sup>事实上，在与罗马人的战争中，日耳曼人学会了模仿罗马军团的阵型，根据需要单独或联合指挥他们的格维尔特豪夫。 <sup>39</sup>
The Romans conquered the world, then, not because their troops “were braver than all their opponents, but because, thanks to their discipline, they had stronger tactical bodies.”37 The only people who successfully avoided conquest by the Romans were the Germans, and their resistance was made possible by a natural discipline inherent in their political institutions, and by the fact that the German fighting column, the Gevierthaufe, was a tactical formation of great effectiveness.38 Indeed, in the course of their wars with the Romans, the Germans learned to imitate the articulation of the Roman legion, maneuvering their Gevierthaufen independently or in union as the occasion required.39
随着罗马国家的衰落和帝国的蛮族化，自米尔提亚德时代以来取得的战术进步就此终结。塞维鲁王朝之后的政治动荡削弱了罗马军队的纪律，并逐渐破坏了其战术形式的卓越性。与此同时，随着大量蛮族被纳入军队，几个世纪以来形成的精锐作战体系已无法维系。历史表明，步兵只有在组织成强大的战术单位时才能优于骑兵。如今，随着国家的衰落和随之而来的战术退化，在西方的新兴蛮族帝国以及查士丁尼的军队中，都出现了用重装骑兵取代步兵的趋势。41随着这种趋势占据上风，以步兵战术决定战局的时代逐渐消逝，欧洲进入了一个漫长的时期，在这个时期，武装骑士的形象主导了军事史。42
With the decline of the Roman state and the barbarization of the Empire, the tactical progress that had been made since the days of Miltiades came to an end. The political disorders of the age following the reign of the Severi weakened the discipline of the Roman army, and gradually undermined the excellence of its tactical forms.40 At the same time, as large numbers of barbarians were admitted into the ranks, it was impossible to cling to the highly integrated battle order that had been devised over the course of centuries. History had shown that infantry was superior to cavalry only if the foot soldiers were organized in strong tactical bodies. Now, with the decline of the state and the consequent degeneration of tactics, there was a growing tendency, in the new barbarian empires of the west and in Justinian's army as well, to replace infantry with heavily armed mounted soldiers.41 As that tendency gained the upper hand, the days when battles were decided by infantry tactics died away and Europe entered a long period in which military history was dominated by the figure of the armed knight.42
德尔布吕克曾被指责认为军事科学的发展止步于罗马的衰落，并于文艺复兴时期重新开始，43这种指责不无道理。从查理曼大帝时代到勃艮第战争中瑞士步兵的出现，所有战争的核心要素都是封建军队。在德尔布吕克看来，这支军队并非战术体系，它依赖于单个战士的战斗力；缺乏纪律、统一指挥和有效的兵种分工。在这一时期，战术上没有任何进步，德尔布吕克似乎赞同马克·吐温笔下康涅狄格州的美国佬的观点：“当你统计战果时，你根本分不清哪场战斗是哪场，也分不清谁赢了。” 诚然，在克雷西战役中，英国骑士下马步战，进行防御；而在阿金库尔战役中，下马的骑士们实际上发起了进攻；但这仅仅是个别事件，不能被视为对现代步兵发展的预测。44
Delbrück has been accused of maintaining that the development of military science stops with the decline of Rome and starts again with the Renaissance,43 and the accusation is justified. The essential element in all warfare from the days of Charlemagne to the emergence of the Swiss infantry in the Burgundian Wars was the feudal army. This, in Delbrück's opinion, was no tactical body. It depended upon the fighting quality of the single warrior; there was no discipline, no unity of command, no effective differentiation of arms. In this whole period, no tactical progress was made, and Delbrück seems inclined to agree with Mark Twain's Connecticut Yankee, that “when you come to figure up results, you can't tell one fight from another, nor who whipped.” It is true that at Crécy, the English knights dismounted and fought a defensive battle on foot and that, at Agincourt, dismounted knights actually took the offensive; but these were mere episodes and cannot be considered as forecasts of the development of modern infantry.44
十五世纪，瑞士人复兴了独立步兵。“劳彭战役、森帕赫战役、格朗松战役、穆尔滕战役和南锡战役，让我们再次拥有了一支堪比方阵和军团的步兵。”<sup> 45</sup>瑞士长矛兵的队形类似于德国的格维尔陶夫长矛兵；<sup>46 </sup> 在与勃艮第人的战争中，他们完善了罗马军团使用的复杂战术。例如，在森帕赫战役中，瑞士步兵被分为两队，一队负责防御敌军骑兵，另一队则对敌军侧翼发动致命一击。<sup> 47</sup>
It was among the Swiss in the fifteenth century that the independent infantry was reborn. “With the battles of Laupen and Sempach, Granson, Murten and Nancy we have again a foot soldiery comparable to the phalanx and the legions.”45 The Swiss pikemen formed themselves in bodies similar to the German Gevierthaufe;46 and, in the course of their wars against the Burgundians, they perfected the articulated tactics used by the Roman legions. At Sempach, for instance, the Swiss infantry was divided into two bodies, one holding a defensive position against the mounted enemy, the other delivering a decisive blow on the enemy's flank.47
战术单位的复兴是一场堪比坎尼战役之后的军事革命。正是这种复兴，而非火器的引入，终结了封建战争。在穆尔滕、格朗松和南锡战役中，骑士们使用了新式武器，但并未对战局产生影响。<sup> 48</sup>随着步兵战术单位在战争中重新占据主导地位，骑兵沦为单纯的骑兵，成为军队中一支非常有用但辅助性的力量。德尔布吕克在其第四卷中探讨了这一发展以及现代步兵向常备军时代的演变，并总结了法国大革命带来的战术革命。<sup> 49</sup>
The revival of tactical bodies was a military revolution comparable to that which followed Cannae. It was this revival, rather than the introduction of firearms, that brought feudal warfare to an end. At Murten, Granson, and Nancy the new weapons were employed by the knights, but had no effect upon the outcome of the battle.48 With the restoration of the tactical body of infantry as the decisive one in warfare, the mounted soldiers became a mere cavalry, a highly useful but supplementary part of the army. In his fourth volume, Delbrück discussed this development and the evolution of the modern infantry to the age of the standing army and concluded with an account of the revolution in tactics made possible by the French Revolution.49
德尔布吕克对战术单位兴起的关注，不仅赋予了他的军事史以连贯性，也阐明了他认为贯穿全书的核心主题，即政治与战争的相互关系。他指出，在历史的每个时期，政治的发展与战术的演变都密切相关。“马其顿国王统治下的重装步兵方阵与罗马贵族共和国时期的重装步兵方阵发展方式截然不同，而步兵大队的战术发展也与宪政变革息息相关。此外，根据其性质，日耳曼百人队与罗马步兵大队的作战方式也大相径庭。”<sup> 50</sup>
The attention that Delbrück pays to the emergence of tactical bodies serves not only to give a sense of continuity to his military history but also to illustrate the theme that he considered basic to his book, namely, the interrelationship of politics and war. In every period of history, he pointed out, the development of politics and the evolution of tactics were closely related. “The Hopliten-Phalanx developed in quite a different manner under the Macedonian kings than it did in the aristocratic Roman Beamten-Republik, and the tactics of the cohort were developed only in relationship with constitutional change. Again, according to their nature, the German hunderts fought quite differently from the Roman cohorts.”50
例如，罗马军队在坎尼战役中战败，正是由于其战术薄弱。而造成这种薄弱的原因之一是，这支军队由未经训练的平民而非职业军人组成，而且当时的宪法规定最高统帅权必须在两位执政官之间轮换。<sup> 51</sup>坎尼战役之后，统一指挥的必要性被普遍认可。经过各种政治尝试后，公元前211年，西庇阿被任命为罗马在非洲的军队总司令，并被保证在战争期间继续担任此职。这一任命直接违反了国家宪法，标志着共和制度衰落的开始。政治与战争的相互关联在此显而易见。德尔布吕克写道：“第二次布匿战争在世界历史上的重要性在于，罗马进行了一次内部变革，极大地增强了其军事潜力，”<sup> 52</sup>但同时也改变了整个国家的性质。
The Roman army at Cannae, for example, was defeated because of the weakness of its tactics. But contributory to that weakness was the fact that the army was composed of untrained civilians rather than professional soldiers and the constitution of the state required that the high command alternate between the two consuls.51 In the years following Cannae the necessity of a unified command was generally recognized. After various political experiments were tried, P. C. Scipio was in the year 211 B.C. made general in chief of the Roman armies in Africa and assured of continued tenure for the duration of the war. The appointment was in direct violation of the state constitution and it marked the beginning of the decline of republican institutions. The interrelationship of politics and warfare is in this case apparent. “The importance of the Second Punic War in world history,” Delbrück writes, “is that Rome effected an internal transformation that increased her military potentiality enormously,”52 but at the same time changed the whole character of the state.
正如政治因素在罗马战术的完善中起主导作用一样，战术形式的崩溃也只有通过仔细研究后期帝国的政治制度才能解释。三世纪的政治和经济动荡对罗马军事制度产生了直接影响。“持续不断的内战摧毁了此前维系罗马军队坚固壁垒的纽带，摧毁了构成军团军事价值的纪律。”<sup> 53</sup>
Just as the political element was predominant in the perfection of Roman tactics, so also the breakdown of tactical forms can be explained only by a careful study of the political institutions of the later Empire. The political and economic disorders of the third century had a direct effect upon Roman military institutions. “Permanent civil war destroyed the cement that till now had held the strong walls of the Roman army together, the discipline that constituted the military worth of the legions.”53
在德尔布吕克的《战争艺术史》中，他并未对政治与战争的关系进行全面探讨。然而，随着他从一个历史时期过渡到另一个历史时期，他将纯粹的军事置于其整体背景之中，阐明了政治和军事制度之间的紧密联系，并指出一个领域的变革必然导致另一个领域的相应反应。他指出，德国的格维尔特豪夫（Gevierthaufe）是德意志部落村落组织的军事体现，并论证了德意志社群生活的瓦解如何导致了格维尔特豪夫作为战术单位的消亡。<sup>54</sup>他还指出，瑞士在十五世纪取得的胜利得益于各州民主与贵族因素的融合，以及城市贵族与农民群众的联合。55在法国大革命时期，他描述了政治因素如何——在这种情况下是“保卫祖国的新理念”——“极大地鼓舞了广大士兵的意志，使他们能够发展出新的战术” 。56
In no part of the History of the Art of War does Delbrück include a general discussion of the relationship of politics and war. But, as he moves from one historical epoch to another, he fits the purely military into its general background, illustrating the close connection of political and military institutions and showing how changes in one sphere led of necessity to corresponding reactions in the other. He shows that the German Gevierthaufe was the military expression of the village organization of the German tribes and demonstrated the way in which the dissolution of German communal life led to the disappearance of the Gevierthaufe as a tactical body.54 He shows how the victories of the Swiss in the fifteenth century were made possible by the fusion of the democratic and aristocratic elements in the various cantons, and the union of the urban nobility with the peasant masses.55 And in the period of the French Revolution he describes the way in which the political factor, in this case “the new idea of defending the fatherland, inspired the mass [of the soldiers] with such an improved will, that new tactics could be developed.”56
德尔布吕克所有军事理论中最引人注目的是他认为所有军事战略都可以分为两种基本形式。这一理论早在《孙子兵法史》出版之前就已提出，并在该书的第一卷和第四卷中得到了简明扼要的总结。<sup> 57</sup>
The most striking of all of Delbrück's military theories was that which held that all military strategy can be divided into two basic forms. This theory, formulated long before the publication of the History of the Art of War, is conveniently summarized in the first and fourth volumes of that work.57
德尔布吕克时代的大多数军事思想家认为，战争的目标是歼灭敌军，因此，实现这一目标的战役就是所有战略的最终目的。他们常常选择性地引用克劳塞维茨的理论来支持自己的观点。德尔布吕克对军事史的初步研究使他确信，这种战略思维并非一直被普遍接受；历史上曾有很长一段时间，完全不同的战略主导着战场。此外，他还发现，克劳塞维茨本人也曾断言，历史上存在不止一种战略体系。他在1827年的一份笔记中指出，战争有两种截然不同的方法：一种是完全以歼灭敌军为目标的战争；另一种是有限战争，在有限战争中，歼灭敌军是不可能的，要么是因为战争的政治目标或政治冲突较小，要么是因为军事手段不足以实现歼灭。<sup> 58</sup>
The great majority of military thinkers in Delbrück's day believed the aim of war to be the annihilation of the enemy's forces and that, consequently, the battle that accomplishes this is the end of all strategy. Often they selectively cited Clausewitz to support their claim. Delbrück's first researches in military history convinced him that this type of strategical thinking had not always been generally accepted; and that there were long periods in history in which a completely different strategy ruled the field. He discovered, moreover, that Clausewitz himself had asserted the existence throughout history of more than one strategical system, suggesting in a note written in 1827 that there were two sharply distinct methods of conducting war: one which was bent solely on the annihilation of the enemy; the other, a limited warfare, in which such annihilation was impossible, either because the political aims or political tensions involved in the war were small or because the military means were inadequate to accomplish annihilation.58
克劳塞维茨开始修订《战争论》，但未能完成他对两种战争形式的全面分析便去世了。德尔布吕克决定接受这种区分，并阐述每种战争形式所蕴含的原则。他将第一种战争形式命名为歼灭战战略（ Niederwerfungsstrategie）。这种战略的唯一目标是决战，而指挥官只需评估在特定情况下进行决战的可能性即可。
Clausewitz began to revise On War, but died before he could complete his intended comprehensive analysis of the two forms. Delbrück determined to accept the distinction and expound the principles inherent in each. The first form of warfare he named Niederwerfungsstrategie (the strategy of annihilation). Its sole aim was the decisive battle, and the commanding general was called upon only to estimate the possibility of fighting such a battle in a given situation.
德尔布吕克将第二种战略称为“消耗战略”（Ermattungsstrategie）或“双极战略”。它与歼灭战略的区别在于：“歼灭战略只有一个极点，即战斗；而消耗战略有两个极点，即战斗和机动，将军的决策就在这两者之间转换。”在消耗战略中，战斗仅仅是实现战争政治目标的几种同样有效的手段之一，其重要性本质上并不高于占领领土、摧毁农作物或商业以及封锁。这种战略既不是第一种战略的简单变体，也不是低劣的战略。在某些历史时期，由于政治因素或军队规模较小，它是唯一可行的战略。它对指挥官提出的要求与歼灭战略的执行者所面临的要求一样艰巨。在资源有限的情况下，战略家必须决定几种作战方式中哪一种最符合其目标，何时进攻，何时机动，何时遵循“大胆”原则，何时遵循“节约兵力”原则。“因此，这一决定是主观的，尤其是在任何时候都无法完全掌握所有情况和条件，特别是敌营的情况。在仔细考虑所有情况——战争目标、作战力量、政治影响、敌方指挥官的个人情况、敌方政府和人民的情况以及己方情况——之后，将领必须决定是否应该进行战斗。他可以得出结论，必须不惜一切代价避免任何更大规模的行动；他也可以决定抓住一切机会进行战斗，这样他的行为与单一战略之间就没有本质区别了。”<sup> 59</sup>
The second type of strategy Delbrück called variously Ermattungsstrategie (the strategy of exhaustion) and two-pole strategy. It was distinguished from the strategy of annihilation by the fact “that the Niederwerfungsstrategie has only one pole, the battle, whereas the Ermattungsstrategie has two poles, battle and maneuver, between which the decisions of the general move.” In Ermattungsstrategie, the battle is merely one of several equally effective means of attaining the political ends of the war and is essentially no more important than the occupation of territory, the destruction of crops or commerce, and the blockade. This second form of strategy is neither a mere variation of the first nor an inferior form. In certain periods of history, because of political factors or the smallness of armies, it has been the only form of strategy that could be employed. The task it imposes on the commander is quite as difficult as that required of the exponent of the strategy of annihilation. With limited resources at his disposal, the Ermattungsstratege must decide which of several means of conducting war will best suit his purpose, when to fight and when to maneuver, when to obey the law of “daring” and when to obey that of “economy of forces.” “The decision is therefore a subjective one, the more so because at no time are all circumstances and conditions, especially what is going on in the enemy camp, known completely and authoritatively. After a careful consideration of all circumstances—the aim of the war, the combat forces, the political repercussions, the individuality of the enemy commander, and of the government and people of the enemy, as well as his own—the general must decide whether a battle is advisable or not. He can reach the conclusion that any greater actions must be avoided at all cost; he can also determine to seek [battle] on every occasion so that there is no essential difference between his conduct and that of one-pole strategy.”59
历史上，亚历山大、凯撒和拿破仑等伟大的统帅都曾奉行歼灭战战略。但同样伟大的将领中，也有不少人擅长歼灭战战略。德尔布吕克列举了伯里克利、贝利萨留、瓦伦斯坦、古斯塔夫·阿道夫和腓特烈大帝。提及腓特烈大帝的名字，令这位历史学家遭受了铺天盖地的批评。其中最激烈的批评来自总参谋部的历史学家，他们坚信歼灭战战略才是唯一正确的战略，并坚持认为腓特烈是拿破仑的先驱。德尔布吕克回应说，持有这种观点是对腓特烈的严重误解。如果腓特烈是一位歼灭战战略家，那么如何解释他在1741年统领六万大军时，拒绝进攻一支仅有两万五千人的溃败之师？又如何解释他在1745年霍亨弗里德贝格战役取得重大胜利后，再次选择采取机动战策略？<sup> 60</sup>如果以歼灭战战略的原则作为评判将领的唯一标准，腓特烈无疑是一位糟糕的将领。<sup> 61</sup>然而，腓特烈的伟大之处在于，尽管他意识到自己的资源不足以让他每次都发动正面交锋，但他仍然能够有效地运用其他战略原则来赢得战争。
Among the great commanders of the past who had been strategists of annihilation were Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon. But equally great generals had been exponents of Ermattungsstrategie. Among them, Delbrück listed Pericles, Belisarius, Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus, and Frederick the Great. The inclusion of the last name brought down upon the historian a flood of angry criticism. The most vocal of his critics were the historians of the general staff who, convinced that the strategy of annihilation was the only correct strategy, insisted that Frederick was a precursor of Napoleon. Delbrück answered that to hold this view was to do Frederick a grave disservice. If Frederick was a strategist of annihilation, how was one to explain away the fact that in 1741, with 60,000 men under his command, he refused to attack an already beaten army of only 25,000, or that, in 1745, after his great victory at Hohenfriedberg, he preferred to resort again to a war of maneuver?60 If the principles of Niederwerfungsstrategie were to be considered the sole criteria in judging the qualities of a general, Frederick would cut a very poor figure.61 Yet Frederick's greatness lay in the fact that although he realized that his resources were not great enough to enable him to seek battle on every occasion he was nevertheless able to make effective use of other strategical principles in order to win his wars.
德尔布吕克的论点未能说服批评者。科尔马·冯·德·戈尔茨和弗里德里希·冯·伯恩哈迪都加入了反对他的行列，一场旷日持久的论战就此展开，持续了二十多年。德尔布吕克酷爱争论，不遗余力地反驳对他的理论的驳斥。然而，他的“紧急战略”理念却遭到了受拿破仑和毛奇传统训练、坚信速战速决的军官们的拒绝。
Delbrück's arguments did not convince his critics. Both Colmar von der Goltz and Friedrich von Bernhardi entered the lists against him, and a paper warfare ensued that lasted for over twenty years.62 Delbrück, who loved controversy, was indefatigable in answering refutations of his theory. But his concept of Ermattungsstrategie was rejected by an officer corps trained in the tradition of Napoleon and Moltke and convinced of the feasibility of the short, decisive war.
然而，军事批评家们完全忽略了德尔布吕克战略理论的深层意义。历史表明，不可能存在一种适用于所有时代的单一战略理论。如同战争的各个阶段一样，战略与政治、与国家的生死存亡息息相关。在伯罗奔尼撒战争中，雅典相对于其所面对的同盟的政治弱点决定了伯里克利所采取的战略。如果他像后来的克里昂那样，试图遵循“下位战略”（Niederwerfungsstrategie）的原则，灾难便会随之而来。<sup>63</sup>贝利萨留的意大利战争战略是由拜占庭帝国与波斯之间紧张的政治关系决定的。“一如既往，政治决定了战争的管理，并决定了战略的走向。” 64再次强调，“三十年战争的战略是由极其复杂且不断变化的政治关系决定的”，像古斯塔夫·阿道夫这样的将领，尽管其个人勇气和好战倾向毋庸置疑，却也被迫进行有限战争。65腓特烈大帝之所以成为伟大的将领，并非因为他赢得了多少战役，而是因为他的政治智慧以及他的战略与政治现实的契合。任何战略体系都不可能自给自足；一旦试图使其自给自足，使其脱离政治背景，战略家就会成为国家的威胁。
Yet the military critics completely missed the deeper significance of Delbrück's strategic theory. History showed that there could be no single theory of strategy, correct for every age. Like all phases of warfare, strategy was intimately connected with politics, with the life and the strength of the state. In the Peloponnesian War, the political weakness of Athens in comparison with that of the League that faced it determined the kind of strategy which Pericles followed. Had he attempted to follow the principles of Niederwerfungsstrategie, as Cleon did later, disaster would have followed automatically.63 The strategy of Belisarius' wars in Italy was determined by the uneasy political relations between the Byzantine Empire and the Persians. “Here as always it was politics that determined the administration of the war and that prescribed to strategy its course.”64 Again, “the strategy of the Thirty Years' War was determined by the extremely complicated, repeatedly changing political relationships,” and generals like Gustavus Adolphus, whose personal bravery and inclination toward battle were unquestioned, were nevertheless compelled to make limited war.65 It was not the battles won by Frederick the Great that made him a great general, but rather his political acumen and the conformity of his strategy with political reality. No strategic system can become self-sufficient; once an attempt is made to make it so, to divorce it from its political context, the strategist becomes a menace to the state.
从王朝战争到民族战争的转变，1864年、1866年和1870年的胜利，以及国家战争潜力的巨大增长，似乎都证明了歼灭战战略是现代战争的自然形式。即使到了1890年，德尔布吕克本人尽管坚持战略的相对性，似乎也仍然相信这一点。然而，在19世纪末，19世纪60年代的大规模军队正在演变为参加第一次世界大战的百万军队。这种转变难道不会使歼灭战战略的运用变得不可能，并预示着回归伯里克利和腓特烈二世的原则吗？只要总参谋部拒绝承认其他战略体系的存在，国家难道不会处于严重的危险之中吗？这些问题隐含在德尔布吕克的所有军事著作中，并在德国加入第一次世界大战后不断萦绕在他的心头。
The transition from dynastic to national war, the victories of 1864, 1866, and 1870, the immense increase in the war potential of the nation seemed to prove that Niederwerfungsstrategie was the natural form of war for the modern age. As late as 1890, Delbrück himself, despite his insistence on the relativity of strategy, seems to have believed that this was true.66 Yet in the last years of the nineteenth century, the mass army of the 1860s was being transformed to the Millionenheer which fought in the First World War. Might not that transformation make impossible the application of the strategy of annihilation and herald a return to the principles of Pericles and Frederick? Was not the state in grave danger as long as the general staff refused to admit the existence of alternate systems of strategy? These questions, implicit in all of Delbrück's military writings, were constantly on his lips as Germany entered the First World War.
三
III
由于德尔布吕克是德国首屈一指的军事专家，他在1914年至1918年战争期间的著述颇具价值。作为一名军事评论员，他的信息来源并不比其他报刊杂志的同行更优越。和他们一样，他也只能依赖总参谋部发布的公报、日报上的报道以及中立国的报告。如果说他对战争的描述展现出一般文职评论员所不具备的广阔视野和深刻理解，那是因为他掌握了现代战争的技术知识，并且从历史研究中获得了独特的视角。在他每月为《普鲁士年鉴》（Preussische Jahrbücher）撰写的评论文章中，我们可以找到对他在历史著作中阐述的原则，特别是他的战略理论以及他对战争与政治相互关系的强调的进一步阐释。<sup> 67</sup>
Since Delbrück was Germany's leading civilian expert on military affairs, his writings in the war years, 1914–1918, are of considerable interest. As a military commentator, his sources of information were in no way superior to those of other members of the newspaper and periodical press. Like them he was forced to rely on the communiqués issued by the general staff, the stories that appeared in the daily press, and reports from neutral countries. If his accounts of the war were distinguished by a breadth of vision and understanding not usually found in the lucubrations of civilian commentators, it was due to his technical knowledge of modern war and the sense of perspective he had gained from his study of history. In his monthly commentaries in the Preussische Jahrbücher one can find a further exposition of the principles delineated in his historical works and especially of his theory of strategy and his emphasis upon the interrelationship of war and politics.67
根据施利芬战略，德军于1914年席卷比利时，旨在迅速瓦解法国的抵抗力量，然后将全部兵力集中于俄国。这便是“下议院战略”的极致体现，德尔布吕克本人在战争爆发的第一个月就认为这一战略是正当的。与大多数同僚一样，他并不担心法国会进行有效的抵抗。法国政局的不稳定必然会对法国的军事机构造成不利影响。“一支在43年内更换了42位陆军部长的军队，不可能拥有一个高效运转的组织。”<sup> 68</sup>他也认为英国没有能力继续抵抗。他认为，英国过去的政治发展使其不可能组建一支规模大于象征性规模的军队。英国历来依靠规模较小的职业军队；实行全民征兵制在心理上和政治上都是行不通的。 “每个民族都是其历史、其过去的产物，无法脱离历史，正如一个人无法脱离自己的青春一样。” 69
In accordance with the Schlieffen strategy, the German army swept into Belgium in 1914 with the purpose of crushing French resistance in short order and then bringing the full weight of its power against Russia. This was Niederwerfungsstrategie in its ultimate form, and Delbrück himself, in the first month of the war, felt that it was justified. Like most of his fellows, he had little fear of effective French opposition. The instability of French politics could not but have a deleterious effect upon France's military institutions. “It is impossible that an army that has had forty-two war ministers in forty-three years will be capable of an effectively functioning organization.”68 Nor did he feel that England was capable of continued resistance. Its past political development, he believed, would make it impossible for it to raise more than a token force. England had always relied on small professional armies; the institution of universal conscription would be psychologically and politically impossible. “Every people is the child of its history, its past, and can no more break away from it than a man can separate himself from his youth.”69
然而，当德军第一次大规模攻势未能达成目标，漫长的堑壕战随即展开时，德尔布吕克意识到一场意义重大的战略变革即将到来。随着西线僵局的持续，尤其是在凡尔登攻势失败之后，他越来越确信最高统帅部的战略思维必须做出改变。至少在西线，防御战已成为主流，这一事实“意义尤为重大，因为在战前，德国所推崇的战略理论总是以极其偏袒的态度宣扬进攻的重要性。”<sup> 70 </sup> 现在，西线的形势显然已接近“防御战略”时代。 “尽管这场战争已经给我们带来了许多新事物，但我们仍然可以从中找到一些历史的相似之处：例如，腓特烈战略，其坚不可摧的阵地、日益强大的炮兵、野战工事、不常进行的战术决策以及由此导致的长期撤退，与今天的阵地战和消耗战有着明显的相似之处。” <sup> 71</sup>在西线，依靠决定性战役已不再可行。德国必须找到其他手段来向敌人施加其意志。
When the first great German drive fell short of its goal, however, and the long period of trench warfare set in, Delbrück sensed a strategical revolution of the first importance. As the stalemate in the West continued, and especially after the failure of the Verdun offensive, he became increasingly convinced that the strategical thinking of the High Command would have to be modified. In the West at least, defensive warfare was the order of the day, a fact “the more significant since, before the war, the preeminence of the offensive was always proclaimed and expounded with quite exceptional partiality in the theory of strategy fostered in Germany.”70 Now, it was apparent that conditions on the western front approximated those of the age of Ermattungsstrategie. “Although this war has already brought us much that is new, nevertheless it is possible to find in it certain historical analogies: for example, the Frederician strategy with its impregnable positions, its increasingly strengthened artillery, its field fortifications, its infrequent tactical decisions and its consequent long withdrawals presents unmistakable similarities with today's war of position and exhaustion (Stellungs—und Ermattungskrieg).”71 In the West, reliance upon the decisive battle was no longer possible. Germany would have to find other means of imposing its will upon the enemy.
到1916年12月，德尔布吕克指出，“无论我们的军事形势多么有利，战争的继续也难以使我们取得足以左右和平的进展。”<sup> 72</sup>德军取得彻底的、压倒性的胜利即使不是不可能，也几乎不可能。但这并不意味着德国无法“赢得战争”。其内陆位置不仅使其对手孤立无援，而且使其能够保持主动权。其实力如此强大，以至于不难让对手相信德国不可战胜。当西线的顽强防御正在消耗协约国军队的士气时，最高统帅部明智的做法是将最强大的兵力投入到协约国联盟中最薄弱的环节——俄国和意大利。对俄国发动集中进攻将彻底瓦解沙皇军队的士气，并很可能在圣彼得堡引发革命。奥德联军对意大利的成功进攻不仅会对英法两国产生巨大的士气影响，还会威胁到法国与北非的联系。73
By December 1916 Delbrück was pointing out that “however favorable our military position is, the continuation of the war will scarcely bring us so far that we can simply dictate the peace.”72 A complete and crushing victory of German arms was unlikely, if not impossible. That did not mean, however, that Germany could not “win the war.” Its inner position not only separated its opponents but enabled it to retain the initiative. Its strength was so formidable that it should not be difficult to convince its opponents that Germany could not be defeated. While a firm defensive in the West was sapping the will of Allied troops, the High Command would be well advised to throw its strongest forces against the weakest links in the Allied coalition—against Russia and Italy. A concentrated offensive against Russia would complete the demoralization of the armies of the czar and might very well precipitate a revolution in St. Petersburg. A successful Austro-German offensive against Italy would not only have a tremendous moral effect in England and France but would threaten France's communications with North Africa.73
因此，在德尔布吕克看来，德国的战略必须旨在摧毁敌对联盟，从而孤立英法两国。在这方面，同样重要的是，不能采取任何可能为西方列强带来新盟友的措施。德尔布吕克始终坚决反对潜艇战，他正确地担心潜艇战会将美国拖入战争。74 ”
In Delbrück's opinion, then, Germany's strategy must be directed toward the destruction of the enemy coalition and the consequent isolation of England and France. In this connection, it was equally important that no measures be adopted that might bring new allies to the Western powers. Delbrück was always firmly opposed to the submarine campaign, which he rightly feared would bring the United States into the war.74”
但归根结底，如果德国想要赢得战争，政府就必须对冲突中隐含的政治现实有清晰的认识。由于西线战事已演变为“埃尔马通斯克里格”（Ermattungskrieg ，意为“战争”），冲突的政治层面变得愈发重要。“政治是决定性和制约性因素；军事行动只是其手段之一。”<sup> 75</sup>因此，必须制定一项政治战略来削弱法国和英国人民的意志。
But in the last analysis, if the war was to be won by Germany, the government would have to show a clear comprehension of the political realities implicit in the conflict. Since the war in the West had become an Ermattungskrieg, the political aspect of the conflict had increased in importance. “Politics is the ruling and limiting factor; military operations is only one of its means.”75 A political strategy must be devised to weaken the will of the people of France and England.
在政治领域，德尔布吕克从战争伊始就感到德国存在一个非常现实的战略弱点。“由于我们在普鲁士的波兰和丹麦地区推行狭隘的德意志化政策，我们在世界上落得的名声不是保护小民族，而是压迫小民族的。”<sup> 76</sup>如果这种名声在战争过程中得到证实，将会鼓舞德国的敌人，并危及最终胜利的希望。德尔布吕克援引历史，认为拿破仑的例子应该对德国的政治领导人起到警示作用。这位皇帝最辉煌的胜利反而增强了对手的意志，并最终导致了他的失败。“愿上帝保佑德国不要重蹈拿破仑的覆辙……欧洲在这一点上团结一致：它绝不会屈服于任何一个国家强加于它的霸权。”<sup> 77</sup>
In the political field, Delbrück had felt from the beginning of the war that Germany suffered from a very real strategical weakness. “Because of our narrow policy of Germanization in the Polish and Danish districts of Prussia, we have given ourselves the reputation in the world of being not the protectors but the oppressors of small nationalities.”76 If this reputation were confirmed in the course of the war, it would give moral encouragement to Germany's enemies and would jeopardize the hope of ultimate victory. Turning to history, Delbrück argued that the example of Napoleon should serve as a warning to Germany's political leaders. The emperor's most overwhelming victories had served only to strengthen the will of his opponents and to pave the way for his ultimate defeat. “May God forbid that Germany enter upon the path of Napoleonic policy…. Europe stands united in this one conviction: it will never submit to a hegemony enforced upon it by a single state.”77
德尔布吕克认为入侵比利时是出于战略上的必要；78但尽管如此，这仍然是一个不幸的举动，因为它似乎证实了人们对德国意图征服和吞并小国的怀疑。从1914年9月到战争结束，德尔布吕克一直坚持要求德国政府在战争结束后明确声明无意吞并比利时。他认为，只要德国仍有可能继续控制佛兰德斯海岸，英国就绝不会媾和。削弱西方列强抵抗的第一步，就是明确声明德国在西方没有任何领土野心，其战争目标“绝不会以任何方式损害其他民族的自由和荣誉” 。79
Delbrück believed that the invasion of Belgium had been a strategical necessity;78 but it was nonetheless an unfortunate move, for it seemed to confirm the suspicion that Germany was bent upon the subjugation and annexation of small states. From September 1914 until the end of the war, Delbrück continued to insist that the German government must issue a categorical disclaimer of any intention of annexing Belgium at the conclusion of hostilities. England, he argued, would never make peace as long as there was danger of German retention of the Flanders coast. The first step in weakening the resistance of Western powers was to state clearly that Germany had no territorial desires in the West and that its war aims would “prejudice in no way the freedom and honor of other peoples.”79
或许，说服西方列强相信德国并非意图称霸世界的最佳途径，就是让他们明白德国并不反对通过谈判达成和平。自1914年9月协约国在马恩河取得反攻成功以来，德尔布吕克就一直支持这种和平。他坚信战争是由俄国的侵略造成的，并认为英法两国没有理由继续与这个“守护欧洲和亚洲免受莫斯科统治”的强权作战。<sup>80</sup>随着战争的持续，他更加坚信，真诚的谈判意愿将为德国赢得仅靠武力无法实现的胜利；在美国参战后，他公开预言，除非德国领导人动用这一武器，否则必败无疑。因此，他对1917年7月国会通过的和平决议<sup> 81</sup>感到振奋，因为他认为，该决议比任何可能在西线发动的新攻势更能削弱西方列强的抵抗。
Perhaps the best way to convince the Western powers that Germany was not seeking world domination was to make it apparent that Germany had no objection to a negotiated peace. Delbrück had favored such a peace ever since the successful Allied counteroffensive on the Marne in September 1914. He firmly believed that the war had been caused by Russian aggression and saw no reason why England and France should continue to fight the one power that was “guarding Europe and Asia from the domination of Moskowitertum.”80 As the war was prolonged, he was strengthened in his conviction that a sincere willingness to negotiate would win for Germany a victory that arms alone would be powerless to effect; and after the entrance of the United States into the war he openly predicted defeat unless Germany's leaders used that weapon. He was, therefore, enthusiastic about the passage by the Reichstag of the Peace Resolution of July 1917,81 for he felt that it would do more to weaken the resistance of the Western powers than any possible new offensive upon the western front.
德尔布吕克从未动摇过他对德国军队是世界上最强军队的信念，但他同时也意识到，即便是最强的军队也远远不够。1917年全年，他反复强调一个主题：“我们必须正视现实——在某种意义上，全世界都与我们为敌——而且我们必须正视这样一个事实：如果我们试图探究这一世界联盟的根本原因，我们将一次又一次地被对德国世界霸权的恐惧所绊倒……对德国专制统治的恐惧是我们必须面对的最沉重的现实之一，也是敌人力量中最强大的因素之一。”<sup> 82</sup>只有克服这种恐惧，战争才会继续下去。而克服这种恐惧的唯一途径，就是制定一项基于放弃在西方领土野心和愿意谈判的政治战略。
Delbrück never for a moment wavered in his belief that the German army was the best in the world, but he saw that that best was not good enough. Throughout 1917 he hammered away at one constant theme: “We must look the facts in the face—that we have in a sense the whole world leagued against us—and we must not conceal from ourselves the fact that, if we try to penetrate to the basic reasons for this world coalition, we will ever and again stumble over the motive of fear of German world hegemony…. Fear of German despotism is one of the weightiest facts with which we have to reckon, one of the strongest factors in the enemy's power.”82 Until that fear was overcome, the war would continue. It could be overcome only by a political strategy based upon a disclaimer of territorial ambitions in the West and a willingness to negotiate.
正如德尔布吕克认为，当前战争的形势在某些方面与十八世纪的战争有相似之处一样，他对战争政治层面的高度重视也完全符合腓特烈大帝奉行的“政治战略”（Ermattungsstrategie ）原则。1914年，德军投入战场时，孤注一掷地押注于决定性战役，结果却以失败告终。如今，德尔布吕克将军事行动置于次要地位。战役本身不再是目的，而是一种手段。如果德国的政治姿态最初未能说服西方列强接受和平，那么就可以发动新的军事攻势，以打破他们的犹豫。但只有将军事行动与政治纲领完美结合，才能最终赢得战争的胜利。
Just as the conditions of the present war were, to Delbrück, comparable in some ways to those of the eighteenth century, so was this heightened emphasis upon the political aspects of the war in full accordance with the principles of Ermattungsstrategie as practiced by Frederick the Great. When the German army had taken the field in 1914 it had staked all on the decisive battle and had failed. Delbrück would now relegate military operations to a subordinate position. The battle was no longer an end in itself but a means. If Germany's political professions failed at first to convince the Western powers that peace was desirable, a new military offensive could be undertaken and would serve to break down that hesitation. But only such a coordination of the military effort with the political program would bring the war to a successful issue.
德尔布吕克渴望找到一种能够有效削弱敌方抵抗的政治策略，但他的愿望最终落空了。早在1915年，德国公众舆论中相当一部分人就已将战争视为获取新领土的手段，不仅在东方，也在西方。当德尔布吕克呼吁发表撤出比利时的意愿声明时，他遭到了猛烈抨击，并被《德意志日报》指责为“向外国敌人卑躬屈膝”。<sup>83</sup>战争形势的变化并未削弱人们对战利品的渴望，而势力强大的“祖国党”（Vaterlandspartei） ——最重要的吞并主义团体——对国家政策施加了巨大的影响。德国政府不仅没有就比利时问题发表任何声明，而且从未就通过谈判达成和平的问题明确表态。1917年，当国会辩论和平决议时，兴登堡和鲁登道夫威胁说，如果国会通过该决议，他们将辞职。决议通过后，最高统帅部的影响力如此强大，以至于政府不敢将该决议作为其政策的基石。由于所谓的1917年7月危机，西方列强更加确信国会的表态虚伪，德国领导人仍然一心想要称霸世界。
In his desire for a political strategy that would be effective in weakening the resistance of the enemy, Delbrück was bitterly disappointed. It became apparent as early as 1915 that strong sections of German public opinion regarded the war as a means of acquiring new territory not only in the East but in the West. When Delbrück called for a declaration of willingness to evacuate Belgium, he was greeted with abuse and was accused by the Deutsche Tageszeitung of being “subservient to our enemies in foreign countries.”83 The changing fortunes of war did not diminish the desire for booty and the powerful Vaterlandspartei, the most important of the annexationist groups, exercised a strong influence on national policy. Not only did the German government not make any declaration concerning Belgium but it never made its position clear on the question of a negotiated peace. When the Peace Resolution was being debated in 1917, Hindenburg and Ludendorff threatened to resign if the Reichstag adopted the measure. After the passage of the resolution, the influence of the High Command was exerted so effectively that the government did not dare to make the resolution the keystone of its policy. As a result of the so-called crisis of July 1917, the Western powers were encouraged to believe that the Reichstag's professions were insincere and that Germany's leaders were still bent on world domination.
对德尔布吕克而言，七月危机有着更深远的意义。它暴露出政府内部政治领导力的匮乏，以及军方日益主导政策制定的趋势。德国的军方领导人向来不以政治手腕见长，但过去他们至少会听从国家元首的建议。格奈森瑙曾心甘情愿地将自己的观点置于哈登贝格之下；毛奇——尽管有时并不情愿——也屈从于俾斯麦的政治判断。如今，在德国最严重的危机时刻，军方完全掌控了政权，而他们之中竟无人真正理解当下的政治需要。尽管兴登堡和鲁登道夫才华横溢，但他们仍然只想着如何取得对西方列强的决定性军事胜利，如何通过一场“征服战争”（Niederwerfung）将西欧纳入麾下。德尔布吕克越来越感到绝望，他写道：“雅典在伯罗奔尼撒战争中走向灭亡，是因为伯里克利没有继承人。德国有足够多的像克里昂那样充满激情的人。任何相信德国人民的人都会相信，他们的子弟中不仅有伟大的战略家，而且还有一位才华横溢的政治家，时代需要会将外交政策的领导权交到他手中。”<sup> 84</sup>然而，这位才华横溢的政治家始终没有出现；最终，那些充满激情的克里昂们取得了胜利。
To Delbrück the crisis of July had a deeper significance. It showed within the government a dearth of political leadership and a growing tendency on the part of the military to dominate the formulation of policy. Germany's military leaders had never been known for their political acumen, but in the past they had followed the advice of the political head of the state. Gneisenau had willingly subordinated his views to those of Hardenberg; Moltke—although at times reluctantly—had bowed to Bismarck's political judgment. Now, in the time of Germany's greatest crisis, the military were taking over completely and there was among them no man with a proper appreciation of the political necessities of the day. For all their military gifts, Hindenburg and Ludendorff still thought solely in terms of a decisive military victory over the Western powers, a Niederwerfung that would deliver western Europe into their hands. It was with a growing sense of despair that Delbrück wrote: “Athens went to her doom in the Peloponnesian War because Pericles had no successor. We have fiery Cleons enough in Germany. Whoever believes in the German people will be confident that it has not only great strategists among its sons but also that gifted statesman in whose hands the necessity of the time will place the reins for the direction of foreign policy.”84 But that gifted statesman never appeared; and the fiery Cleons prevailed.
因此，德尔布吕克怀着忐忑不安的心情，注视着1918年德军攻势的展开。“显而易见，”他写道，“自战争伊始，我在此阐述的原则绝无改变，而关于我们西方战争目标的分歧依然存在。”<sup> 85</sup>他坚持认为，战略并非抽象的概念，它不能脱离政治考量。“这场伟大的战略攻势本应伴随着一场类似的政治攻势，并加以强化，这场政治攻势本应像兴登堡和身着野战灰制服的士兵在前线那样，在敌人的后方发挥作用。” 如果德国政府在攻势开始前十四天宣布，他们坚定地希望通过谈判达成和平，并在和平之后撤出比利时，结果又会如何呢？劳合·乔治和克列孟梭或许会将这些主张视为德国软弱的迹象。但现在，随着攻势的推进，“劳合·乔治和克列孟梭还会继续掌舵吗？我非常怀疑。我们现在甚至可能正坐在会议桌旁。” 86
It was, consequently, with little confidence that Delbrück watched the opening of the German offensive of 1918. “It is obvious,” he wrote, “that no change can be made in the principles I have expounded here since the beginning of the war, and the dissension with regard to our western war aims remains.”85 Strategy, he insisted, is not something in the abstract; it cannot be divorced from political considerations. “The great strategical offensive should have been accompanied and reinforced by a similar political offensive, which would have worked upon the home front of our enemies in the same way as Hindenburg and the men in field gray worked upon the front lines.” If only the German government had announced, fourteen days before the opening of the offensive, that they firmly desired a negotiated peace and that, after such peace, Belgium would be evacuated, what would the result have been? Lloyd George and Clemenceau might have regarded these claims as signs of German weakness. But now, as the offensive rolled forward, “would Lloyd George and Clemenceau still be at the helm? I doubt it very much. We might even now be sitting at the conference table.”86
由于战争的军事和政治层面未能协调一致，德尔布吕克认为，这场攻势至多只能取得一些战术上的胜利，而不会产生任何重大的战略意义。但他也没有料到，这竟是战略家们孤注一掷的最后豪赌，德军的突然溃败和彻底崩溃令他大为震惊。在1918年11月出版的《普鲁士年鉴》上，他向读者发表了一篇耐人寻味且颇具启发性的道歉。“我犯了多么大的错误啊！”他写道，“尽管四周前形势严峻，但我仍然抱有希望，认为即使前线摇摇欲坠，也能守住阵地，迫使敌人停战，从而保卫我们的边界。”他曾说过一句话，这句话体现了他作为军事评论员对德国人民的责任感：“我承认，我常常言辞过于自信，而忽略了内心的真实感受。不止一次，我被陆军和海军发布的公告和报告中那种自信的语气所蒙蔽。” 但他表示，尽管存在这些判断失误，他仍然可以为自己始终坚持德国人民有权听到真相而感到自豪，即使真相并不美好；而且，他不断倡导政治温和，努力为他们指明通往胜利的道路。87
Because of the failure to coordinate the military and political aspects of the war, Delbrück felt that the offensive, at most, would lead to mere tactical successes and would have no great strategical importance. But even he did not suspect that this was the last gamble of the strategists of annihilation, and the suddenness and completeness of the German collapse surprised him completely. In the November 1918 issue of the Preussische Jahrbücher he made a curious and revealing apology to his readers. “How greatly I have erred,” he wrote. “However bad things looked four weeks ago, I still would not give up the hope that the front, however wavering, would hold and would force the enemy to an armistice that would protect our boundaries.” In a sentence that illustrates the responsibility that he felt as a military commentator to the German people, he added, “I admit that I often expressed myself more confidently than I felt at heart. On more than one occasion, I allowed myself to be deceived by the confident tone of the announcements and reports of the army and the navy.” But despite these mistakes in judgment, he could, he said, be proud of the fact that he had always insisted that the German people had a right to hear the truth even when it was bad and, in his constant preaching of political moderation, he had tried to show them the road to victory.87
正是本着这种精神，德尔布吕克对战争最后阶段的军事行动进行了最全面的回顾和最深刻的批判。这体现在他于1922年向战后由帝国议会设立的调查1918年德国崩溃原因的委员会第四小组委员会提交的两份报告中。在小组委员会的证词中，德尔布吕克重申了他在《普鲁士年鉴》上发表的论点，但由于审查限制的解除，他得以对1918年攻势的军事方面进行比战争期间更为详细的批判。88
It was in this spirit also that Delbrück made his most complete review and most searching criticism of the military operations of the last phase of the war. This was in the two reports which he made in 1922 before the Fourth Subcommittee of the commission set up by the Reichstag after the war to investigate the causes of the German collapse in 1918. In his testimony before the subcommittee, Delbrück repeated the arguments that he had made in the pages of the Preussische Jahrbücher, but the removal of censorship restrictions enabled him to give a much more detailed criticism of the military aspect of the 1918 offensive than had been possible during the war.88
德尔布吕克的主要批评对象是鲁登道夫，正是他策划并指挥了1918年的攻势。德尔布吕克认为，这位将军只有在一点上展现出了军事才能。他“以极大的精力和谨慎，巧妙地准备了这次进攻，包括部队的先前训练和突袭敌人的时机选择。”<sup> 89</sup>但这种前期准备的优势被几个根本性的弱点和战略思维上的重大失误所抵消。首先，在进攻前夕，德军根本没有能力对敌人造成致命一击。其兵力优势微弱，预备队规模更是远逊于敌军。其装备在许多方面也同样落后，而且后勤补给系统存在缺陷，摩托化部队的燃料储备不足，这些都极大地限制了德军的作战能力。这些劣势在进攻开始前就已经显现，但却被最高统帅部所忽视。<sup> 90</sup>
The main weight of Delbrück's criticism was directed against Ludendorff, who conceived and directed the 1918 offensive. In only one respect, he felt, had the general shown even military proficiency. He had “prepared the attack, as regards both the previous training of the troops and the moment for taking the enemy by surprise, in a masterly manner with the greatest energy and circumspection.”89 But the advantages of this preliminary preparation were outweighed by several fundamental weaknesses and by gross mistakes in strategical thinking. In the first place, the German army on the eve of the offensive was in no position to strike a knockout blow against the enemy. Its numerical superiority was slight and, in reserves, it was vastly inferior to the enemy. Its equipment was in many respects equally inferior, and it was greatly handicapped by a faulty supply system and by insufficient stocks of fuel for its motorized units. These disadvantages were apparent before the opening of the offensive but were disregarded by the High Command.90
然而，鲁登道夫对这些弱点有着足够的认识，他承认在最有可能取得最大战略胜利的地点打击敌人是不可能的。用他自己的话说，“战术比纯粹的战略更重要”。这实际上意味着，他选择在最容易突破的地点发起进攻，而不是在最能实现既定进攻目标的地点。这场战役的战略目标是歼灭敌人。“为了实现战略目标——将英军与法军分离，并最终歼灭英军——最佳的进攻路线应该是沿着索姆河推进。然而，鲁登道夫却将进攻战线向南延伸了大约四英里，因为他认为敌人在那里的实力特别薄弱。”<sup> 91</sup>胡蒂埃指挥的防御部队在此处突破了防线，但它的成功反而阻碍了进攻的展开，因为它的推进速度超过了贝洛指挥的、正在阿拉斯作战的真正进攻部队。当贝洛的部队受阻后，“我们迫于某种压力不得不沿着[胡蒂埃]的成功路线前进……因此，进攻的思路发生了改变，分散兵力的危险也随之而来。” 92
Ludendorff was sufficiently aware of these weaknesses, however, to admit the impossibility of striking the enemy at that point where the greatest strategical success could have been won. In his own words, “tactics were to be valued more than pure strategy.” That meant, in effect, that he attacked at those points where it was easiest to break through and not at those points where the announced aim of the offensive could best be served. The strategical goal of the campaign was the annihilation of the enemy. “In order to attain the strategical goal—the separation of the English army from the French and the consequent rolling-up of the former—the attack would have best been arranged so that it followed the course of the Somme. Ludendorff, however, had stretched the offensive front some four miles further to the south because the enemy seemed especially weak there.”91 The defensive wing of the army under Hutier broke through at this point, but its very success handicapped the development of the offensive, for its advance outpaced the real offensive wing under Below which was operating against Arras. When Below's forces were checked “we were forced with a certain amount of compulsion to follow the line of [Hutier's] success…thereby the idea of the offensive was altered and the danger of dispersing our forces evoked.”92
简而言之，鲁登道夫采取了阻力最小的战术路线，开始了灾难性的即兴发挥政策，违背了他声称遵循的“低阶战略”的第一原则。“一种不以彻底消灭敌人为目标，而满足于零星打击的战略，可以在这个地方，也可以在那个地方进行打击。但一种旨在取得决定性胜利的战略，必须在首次成功打击的地方进行。”鲁登道夫和兴登堡非但没有遵守这一原则，反而奉行这样的原则：当一个战区出现困难时，可以在另一个战区发起新的打击。93结果，大规模进攻演变成一系列各自为战、缺乏协调且毫无成效的突袭。
In short, by following the tactical line of least resistance Ludendorff began a disastrous policy of improvisation, violating the first principle of that Niederwerfungsstrategie that he professed to be following. “A strategy that is not predicated upon an absolute decision, upon the annihilation of the enemy, but is satisfied with single blows, may execute these now in this place, now in that. But a strategy which intends to force the decision, must do it where the first successful blow was struck.” Far from obeying this precept, Ludendorff and Hindenburg operated on the principle that, when difficulties developed in one sector, new blows could be struck in another.93 As a result, the grand offensive degenerated into a series of separate thrusts, uncoordinated and unproductive.
根本性的错误在于最高统帅部未能清楚地认识到德军在1918年能够取得的成就，也未能根据其潜力调整战略。德尔布吕克在此重申了他作为历史学家和评论家所有著作的核心主题。双方兵力的相对优势如此悬殊，最高统帅部本应意识到彻底歼灭敌人已不再可能。因此，1918年攻势的目标应该是使敌人疲惫不堪，从而愿意进行和平谈判。而这本身只有在德国政府明确表达了和平意愿的情况下才有可能实现。一旦德国政府明确表态，德军在发起攻势时便能获得巨大的战略优势。此时，德军的攻势便可根据自身兵力进行调整。它可以安全地在战术优势点——也就是最容易取得胜利的地方——发起进攻，因为即使是小规模的胜利，也能在敌军首都产生倍增的士气鼓舞。94最高统帅部在1918年失败并输掉了战争，是因为它忽视了历史上最重要的教训——政治与战争的相互关系。“再次回到克劳塞维茨的这句基本论断，任何战略构想都不能脱离政治目标而得到完整考虑。” 95
The cardinal fault was the failure of the High Command to see clearly what could be accomplished by the Germany army in 1918 and the failure to adapt its strategy to its potentialities. Here Delbrück returned to the major theme of all his work as historian and publicist. The relative strength of the opposing forces was such that the High Command should have realized that annihilation of the enemy was no longer possible. The aim of the 1918 offensive, therefore, should have been to make the enemy so tired that he would be willing to negotiate a peace. This in itself would have been possible only if the German government had expressed its own willingness to make such a peace. But once this declaration had been clearly made, the German army in opening its offensive would have won a great strategical advantage. Its offensive could now be geared to the strength at its disposal. It could safely attack at the points of tactical advantage—that is, where success was easiest—since even minor victories would now have a redoubled moral effect in the enemy capitals.94 The High Command had failed in 1918 and had lost the war because it had disregarded the most important lesson of history, the interrelationship of politics and war. “To come back once more to that fundamental sentence of Clausewitz, no strategical idea can be considered completely without considering the political goal.”95
第四
IV
军事史学家通常被视为一种异类，既受到专业同行的怀疑，也受到他们试图描绘其行为的军人的怀疑。军方的怀疑不难理解，很大程度上源于专业人士对业余人士的天然蔑视。但学院派对身边军事史学家的不信任则根源更深。尤其在民主国家，这种不信任源于一种信念，即战争是历史进程中的一种异常现象，因此，研究战争既无益也不得体。值得注意的是，二十世纪初军事史学界的泰斗查尔斯·奥曼爵士在其著作《论历史的写作》中，将论述其自身领域的章节命名为“为军事史辩护”。查尔斯爵士指出，涉足军事领域的平民历史学家是一种特殊现象，他解释道：“无论是中世纪的修道院编年史家还是现代的自由派历史学家，对战争的理解往往仅限于战争会带来各种恐怖，并造成令人痛惜的生命损失。这两个阶层都试图通过贬低战争在历史上的重要性和意义来掩盖他们个人对军事事务的无知或厌恶。” 96
The military historian has generally been a kind of misfit, regarded with suspicion both by his professional colleagues and by the military men whose activities he seeks to portray. The suspicion of the military is not difficult to explain. It springs in large part from the natural scorn of the professional for the amateur. But the distrust with which academicians have looked on the military historians in their midst has deeper roots. In democratic countries especially, it arises from the belief that war is an aberration in the historical process and that, consequently, the study of war is neither fruitful nor seemly. It is significant that in his general work On the Writing of History, the dean of military historians in the early twentieth century, Sir Charles Oman, should entitle the chapter dealing with his own field “A Plea for Military History.” Sir Charles remarks that the civilian historian dabbling in military affairs has been an exceptional phenomenon, and he explains this by writing: “Both the medieval monastic chroniclers and the modern liberal historiographers had often no closer notion of the meaning of war than that it involves various horrors and is attended by a lamentable loss of life. Both classes strove to disguise their personal ignorance or dislike of military matters by deprecating their importance and significance in history.”96
奥曼所愤慨的那种偏见，汉斯·德尔布吕克一生都深有体会。年轻时，他投身军事史研究，却发现同行们认为他所从事的领域不值得他耗费精力。兰克本人在德尔布吕克获得教授资格后得知他打算撰写一部战争艺术史时，也表达了对这一计划的反对。而当德尔布吕克将这部著作的第一卷呈献给西奥多·蒙森时，蒙森却颇为不悦地说道：“他恐怕没时间读这本书。” 97 1887年，德尔布吕克呼吁学者们“不仅要将战争史视为一种偶然的兴趣，更要将其作为一项专业研究”，但鲜有学院派历史学家响应。98晚年，他仍在《世界史》中抱怨那些坚持认为“战役和战争可以被视为世界历史中无关紧要的副产品”的人。99
The prejudice that Oman resented was felt equally keenly, throughout his life, by Hans Delbrück. When, as a relatively young man, he turned his talents to the study of military history, he found that the members of his discipline regarded his specialty as not worth the energy he expended upon it. Ranke himself, when he learned after Delbrück's Habilitation that the young man intended to write a history of the art of war, expressed his disapproval of the project, and Theodor Mommsen, when Delbrück presented him with the first volume of the work, said rather ungraciously that “his time would hardly permit him to read this book.”97 Few academic historians heeded Delbrück's plea in 1887 that there was a crying need for scholars “to turn not only an incidental but a professional interest to the history of war,”98 and in his last years he was still complaining, as he did in the pages of his Weltgeschichte, about those who persisted in believing that “battles and wars can be regarded as unimportant by-products of world history.”99
或许随着时间的流逝，人们对德尔布吕克《科学批判》的发现兴趣有所减弱，甚至他曾经热衷的战略争论也与我们当下的关注点有所疏远。但毫无疑问，《战争艺术史》仍将是运用现代科学研究古代遗产的杰出典范之一，而且无论细节如何修改，其主体内容都无可争议。此外，在战争成为每个人关注焦点的时代，德尔布吕克作为历史学家和政治家的著作，其核心主题既是提醒，也是警示。政治与战争的协调在今天与伯里克利时代同样重要，任何自成一体或忽视战争政治层面的战略思考都只会导致灾难。
It may be that the passage of time has diminished interest in the discoveries of Delbrück's Sachkritik and that even the strategical controversies that he delighted in have become somewhat remote from our present concerns. But there is no doubt that the History of the Art of War will remain one of the finest examples of the application of modern science to the heritage of the past, and, however modified in detail, the bulk of the work stands unchallenged. Moreover, in an age in which war has become the concern of every man, the major theme of Delbrück's work as historian and publicist is at once a reminder and a warning. The coordination of politics and war is as important today as it was in the age of Pericles, and strategical thinking that becomes self-sufficient or neglects the political aspect of war can lead only to disaster.
1参见 Hans Delbrück，“Etwas Kriegsgeschichtliches”， Preussische Jahrbücher 60 (1887), 607。
1 See Hans Delbrück, “Etwas Kriegsgeschichtliches,” Preussische Jahrbücher 60 (1887), 607.
2请参阅上文关于克劳塞维茨和毛奇的文章。
2 See the essays on Clausewitz and Moltke, above.
3德尔布吕克本人在《Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte》（柏林，1900-20），1:vii f. 和《Krieg und Politik》（柏林，1918-19），3:225ff中撰写了简短的自传草图另请参阅 J. Ziekursch 的Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch (1929)。理查德·H·鲍尔（Richard H. Bauer）在《现代欧洲一些历史学家》（Some Historians of Modern Europe）中关于德尔布吕克的文章对德尔布吕克的一生进行了精彩的描述。伯纳多特·施密特（芝加哥，1942 年），100-27。
3 Delbrück himself has written brief autobiographical sketches in Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte (Berlin, 1900–20), 1:vii f., and Krieg und Politik (Berlin, 1918–19), 3:225ff. See also J. Ziekursch in Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch (1929). An excellent account of Delbrück's life is given in Richard H. Bauer's article on Delbrück in Some Historians of Modern Europe, ed. Bernadotte Schmitt (Chicago, 1942), 100–27.
4 Hans Delbrück，《Lamberts von Hersfeld Über die Glaubwürdigkeit》（波恩，1873 年）。参见理查德·H·鲍尔（Richard H. Bauer）《现代欧洲的一些历史学家》 ，编辑。施密特，101f。
4 Hans Delbrück, Über die Glaubwürdigkeit Lamberts von Hersfeld (Bonn, 1873). See Richard H. Bauer in Some Historians of Modern Europe, ed. Schmitt, 101f.
5关于 Rüstow，参见Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie，30:34ff。 Marcel Herwegh、 Guillaume Rüstow（巴黎，1935 年）；以及 Georges Rapp、Viktor Hofer 和 Rudolf Jaun，《瑞士将军表》，3 卷。 （巴塞尔，1983），特别是。卷。 3.
5 On Rüstow, see Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 30:34ff.; Marcel Herwegh, Guillaume Rüstow (Paris, 1935); and Georges Rapp, Viktor Hofer, and Rudolf Jaun, Der schweizerische Generalstab, 3 vols. (Basel, 1983), esp. vol. 3.
6 Hans Delbrück，《Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neidhardt von Gneisenau》（柏林，1882 年）。
6 Hans Delbrück, Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neidhardt von Gneisenau (Berlin, 1882.).
7. 《战争艺术史及其在政治史框架下的意义》（柏林，1900年）。该书共七卷，但只有前四卷可视为德尔布吕克本人所著。第五卷（1928年）和第六卷（1932年）由埃米尔·丹尼尔斯撰写；第七卷（1936年）由丹尼尔斯和奥托·海因茨合著。本文将探讨前四卷。所有引文均出自第一版。前两卷的第二版于1908年出版，第一卷的第三版于1920年出版。这些后续版本中的任何改动均未对原著造成实质性影响。前四卷于1962-1964年在柏林再版。
7 Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte (Berlin, 1900). The work is in seven volumes but only the first four can be considered Delbrück's own. The fifth volume (1928) and the sixth (1932) were written by Emil Daniels; a seventh volume (1936) was written by Daniels and Otto Haintz. The first four volumes will be treated here. All citations will be made from the first edition. A second edition of the first two volumes appeared in 1908 and a third edition of the first volume in 1920. None of the changes in these later editions made essential differences in the original work. The first four volumes were also repeated in 1962–64 (Berlin).
8特别参见 Annelise Thimme, Hans Delbrück als Kritiker der Wilhelminischen Epoche (杜塞尔多夫, 1955)。
8 See especially Annelise Thimme, Hans Delbrück als Kritiker der Wilhelminischen Epoche (Düsseldorf, 1955).
9安德烈亚斯·希尔格鲁伯 (Andreas Hillgruber)，《汉斯·德尔布吕克》，《德国历史学家》，主编。 Hans-Ulnch Wehler（哥廷根，1972 年），4:42。
9 Andreas Hillgruber, “Hans Delbrück,” in Deutsche Historiker, ed. Hans-Ulnch Wehler (Göttingen, 1972), 4:42.
10 Wilhelm Groener，“Delbrück und die Kriegswissenschaften”，载于Am Webstuhl der Zeit，eine Erinnerungsgabe Hans Delbrück dem Achtzigjahrigen…dargebracht，编辑。埃米尔·丹尼尔斯和保罗·吕尔曼（柏林，1928 年），35。
10 Wilhelm Groener, “Delbrück und die Kriegswissenschaften,” in Am Webstuhl der Zeit, eine Erinnerungsgabe Hans Delbrück dem Achtzigjahrigen…dargebracht, ed. Emil Daniels and Paul Rühlmann (Berlin, 1928), 35.
11 Franz Mehring，“Eine Geschichte der Kriegskunst”， Die Neue Zeit（Ergänzungsheft，第 4 期，1908 年 10 月），2，以及Gesammelte Schriften，卷。 1（柏林，1959 年）。关于苏联版的《 Geschichte der Kriegskunst》，请参阅 Otto Haintz，1962 年版 Delbrück 著作前四卷的简介，第 14 页。 6.
11 Franz Mehring, “Eine Geschichte der Kriegskunst,” Die Neue Zeit (Ergänzungsheft, no. 4, October 1908), 2, and Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1959). On the Soviet edition of the Geschichte der Kriegskunst, see Otto Haintz, introduction to the first four volumes of the 1962 edition of the Delbrück work, p. 6.
12 《战争史》，1:xi。
12 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 1:xi.
13同上，4：序言。
13 Ibid., 4:preface.
14同上，1:377。
14 Ibid., 1:377.
15德尔布吕克在他对波斯战争的第一篇报道中使用了最后一种方法，《Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege: Zwei kombmterte kriegsgescbichtliche Studien》（柏林，1887 年）。
15 Delbrück used this last method in his first account of the Persian Wars, Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege: Zwei kombmterte kriegsgescbichtliche Studien (Berlin, 1887).
16 战争史，1 简介。
16 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 1 introduction.
17希罗多德，7:184–87。
17 Herodotus, 7:184–87.
18 《战争史》，1:10。
18 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 1:10.
19汉斯·德尔布吕克，《历史上的数字：在伦敦大学发表的两场讲座》（伦敦，1913 年），第 24 页。
19 Hans Delbrück, Numbers in History: Two Lectures Delivered before the Unwersity of London (London, 1913), 24.
20希罗多德，6:109–16。
20 Herodotus, 6:109–16.
21《战争史》，1:39。
21 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 1:39.
22同上，1:427。
22 Ibid., 1:427.
23德尔布吕克，《历史上的数字》，18。
23 Delbrück, Numbers in History, 18.
24格罗纳将军明确承认德尔布吕克的贡献。参见“Delbrück und die Kriegswissenschaften”，38。
24 General Groener made explicit acknowledgment of Delbrück's contribution. See “Delbrück und die Kriegswissenschaften,” 38.
25《战争史》，1:7。
25 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 1:7.
26 Groener, “Delbrück und die Kriegswissenschaften,” 38。倾斜的战斗顺序首先由底比斯的伊巴密浓达使用，与 1757 年腓特烈大帝在洛滕使用的顺序惊人地相似。关于伊巴密浓达，请参阅Geschichte der Kriegskunst , 1:130-35。
26 Groener, “Delbrück und die Kriegswissenschaften,” 38. The oblique battle order, first used by the Theban Epaminondas, bears a striking resemblance to that used by Frederick the Great at Leuthen in 1757. On Epaminondas, see Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 1:130–35.
27 《战争史》，1：2.81–302。 Graf Schlieffen， Cannae（柏林，1925 年），3。另请参阅上面关于毛奇的文章。
27 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 1:2.81–302. Graf Schlieffen, Cannae (Berlin, 1925), 3. See also the essays on Moltke, above.
28 战争艺术史，2:80。德尔布吕克不仅在马拉松战役中使用了这种方法，而且在他对条顿堡森林战役的重建中也使用了这种方法。
28 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 2:80. Delbrück used the method not only for the battle of Marathon but also in his reconstruction of the battle of the Teutoburger Wald.
29如果假设希腊人只有在进入箭矢射程后才会发起冲锋，那么德尔布吕克的论点就显得薄弱了。但希罗多德明确指出（6:115），他们“奔向敌人，距离敌人至少有一英里”。乌尔里希·冯·维拉莫维茨为希罗多德辩护，认为女神阿尔忒弥斯赋予了希腊人足够的力量发起冲锋，并批评了那种低估神灵启示和其他形式灵感重要性的学术观点。J·克罗迈耶也支持他的观点，德尔布吕克曾与克罗迈耶在《历史杂志》（95:1ff., 514f.）和《普鲁士年鉴》 （121:158f.）中就此展开辩论。
29 Delbrück's argument becomes weaker if one assumes that the Greeks would begin their charge only when they came within arrow range, but Herodotus says explicitly (6:115) that they “advanced at a run towards the enemy, not less than a mile away.” Ulrich von Wilamowitz defended Herodotus by arguing that the goddess Artemis gave the Greeks sufficient strength to make the charge and criticized the kind of scholarship that under-estimated the importance of divine, and other forms of, inspiration. He was supported by J. Kromayer, with whom Delbrück argued the point in the Historische Zeitschrift (95:1ff., 514f.) and the Preussische Jahrbücher (121:158f.).
30 《战争史》，1：41-59。
30 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 1:41–59.
31同上，1:417。
31 Ibid., 1:417.
32 FJ Schmidt、Konrad molinski 和 Siegfried Mette Hans Delbrück：Der Historiker und Politiker（柏林，1928 年），96。Eugen von Frauenholz， Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens（慕尼黑，1940 年），2：vii。
32 F. J. Schmidt, Konrad molinski, and Siegfried Mette Hans Delbrück: Der Historiker und Politiker (Berlin, 1928), 96. Eugen von Frauenholz, Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens (Munich, 1940), 2:vii.
33 《战争史》，2:43。
33 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 2:43.
34同上，1:330ff。
34 Ibid., 1:330ff.
35同上，1:380。
35 Ibid., 1:380.
36同上，1:381。另见 1:253。“纪律的意义和力量最早由罗马人充分认识和实现。”
36 Ibid., 1:381. See also 1:253. “The meaning and power of discipline was first fully recognized and realized by the Romans.”
37同上，2:43。
37 Ibid., 2:43.
38同上，2:45及以下。
38 Ibid., 2:45ff.
39同上，2:52f。
39 Ibid., 2:52f.
40同上，2:205ff。这一章的标题是“Niedergang und Auflosung des romischen Kriegswesens”，是第二卷的关键章节。
40 Ibid., 2:205ff. This chapter, entitled “Niedergang und Auflosung des romischen Kriegswesens,” is the key chapter of the second volume.
41同上，2:424ff。
41 Ibid., 2:424ff.
42同上，2:433。
42 Ibid., 2:433.
43 TF Tout 见《英国历史评论》 22 (1907)，344–48。
43 T. F. Tout in English Historical Review 22 (1907), 344–48.
44 《战争史》，3:483。对于德尔布吕克关于中世纪战争的讨论的尖锐批评，请参阅注释 43 中引用的图特。
44 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 3:483. For a penetrating criticism of Delbrücks discussion of medieval warfare, see Tout, cited in note 43.
45 《战争史》，3:661。参见上面关于马基雅维利的文章。
45 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 3:661. See essay on Machiavelli, above.
46同上，3:609ff。
46 Ibid., 3:609ff.
47同上，3:594。
47 Ibid., 3:594.
48同上，4:55。
48 Ibid., 4:55.
49参见上文关于腓特烈大帝、吉贝尔和比洛的文章。
49 See the essay on Frederick the Great, Guibert, and Bülow, above.
50 《战争史》，2:424。
50 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 2:424.
51同上，1:305。
51 Ibid., 1:305.
52同上，1:333。
52 Ibid., 1:333.
53同上，2:209。
53 Ibid., 2:209.
54同上，1:25–38，424ff。
54 Ibid., 1:25–38, 424ff.
55同上，3:614f。
55 Ibid., 3:614f.
56同上，4:474。
56 Ibid., 4:474.
57同上，1:100ff.；4:333–63, 426–44。
57 Ibid., 1:100ff.; 4:333–63, 426–44.
58参见上文关于克劳塞维茨的文章。
58 See the essay on Clausewitz, above.
59 Hans Delbrück，《Die Strategie des Pertkles erlautert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen》（柏林，1890 年），27-28。这部著作是德尔布吕克对这两种战略形式最系统的阐述。
59 Hans Delbrück, Die Strategie des Pertkles erlautert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin, 1890), 27–28. This work is Delbrück's most systematic exposition of the two forms of strategy.
60 普鲁士年鉴，115 (1904)，348f。
60 Preussische Jahrbücher, 115 (1904), 348f.
61在《佩里克勒斯战略》中，德尔布吕克写了一篇讽刺文章，指出如果用这些标准来评判腓特烈的战役，他不过是个三流将领。为此，德尔布吕克在普鲁士议会上被指控诋毁民族英雄。
61 In the Strategie des Perikles, Delbrück wrote a parody that showed that the application of such criteria to Frederick's campaigns would prove him a third-rate general. For this Delbrück was accused in the Prussian Landtag of maligning a national hero.
62对这场争论的完整描述和参考书目出现在Geschichte der Kriegskunst , 4:439-44 中。另请参阅 Friedrich von Bernhardi, Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben (Berlin, 1917), 126, 133, 143。对德尔布吕克战略理论最彻底和明智的批评是 Otto Hintze，“Delbrück、Clausewitz und die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen”， Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen 《普鲁士历史》 33 (1920), 131–77。欣策反对德尔布吕克对腓特烈时代的战略与拿破仑时代的战略进行的尖锐区分，并坚持认为腓特烈既是一位“下化”战略家，又是一位“复兴”战略家。他还质疑德尔布吕克对克劳塞维茨意图的解释，正如 H. Rosinski 在Historische Zeitschrift 151 (1938) 中所做的那样。参见 Delbrück 对 Hintze, Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte 33 (1920), 412–17 的回答。
62 A full account of the controversy, with bibliography, appears in Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 4:439–44. See also Friedrich von Bernhardi, Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben (Berlin, 1917), 126, 133, 143. The most thorough and judicious criticism of Delbrück's strategical theory is that of Otto Hintze, “Delbrück, Clausewitz und die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen,” Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte 33 (1920), 131–77. Hintze objects to the sharp distinction that Delbrück draws between the strategy of Frederick's age and that of Napoleon and insists that Frederick was at once a Nieder-werfung and an Ermattung-strategist. He also questions Delbrück's interpretation of Clausewitz's intentions, as does H. Rosinski in Historische Zeitschrift 151 (1938). See Delbrück's answer to Hintze, Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte 33 (1920), 412–17.
63 《战争史》，1:101f。
63 Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 1:101f.
64同上，2:394。
64 Ibid., 2:394.
65同上，4:341。
65 Ibid., 4:341.
66 《伯里克利战略》，第 1 章。 1.
66 Strategie des Perikles, ch. 1.
67德尔布吕克在《普鲁士年鉴》中撰写的文章被收录在名为《Krieg und Politik》（柏林，1918-19 年）的三卷本著作中在最初出现的文章中，德尔布吕克偶尔添加了解释性注释和非常有趣的摘要陈述。关于德尔布吕克战争著作的最佳文章是恩斯特·布赫芬克 (Ernst Buchfinck) 将军撰写的《德尔布吕克战争、战争和世界战争》，载于《时代网》，编辑。施密特，41-49。另见 Martin Hobohm，“Delbrück、Clausewitz und die Kritik des Weltkrieges”，《Preussische Jahrbücher》，181 (1920)，203-32。
67 The articles that Delbrück wrote in the Preussische Jahrbücher are collected in the three-volume work called Krieg und Politik (Berlin, 1918–19). To the articles as they originally appeared Delbrück has added occasional explanatory notes and a highly interesting summary statement. The best article on Delbrück's war writings is that by General Ernst Buchfinck, “Delbrücks Lehre, das Heer und der Weltkrieg,” in Am Webstuhl der Zeit, ed. Schmitt, 41–49. See also Martin Hobohm, “Delbrück, Clausewitz und die Kritik des Weltkrieges,” Preussische Jahrbücher, 181 (1920), 203–32.
68 战争与政治，1:35。
68 Krieg und Politik, 1:35.
69德尔布吕克关于英国作为军事强国的弱点的观点在 1916 年 4 月的一篇文章中得到了最清晰的阐述。参见《战争与政治》，第 1 卷，第 243 页及后续页。
69 Delbrück's views on England's weakness as a military power were most clearly developed in an article in April 1916. See Krieg und Politik, 1:243 ff.
70同上，2:242。
70 Ibid., 2:242.
71同上，2:164。另见 2:17。
71 Ibid., 2:164. See also 2:17.
72同上，2:97。
72 Ibid., 2:97.
73布赫芬克，“Delbrücks Lehre，das Heer und der Weltkrieg”，48。
73 Buchfinck, “Delbrücks Lehre, das Heer und der Weltkrieg,” 48.
74 《战争与政治》，1:90, 227ff., 261。
74 Krieg und Politik, 1:90, 227ff., 261.
75同上，2:95。
75 Ibid., 2:95.
76同上，1:3f。
76 Ibid., 1:3f.
77参见 ibid.，1:59，以及 ibid.，2:122ff 中题为“Das Beispiel Napoleons”的文章。
77 See ibid., 1:59, and the article entitled “Das Beispiel Napoleons,” in ibid., 2:122ff.
78 战争与政治，1:33。
78 Krieg und Politik, 1:33.
79同上，2:97
79 Ibid., 2:97
80同上，1:18。
80 Ibid., 1:18.
81帝国议会以212票对126票通过的《和平决议》部分内容如下：“帝国议会致力于实现各国人民之间的理解和平与持久和解。侵犯领土以及政治、经济和金融迫害与这种和平格格不入。帝国议会反对任何旨在战后设置经济壁垒或延续民族仇恨的方案。必须保障海洋自由。唯有经济和平才能为各国人民的友好联合奠定基础。帝国议会将积极推动建立国际司法组织。但是，只要敌对政府不与这种和平相悖，只要他们以征服和统治威胁德国及其盟国，德国人民就将团结一致、坚定不移地战斗下去，直到他们及其盟国的生存和发展权利得到保障。如此团结的德国人民是不可战胜的。”
81 The Peace Resolution, passed by the Reichstag by 212 votes to 126, stated in part: “The Reichstag strives for a peace of understanding and a lasting reconciliation among peoples. Violations of territory and political, economic and financial persecutions are incompatible with such a peace. The Reichstag rejects every scheme which has for its purpose the imposition of economic barriers or the perpetuation of national hatreds after the war. The freedom of the seas must be secured. Economic peace alone will prepare the ground for the friendly association of the peoples. The Reichstag will actively promote the creation of international organizations of justice. But so long as the enemy governments dissociate themselves from such a peace, so long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and domination, then so long will the German people stand united and unshaken, and fight till their right and the right of their allies to live and grow is made secure. United thus, the German people is unconquerable.”
82 Kneg und Politik，2:187。
82 Kneg und Politik, 2:187.
83参见 RH Lutz 编，《德意志帝国的衰落》，胡佛战争图书馆出版物，第 1 号（斯坦福，加利福尼亚州，1932 年），第 307 页。
83 See R. H. Lutz, ed., Fall of the German Empire, Hoover War Library Publications, no. 1 (Stanford, Ca., 1932), 307.
84 战争与政治，3:123。
84 Krieg und Politik, 3:123.
85同上，3:63。
85 Ibid., 3:63.
86同上，3:73。
86 Ibid., 3:73.
87同上，3:203–206。
87 Ibid., 3:203–206.
88德尔布吕克的证词在Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Deutschen Verfassunggebenden Nationalversammlung und des Deutschen Reichstages 1919–1926 中得到了完整再现。 Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre 1918 (Vierte Reihe im Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses)，（柏林，1920–29），3:239–73。委员会报告的节选，但只有德尔布吕克证词的一小部分，可以在《1918 年德国崩溃的原因》中找到，编辑。 RH Lutz，胡佛战争图书馆出版物，编号。 4（斯坦福大学，1934 年）。
88 Delbrücks testimony is reproduced completely in Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Deutschen Verfassunggebenden Nationalversammlung und des Deutschen Reichstages 1919–1926. Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches im jahre 1918 (Vierte Reihe im Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses), (Berlin, 1920–29), 3:239–73. Selections from the Commission's report, but only a very small portion of the Delbrück testimony, may be found in The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918, ed. R. H. Lutz, Hoover War Library Publications, no. 4 (Stanford, 1934).
89 Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches，3:345。卢茨主编，《德国崩溃的原因》，90。
89 Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches, 3:345. Lutz, ed., Causes of the German Collapse, 90.
90 Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches，3:246。
90 Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches, 3:246.
91同上，3:247。
91 Ibid., 3:247.
92同上，3:346。
92 Ibid., 3:346.
93同上，3:250–51。
93 Ibid., 3:250–51.
94同上，3:253f。
94 Ibid., 3:253f.
95同上，3:253。
95 Ibid., 3:253.
96 Charles Oman，《论历史的写作》（纽约，无日期），159f。
96 Charles Oman, On the Writing of History (New York, n.d.), 159f.
97 Haintz，1962 年版《Geschicbte der Kriegskunst》简介，9。
97 Haintz, introduction to the 1962 edition of Geschicbte der Kriegskunst, 9.
98德尔布吕克，“Etwas Kriegsgeschichtliches”，610。
98 Delbrück, “Etwas Kriegsgeschichtliches,” 610.
99汉斯·德尔布吕克，《世界史》（柏林，1924-28），1:321。
99 Hans Delbrück, Weltgeschichte (Berlin, 1924–28), 1:321.
13. 俄罗斯军事思想：西方模式与苏沃洛夫的影响
13. Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov
F自1709年彼得大帝在波尔塔瓦战役中战胜瑞典以来，俄罗斯一直是欧洲强国，并在随后的几个世纪中崛起成为世界强国之一。军事实力是其崛起的基石。然而，尽管涌现出众多杰出的军事将领，且19世纪战争理论文献浩如烟海，俄罗斯却鲜有战略思想家的出现，其影响也仅限于昙花一现。俄罗斯没有出现像马汉、克劳塞维茨或若米尼那样的人物——即便若米尼最终在俄罗斯军队中结束了他的军事生涯。
FROM THE TIME of Peter the Great's victory over the Swedes at Poltava in 1709, Russia has been a major European power, rising in the course of the following centuries to become one of the great powers of the world. Military strength made this ascent possible. But despite many effective military leaders and despite the development of an extensive literature on the theory of war in the nineteenth century, Russia produced no strategic thinkers whose work has had more than a temporary impact. There are no Russian Mahans, Clausewitzes, or Jo-minis—even if Jomini ended his career in the Russian service.
考虑到直到19世纪中叶，参军一直是受过教育的俄罗斯人的首选职业，这一悖论或许会显得更加令人惊讶。<sup> 1</sup>军队和军事价值观在亚历山大一世和尼古拉一世统治时期都占据主导地位。1855年以后，随着经济扩张和社会日益复杂化，军队对上层阶级生活的影响力有所减弱，但这并不意味着它就此变得无关紧要。
This paradox may seem still more surprising when we consider that until the middle of the nineteenth century service in the army was the preferred career for educated Russians.1 The army and military values played a dominant role in the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I. After 1855, as the economy expanded and society became more complex, the army lost some of its former hold over the lives of the upper classes, but nothing justifies the suggestion that it became in any sense insignificant.
本文的目的并非解释为何十九世纪的俄国涌现出文学、音乐和科学天才，而战略天才却未能出现。相反，我们将从俄国社会政治发展的宏观视角来探讨俄国军事思想的演变历程。即便俄国军事思想家本身似乎并不值得深入分析，但俄国关于军事服务、战术和战略的思想之所以引人入胜且意义重大，是因为它们源于俄国，也因为俄国在现实世界的政治、外交和战争中始终扮演着举足轻重的角色。
It cannot be the aim of this essay to explain why literary, musical, and scientific genius flourished in nineteenth-century Russia and strategic genius did not. Rather we shall discuss the course of Russian military thought in the broad context of the country's social and political development. Even if no Russian military thinkers would seem to merit extensive analysis purely for their own sake, Russian ideas on military service, tactics, and strategy form an interesting and important subject because they are Russian, and because Russia was and is important in the real world of politics, diplomacy, and war.
我
I
几乎所有与俄罗斯相关的问题，都不得不从探讨其与欧洲其他国家，或者通常但略有误导地称为“俄罗斯与西方”之间错综复杂的关系入手。认为俄罗斯在某种程度上凌驾于西方文明之上是误导性的；显然并非如此。自988年皈依基督教以来，俄罗斯与西方传统的联系比与任何其他主要文明社会都更为紧密。无论过去和现在存在何种差异，俄罗斯文化都与欧洲其他国家有着相同的根本渊源。正是这种亲近感和差异性，使得俄罗斯人难以确定自身的定位。西方文化中究竟有多少是“西欧”文化，而非俄罗斯文化，因而需要有意识地借鉴或摒弃？又有哪些是俄罗斯独有的？
In almost every question relating to Russia, one is forced to begin one's answer by considering the tortured and complex matter of its relationship to the rest of Europe, or as it is usually but somewhat misleadingly put, of “Russia and the West.” It is misleading to suggest that Russia is somehow beyond the pale of Western civilization; clearly that is not the case. Since the adoption of Christianity in 988 Russia has been more closely related to the Western tradition than to that of any other major civilized society. Whatever the differences, past and present, Russian culture has its roots in the same ultimate sources as the rest of Europe. It is as much the closeness as the differences that have made it difficult for Russians to know where they stand. How much of Western culture in general is “Western European” but not Russian and therefore to be consciously borrowed or rejected? What is uniquely Russian?2
军事思想家们与俄罗斯知识分子有着共同的核心关切。探寻“俄罗斯的战争艺术”是十九世纪俄罗斯军事著作的核心议题。与探寻俄罗斯特性相关但又不完全相同的是，俄罗斯自身落后以及与其他强国（尤其是西方国家）的实际竞争问题。然而，影响俄罗斯国力和战略地位的问题，并不一定与那些探讨俄西关系的知识分子所关注的问题相一致。
Military thinkers shared this central concern of Russian intellectuals. The search for a “Russian art of war” was a central issue in nineteenth-century Russian military writing. Related to, but not the same as, the search for Russianness was the question of backwardness and practical competition with other powers, particularly Western ones. Issues that affected Russia's power and strategic position, however, did not necessarily correspond to issues that aroused the concern of intellectuals who dealt with the problem of Russia and the West.
尤其值得一提的是，奴役了半数俄罗斯人口的农奴制，从十八世纪末开始日益困扰着俄罗斯知识分子。他们认为，农奴制与他们逐渐认同的西方人对自由的信仰格格不入。最终，一些知识分子开始反感他们眼中的过度西化，反对农奴制，因为在他们看来，农奴制扭曲了他们想象中曾经存在的、家长式的、非官僚化的彼得大帝之前的社会。然而，在农奴制成为军事问题之前，它已在知识分子中存在了长达五十年之久。在整个十八世纪以及拿破仑战争结束之前，无论农奴制存在何种道德或其他缺陷，它都没有对俄军构成威胁；相反，它增强了俄军的实力，并使其成为俄军的强大力量。
In particular, the serf system, which enslaved half of the Russian population, increasingly troubled Russian intellectuals from the late eighteenth century onward. They saw it, among other things, as inconsistent with the Western belief in human liberty that they had come to share. Eventually some of them, rejecting what they had begun to see as over-westernization, opposed serfdom because it was to them a distortion of the paternalistic unbureaucratic pre-Petrine society they imagined had once existed. Yet serfdom was an issue for intellectuals for fifty years before it became a military concern. Throughout the eighteenth century and through the end of the Napoleonic Wars the serf system, whatever its moral and other faults, posed no problem for the Russian army; on the contrary, it strengthened the army, and helped make it what it was.
从1709年到19世纪中叶，俄罗斯凭借强制征召相对较少的农奴终身（后改为25年）服役以维持一支庞大的职业军人常备军的严苛却有效的手段，取得了令人瞩目的成就。在18世纪，这套制度或许比旧制度西欧军队中征兵制与雇佣兵制相结合的模式更为令人满意。俄罗斯的农民士兵几乎没有任何报酬，而且一旦经历了征兵和前往部队的痛苦过程（期间许多人逃跑），逃兵率与西方报道的高逃兵率相比就非常低。
The harsh but effective device of forcibly enrolling a relatively small number of serfs for lifetime (later twenty-five-year) service to maintain a large standing army of professional soldiers was the basis of Russia's remarkable successes from 1709 to the mid-nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century this system was perhaps more satisfactory than the mixture of conscription and mercenary service that characterized the armies of Old Regime Western Europe. Russian peasant soldiers were paid virtually nothing, and once the trauma of recruitment and transportation to their regiments, during which many fled, was over, desertion was very low in comparison with the high rates reported in the West.3
可以说，十八世纪的俄国将领们对腓特烈模式过于推崇，并取得了巨大成功。然而，他们却未能充分利用可靠的俄国农民士兵所蕴含的战术创新潜力。直到十八世纪末，在俄国最伟大的将领亚历山大·苏沃洛夫的领导下，俄军才开始采用一些后来成为革命时代特征的战术创新，例如快速强行军和分散式阵型。苏沃洛夫首先是一位富有远见的领袖，尽管出身贵族，但他对农民士兵的价值有着前人所不具备的深刻认识。此外，他也是一位博学多识、见多识广的人，精通欧洲主要语言，并且密切关注西方（尤其是法国）军事文章和书籍中关于战术创新的讨论。5苏沃洛夫究竟是本能地意识到俄国农民士兵或许能够以更灵活、更现代的方式作战，还是有意识地尝试西方理论著作中描述的战术，这一点并不特别重要。他证明了十八世纪末的俄国军事体系有能力采用新的战术，并与西方最优秀的军队抗衡。即使在像米哈伊尔·库图佐夫和米哈伊尔·巴克莱·德·托利这样能力出众但缺乏远见的指挥官的指挥下，他们采用的是更为传统的战术，俄国的动员体系和整体军事力量仍然能够在1812年击败拿破仑的军队。
It can be argued that Russian commanders in the eighteenth century were overly impressed by the Frederician model, which they adopted with great success. They failed, however, to take advantage of the potential for tactical innovation that the reliable Russian peasant soldier afforded them.4 Only very late in the century, under the greatest of all Russian commanders, Alexander Suvorov, were some of the innovations in tactics that came to characterize the Revolutionary Era, such as rapid forced-marches and dispersed order, adopted by Russian forces. Suvorov was above all an inspired leader of men and, aristocrat though he was, clearly recognized the value of the peasant soldier as none of his predecessors had. He was also a sophisticated and well-read man, familiar with the major European languages and aware of the discussions of tactical innovations that were filling the pages of Western, particularly French, military articles and books.5 Whether Suvorov instinctively sensed that the Russian peasant soldier might be able to fight in a more flexible, modern manner, or self-consciously experimented with techniques described in Western theoretical writing is not particularly significant. He demonstrated that the Russian military system at the end of the eighteenth century was capable of adopting new tactics and of competing with the best the West could offer. Even under able though less-inspired commanders, such as Michael Kutuzov and Michael Barclay de Tolly, who used more traditional methods, the Russian mobilization system and military effort as a whole proved capable of defeating Napoleon's armies in 1812.
苏沃洛夫的榜样或许比他所著的任何作品都更为重要。他并非系统性的战略或战术思想家，或者至少他没有将这方面的思考记录在纸上。他最著名的作品《胜利的艺术》（1975年）是一本仅有八页的小册子，一本面向初级军官和士官的实用指导手册。该手册语言浅显易懂，强调了部队战斗精神的重要性，阐述了战场战术，并指导如何保持部队的健康和士气。6无论苏沃洛夫作为理论家的成就如何，他作为指挥官的才能都堪称卓越，为所有后来的俄罗斯指挥官树立了标杆。即使是击败拿破仑的库图佐夫，也未能完全企及他的成就。
Suvorov's example is probably more important than anything he wrote. He was not a systematic strategic or tactical thinker, or at least he did not put his thoughts on that subject down on paper. His most famous work, The Art of Victory (1975), is an eight-page pamphlet, a manual of practical advice directed at junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Written in simple language, it emphasizes the importance of the troops' fighting spirit, explains battlefield tactics, and adds instruction on maintaining health and morale.6 Whatever Suvorov's achievements as a theorist, his talents as a commander were great, and set a standard against which all subsequent Russian commanders are compared. None, not even Kutuzov, conqueror of Napoleon, ever quite equaled him.
尽管苏沃洛夫精通语言，且对西方世界有着深刻的了解，但他最终却成为了俄罗斯战争艺术的象征。原因有很多：他与普鲁士化倾向严重的保罗一世关系不睦；虽然他性格古怪，但他的古怪却具有亲民的特质，他深受农民士兵的喜爱，进而也赢得了后来那些具有民粹主义民族主义倾向的知识分子的支持；最重要的是，他战胜了俄罗斯的敌人。甚至他最后翻越阿尔卑斯山的撤退也堪称壮举，以至于俄罗斯人将其视为一场道德上的胜利，一场战胜奥地利背信弃义的胜利。
Despite his linguistic skills and sophisticated knowledge of the West, Suvorov came to symbolize the Russian art of war. There were many reasons: he did not get along with Paul I, the arch Prussianizer; although eccentric, his eccentricity had a common touch, and he appealed to the peasant soldier and therefore to later intellectuals of populist-nationalist inclinations; and above all, he won battles over Russia's enemies. Even his final retreat over the Alps was such a spectacular effort that the Russians regarded it as a moral victory, a triumph in the face of Austrian perfidy.
因此，俄国人带着军事胜利的实践经验进入了十九世纪，这部分是由于其社会和政治秩序的落后，或者至少是由于其独特的特征。但是，俄国在文化和知识方面的成就，却无法与他们的政治和军事成就相提并论。他们是胜利者，但在某种意义上，他们不得不向西方——以克劳塞维茨和约米尼为代表的失败者——寻求战略思想的指导。7
Russians thus entered the nineteenth century with the practical experience of military success, in part because of the backwardness, or at least because of the distinctive characteristics of their social and political order. But nothing in the cultural or intellectual efforts of their country was comparable with their political and military achievements. They were the winners, but they had to look to the West, in a sense to the losers, represented by Clausewitz and Jomini, to instruct them in strategic thought.7
颇具讽刺意味的是，新兴的“俄罗斯民族学派”或俄罗斯战争艺术理念深受革命时代的影响，甚至可能是革命时代的产物。革命时代强调民族因素，认为它能激发士兵的忠诚和热情。这种理念，以及与之相关的普遍服役制和庞大的训练有素的预备队或民兵体系，是年轻一代进步军官军事思想中最重要的特征。其中一些人参与了1825年12月的未遂政变。他们拥护这些军事思想，以及其他一系列自由主义政治理念，或许促成了尼古拉一世（1825-1855）统治时期军事思想的保守化。尼古拉一世尤其希望根除十二月党人的颠覆性影响，这些人曾试图阻止他登基，因此，他们所倡导的一切都自然而然地受到怀疑。但民族精神的理想早已深深根植于俄罗斯的军事传统之中。然而，关于转向短期征兵制并保留庞大预备役部队的讨论最终不了了之，因为这必然与农奴制的重大改革联系在一起，而这些改革虽然被讨论过，但在尼古拉二世统治时期却并未取得任何实际进展。8
In a paradoxical way, the emerging “Russian national school” or the notion of a Russian art of war was greatly influenced by, or was possibly a product of, the Revolutionary Era, which stressed the national element as a force making men fight with loyalty and enthusiasm. This notion and the associated concept of an army based on universal service and a large trained reserve or militia were the most important features of the military thought of the younger generation of progressive military officers, some of whom participated in the unsuccessful attempt at a coup d'état in December 1825. That they espoused these military ideas, as well as a long list of other liberal political notions, may have contributed to the conservatism of military thought during the ensuing reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855). Nicholas, above all, wanted to extirpate the subversive influence of the Decembrists, who had attempted to prevent his accession to the throne, and whatever they advocated was automatically suspect. But the ideal of the national spirit was already too deeply entrenched in the Russian military tradition. Discussion of shifting to a short-term conscript army with a large reserve force ended, however, because it was inevitably linked with major reforms in the serf systems, which although discussed, made no actual progress under Nicholas.8
尼古拉一世的统治时期通常被认为是俄罗斯军国主义的鼎盛时期，这在许多方面确实如此。尼古拉本人也希望如此。他绝非愚钝，也并非总是反对变革或试验（只要风险不大），但在军事领域——他最热爱的领域——他却极其保守。9 19世纪下半叶一位杰出的军事理论家G.A. Leer后来写道，关于尼古拉时代：“人们常说腓特烈式的战术在耶拿和奥尔施泰特战役中被埋葬了。的确，它们的外在形式被埋葬了，但它们的精神却延续了下来，至少在19世纪50年代的俄罗斯军队中是如此。” 10
The reign of Nicholas I is usually described as the apogée of Russian militarism, which indeed it was in many respects. Nicholas certainly wished it to be so. Far from unintelligent, and not always opposed to change or experimentation if the risks were not too great, he was profoundly conservative when it came to military matters, his greatest love.9 A leading military theorist of the second half of the century, G. A. Leer, later wrote of the Nicolaian Era: “It is usually said of Frederician tactics that they were buried…at Jena and Auerstedt. Indeed, their outer cover, their forms, were buried, but their spirit continued to live, at least in our army in the 1850's.”10
然而，正是在尼古拉二世统治时期，军民社会之间的平衡开始发生重大变化。尽管拿破仑时代后俄罗斯维持着庞大的常备军，但文官机构的迅速扩张意味着，到19世纪中叶，文官人数首次超过了军官。此外，文官职业在很大程度上与军官职业分离，以至于到尼古拉二世统治末期，年轻一代的高级文官大多是毕生在文职部门任职的人。对于大多数贵族而言，成为军官不再是唯一合理的选择。<sup> 11</sup>始于亚历山大一世时期并在尼古拉二世时期延续的高等教育和中等教育的规模扩张，尽管伴随着对课程内容控制力度的加大，也催生了庞大的读者群体，为新一代俄罗斯作家提供了市场，其中包括19世纪俄罗斯文学的第一批真正伟大的作家——普希金、莱蒙托夫和果戈理，仅举几例其中最著名的例子。矛盾的是，在尼古拉二世统治下，俄罗斯的非军事领域发展得比军事领域更快、更成功。
Nevertheless, it was during the reign of Nicholas that major changes in the balance between military and civilian society began to take place. Despite the huge standing army that was maintained after the Napoleonic Era, the rapid growth of the civil bureaucracy meant that by the middle of the century civil officials for the first time outnumbered military officers. Furthermore, the civil career had become to a great degree separated from the military, so that by the end of Nicholas's reign the younger generation of top civil officials were mostly men who had spent their entire careers in civil agencies. No longer was the career of the military officer virtually the only reasonable option open to the majority of the nobility.11 The quantitative expansion of higher and secondary education that began under Alexander I and continued under Nicholas, even though accompanied by increased attempts to control the content of the curriculum, meant that there emerged a significant reading public, which provided a market for the new generation of Russian writers, who included the first really great figures of nineteenth-century Russian literature—Pushkin, Lermontov, and Gogol, to mention only the most well known. Paradoxically the nonmilitary aspects of Russian life were developing more rapidly and more successfully under Nicholas than was the military.
尽管利尔对当时的兵营方阵思维做出了悲观的评价，但后来主导俄国军事思想的一些问题，早在尼古拉时代就已开始出现，甚至在官方作家中也有所体现。1837年，梅德姆将军撰文指出，武器和防御战技术的进步提升了战争中“道德力量”的重要性，这预示了19世纪后期由德拉戈米罗夫领导的民族主义“回归苏沃洛夫”学派的主要方向。<sup> 12</sup>德拉戈米罗夫本人则将他的观点归功于当时另一位人物——19世纪50年代总参谋学院教授卡尔佐夫上校的讲座。<sup> 13</sup>
Nevertheless, despite Leer's gloomy observation about the barracks square mentality of the period, some of the issues that later dominated military thought in Russia began to emerge, in the age of Nicholas, even among official writers. General N. V. Medem, writing in 1837, argued that improvements in weapons and techniques of defensive warfare increased the importance of “moral force” in war, anticipating the primary thrust of the nationalist “back to Suvorov” school led by Dragomirov in the late nineteenth century.12 Dragomirov himself attributed his views to the lectures of another figure of the era, Colonel A. P. Kartsov, professor at the General Staff Academy in the 1850s.13
对于新兴的民族主义学派来说，一个棘手的问题是，俄罗斯第二位伟大的英雄库图佐夫最出名的，是他面对拿破仑入侵军队时精心策划的战略撤退，而这场撤退最终导致了莫斯科的放弃和焚毁。接替梅德姆担任总参谋学院战略学教授的博格达诺维奇强调了防御作为削弱敌人手段的重要性，以及一支庞大的常备军在这方面的价值，并赞扬库图佐夫避免了徒劳无功的战斗。<sup> 14</sup>
Something of a problem for the nascent nationalist school was the fact that Russia's second great hero, Kutuzov, was most noted for his careful strategic retreat in the face of Napoleon's invading army, a retreat that ultimately included the abandonment and burning of Moscow. M. I. Bogdanovich, who succeeded Medem as professor of strategy at the General Staff Academy, emphasized the importance of defense as a means of weakening the enemy, and the value of a large standing army for that purpose, and praised Kutuzov for avoiding unproductive battles.14
在尼古拉一世统治时期，俄罗斯维持着一支规模庞大的常备军，其依据是传统的农民征召兵25年服役制度。在与波斯和土耳其的相对较小的冲突中，以及在镇压波兰和匈牙利的叛乱中，这支军队都尽职尽责，尽管事后看来，其存在一些弱点。然而，没有任何事件动摇政权的信念，即一切安好，无需进行任何实质性的改变。<sup> 15 </sup> 俄罗斯的政策旨在维护欧洲的现状，尼古拉一世用如今会被称为威慑政策的措辞来描述这一政策：“俄罗斯本身就是一个强大而幸运的国家；它永远不会对邻国或欧洲构成威胁。然而，它的防御阵地必须足够强大，以至于任何攻击都不可能得逞。”<sup> 16</sup>
Throughout the reign of Nicholas I a very large standing army was maintained on the basis of the traditional system of twenty-five-year terms of service for peasant conscripts. In relatively minor conflicts with Persia and Turkey, and in the suppression of rebellions in Poland and Hungary the army did its job, although with the benefit of hindsight some weaknesses can be discerned. Nothing happened, however, to upset the regime's conviction that all was well and that no substantial changes were needed.15' Russia's policy was aimed at preserving the European status quo, and Nicholas described it in terms that would now be labeled a policy of deterrence: “Russia is a power mighty and fortunate in its own right; it will never be a threat to its neighbors or to Europe. However, its defensive position must be so impressive as to make any attack impossible.”16
二
II
克里米亚战争的失败和尼古拉二世的去世标志着俄罗斯军队旧制度乃至俄罗斯社会诸多方面走向终结的开始。俄军士兵在克里米亚英勇作战，表现出色。尽管困难重重，军队的补给依然充足，而且盟军指挥官很可能犯了与俄军一样多的错误。然而，战争最终还是失败了。动员起来的1,742,297名官兵（外加787,197名非正规军和民兵）显然不足以对抗30万法国、英国、撒丁岛和土耳其军队。当然，为了保卫波罗的海沿岸免受盟军可能的登陆，以及保护奥地利边境免受可能的干预，俄军的兵力被大量消耗，而且由于缺乏充足的后备力量，根本无法迅速增加有效兵力。
The defeat in the Crimean War and the death of Nicholas marks the beginning of the end of the old regime in the Russian military and much else in Russian society. Russian soldiers fought bravely and well in the Crimea. Despite great difficulties the troops were supplied, and very likely the Allied commanders made as many blunders as their opponents. Nevertheless, the war was lost. The mobilization of 1,742,297 officers and men (plus 787,197 irregulars and militia) proved inadequate to deal with a force of 300,000 French, British, Sardinian, and Turkish troops.17 Of course, the need to defend the Baltic coast against possible Allied landings and the Austrian frontier against possible intervention dissipated Russian numerical strength, and lacking substantial reserves there was no way to increase rapidly the number of effective troops available.
克里米亚战争向有远见的俄国人表明，自1815年以来，欧洲的军事平衡已经发生了变化。自彼得大帝时代以来，俄国一直享有并成功利用的优势已不足以确保其继续保持大国地位，更遑论继续作为欧洲陆军霸主。武器技术的创新固然是问题的一部分；但如果问题仅限于此，解决起来就相对简单了。即使到了世纪末，许多新式武器已被采用，军需品在军费总预算中所占的比例仍然很小。新型步枪和火炮可以从国外购买，也可以在国内仿制。
The Crimean War demonstrated to perceptive Russians that the military balance in Europe had shifted since 1815 and that the advantages Russia had enjoyed and exploited successfully since the time of Peter the Great no longer sufficed to ensure its continued status as a great power, much less as the dominant European land power. Innovations in weapons technology were part of the problem; but if that had been all that was involved, the solution would have been relatively simple. Even at the end of the century, when many of the new weapons had been adopted, military hardware was still a very modest part of the total military budget.18 New model rifles and artillery could be bought abroad or copied at home.
更难应对的是涉及人员和物资动员、运输和组织的根本性变革。欧洲列强正在以前所未有的规模发展动员整个社会投入战争的手段，这一过程最终导致了第一次世界大战的惨剧。18世纪的俄国专制政权曾利用其服务型国家和农奴制的传统，终身征召农民入伍，从而占据了优势。到了19世纪中叶，现代行政技术、大众教育和铁路运输使得德国、法国和奥地利能够将很大比例的成年男性人口训练成随时待命的士兵。这就是克里米亚战争后俄国军队面临的基本战略问题。
Far more difficult to deal with were fundamental changes that involved the mobilization, transportation, and organization of men and matériel. European powers were developing the means to mobilize the entire society for war to an unprecedented extent, a process that would culminate in the horrors of the First World War. The Russian autocracy in the eighteenth century had had the advantage of being able to conscript peasants for life, exploiting the tradition of the service state and the serf system. By the mid-nineteenth century, modern administrative techniques, mass education, and railroad transport made it possible for Germany, France, and Austria to turn a high proportion of the adult male population into trained soldiers, available on short notice. This was the basic strategic problem that confronted the Russian military in the post-Crimean period.
对俄罗斯而言幸运的是，尼古拉一世官僚机构中涌现出一批杰出的、进步的、睿智的、充满活力的官员，他们启动了一系列重大项目，即所谓的“大改革时代”，这一时期始于1855年亚历山大二世即位。这些改革几乎触及了俄罗斯生活的方方面面，唯独中央政治体制除外，其中农奴解放是核心内容。<sup> 19</sup>在这群“现代化官僚”中，德米特里·米柳京是其中的领军人物之一。他于1861年至1881年担任陆军大臣，主要负责解决俄罗斯的基本战略问题——人力动员和训练，而这一问题体现在1874年的军事改革及其相关措施中。
Fortunately for Russia, a remarkable group of progressive, intelligent, and energetic officials emerged from the bureaucracy of Nicholas I to launch a wide range of major projects, the so-called Era of the Great Reforms, beginning with the accession of Alexander II in 1855. The reforms touched virtually every aspect of Russian life except the central political system, with the emancipation of the serfs as the centerpiece.19 One of the leading members of the small group of “modernizing bureaucrats,” Dmitrii Miliutin, who was minister of war from 1861 to 1881, was largely responsible for the attempt to deal with Russia's basic strategic problem, manpower mobilization and training, that was embodied in the military reform of 1874 and related measures.
米柳京曾在高加索地区服役并立下赫赫战功，但他的主要活动——或许令人惊讶的是，正是这些活动使他引起了最有影响力的圈子的关注——是他作为军事史学家和最高军事教育机构司令部训练处处长的工作。20在那里，他直接在尼古拉一世的弟弟米哈伊尔·帕夫洛维奇大公和后来与解放运动密切相关的罗斯托夫采夫将军手下任职。他的主要历史著作于1852年至1855年间出版，共五卷，讲述了俄罗斯参与第二次反法同盟战争的历史，其中主要论述了苏沃洛夫著名的意大利战役。米柳京是一位务实的现代化改革者，并非梦想着建立一种独特的俄罗斯战争艺术的浪漫主义者，但他显然被苏沃洛夫对战争中道德或精神因素至关重要的强调所打动。他写道，军事艺术有两个方面，
Miliutin had served with distinction in the Caucasus, but his main activity, which, perhaps surprisingly, brought him to the attention of the most influential circles, was his work as a military historian and as director of the training section of the Supreme Headquarters for the Institutions of Military Education.20 There he served directly under the Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, brother of Nicholas I, and General la. I. Rostovtsev, who was later to be closely associated with the elaboration of the emancipation. His major historical work, published in five volumes in 1852–1855, was his history of Russia's participation in the Wars of the Second Coalition, primarily Suvorov's famous Italian campaign. Miliutin was a practical modernizer, no romantic who dreamed of a uniquely Russian art of war, but he was clearly struck by Suvorov's emphasis on the crucial importance of moral or spiritual factors in war. There are two sides in military art, he wrote,
物质与精神。军队不仅是物质力量，是军事行动武器的集合体，更是拥有智慧和情感的人类的联合体。精神力量在军事领袖的所有考量和决策中都扮演着重要角色，因此，仅仅将军队视为一台机器来统治是不够的。他必须能够驾驭人，才能将军队牢牢掌控在自己手中，并凭借其对军队的精神力量获得有条件的权威。21
the material and the spiritual. An army is not only a physical power, a mass consisting of weapons of military operations, but it is as well a union of humans endowed with intelligence and heart. Spiritual force plays an important part in all considerations and calculations of the military leader, and consequently for the latter it is insufficient to rule armies as a machine. He must be able to rule the human being to fasten the army to himself, and with his spiritual power over the army acquire conditional authority.21
米留京的改革方案有三大目标：(1) 改进军队的行政结构；(2) 实行短期服役制，缩减常备军规模，并建立庞大的预备役部队；(3) 提高军事教育质量，特别是军官和士兵的教育水平。所有这些努力，尤其是实行普遍征兵制和提高教育水平，都产生了广泛的社会影响，远非聘请少数外国技术人员制造新式武器那么简单。米留京认识到，如果俄罗斯要保持其在世界强国中的地位，就必须实现俄罗斯社会的现代化，而不仅仅是俄罗斯军队的现代化。行政结构的改革虽然遭到米留京官僚对手的反对，但却赋予了陆军部长更大的权力。22 更为普遍意义的是向全民征兵制和预备役制度的转变。由于长期以来人们认为服兵役就意味着结束农奴身份，因此在解放农奴之前，这种转变是无法认真考虑的。不能指望农民新兵在军队服役几年后就恢复农奴身份。23自彼得大帝为了与西方军事强国竞争而使上层阶级西化以来，俄罗斯的军事需求首次引发了重大的社会变革。
Miliutin's reform program had three main goals: (1) to improve the administrative structure of the military; (2) to shift to a system of shortterm service with a reduced standing army and a large reserve force; and (3) to raise the quality of military education, particularly of officers but of the rank and file as well. All of these efforts and especially the introduction of general conscription and improved education had broad societal implications, far different from hiring a few foreign technicians to build a new weapon. Miliutin recognized that Russian society, not just the Russian army, had to modernize if Russia was to maintain its position among the major powers. Changes in the administrative structure, although opposed by Miliutin's bureaucratic rivals, gave more authority to the minister of war.22 Of far greater general significance was the shift to the more or less universal conscription and the reserve system, which was impossible to consider seriously prior to the emancipation of the serfs, due to the long-standing tradition that army service ended serf status. Peasant recruits could not be expected to return to the status of serfs after spending several years in the army.23 For the first time since Peter the Great westernized the upper class to enable him to compete with Western military powers, Russia's military requirements dictated major social changes.
米柳京改革不仅建立了短期征兵制和预备役制度，而且其影响远不止于此，它彻底改变了俄罗斯传统的、由法律界定的社会阶级体系。改革前，只有农民和城市社会的最底层民众才需服兵役，而自1762年起，贵族也可以自愿担任军官。改革后的制度引入了普遍服役义务的原则，不分社会地位，唯一的区别在于服役年限，而服役年限与受教育程度成反比。完全没有受过教育的农民服役六年（后减至五年）；随着教育程度的提高，服役年限也大幅缩短，大学毕业生只需服役六个月。当然，贵族通常比非贵族受过更好的教育，但也有相当数量的非贵族拥有小学、中学甚至大学学历。在这一方面给予他们与贵族同等的待遇，是社会政策的一项重大突破，而这一突破不能仅仅从军事角度来论证其合理性。但从广义的历史角度来看，这与俄罗斯国家的政策是一致的，即始终为在国家服务中启用非贵族人士敞开大门，即使在非常高的职位上也是如此，只要这样做是合适的。然而，毫无疑问，大改革时代弥漫着一种理想主义的色彩，这一点在国务委员会讨论已完成的改革方案时对旧军队的表述中得到了很好的体现：“不久之前，几乎终身服役且伴随着诸多苦难，对于祖国的每个公民来说，这并非光荣和自然的义务，而是对犯罪和堕落生活的惩罚。刑法典将征召入伍定义为等同于流放西伯利亚和关押在惩戒营；此外，如果其他方法无效，社会还允许地主用这种方式清除堕落之人。”<sup> 24</sup>
The Miliutin reform not only instituted short-term conscription and a reserve system but went far beyond that to change Russia's traditional system of legally defined social classes. Before the reform only peasants and the lowest levels of urban society were subject to conscription, while since 1762. the nobility had served as officers if they chose to. The reformed system introduced the principle of a universal service obligation, regardless of social status, the one distinction being the length of service, which varied inversely with the amount of education. Totally uneducated peasants served for six years (later reduced to five); at each level of education there was a substantial reduction, with university graduates serving for only six months. Of course nobles generally had more education than non-nobles, but there were significant numbers of non-nobles with primary, secondary, and even university educations. That they should be treated equally with nobles in this area was a major departure in social policy, and one that could not be justified on narrowly military grounds. But in a broad historical sense it was consistent with the Russian state's policy of always leaving the door open to use non-nobles in state service, even at very high levels, when that seemed desirable. Unquestionably, however, an element of idealism permeates the Era of the Great Reforms that was well expressed in the State Council's statement about the old army when it came to discuss the completed reforms proposal: “Not long ago service, virtually for life and accompanied by many deprivations, was not considered honorable and natural for every citizen of the fatherland but a penalty for crime and a depraved life. The conscription of a man into the army was defined in the criminal code as the equivalent of exile to Siberia and detention in a penal brigade; further, society permitted landowners to remove depraved individuals by this means if other methods failed.”24
国务委员会是一个由资深官僚和军官组成的高级咨询机构。该机构对沿用多年的旧军事体制采取了坚决的反对立场，这有力地证明了许多人，而不仅仅是改革运动的领导人，都认识到进行实质性改革的必要性。俄国军事改革者们所借鉴的典型例子是普鲁士在普法战争中击败法国之前，尤其是在之后的战绩。然而，国务委员会的声明以及米柳京本人类似的表态也表明，他们试图恢复军队在苏沃洛夫和库图佐夫领导下取得胜利的时期所展现出的精神，那时，即使是严苛的征兵制度似乎也未能摧毁俄国士兵的热情。
The State Council was a high-level advisory body composed of very senior bureaucrats and soldiers. That this body took a firm stand against the old military system that had served for so long is striking evidence that the need for substantial change was recognized by many, not only by the leaders of the reform movement. The compelling example to which the Russian military reformers looked was Prussia before and particularly after its dramatic defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War. Nevertheless the State Council's statement and similar declarations by Miliutin himself25 also suggest an attempt to restore what was believed to have been the spirit of the army at an earlier time, the era of Russian triumphs under Suvorov and Kutuzov, when even the oppressive system of recruitment had not, it seemed, destroyed the enthusiasm of the Russian soldier.
米留京改革军官训练的总体目标与此类似。在旧军队中，大多数军官都是贵族，他们短暂地担任“容克军官”或团级军官学员，之后便在接受极少教育的情况下被提拔，并且在大多数情况下，他们的整个职业生涯都注定是二等军官。只有一小部分贵族（占总数的17%）进入国家军事院校深造，他们通常占据高级军衔，并在精锐部队服役。米留京希望消除这种本质上的双轨制，并为所有军官建立统一的教育标准。然而，精英军官根深蒂固的政治影响力使他们得以保留其特殊的、对国家而言极其昂贵的学校，从而导致用于扩建广大军官训练设施的资源减少。米柳京在这一领域的一些措施在他1881年辞去陆军部长职务后甚至进一步被削弱，但到第一次世界大战前夕，各类军官之间的教育差异即使没有完全消除，也已大大缩小，许多上校和将军都出身卑微。26
The same general goal was involved in Miliutin's attempts to improve officer training. In the old army most of the officers were nobles who served briefly as “Junkers” or officer cadets in regiments and were then promoted with minimal education and were destined, in most cases, to second-class status throughout their careers. A much smaller group (17 percent overall) of nobles attended special state military schools, generally filled the higher ranks, and served in the elite regiments. Miliutin hoped to eliminate what was essentially a two-class system and establish common educational standards for all officers. However, the entrenched political influence of the elite officers enabled them to preserve their special, and for the state very expensive schools, leaving fewer resources to be devoted to the expanded facilities for the mass of the officer corps. Some of Miliutin's measures in this area were even further watered down after his resignation as minister of war in 1881, but by the eve of World War I the educational differences between the various types of officers had been greatly reduced if not eliminated, and many colonels and generals were of humble origin.26
然而，在整个社会层面，军官阶层的地位在旧制度的最后五十年间有所下降。军官的薪酬非常低，更重要的是，经济的扩张为受过教育的男性创造了其他职业机会。直到19世纪50年代，年轻贵族通常的选择要么是参军，要么是进入文官系统；而现在，他们可以考虑从事各种专业，例如教师、商人、工程师等等。选择职业也是一种政治决定。军队是政权的堡垒；在大改革之后，保守主义抬头，越来越多的受过教育的俄罗斯人，即使没有积极反对政权，也至少失去了对政权的热情。这使得从军的吸引力大不如前，只有那些出身卑微、仍然将其视为社会晋升途径的人，以及少数家族世代在著名部队服役的富裕贵族精英才会选择从军。
In society as a whole, however, the status of the officer corps declined during the last fifty years of the old regime. Officers were very poorly paid and, more importantly, the economy was expanding, creating alternative career opportunities for men with education. Until the 1850s the choice for a young nobleman was usually military service or the civil bureaucracy; now he could consider the professions, teaching, commerce, engineering, and much else. Selecting a career was also a political decision. The military was the bulwark of the regime; after the era of the Great Reforms was succeeded by a new conservatism, a larger and larger segment of educated Russian society, if it did not go into active opposition, at least lost its enthusiasm for the regime. This made the choice of a military career less attractive than it had been, except for men of very humble background who still saw it as a way to rise in society, and for a small elite of wealthy nobles whose families had traditionally served in the famous regiments.
三
III
因此，到19世纪70年代中期，俄国已经建立起现代欧洲大陆军事体系的基本架构。现在的问题是如何使其有效运作，并发展出一支真正能与其他欧洲大陆主要强国相匹敌的军队。人力不再是问题；俄国拥有的兵力远远超过了其训练能力。通过慷慨的豁免政策和抽签制度，这套新体系远未达到真正普惠的程度。正如前文所述，19世纪70年代至1914年间迅速发展的新型军事技术也并未构成不可逾越的障碍；俄国引进的武器装备数量与竞争对手不相上下。根本问题在于预算和军队规模。即使撇开效率低下的行政管理不谈，漫长的边疆和相对落后的铁路网络也意味着动员速度较慢，需要更大规模的常备军。此外，人们还认为，俄罗斯的文盲农民需要比西方农民更长的训练时间，这也是俄国维持大量兵力参战的另一个原因。尽管军需品支出比例略有上升，但军费预算的大部分仍然用于后勤开支，因此军队总规模是决定军费预算的关键因素。27即使在19世纪90年代经历了快速工业化之后，俄国仍然是一个贫穷且相对欠发达的国家，维持一支规模略大于其西部邻国的军队是一个巨大的负担。比起如何阻止奥地利或德国入侵波兰，更关键的问题是，在军队规模庞大、动员和集结迅速的时代，俄国经济发展速度不足以支撑必要的军事力量。
Thus by the mid-1870S, Russia had in place the basic structure of a modern continental European military system. The problem now was how to make it work and to develop a force truly comparable to that of the other major Continental powers. Manpower was no longer the issue; Russia had more men available than it could ever afford to train. By means of generous exemptions coupled with a lottery, the new system remained well short of being truly universal. Nor, as mentioned above, did the new military technology that rapidly developed in the decades from the 1870s to 1914 pose insuperable difficulties; Russia introduced weapons comparable to those of its rivals in reasonable quantity. The basic problem was the budget and the size of the army. Even aside from a less than efficient administration, the long frontiers and the less extensive railroad network meant slower mobilization and the need for larger standing forces. It was also believed that illiterate Russian peasants needed longer training than their Western counterparts, another reason for keeping many men under arms. The bulk of the military budget still went for subsistence expenses despite a modest rise in the proportion spent on hardware, so the total size of the army was the crucial factor in determining the military budget.27 Russia was a poor, relatively underdeveloped country, even after the rapid industrialization of the 1890s, and maintaining forces somewhat larger than those of its neighbors immediately to the West was a great burden. More important than the best way to stop an Austrian or German invasion of Poland, the crucial problem was the failure of the economy to develop rapidly enough to support the necessary military establishment in an era of mass armies and the rapid mobilization and concentration of these forces.
世纪末，一位名叫A.A.古列维奇的陆军中校，隶属于总参谋学院，他认识到现代战争与国民经济之间的密切联系。他甚至预见到，下一场欧洲战争很可能是旷日持久、消耗巨大的，而非速战速决。然而，他乐观地认为，俄国较低的经济发展水平和较差的生活水平反而使其更能承受战争的压力。与法国和德国这些工业化程度较高的国家相比，俄国庞大的劳动力动员比例要小得多。法国和德国的工业化程度更高，经济更加脆弱，更容易受到冲击，而且由于动员导致大量劳动力流失，它们遭受的损失也会更大。<sup> 28</sup>
At the end of the century one soldier, Lt. Colonel A. A. Gulevich of the General Staff Academy, recognized the intimate connection of modern war and the national economy. He even foresaw that the next European war would probably be drawn out and exhausting rather than quick and decisive. Optimistically, however, he saw Russia's lower level of economic development and poorer standard of living as better enabling it to stand the strain of such a war. A smaller proportion of Russia's large labor force would be mobilized than in the well-developed industrial economies of France and Germany, which were much more fragile, easily disrupted, and would suffer more because of greater withdrawals of manpower due to mobilization.28
十九世纪，可能唯一一部在俄国以外产生重大影响的俄国军事著作并非出自军人之手。扬·布洛赫的《未来战争：技术、经济和政治方面》是一部鸿篇巨制，共五卷，研究了工业和科学进步对战争的影响，书中配有大量插图，并包含无数图表。它正确地描述了十九世纪末期发展起来的新型战争技术的巨大潜力，但同时也指出，现代工业经济无法在战争的压力下长期维持下去。这是一部深刻的和平主义著作，旨在用大量的数据证明战争在现代世界是不可接受的，但其结论与古列维奇的著作非常相似。布洛赫是一位波兰犹太人，也是一位铁路大亨，他与阿克·普济列夫斯基将军以及其他许多人合作完成了这部巨著。古列维奇或许参与了这个项目，或者至少了解布洛赫早期的著作。布洛赫在第一次世界大战前一直是欧洲反战运动的杰出人物，但他的作品似乎在很大程度上被军方忽视了，至少在俄国是如此。
Probably the only Russian work on military affairs that had any significant impact outside of Russia in the nineteenth century was not written by a soldier. Jan Bloch's The Future War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Aspects was a massive five-volume study of the impact of industrial and scientific progress on warfare, lavishly illustrated, and filled with innumerable charts and tables. It correctly described the awesome potential of the new technology of warfare that had developed in the last years of the nineteenth century but argued that the modern industrial economy was incapable of sustaining itself long under the stress of war. It was a profoundly pacifist work, determined to demonstrate by weight of numbers that war was simply unacceptable in the modern world, but its conclusions were very similar to Gulevich's.29 Bloch was a Polish Jew, a railroad magnate who collaborated with General A. K. Puzyrevskii and probably many others in putting this huge treatise together. Gulevich may possibly have been involved in or at least aware of the project and of Bloch's earlier publications. Bloch remained a prominent figure in the European antiwar movement before World War I, but his work seems to have been largely ignored by the military, at least in Russia.
从改革开放后到第一次世界大战，俄国军事思想并未聚焦于日益严峻的现代工业战争问题，而是出人意料地将注意力集中在看似无关紧要的俄国战争艺术的历史争论上。这一思想的拥护者都是才智过人、肩负使命的人物，他们对本国的军事成就感到无比自豪，而这种自豪感又受到19世纪下半叶俄国民族主义兴起的推动。克里米亚战争的惨败以及俄国在1877-1878年对土耳其战争中表现不佳，促使他们寻求在自身传统中寻找解决之道，而这一探索最终不可避免地将他们引向了彼得大帝和苏沃洛夫。这一学派的领军人物之一是才华横溢的军事史学家马斯洛夫斯基，他于1890年在为他设立的总参谋部学院担任了首任俄罗斯军事艺术史教席。在马斯洛夫斯基看来，彼得大帝并非一个借鉴者，而是一位革新者。
Russian military thought in the post-reform era down to the First World War did not focus on the growing problem of modern industrial war. Rather it centered to a surprising degree on what would seem to be a largely irrelevant historical dispute over the Russian art of war. Its exponents were intelligent men with a sense of mission, and a pride in the military achievements of their nation that was stimulated by the general growth of Russian nationalism in the second half of the century. The humiliation of the Crimean War and the less than brilliant showing of Russia against Turkey (1877–1878) caused them to seek solutions in their own tradition, a search that led inevitably back to Peter the Great and Suvorov. A leading exponent of the school was the talented military historian D. A. Maslovskii, who was to hold the first chair of the History of Russian Military Art at the General Staff Academy, established for him in 1890.30 For Maslovskii, Peter was not a borrower but a transformer:
彼得大帝在制定《1716 年军事条例》时，可以利用大量关于军事艺术和西欧军队条例的原始著作和翻译作品，但这些资料仅仅作为他系统发展自身观点和经验的素材。只有他的天才才能解释，在我国正规军发展初期，欧洲操练和阵型的“野蛮复杂性”是如何在俄罗斯军事艺术中变得如此精妙简单的。
The entire mass of original and translated works on the military art and the statutes of Western European armies which were certainly at Peter's disposal in composing the statute [the Military Statute of 1716, only served the great commander as material for the systematic development of what were solely his own views and experience, and only his genius makes it possible to explain how the “barbaric complexity” of European drill and formations were made brilliantly simple in the Russian military art, at the time of the beginning of the development of our regular army.
像任何一位优秀的指挥官一样，彼得深知他必须了解他的对手，但马斯洛夫斯基认为，这丝毫没有削弱他所取得成就的独特俄罗斯性质。31
Like any able commander Peter was aware that he must know his opponents, but that, Maslovskii argued, did not diminish the uniquely Russian nature of his achievement.31
像马斯洛夫斯基及其继任者、立场较为温和的阿·齐·米什拉耶夫斯基这样的军事史学家，对那些直接参与军事政策制定的人员的战略思想的影响，虽然有时也相当显著，但却是间接的。其中最杰出的当属米·伊·德拉戈米罗夫，他曾随部队在前线作战，教授战术，后来担任总参谋学院院长。他于1879年出版的战术教科书，在之后的三十年里一直是俄国军官的标准教材。德拉戈米罗夫以提倡使用刺刀而非火器，并强调士气的重要性而闻名。即使是日俄战争的经历也未能改变他的立场。德拉戈米罗夫在1906年出版的遗作中援引这场战争，论证道：“子弹和刺刀并非相互排斥，而是相互补充：前者为后者铺平道路。无论火器如何发展完善，这种相互关系始终不变。” 33虽然不像苏沃洛夫那样直言不讳（据说苏沃洛夫曾说过“子弹是个傻瓜，但刺刀是个好家伙”），但他的基本想法是一样的——战争中真正重要的是人们的战斗意志：
Military historians like Maslovskii and the successor to his chair, the somewhat more moderate A. Z. Myshlaevskii, had only an indirect, if at times significant, influence on the strategic thinking of men more immediately involved in military policy. By far the most prominent of these was M. I. Dragomirov, who served with troops in the field, taught tactics, and later was head of the General Staff Academy. His textbook on tactics, published in 1879, was the standard work used by Russian officers for thirty years.32 Dragomirov is noted for advocating the bayonet in preference to firearms, and stressing the importance of morale. Even the experience of the Russo-Japanese War did not change his position. Citing that war, Dragomirov argued in a work published posthumously in 1906 that “the bullet and the bayonet do not exclude but supplement each other: the first paves the way for the second. This mutual relationship remains the same no matter how far the perfection of firearms is carried.”33 Not as blunt as Suvorov when he supposedly said “The bullet is a fool, but the bayonet is a fine fellow,” his basic notion was the same—what really matters in war is the will of men to fight:
例如，想象一下现代先进的速射火炮；假设军官们瞄准技术精湛，炮兵也训练有素，熟练掌握火炮操作；然而，如果操作人员无法忍受炮弹在头顶爆炸的冲击，从而放弃这些精良的火炮，那么这种火炮的意义将荡然无存。34
Imagine, for example, contemporary advanced rapid-firing artillery; assume that the officers are skilled in aiming, and those servicing the artillery are superbly trained in the working of these guns; the significance of such artillery will be nevertheless destroyed if the men working it cannot stand the experience of shells exploding over their heads and abandon their wonderful guns.34
在十九世纪后期的俄国军事思想界，更为突出的是德拉戈米罗夫的继任者、总参谋学院院长加里·李尔将军。李尔是反对德拉戈米罗夫及其“民族学派”的“学院派”代表人物，也是除德拉戈米罗夫之外唯一一位在俄国以外享有一定知名度的俄国军事作家。<sup> 35</sup>他认为战略的基本要素是永恒不变的，源于对欧洲历史上伟大统帅和军事作家的研究，例如劳埃德、拿破仑、若米尼和克劳塞维茨。然而，他与德拉戈米罗夫的分歧更多在于其思想来源而非实质内容。李尔同样强调冷兵器的决定性作用——火力是准备性的，刺刀才是决定性的，而最终的胜利取决于士气。<sup> 36</sup>
Even more prominent in Russian military thought in the late nineteenth century was General G. A. Leer, Dragomirov's successor as director of the General Staff Academy. Leer was the foremost of the “academics” who opposed Dragomirov and the “national school” and, except for Dragomirov, the only Russian military writer who was known to any extent outside of Russia.35 For him the basic elements of strategy were permanent, unchanging, and to be derived from the study of the great commanders and writers of the past in European warfare: Lloyd, Napoleon, Jomini, and Clausewitz. However, it was more in the sources of his inspiration than in the substance of his views that he differed from Dragomirov. Leer, too, emphasized the decisive importance of cold steel—firepower was preparatory, the bayonet decisive, and victory depended ultimately on moral force.36
日俄战争的失败以及随之而来的俄国近乎革命的局面，在军界引发了诸多讨论，但除了显而易见的加强军力的必要性之外，并未达成共识。一项大规模、耗资巨大且极具争议的海军建设计划随即启动，旨在取代在对马海战中被击沉的舰队。战后数年间，军队的大部分精力都被转移到了内部安全问题上，这令大多数军事领导人感到不满。直到1910年，才有可能启动一项大规模的军队改进计划，以应对当时已变得极有可能甚至不可避免的欧洲全面战争。
Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and the concomitant near-revolution in Russia produced much discussion within military circles but no consensus beyond the obvious need to strengthen the armed forces. A large-scale, very expensive, and controversial program of naval construction was begun to replace the fleet sunk at the battle of Tsushima. For several years after the war much of the army's attention was diverted to problems of internal security, to the disgust of most military leaders.37 Not until 1910 was it possible to begin a major program of improvement to prepare the army for the general European war that by then had come to seem likely or even inevitable.
尽管日俄战争使人们认识到现代火力的重要性以及攻克防御工事的难度，但民族学派并未因此而声名扫地。事实上，正如上文引述的德拉戈米罗夫的评论所表明的那样，日军的士气和热情反而强化了俄国人对士气至上的基本信念。<sup> 38</sup>一批新的资深理论家取代了德拉戈米罗夫和利尔那一代人，他们各自代表着不同的阵营，其中一些人试图在两者之间保持平衡。曾有一段时间，有人提议取消总参谋学院的俄罗斯军事艺术史教席——该教席历来是民族学派的堡垒——但最终并未实施。1906年，精力充沛、著作颇丰的历史学家阿卜杜拉·卡拉姆·拜约夫将军接替了米什拉耶夫斯基的职位。或许更为重要的是，与民族学派观点相近的米赫涅维奇将军担任了总参谋学院院长。
Despite the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War about the importance of modern firepower and the difficulty of attacking entrenched positions, the national school was by no means discredited. Indeed the spirit and enthusiasm of the Japanese troops reinforced the Russian basic belief in the paramount importance of morale, as the comments of Dragomirov cited above suggest.38 A new group of senior theorists replaced the generation of Dragomirov and Leer on both sides of the fence, with some attempting to straddle it. For a short time there was talk of abolishing the chair of the History of Russian Military Art at the General Staff Academy, traditionally the bastion of the national school, but it did not happen. Myshlaevskii was replaced in 1906 by General A. K. Baiov, an energetic and prolific historian. Perhaps even more important was the presence of General N. P. Mikhnevich, who shared many of the views of the national school, as director of the academy.
然而，不出所料，远东战败引发了一波自我批评浪潮，对一些人来说，这意味着像俄罗斯历史上一贯的做法一样，向西方寻求解决之道。其中最杰出的人物是总参谋部学院战术讲师A.A.涅兹纳莫夫上校。尽管涅兹纳莫夫喜欢引用俄罗斯和欧洲历史上伟大的指挥官和军事作家的著作，但他极具论战性的著述的核心论点是，俄罗斯必须展望未来，做好打“现代战争”的准备——他甚至用“现代战争”作为自己一部重要著作的标题。正如涅兹纳莫夫所说：
Not surprisingly, however, the defeat in the Far East brought forth a wave of self-criticism and for some this meant, as it always had throughout Russian history, looking west for solutions. Foremost among them was Colonel A. A. Neznamov, lecturer on tactics at the General Staff Academy. Although Neznamov was fond of citing the great Russian as well as European commanders and military writers of the past, the primary thrust of his highly polemical writing was that Russia must look forward and be prepared to fight “contemporary war,” a phrase he used as the title of one of his major works.39 As Neznamov put it:
如前所述，仅仅了解基本原理是不够的；原理是永恒的，但作战手段会不断变化，因此，作战方法和形式也必须随之改变，这不言而喻。理论的任务正是要展现这些当代的作战方法和形式，甚至还要对不久的将来有所展望。对于思想而言，最丰富的资源莫过于近代史上那些最优秀的范例，也就是那些当代因素占据主导地位的范例，这些因素包括具有战略意义的因素——铁路、电报和大规模军队，以及具有战术意义的因素——速射武器和电报。40
Merely knowing basic principles, as already mentioned, is not enough; principles are eternal, but the means of battle change and with them, it goes without saying, methods and forms must change too. The task of theory is to show just these contemporary methods and forms and even look forward somewhat into the near future. For ideas there is an inexhaustible source in the best models of all of the most recent past, that is, those in which contemporary factors were prominent, factors of strategic significance—railroads, the telegraph and mass armies, and of tactical significance—rapid-firing weapons and the telegraph.40
涅兹纳莫夫认为，俄国战败于日本并非因为通讯不畅、缺乏民众支持、不熟悉的满洲地形和植被、将领无能，甚至也不是因为“政府政策的总体偏差”。所有这些因素在俄国军事鼎盛时期也同样存在——苏沃洛夫的部队对北意大利的陌生程度，难道不也如同库罗帕特金的部队对满洲的陌生程度一样吗？在现代火力时代，俄国仍然梦想着雷鸣般的刺刀冲锋，寄希望于士兵的英勇，并期待战争能造就一位英雄统帅。<sup> 41</sup>涅兹纳莫夫断然推翻了苏沃洛夫及其众多追随者的观点，坚定地宣称：“火力决定胜负。”<sup> 42</sup>
Neznamov believed that Russia lost the war with Japan not because of poor communications, lack of popular support, the unfamiliar Manchurian terrain and vegetation, poor generals, or even the “general drift of government policy.” All of those factors had also been present in the days of Russia's military glory—was not Northern Italy just as unfamiliar to Suvorov's men as Manchuria's to Kuropatkin's? In the days of modern fire power, Russia still dreamt of thunderous bayonet charges, put its faith in the valor of its soldiers, and expected the war to give birth to a hero-commander.41 Decisively reversing Suvorov and the long line of his followers, Neznamov firmly asserted: “Fire decides battle.”42
第一次世界大战前夕，涅兹纳莫夫对战争形势的了解可谓无人能及。他探讨了在漫长战线上应对大规模军队的难题。他认为，战争的目标仍然是在一场速战速决的战斗中摧毁敌军，但他意识到，在他所设想的未来战争中，这样的结果不太可能实现。然而，他并未预见到堑壕战的僵局，而是预料到双方会持续在广阔的战线上部署大量兵力，并进行频繁的机动，试图包抄对方。他认为这种情况大概不会持续超过几个月，因此战争应该会很快结束。<sup> 43</sup>
On the eve of the First World War, Neznamov was probably as up to date as anyone could be. He discussed the problems of dealing with mass armies on extended fronts. The goal of war, he thought, remained the destruction of the enemy army in a quick decisive battle, but he realized that such an outcome was unlikely in the future war he attempted to describe. However, he did not foresee the stalemate of trench warfare, but expected the continued deployment of large forces over wide areas with considerable movement as each side tried to outflank the other, a scenario that presumably could not last for more than some months, so that the war would be short.43
与民族学派的成员一样，涅兹纳莫夫也以彼得大帝为榜样，但他对沙皇的解读与他们不同：
As did the members of the national school, Neznamov took Peter the Great as a model, but his interpretation of the czar differed from theirs:
彼得大帝凭借其卓越的智慧，无疑能够把握引进外来事物的利弊；他爱俄罗斯胜过爱自己的儿子，甚至为了俄罗斯的福祉而牺牲了儿子。他曾这样描述自己“模仿”的本质：“欧洲在未来几十年内对我们仍然必不可少，之后我们将弃之不顾。”他梦想着“我们将超越欧洲”。在某些方面，即便只是在军事领域，他也的确做到了！然而，历史总是惊人地相似，欧洲再次超越了我们。我们将再次沿用旧方法：迅速吸收现成的、最好的东西，并在国内加以改进，然后“弃之不顾”。<sup> 44</sup>
Peter the Great with his genius certainly recognized the boundary between the useful and the damaging in adopting foreign things; he loved Russia more than his own son, whom he sacrificed for its welfare. In his own words he thus described the nature of his “imitations”: “Europe is still necessary to us for several decades, after that we will turn our back to it.” He dreamed “that we would overtake and outstrip it.” In some ways so it was, even if only in military affairs! But then history repeated itself, and Europe overtook us again. And once again we will take up the old method; quickly take what is ready, what is best, and improve upon it at home and then “turn our backs” afterwards.44
显然，涅兹纳莫夫属于俄罗斯众多思想家和领导人的行列，他们认为俄罗斯可以而且应该借鉴西方，而不必担心丧失民族特性。这些人中有些是政府领导人，例如19世纪末的彼得一世、维特伯爵或米柳京；另一些则是持不同政见者，例如深受叶卡捷琳娜二世启蒙思想影响的亚历山大·拉季谢夫、涅兹纳莫夫时代的自由派立宪民主党领袖保罗·米柳科夫，以及列宁和其他马克思主义者。
Clearly Neznamov stood in that long line of Russian thinkers and leaders who believed that Russia could and should borrow from the West without worrying about losing its national identity. Some had been government leaders like Peter I, Count Witte in the late nineteenth century, or Miliutin; others were dissenters like Alexander Radishchev, who took Catherine's Enlightenment rhetoric to heart, Paul Miliukov, the leader of the liberal Cadet party in Neznamov's own day, or Lenin and other Marxists.
涅兹纳莫夫1911年出版《现代战争》时是一名上校，也是总参谋学院的教授。尽管他的上级可能读过他的著作，甚至部分赞同其中的观点，但他似乎不太可能影响到当时做出的重大战略决策，以及1914年及之后影响俄国政策的决策。他之所以重要且引人注目，是因为他代表了军事思想光谱中极端的“西方”立场。
Neznamov was a colonel when he published Sovremennaia voina in 1911, a professor at the General Staff academy. Although his seniors may have read his works and even approved of them in part, it seems unlikely that he influenced the major strategic decisions that were made in those years, and which affected Russian policy in 1914 and subsequently. He is important and interesting because he represents the extreme “Western” position in the spectrum of military thought.
第四
IV
在第一次世界大战前夕，那些参与或希望参与制定俄国战略的人员之间存在着意见分歧，这种分歧大致与理论家中的民族学派和学院派之间的分歧相对应。战争部长苏霍姆利诺夫是政策制定中的主导人物，也是民族学派元老德拉戈米罗夫的门生。在许多问题上与他持相反观点的是一群被称为“青年土耳其党”的军官，他们坚信西方技术和军事方法对俄军至关重要。这群军官包括戈洛温将军，他在革命后流亡海外期间著述颇丰，在西方享有盛名；以及阿列克谢耶夫将军，他于1914年担任重要的基辅军区司令。后者的影响力对最终实施的计划至关重要，该计划旨在战争初期同时进攻奥地利和德国。
Among the men who planned, or wished to plan, Russia's strategy on the eve of the First World War a division of opinion existed that very roughly corresponded to the division among theorists between the national school and the academics. Sukhomlinov, the minister of war and a dominant figure in the development of policy was a protégé of Dragomirov, the grand old man of the national school. Arrayed against his views on many matters was a group of officers known as the Young Turks who were convinced that Western technology and military methods were of central importance for the Russian army. This group included General Golovin, whose extensive writing as an émigré after the Revolution made him well known in the West, and General Alekseev, commander of the important Kiev Military District in 1914. The latter's influence was crucial in determining the plan put into effect, of attacking both Austria and Germany in the early weeks of the war.
事后看来，这一决定无疑是错误的，也是造成这一致命后果的结果。当时的地理现实和政治形势使得单独进攻中欧列强中的任何一方都极为困难。最终的结果是双方都无法取其轻的妥协。帝国的西部边界是俄属波兰，南邻奥匈帝国，西接德国，北与德国接壤。因此，它成为了一个暴露的突出部，极易受到来自南部奥属加利西亚和北部德属东普鲁士的钳形攻势。在日俄战争和1905年革命后的几年里，俄军的大部分兵力被调往国内安全部门，最高统帅部决定采取战略防御，放弃波兰的大部分领土，并在更东边建立一条防线，使其免受南北两翼的威胁。这符合当时的实际情况，也与“民族学派”的一些理念相符，该学派认为纵深防御是俄罗斯传统的一部分。然而，作为一项防御计划，它与当时几乎所有战略理论家普遍认为进攻行动通常是可取的观念相悖。
This fateful and, in retrospect, clearly mistaken decision was the result of geographical reality and political circumstances, which made it very difficult to attack only one or the other of the Central European powers. The outcome was an unhappy compromise that had the advantages of neither alternative. The western limit of the empire was Russian Poland, bordered by Austria-Hungary on the south and by Germany to the west and north. It was thus an exposed salient, vulnerable to a pincers movement from Austrian Galicia to the south and German East-Prussia to the north. In the years immediately after the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 revolution when much of the Russian army was diverted to internal security duties, the High Command decided on a strategic defensive that called for abandoning much of Poland and establishing a defensive line further to the east that would not be threatened from either the northern or southern flanks. This was consistent with reality and with some of the ideas of the “national school,” which recognized defense in depth as part of the Russian tradition. However, as a defensive plan it went counter to the widespread notion among virtually all strategic theorists of the day that offensive action was normally preferable.
1910年至1914年间，随着俄军实力的增强，与法国的联盟日益紧密，俄军对法国的信任与日俱增，对德国的恐惧也与日俱增，因此，作战计划进行了修订。陆军部长苏霍姆利诺夫和丹尼洛夫将军主张尽早对德国发动进攻，同时对奥地利保持防御姿态。德国是主要威胁，如果德国成功征服法国，俄军的处境将岌岌可危。因此，必须竭尽所能转移德国对法国的压力。然而，地理环境使得这一策略难以实施。从俄属波兰西部边境进攻柏林，将面临来自东普鲁士南部的德军侧翼攻击，很可能被切断退路。而进攻东普鲁士则因马祖里湖区难以逾越以及缺乏南北向铁路而更加复杂。俄军只能从东部进攻，从波兰北上，而德军则可以通过铁路东西调动，以应对俄军的两面夹击。最终，这正是俄军实际采取的策略。
Between 1910 and 1914 as the Russian army increased in strength, the alliance with France became closer, and as Russian confidence in the French and fear of the Germans grew, the plan was revised. Minister of War Sukhomlinov and General Danilov argued for the earliest possible offensive against Germany, while maintaining a defensive stance against Austria. Germany was the main threat and if the Germans succeeded in overwhelming France, Russia's position would be hopeless. Therefore it was essential to do everything possible to divert German pressure from France. But geography made this approach very difficult. An offensive from the western border of Russian Poland against Berlin would be exposed to German flank attacks south from East Prussia that might well cut it off. An offensive against East Prussia was complicated by the impenetrable Masurian Lakes region and the lack of north-south rail lines. The Russians could attack only from the east and march north from Poland while the German forces could be moved east and west by rail to deal with a two-pronged Russian attack. In the event this is what actually happened.
阿列克谢耶夫将军主张，与其立即对德国发动进攻，不如向南推进至奥地利加利西亚。奥俄边境易守难攻，即便俄军不进攻，也需要大量兵力来防范奥地利的进攻。因此，有人提出，何不向西、向南进军，进入斯拉夫友好民族聚居的地区？在那里取得早期胜利或许能迫使奥地利退出战争。该计划符合传统的泛斯拉夫主义情绪和反奥地利情绪，而且仅从地理角度来看，似乎更有可能迅速取得胜利。然而，最终的结果是，双方都试图迅速进攻奥地利和德国，这意味着任何一方都缺乏取得决定性胜利所需的资源。两种战略都有其合理之处，但没有人拥有足够的权威来坚持采用其中任何一种，最终导致了灾难性的妥协。45
The alternative to mounting an immediate offensive against Germany, advancing south into Austrian Galicia was advocated by General Alekseev. The Austro-Russia frontier was not easily defended, and even if the Russians did not attack, many troops would be needed to guard against an Austrian offensive. Therefore, the argument was, why not move west and south against Austria into territory inhabited by friendly Slavic peoples? An early success there might force Austria out of the war. The plan was consistent with traditional pan-Slav sentiments and anti-Austrian feelings, and for purely geographical reasons seemed to promise much greater prospects of rapid victory. The upshot of the disagreement was an attempt to attack both Austria and Germany quickly, which meant that neither offensive had the resources it needed to achieve a decisive success. Good arguments could be made for each strategy, but no one had sufficient authority to insist on one or the other and the result was a disastrous compromise.45
战前时期的主要军事作家中，没有一人属于那个主要负责决定俄国在战争初期实际行动的群体。最接近这一群体的是尼古拉·尼古拉·米赫涅维奇，他于1904年至1907年担任总参谋学院院长，并于1911年至1917年担任总参谋长。米赫涅维奇的战略教科书在20世纪初取代了里尔的著作，成为当时的经典之作。<sup> 46</sup>他是一位温和的民族主义者，立场介于涅兹纳莫夫的极端主义和库罗帕特金的极端主义之间。库罗帕特金是俄军在对日战争中战败的指挥官，他在1910年出版的三卷本《俄军史》中指出，自拿破仑战败以来，俄国由于日益西化和卷入欧洲事务，在精神和物质层面都遭到了削弱。尽管库罗帕特金并不反对采用现代军事技术，但他首先是一位浪漫的民族主义者，他认为“俄罗斯必须属于俄罗斯人”，而不是属于外国人或帝国的非俄罗斯公民。47
None of the major military writers of the prewar period belonged to the group that was primarily responsible for determining Russia's actual moves at the start of the war. The man who came closest was N. P. Mikhnevich, from 1904 to 1907 director of the General Staff Academy and from 1911 to 1917 chief of the general staff. Mikhnevich's textbook on strategy replaced Leer's as the standard at the beginning of the twentieth century.46 He was a moderate nationalist, somewhere between the extreme of Neznamov on one side and A. N. Kuropatkin on the other. Kuropatkin, the unsuccessful commander of the Russian armies in the war with Japan, argued in his three-volume history of the Russian army, published in 1910, that since the defeat of Napoleon, Russia had been weakened in both a spiritual and material sense by increased westernization and involvement in European affairs. Although not opposed to adopting modern military technology, Kuropatkin was first and foremost a romantic nationalist who believed that “Russia must belong to the Russians,” not to the foreigners or to the non-Russian citizens of the empire.47
米赫涅维奇是一位冷静而系统、熟悉西方军事思想的作家，他没有陷入任何民族主义的极端情绪，但他仍然能够在1898年写道：“我们的军事艺术几乎从未落后于欧洲，而且常常领先于欧洲，为欧洲从我们这里获得的战术和战略提供了方向和新思路。”<sup> 48</sup>与库罗帕特金一样，米赫涅维奇也清楚地意识到技术对战争的重大影响；他在1898年出版了一本名为《最新技术发明对军队战术的影响》的书。 <sup> 49</sup>在书中，他仔细地论述了各种新型和改进的武器，但最终得出结论：进攻与防御之间的平衡并没有真正改变，所有伟大的指挥官都更倾向于进攻，因为进攻能带来精神优势，并允许将力量集中在决定性地点。<sup> 50</sup>
A sober and systematic writer, familiar with Western military thought, Mikhnevich did not engage in any such nationalistic excesses, but he was nevertheless capable of writing in 1898: “Our military art has almost never lagged behind Europe and quite often advanced ahead of it, giving direction and new ideas in tactics and strategy which Europe acquired from us.”48 Like Kuropatkin, Mikhnevich was well aware that technology was having a major impact on warfare; he published a book in 1898 called The Influence of the Newest Technical Inventions on Army Tactics.49 In it he deals carefully with the various new and improved weapons, but concludes that the balance between attack and defense has not really been changed and that all great commanders preferred attack because it confers a moral advantage and permits concentration of effort at a decisive point.50
十五年后，即1913年，经历了日俄战争之后，米赫涅维奇的观点与苏沃洛夫的风格略有不同。他写道：“进攻行动能带来更大的收益，但只有在军队完成战略部署并做好充分准备，兵力充足的情况下才能进行。”<sup> 51</sup>这或许是对当时俄国战争计划的批评，该计划要求迅速转入进攻以支援法国。然而，米赫涅维奇强调精神力量的传统民族主义思想在他论述胜利的关键在于精神力量而非数量优势时显露无疑。他量化了这两个因素的相对重要性，指出胜利四分之三取决于精神力量，四分之一取决于物质因素。此外，为了证明俄国卓越的军事精神，米赫涅维奇列举表格，表明几个世纪以来，欧洲军队在与俄军作战时的伤亡率高于与其他欧洲军队作战时的伤亡率。最后，回到技术问题上，他得出结论：军队的武器必须与敌军的武器一样好，这并非因为先进武器的效能更高，而是因为劣质武器会打击士气。<sup> 52</sup>与涅兹纳莫夫和当时许多欧洲作家不同，米赫涅维奇否定了“闪电战”的概念，并认为俄罗斯相对于更发达的欧洲工业国家具有优势，因为动员劳动力会扰乱这些国家的经济：“因此，时间是我们军队最好的盟友，正因如此，我们采取‘消耗战’战略并非危险之举，初期应避免在边境与敌军进行决定性交战，以免敌军兵力占优。”<sup> 53</sup>这种观点让人想起古列维奇，它与通常认为经济落后并非优势的民族主义观点有所不同，尽管库图佐夫击败拿破仑的例子或许可以作为佐证。民族学派通常更倾向于强调俄罗斯士兵精神优势的积极方面。当然，米赫涅维奇对发达工业经济体的脆弱性判断是错误的——但第一次世界大战前夕，几乎所有其他欧洲和俄罗斯作家都犯了同样的错误。
Fifteen years later, in 1913, after the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, Mikhnevich was somewhat less Suvorov-like when he wrote: “Offensive action reaps greater benefits, but can only be undertaken when the army has completed its strategic deployment, and is fully prepared with sufficient forces.”51 Possibly this was a criticism of Russia's war plans at the time, which called for a very rapid move to the offensive in order to support France. Nevertheless, the traditional national-school emphasis on moral force is evident when he argues that superiority of forces is essential to victory not merely in numbers but in moral force as well. He quantifies the relative importance of the two factors, saying that victory depends three-fourths on moral force and one-fourth on material factors. Furthermore, to demonstrate Russia's superior military spirit, Mikhnevich presents tables showing that European armies over the centuries have suffered higher casualty rates fighting Russian soldiers than in fighting other Europeans. Finally, returning to the question of technology, he concludes that an army's weapons must be as good as its enemies', not so much because of the greater effectiveness of superior ones, but because having inferior weapons hurts morale.52 In contrast to Neznamov and many European writers of the time, Mikhnevich rejected the notion of a “lightning war” and argued that Russia had an advantage over the more developed European industrial states, whose economies would be disrupted by the mobilization of labor: “Thus time is the best ally of our military forces, and for that reason it is not dangerous for us to follow ‘a strategy of attrition and exhaustion,’ initially avoiding decisive engagements with the enemy on the border when the superiority of forces may be on its side.”53 This opinion, which recalls Gulevich, was something of a departure from the usual national view that discounted economic backwardness as an advantage, despite the possible example of Kutuzov's defeat of Napoleon. The national school had generally preferred to emphasize the more positive quality of the spiritual advantage of the Russian soldier. Mikhnevich, of course, was wrong about the vulnerability of advanced industrial economies—but so was almost every other writer, European and Russian, on the eve of World War I.
V
V
本文的目的并非暗示俄西关系是俄罗斯战略思想的唯一议题。文中简要提及的人物，以及一些未被提及的人物，都是博学睿智的专业人士，他们的著作涵盖了诸多主题：动员、后勤、不同类型兵种（步兵、炮兵、骑兵等）的协调、作战和战略规划等等。然而，正是俄罗斯的特殊性问题，将俄罗斯战略思想家与其他欧洲学者区分开来，同时也构成了他们与其他领域俄罗斯思想家之间的思想纽带。无论他们是热切的西化派，还是俄罗斯特殊优势的坚定拥护者，他们都不得不面对三重困境：俄罗斯辉煌的军事历史、十九世纪和二十世纪令人沮丧的经历，以及作为专业人士，他们希望在俄罗斯其他领域成就日益获得世界认可的世界中保持尊严的愿望。
It has not been the purpose of this essay to suggest that the relationship between Russia and the West was the only issue in Russian strategic thought. The men who have been discussed briefly, and others who have not even been mentioned, were well-informed, perceptive professionals and their works dealt with many subjects: mobilization, logistics, the coordination of different types of forces (infantry, artillery, cavalry, etc.), operational and strategic planning, and so forth. However, it is the issue of Russia's special characteristics that separates Russian strategic thinkers from other European writers on the subject and also provides the intellectual link between them and Russian thinkers in other fields. Whether they were eager westernizers or the most ardent believers in Russia's special advantages, all had to grapple with the threefold problem of the glorious Russian military past, the depressing experiences of the nineteenth and twentieth century, and their wish as professionals to hold their heads up in a world where Russian achievements in other fields were gaining worldwide recognition.
人们很容易将民族学派斥为一群愚蠢的浪漫主义者，认为他们忽视了当时的现实技术，但这样做是错误的。战斗的意志，即甘愿冒生命危险的精神，对任何军队都至关重要。即使在最糟糕的指挥官手下，更不用说像苏沃洛夫这样富有远见的领袖，俄国士兵也反复证明，无论在国内还是国外，他们都会以惊人的韧性战斗。这无疑是一项宝贵的财富，忽视它是愚蠢的。它恰好与知识分子渴望满足自身对欧洲的自信需求不谋而合，这只是偶然。然而，对道德力量和精神的强调似乎并未渗透到军官队伍的底层，因此对士兵的悲惨生活以及他们与军官之间的关系几乎没有产生任何影响。尽管如此，前线士兵在1917年二月革命后仍然保持忠诚，这表明民族学派的倡导者们对俄国农民士兵的本质的判断在某种程度上是正确的。
It is easy to dismiss the national school as foolish romantics who ignored the technical realities of their own time, yet to do so would be a mistake. The will to fight, to risk death, is essential for any army. Russian soldiers under the worst of commanders, not to mention inspired leaders like Suvorov, had proven repeatedly that they would fight both at home and abroad with impressive tenacity. This was unquestionably an asset that it would have been foolish to ignore. That it dovetailed nicely with the desire of intellectuals to satisfy their own need for confidence relative to Europe is incidental. But the emphasis on the importance of moral force, of spirit, seems not to have penetrated the lower levels of the officer corps, and thus had little effect on the miserable life of the enlisted men and the relationship between them and their officers. That the soldiers at the front remained loyal until after the February 1917 revolution suggests that, nevertheless, the exponents of the national school were to some degree correct about the nature of the Russian peasant soldier.
但这两种思想流派并非本质上水火不容；归根结底，只是侧重点不同而已。“学院派”并不否认士气和精神的重要性，而民族主义者也认识到现代武器必不可少。或许只有在俄罗斯，由于俄欧关系这一更为敏感的问题，才会出现对军事行动中这两个关键要素的侧重，最终演变成持续数代的战略思想分歧。
But the two schools of thought were not fundamentally incompatible; it was after all, a matter of emphasis. “Academics” did not deny the importance of morale and spirit, and nationalists recognized that modern weapons were essential. Perhaps only in Russia, because of the sensitive nature of the broader issue of Russia and Europe, could emphasis on one or the other of these two essential aspects of a military effort have come to be the basis of a division in strategic thought that lasted for generations.
1 Walter M. Pintner，“1725-1914 年沙皇俄国的国防负担”，《俄罗斯评论》 43，第 3 期（1984 年），256-57 页。
1 Walter M. Pintner, “The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725–1914,” The Russian Review 43, no. 3 (1984), 256–57.
例如，19世纪中叶的两位俄罗斯民族主义者认为，俄罗斯农民村庄的土地分配制是一种可以追溯到远古时期的古老民族传统，因此它体现了俄罗斯民族性格的某些特征。至于它究竟体现了什么，则取决于作者的政治立场。后来人们认识到，土地分配制公社通常是一种相对较新的制度，它是彼得大帝统治时期税收制度改革的产物。参见杰罗姆·布鲁姆， 《9至19世纪俄罗斯的领主与农民》（普林斯顿，1961年），第504-535页。
2 Russian nationalists in the mid-nineteenth century decided, for example, that the Russian peasant village system of repartitional tenure was an ancient national tradition going back to early times and that therefore it demonstrated something about Russian national character. Exactly what it demonstrated depended on the political stance of the writer. Later it was established that the repartitional commune was generally a relatively new institution that developed as a response to changes in the taxation system in the reign of Peter the Great. Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 1961), 504–535.
3 Walter M. Pintner，“18世纪俄罗斯的军事风格、俄罗斯社会和俄罗斯权力”，载于AG Cross编，《 18世纪的俄罗斯与西方》 （马萨诸塞州牛顿维尔，1983年），第262-270页。另见Pintner，“负担”，第251页。
3 Walter M. Pintner, “Russia's Military Style, Russian Society, and Russian Power in the Eighteenth Century,” in Russia and the West in the Eighteenth Century, ed. A. G. Cross (Newtonville, Mass., 1983), 262–70. See also Pintner, “Burden,” 251.
4 Pintner，“俄罗斯的军事风格”，262–70。
4 Pintner, “Russia's Military Style,” 262–70.
5 Philip Longworth，《胜利的艺术：苏沃洛夫将军的生平与成就，1729–1800》（纽约，1965 年），第 10 章。
5 Philip Longworth, The Art of Victory: The Life and Achievements of Generalissimo Suvorov, 1729–1800 (New York, 1965), ch. 10.
6这部作品的标题常被译为《胜利的科学》 ，但这歪曲了“nauka”一词在该语境中的含义以及作品的实际性质。或许更准确但略显拗口的译名是《制胜的实用智慧》。他的另一部主要作品是《苏兹达尔规章》（1765年），这是一部他早期创作的训练手册。关于《胜利的科学》，参见A. V. Suvorov，《文献集》，G. P. Meshchenakov编（莫斯科，1952年），第3卷，第501-508页；关于参见A. V. Suvorov， 《实战指南》（莫斯科，1948年），该书也收录于A. V. Suvorov，《文献集》 （莫斯科，1949年），第1卷，第73-168页。
6 The title is often translated as The Science of Victory, which distorts the meaning of nauka in that context and the actual nature of the work. Perhaps even more accurate, if awkward, would be Practical Wisdom for Winning. His other major work was the “Suzdal' Regulations” (1765), a training manual written early in his career. See A. V. Suvorov, Dokumenty, ed. G. P. Meshchenakov (Moscow, 1952), 3:501–508, for Nauka pobezhdat', and A. V. Suvorov, Polkovoe uchrezhdenie (Moscow, 1948), for the “Suzdal' Regulations,” which are also in A. V. Suvorov, Dokumenty (Moscow, 1949), 1:73–168.
7克劳塞维茨和约米尼都曾为俄国效力，克劳塞维茨效力时间很短，而约米尼则效力了大半辈子。
7 Both Clausewitz and Jomini were at times in Russian service, Clausewitz briefly and Jomini for much of his life.
8 John LH Keep，“俄罗斯军队对法国大革命的反应”， Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas 28，第 1 期。 4（1980），515-16； EA Prokof'ev， Borha Dekabristov za peredovoe russkoe voennoe iskusstvo（莫斯科，1953 年），109–28； Peter HC Von Wahlde，“俄罗斯帝国的军事思想”（博士论文，印第安纳大学，1966 年），47-49。
8 John L. H. Keep, “The Russian Army's Response to the French Revolution,” Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas 28, no. 4 (1980), 515–16; E. A. Prokof'ev, Borha Dekabristov za peredovoe russkoe voennoe iskusstvo (Moscow, 1953), 109–28; Peter H. C. Von Wahlde, “Military Thought in Imperial Russia” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1966), 47–49.
例如，尼古拉一世支持基谢廖夫对国家农民管理机构进行广泛的重组，并授权修建俄罗斯的第一条铁路，尽管他的一些较为传统的顾问对此表示反对（沃尔特·M·平特纳，《尼古拉一世时期的俄罗斯经济政策》 [伊萨卡，1967]，131-52）。
9 Nicholas, for example, supported Kiselev's extensive reorganization of the state peasant administration and authorized the building of the first railroads in Russia, despite opposition from his more traditional advisors (Walter M. Pintner, Russian Economic Policy under Nicholas I [Ithaca, 1967], 131–52).
10 GA Leer，《军事问题》（圣彼得堡，1897 年），第 33 页，引自 Von Wahlde，“军事思想”，第 59 页。
10 G. A. Leer, Korennye voprosy (St. Petersburg, 1897), 33, as quoted by Von Wahlde, “Military Thought,” 59.
11 Walter M. Pintner，“民事官僚机构的演变，1755–1855”，载于《俄罗斯官僚机构：从十七世纪到二十世纪俄罗斯社会的官僚化》，Walter M. Pintner 和 Don Karl Rowney 编辑（教堂山，1980 年），第 209 页；Pintner，“负担”，第 254–57 页。
11 Walter M. Pintner, “The Evolution of Civil Officialdom, 1755–1855,” in Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, ed. Walter M. Pintner and Don Karl Rowney (Chapel Hill, 1980), 209; Pintner, “Burden,” 254–57.
12 NV Medem，《战术》（圣彼得堡，1837 年），第 7-8 页、第 32-39 页，引自 Von Wahlde，《军事思想》，第 37 页。
12 N. V. Medem, Taktika (St. Petersburg, 1837), 7–8, 32–39, as cited in Von Wahlde, “Military Thought,” 37.
13 GP Meshcheriakov， Russkata voennaia mysl' v XIX v.（莫斯科，1973 年），94，援引 MI Dragomirov， Uchebnik taktiki（圣彼得堡，1879 年），xxv。
13 G. P. Meshcheriakov, Russkata voennaia mysl' v XIX v. (Moscow, 1973), 94, citing M. I. Dragomirov, Uchebnik taktiki (St. Petersburg, 1879), xxv.
14 MI Bogdanovich， Zapiski o strategii。 Pravila vedettita voiny、tsvelechennye iz socbienenii Napoleona、ertsgertsoga Karla、generala Zhomini i drugtkh pisatelei（圣彼得堡，1847 年），pt。 2，第 324-36 页，引用自冯·瓦尔德 (Von Wahlde)，“军事思想”，第 72-73 页。
14 M. I. Bogdanovich, Zapiski o strategii. Pravila vedettita voiny, tsvelechennye iz socbienenii Napoleona, ertsgertsoga Karla, generala Zhomini i drugtkh pisatelei (St. Petersburg, 1847), pt. 2, pp. 324–36, as cited in Von Wahlde, “Military Thought,” 72–73.
15有关每场战役的讨论，请参阅约翰·谢尔顿·柯蒂斯所著《尼古拉一世统治下的俄国军队，1825-1855》（达勒姆，1965 年），第 2、4、8 和 15 章。
15 For a discussion of each campaign see John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825–1855 (Durham, 1965), chs. 2, 4, 8, and 15.
16 AA Shcherbatov, General' Feldmarshal Kniaz' Paskevich, Ego zhizn' i deitatel'nost' (圣彼得堡，1894 年)，4:167, 174，引用了 1831 年沙皇手写的备忘录。
16 A. A. Shcherbatov, General' Feldmarshal Kniaz' Paskevich, Ego zhizn' i deitatel'nost' (St. Petersburg, 1894), 4:167, 174, quoting a handwritten memorandum of the czar from 1831.
17 Robert F. Baumann，“1870-1874 年俄罗斯普遍兵役制的辩论”（耶鲁大学博士论文，1982 年），第 3 页，引用了中央国家军事历史档案馆一份未发表的文件，日期为 1870 年。
17 Robert F. Baumann, “The Debate over Universal Military Service in Russia, 1870–1874” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1982), 3, citing an unpublished document from the Central State Military Historical Archive, dated 1870.
18 Pintner，“负担”，240–45。
18 Pintner, “Burden,” 240–45.
19有关这群杰出的改革官僚的起源和发展的精彩讨论，请参阅 W. Bruce Lincoln 的《改革先锋》（De Kalb，111，1983）。
19 For an excellent discussion of the origins and development of this remarkable group of reforming bureaucrats see W. Bruce Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform (De Kalb, 111., 1983).
20 Forrestt A. Miller，《德米特里·米柳京与俄罗斯的改革时代》（纳什维尔，1968 年），第 19-20 页。
20 Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, 1968), 19–20.
21 Dmitrii A. Miliutin， Istoriia voiny s Frantsieiu v Tsarsvovanie Imperatora Pavla I，v 1799 godu，5 卷。 （圣彼得堡，1852-55），5:115，冯·瓦尔德引用，“军事思想”，70。
21 Dmitrii A. Miliutin, Istoriia voiny s Frantsieiu v Tsarsvovanie Imperatora Pavla I, v 1799 godu, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1852–55), 5:115, as cited by Von Wahlde, “Military Thought,” 70.
22 David R. Jones，“中央军事（1917 年以前）的行政系统和决策过程”，《俄罗斯和苏联军事海军百科全书》（佛罗里达州海湾微风，1980 年），第 108-130 页。
22 David R. Jones, “Administrative System and Policy-Making Process, Central Military (before 1917),” The Mrfitary-Naval Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union (Gulf Breeze, Fla., 1980), 108–30.
23参见阿尔弗雷德·J·里伯编，《专制政治：亚历山大二世致巴里亚京斯基亲王的信，1857-1864》（巴黎和海牙，1966年）以及丹尼尔·菲尔德，《农奴制的终结：俄国的贵族与官僚制度，1855-1861》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1976年）。里伯在第15-58页论证，实行普遍征兵制和后备役制度的愿望是解放的主要原因。菲尔德在其对这一主题最全面的西方研究中，并不接受这一观点（见第二章）。
23 Alfred J. Rieber, ed., The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, 1857–1864 (Paris and The Hague, 1966) and Daniel Field, The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855–1861 (Cambridge, Mass., 1976). Rieber argues on pages 15–58 that the desire to have general conscription and a reserve system was the main reason for emancipation. Field, in the most extensive Western study of the subject, does not accept this position (see ch. 2).
24鲍曼，《辩论》，134，引用了莫斯科列宁图书馆手稿部米留京收藏的一份未发表的文件。
24 Baumann, “Debate,” 134, citing an unpublished document in the Miliutin collection in the manuscript division of the Lenin library in Moscow.
25同上，第 34 页。
25 Ibid., 34.
26军官总数中约有一半是世袭贵族的子嗣，超过三分之一是“私人贵族”的子嗣，即那些为国家效力但在其子出生时尚未晋升到足以使其子嗣获得世袭地位的贵族。其余军官则出身非贵族家庭，最常见的是士兵之子。参见 Curtiss，《俄罗斯军队》，176-77、189-90；Peter Kenez，“革命前军官团概况”，《加州斯拉夫研究》 7 (1973)，121-45。
26 About half of the total officer corps were sons of hereditary nobles, and over one-third sons of “personal nobles,” that is, of men who served the state but who had not risen high enough in the table of ranks at the time of their son's birth to confer hereditary status on him. The remainder came from non-noble backgrounds, most commonly sons of soldiers. Curtiss, The Russian Army, 176–77, 189–90; Peter Kenez, “A Profile of the Pre-revolutionary Officer Corps,” California Slavic Studies 7 (1973), 121–45.
27 Pintner，“负担”，245–48。
27 Pintner, “Burden,” 245–48.
28 AA Gulevich， Voina t narodnoe khoziaistvo（圣彼得堡，1898 年），15–16、23–32。
28 A. A. Gulevich, Voina t narodnoe khoziaistvo (St. Petersburg, 1898), 15–16, 23–32.
29伊万·S·布利奥赫，《技术、经济和政治学中的思想》，5卷（圣彼得堡，1898年）。该书还以波兰语、法语和德语出版，卷数不一，部分内容为英语。参见下文第18篇论文中对布洛赫的讨论。
29 Ivan S. Bliokh, Budushchata votna v tekhmcheskom, ekonomischeskom ipoliticheskom otnosheniiakh, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1898). It was also published in varying numbers of volumes in Polish, French, and German versions, and partially in English. See the discussion of Bloch in essay 18, below.
30冯·瓦尔德，《军事思想》，104。
30 Von Wahlde, “Military Thought,” 104.
31 DF Maslovskii， Stroevaia i polleaia sluzbba russkikh voisk vremen Imperatora Petra Velikaga i Imperatritsy Elizavety（圣彼得堡，1883 年），6-7；另见他的Zapiski po istorii voennago iskusstva v Rossii（圣彼得堡，1891 年），1:4。
31 D. F. Maslovskii, Stroevaia i polevaia sluzbba russkikh voisk vremen Imperatora Petra Velikaga i Imperatritsy Elizavety (St. Petersburg, 1883), 6–7; see also his Zapiski po istorii voennago iskusstva v Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1891), 1:4.
32德拉戈米罗夫，《战术学》。德拉戈米罗夫著作颇丰，著述颇丰。梅谢里亚科夫在其著作《俄罗斯军事思想》第302页列出了他的九部专著和四卷论文集。
32 Dragomirov, Uchebmk taktiki. Dragomirov was a prolific author of books and articles. Meshcheriakov, in Russkaia voennata mysl', lists nine monographs and four volumes of collected essays on page 302.
33 MI Dragomirov， Uchebnik taktiki，1906 年编辑，in Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl' XIX in nachala XX vekov，编辑。 LG Beskrovnyi（莫斯科，1960 年），346。
33 M. I. Dragomirov, Uchebnik taktiki, 1906 ed., in Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl' XIX i nachala XX vekov, ed. L. G. Beskrovnyi (Moscow, 1960), 346.
34 MI Dragomirov，“Podgotovka voisk v mirnoe vremia (vospitanie i obrazovanie)”（基辅，1906 年）， Izbrannye trudy（莫斯科，1956 年），603。
34 M. I. Dragomirov, “Podgotovka voisk v mirnoe vremia (vospitanie i obrazovanie)” (Kiev, 1906) in Izbrannye trudy (Moscow, 1956), 603.
35在 1868 年至 1880 年间，他的至少四部作品以德语出版，1894 年有一部作品以法语出版。
35 Between 1868 and 1880 at least four of his works appeared in German and one, in 1894, in French.
36关于 Leer，请参阅 Meshcheriakov， Russkata voennaia mysl'，200–202.、246–47。
36 On Leer see Meshcheriakov, Russkata voennaia mysl', 200–202., 246–47.
37 William C. Fuller, Jr.，《沙皇俄国的军民冲突》（普林斯顿，1985 年），第 5-8 章。另见 John S. Bushnell，“叛乱者和革命者：1905-1907 年俄国的军事革命”（印第安纳大学博士论文，1977 年）。
37 William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia (Princeton, 1985), chaps. 5–8. See also John S. Bushnell, “Mutineers and Revolutionaries: Military Revolution in Russia, 1905–7” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1977).
38这一点要归功于威廉·富勒。
38 I owe this point to William Fuller.
39 AA Neznamov， Sovremennaia voina。 Detstvtia pollot armii（圣彼得堡，1911 年；第 2 版，1912 年）。
39 A. A. Neznamov, Sovremennaia voina. Detstvtia polevot armii (St. Petersburg, 1911; 2d ed., 1912).
40 Neznamov, Sovremennaia voina , 1911 ed., 9. 强调原文。
40 Neznamov, Sovremennaia voina, 1911 ed., 9. Emphasis in original.
41同上，第 vi 页。
41 Ibid., vi.
42 AA Neznamov，Tekushchie voennye voprosy（圣彼得堡，1909 年），56，引用自 Von Wahlde，“军事思想”，321。
42 A. A. Neznamov, Tekushchie voennye voprosy (St. Petersburg, 1909), 56, as cited by Von Wahlde, “Military Thought,” 321.
43 Neznamov，“Sovremennaia voina”，1912 年编辑，Beskrovnyi，Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl'，557–61、567、624；涅兹纳莫夫，“Plan voiny”（圣彼得堡，1913 年），Beskrovnyi，Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl'，673–93；另请参见冯·瓦尔德 (Von Wahlde) 中对内兹纳莫夫 (Neznamov) 的讨论，“军事思想”，223-33。
43 Neznamov, “Sovremennaia voina,” 1912 ed., in Beskrovnyi, Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl', 557–61, 567, 624; Neznamov, “Plan voiny” (St. Petersburg, 1913), in Beskrovnyi, Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl', 673–93; see also the discussion of Neznamov in Von Wahlde, “Military Thought,” 223–33.
44涅兹纳莫夫，“计划 voiny”，714。
44 Neznamov, “Plan voiny,” 714.
45参见杰克·斯奈德，《欧洲战争计划中的进攻崇拜，1870-1914》（伊萨卡，1984 年），第 6、7 章，以及诺曼·斯通，《东线，1914-1917》（伦敦和纽约，1975 年），第 1、2 章。关于战争计划的主要俄罗斯资料来源是 A.M. 扎伊翁奇科夫斯基，《俄罗斯帝国战争计划》（莫斯科，1926 年）。
45 See Jack Snyder, The Cult of the Offensive in European War Planning, 1870–1914 (Ithaca, 1984), chs. 6, 7, and Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (London and New York, 1975), chs. 1, 2. The principal Russian source on war plans is A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialtsicheskoi voine (Moscow, 1926).
46 NP Mikhnevich，战略，2 卷。 （圣彼得堡，1899-1901）。
46 N. P. Mikhnevich, Strategiia, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1899–1901).
47 AN Kuropatkin， Zadachi russkoi armii（圣彼得堡，1910 年），1：i-iii，3：189。
47 A. N. Kuropatkin, Zadachi russkoi armii (St. Petersburg, 1910), 1:i-iii, 3:189.
48 NP Mikhnevich， Osnovy russkogo voennogo iskusstva。 Sravnitel'nyi ocherk sostoianiia voennogo iskusstva v Rossii i zapadnoi Evrope v vazhneishie istoricheskie epokhi（圣彼得堡，1898 年），9-10，引用于 Von Wahlde，“军事思想”，206。
48 N. P. Mikhnevich, Osnovy russkogo voennogo iskusstva. Sravnitel'nyi ocherk sostoianiia voennogo iskusstva v Rossii i zapadnoi Evrope v vazhneishie istoricheskie epokhi (St. Petersburg, 1898), 9–10, as quoted in Von Wahlde, “Military Thought,” 206.
49 NP Mikhnevich， Vlitanie noveishtkh tekhntchesktkh izobretenii na taktiku voisk（圣彼得堡，1898 年）。
49 N. P. Mikhnevich, Vlitanie noveishtkh tekhntchesktkh izobretenii na taktiku voisk (St. Petersburg, 1898).
50 Mikhnevich，Beskrovnyi 的“Vliianie”， Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl'，415、426。
50 Mikhnevich, “Vliianie” in Beskrovnyi, Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl', 415, 426.
51 NP Mikhnevich，“Osnovy strategii”（圣彼得堡，1913 年），Beskrovnyi， Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl'，463。
51 N. P. Mikhnevich, “Osnovy strategii” (St. Petersburg, 1913), in Beskrovnyi, Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl', 463.
52同上，464、467-69。
52 Ibid., 464, 467–69.
53同上，461。
53 Ibid., 461.
14. 比若、加列尼、利奥泰：《法国殖民战争的发展》
14. Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare
C殖民地战争一直是军事史上较为被忽视的领域之一。就十九世纪而言，这种情况尤其令人费解，因为从滑铁卢战役到马恩河战役，英法两国军队的主要军事经验都发生在欧洲之外。1815年至1914年间，英国只与一个欧洲对手交战——克里米亚战争中的俄国。诚然，法国在欧洲大陆扮演了更为活跃的军事角色，尤其是在拿破仑三世统治时期。然而，在1830年至1854年间，法国一百个步兵团中有六十七个在北非服役，平均服役六年，而且第二帝国时期的大多数高级将领都是“非洲人”。在第一次世界大战爆发前欧洲列强之间长达四十三年的和平时期，殖民地是法国士兵唯一可能听到枪声的地方。殖民地服役是法国军队中一条颇受欢迎的晋升途径。因此，毫不奇怪，1914年以前法国一些最具影响力的军官拥有丰富的殖民地经验：霞飞和加列尼，以及众多名气较小的军官，包括弗朗谢·德斯佩雷、芒金、古罗、亨利和菲利波，他们都在战争中晋升到了高级军衔。事实上，无论是1870年还是1914年，法国最高统帅部中的殖民地因素都如此显著，以至于法国在两次世界大战中军事表现不佳的原因常常被归咎于在欧洲错误地应用了殖民地发展起来的作战方法。批评家尤其强调殖民地服役与第一次世界大战初期几个月里那些血腥而徒劳的进攻之间的联系，而这种联系正是由路易·德·格朗梅松上校所揭示的。这位殖民地军官作为第三局局长，启发了1913年步兵条例的制定，该条例正式批准了“突击进攻”（offing à outrance）。
COLONIAL WARFARE remains one of the more neglected areas of military history. This is particularly strange when it comes to the nineteenth century, because the major military experience of both the British and the French armies between Waterloo and the Marne lay outside of Europe. The British fought only one European opponent between 1815 and 1914—Russia in the Crimea. The French, it is true, played a more active military role on the continent of Europe, especially under Napoleon III. However, between 1830 and 1854, sixty-seven of France's one hundred line infantry regiments saw an average of six years' service in North Africa and most of the senior generals during the Second Empire were “Africains.” In the forty-three-year period of peace between the major European powers that preceded the outbreak of the First World War, the colonies were the only place where a French soldier might hear a shot fired in anger. Colonial service offered one of the favored paths of advancement in the French army. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that some of the most influential soldiers in pre-1914 France possessed substantial colonial experience: Joffre and Galliéni, together with a host of lesser-known officers, including Franchet d'Esperey, Mangin, Gouraud, Henrys, and Philipot, who were to rise to high rank in the war. In fact, so conspicuous was the colonial element in ‘the French High Command both in 1870 and in 1914 that the blame for France's poor military performance in both wars has often been based on the misplaced application in Europe of methods of warfare developed in the colonies. Critics especially stressed the link between colonial service and the murderous and futile attacks of the early months of the First World War that was provided by Colonel Louis de Grandmaison, a colonial soldier who, as chief of the 3e Bureau, inspired the infantry Regulations of 1913, which officially sanctioned the offensive à outrance.
法国海外军队以其适应欧洲以外地区全新战争环境的能力而自豪。几乎从1830年踏上北非的那一刻起，许多非洲军团的士兵就开始展现出“融入当地”的愿望，而这正是法国殖民征服方式的典型特征。许多士兵在阿尔及利亚穿着色彩鲜艳、非洲化的制服，这无疑是他们致力于像变色龙一样适应新环境的最直观体现。尽管英国海外军队也从被征服民族中招募士兵，并对当地传统做出一些让步，但其殖民地部队本质上仍然是按照欧洲模式组建的。然而，法国士兵不仅吸收了他们在非洲遇到的服饰，也吸收了当地的战术。事实上，在他们看来，其殖民方法的优势在于能够利用昔日敌人的“天然”战斗能力和作战风格，将其转化为法国殖民征服的强大动力。法国人并没有试图将他们的当地新兵欧洲化。相反，他们希望这些国家能够按照传统的战争方式进行作战，但要在法国的指导下，为了法国的利益而进行。
The French army abroad prided itself on its ability to adapt to the new conditions of warfare that it met outside of Europe. Almost from the moment they set foot in North Africa in 1830, many soldiers of the armée d'Afrique began to exhibit the desire to “go native” that was to characterize the French approach to colonial conquest. The colorful, Africanized uniforms adopted by many soldiers in Algeria simply offered the most visible evidence of their commitment to adapt, chameleon-like, to their new environment. Although the British army abroad recruited among conquered peoples and made some concessions to native tradition, its colonial regiments were essentially cast in a European mold. French soldiers, however, adopted not only the dress but also the tactics they encountered in Africa. Indeed, the strength of their colonial methods in their own judgment lay in their ability to harness the “natural” fighting abilities and styles of warfare of their erstwhile enemies to the juggernaut of French colonial conquest. The French did not seek to Europeanize their native recruits. Rather, they wanted them to practice their traditional methods of warfare, but under the guiding hand, and in the interests, of France.
法国在非洲的战略战术不仅受敌方制约，也深受地形的限制。在荒凉偏远的地区作战，面对行踪诡秘的敌人，法军被迫放弃适用于欧洲的作战方式。在非洲，机动性、小规模作战和出其不意比兵力优势和传统后勤保障更为重要。
French strategy and tactics in Africa were not only dictated by the enemy. They were also determined by the nature of the terrain. Campaigning over barren and remote areas, against an often-elusive foe, French soldiers were forced to abandon methods of fighting suitable to Europe. Mobility, small-unit operations, and surprise became more important in Africa than weight of numbers and conventional logistics.
因此，我们对法国殖民军队的普遍看法是，存在一种“殖民战争学派”，其主要理论由比若在阿尔及利亚发展而来，后经加列尼在东京和利奥泰在摩洛哥完善。这一“殖民战争学派”的出现源于法国士兵在海外遇到的新情况。由于被孤立在非洲和印度支那，法国殖民士兵逐渐脱离了欧洲战争的现实。他们因战胜装备简陋、组织涣散的当地居民而受到鼓舞，将非洲的经验带回欧洲，并试图将其应用于完全不适用的环境中。因此，1914年法国在欧洲的军事失败，很大一部分责任都落在了这些人的肩上。
Our received view of the French colonial army, then, is that there existed a “colonial school” of warfare whose main theories were developed by Bugeaud in Algeria and later refined by Galliéni in Tonkin and Lyautey in Morocco. This “colonial school” came into being because of the new conditions that French soldiers met abroad. Isolated in Africa and Indochina, French colonial soldiers lost touch with the realities of European warfare. Encouraged by their successes against poorly armed and organized natives, they transferred their African experience back to Europe and sought to apply it in conditions that were entirely inappropriate. Therefore, a large share of the blame for French military shortcomings in Europe in 1914 has fallen upon the shoulders of these men.
这种观点需要更深入的探讨。鉴于法国在海外军事经验的丰富多样，法军遭遇的对手实力参差不齐，以及作战环境的极端地形和气候条件，要提炼出一套适用于所有情况的战术原则，即使并非不可能，也绝非易事。关于殖民经验对法国的影响，人们已经谈论了很多。但是，本土军队，或者说“欧洲”思维，在殖民地究竟产生了多大的影响？此外，考虑到19世纪和20世纪法国军民关系的持续恶化，以及大多数法国人对殖民主义的漠视，有时甚至是敌视，政治因素或民众的偏见是否对法国军队在海外的发展产生了一定的影响？简而言之，法国军队中是否存在像利奥泰等人所认为的那样的“殖民主义”战争模式？或者，殖民主义的作战方法仅仅是反复试验的产物，甚至可能受到一些并非源自非洲的因素的影响？最后，殖民地军事经验在多大程度上影响了 1914 年之前法国在欧洲的军事方法？
This view needs closer examination. Given the great variety of French military experience abroad, the different levels of sophistication of the opponents French troops encountered, and the extremes of terrain and climate in which they fought, it must have been difficult, if not impossible, to distill a set of tactical principles applicable in all situations. Much has been said about the influence of the colonial experience in France. But how important was the influence of the metropolitan army, of “European” thinking, in the colonies? Also, given the steady deterioration of civil-military relations in France during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the basic indifference, and at times downright hostility, of most Frenchmen to colonialism, might not politics or popular prejudices have had some influence on the development of the French army abroad? In short, did there exist in the French army a “colonial school” of warfare as Lyautey and others suggest,1 or were colonial methods no more than the product of trial and error and perhaps of factors that were not even African in origin? And lastly, how far did the colonial military experience influence French methods in Europe before 1914?
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如果说法国存在一种“殖民地战争学派”，那么其创始人无疑是托马斯-罗伯特·比若元帅。比若曾是拿破仑战争的老兵，在西班牙服役多年。在波旁王朝复辟期间被迫退役的几年里，他一直在思考法国战败的原因。1830年七月革命后，他重返军队，此时他对反叛乱战争的见解已相当成熟。尽管他在1836年曾在阿尔及利亚待过几个月，但他对阿尔及利亚战争的公开敌视态度使他失去了担任高级指挥官的机会。然而，到了1839年，比若似乎改变了主意，积极争取总督兼总司令的职位，并在次年被路易·菲利普国王任命。
If a “colonial school” of warfare existed in France, its founder was incontestably Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud. A Napoleonic veteran who had seen extensive service in Spain, Bugeaud spent his years of enforced retirement from the army during the Bourbon Restoration pondering France's defeat. When he reentered the army following the July Revolution of 1830, his views on counterinsurgency warfare were already well formed. Although he spent a few months in Algeria in 1836, his outspoken hostility to the Algerian adventure eliminated him from consideration for high command there. However, Bugeaud seems to have undergone a change of heart by 1839, and actively sought the posts of governor general and commander in chief, to which King Louis Philippe appointed him the following year.
1840年，当比若抵达阿尔及利亚时，一种似曾相识的感觉几乎让他难以承受——法军正在重蹈覆辙，犯下在西班牙犯下的所有错误。大部分士兵被束缚在固定的防御阵地上，饱受阿拉伯人的骚扰，他们袭击补给车队，摧毁“战线后方”的庄稼和物资。由于缺乏明确的目标，反击的尝试屡屡受挫。数千人的纵队，负重炮和沉重的补给车队，在荒凉而饱受战火蹂躏的乡村艰难跋涉，搜寻敌人。敌人在他们面前节节败退，拒绝正面交锋，却不断袭击侧翼、补给车队和掉队的士兵。就这样，几周的战役过后，法军纵队筋疲力尽地返回基地，却几乎一无所获。
When Bugeaud arrived in Algeria in 1840, he was nearly over-whelmed by a sense of déjà vu—the French army was repeating all of the mistakes that it had made in Spain. Most of the soldiers were tied down defending fixed points and tormented by the Arabs who raided their supply wagons and destroyed crops and supplies “behind the lines.” Attempts to launch reprisal raids faltered in the absence of any clear objectives. Columns of thousands of men, weighted down by artillery and heavy convoys of supplies, toiled over a stark and blistered countryside in search of their foe. The enemy retreated before them, refusing battle but slashing at flanks, supply convoys, and stragglers. After a few weeks of campaigning in this manner, French columns would return to base exhausted, with very little to show for their efforts.
比若着手重整他那士气低落、萎靡不振的部队：“我们必须摒弃文明国家之间那些精心策划、跌宕起伏的战斗，”他向士兵们宣告，“我们必须认识到，非常规战术才是这场战争的灵魂。”比若的改革基于四大原则：机动性、士气、领导力和火力。他摒弃了以往法军控制乡村的主要手段——构筑防御工事，转而强调侦察队和情报的重要性，以便迅速部署部队打击敌军。数百至数千人的机动纵队，摒弃了火炮和重型辎重，可以分散在乡村各处，从不同方向汇聚到预先选定的目标。凭借这种战术，比若得以深入此前难以攻克的地区，将战火推进到卡比利亚山脉腹地，令敌人疲于奔命。
Bugeaud set out to remodel his listless and demoralized command: “We must forget those orchestrated and dramatic battles that civilized peoples fight against one another,” he proclaimed to his troops, “and realize that unconventional tactics are the soul of this war.” Bugeaud based his reforms on four principles: mobility, morale, leadership, and firepower. In place of fortifications, which had been the principal French method of controlling the countryside, he emphasized the value of scouting parties and intelligence reports in locating enemy forces against which troops could be rapidly deployed. Mobile columns numbering from a few hundred to a few thousand men, shorn of artillery and heavy wagons, could fan out over the countryside to converge from different directions on a previously selected objective. In this way, Bugeaud was able to penetrate into areas that before had been immune to attack, carry the fight into the very heart of the Kabylia Mountains, and give his enemies no rest.
然而，如果没有适当的心理准备，这样的战略是不可能实现的。士气低落的士兵很少会抱有进攻的意愿，而1840年比若德麾下的士兵士气跌至谷底。法军的制服和装备并不适合非洲的气候。士兵们被困在疾病肆虐的驻地，不断遭受阿拉伯劫掠者的骚扰，大多数士兵宁愿吃狗肉、猫肉和根茎，也不愿吃军方提供的陈面包、劣质大米和咸肉。这些食物常常导致剧烈腹泻，甚至可能因脱水而死亡。处理伤病员的安排十分原始，被送进医院几乎等同于被判死刑。事实上，军医院的条件极其恶劣，以至于一些士兵为了避免在那里遭受漫长而肮脏的死亡，有时会选择自杀。
Such a strategy would have been impossible, however, without appropriate psychological preparation. Demoralized soldiers are seldom offensive-minded, and the morale of Bugeaud's command in 1840 stood at rock bottom. French uniforms and equipment were unsuited to the African climate. Confined to disease-ridden garrisons, continually harassed by Arab raiders, most soldiers preferred a diet of dogs, cats, and roots to the stale bread, poor-quality rice, and salted bacon provided, a diet that often produced violent diarrhea and could lead to death from dehydration. Arrangements for dealing with the sick and wounded were primitive, and assignment to the hospital almost tantamount to a death sentence. Indeed, conditions in military hospitals were so frightful that soldiers would sometimes commit suicide to avoid a lingering and squalid death there.2
比若德决心重振士气。士兵们一离开瘟疫肆虐的驻地，健康状况就几乎立刻得到改善。他制定了新的措施来照顾伤病员，而此前在战役中，他们常常被弃置于阿拉伯人的摆布之下。永久性医院取代了简陋的木棚，那些木棚几乎只能算是停尸房。装备经过重新设计，步兵的负重大大减轻；物资不再由人力或马车运送，而是由骡子驮运。小型机动纵队开始进驻山区，靠劫掠粮仓或袭击阿拉伯人的牲畜为生。他对士兵福祉的关怀，加上士兵们对他领导才能的信任，为军事行动注入了新的活力。比若德的榜样影响了整个军官团，为整支军队带来了信心和动力。到 1842 年，他已使军队重新转入进攻状态，并且毫不夸张地宣称，他已使自己的军队“比阿拉伯人更阿拉伯”。
Bugeaud set out to instill a new sense of optimism. The health of his men improved almost as soon as they were taken out of their pestilential garrisons. New provisions were made for the care of sick and wounded who before, on campaign, had often been abandoned to the mercy of the Arabs. Permanent hospitals replaced wooden sheds that were little more than mortuaries. Equipment was redesigned and the load of the foot soldier considerably lightened; supplies were carried by mules instead of men or wagons. Small mobile columns now moved into the hills, surviving by plundering the grain silos or raiding the flocks of the Arabs. Concern for the welfare of his men combined with their confidence in his talents as a leader to breathe new life into military operations. Bugeaud's example filtered through the officer corps, lending confidence and energy to the entire army. By 1842, he had put the army back on the offensive and could claim with only slight exaggeration that he had made his force “even more Arab than the Arabs.”
比若在阿尔及利亚期间，他对火力部署的思考发生了一些改变。最初，他批评法军构筑多达三千人的庞大方阵，纵深数列。阿拉伯人很少试图突破方阵，而内排士兵由于无法开火而白白浪费了兵力。比若主张采用多个小型方阵，使火力相互重叠，从而实现相互支援。齐射应有规律，并尽可能长时间地克制开火，以便让敌人接近到足以对其造成真正伤害的距离。然而，1836年之后，很明显，当时并不存在一支规模足以威胁法军方阵或哨所的阿拉伯军队。在阿尔及利亚，遭遇战而非正面交锋成为常态，对方阵和射击纪律的重视程度也随之降低。
Bugeaud's thinking about firepower underwent some modifications during his stay in Algeria. Originally, he had criticized the French for forming massive squares of up to three thousand men, several lines deep. Arabs seldom attempted to overwhelm squares, and the men in the interior ranks were wasted because they were unable to fire. Instead, he advocated a number of small squares with overlapping fields of fire to give mutual support. Volleys should be regular, and firing withheld for as long as possible to allow the enemy to get close enough to do him real damage. After 1836, however, it became apparent that no Arab army existed that was large enough to threaten French squares or posts. Skirmishing, rather than pitched battles, became the rule in Algeria, and the emphasis on squares and fire discipline diminished.3
比若无疑是十九世纪最杰出、最具想象力的军事家之一。他打造了一支具备进攻能力的军队，设定了作战目标，然后设法将敌人引诱到战场上，凭借己方军队的纪律性和火力优势取得胜利。1836年以后，阿拉伯人越来越难以被引诱到战场上，于是比若便转而攻击他们的资源。通过摧毁他们的生计，比若迫使阿拉伯人投降。
Bugeaud was certainly one of the ablest and most imaginative technicians of war in the nineteenth century. He moulded a force capable of offensive operations, set his objective, and then sought to bring his enemy to battle where the superior discipline and firepower of his troops gave him the advantage. When the Arabs could not be brought to battle, as was increasingly the case after 1836, he operated against their resources. By destroying their livelihoods, Bugeaud forced the Arabs to submit.
在非洲，劫掠（razzia）由来已久。在法国人到来之前，北非战争的特点是掠夺战利品，而非杀戮。正规的正面交锋很少，而且通常是无序的小规模冲突，士兵们试图用声势震慑敌人，而不是大量杀伤敌军。
The razzia, or raid, had long been practiced in Africa. The acquisition of booty rather than the desire to inflict death characterized North African warfare before the arrival of the French. Pitched battles were few, and were usually formless skirmishes in which men sought to overawe with noise rather than to kill large numbers of the enemy.
然而，1841年，比若将劫掠行动提升到了全面战争的层面。在此之前，法国人只是零星地进行过焚烧庄稼和砍伐树木的行动。毫无疑问，阿拉伯人拒绝抵抗令比若感到沮丧。此外，尽管他大肆吹嘘法军的机动性，但他的部队却常常无法追上行踪诡秘的敌人。因此，他在米利亚纳附近的上谢利夫地区发动了第一次破坏性战役。很快，烧焦的田野、被毁的果园和满目疮痍的村庄便成了法军纵队在阿尔及利亚各地留下的印记。在此期间访问过阿尔及利亚的卡斯特拉内将军为劫掠行动辩护道：“在欧洲，一旦你控制了两三个大城市，整个国家就都属于你了。” “但在非洲，你如何对付那些与土地唯一的联系就是帐篷桩的人民呢？……唯一的办法就是夺走养活他们的粮食，夺走让他们穿衣的牲畜。因此，我们向粮仓宣战，向牲畜宣战，向掠夺者宣战。 ” 4
In 1841, however, Bugeaud elevated the razzia to the level of total war. Before this time, the French had only sporadically practiced the burning of crops and cutting down of trees. Bugeaud was frustrated, no doubt, by the Arabs' refusal to stand and fight. Also, despite his much-vaunted claims of French mobility, his troops were often unable to catch their elusive enemy. Therefore, he launched his first campaign of devastation in the upper Cheliff near Miliana. Blackened fields, destroyed fruit orchards, and devastated villages soon marked the passage of French columns everywhere in Algeria. General Castellane, who visited Algeria in this period, defended the razzia: “In Europe, once [you are] master of two or three large cities, the entire country is yours,” he wrote. “But in Africa, how do you act against a population whose only link with the land is the pegs of their tents?…The only way is to take the grain which feeds them, the flocks which clothe them. For this reason, we make war on silos, war on cattle, the razzia.”4
无论军方支持劫掠的理由是什么，其长期后果都是极其恶劣的。当士兵被允许烧杀抢掠时，纪律难以维持。很快，士兵们的态度变得冷酷无情，情感麻木，任何超越彻底毁灭的政治或军事目标都在这场暴行和过度行为的狂欢中消逝殆尽。战争的残酷程度在1845年6月达到了顶峰，当时阿马布尔·佩利西耶上校将一群阿拉伯人困在谢利夫以北沿海山区达赫拉的洞穴中。经过一番毫无结果的谈判后，佩利西耶下令在洞口生火。五百名阿拉伯男女老幼窒息而死。
Whatever the military arguments in favor of the razzia, its long-term effects were baleful. Discipline was difficult to maintain when soldiers were allowed to burn, pillage, and rape. Soon attitudes hardened, sensibilities were anesthetized, and any political or military goals beyond utter devastation were lost in an orgy of brutality and excess. The growing savagery of the war hit its nadir in June 1845, when Colonel Amable Pelissier trapped a group of Arabs in the caves of Dahra in the coastal mountains north of Cheliff. After desultory negotiations, Pelissier ordered a fire built in the cave mouth. Five hundred Arab men, women, and children were asphyxiated.
当佩利西耶用耸人听闻且自我吹捧的文笔将暴行描述的报告提交给贵族院时，法国爆发了轩然大波。然而，比若非没有谴责他的下属，反而赞扬了佩利西耶，甚至暗示这种行为可能会再次发生。同年8月，圣阿尔诺上校将一大批躲藏在山洞里的阿拉伯人埋葬：“下面有五百名强盗，他们再也无法屠杀法国人了，”他高声宣称。在接下来的两年里，又发生了其他类似的集体屠杀。
When Pelissier's report describing the atrocity in lurid and self-congratulatory prose was released to the Chamber of Peers, a storm of protest broke out in France. But far from condemning his subordinate, Bugeaud praised Pelissier and even suggested that the action might be repeated. In August of that year, Colonel Saint-Arnaud entombed a large number of Arabs who had sought refuge in a cave: “There are five hundred brigands down there who will never again butcher Frenchmen,” he trumpeted. Other mass liquidations followed over the next two years.5
必须指出的是，法国人在海外的暴行并不比其他殖民列强——例如俄国在高加索地区的暴行、英国在印度兵变期间的暴行，以及世纪之交的德国——更为残暴。然而，这些广为人知的暴行却产生了长远的后果，其中最直接、最明显的便是阿拉伯人持续的敌意。比若认为没有必要安抚他的对手，他辩称只有通过残酷的战争手段，他们才会“接受征服的枷锁”。在比若看来，阿拉伯人的敌意是不可改变的，因此，必须彻底镇压才能控制他们。他还试图在战略要地建立退伍军人村，以确保乡村的安全。但响应者寥寥，这些计划最终被搁置。
It must be said that the French behaved with no greater brutality abroad than did other colonial powers—the Russians in the Caucausus, the British during the Indian Mutiny, or the Germans at the turn of the century. But these well-publicized atrocities were to have long-term consequences, the first and most obvious being the continued hostility of the Arabs. Bugeaud saw no need to appease his opponents, arguing that only through the hard hand of war would they “accept the yoke of conquest.” For Bugeaud, the Arabs' hostility was unalterable and therefore, they had to be crushed to be controlled.6 He also attempted to establish villages of retired soldiers in strategic locations to ensure the security of the countryside. But few settlers stepped forward and these plans were abandoned.
随着阿尔及利亚征服的完成，一些军官开始将军队视为保护阿拉伯人免受法国殖民者贪婪和种族主义侵害的卫士。然而，多年征服战争留下的仇恨和不信任从未消散。士兵们始终意识到，他们守卫着一群阴郁而充满敌意的阿尔及利亚人，这些人随时可能起义，将他们赶入大海。因此，他们对伊斯兰教复兴的任何迹象都极为紧张，担心这会激起阿尔及利亚人的反抗。
With the conquest of Algeria completed, some officers came to see the army as the protector of the Arabs against the French settlers' greed and racism. However, the bad blood and distrust of these years of conquest was never dissipated. Soldiers were always conscious that they stood guard over a sullen and hostile mass of Algerians who might one day rise up and cast them into the sea. Hence their extreme nervousness at the slightest indication of an Islamic religious revival, which they feared might galvanize the Algerians into revolt.
比若战役的第二个后果是激怒了法国人。显而易见，阿尔及利亚的服役扭曲了法国士兵的价值观，法国声称要将文明和秩序带给非洲，但这与残酷的征服现实之间却出现了巨大的鸿沟。1846年，托克维尔从阿尔及利亚返回，对当地军政府的暴行感到震惊——他后来将阿尔及利亚军队的军官形容为“白痴”。<sup> 7</sup>法国军队在阿尔及利亚的暴行，以及他们即便对待欧洲平民也公然践踏最基本的自由理念，加剧了法国的反军国主义情绪。随着世纪末德雷福斯事件的爆发，这种反军国主义情绪最终成为一股重要的政治力量。
The second consequence of Bugeaud's campaigns was that they outraged Frenchmen. It was only too obvious that Algerian service had distorted the values of French soldiers, and that a gulf had opened between the claims of France to bring civilization and order to Africa and the bitter realities of conquest. In 1846, Alexis de Tocqueville returned from Algeria horrified by the excesses of the military regime there—he later described the officers of the Algerian army as “imbecilic.”7 The atrocities of the French army in Algeria, their flaunting of the most basic notions of liberty even when dealing with European civilians, fed anti-militarism in France that with the Dreyfus affair at the end of the century would become a significant political force.
最终，比若的战役使军队与法国彻底疏远。他们被从欧洲驱逐到伊斯兰地区，这种背国之感早已十分强烈。他们安慰自己说，他们是在为祖国的荣耀而战。然而，当他们在国内的艰辛被忽视时，他们感到困惑；当他们在非洲存在的目的受到质疑时，他们感到恼怒；最终，当他们的作战方式遭到谴责时，他们更是怒不可遏。他们感到，法国既不理解他们，也不感激他们：“我们身处非洲，损害健康，冒着生命危险，为法国的荣耀而战，而最无知的旁观者却可以侮辱我们，诽谤我们的动机，把不属于这个世纪、也不可能属于军人的罪恶念头强加在我们身上，”圣阿尔诺怒吼道。“滚开，你们这些公开诋毁我们的人！” 8这种“被冤枉和被歪曲”的感觉迫使驻非军队封闭自己，他们只能从彼此是兄弟情谊、职业军旅侨民的身份中寻求慰藉，对他们而言，法国越来越像一个遥远而难以理解的国度。他们是被困在两种文化之间的人，既不愿融入非洲社会，也无法返回故土。
Finally, Bugeaud's campaigns alienated the army from France. Cast from Europe into an Islamic region, their sense of dépaysement was already acute. They consoled themselves with the thought that they were fighting for the greater glory of their country. However, they were perplexed when their hardships were ignored at home, annoyed when the purpose of their presence in Africa was questioned, and, ultimately, enraged when their methods of campaigning were condemned. France, they felt, neither understood nor appreciated them: “Here we are in Africa, ruining our health, risking our lives, working for the glory of France, and the most uninformed observer can insult us and slander our intentions, imputing to us criminal feelings which are not of this century and which cannot belong to a soldier,” Saint-Arnaud bellowed. “Be off with you, public revilers!”8 This feeling that it had been “wronged and misrepresented” forced the army in Africa to turn in on itself, to seek comfort in the fact that they were a band of brothers, professional military expatriates for whom France was increasingly a remote and incomprehensible land. They were men trapped between two cultures, unwilling to become African and unable to return home.
这种态度对法国军民关系的长期影响早已为人所知。本研究的重点在于它对殖民地军事行动的影响。这些行动的残酷性丝毫未减。相反，除了少数军官外，几乎所有军官都认为法国国内的谴责是必然的，这使得他们无需迎合宗主国的情绪。正是在军队在法国日益不得人心，以及19世纪40年代和后来的西非战役给整个殖民事业带来的耻辱的背景下，我们才能理解加利埃尼和利奥泰的理论。
The long-term effects of this attitude on civil-military relations in France have frequently been noted. What is interesting within the framework of this study is the effect that it had on operations in the colonies. They lost nothing of their brutality. On the contrary, among all but a few officers the feeling that disapproval in France was automatic removed any need to cater to metropolitan sensibilities. It is in this context of the growing unpopularity of the army in France and the discredit that the campaigns of the 1840s and later campaigns in West Africa brought upon the entire colonial enterprise, that the theories of Galliéni and Lyautey must be understood.
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II
加利埃尼和利奥泰是与法国第二阶段殖民扩张联系最为紧密的两个名字，这一扩张始于法兰西第三共和国时期。诚然，1847年阿尔及利亚抵抗运动结束后，法国的帝国扩张并未停止。法国海军在越南建立了沿海基地，费德尔布将军扩大了法国在塞内加尔的势力范围，此外还有那次不幸的墨西哥入侵。但这些行动都相对有限。这种情况在19世纪80年代发生了改变。几乎一夜之间，法国军队承担起了吞并非洲大片领土、入侵马达加斯加以及将法国势力扩展到印度支那内陆地区的重任。
Galliéni and Lyautey are two names most commonly associated with France's second phase of colonial expansion, which began under the Third Republic. To be sure, French imperial expansion had not come to a halt after Algerian resistance ceased in 1847. The French navy established coastal bases in Vietnam, General Faidherbe extended the French foothold in Senegal, and there was the ill-fated Mexican venture. But these were relatively limited operations. This changed in the 1880s. Almost overnight, French soldiers took on the tasks of digesting an enormous chunk of Africa, invading Madagascar, and extending French power into the Indochinese hinterland.
自比若时代以来，法兰西第三共和国时期殖民地士兵的处境已有所改变。首先，军事技术的进步使欧洲人在非洲拥有了相对于对手的巨大优势。1830年法国入侵阿尔及利亚时，阿尔及利亚人至少拥有八千支滑膛枪，足以使征服者丧失任何显著的技术优势。在战场上，长管杰扎伊尔步枪的射程甚至超过了法国滑膛枪，后者是为近距离齐射而设计的。纪律而非更先进的武器才是征服的关键。法国人唯一拥有的火力优势——火炮——由于其笨重和机动性差，被比若主动放弃了。
The situation of colonial soldiers under the Third Republic had altered somewhat since the days of Bugeaud. In the first place, advances in military technology were to give Europeans in Africa enormous advantages over their opponents. When the French invaded Algeria in 1830, the Algerians possessed at least eight thousand muskets, enough to deprive the conquerors of any significant technological advantage. In the field, the long-barrelled jezail could actually out-range French muskets, which were designed for volley-firing at close quarters. Discipline, rather than superior weaponry, was the key to conquest. The only advantage in firepower the French possessed—their artillery—was willingly forfeited by Bugeaud because of its weight and immobility.
十九世纪末，栓动式和弹匣供弹式步枪的普及使法国人在技术上拥有了无可争议的优势，而他们的对手则装备着各种古董或原始武器。即使像萨莫里人和一些摩洛哥部落那样，他们的对手设法获得了现代步枪，但他们也往往数量不足，弹药匮乏，或者缺乏充分的射击训练来发挥其全部优势。
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the availability of bolt-action and magazine-fed rifles gave the French an incontestable technological advantage over opponents who were armed with an assortment of antique or primitive weapons. Even when their opponents did manage to acquire modern rifles, as did Samori and some Moroccan tribes, they seldom had them in sufficient numbers, possessed an adequate supply of ammunition, or developed the fire discipline to use them to full advantage.
19世纪90年代马克沁机枪的引入极大地增强了法国的火力，这种机枪每秒可发射11发炮弹。比若德认为过于笨重而弃用的火炮被便携式80毫米炮，以及后来的65毫米“山炮”所取代，这些山炮可以拆卸，并由骡子或骆驼驮运。在摩洛哥，法军甚至可以使用75毫米炮。他们的对手很少拥有火炮，即使拥有，也通常只是博物馆里的展品。这些技术进步显然增强了法国远征军的实力。它们也使得更少的兵力就能参与作战，因为火力不再与士兵数量完全挂钩。规模较小的远征军提高了机动性。火炮还使法军能够攻破散布在非洲各地的泥石砌筑的堡垒，这些堡垒被称为“塔塔”。数量不多但训练有素的部队，配备速射步枪和火炮，就能击败人数远超自身、装备老式武器的军队。毋庸置疑，强大的火力是法国相对于非欧洲对手的主要优势。
French firepower was assisted by the introduction in the 1890s of the Maxim gun, which fired at a rate of eleven shots a second. The kind of artillery that Bugeaud had jettisoned as too heavy was replaced by portable 80-mm, and later 65-mm “mountain guns,” which could be broken down and carried on the backs of mules or camels. In Morocco, the French could even use their 75s. Their opponents seldom acquired artillery, and when they did, they were usually museum pieces. These technological advances obviously added muscle to French expeditions. They also allowed smaller numbers of men to campaign, because volume of fire was no longer related absolutely to numbers of soldiers. Smaller expeditions permitted an increase in mobility. Artillery also allowed French to break into the mud- and stone-walled fortresses, called “tatas,” which dotted the African landscape. Small numbers of disciplined troops armed with rapid-fire rifles and artillery could now defeat far larger armies armed with old-fashioned weapons. Superior firepower was incontestably the major advantage that the French held over their non-European opponents.
与比若时期相比，军队状况的第二个不同之处在于组建了专门用于殖民地作战的团。正如前文所述，征服阿尔及利亚主要由法国本土的部队完成；但一些富有远见的指挥官已经开始组建专门的本土部队。
A second way in which the army's situation differed from that under Bugeaud had to do with the creation of regiments tailored for colonial service. As has been noted, the conquest of Algeria was carried out in the main by metropolitan French regiments; but a few imaginative commanders had begun to develop specialized native regiments.
随着世纪的推移，法国越来越依赖本土招募的士兵作战。1857年，费德尔布组建了第一支塞内加尔步兵团。此外，在东京、马达加斯加、越南和撒哈拉沙漠也招募了本土部队，这些部队此后与法国海军陆战队并肩作战。法国海军陆战队也为本土部队、外籍军团和法国纪律部队提供了大部分军官和士官。最迟到1900年，殖民地部队已占法国军队总兵力的十分之一。
As the century wore on, France increasingly relied on native recruits to do its fighting. In 1857, Faidherbe raised the first regiment of tirailleurs sénégalais. Native troops were also raised in Tonkin, Madagascar, Vietnam, and in the Sahara, and henceforth served with the French marines, who also provided most of the officers and NCOs for the native regiments, the Foreign Legion, and the French disciplinary units. By 1900 at the latest, colonial troops made up one-tenth of French army strength.9
法国人选择依靠当地士兵来承受帝国扩张的重压，原因有很多。法国军官声称，这些在当地招募的士兵比白人更具韧性和适应性，白人在非洲严酷的气候条件下往往会大量死亡。他们还辩称（主要是为了迎合国内舆论），招募当地士兵是“分而治之”政策的一部分，这有助于分化非洲人对法国扩张的反对力量：不是法国人征服非洲人，而是非洲人为了法国征服非洲人。这样一来，暴行就可以被解释为非洲人而非法国人的暴行所致。
There are many reasons why the French chose to rely on native troops to bear the brunt of imperial expansion. French officers claimed that these men, recruited in the country, were more resilient and adaptable than whites, who tended to die in large numbers when exposed to the rigors of the African climate. They also argued, mainly for home consumption, that native recruitment was part of a “divide and rule” policy, which helped to split African opposition to French expansion: Frenchmen were not conquering Africans; Africans were conquering Africans for France. In this way, brutalities might be explained as the result of African, rather than of French, excesses.
另一个有利于招募土著士兵的因素是成本。土著士兵的报酬微乎其微；他们往往仅仅为了获得一支新步枪和战利品而报名参战。他们可以靠土地生存，因此不需要像法军那样配备补给车队。
Another factor that favored native recruitment was cost. Natives were paid next to nothing; often they would sign up for a campaign simply for a new rifle and the prospect of booty. They could live off the land, and so did not require the supply convoys that accompanied French troops.
法国殖民地士兵之所以更倾向于使用本地部队，原因与普法战争后法国实行普遍征兵制密切相关。尽管殖民地士兵声称法国应征入伍者难以适应殖民地环境，但他们真正担心的是这些公民士兵会将政治影响力带到海外。殖民地军官最不愿看到的就是议会调查委员会为了回应不满的法国应征入伍者提出的投诉而奔波于各个殖民地。比若时代糟糕的军民关系让殖民地士兵深刻体会到封闭式职业部队的价值。1900年，殖民地军队被赋予独立的组织和地位，他们渴望与法国本土军队保持距离的愿望也得以完全实现。
French colonial soldiers also came to prefer native troops for a reason that was linked to the introduction of universal conscription in France following the Franco-Prussian War. Although colonial soldiers argued that French conscripts adapted poorly to colonial conditions, their real fear was that citizen-soldiers would bring political influence to bear overseas. The last thing colonial officers desired was parliamentary committees of enquiry criss-crossing the colonies in answer to complaints initiated by disgruntled French conscripts. The poor civil-military relations of the Bugeaud era had taught colonial soldiers the value of a closed professional corps. Their desire to isolate themselves from France and from the French metropolitan army was fully realized in 1900, when the colonial army was given a separate organization and status.
影响十九世纪末殖民活动的第三个因素是围绕殖民地争夺而展开的激烈国际竞争氛围。1884年至1885年在柏林举行的刚果会议确立了“有效占领”原则，作为殖民主张的先决条件。会议还宣布德国加入了争夺非洲领土的行列。法国殖民士兵，其中不乏一些野心勃勃之徒，如今已在非洲土地争夺战的起跑线上集结完毕。
A third factor that influenced colonial operations in the late nineteenth century was the atmosphere of intense international competition that surrounded the race for colonies. The Congo Congress in Berlin of 1884–1885 had established the principle of “effective occupation” as the prerequisite for colonial claims. It also announced that Germany had joined the race for African territory. French colonial soldiers, among whom a buccaneering element predominated, now ranged themselves on the starting blocks for the great African land rush.
国际竞争赋予殖民征服以紧迫感，尤其是在民族主义盛行、野心勃勃的法国士兵心中，这往往导致最基本的战术谨慎被牺牲，转而急于争夺领土。比若（Bugeaud）不屑于补给线，派遣流动纵队深入阿尔及利亚内陆。但他的经验证实，这些行动不应持续太久，因为它们会造成人员和牲畜的过度伤亡。<sup> 10 </sup> 比若的流动纵队有其军事依据。但在西苏丹，情况却并非如此。到了19世纪80年代，独立的军事纵队开始冒险进入比若都认为安全的地区之外。通常情况下，火力足以使法军摆脱困境。但在西非，纵队不止一次踏入未知的领土，却最终因补给不足而被迫撤退，而且往往是在撤退前留下一个位置极其危险的前哨，而该前哨在遭到攻击时往往距离太远，无法得到有效支援。 1895年，一支由八千名士兵组成的法国纵队从马达加斯加海岸的马任加出发，向350英里外的塔那那利佛进发。他们在疟疾肆虐的沼泽地带饱受折磨，抵达干旱的中部高原后几乎全军覆没。三个月过去了，他们距离目标仍有125英里。杜舍纳将军被迫挑选3500名最精锐的士兵，命令他们要么向塔那那利佛进发，要么战死沙场。
The urgency that international competition gave to colonial conquest, especially in the minds of nationalistic and ambitious French soldiers, often led to the most elemental notions of tactical prudence being sacrificed in a headlong rush to stake territorial claims. Bugeaud had disdained supply lines and launched flying columns into the Algerian hinterland. But his experience confirmed that these operations should not be prolonged because they took an excessive toll on men and animals.10 And Bugeaud's flying columns had had a military rationale. This was often not the case in the Western Sudan. By the 1880s, independent military columns began to venture far beyond the bounds of what even Bugeaud would have thought safe. Usually firepower was sufficient to extricate the French from difficult situations. But on more than one occasion in West Africa, columns set out over unexplored territory only to run short of supplies. They were then forced to retreat, often after leaving a precarious outpost far too distant to be effectively supported when it was attacked.11 The French column of eight thousand men that set out from Majunga on the Madagascar coast to march the 350 miles to Tananarive in 1895 suffered horribly in the malarial swamps and almost perished once it reached the arid central plateau. After three months it was still 125 miles from its objective. General Duchesne was forced to select 3,500 of the fittest troops and order them to march to Tananarive or die in the attempt.
在殖民战争中，常识的缺失在世纪末期尤为明显，“飞龙纵队”的运用更是达到了近乎荒诞的地步。马尔尚横跨非洲抵达法绍达的史诗级远征，以及富罗-拉米、武莱-沙诺瓦和埃米尔·让蒂莱等人的支援行动，共同构成了通常被称为“乍得湖三路争夺战”的局面，充分展现了殖民地士兵的野心和他们抢占国际先机的欲望，是如何牺牲军事计划的。马尔尚三千英里的远征展现了惊人的毅力，激励了无数法国学生。然而，他此次远征的军事目的却始终不明。他最终的结局只有两种可能：要么被马迪的军队歼灭，要么被基钦纳的军队击败。福罗和拉米率领的250人纵队从阿尔及尔沿沙漠路线前往乍得湖，他们只能靠射杀人质和打毁水井来迫使口渴的居民为他们提供食物和驮畜，才得以生存。臭名昭著的武莱-沙诺因远征队很快就失去了军事凝聚力，因为部队无法自给自足：他们在尼日尔河以东的乡村地区游荡，四处劫掠杀戮，直到两位队长在非洲辅助部队的叛乱中丧生。让蒂尔从南方沿沙里河推进的路线遭遇了一系列由苏丹冒险家拉比修建的堡垒。由于需要频繁返回布拉柴维尔补充兵力和物资，他抵达乍得湖的战役耗时近五年。
The neglect of common sense in colonial warfare became especially apparent in the century's closing years, when the “flying column” entered the realm of the surreal. Marchand's epic march across Africa to Fashoda and the supporting missions of Foureau-Lamy, Voulet-Chanoine, and Emile Gentile, which together composed what is often referred to as the three-pronged “race for Lake Chad,” demonstrated how far military planning had been sacrificed to the ambitions of colonial soldiers and their desire to steal a march on international competition. Marchand's three-thousand-mile expedition offered a tremendous demonstration of stamina, an inspiration to French schoolboys. But the military purpose of his expedition has never been clear. Only two things could have happened to him: either the Madhi's forces would wipe him out, or those of Kitchener would. The 250-man column of Foureau and Lamy, which took the desert route from Algiers to Lake Chad, was able to survive only by shooting hostages and surrounding wells to force the thirsty inhabitants to bring them food and pack animals. The notorious Voulet-Chanoine mission soon lost all military cohesion because its troops were unable to feed themselves: they meandered through the countryside east of the Niger River raiding and killing until the two captains perished in a mutiny among their African auxiliary troops. Gentil's route of advance from the south along the Chari River encountered a series of forts constructed by the Sudanese adventurer Rabih. The frequent need to return to Brazzaville for men and supplies meant that his campaign to reach Lake Chad took nearly five years.
影响法兰西第三共和国殖民策略演变的最后一个因素是军队的政治演变。拿破仑战争后诞生的军队中，有大量军官在当时被认为是左翼人士。波旁王朝复辟时期从未信任过自己的士兵，军队在1830年的“三光荣战役”中表现平平，很大程度上归因于军队与复辟政权之间存在的信任鸿沟。19世纪初的巴黎综合理工学院是自由主义的堡垒。因此，炮兵和工兵尤其被视为“共和派”的代表。
A final element that influenced the evolution of French colonial tactics under the Third Republic was the political evolution of the army. The force that emerged from the Napoleonic Wars contained a large number of officers considered left-wing by the standards of the times. The Bourbon Restoration never trusted its soldiers, and the army's lackluster performance in the “trois glorieuses” of 1830 can be attributed in great part to the gulf of confidence that existed between it and the Restoration. The Ecole Polytechnique in the early years of the nineteenth century was a bastion of liberalism. Consequently, the artillery and the engineers especially were regarded as the “republican” arms.
然而，随着世纪的推进，军队的政治重心逐渐右倾。这种转变更多是由于军队的官僚化，使其更加注重秩序，而非保守阶级大量投身军旅。像卡瓦尼亚克这样因其极左观点而被流放到阿尔及利亚的军官，在1848年并不认为共和主义者和反革命主义者之间存在矛盾。然而，军队在1848年六月运动中对巴黎工人的镇压，一些军官（如圣阿尔诺）参与路易·拿破仑1851年12月2日的政变，以及最终在1871年对巴黎公社的残酷镇压，都向左翼发出了明确的信号：他们再也无法指望在军队内部获得支持。德雷福斯事件对军队而言是一场前所未有的灾难，因为它在广大中产阶级中助长了对军事司法和军人心态的愤世嫉俗。它打破了各政党对军队不可侵犯的认知。军队如同教会一样，以前所未有的方式被推入了政治漩涡。自1899年以来一直掌控政府的左翼政客们，如今准备利用任何军事丑闻来达到自身目的。而右翼也同样准备不遗余力地捍卫军队。
As the century progressed, however, the army's political center of gravity shifted toward the right. This change was due more to the bureaucratization of the army, which gave it an interest in order, rather than to the fact that the conservative classes were attracted in great numbers to the career of arms. Officers like Cavaignac, who had been exiled to Algeria because of his extreme left-wing views, saw no contradiction in 1848 in being both republican and antirevolutionary. However, the army's suppression of the Parisian workers in the June Days of 1848, the association of some officers like Saint-Arnaud with Louis-Napoleon's coup d'état of December 2, 1851, and, finally, the violent repression of the Commune in 1871, served notice on the Left that they could no longer hope to find support within the military. The Dreyfus affair was a singular disaster for the army, because it fostered a cynical view of military justice and the military mentality in a broad section of the middle classes. It shattered the understanding among political parties that the army was inviolate. The army, like the Church, was now thrust into the world of politics as never before. Politicians on the Left, who controlled governments from 1899, were now prepared to exploit any military scandal for their own ends. The Right was equally prepared to go very far in the army's defense.
法国帝国主义鲜明的军事色彩使殖民者很容易受到左翼反军国主义的冲击。很少有政治家真正关心军事改革，或者停止在非洲的殖民扩张。然而，殖民行动如今已卷入国内政治。这一点在1885年首次显现，当时众议院以内格里埃在印度支那谅山战役中的失败为借口，推翻了亲殖民的儒勒·费里政府。到了世纪末，军国主义与殖民主义的结合催生了更多政治产物。右翼对政府在法肖达的撤退强烈抗议。1899年夏天，正值德雷福斯上尉在雷恩接受充满政治意味的重审之际，武莱-沙诺瓦暴行的消息传出，对军队和中右翼来说，可谓雪上加霜。 1901-1902年图阿特远征期间，两万五千头骆驼死于缺乏经验的法国士兵之手。此外，征服一个年贸易额“甚至不及大城镇一家杂货店”的地区耗费了巨额资金，这引发了议会对“阿尔及利亚将军们”的强烈谴责，并促使议会提出一项法案，将军事行动置于文职总督的管辖之下。征服摩洛哥也为政治谴责士兵和殖民者提供了诸多契机。社会主义领袖让·饶勒斯总是会以铿锵有力的言辞谴责殖民地的任何军事暴行——例如，1913年，社会主义者组织了超过十万名哀悼者，参加在突尼斯惩戒营中离奇死亡的士兵埃诺的葬礼。
The distinctly military stamp of French imperialism left the colonialists vulnerable to the Left's antimilitarism. Few politicians were seriously interested in military reform, or in halting the race for colonies in Africa. However, colonial operations were now drawn into domestic politics. This was first apparent in 1885, when the Chamber of Deputies used Negrier's defeat at Lang-son in Indochina as an excuse to overthrow the procolonial government of Jules Ferry. Toward the end of the century, the wedding of militarism and colonialism produced even more political offspring. The Right complained loudly over the government's retreat at Fachoda. The news of the Voulet-Chanoine atrocities could not have broken at a worse time for the army and the center-right, in the summer of 1899 in the midst of Captain Dreyfus's politically charged retrial at Rennes. The death of 25,000 camels at the hands of inexperienced French soldiers during the Tuat expedition of 1901–1902, together with the enormous costs of conquering a region whose annual trade “does not equal that of a grocery store in a large town,” provoked denunciations of the “Algerian generals” in parliament and the introduction of a bill to bring military operations under the civilian governor general. The conquest of Morocco provided numerous occasions for political denunciations of soldiers and colonialists. The socialist leader Jean Jaurès could always be counted upon to condemn any military excesses in the colonies in ringing terms—for instance, in 1913, over 100,000 mourners were mustered by the Socialists for the funeral of Private Aenoult, who had died in mysterious circumstances in a Tunisian disciplinary battalion.
19世纪90年代，法国反军国主义势力日益壮大，殖民主义运动也因此变得脆弱不堪，这要求殖民征服采取新的策略。加利埃尼和利奥泰的战略理论正是对这种新形势的回应。
The growing strength of antimilitarism in France by the 1890s and the consequent vulnerability of the colonialist movement required a new approach to colonial conquest. The strategic theories of Galliéni and Lyautey were the response to the new conditions.
三
III
在非洲的早期岁月里，约瑟夫-西蒙·加列尼与其他雄心勃勃、行事鲁莽的年轻军官并无太大区别。然而到了1890年，加列尼似乎开始真正担忧法国鲁莽且准备不足的远征，这些远征给西苏丹的大片地区带来了破坏。他呼吁暂停军事行动，让受灾地区得以恢复。加列尼认为，通过迎合非洲商人的利益，法国无需诉诸武力即可扩大其影响力。这些观点引起了奥兰选区议员、殖民地事务副国务秘书、以及日后众议院强大的“殖民党”领袖欧仁·艾蒂安的注意。正是通过与艾蒂安的接触，以及他作为军事代表参与1889年成立的省级委员会（该委员会旨在就法国在尼日尔河上游的未来政策提供建议，并对法国殖民官员抱有极大的敌意），加利埃尼才得以充分了解法国本土对非洲军事暴行的强烈不满。然而，加利埃尼的观点并未占上风。1892年，当他的竞争对手路易·阿尔希纳尔上校再次被任命为苏丹高级司令时，加利埃尼便调往东京湾。
In his early years in Africa, there was little to distinguish Joseph-Simon Galliéni from other ambitious and impetuous young officers. However, by 1890, Galliéni seems to have become genuinely concerned about the reckless and ill-prepared French expeditions that had laid waste to great areas of the Western Sudan. He called for a suspension of operations to allow the devastated areas to recover. Galliéni argued that, by catering to the interests of African merchants, France would be able to extend its influence without further recourse to brute force. These views brought Galliéni to the attention of Eugène Etienne, deputy for Oran, undersecretary of state for the colonies, and future leader of the powerful “Colonial Party” in the Chamber of Deputies. It was through his contact with Etienne, and his presence as the military delegate on the 1889 departmental commission set up to advise on the future course of French policy on the Upper Niger—a commission extremely hostile to the French colonial officers—that Galliéni was made aware of the full extent of metropolitan discontent with military brutalities in Africa. Galliéni's views did not prevail, however, and when a rival, Colonel Louis Archinard, was reappointed commandant supérieur of the Sudan in 1892, Galliéni moved to Tonkin.
在印度支那，加列尼的任务是平定该国极北地区，那里曾是黑旗海盗的聚集地，这些中国海盗被法国人从沿海据点驱逐出去。加列尼放弃了大规模作战或“前线”的概念，转而采用他称之为“渐进式占领”的方法。他设立哨所，巡逻队围绕哨所巡逻，逐步扩大控制范围，直至与相邻哨所接壤。与此同时，哨所本身也成为一个市场，吸引当地居民前来，法国人通常以高于市场价的价格收购他们的商品。当地居民的到来使法国人得以建立联系、收集情报，但更重要的是，向他们证明与法国合作将带来繁荣。当地居民对法国资助的道路、市场、水井和其他公共工程项目所带来的经济重建感激不尽，他们认识到殖民主义的好处，并积极拥护占领者。
In Indochina, Galliéni was given the tasks of pacifying the extreme north of the country, which was infested by the Black Flags, Chinese “pirates” whom the French had driven from their coastal strongholds. Abandoning concepts of large-scale operations or “front lines,” Galliéni put into practice a method he called “progressive occupation.” Posts were established around which patrols would circulate, progressively extending the area of control until they touched upon that of an adjacent post. At the same time, the post would become a market that attracted the natives, often by purchasing their goods at prices above the market level. The arrival of the indigenous population allowed the French to make contacts and gather intelligence but, above all, to demonstrate that prosperity would follow cooperation with the French. The natives, grateful for the economic reconstruction of their land via the roads, markets, wells, and other public works projects sponsored by the French, recognized the advantages of colonialism and rallied to the occupying power.
加利埃尼的观点由他热情洋溢的下属于贝尔·利奥泰加以系统化和阐述。乍看之下，两人似乎并无太多共同之处。加利埃尼出身卑微；利奥泰则可追溯到诺曼底和法国东部边疆的显赫贵族世家，并公开鄙视资产阶级法国的“平庸”。加利埃尼是一位经验丰富的殖民地官员——他职业生涯的大部分时间都在殖民地任职——而利奥泰则是在四十岁高龄才来到殖民地。在此之前，他一直在总参谋部任职，并在当时颇为时髦的骑兵部队服役；他在圣日耳曼郊区的政治和文学沙龙中拥有颇具影响力的朋友。加利埃尼对第三共和国的忠诚与利奥泰对逝去君主制的怀念不相上下。加列尼性格冷峻、严肃、疏离。利奥泰则热情洋溢、充满活力，他魅力非凡，尽管这种魅力略显脆弱。
Galliéni's views were codified and elaborated by his enthusiastic subordinate, Hubert Lyautey. At first glance, the two men seemed to have little in common. Galliéni's social origins were modest; Lyautey traced his roots to the great noble families of Normandy and the eastern marches of France, and openly disdained the “mediocrity” of bourgeois France. Galliéni was a hardened broussard—a man who had spent the greater part of his career in colonial service—and Lyautey had come to the colonies at the rather advanced age of forty. Until then, his service had been spent in general-staff assignments and in fashionable cavalry regiments; he had influential friends in the political and literary salons of the Faubourg Saint-Germain. Galliéni's devotion to the Third Republic was more than matched by Lyautey's nostalgia for the departed monarchy. Galliéni was cool, austere, aloof. Lyautey was warm, enthusiastic, a man of immense, if slightly brittle, charm.
两人在东京湾相遇并合作，随后又在马达加斯加继续合作，这本身就是一件偶然之事，却对法国未来的军事政策产生了深远的影响。利奥泰究竟有多渴望被派往东京湾，这一点尚不清楚。尽管他才华横溢，或许正因如此，利奥泰在军队中并不受欢迎。他雄心勃勃，但很快就后悔选择了军旅生涯——晋升缓慢，职责枯燥乏味，而且他厌恶同事们缺乏想象力和麻木不仁。1891年，他的不满情绪在著名的《两世界评论》（Revue des deux mondes）上发表，题为《论军官在普遍征兵制下的社会角色》（Du rôle social de l'officier dans le service militaire universel）。这篇文章列举了法兰西第三共和国军队未能适应普遍征兵制的种种弊端。利奥泰描绘了一幅令人沮丧的景象：军官们“更了解自己的马匹而非士兵”，总参谋部被野心所吞噬，过度沉溺于对战争的理性研究，成员们不惜一切代价逃避部队指挥。最重要的是，利奥泰痛斥军官团未能秉承阿尔伯特·德·蒙上尉和路易·勒瓦尔将军等改革者的精神。这些改革者将军队视为弥合法国民众在政治、社会和宗教分歧的机构，并赋予他们共同的目标感和爱国主义精神。《论军官的社会角色》一书揭示了利奥泰作为一位受挫的理想主义者的形象，他一直在寻找一项能够凝聚民族团结、引领法国复兴的事业。
That the two men were to meet and collaborate in Tonkin and subsequently in Madagascar was a fortuitous event that was to influence French military policy for years to come. How much Lyautey wanted to be assigned to Tonkin is unclear. Despite his obvious promise, or perhaps because of it, Lyautey was not popular in the army. Very ambitious, he quickly came to regret his choice of a military career with its slow promotion and tedious duties, and to despise the lack of imagination and torpor of his colleagues. In 1891, his frustrations found their way into print in an article that appeared in the prestigious Revue des deux mondes. “Du rôle social de l'officier dans le service militaire universel” offers a litany of complaints about the failure of the French army in the Third Republic to adapt to universal conscription. Lyautey draws a depressing picture of officers “who know their horses better than their men,” of a general staff consumed by ambition, given to an excessively intellectual approach to the study of war, whose members sought to avoid troop command at all costs. Above all, Lyautey decried the failure of the officer corps to enter into the spirit of reformers like Captain Albert de Mun and General Louis Lewal, who saw the army as an institution that could reconcile the political, social, and religious differences that divided Frenchmen, and give them a sense of common purpose and patriotism. “Du role social de l'officier” reveals Lyautey as a frustrated idealist, in search of a cause that would forge national unity and lead to the regeneration of France.
1894年，利奥泰被派往印度支那，在那里他发现了一个值得效忠的人和一个值得效忠的理想。尽管加列尼和利奥泰的背景和性格迥异，但他们却完美互补。加列尼是一位典型的军人，他将绥靖视为一个军事问题，尽管他也准备运用政治和外交手段来实现他的军事目标。利奥泰吸收了加列尼的方法，并试图将其提升为一个通用体系，以调和殖民扩张与他的理想主义和爱国主义。这并非易事，因为利奥泰意识到，他理想化的殖民主义版本至少包含两个内在矛盾。首先，殖民主义意味着一个种族对另一个种族的统治，并因此遭受剥削。其次，正如许多批评家指出的那样，殖民扩张代价高昂。利奥泰该如何说服他们，殖民士兵为法国赢得的那些沙地、灌木丛和丛林最终能够为殖民强国带来利润呢？
In 1894, Lyautey was assigned to Indochina, and there discovered a man and an ideal worth serving. Despite their differences in background and temperament, Galliéni and Lyautey complemented each other perfectly. Galliéni was the quintessential soldier, who saw pacification as basically a military problem, even though he was prepared to employ politics and diplomacy to achieve his military goals. Lyautey absorbed Galliéni's methods but sought to elevate them into a general system, one that would reconcile colonial expansion with his idealism and patriotism. This was not an easy task, for Lyautey recognized that his idealized version of colonialism contained at least two inherent contradictions. First, colonialism meant the domination, and consequently the exploitation, of one race by another. Second, as many critics pointed out, colonial expansion was costly. How was Lyautey to convince them that all those acres of sand, scrub, and jungle that colonial soldiers were winning for France could eventually profit the colonizing power?
答案部分体现在1900年1月《两世界评论》（Revue des deux mondes）发表的第二篇文章中，该文题为《论殖民地军队的角色》（Du rôle colonial de l'Armée）。文章赞扬了加利埃尼在东京的策略。更重要的是，文章指出，宗主国军官似乎不愿承担的社会角色，实际上已被殖民地军官所采纳：“殖民地军官首先是通过其社会角色来定义自身的。”殖民地士兵不仅仅是战士。他们还是管理者、农民、建筑师和工程师——简而言之，他们会掌握任何发展其管辖区域所需的技能。利奥泰声称，在殖民地，战争是一种建设性的力量，是饱受无政府状态蹂躏或遭受东方专制统治的土地实现经济复兴的序曲。殖民地军队成为“一支行军队伍”，运用经济、政治和外交手段来最大限度地减少征服过程中的暴力。如此一来，殖民主义不再是一个种族对另一个种族的剥削，也不再是强加外来政权。殖民主义促进了进步，因此对征服者和被征服者都有益。和平、稳定以及商业和农业资源的开发最终将为法国及其殖民地带来利润。此外，这一切可以通过与当地精英“合作”来实现，通过一个灵活、有弹性的保护国来实现，该保护国旨在引导传统的等级制度，而不是用僵化的法国官员取而代之，后者会试图像管理法国本土省份一样管理东京或马达加斯加。
The answer is provided in part in a second article published by the Revue des deux mondes in January 1900, entitled “Du rôle colonial de l'Armée.” The article praised Galliéni's methods in Tonkin. But more, it announced that the social role that metropolitan officers seemed reluctant to take up had, in fact, been adopted by officers in the colonies: “The colonial officer defines himself, above all, by his social role.” A colonial soldier was more than a warrior. He was an administrator, farmer, architect, and engineer—in short, he took up any skill required to develop the region in his charge. In the colonies, Lyautey claimed, war was a constructive force, the prelude to the economic revival of lands torn by anarchy or suffering the heavy hand of oriental despotism. The colonial army became “an organization on the march” which employed economic, political, and diplomatic weapons to minimize the violence of conquest. In this way, colonialism was no longer the exploitation of one race by another and the imposition of an alien government. Colonialism led to progress, and therefore was beneficial to conqueror and conquered alike. Peace, stability, and the development of commercial and agricultural resources eventually would mean profits for both France and its colonies. Furthermore, this could be done in “association” with the native elites, through a supple, flexible protectorate that sought to guide the traditional hierarchy rather than supplant it with hidebound French officials who would try to run Tonkin or Madagascar as if they were metropolitan départements.
但利奥泰的文章还有鲜为人知的第三个层面。1900年，一项将殖民地军队从海军的管辖下剥离，并赋予其在战争部内独立地位的法案提交议会审议。利奥泰试图影响该法案的投票，他不仅赞扬殖民扩张的优点，还声称，帝国建设的伟大任务需要“一支真正的殖民地军队，而不仅仅是驻扎在殖民地的军队，这两者并不相同”。殖民地军队需要其“自主权”，否则就会被宗主国军队“吸收、官僚化”，或者被大量来到殖民地“重演奥斯特里茨战役……却毫无准备地执行殖民地军官日常工作中那些耐心、默默无闻、毫无回报的任务，而这些任务恰恰是他们唯一有利可图的工作”的军官所淹没。<sup> 12</sup>
But Lyautey's article had a third dimension that is seldom discussed. In 1900, a bill to remove the colonial army from the custody of the navy and give it an independent status within the War Ministry was before parliament. Lyautey sought to influence the vote on that bill not only by praising the virtues of colonial expansion, but by claiming that the great task of empire building required, “a colonial army, that is really a colonial army and not only the army in the colonies, which is not the same thing.” The colonial army needed its “autonomy” lest it be “absorbed, bureaucratized” by the metropolitan army, or flooded with officers who come to the colonies “to refight Austerlitz…badly prepared to carry out the patient, ungrateful, obscure work which are the daily tasks, the only profitable ones, of the colonial officer.”12
《论殖民地军队的角色》一书意义重大，即便没有其他原因，也足以表明殖民地士兵正在逐渐形成一种与本土同僚截然不同的心态，以及一种使命感，这种使命感不仅包括殖民地的发展，还包括法国的精神重建。利奥泰写道：“一旦踏出法国，就无法避免地会处处感受到我们方法的摇摆不定和影响力的衰落。……这种（在法国之外的）生活也带来了我们的怀疑和痛苦。”然而，他的悲观情绪被通过殖民行动拯救国家的希望所缓和。利奥泰认为，殖民地见证了“法国人持续增长的价值”，这蕴含着“无与伦比的能量和意志，绝不能浪费”。在利奥泰看来，殖民军队将提供火花和骨干力量，使“法兰西民族”重返世界霸主地位。13
“Du rôle colonial de l'Armée” is important, if for no other reason than that it announced that colonial soldiers were well on their way to acquiring a mentality that set them apart from their metropolitan colleagues, and a sense of mission that included not only the development of the colonies, but also the spiritual reconstruction of France. “It is impossible, as soon as one steps outside of France, not to realize everywhere the fluctuations of our methods and our receding influence,” Lyautey wrote. “…This life outside [of France] brings with it our hours of doubt and anguish.” However, his pessimism was tempered by the hope of national salvation through colonial action. According to Lyautey, the colonies had witnessed the “continuing, if not growing, worth of individual Frenchmen,” which offered “an incomparable capital of energy and will which must not be squandered.” For Lyautey, the colonial army was to furnish the spark and the cadre that would restore “la race française” to its preemiment place in the world.13
至少从表面上看，《论殖民军队的角色》一书对殖民征服和发展的问题提出了一种理性而人道的见解。谁能不赞赏这位官员对官僚主义愚蠢行径的批判，对战争破坏性的痛斥，以及对一个由开明的殖民士兵和行政官员引导、土著居民幸福繁荣的殖民地世界的憧憬呢？然而，显而易见的问题是：“它奏效了吗？”这种“殖民角色”仅仅是对理想世界的描绘，是旨在确保殖民军队法案通过的宣传手段，还是对法国在海外殖民方式的现实描述？答案或许可以在法国征服摩洛哥的事件中找到，而利奥泰的名字也与这一事件紧密相连。1903年，他被任命为阿尔及利亚-摩洛哥边境南奥拉奈军区的指挥官。这位学徒如今已成为一名名副其实的巫师，拥有在摩洛哥运用“加列尼方法”的完全自主权。这次经历证明，利奥泰的理论既过于狭隘，又过于理想化。
On the surface, at least, “Du rôle colonial de l'Armée” offers a sensible and humane approach to the problems of colonial conquest and development. Who could fail to applaud the functionary who castigated the idiocy of bureaucratic practice, the colonial soldier who decried the destructiveness of war, who envisaged a colonial world of happy and prosperous natives guided by enlightened colonial soldiers and administrators? However, the obvious question is, “Did it work?” Was the “rôle colonial” simply a vision of an ideal world, a piece of propaganda designed to ensure the passage of the colonial army law, or was it a realistic description of French colonial methods abroad? The answer is perhaps to be found in the French conquest of Morocco, an event with which Lyautey's name is indelibly linked. In 1903, he was named to command the military district of the South Oranais on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. The apprentice now became a sorcerer in his own right, with carte blanche to apply the “Galliéni method” in Morocco. The experience was to prove that Lyautey's theories were at once too narrow and too idealistic.
这种狭隘的观念必然源于他将人视为本质上的经济动物。在摩洛哥，他曾对军官们说：“我们殖民军事行动存在的理由始终是，而且首先是，经济利益。”<sup> 14 </sup> 因此，军事工程师们设立了一些后来成为“吸引中心”的据点，摩洛哥人可以在那里以远高于塔菲拉勒特或非斯的价格出售他们的山羊、绵羊、骆驼和马匹。他们也乐于拜访利奥泰为了“争取民心”而引进的军医。然而，市场最终并未像利奥泰所希望的那样，成为“瓦解异己势力的强大工具”。摩洛哥人并不认为与法国人进行贸易和掠夺法国人之间存在矛盾。利奥泰通过人为抬高物价，将贸易从塔菲拉勒特和非斯引开，从而疏远了当地的强大势力。1906年，这些人下令抵制法国市场。到7月份，法国邮局的贸易几乎完全停滞了。15
The narrowness followed inevitably from his view of man as essentially an economic animal. In Morocco he told his officers: “The raison d'être of our colonial military operations is always, and above all, economic.”14 Consequently, the military engineers established posts that were to become “centers of attraction,” where Moroccans could sell their goats, sheep, camels, and horses at prices far higher than they would fetch in the Tafilalet or Fez. They were also happy to visit army doctors whom Lyautey imported as part of his “hearts and minds” approach to conquest. But the marketplace never proved to be the “great agent of dissolution of the dissidents” that Lyautey had hoped. The Moroccans saw no contradiction in trading with the French one minute and plundering them the next. By drawing commerce away from the Tafilalet and Fez with his artificially inflated prices, he alienated powerful interests there. In 1906, these people ordered a boycott of French markets. By July, trade in French posts had virtually dried up.15
摩洛哥人也没有得到多少在法军哨所附近定居的优惠。法军军队行事傲慢，骑马闯入“友好”的村落，要求村民准备一只羊或几只鸡做晚餐。法国人征用骡子和骆驼用于其漫长的车队的做法也不得人心。最糟糕的是，在法军哨所附近定居甚至可能非常危险，因为法国军事司法倾向于将当地人一概而论地处理，并惩罚那些距离最近的人。因此，到1906年中期，利奥泰的“经济渗透”计划彻底失败也就不足为奇了。
Nor were Moroccans offered many incentives to settle near French posts. French-led troops could behave with great arrogance, riding into a “friendly” douar to demand that a sheep or several chickens be prepared for dinner. The French habit of requisitioning mules and camels for their interminable convoys was not popular. At its worst, to settle near a French post could prove positively dangerous, for French military justice tended to deal with natives en bloc and to punish those nearest at hand.16 It must come as no surprise, therefore, that by mid-1906 Lyautey's program of “economic penetration” lay in tatters.
利奥泰的军事改革与他的经济改革一样，收效甚微。他是法国军队中最具声望的“本土化”倡导者，主张减轻部队负担，提高机动性。他常说：“在非洲，保卫自己的关键在于机动。”在许多方面，这不无道理。然而，他创建特种部队的尝试却因如何兼顾机动性和稳固性这一老生常谈的问题而失败。利奥泰依靠游击队（或称“古米耶”）为他的哨所提供远程安全保障。但他很快发现这些游击队存在缺陷。如果得到正规军的密切支援，他们足以应付突袭。但在正规战斗中，他们却可能成为累赘：他们五分钟内就能耗尽所有弹药，一旦遭到围攻便会溃逃。17一些家庭会将一个儿子送入游击队，而其余家人则加入反叛武装，这种情况并不少见。不出所料，这些游击队往往无法像法国军官所期望的那样全力以赴。几名负责指挥古米耶（goumier，摩洛哥民兵）的军官背部中弹身亡，这很可能是当地民兵以肆意乱射而臭名昭著的后果。但没有人真正信任古米耶。他们的军事效用确实有限。法国军官一次又一次地发现，他们的游击队员机动性不如他们要抓捕的劫掠团伙。他们的装备往往也更差，只能使用剩余的法军武器，而他们的对手却可以从公开市场上购买最新型号的武器。摩洛哥人以小股部队的形式继续袭击补给车队，并劫掠那些“臣服”于法国的部落的牲畜。古米耶很少能够追踪到这些劫掠者。18
Lyautey's military reforms met with little more success than did his economic ones. He was the French army's most prestigious advocate of “going native,” of lightening the load of his troops and increasing their mobility. “In Africa, one defends oneself by moving,” he was fond of saying. In many respects, this made sense. However, his attempts to create specialized units foundered on the old problem of how to reconcile mobility with solidity. Lyautey relied on units of partisans, or goumiers, to provide long-range security for his posts. But he soon discovered that they had their shortcomings. If closely supported by regular troops, they were adequate for razzias. In formal combat, they could prove a positive liability: they fired all their ammunition in five minutes and fled if pressed.17 It was not uncommon for families to place one son in the goumiers while the rest of the family joined the dissidents. Not surprisingly, attacks were often not pressed home with the ardor that French officers would have liked. A few officers in charge of goumiers died with a bullet in the back, possibly the result of the wild, indiscriminate firing for which native levies were famous. But no one quite trusted goumiers. Certainly, their military usefulness was limited. Time and again, French officers found that their partisans were less mobile than the bands of raiders they were set to catch. They were often less well armed, having to content themselves with surplus French arms while their opponents could purchase the latest models on the open market. Moroccans, operating in small groups, continued to attack supply columns and to plunder the herds of tribes who had “submitted” to the French. Seldom were the goumiers able to track the raiders down.18
利奥泰的“行军组织”需要一个可靠的情报网络。如果法国人希望最大限度地减少抵抗，就必须对各个部落、其内部派系及其主要领导人有透彻的了解。利奥泰指示情报部门研究各个部落，派遣间谍，并贿赂那些可能为法国效力的人。作为一个开展民族志研究的学术机构，它取得了巨大的成功。但作为一个间谍机构，它却基本上失败了。情报官员的报酬微乎其微。部落成员向他们提供的信息含糊不清或支离破碎，总是有所保留，以便在下一个集市日出售。<sup> 19</sup>不乏渴望接受利奥泰贿赂的摩洛哥人。但是，那些对摩洛哥社会只有肤浅了解的法国官员发放的贿赂几乎总是落入了错误的人手中，正如摩洛哥酋长赖苏尼所说，是“一些没有影响力的小人物”。“他们许诺了很多，但却无力兑现。”<sup> 20</sup>
Lyautey's “organization on the march” required a reliable intelligence network. A sound knowledge of the tribes, their divisions, and their principal leaders was essential if the French hoped to minimize resistance. Lyautey detailed the Intelligence Service to study the tribes, send out spies, and bribe those who might use their influence for France. As an academic organization drawing up ethnographic studies, it was a great success. As a spy service, it was largely a failure. Intelligence officers received a poor return on their money. Tribesmen gave them vague or fragmentary information, always holding back something to sell on the next market day.19 There was no shortage of Moroccans eager to take Lyautey's money. But bribes handed out by French officers who had only a superficial knowledge of Moroccan society almost inevitably went to the wrong people, “small men who had no influence,” according to the Moroccan caid Raisuni. “They promised great things, but they had no power to carry them out.”20
由于机动性不如敌人，且情报不足，法国人只能退而求其次，诉诸于他们认为唯一的选择——突袭。如果无法惩罚真正的罪犯，他们就惩罚那些能够抓到的人。“利奥泰方法”实际上就是一系列针对所受损失的报复性袭击。可怕的突袭制度化并持续下去。“经济渗透”、“吸引区”、“本土政治”和“行军组织”这些概念越来越像空洞的陈词滥调。诚然，利奥泰从未排除使用武力——他有时也承认“在这个国家，唯有武力才能赢得尊重”。但如果将利奥泰的“争取民心”的征服方法视为一种哲学理论，它却带有一种奇特的维多利亚时代中期的气息。这种方法假定所有人，甚至阿拉伯人，都可以被教导按照欧洲人定义的自身利益行事；只有少数狂热分子可能需要更具说服力的方法。这种观点在1857-1858年印度兵变后，在英国已基本失去信誉。利奥泰如此保守，深受历史和自身部落主义思想的影响，为何会宣扬这种理论，其原因必须从政治层面而非军事理论层面去探究。
Less mobile than their enemy and inadequately informed, the French fell back upon the only option they saw open to them—the razzia. If they could not punish the guilty, they would punish whom they could catch. The “Lyautey method” boiled down in practice to a series of reprisal raids for damage inflicted. The dreadful razzia was institutionalized and perpetuated. “Economic penetration,” “zone of attraction,” “native politics,” and “organization on the march” increasingly sounded like so many hollow clichés. To be sure, Lyautey had never ruled out the use of force—occasionally he admitted that “in this country, force alone imposes respect.” But if regarded as a philosophical doctrine, Lyautey's “hearts and minds” approach to conquest had a curiously mid-Victorian ring to it. It assumed that all men, even Arabs, could be taught to act in their own interests, as these interests were defined by Europeans; only a few fanatics might require more persuasive methods. This view had been largely discredited in Britain following the Indian Mutiny of 1857–1858. The reason why Lyautey, a man so utterly conservative, steeped in history and in his own brand of tribalism, would preach such a doctrine must be sought in the realm of politics rather than in that of military theory.
在东京，加利埃尼致力于边境绥靖。他无意将法国的占领范围扩大到中国，而只是想镇压在北方活动的黑旗军。要了解加利埃尼在东京取得的成效，还需要进行更多研究。他和利奥泰声称他们的和平手段取得了成效。或许是因为越南和中国之间的敌意太过强烈，以至于越南人宁愿选择法国人而不是他们的传统敌人。又或许是因为越南人饱受战争摧残，最终因精疲力竭而投降。21无论东京的情况如何，在摩洛哥，利奥泰的手段并未取得完全成功。尽管摩洛哥人之间存在部落间的竞争，但他们都认同生活在“伊斯兰王国”（Dar al-Islam）内，并对苏丹保持忠诚。利奥泰两次试图通过在贝沙尔和拉斯艾因设立据点进一步推进，但都以失败告终，部分原因是这些行动在巴黎引发了抗议。但更重要的是，他们致力于煽动1908年摩洛哥东部的部落起义。随后的法国入侵使得法国的占领范围得以从东部一直延伸到阿特拉斯山脉的山麓。摩洛哥并非被利奥泰的“行军组织”所征服。恰恰相反，法国人每一次试图通过“和平渗透”——无论是外交手段还是军事手段——最终都激起了摩洛哥的反抗，迫使法国不得不派遣重兵入侵。作为一种边境绥靖政策，利奥泰的“行军组织”收效甚微；作为一种征服政策，它彻底失败了。
In Tonkin, Galliéni had been engaged in frontier pacification. He had no desire to extend French occupation into China, but only to subdue Black Flags operating in the north. More research is needed before we can know the extent of Galliéni's success in Tonkin. He and Lyautey claimed that their peaceful methods had borne fruit. It may have been that hostility between the Vietnamese and the Chinese was so acute that the Vietnamese favored the French over their traditional enemies. Or the Vietnamese may have been so worn down by war that they submitted out of sheer exhaustion.21 Whatever the case in Tonkin, in Morocco Lyautey's methods enjoyed less than complete success. Despite their tribal rivalries, Moroccans did share a common sense of living in the “Dar al-Islam” and a common loyalty to the sultan. Lyautey's two attempts to advance by setting up posts further into Morocco at Bechar and Ras el-Ain failed in part because they provoked protests in Paris. But more importantly, they worked to galvanize a tribal uprising in eastern Morocco in 1908. The subsequent French invasion allowed the extension of the occupation in the East to the very foothills of the Atlas Mountains. Morocco was not conquered by Lyautey's “organization on the march.” On the contrary, every attempt by the French to work through “peaceful penetration,” whether diplomatic or military, eventually provoked a reaction that required an invasion by heavy columns of French troops. As a doctrine of frontier pacification, Lyautey's “organization on the march” worked poorly; as a doctrine of conquest, it failed.
那么，为什么“法国征服摩洛哥更多地依靠说服而非武力”这种说法至今仍流传甚广呢？本质上是因为“争取民心”与其说是法国在摩洛哥行之有效的军事策略，不如说更像是一种针对法国民众的公关手段。正如所有游击战一样，利奥泰面临的难题是如何剥夺少数意志坚定的战士们在非战斗民众中的支持和同情。利奥泰的“经济渗透”策略试图说服这部分软弱的民众，让他们相信支持法国符合自身利益。正如我们所见，这种方法过于简单粗暴，最终在军事上以失败告终。
Why, then, does the myth still linger that the French relied far more upon persuasion than force to conquer Morocco? Essentially because “hearts and minds” was more a public-relations exercise with the French people than a workable military formula in Morocco. As in all guerrilla wars, the problem for Lyautey was to deprive the determined handful of warriors of the support and sympathies of the noncombatant population. Lyautey's “economic penetration” sought to persuade this soft center that its interests lay in supporting the French. As we have seen, this proved too simplistic an approach and ultimately failed as a military practice.
如果利奥泰继续鼓吹“争取民心”，其原因更多地与法国的政治局势有关，而非摩洛哥。只有声称他正在“教化”摩洛哥，摩洛哥人实际上更喜欢法国的存在而不是他们原有的无政府状态，他才能说服对殖民扩张价值持怀疑态度的法国公众。“争取民心”——或者如利奥泰所称的“本土政治”——旨在迎合那些对法国士兵坚持要征服的广袤灌木丛和沙漠充其量也只是态度暧昧的法国人。22通过经济渗透和和平关系进行帝国扩张在非洲行不通。突尼斯就是一个很好的例子：如果现代阿尔及利亚在地图上看起来似乎即将把东部邻国挤出马格里布地区，那是因为驻扎在突尼斯的法国士兵试图通过贸易和外交手段将影响力扩展到撒哈拉沙漠，而驻扎在阿尔及利亚的法国士兵则采取了更为强硬的手段。23军队用刺刀向前推进，而不是用微笑和贸易条约。
If Lyautey continued to promote “hearts and minds,” it was for reasons connected far more with the political situation in France than in Morocco. Only by claiming that he was “civilizing” Morocco, that the Moroccans actually preferred the French presence to their normal state of anarchy, could he sell colonial expansion to a French public skeptical of its value. “Hearts and minds”—or “native politics,” as Lyautey called it—was designed to appeal to Frenchmen who were at best ambivalent about the acres of scrub and desert that their soldiers insisted on bringing under the flag.22 Imperial expansion through economic penetration and peaceful relations did not work in Africa. Tunisia offers a good example: if modern-day Algeria looks on a map as if it is about to crowd its eastern neighbor out of the Maghreb, it is because French soldiers in Tunisia tried to extend their influence into the Sahara through trade and diplomacy, while those in Algeria adopted a more muscular approach.23 Armies advanced at the points of their bayonets, not with smiles and trade treaties.
我们必须谨慎，不要对利奥泰的形象描述得过于悲观。他本质上是一位人道主义者，其征服手段远比例如苏丹海军军官的手段温和得多。他也是一位经验丰富的外交家，常常凭借其个人魅力，在摩洛哥扭转叛乱与效忠的局面。然而，即便不是完全不可能，也很难将利奥泰的个人才能转化为一套有效的殖民统治体系，尤其是在法国官僚体制严苛的背景下。利奥泰的个人魅力固然巨大，但也无法阻止许多部落在1925年大规模倒戈，加入阿卜杜勒·克里姆领导的里夫叛乱。
One must be careful not to paint too bleak a picture of Lyautey. He was fundamentally a humane individual whose methods of conquest were far less brutal than those practiced for instance by marine officers in the Sudan. And he was an experienced diplomat who was often able, by sheer force of personality, to tilt the balance between revolt and allegiance in Morocco. Nonetheless, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to transform Lyautey's personal talents into an effective system of colonial government, especially with the heavy-handed bureaucratic system of the French. Nor was Lyautey's charm, immense as it was, able to prevent the wholesale defection of a number of tribes to Abd el-Krim's Riff rebellion in 1925.
以上便是利奥泰狭隘观点的例证。但他的理想主义究竟是如何让他失望的呢？利奥泰设想殖民主义是“两个民族为了战胜贫瘠和苦难而结成的兄弟联盟”。<sup> 24</sup>然而，在实践中，即使是像利奥泰这样才华横溢的人也无法使这套体系真正实现其理想。摩洛哥保护国剥夺了苏丹的权力，欧洲人取代摩洛哥人进行统治，而移民则剥夺了当地居民的土地。尽管利奥泰告诫人们摩洛哥人并非低人一等，只是“不同”，但种族主义依然根深蒂固。在军队统治的部落地区，由军官主导的“间接管理”往往意味着受法国势力支持的酋长们的残酷剥削。或许最严重的暴行发生在南部，利奥泰放任“阿特拉斯山脉之王”为所欲为，结果马达尼·格拉维几乎像黑手党老大一样掌控了马拉喀什，甚至连城里34000名妓女都受他控制。“你不可能用处女来管理殖民地，”利奥泰只能这样为自己辩解。法国人的确给摩洛哥带来了稳定，使经济得以在有限的范围内发展。然而，受益的并非广大摩洛哥民众，而是行政官员和移民。
So much for the narrowness of Lyautey's views. But how did his idealism fail him? Lyautey held a vision of colonialism as a “fraternal union between two peoples to vanquish sterility and misery.”24 In practice, however, not even a man as ingenious as Lyautey could make the system live up to its ideal. The Moroccan protectorate stripped the sultan of his powers and Europeans administered in the place of Moroccans, while immigrants dispossessed the natives of their lands. Racism retained all of its vitality despite Lyautey's admonitions that Moroccans were not inferior, only “different.” In tribal areas ruled by the army, a system of “indirect administration” under the guiding hand of officers too often meant merciless exploitation by caids who were backed by French power. Perhaps the greatest abuses occurred in the south where Lyautey allowed the “Lords of the Atlas” free rein to govern as they pleased, with the result that Madani el Glaoui virtually ran Marrakech like a Mafia chief, down to the control of the city's 34,000 prostitutes. “You cannot run a colony with virgins,” was all that Lyautey could say in his defense. The French certainly brought stability to Morocco, which allowed the economy to develop within narrow limits. However, it was administrators and immigrants, rather than the mass of Moroccans, who benefited.
第四
IV
如果法国人征服非洲靠的是刺刀而非“民心”，那么他们从殖民经验中汲取了哪些军事教训？这些教训在1914年之前对欧洲战术理论产生了多大影响？在探讨殖民战争理论时，很难从如此复杂多样的经验中提炼出一套基本的军事原则。作战方式可能取决于敌情、地形，或者，最后，国内政治压力。
If Africa was won by French bayonets rather than by “hearts and minds,” what were the military lessons that the French drew from their colonial experience and how far did they influence European tactical doctrine before 1914? In discussing a colonial school of warfare it is difficult to distill a set of basic military principles from an experience that was so varied. The form of operations could be dictated by the nature of the enemy, the nature of the terrain, or, lastly, by domestic political pressures.
对法国作战方法影响最大的，也是最显而易见的，是敌人的性质。在近一个世纪的欧洲以外战争中，法国人遇到的对手组织程度差异显著。有些对手组织严密、装备精良，例如达荷美王国的军队，其中包括“亚马逊”部队。这些部队能够列队射击、提供火力掩护、从纵队中展开长线阵型并进行侧翼包抄，但正如后文所述，这些能力并不一定能保证他们在军事上有效。<sup> 25</sup>另一些对手则组织程度较低：例如阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔的阿拉伯军队、萨莫里的军队、乍得湖畔的拉比赫军队以及越南的黑旗军。他们拥有相对现代化的武器装备、基本的军事组织，并接受过一定的训练，其操练和纪律水平即便达不到欧洲的标准，也至少使他们比任何本土对手都具有明显的优势。第三类人仅拥有原始武器——例如图阿雷格人，他们的武器装备只有长矛、阔剑和盾牌。许多其他非洲人最多也只有一些用于狩猎或驱赶牲畜、而非用于战争的火枪。法国人在所有战区都遭遇了游击队。当然，这些类别之间可能存在重叠。阿尔及利亚人、摩洛哥人、黑旗军和萨莫里人既进行过正规战役，也采用过伏击和破坏交通线等游击战术。鉴于法国人在海外遇到的敌方战术和武器种类繁多，他们拒绝制定殖民战争的通用原则，而是认为重要的是根据具体情况灵活应对，这也就不足为奇了。
The first and most obvious influence on French methods was the nature of the enemy. In what amounted to almost a century of extra-European warfare, the French encountered opponents with markedly different levels of organization. Some were well organized and well armed, like the armies of the king of Dahomey, which included the “Amazonian” contingents. These troops were able to fire by ranks, offer covering fire, form extended lines from deep columns, and undertake flanking movements, although, as will be seen, this did not necessarily make them militarily effective.25 Others were semiorganized: the Arabs of Abd el-Kader, Samori's sofas, Rabih's army on Lake Chad, or the Black Flags in Vietnam. They possessed reasonably modern weapons, a rudimentary military organization, and were trained to standards of drill and discipline which, if not up to European norms, at least gave them a marked superiority over any indigenous opponents. A third category had only primitive weapons—the Tuareg, for instance, whose armament consisted of a spear, broadsword, and shield. Many other Africans had at most muskets designed for hunting or keeping animals out of crops rather than for warfare. The French also encountered guerrillas in all theaters of operation. Of course, some of these categories could and did overlap. Algerians, Moroccans, Black Flags, and Samori all fought set-piece battles and resorted to guerrilla tactics of ambush and operations against communications. Given the variety of enemy tactics and weapons that the French encountered abroad, it is hardly surprising that they declined to establish general principles of colonial warfare and instead concluded that the important thing was to adapt to each situation as it arose.
战役伊始，指挥官最重要的考量是选择一个既符合敌情又符合自身战役目标的作战目标。法军可能直接入侵并吞并领土，也可能进行边境绥靖。无论哪种情况，战争都必须围绕敌人“最珍视”的目标展开，正如英国将军加内特·沃尔斯利爵士所言。首都或其他抵抗中心是最显而易见的作战目标：突尼斯、塔那那利佛、非斯、马拉喀什或阿波美。在这种情况下，可以派遣纵队攻占目标。如果运气好的话，抵抗就会瓦解。要塞也是攻击目标之一。印度支那战役初期，法军主要通过两栖登陆作战夺取河上要塞。在西苏丹，非洲人常常选择守卫他们的要塞。正如埃米尔·让蒂尔在沙里河战役中所发现的那样，强攻这些要塞可能会付出惨重代价。然而，由于城墙是用泥土和石头砌成的，因此极易受到炮火攻击，即使是法军在战役中使用的轻型80毫米火炮也无法幸免。一旦攻破城墙，装备更精良、训练有素的法军通常就能轻松取胜。
The most important consideration for a commander at the onset of a campaign was to select an objective that matched both the nature of his opposition and the aims of his campaign. The French might be engaged in straight invasion and annexation, or in frontier pacification. In either case, war had to made on that which, in the words of the British General Sir Garnet Wolseley, the enemy “prized most.” A capital or other center of resistance offered the most obvious objective: Tunis, Tananarive, Fez, Marrakech, or Abomey. In this case, a column could be launched and the objective seized. With luck, resistance would then collapse. Fortresses were also targeted. The early stages of the Indochinese campaign were taken up largely in the seizure of river forts by marine amphibious assault. In the Western Sudan, Africans often chose to defend their tatas. These might prove costly to storm, as Emile Gentil discovered on the Chari. However, the mud and stone construction of their walls made them extremely vulnerable to artillery, even the light 80-mm cannon that the French carried on campaign. Once a breach had been made, the better armed and disciplined French usually had little trouble.
最不具威胁的敌人莫过于那些胆敢对法军方阵地发动自杀式攻击的敌人。这类战斗有力地展现了法军火力优势和抵抗的徒劳，也使得随后的绥靖工作变得轻松许多。比若在1836年锡卡克河战役和1844年伊斯利战役中取得的辉煌胜利并未终结抵抗，但却证明了将敌人引诱至决战的价值。尽管达荷美军队组织严密，但正因如此，他们才得以相对轻松地被击败。在西苏丹、图阿特和摩洛哥，法军得以在开阔地带歼灭所有进攻者。这有助于在敌军内部播下不和的种子，瓦解部落联盟，并使征服得以逐步推进。将敌人引诱至决战之地，从而充分发挥法军火力优势，避免了采用约米尼亚式的复杂机动战略。
By far the least troublesome foes were those whose bravery led them to suicidal attacks on French squares. Such battles forcefully demonstrated the superiority of French firepower and the futility of resistance. It made the subsequent task of pacification much easier. Bugeaud's spectacular victories on the Sikkak River in 1836 and against the Moroccans at Isly in 1844 did not end resistance, but they did prove the value of bringing the enemy to battle. Despite its elaborate organization, indeed because of it, the army of Dahomey was defeated with relative ease. In the Western Sudan, the Tuat, and Morocco, French forces were able to decimate those who attacked them in the open. This helped to sow the seeds of discord in enemy ranks, break up tribal coalitions and allow the conquest to proceed in a piecemeal fashion. Bringing the enemy to battle where the superiority of French firepower would prove decisive removed the need for complicated strategies of maneuver in the Jominian tradition.
一旦敌军在战斗中遭受重创，或其主要基地被攻占，便可能转而采取游击战。尽管一些游击队指挥官，例如萨莫里，展现出极强的应变能力，但最终法军火力优势往往使得精心策划的伏击也付出惨重代价，而法军的损失则微乎其微。
Once the enemy had been badly hurt in battle, or his main base had been seized, he might resort to guerrilla operations. Although some guerrilla leaders, like Samori, proved to be extremely resourceful, in the end the superiority of French firepower usually rendered the best-planned ambush a costly undertaking, while French loses remained trifling.
大多数“异见者”意识到与入侵者正面交锋的艰难，便退守到自己的领土内。法国人的任务是说服他们投降。然而，市场很少像利奥泰所希望的那样成为“瓦解异见者的强大工具”，因此法国人通常被迫诉诸不可抗力。劫掠是征服领土的首选手段。这无疑对士兵来说最为有利可图；劫掠可以维持军队的运转，并使其更加灵活。但劫掠的主要目的是恐吓敌人，使其陷入饥饿。在西苏丹，由于法国人经常缺乏训练有素的部队，当地的辅助部队会肆意破坏大片乡村地区，迫使幸存者因精疲力竭而投降。这些做法彻底否定了利奥泰关于殖民地士兵只使用取得胜利所需的最小武力，并且始终牢记“今天的敌人就是明天的盟友”的说法。他告诫人们应该震慑敌人而不是消灭敌人，但这些劝告通常无人理会。搜捕行动奏效了，因此包括利奥泰在内的殖民地官员都使用了这种手段。
Most “dissidents,” recognizing the difficulty of opposing the invaders in battle, withdrew into their territory. The task of the French was to convince them to submit. As the marketplace seldom proved to be the “great agent of dissolution of the dissidents” that Lyautey had hoped, the French usually were forced to resort to force majeure. The razzia was the preferred method of subduing a territory. It was certainly the most profitable for the soldiers; pillage sustained a column and made it more mobile. But the principal purpose of the razzia was to terrorize the enemy and reduce him to starvation. In the Western Sudan, where the French were often short of trained troops, native auxiliaries would lay waste to great areas of the countryside, forcing the survivors to submit from sheer exhaustion. These practices made a mockery of Lyautey's claims that colonial soldiers applied only the minimum of force necessary for victory and never lost sight of the fact that today's enemy was tomorrow's ally. His admonitions that the enemy was to be overawed rather than eliminated usually fell on deaf ears. The razzia worked, and so colonial officers, including Lyautey, used it.
地形是影响殖民行动的第二个因素。从某种意义上说，所有殖民战役都是“与自然对抗”，其程度甚至超过了与敌人对抗。法国军队的困境往往并非源于敌人的实际战斗力，而是源于敌人难以接近。例如，据F·赫洛特上尉所述，马达加斯加的霍瓦人本可以给疲惫不堪、兵力分散的法军造成巨大损失，“如果叛军的勇气和他们的机动性一样强的话。但由于害怕与法军正面交锋，惧怕刺刀，一旦法军向他们逼近，他们便仓皇逃窜。”<sup> 26</sup>然而，在马达加斯加，如同在东京湾、西苏丹以及阿尔及利亚早期一样，造成困难的并非叛军的子弹，而是地形、气候，尤其是疾病。由于需要快速穿越疾病肆虐的地区，补给车队无法通行，食物和水源匮乏，在山地或沙漠环境中作战困难重重，以及漫长的征程，法国军队不得不根据地形调整作战策略。他们必须减轻负重，提高机动性，远离基地，就地取材，并且违背欧洲传统的军事理念，做好在敌军面前分兵作战的准备。比若（Bugeaud）发展出了汇聚纵队的战术——即将部队分成若干纵队，从不同方向汇聚到目标——其主要目的是为了在补给有限的地区尽可能快速地调动更多兵力。然而，分兵作战并非没有风险。因行军途中分兵而导致的最著名的惨败案例，并非发生在法国，而是发生在美国和英国。兵力分散使得敌人能够集中火力攻击最脆弱的纵队，正如卡斯特在 1876 年的小巨角河战役和切姆斯福德勋爵在 1879 年的伊桑德尔瓦纳战役中所发现的那样。法国人也曾因兵力分散而遇到问题——在 1907 年至 1908 年摩洛哥的沙维亚战役中，达马德将军不断使用汇聚纵队战术，使得机动性强的摩洛哥骑兵屡次集中火力攻击最薄弱的纵队。
The nature of the terrain was a second factor that influenced colonial operations. In a real sense, all colonial campaigns were fought “against nature” as much as, and perhaps even more than, against the enemy. It was often the inaccessibility of the enemy rather than his actual fighting powers that caused the French problems. For instance, according to Captain F. Hellot, the Hovas of Madagascar might have done great damage to the exhausted and overextended French “had the courage of the rebels been as great as their mobility. But the fear of coming into direct contact with the troops, the terror of the bayonet, made them flee as soon as a march was made on them.”26 In Madagascar, as in Tonkin and the Western Sudan, and in the early years in Algeria, however, the difficulties were caused not so much by rebel bullets as by terrain, climate, and especially disease. The need to march through disease-ridden areas quickly, the absence of roads for supply wagons, the lack of food and often water, the difficulties of campaigning in mountainous terrain or in desert conditions, and the sheer vastness of the distances forced the French to tailor operations to the lay of the land. They had to lighten loads, work for mobility, leave their bases far behind, live off the land, and, in the teeth of conventional European military wisdom, be prepared to divide their forces in the presence of the enemy. Bugeaud developed the tactic of converging columns—that is, dividing a force into separate columns which would converge on an objective from several directions—principally to be able to move as many men as possible quickly over a land that could provide only limited supplies. However, the division of forces was not without its dangers. The most famous debacles that occurred as the result of separating one's force on the march were American and British rather than French. Divided forces allowed the enemy to concentrate on the most vulnerable column, as Custer discovered at the Little Big Horn in 1876 and Lord Chelmsford at Isandhlwana in 1879. The French too had their problems with dividing forces—during the Chaouia campaign of 1907–1908 in Morocco, General d'Amade's persistent use of converging columns allowed mobile Moroccan horsemen repeatedly to concentrate on the weakest one.
地形特征以及水源和粮食的供应情况也会影响部队的推进路线、投入兵力以及是否使用炮兵。在征服阿尔及利亚的最初十年里，法军使用的重型纵队被迫沿着山谷行进，这使得抵抗力量在山丘上相对安全。即便如此，在一支8000至10000人的纵队中，仍有多达1500名士兵专门负责修建道路，以便其余部队通行。之所以迟迟未能击败撒哈拉沙漠的图阿雷格人，并非因为他们战斗力特别强悍，而是因为他们难以接近。像萨莫里这样足智多谋的起义指挥官会设法摧毁法军推进路线上的所有可用资源。通过这种方式，他们能够限制法军入侵的效率，并常常迫使法军因补给不足而撤退。如果像武莱和沙诺因的军队那样，一支纵队过于沉重，以至于士兵们可以带着妻子参加战役，那么这支纵队可能会完全失去军事目标，只是四处游荡寻找食物。
The nature of the terrain and the availability of water and food might also determine the line of advance of a force, the numbers of troops committed, and whether artillery might be included. The heavy columns employed by the French in the first decade of the Algerian conquest were forced to follow the valleys, leaving the resistance relatively safe in their hills. Even then, up to 1,500 soldiers in a column of 8,000 or 10,000 men would be employed solely in building a road so that the rest of the column could pass. The Tuareg of the Sahara took so long to defeat not because they were particularly formidable fighters but because they were so difficult to get at. Intelligent insurgent commanders like Samori took care to destroy all available resources in the path of the advancing French. In this way they were able to limit the effectiveness of French incursions and often force them to retire due to lack of supplies. If a column was too heavy, as was that of Voulet and Chanoine, who allowed the men to bring their wives on campaign, it might lose all sight of a military objective and simply wander about looking for sustenance.
敌人的性质和地形的性质无疑在很大程度上决定了殖民地的战略和战术。然而，考虑到法国军队在海外的长期经验以及他们声称能够适应新的、不同的殖民地环境，令人惊讶的是，他们却常常选择那些似乎更多地借鉴欧洲而非非洲的军事解决方案。事实上，法国殖民军队面临的根本问题并非在于如何判断其殖民地军事经验有多少适用于欧洲，而是如何将欧洲的军事惯例排除在殖民地之外。
The nature of the enemy and the nature of the terrain certainly dictated colonial strategy and tactics to a great degree. Nevertheless, it is surprising, given the long experience of the French army abroad and their claims of adaptability in the face of new and different colonial conditions, how often they opted for military solutions that seemed to owe more to Europe than to Africa. Indeed, the essential problem of the French colonial army was not to decide how much of its colonial military experience was applicable to Europe, but how to keep European military practices out of the colonies.
欧洲战役模式渗透殖民地的最明显证据便是重型纵队的持续使用。殖民地士兵对此颇有微词，原因多种多样。他们声称这种战术效率低下：1881年入侵突尼斯印证了比若的观点，即一支没有占领目标的纵队“如同船只在海上留下的尾迹”。当地居民在纵队通过前保持沉默，之后便再次起义，迫使军队进行第二次入侵并永久占领。其次，重型纵队经常在无法承载大量兵力通行的地区作战。1898-1899年，富罗-拉米远征撒哈拉沙漠的部队几乎全军覆没，原因就是他们与补给车队的距离过远。1901-1902年的图阿特远征则需要征用35000头骆驼，几乎是阿尔及利亚南部全部的骆驼种群，才能维持其后勤保障。由于法国士兵无法妥善管理这些骆驼，多达25000头骆驼死亡，使撒哈拉地区许多阿拉伯人失去了生计来源。“我认为没有哪一次屠杀能与1901年的惨剧相提并论，”撒哈拉专家E.F.戈蒂埃写道，“沿途的豺狼和秃鹫都被这项艰巨的任务压垮了。”<sup> 27</sup>
The most obvious evidence of the encroachment of European campaign methods into the colonies was the persistent use of the heavy column. Colonial soldiers objected to it for a variety of reasons. They claimed it was ineffective: the invasion of Tunisia in 1881 confirmed Bugeaud's view that a column without occupation “is like the wake of a ship upon the sea.” The local inhabitants sat still until the column passed, and then revolted anew, requiring a second invasion and a permanent occupation. Second, heavy columns operated often in country that could not support the passage of large numbers of men. The Foureau-Lamy expedition into the Sahara in 1898–1899 almost perished because it outdistanced its supply convoys. The Tuat expedition of 1901–1902 required the requisition of 35,000 camels, virtually the entire camel population of southern Algeria, to support it. As the French soldiers were unable to manage them properly, fully 25,000 of the camels died, which deprived many Arabs in the Saharian regions of their means of a livelihood. “I do not think that there has been a massacre comparable to that of 1901,” the Sahara expert E. F. Gautier wrote. “The jackals and the vultures along the way were overwhelmed with the immensity of their task.”27
对纵队的第三个反对意见是，在利奥泰看来，这就像“用锤子砸苍蝇”。<sup> 28</sup>正如利奥泰在1908年入侵摩洛哥东部期间提醒阿利克斯将军的那样，法国人可以依靠火力而非人数来击败组织涣散的敌人。第四，纵队效率低下：太多宝贵的人力被消耗在护送任务和行军路线上的哨所守卫上。用现代军事术语来说，就是“尾巴”与“牙齿”的比例过高。1911年莫尼埃将军率领7500人解救非斯时，情况确实如此。“当你拖着正规军、75炮兵部队、马匹行军时，你得养活所有人，”利奥泰向未来的乔治·卡特鲁将军抱怨道。“你需要炮弹，你需要基地和守卫基地的人员。这在摩洛哥行军是行不通的。”<sup> 29</sup>和往常一样，利奥泰的言辞并不坦诚。之所以采用纵队，部分原因是他的“和平渗透”策略产生了与预期截然相反的结果。他反对使用重型纵队的理由则更为充分，因为这会在欧洲引起不必要的关注。经验丰富的殖民者坚信，推进应以隐蔽的方式进行，蚕食敌方领土，并更改城镇名称以迷惑巴黎，尤其是在第一次世界大战前国际关系微妙的时期。因此，利奥泰反对使用纵队的主要原因是政治因素而非军事因素。
A third objection to the column was that, in Lyautey's estimation, it was like using “a hammer to crush a fly.”28 The French could depend on firepower, rather than numbers, to overcome an ill-organized enemy, as Lyautey reminded General Alix during the 1908 invasion of eastern Morocco. Fourth, the column was inefficient: too much precious manpower was expended in convoy duty and in guarding posts on the line of march. In modern military parlance, the ratio of “tail” to “teeth” was excessive. This certainly was the case when General Monier led 7,500 men to relieve Fez in 1911. “When you drag along regular troops, seventy-fives, horses, you have to feed all that lot,” Lyautey complained to the future general Georges Catroux. “You need shells, you need bases and men to guard them. That's no way to operate in this country.”29 As usual, Lyautey was being less than frank. The column was used in part because his methods of “peaceful penetration” produced results diametrically opposed to those he had predicted. He was on more solid ground when he objected to the heavy column because it attracted unwanted attention in Europe. Experienced colonial hands were firm believers in advancement through stealth, nibbling away at enemy territory and changing the names of towns to throw Paris off the scent, especially in the delicate period of international relations that preceded the First World War. Therefore, Lyautey's objections to the use of the column were founded principally on political rather than military factors.
尽管殖民地士兵怨声载道，但重型纵队在殖民地的存续时间远远超过了他们认为的正常寿命。这其中有几个原因。当制定大规模作战计划时，指挥权可能会交给被派往殖民地的本土军官，而不是殖民地士兵——例如，达马德和莫尼埃就被调离了摩洛哥战役的关键阶段。由于陆军学院不教授殖民地战争，因此无法将殖民地经验传授给新一代军官。此外，大多数将军都追求兵力优势，他们认为，在敌情不明的情况下，派出小股纵队进入未知的地形，无异于在蒙特卡洛赌上家族产业。
Despite the complaints of colonial soldiers, the heavy column survived in the colonies far beyond what they believed should have been its normal lifetime. There were several reasons for this. When a big operation was planned, command might be assigned to a metropolitan officer seconded to the colonies, rather than to a colonial soldier—d'Amade and Monier, for example, were sent out of crucial stages of Morocco operation. As colonial warfare was not taught in the War College, there was no way of passing colonial experience on to new generations of officers. Also, most generals sought safety in numbers, and felt that small columns launched into unmapped country against a foe whose strength was not known was like betting the family estate at Monte Carlo.
但重型纵队得以幸存的最终原因在于，它确实常常发挥了作用。当然，纵队也有其局限性——像萨莫里这样狡猾的对手可能会通过焦土战术或切断其交通线来削弱它。纵队规模过大，可能无法在远离其基地的地方继续作战，就像进军塔那那利佛的纵队那样。它也可能像内格里尔的纵队在谅山战役中那样，遭到突袭而被迫撤退。然而，在大多数情况下，纵队都达到了预期目的——那些试图与入侵者进行武力较量的非洲人，都深刻体会到了现代火力的威力。塞尔维埃将军的纵队虽然耗费了大量的骆驼，但最终结束了图阿特地区的抵抗。达马德将军的纵队虽然受到殖民地士兵的诸多批评，但在1908年击败了绍维亚的摩洛哥军队，同年，阿利克斯将军的纵队也横扫了阿特拉斯山脉。即使是人们眼中堪称殖民地军人典范的查尔斯·芒金，也在1912年率领一支庞大的部队进军马拉喀什。一场激烈的战斗或许无法彻底消除抵抗，但无疑瓦解了抵抗力量，凸显了法军的强大，并为日后逐步征服各个部落和派系铺平了道路。
But there was a final reason why the heavy column survived, and that was because, in fact, it often did prove effective. Of course there were limits—clever opponents like Samori might blunt it through scorched earth tactics, or by operating against its communications. A column might be too large to survive far beyond its base, as was the column that marched on Tananarive. It might be caught off guard and forced to retreat, as was Negrier's column at Lang-son. However, in most cases, the column served its purpose—Africans who attempted a test of arms with the invaders were given hard lessons in the force of modern firepower. General Servière's column, although expensive in camels, ended resistance in the Tuat. General d'Amade's columns, though much criticized by colonial soldiers, crushed the Moroccans in the Chaouia in 1908, as did the column of General Alix across the Atlas in the same year. Even the man whom one thinks of as a colonial soldier par excellence, Charles Mangin, took a heavy column to Marrakech in 1912. A pitched battle might not end resistance. But it certainly fragmented it, forced home the point that the French were strong, and paved the way for piecemeal conquest of the tribes and factions.
欧洲还以其他方式干预了法国在海外的军事行动。殖民地士兵深知政府往往不赞成海外作战计划，因此常常仓促发动行动，通常缺乏足够的支援或情报，试图给政府留下既成事实。法国在殖民地遭遇的许多挫败，例如博尼埃在廷巴克图附近的阵亡，都可以追溯到这些行动仓促拼凑而成，以避免在法国被发现，并可能遭到巴黎方面的撤销命令。
Europe intruded into French military methods abroad in other ways. The colonial soldier's knowledge that the government tended to disapprove proposed operations overseas meant that operations were often launched in haste, usually without adequate support or intelligence, in an attempt to present the government with a fait accompli. Many of the French setbacks in the colonies, like Bonnier's death near Timbuktu, can be traced to the fact that operations were quickly cobbled together to avoid detection in France and possibly a countermanding order from Paris.
战役经费匮乏、训练有素的部队短缺、国内对殖民扩张的敌视以及殖民地士兵所受到的政治约束，都可能迫使他们采取“非洲式”的作战方式作为最后的手段。如果殖民官员主张使用小型轻装纵队，往往是因为他们别无选择。例如，拉佩林在1901年后组建的撒哈拉骆驼骑兵部队，其成立的初衷就是为了维护撒哈拉沙漠的治安。当时，政府拒绝派遣超过少数几名当地步兵驻守图阿特人。拉佩林被迫适应当地环境，否则就只能眼睁睁地看着自己的绿洲遭到伏击。
The lack of funds for campaigns, shortage of trained troops, hostility to colonial expansion at home, and political restraints placed on soldiers in the colonies might force them to adopt “African” methods as a last resort. If colonial officers advocated small, light columns, it was often because they had no alternative. For instance, the Saharians, the camel corps that Laperrine founded after 1901 to police the Sahara, came into being after the government refused to provide more than a handful of native infantry to garrison the Tuat. Laperrine was forced to adapt to local conditions or be content to be ambushed in his oasis.
资金短缺或拒绝提供兵力往往不足以约束那些年轻气盛、不惜一切代价在非洲扬名立万的军官。他们需要的是明确的命令和资深士兵，甚至可能需要从本土军队抽调人员来确保命令的执行。在缺乏这两者的情况下，军官们便通过当地酋长或地方长官招募廉价的“辅助人员”。搬运工被绑架，脖子被铁链锁在一起以防止逃跑。以这种方式组织的行动的后果不难想象。沃莱-沙诺因行动就是一个极端例子，它彻底“本土化”了。军官们之所以在非洲启用辅助人员和地方长官，并非因为他们特别有效，而是因为他们廉价且容易获得。
The lack of funds or the refusal to provide troops often was not enough to restrain the young and ambitious officers who sought to make a name for themselves in Africa at any cost. What was needed were explicit orders and senior soldiers, perhaps even seconded from the metropolitan army, to see that they were carried out. In the absence of either, officers recruited inexpensive “auxiliaries” through local chiefs or caids. Porters were kidnapped and chained together by their necks to prevent escape. The result of operations organized in this manner is not difficult to imagine. The Voulet-Chanoine mission offers but the most extreme example of an operation that “went native” with a vengeance. Officers turned to auxiliaries and goumiers in Africa, not because they were particularly effective, but because they were cheap and available.
军官们也可能打着科学研究的旗号来规避军事行动的限制。探险、地形研究、动植物考察或部落人类学研究都可作为掩护：事实上，其中一些任务目标更像是大学的研究提案，而非军事行动计划。他们甚至可能通过为科学家提供“军事护卫”来更彻底地掩盖其真实目的。资深探险家费迪南·富罗是拉米1898年乍得湖探险队的名义指挥官。西奥多·佩恩1899年入侵图阿特人，引发了一场漫长而代价高昂的征服战争，而这次入侵伪装成由阿尔及尔高等科学研究院一位教授领导的地质探险。通过这种方式，军官们得以利用巴黎地理学会、教育部或公共工程部，甚至殖民主义团体的捐款来弥补战争部资源的不足。 Flatters、Lamy、Pein、Voulet 和 Chanoine 都为他们的任务找到了非军事资金。
Officers might also fly the banner of scientific research to circumvent restrictions on military operations. Exploration, topographical studies, examination of flora and fauna, or anthropological studies of tribes all served as cover: indeed, some of these mission objectives read more like university research proposals than plans for military operations. They might even disguise their purpose more thoroughly by providing a “military escort” for a scientist. The veteran explorer Ferdinand Foureau was the nominal commander of Lamy's 1898 expedition to Lake Chad. Theodore Pein's 1899 incursion into the Tuat, which touched off a long and costly campaign of conquest, masqueraded as a geological expedition under the leadership of a professor from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques at Algiers. In this way, officers were able to supplement the inadequate resources of the War Ministry with contributions from the Paris Geographical Society, the Ministries of Education or Public Works, or from colonialist groups. Flatters, Lamy, Pein, and Voulet and Chanoine all found nonmilitary financing for their missions.
V
V
第一次世界大战爆发前欧洲的漫长和平时期，使得殖民地士兵成为他们所有战友中唯一拥有实战经验的群体。然而，将殖民地战争的经验教训转化为法国军事思想却困难重重，很大程度上是因为这些经验教训本身就存在矛盾。缺乏严谨的分析，殖民地经验非但不能启发那些试图发展军事理论的人，反而会令他们更加困惑。殖民地战役强调的是正面交锋而非机动作战。但1914年法国参谋部的思路却强调侧翼包抄和包围的重要性。在海外，步兵对装备简陋、纪律涣散的敌人发起进攻通常都能取得成功。与此同时，殖民地作战也令人震惊地展现了火力远胜于人数的优势。方阵之所以能够保留下来，正是因为它使法军能够最大限度地发挥其防御火力。
The long years of peace in Europe that preceded the outbreak of the First World War meant that colonial soldiers alone among their colleagues had any experience of combat. However, it proved difficult to translate the lessons of colonial warfare into French military thinking, in great part because those lessons were contradictory. Without rigorous analysis, the colonial experience might confuse rather than enlighten those seeking to develop doctrine. Colonial campaigns emphasized the value of the battle over maneuver. But French staff thinking in 1914 stressed the importance of flanking movements and envelopment. Overseas, infantry attacks against an ill-armed and undisciplined enemy usually brought success. At the same time, colonial operations offered a stunning demonstration of the superiority of firepower over numbers. The square survived precisely because it allowed the French to maximize their defensive firepower.
骑兵的冲击力在殖民地并不十分明显。非洲和印度支那的战争主要以步兵对决为主。在北非，斯帕希骑兵很少作为作战单位使用，而是被用作侧翼护卫、车队护航、侦察或封锁退路。撒哈拉骑兵和古米骑兵被用作骑兵，这一理念启发了19世纪40年代非洲猎骑兵的建立。在1908年的绍维亚战役中，非洲猎骑兵在拉法卡对摩洛哥军队发动了一次经典的冲锋，但摩洛哥军队却束手就擒，任由骑兵从他们头顶冲过。<sup> 30</sup>同年，在摩洛哥东部的布德尼布，一次骑兵冲锋在棕榈树林中失去动力，被迫撤退。<sup> 31</sup>
The shock power of cavalry was not particularly evident in the colonies. The wars in Africa and Indochina were primarily infantry duels. In North Africa, spahis were seldom employed as a unit, but used as flank guards, convoy escorts, in reconnaissance, or to block lines of retreat. Saharians and goumiers were used as mounted infantry, the same concept that had inspired the founding of the chasseurs d'Afrique in the 1840s. The chasseurs did mount a classic charge against the Moroccans at R'Fakha during the Chaouia campaign of 1908, but the Moroccans lay down and let the charge pass over them.30 In that same year, a cavalry charge at Bou Denib in eastern Morocco lost its momentum in a palm grove and was forced to retreat.31
轻型火炮的发展使火炮在殖民地战场上的重要性日益凸显。如果说火炮在海外从未像1914年后在欧洲那样占据主导地位，部分原因在于殖民地的敌人，尤其是那些四处游荡的骑兵，往往难以成为有效的攻击目标。此外，在构成殖民地战争主要组成部分的突袭和反游击战中，对火炮支援的需求也不高。但一旦敌军集结，火炮确实能增强法军方阵的防御能力。摩洛哥战役便提供了诸多例证。在要塞攻防战中，大炮也是军队的重要支援力量。
The development of light artillery made that arm more prominent on the colonial battlefield. If artillery never attained the dominant position overseas that it was to occupy in Europe after 1914, this was in part because colonial opponents, especially swirling horsemen, often offered poor targets. Nor was there much call for artillery support in the raids and counterguerrilla operations that made up much of colonial fighting. But artillery did augment the defensive power of French squares once the enemy was massed. Morocco provided many examples of this. Cannon were also a vital support to the army during fortress assaults.
在1914年之前，至少有三个主要因素阻碍了殖民地战术在法国的引入。首先，法国本土军队对殖民地士兵抱有强烈的偏见。这很大程度上源于1870年，当时那些在阿尔及利亚、墨西哥和其他遥远战场上赢得辉煌声誉的士兵，在面对欧洲敌人时却表现得十分无能。法国本土军队一直认为，殖民地的小规模冲突不足以应对欧洲战争，而选择流亡海外的士兵则无法参与到与德国开战的严肃备战工作中。嫉妒也是一个因素——殖民地士兵经历过战斗，获得过勋章，并且往往晋升速度更快。势利眼也起到了一定的作用——殖民地军队往往吸引那些缺乏在法国谋求理想职业所需的社会或职业关系的军官，他们在圣西尔军校或巴黎综合理工学院的成绩平平，或者是因为职业前景黯淡或被社会排斥而被迫流亡海外的冒险家。伦敦的军官们谴责他们的殖民地同僚是“一群流氓”、“一群乌合之众”，认为他们不过是在滑稽地模仿军旅生活，而非认真地履行军人职责。考虑到两军之间存在的巨大偏见，以及选择在海外承担风险和不确定性的士兵与选择在和平时期军队中过着安全、正规军官生活的人之间性格上的根本差异，那些仅仅因为曾在殖民地服役就建议在法国采用某些方法的士兵，不太可能被认真对待。
At least three major factors worked against the importation of colonial tactics into France before 1914. First, there was a strong prejudice against colonial soldiers in the metropolitan army. This stemmed in great part from 1870, when men who had earned brilliant reputations in Algeria, Mexico, and other far-flung battlefields proved inept when faced with a European enemy. The feeling persisted in the metropolitan army that colonial skirmishes provided poor preparation for European warfare and that soldiers who chose exile abroad were lost to the serious business of preparation for war with Germany. Jealousy was also a factor—colonial soldiers had seen action, earned decorations, and often enjoyed accelerated promotion. Snobbery played its part—the colonial army tended to attract officers who lacked the social or professional connections to stake out a satisfactory career in France, whose records at Saint-Cyr or the Ecole Polytechnique had been undistinguished, or adventurers forced abroad because of poor professional prospects or social ostracism. Metropolitan officers condemned their colonial colleagues as “a collection of hooligans,” “bachi-bouzouks” engaged in a parody of military life rather than in serious soldiering. Given the gulf of prejudice that separated the two forces and the fundamental differences in temperament between men who had opted for the risks and uncertainties of life abroad and those who selected the safe, formalized existence of an officer in a peacetime army, it is unlikely that soldiers who suggested that methods be adopted in France merely because they worked in the colonies would have been taken seriously.
但鲜有殖民地士兵怀有改写战略战术条例的野心。从纷繁复杂的殖民地军事经验中遴选出一套原则，其难度几乎是无法克服的。然而，更重要的是，比若、加利埃尼和利奥泰的思想和著述的核心在于强调殖民征服与欧洲战争实践之间的差异，而非相似之处。他们从未主张将殖民地作战方法照搬法国，因为在他们看来，殖民地士兵的职责本质上是一种政治活动，而非纯粹的军事活动。殖民地士兵的任务需要的是想象力、判断力和特殊技能，而非僵化的服从或普鲁士式的形式主义。在殖民地取得成功的关键在于能够灵活应对每一种新情况，而非照搬法国军事学院的某种固定模式。利奥泰认为每个殖民地的情况都不同，他梦想着有一天，就像英属印度一样，每个法国殖民地都能拥有自己的殖民军队，由精通当地方言和习俗的法国军官和士官指挥，从而能够发挥有效的政治作用。殖民地士兵没有资格对法国军队讲授战略战术的精髓。毕竟，对付黑旗军的战术在对付摩洛哥人时可能完全失效。同样，在一次战役中对付萨莫里人的策略也未必能在下一次战役中奏效。为什么要指望普鲁士人像非洲人那样作战呢？殖民战争的价值在于它培养了韧性和在压力下反应的能力。当像加列尼和利奥泰这样的殖民地士兵回到法国高级指挥部时，他们最关心的是了解最新的欧洲大陆理论。
But few colonial soldiers harbored ambitions to rewrite the strategic and tactical regulations. The difficulties of selecting a set of principles out of the varied colonial military experience were virtually insurmountable. However, far more than this, the entire thrust of the thoughts and writings of Bugeaud, Galliéni, and Lyautey stressed the differences rather than the similarities between colonial conquest and warfare as it was practiced in Europe. Nowhere do they argue for the importation into France of colonial methods, for, by their reckoning, colonial soldiering was essentially a political, rather than a purely military, métier. The colonial soldier's task required imagination, judgment, and special skills, not stiff obedience or Prussian formalism. Adaptability in the face of each new situation, not the application of some pat formula of the Ecole de Guerre, made for success in the colonies. Lyautey argued that each colonial situation was different, and dreamed of the day when, like British India, each French colony would possess its own colonial army, commanded by French officers and NCOs well versed in local dialects and customs, and therefore able to play an effective political role. It was hardly the place of colonial soldiers to lecture the army in France on the finer points of strategy and tactics. After all, methods that succeeded against Black Flags might fail utterly when applied against Moroccans. Nor did approaches that worked against Samori in one campaign necessarily prove successful in the next. Why should Prussians be expected to fight like Africans? Colonial warfare was valuable because it instilled resilience and the ability to react under pressure. When colonial soldiers like Galliéni and Lyautey returned to high command in France, their immediate concern was to be brought up to date on the latest Continental theories.
事实上，殖民地军事经验最引人注目之处在于它对宗主国思想的影响微乎其微。尤其值得注意的是，在1914年之前，只有极少数军人和政治家将目光投向非洲，试图解决法国兵力不足的问题。芒金在其1910年出版的《黑力》（La force noire）一书中论证，非洲拥有取之不尽的人力资源，足以抵消德国的优势。然而，他呼吁大规模征召非洲人，却鲜有人支持，即便是在殖民地士兵中也未见起色。加利埃尼和利奥泰对殖民地可能为法国国力做出的贡献只字未提。考虑到英国远不如法国那样关注兵力不足的问题，却从1914年伊始就大量使用殖民地军队，这种沉默就显得更加令人惊讶。利奥泰在1914年的关注点极其狭隘，他只想着如何拯救摩洛哥，而不是派遣摩洛哥人到法国服役。由此只能得出结论：芒金的观点并未被广泛接受，是因为法国士兵，即使是殖民地的士兵，也不认为殖民地战争能为欧洲提供任何有用的经验，而且他们认为，尤其是当地军队，缺乏适合在欧洲作战的素质。32
Indeed, what is most striking about the colonial military experience is how little it influenced metropolitan thinking. This is especially the case when one considers that only a few soldiers or politicians looked to Africa to solve the problem of French numerical inferiority before 1914. Mangin argued in his 1910 book, La force noire, that Africa offered an inexhaustible reservoir of manpower to offset German superiority. But his calls for massive enlistment of Africans found little support, even among colonial soldiers. Galliéni and Lyautey were silent on the contributions that the colonies might make to French strength. This silence is all the more astonishing given that the British, who were far less concerned with the problem of numerical inferiority than were the French, used large numbers of colonial troops from the beginning in 1914. Lyautey's concern in 1914 was the remarkably parochial one of saving Morocco, not of sending Moroccans to serve in France. One can only conclude that Mangin's views did not enjoy wide acceptance because French soldiers, even those in the colonies, did not believe that colonial warfare offered any useful lessons for Europe, and because they believed that native troops especially lacked the qualities suitable to warfare in Europe.32
最终，他们意识到法国的政治气候不利于扩充殖民地军队以弥补法国征兵人数的不足。殖民主义在法国并不受欢迎，尤其是在左翼阵营，殖民地士兵被视为与雇佣兵无异。殖民地军队之所以能被容忍，是因为它规模相对较小且驻扎在遥远的地方。然而，如果主张大规模扩充殖民地军队，并将大量在非洲和印度支那招募的、只对其军官负责的士兵调往法国，势必会激怒广大政治群体，并使军队面临凯撒主义的指责。
Finally, they realized that the political climate in France was unfavorable to the expansion of the colonial army to make up for the shortfall in French conscripts. Colonialism was not popular in France, especially on the Left, where colonial soldiers were regarded as little better than mercenaries. The colonial army was tolerated because it was relatively small and distant. However, to advocate the wholesale expansion of the colonial army and the transfer to France of large numbers of soldiers recruited in Africa and Indochina, answerable only to their officers, would have antagonized a broad section of political opinion and opened the army to charges of Caesarism.
这一切并非否认殖民战争对未来战争形态的某些方面具有借鉴意义。殖民战争往往模糊了政治考量与军事考量之间的界限。决定战争时机和形式的，往往并非纯粹的军事考量，而是欧洲外交关系以及来自巴黎或殖民地内部的政治压力。许多后来参加第一次世界大战的指挥官或许会从中汲取经验。此外，尽管殖民地士兵声称其目的是以最小的武力征服敌人，但殖民战争造成的破坏却预示着总体战的到来。
All this is not to say that colonial warfare did not provide some useful indications of the shape of future wars. Colonial operations often obscured the dividing line between political and military considerations. The state of European diplomatic relations and political pressures from Paris or from within the colonies, rather than purely military considerations, often determined the timing and form of an operation, a factor that many future commanders of the First World War might have pondered with profit. Also, the devastation of colonial warfare pointed toward total war, despite the disclaimers from colonial soldiers that its purpose was to subdue the enemy with a minimum of force.
对殖民地士兵最严厉的批评是将他们轻易战胜部落民与战争初期几个月徒劳的进攻联系起来。这种观点究竟有多大道理？必须记住，在利奥泰看来，殖民扩张提供了三大优势。前两点——“两个民族的兄弟情谊”以及法国与其殖民地之间互惠互利的经济关系——已在前文讨论过。殖民扩张的第三个目标同样具有政治意义：培养一支充满活力、具有民族使命感的殖民地士兵核心力量，以对抗共和法国的惰性、形式主义和制度弊病。在此，利奥泰并非仅仅表达某种遥远的希望。相反，他反映了当时日益壮大的殖民地军官精英阶层的观点，即他们的使命是拯救法国这一政治使命。这与20世纪50年代一些殖民地军官的态度颇为相似，他们自认为肩负着保护法国、欧洲乃至西方文明免受共产主义世界阴谋（即所谓的“革命战争”）威胁的重任。在1914年之前的殖民地士兵眼中，法国似乎是一个深陷政治和社会冲突泥潭、无力对抗强大自信的德国的国家。法国的混乱、分裂和体制失灵在军队内部体现得尤为严重。德雷福斯事件以及随后左翼对军队的诋毁严重打击了士气。1899年之后，殖民地士兵在很大程度上免受左翼与军队之间清算的影响——这得益于距离以及强大的殖民地政治家的庇护。然而，当他们回到家乡时，却发现军队士气低落、群龙无首、官僚主义盛行，似乎无力应对日益增长的德国威胁。他们力图重振军队士气，提振信心。殖民地士兵并不太关注进攻的具体操作，因为他们深知自己在这方面经验不足，也无从向本土的同僚传授经验。他们更强调进攻意识的价值。比若、加列尼和利奥泰作为指挥官的成功，主要在于他们激励士兵的能力。士气、进取心、主动性——这些曾支撑士兵在海外作战的品质——在他们看来，1914年以前本土军队所缺乏的。
The most damning criticism of colonial soldiers links their facile victories against tribesmen to the futile offensives of the early months of the war. How valid is this view? It must be remembered that for Lyautey colonial expansion offered three advantages. The first two—a “fraternal union of two peoples,” and a profitable economic relationship between France and its colonies—have been discussed. The third goal of colonial expansion was equally political: to build up a core of colonial soldiers with energy and a sense of national purpose who would react against the inertia, formalism, and institutional malaise of Republican France. In this, Lyautey was not merely stating some distant hope. Rather, he reflected the view of a growing elite of colonial officers that their mission was the political one of the salvation of France. This was not dissimilar to the attitude of a number of colonial officers in the 1950s who took it upon themselves to protect France, Europe, and Western civilization from the perils of a communist world conspiracy in the form of “la guerre révolutionnaire.” To colonial soldiers in the years before 1914, France appeared to be a country hopelessly riven by political and social conflicts, in poor condition to confront a powerful, confident Germany. The confusion, divisions, and institutional malfunctioning in France seemed at their most critical within the army itself. The Dreyfus affair and the subsequent vilification of the army by the Left had savaged morale. Colonial soldiers had been largely immune to this settling of accounts between the Left and the army after 1899—distance and the protection of powerful colonialist politicians had seen to that. However, they returned home to find a demoralized, leaderless, and bureaucratized army which appeared incapable of facing up to the mounting German threat. They sought to revive the spirit of the army, to bolster its confidence and morale. Colonial soldiers were not concerned so much with the mechanics of the offensive, for in this area they knew that they traded in a devalued currency and had little to teach their metropolitan colleagues. Rather they argued for the value of offensive-mindedness. The success of Bugeaud, Galliéni, and Lyautey as commanders lay primarily in their ability to motivate men. Morale, aggressiveness, initiative, the very qualities that had sustained soldiers overseas, seemed to them lacking in the army at home before 1914.
因此，更准确地说，殖民地士兵对进攻的精神贡献大于对战术的贡献。对于身处海外的士兵而言，法国在政治和精神上都处于瘫痪状态，因自身造成的分裂而丧失了团结，国家防御也因此受到削弱。殖民地士兵力图将他们在殖民地感受到的团结一致的目标带回祖国，使法国人民在兄弟情谊和共同的民族目标中团结起来。利奥泰带领着一群殖民地士兵，他们认为“将这个国家从衰败和毁灭中拯救出来是他们的社会责任。这并非通过修改宪法这种经验主义的、暂时性的方法，而是通过对习俗、惰性和忧虑的强烈反抗……[我们必须]对宗主国的惰性做出反应，在法国内外之间建立起持续不断的生命力，这将使这个国家复兴。”<sup> 33</sup>
It is therefore more accurate to say that colonial soldiers contributed to the spirit, rather than to the techniques of the offensive. For soldiers abroad, France was a political and spiritual invalid, deprived of unity by self-inflicted divisions that undermined national defense. Colonial soldiers sought to transport the unity of purpose felt in the colonies back to the fatherland, uniting Frenchmen in a common bond of fraternity and national purpose. Lyautey led a chorus of colonial soldiers who believed it their “social duty to tear this county from decomposition and ruin. Not by changing the constitution, an empirical and transitory method, but by a violent reaction upon manners, inertia and worries…[we must] react upon metropolitan inertia, establish a continuing and regenerating current of life between France without and France within, which will be a revival for this country.”33
1911年至1914年的民族主义复兴为殖民地预言家们提供了机会。格朗梅森的思想深受东京湾服役经历的影响，他主要负责起草了备受争议的1913年条例，该条例宣称进攻是战争胜利的关键。然而，他关注的并非证明进攻在东京湾奏效，因而也应在欧洲奏效。对格朗梅森而言，进攻与其说是一种战略战术理论，不如说是殖民地释放出的“道德力量”的体现，他希望这种力量能够重振法国及其军队。他的观点引起了那些深知自身军队弱点的军官们的共鸣。“培养一种征服的心态远比纠结于战术重要得多，”格朗梅森总结道。<sup> 34</sup>但随着第一次世界大战的爆发，他所宣扬的这种心态不可避免地影响了战术和战略。
The nationalist revival of 1911–1914 offered colonial prophets their chance. Grandmaison, whose attitudes had been formed by service in Tonkin, was largely responsible for drawing up the controversial 1913 regulations, which declared the offensive to be the key to success in war. However, his concern was not to prove that it worked in Tonkin and therefore should work in Europe. For Grandmaison, the offensive was not so much a strategic and tactical doctrine as an expression of the “moral force” unleashed in the colonies, which he hoped would regenerate France and its army. His views struck a responsive cord among officers well aware of their army's weaknesses. “It is far more important to develop a conquering state of mind than to cavil about tactics,” Grandmaison concluded.34 But the state of mind he proclaimed inevitably affected tactics and strategy as the First World War began.
1 Jean Gottman，“Bugeaud、Galliéni、Lyautey：法国殖民战争的发展”，载于Edward Mead Earle 编辑的《现代战略的缔造者》（普林斯顿，1943 年）。
1 Jean Gottman, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943).
2 Anthony Thrall Sullivan、 Thomas-Robert Bugeaud、法国和阿尔及利亚 1784–1849：政治、权力和美好社会（康涅狄格州哈姆登，1983 年），第 85 页。
2 Anthony Thrall Sullivan, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, France and Algeria 1784–1849: Politics, Power, and the Good Society (Hamden, Conn., 1983), 85.
3关于布若的军事改革，请参阅 Gottman 的《布若、加列尼、利奥泰》和 Sullivan 的《托马斯-罗伯特·布若》，第 77-93 页。
3 For Bugeaud's military reforms, see Gottman, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey,” and Sullivan, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, 77–93.
4卡斯特兰伯爵将军，《非洲军事生活纪念品》（巴黎，1879 年），268。
4 General le Comte de Castellane, Souvenirs de la vie militaire en Afrique (Paris, 1879), 268.
5托马斯·罗伯特·布若·沙利文，127-32。
5 Sullivan, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, 127–32.
6同上，第 129 页。
6 Ibid., 129.
7 Melvin Richter，“托克维尔论阿尔及利亚”，《政治评论》 25（1963 年 7 月），377。
7 Melvin Richter, “Tocqueville on Algeria,” Review of Politics 25 (July 1963), 377.
8托马斯·罗伯特·布若·沙利文，130。
8 Sullivan, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, 130.
9 “殖民地士兵”一词或许容易引起混淆，尤其是在本文的讨论范围内。事实上，法国拥有两支殖民地军队。非洲军团由北非士兵和为马格里布地区征召的白人军团组成，包括外籍军团、非洲营、祖阿夫兵团和非洲猎兵。严格来说，殖民地军队则是由在撒哈拉以南非洲、印度支那和其他殖民地招募的海军陆战队和步兵发展而来。殖民地军队曾是法国海军的一个分支，直到1900年才在战争部获得独立地位。然而，这些分类并非泾渭分明。外籍军团曾被部署在苏丹、达荷美、马达加斯加和印度支那；阿尔及利亚步兵也曾在印度支那和马达加斯加作战；海军陆战队员和塞内加尔步兵也参与了征服摩洛哥的战役。此外，将本土军队的士兵调派到殖民地也是很常见的做法，加利埃尼和利奥泰的情况就是如此。
9 The term “colonial soldier” is perhaps a confusing one, especially within the scope of this essay. France, in effect, possessed two colonial forces. The armée d'Afrique was composed of North African soldiers and white regiments raised for service in the Maghreb—the Foreign Legion, bataillons d'Afrique, Zouaves, and chasseurs d'Afrique. The armée coloniale properly speaking grew out of the infanterie de marine and tirailleurs recruited in sub-Saharan Africa, Indochina, and other colonies. The colonial army formed a branch of the French navy until it was given separate status within the War Ministry in 1900. However, these categories were never watertight. The Foreign Legion was used in the Sudan, Dahomey, Madagascar, and Indochina; Algerian tirailleurs fought in Indochina and Madagascar; and marines and Senegalese tirailleurs participated in the conquest of Morocco. It was also common for soldiers of the metropolitan army to be seconded to the colonies, as was the case with both Galliéni and Lyautey.
10休·斯特拉坎，《欧洲军队与战争行为》（伦敦和波士顿，1983 年），第 83 页。
10 Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London and Boston, 1983), 83.
11 AS Kanya-Forstner，《征服西苏丹》（剑桥，1963 年），188-89 页。
11 A. S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan (Cambridge, 1963), 188–89.
12 Hubert Lyautey，“Du rôle colony de l'Armée”， Revue des deux mondes 157（1900 年 1 月 15 日），32.4-2.5。
12 Hubert Lyautey, “Du rôle colonial de l'Armée,” Revue des deux mondes 157 (January 15, 1900), 32.4-2.5.
13同上，第 238 页。
13 Ibid., 238.
14 André Le Révérand， Lyautey（巴黎，1983 年），283。
14 André Le Révérand, Lyautey (Paris, 1983), 283.
15 Ross E. Dunn，《沙漠中的抵抗》（伦敦，1977 年），第 116-19 页。
15 Ross E. Dunn, Resistance in the Desert (London, 1977), 116–19.
16休伯特·利奥蒂，《摩洛哥》（巴黎，1937 年），276。
16 Hubert Lyautey, Vers le Maroc (Paris, 1937), 276.
17 Charles Kuntz，《摩洛哥田园纪念品》（巴黎，1913 年），20-21。另见 L. Lehuraux，《征服绿洲》，Theodore Pein 上校（巴黎，1935 年），87-89。
17 Charles Kuntz, Souvenirs de campagne au Maroc (Paris, 1913), 20–21. See also L. Lehuraux, Le conquérant des oasis, Colonel Theodore Pein (Paris, 1935), 87–89.
18道格拉斯·波奇，《征服摩洛哥》（纽约，1983 年），185-86 页。
18 Douglas Porch, The Conquest of Morocco (New York, 1983), 185–86.
19 Said Guennoun，《La montagne berbere》（巴黎，1929 年），107、137。
19 Said Guennoun, La montagne berbere (Paris, 1929), 107, 137.
20 Rosita Forbes， El Raisuni（伦敦，1924 年），194。
20 Rosita Forbes, El Raisuni (London, 1924), 194.
21 J. Kim Munholland，“‘合作战略’与法国对东京的绥靖，1885–1897”，《历史杂志》 24，第3期（1981年），629–50。
21 J. Kim Munholland, “‘Collaboration Strategy’ and the French Pacification of Tonkin, 1885–1897,” The Historical Journal 24, no. 3 (1981), 629–50.
22门廊，征服摩洛哥，187–88。
22 Porch, Conquest of Morocco, 187–88.
23 Kenneth J. Perkins，《指挥官、上尉和上校：法国在殖民地马格里布的军事管理，1844–1934》（纽约，1981 年），第 154 页。
23 Kenneth J. Perkins, Quaids, Captains, and Colons: French Military Administration in the Colonial Maghrib, 1844–1934 (New York, 1981), 154.
24 Le Révérand，利奥泰，235。
24 Le Révérand, Lyautey, 235.
25 RA Kea，“16至19世纪黄金海岸的火器与战争”，《非洲历史杂志》 12（1971），185-213。
25 R. A. Kea, “Firearms and Warfare in the Gold Coasts from the 16th to the 19th Centuries,” Journal of African History 12. (1971), 185–213.
26 Sonia Howe，《马达加斯加的悲剧》（伦敦，1938 年），第 320 页。
26 Sonia Howe, The Drama of Madagascar (London, 1938), 320.
27 L. Lehuraux，《Les français au Desert》（阿尔及尔，ND），102。
27 L. Lehuraux, Les français au desert (Algiers, n.d.), 102.
28 Georges Catroux，《Lyautey le marocain》（巴黎，1952 年），125。
28 Georges Catroux, Lyautey le marocain (Paris, 1952), 125.
29同上。
29 Ibid.
30 Porch，《征服摩洛哥》，175-176。
30 Porch, Conquest of Morocco, 175–76.
31同上，194。
31 Ibid., 194.
32在这一点上，殖民地军官的态度非常明确。在殖民战争中，一个不言而喻的道理是：如果没有法国军队的支援，当地军队，尤其是非正规军，很容易临阵脱逃。殖民地军官对他们征召的当地士兵怀有父辈般的感情，但很少有人认为他们能与欧洲士兵相提并论。即使在第一次世界大战期间，殖民地军队被运往法国，几十年来形成的刻板印象也很大程度上决定了他们的使用方式：被认为聪明的印度支那军队几乎全部被分配到军火和航空工厂；马达加斯加军队被安排在救护队，但也包括炮兵部队；北非人和塞内加尔人被认为是少数族裔士兵中的精英，几乎被投入到所有重大进攻中，但即使是芒金也把他的黑人部队分为“战士种族”（来自草原的黑人）和其他被用作工人或补充兵员的黑人。北非人被以团为单位派往前线，但最高指挥部更倾向于将黑人和白人营混编部署，因为直到1918年的最后攻势，他们仍然怀疑塞内加尔人的忠诚度。参见马克·米歇尔，《呼吁非洲：1914-1919年非洲战争中的贡献与反应》（巴黎，索邦大学出版社，1982年）。
32 On this point, colonial officers were quite categorical. It was axiomatic in colonial warfare that native troops, especially irregulars, were liable to cut and run unless backed up by French soldiers. Colonial officers retained a paternal affection for their native levies, but few thought them the equal of European soldiers. Even when colonial troops were transported to France during the First World War, the stereotypes developed over the decades largely determined how they would be employed: Indochinese troops, thought intelligent, were assigned almost exclusively to armaments and aviation factories; Madagascar troops were placed in the ambulance corps, but also in the artillery; North Africans and Senegalese, considered the elite of nonwhite soldiers, were thrown into almost all of the major offensives, but even Mangin divided his black troops into “warrior races”—those from the savannah—and the rest, who were employed as workers or replacements. North Africans were sent to the front in regiments, but the High Command preferred to intersperse battalions of blacks and whites because, until the final offensives of 1918, they continued to suspect the solidity of the Senegalese. See Marc Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, contributions et réactions a l'effort de guèrre en AOF, 1914–19 (Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1982).
33 Hubert Lyautey，《东京和马达加斯加书信》，1894-1899 年（巴黎，1942 年），489。
33 Hubert Lyautey, Lettres de Tonkin et de Madagascar, 1894–1899 (Paris, 1942.), 489.
34 Louis de Grandmaison， Deuxconférences faites aux OFFiciers de l'état Major de l'armée（巴黎，1911 年），34。
34 Louis de Grandmaison, Deux conférences faites aux officiers de l'état major de l'armée (Paris, 1911), 34.
15. 从美国战略的起源到第一次世界大战
15. American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War
W弗朗西斯·帕克曼在早期美国军事史著作中记录了美国早期的战争，他从英国正规军整齐的队列与蛮荒的美国荒野（红衫军在此为征服新法兰西而战）的对比中汲取了浪漫主义色彩。然而，尽管身处荒野，面对印第安人非传统的战术，很少有欧洲正规军士兵会抛弃他们鲜艳的军服或欧洲的战术。帕克曼无法提出弗雷德里克·杰克逊·特纳关于美国历史边疆理论的军事版本，该理论认为，欧洲人在抵达新大陆后，既抛弃了他们的欧洲服饰，也抛弃了他们的欧洲思想。
WHEN Francis Parkman chronicled the first American wars in some of the earliest volumes of American military history, he drew romantic effects from the contrasts between the ordered ranks of British regulars and the untamed American wilderness in which the redcoats fought to conquer New France. But few of the European regular soldiers discarded their bright coats or their European tactics, notwithstanding the wilderness and the unconventional tactics of the Indians they confronted there. Parkman could not offer a military variant of the Frederick Jackson Turner frontier thesis of American history, which claimed that Europeans discarded both their European vestments and their European thoughts when they arrived in the New World.
其他有见识的军事史学家也无法提出军事版的边疆论，从而声称美国战争具有独特的美国特色。尽管有些人倾向于夸大印第安人森林战对士兵的影响——例如，他们认为如果爱德华·布雷多克将军的红衣士兵分散躲在树后作战，就能避免在莫农加希拉河战役中遭遇惨败——但军事史学家不得不承认，欧洲的军事纪律和战争艺术通常能够战胜荒野中的敌人。帕克曼著作的高潮——征服新法兰西的辉煌胜利——正是欧洲模式战争的胜利，詹姆斯·沃尔夫的红衣士兵与蒙卡尔姆侯爵的白衣士兵在魁北克城墙外的亚伯拉罕平原上展开的经典欧式战役便是这一胜利的象征。边疆论对美国历史的解读在战争方面适用性极低；美国的战争方式是欧洲战争方式的衍生品，因此美国的战略思想是欧洲战略思想的一个分支。
Nor could other informed military historians advance a military version of the frontier thesis to claim that American war became uniquely American. Despite a certain tendency to exaggerate the impact of the forest warfare of the Indians upon the soldiers—to suggest, for example, that General Edward Braddock could have averted disaster at the Monongahela if only his redcoats had dispersed to fight from behind trees—military historians have had to recognize that European military discipline and the European art of war generally triumphed over wilderness adversaries. The glorious conquest of New France that formed the climax of Parkman's volumes was a triumph of warfare on the European pattern, symbolized by the classically European-style battle between James Wolfe's redcoats and the Marquis de Montcalm's whitecoats on the Plains of Abraham outside the fortress walls of Québec. The frontier interpretation of American history applies only minimally to war; American ways of war were offshoots of European ways of war, and American strategic thought was therefore a branch of European strategic thought.
然而，美国人从欧洲战争方式中汲取的特定经验，对美国20世纪的战略产生了深远的影响。在20世纪，美国人不再仅仅是欧洲的追随者，而是成为了世界许多国家军队的导师，同时还建立了自己的战争机器，使美国成为超级大国。从一开始，美国战争的重点转变之一，就是在战争手段和目的上都比欧洲在宗教战争结束后、法国大革命战争前夕所展现出的战争风格更加放肆。1648年后的欧洲进入了有限战争时代，职业军队通过精心策划的作战手段，为有限的王朝利益服务。而在北美，殖民者和印第安人却发现彼此的文化如此格格不入，以至于无法和谐共处。自1675-1676年新英格兰的菲利普国王战争开始，定居者与印第安人之间的战争逐渐演变为旨在削弱敌方军事实力的斗争。为此，战争手段常常无视欧洲对袭击非战斗人员财产和生命的限制。十七、十八世纪的美国人对战争的理解比同时代欧洲人更为绝对。
Yet the particular emphases that Americans drew from European methods of war making were to help shape American strategy into the twentieth century, when Americans ceased to be simply pupils of Europe and became tutors to the military forces of much of the world, in addition to building a war machine of their own that gave the United States the status of a superpower. From the beginning, one of the American changes of emphasis was toward less restraint in the conduct of war, in both means and ends, than became characteristic of European war after the close of the Wars of Religion and before the Wars of the French Revolution. As Europe after 1648 entered an age of limited war, employing the means of carefully regulated combat among professional armies to achieve ends of limited dynastic advantage, in North America the colonists and the Indians were discovering that their cultures were so incompatible that they could not well endure side by side. Wars between settlers and Indians became—beginning at least with King Philip's War in New England in 1675–1676—struggles aimed at reducing the enemy to military impotence. To this end, the means frequently disregarded European restrictions on attacks against the property and lives of noncombatants. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Americans came to conceive of war in more absolute terms than did their European contemporaries.
最终，英国在美洲的殖民者将美国的战争观念应用于与其他欧洲殖民者以及印第安人的战争，并在1763年七年战争结束后要求和平条约彻底将新法兰西从北美大陆上清除出去。英国政府对当时欧洲标准下如此极端的条件感到不安，但很大程度上是为了避免得罪美国殖民者，最终在1763年的《巴黎条约》中强加了这一条款。
Eventually, Great Britain's colonists in America applied American conceptions of war against rival European colonizers as well as against the Indians, demanding at the close of the Seven Years' War in 1763 that the peace treaty completely eliminate New France from the North American continent. The British cabinet had misgivings over conditions so extreme by European standards of the day, but in no small part in order to avoid offending the American colonists, the settlement was imposed in the Treaty of Paris of 1763.1
然而，正如十八世纪欧洲战争的局限性可能被夸大一样——关于军队行军途中克制行为的证词通常不会出自不善言辞的农民之口——反过来，历史学家也可能倾向于夸大早期美国人诉诸绝对战争的意愿。殖民地时期的美国布道和政治论著反映出人们对欧洲正义战争（因而也是有限战争）观念的认识和接受，这种观念在诸如埃默里希·德·瓦特尔1758年出版的《人民法》等著作中得到了日益系统化的阐述。<sup> 2 </sup> 有时，战争法（jus ad bellum）和战争中法（jus in bello）的标准甚至被应用于印第安战争，例如康涅狄格州政府拒绝援助马萨诸塞州参与一场康涅狄格州认为不公正的印第安冲突。<sup> 3 </sup> 尽管认为印第安人不受基督教战争法保护更为普遍，但美国人仍然明确承认这些法律适用于他们与欧洲人的冲突，即便是在美国革命的激烈情绪之中。<sup> 4</sup>
Just as the limitations of eighteenth-century European war can be exaggerated, however—testimony about the restrained conduct of troops marching through a district does not often come from inarticulate peasants—so conversely, historians may tend to exaggerate the readiness of early Americans to turn toward absolute war. Colonial American sermons and political tracts reflect an awareness and acceptance of the European conception of the just and therefore limited war, which was becoming increasingly codified in such works as Emerich de Vattel's Droit des gens of 1758.2 On occasion, the standards of jus ad bellum and jus in bello were applied even to Indian wars, as when the Connecticut government refused to assist Massachusetts in an Indian conflict that Connecticut judged unjust.3 If it was much more common to consider the Indians outside the protection of the Christian laws of war, the Americans nevertheless explicitly acknowledged those laws as applicable to their own conflicts with Europeans, even amid the violent emotions of the American Revolution.4
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在美国倡导将欧洲战争模式移植到大西洋西岸的众多人物中，最杰出的当属乔治·华盛顿将军。这位大陆军总司令在独立战争的几乎所有方面都接受了欧洲的指导，包括部队的战术训练、尊重国际战争法规定的战斗人员和非战斗人员的权利，当然还有战略。
Foremost among American advocates of transplanting European modes of war to the western shores of the Atlantic was General George Washington. The commander in chief of the Continental Army accepted European tutelage in virtually every aspect of his conduct of the War of Independence, including the tactical training of his troops, respect for the rights of combatants and noncombatants under the international law of war, and most certainly in strategy.
华盛顿拒绝了查尔斯·李少将的建议。李少将认为，为实现革命目标而进行的战争应当以革命的方式进行，号召武装民众起来，发动后世所谓的游击战。华盛顿摒弃了游击战的方式，在他亲自指挥的地区，革命军从未采取任何实质性的手段来模糊战争规则，尤其是模糊战斗人员和非战斗人员之间的界限。在“北方战区”，由于华盛顿不在场，无法阻止约翰·伯戈因少将（后晋升为中将）于1777年率军沿尚普兰湖向哈德逊河推进，但革命军对伯戈因侧翼和交通线的游击式骚扰最终迫使英军在萨拉托加投降。在华盛顿缺席期间，南方战区少将纳撒尼尔·格林鼓励以弗朗西斯·马里恩、托马斯·萨姆特和安德鲁·皮肯斯为代表的非正规军领导人开展“游击战”。格林将游击战与正规军作战巧妙地结合起来的能力，使他足以与毛泽东和武元甲相提并论。6
Washington rejected the counsel of Major General Charles Lee, who believed that a war fought to attain revolutionary purposes ought to be waged in a revolutionary manner, by calling on an armed populace to rise in what a later generation would call guerrilla war.5 Washington eschewed the way of the guerrilla, and where he was in personal command the revolutionaries never resorted in any significant measure to blurring the rules of war, particularly the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. In the “Northern Department,” where he was not present to resist Major General (later Lieutenant-General) John Burgoyne's campaign of 1777 up Lake Champlain toward the Hudson River, guerrilla-style hit-and-run harassment of Burgoyne's flanks and line of communications helped force the British to surrender at Saratoga. In the “Southern Department,” Major General Nathanael Greene in Washington's absence encouraged “the partisan war” conducted by such leaders of irregulars as Francis Marion, Thomas Sumter, and Andrew Pickens. Greene developed a capacity to weave together guerilla operations and those of his regular forces with a skill that makes him not unworthy of comparison with Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap.6
但华盛顿的影响力远远盖过了格林和其他非常规战士在塑造美国战略根基和美国陆军体制发展方面的作用，并扼杀了游击战和反游击战战术的发展。美国独立战争后，每当美军不得不进行反游击战——例如1835年至1841年的第二次塞米诺尔战争、1899年至1903年的菲律宾起义以及1965年至1973年的越南战争——它都发现自己几乎没有此类经验，不得不花费巨资重新学习相应的战术，然而每次事件发生后，它往往将其视为一次无需重蹈覆辙的例外情况。7
But the influence of Washington far overshadowed that of Greene and other unconventional warriors in shaping the roots of American strategy and the institutional development of the United States Army, and aborted development of either guerrilla or counterguerrilla methods of war. Whenever after the Revolution the American army had to conduct a counterguerrilla campaign—in the Second Seminole War of 1835–1841, the Filipino Insurrection of 1899–1903, and in Vietnam in 1965–1973—it found itself almost without an institutional memory of such experiences, had to relearn appropriate tactics at exorbitant costs, and yet tended after each episode to regard it as an aberration that need not be repeated.7
华盛顿将大陆军主力部队尽可能地塑造成与敌对的英军相似，并以此为基础，按照常规战争的方式，在战术和国际战争法的遵守方面，指挥着这场独立战争。由于受过军事教育的军官和训练有素的士官数量有限，加上时间紧迫，华盛顿无法将他的军队的战术和纪律水平提升到与对手匹敌的程度——除了少数特例部队外——他发现，让部队投入战斗无异于自取灭亡。因此，随着战争的进行，他指挥的战斗越来越少；在1776年革命军保卫纽约市失败后，双方主力部队只在1777年9月11日于白兰地河沿岸发生过一次交锋。在那次战斗中，华盛顿之所以坚持作战，是因为他认为为了维护士气，他不能不战而降，放弃大陆军的首都费城。正如他可能预料到的那样，他输了。
Washington molded the main Continental Army into as close a facsimile of the rival British army as he could achieve, and with this version of an eighteenth-century professional army he conducted the Revolution as a conventional war, in terms of both tactics and adherence to the international law of war. Because the limited numbers of militarily educated officers and trained noncommissioned officers available as well as the limits of time prevented Washington from bringing his army up to the tactical and disciplinary standards of its adversary—save for a few exceptional units—he found that committing his troops to battle was an invitation to defeat. Therefore as the war went on he fought fewer and fewer battles; after the revolutionaries' unsuccessful defense of New York City in 1776, there was only one more collision between the main bodies of the rival armies, along the Brandywine Creek on September 11, 1777. On that occasion, Washington fought because he believed that for the sake of morale he could not give up the Continental capital, Philadelphia, without a contest. As he might have anticipated, he lost.
此时，华盛顿的战略并非通过战场上的胜利来赢得战争，而是打一场“甚至被称为‘阵地战’的战争”。他强调，除非迫于无奈，否则我们应该在任何情况下都避免全面作战，或将任何事情置于危险境地，而我们绝不应该让自己陷入这种境地。8通过避免全面作战，华盛顿得以维持大陆军的生存，他也希望革命能够因此得以延续。华盛顿希望通过顽强的抵抗和对敌军的突袭来鼓舞美国士气，削弱英国的抵抗意志，从而赢得战争——汉斯·德尔布吕克称之为“消耗战”。凭借法国的援助，特别是1781年法国舰队在约克镇围困查尔斯·康沃利斯中将，华盛顿最终取得了胜利。
By this time, Washington's strategy was not to win the war through victory in battle, but to wage what “has even been called a War of Posts. That we should on all Occasions avoid a general Action, or put anything to the Risque, unless compelled by a necessity, into which we ought never to be drawn.”8 Avoiding general actions, Washington could keep the Continental Army alive, and he hoped the Revolution would thus remain alive as well. By combining sheer endurance with raids against the enemy to nourish American morale and undermine the British will to persist, Washington hoped to win the war through what Hans Delbrück would have called a strategy of attrition. With the great good fortune of French assistance and particularly the entrapment of Lieutenant-General Lord Charles Cornwallis by a French fleet at Yorktown in 1781, Washington succeeded.
华盛顿坚持建立一支欧式职业军队，并按照欧洲模式进行战争，这反映出他对非常规战争（及其违反国际战争规则的行为）可能撕裂整个社会契约的担忧，以及他维护美国事业尊严的特殊关切——他认为这是这个新生国家在世界各国中争取平等地位的重要组成部分。赢得独立后，同样的关切也指导着华盛顿构建美国的常设军事机构。在1784年应邦联国会之邀撰写的《关于和平建军的感言》中，华盛顿提议建立一支规模较小的正规军，并由一支训练有素的义务兵役民兵提供支持。作为美国首任总统，在他上任不久便遭遇西北印第安人的军事失败后，他发起并鼓励了一项强有力的训练计划。在该计划中，安东尼·韦恩少将首次将这支不足四千人的正规军打造成了一支纪律严明、战术精湛的欧洲军队的缩影。华盛顿也曾试图实现他组建民兵的构想，但他最终只能接受1792年的《民兵法》，该法案规定了强制服兵役的义务，却没有建立必要的机制来使这一义务真正落实，而仅仅停留在理论层面。他想要建立一所军事学院，以欧洲的方式培养军官，但在这方面，他也失望了。出人意料的是，这所学院最终是在反军国主义、主张州权至上的托马斯·杰斐逊政府的领导下成立的。 1802年，杰斐逊签署了法令，正式创建了位于西点的美国军事学院。
Washington's insistence on creating a European-style professional army to wage war on the European pattern reflected his apparent fear of the tendency of irregular war, with its violations of the international rules of war, to tear apart the entire social contract, as well as his specific concern to guard the dignity of the American cause as an essential part of the new nation's claim to equality of status among the nations of the world. With independence won, the same concerns guided Washington in shaping the permanent military institutions of the United States. In his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” composed at the request of the Confederation Congress in 1784, Washington proposed a small regular army supported by a well-regulated compulsory-service militia. As first President of the United States, he responded to military defeats at the hands of the Northwest Indians soon after he took office by sponsoring and encouraging a vigorous training program, in which Major General Anthony Wayne made the small Regular Army of under four thousand for the first time a miniature version of a European army in discipline and tactical proficiency. Washington also sought to realize his idea of a militia, but he had to settle for the Militia Act of 1792, which imposed a compulsory military obligation without erecting the machinery necessary to make the obligation much more than a theory. He wanted a military academy for the European-style education of officers, but in this, too, he was disappointed. The academy was inaugurated instead, and rather surprisingly, under the antimilitary, states'-rights administration of Thomas Jefferson, who signed the statute creating the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1802.9
与华盛顿不同，杰斐逊声称他更倾向于民兵而非正规军，认为民兵才是美国国防的中坚力量——尽管他并未采取多少措施来加强民兵体系。因此，他批准创建西点军校的动机一直备受争议。他或许部分地期望军校毕业生不会继续从事职业军事，而是进入平民生活，并最终将他们的军事技能传播到民兵队伍中。他或许部分地预见到西点军校会像以往那样，提供的与其说是军事课程，不如说是工程课程，从而培养一支真正意义上的“国家建设”军队，让陆军工程师绘制大陆地图，修建道路、运河、公路，甚至建造美国国会大厦。杰斐逊或许还认为，政府出资提供军事教育，是为了用杰斐逊的支持者取代联邦党人对军官团的垄断。无论他的动机如何，杰斐逊在创建西点军校之后，几乎没有对其进行任何扶持。直到1812年战争再次暴露了业余军官和士兵的不足之后，西点军校才不再像其首任校长所说的那样，“像个弃儿，在群山环抱中苟延残喘，被人远远地抚养，几乎不为人知，连它的合法父母都不知道。” 西尔瓦努斯·塞耶自1817年起担任校长，直至1833年卸任，最终使西点军校成为华盛顿所期望的样子。<sup> 10</sup>
Unlike Washington, Jefferson professed to favor the citizen-soldiers of the militia over regulars as the backbone of American defense—though he did little to strengthen the militia system. His motives in approving the creation of the Military Academy have therefore remained a subject of controversy. In part he may have expected the graduates of the academy not to remain professional soldiers but to enter civilian life and in time to disseminate their military skills among the militia. In part he may have anticipated that West Point would offer, as it long did, less a military than an engineering curriculum, to provide a nation-building army in the most literal sense, with army engineers mapping the continental domain and building roads, canals, highway improvements, even the United States Capitol. In part Jefferson may have perceived offering a military education at government expense as a means of replacing the existing domination of the officer corps by Federalist partisans with a preponderance of Jeffersonians. Whatever his motives, Jefferson did little to nurture the Military Academy after creating it. Not until after the War of 1812 had demonstrated anew the deficiencies of amateur officers and soldiers did West Point cease to be, as its first superintendent called it, “a foundling, barely existing among the mountains, and nurtured at a distance out of sight, and almost unknown to its legitimate parents.” The superintendency of Sylvanus Thayer, beginning in 1817 and lasting until 1833, at length made of West Point what Washington had desired.10
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在这项工作中，塞耶的主要助手是丹尼斯·哈特·马汉，他是1824届毕业生中成绩最好的。1826年，塞耶安排马汉前往法国进行为期四年的考察，期间他观察法国军队，在梅斯工程兵和炮兵应用学校学习，并将法国的教学资料带回西点军校。1830年，马汉回到西点军校任教，从1832年到1871年担任“军事和土木工程以及战争科学教授”。正是凭借这一身份，他系统地研究战争的运作方式，将美国内战中那些后来成为将军的职业军人的知识传授给了他们。<sup> 11</sup>
Thayer's principal coadjutor in this work was Dennis Hart Mahan, the highest-ranking graduate of the class of 1824, for whom Thayer arranged in 1826 a four-year sojourn in France to observe the French army, study at the School of Application for Engineers and Artillery at Metz, and bring back French instructional materials to the academy. Returning to teaching duties at West Point in 1830, Mahan was from 1832 to 1871 “Professor of Military and Civil Engineering, and of the Science of War.” As such, he taught the professional soldiers who became the generals of the American Civil War most of what they knew through systematic study of the conduct of war.11
马汉主要传播的是法国对拿破仑战争的解读。拿破仑对十九世纪士兵的吸引力如此之大，以至于美国军事经验，包括华盛顿的统帅才能，在当时的军事研究中几乎被忽略。在相当长的一段时间里，西点军校关于战争科学与艺术的标准教材是J·M·奥康纳上尉翻译的S·F·盖伊·德·弗农的《论战争与防御科学》，其中包含奥康纳整理的安托万-亨利·若米尼战略原则的概要。<sup> 12</sup>马汉关于战争指挥的理论最终以《部队先锋队、前哨和分遣队勤务基础论》为题出版，该书对更高层级的战争指挥提供了比其标题所暗示的更多的指导，尤其是在后来的修订版中。<sup> 13</sup>
Principally, Mahan transmitted French interpretations of Napoleonic war. So strong was the magnetic attraction of Napoleon to nineteenth-century soldiers that American military experience, including the generalship of Washington, was almost ignored in military studies here. The standard West Point text on the science and art of war for a considerable time was Captain J. M. O'Connor's translation of S. F. Gay de Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification, which included a summary of the strategic precepts of Antoine-Henri Jomini prepared by O'Connor.12 Mahan's own teachings on the conduct of war were eventually published in part as An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, a volume that offered more guidance to the higher levels of the direction of war than its title implies, especially in later revised editions.13
马汉只出版过一本篇幅相对较短的战争著作，但却发表了大量关于军事和土木工程的著作。<sup> 14</sup>他为西点军校一年级新生开设的毕业课程同样侧重于工程学而非其他军事研究方面，而且由于包括政治因素在内的各种原因，整个西点军校的课程设置更像是一所工程学院，而非一所培养军事专业人员的学校。这种对技术的重视使得塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿认为，19世纪早期和中期的美国士兵是技术人员而非专业人员。<sup> 15 </sup> 然而，这种对工程学的重视并非毫无价值，它为19世纪的战争做好了准备。它当然包括防御工事，包括野战工事，因此，美国内战期间，军官们鼓励士兵在行军途中哪怕短暂停下来时也要构筑野战工事，这促成了他们的这种积极态度。面对当时展现出的强大火力，这无疑是一项非常恰当的策略；内战是历史上第一次双方都将线膛肩枪作为标准步兵武器的战争。值得注意的是，罗伯特·E·李将军对野战工事在对抗装备步枪的敌人时的重要性认识得相对较慢，而且他也是这场战争中唯一一位过早进入西点军校学习军事艺术（师从丹尼斯·马汉）的主要将领。<sup> 16</sup>
Mahan published only this one relatively short book on warfare but numerous works on military and civil engineering.14 His capstone West Point course for first classmen similarly concerned engineering more than other aspects of military studies, and the entire West Point curriculum remained, for various reasons including political ones, more that of an engineering college than of a school for educating military professionals. This technical emphasis has led Samuel P. Huntington to argue that American soldiers of the early and middle nineteenth century were technicists rather than professionals.15' The engineering emphasis was not without value, however, as preparation for nineteenth-century warfare. It encompassed fortification, of course, including field fortification, and thus helped lead to the readiness with which officers during the American Civil War encouraged their soldiers to construct field fortifications when they halted their marches even briefly. This was a most appropriate policy in the face of the destructive firepower displayed; the Civil War was the first war in which rifled shoulder arms were the standard infantry weapon on both sides. It may be significant that General Robert E. Lee, who was relatively slow in recognizing the value of field fortifications against an enemy equipped with rifles, was also the only principal general of the war who had attended West Point too early to study the military art under Dennis Mahan.16
但不应过分强调马汉对防御工事价值的重视。尽管他认为铁锹在战争中与火枪一样有用，<sup> 17 </sup>但他最终认为野战工事的价值在于它是集中兵力发动进攻的跳板。<sup>18</sup>他深受拿破仑的影响，认为单靠防御无法赢得军事战役，尤其是被动防御，而通过积极行动夺取主动权才是最终胜利的必要条件。他主张采用奥斯特里茨或耶拿-奥尔施泰特式的歼灭战进攻策略。他对拿破仑说：
But too much should not be made of Mahan's emphasis on the value of fortifications. Although he taught that the spade is as useful in war as the musket,17 nonetheless he regarded the value of field fortifications ultimately as that of springboards upon which to concentrate strength for launching attacks.18 He was sufficiently a disciple of Napoleon to believe that defense alone cannot win military campaigns, least of all passive defense, and that seizing the initiative through aggressive action is indispensable to final success. He approached advocating the Austerlitz or Jena-Auerstedt style of offensive battle of annihilation. To Napoleon, he said,
我们之所以能拥有如此辉煌的军事成就，要归功于它一击毙命、彻底击溃敌人的精妙之处。无需徒劳的准备；无需犹豫不决地寻找关键点；无需在决定性时刻犹豫不决；只需一眼便能洞察全局；凭借敏锐的军事直觉，即使是肉眼无法察觉的事物也能被精准地预判；轻装部队如云般倾泻而下，迷惑敌人；炮火如雨般倾泻而下；迅猛的纵队冲入炮火造成的缺口；无所畏惧的胸甲骑兵发起压倒性的冲锋；随后，长矛骑兵和骠骑兵紧随其后，扫荡溃散的敌军——这些便是这一伟大军事时期几乎每一场战役所展现的战术精髓。19
we owe those grand features of the art, by which an enemy is broken and utterly dispersed by one and the same blow. No futilities of preparation; no uncertain feeling about in search of the key-point; no hesitancy upon the decisive moment; the whole field of view taken in by one eagle glance; what could not be seen divined by an unerring military instinct; clouds of light troops thrown forward to bewilder his foe; a crashing fire of cannon in mass opened upon him; the rush of the impetuous column into the gap made by the artillery; the overwhelming charge of the resistless cuirassier; followed by the lancer and hussar to sweep up the broken dispersed bands; such were the tactical lessons taught in almost every battle of this great military period.19
“战场上的勇猛和追击的迅猛，”马汉教导说，“必须相辅相成，才能取得巨大胜利。”“将战火烧到敌人的国土或其盟国的腹地，是使其分担战火重负并挫败其计划的最可靠策略。” 20尤利西斯·S·格兰特将军所发动的歼灭战和威廉·T·谢尔曼将军所进行的破坏性进军，这两位都是丹尼斯·马汉的学生，至少在某种程度上，都预示了这位导师的格言。
“Vigor on the field and rapidity of pursuit,” taught Mahan, “should go hand in hand for great success.” “Carrying the war into the heart of the assailant's country, or that of his allies, is the surest plan of making him share its burdens and foiling his plans.”20 The battles of annihilation waged by Ulysses S. Grant and the destructive marches of William T. Sherman, both students of Dennis Mahan, are at least in some measure prefigured in the mentor's dicta.
然而，马汉最得意的学生，也是他众多学员中最特别的门生，是一位军事知识分子，他抢在导师之前出版了美国第一部重要的军事教科书。这个人就是亨利·瓦格·哈勒克，军队后来称他为“老脑”。这本书名为《军事艺术与科学要素》 ，于1846年首次出版。<sup>21</sup>作为1831届毕业生中的第三名，哈勒克自动获得了在工程兵团担任军官的资格，这在当时是优秀毕业生的惯例。这种在军事工程领域享有优先权的做法，凸显了早期美国军事思想对防御工事的重视，尽管丹尼斯·马汉的思想更倾向于拿破仑式的军事理念，哈勒克的著作和他大部分的军事生涯也体现了这一点。<sup> 22</sup>
Mahan's favorite student, however, his special protégé among the many cadets he taught, was a military intellectual who managed to anticipate his tutor in publishing the first major American textbook on the military art. This was Henry Wager Halleck, “Old Brains,” as the army came to know him. The book was Elements of Military Art and Science, first published in 1846.21 As the third-ranking graduate of the class of 1831, Halleck was automatically entitled to choose a commission in the Corps of Engineers, as was then the custom for the highest graduates. This preferred status of military engineering emphasizes the preoccupation with fortification in early American military thought, notwithstanding Dennis Mahan's more Napoleonic moods, as do Halleck's writing and much of his military career.22
除了编写教科书外，哈勒克还翻译了约米尼的《拿破仑传》，一度人们认为他仅仅是约米尼著作的译者和改写者。<sup>23</sup>但如此轻视哈勒克，就忽略了他在自己的著作中对美国军事问题所做的努力。他在这方面的主要着力点在于军事工程，重申了美国长期以来沿海防御工事建设的价值。在他看来，这是为了争取时间动员和训练公民民兵，从而保卫美国免受外国侵略。<sup> 24</sup>
In addition to composing his textbook, Halleck translated Jomini's Life of Napoleon, and it was once fashionable to regard him as a mere translator and paraphraser of Jomini.23 But to dismiss Halleck in this way is to ignore his efforts to deal in his own book with particularly American military issues. His main thrust in this regard was a focus upon military engineering, by reaffirming the value of America's longstanding program of coastal fortification. This was needed, in his judgment, to defend the United States from foreign attack by buying time for the mobilization and training the citizens' militia.24
在对战略进行更为抽象的思考时，哈勒克同样强调了防御工事的重要性，这显然受到了奥地利大公查理的影响。在战略章节的参考文献中，哈勒克将大公的《战略原理》（Principes de la stratégie）置于若米尼的《战争艺术概要》（Précis de l'art de la guerre）之前，并称其为“一部极具价值的著作”。 <sup>25</sup>他引用查理的话，强调了占据战略要地的重要性，认为这“对军事行动至关重要”，因此必须通过加固来保护己方的战略要地。<sup> 26 </sup> 与此相反，若米尼明确反对大公对战略要地的偏爱，他认为机动部队既是发动战争的主要手段，也是在敌方资产中理所当然的主要目标。若米尼尤其驳斥了查理关于法国边境防御工事在十八世纪战争和法国大革命中发挥决定性作用的说法。27然而，哈勒克不仅赞同地引用了大公的这一说法，而且还用斜体字强调了它。根据哈勒克的说法，在法国大革命战争初期：
In his more abstract considerations of strategy Halleck similarly emphasized fortification, apparently under the influence of the Archduke Charles of Austria. Halleck cited the archduke's Principes de la stratégie ahead of Jomini's Précis de l'art de la guerre in the bibliography of his chapter on strategy, calling it “a work of great merit.”25 He quoted Charles on the importance of possessing strategic points as “decisive in military operations,” and on the consequent necessity to protect one's own strategic points by fortifying them.26 Jomini in contrast had taken explicit issue with the archduke's fondness for strategic points, arguing that mobile armed forces were both the principal means of waging war and, properly, one's main objective among the enemy's assets. Jomini rejected in particular Charles's claim that France's frontier fortifications played a decisive role in the wars of the eighteenth century and the French Revolution.27 Yet Halleck not only quoted this claim by the archduke with approval but emphasized it with italics. At the beginning of the French Revolutionary Wars, according to Halleck:
法国……防御工事坚固：尽管没有军队，且被国内各派势力撕裂（此处我们借用斐迪南大公的话），“她仍然能够抵御整个欧洲的进攻；这是因为自路易十三统治时期以来，她的政府一直致力于按照战略原则，将边境构筑成防御工事；以此体系为基础，她征服了欧洲大陆上所有没有如此设防的国家；仅此一点就能解释，为何她的将领有时仅凭战略上的胜利就能摧毁一支军队，甚至整个国家。28
France…was well fortified: and although without armies, and torn in pieces by domestic factions, (we here use the language of the Archduke,) “she sustained herself against all Europe; and this was because her government, since the reign of Louis XIII, had continually labored to put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principles of strategy; starting from such a system for a basis, she subdued every country on the continent that was not thus fortified; and this reason alone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an army, and even an entire state, merely by a strategic success.28
因此，尽管马汉的战略重心从防御工事转向机动作战，他的门生哈勒克仍然回归防御工事，并将工程学视为军事职业的基础。哈勒克的《军事工程要素》十五章中有五章专门论述防御工事；第六章则着重介绍军事工程师的历史及其重要性。
Thus, notwithstanding Mahan's shift from an emphasis on fortification to a call for mobile war, his protégé returned to fortification and therefore to engineering as the foundation of the military profession. Five of the fifteen chapters in Halleck's Elements are devoted to fortification; a sixth chapter is given over to the history and importance of military engineers.
同样的重视，加上对军事装备（大炮、军刀、马鞍等等）技术细节的普遍关注，塑造了美国内战前几年军事文学的另一项重要贡献。富兰克林·皮尔斯总统的战争部长杰斐逊·戴维斯毕业于西点军校，是美墨战争的英雄。他以自己拥有文职战争部长罕见的专业知识而自豪，并试图利用这些知识来制定军队改革方案。尤其重要的是，他希望重新与欧洲军队和军事思想建立密切联系。因此，他安排了三位杰出的军官——分别是西点军校1818届的理查德·德拉菲尔德少校、阿尔弗雷德·莫迪凯少校和1846届的乔治·B·麦克莱伦上尉——前往欧洲考察克里米亚战争。
The same sort of emphasis, coupled with a more general preoccupation with the technical details of military paraphernalia—cannons, sabers, saddles, and the like—shapes the other major contribution to American military literature in the years before the Civil War. President Franklin Pierce's secretary of war, Jefferson Davis, was a West Point graduate and Mexican War hero. He prided himself on possessing expertise uncommon in a civilian head of the War Department and sought to use it to shape a program of army reforms. Not least, he hoped to restore a close and current acquaintance with European armies and military thought. Thus he arranged for three outstanding officers—Majors Richard Delafield and Alfred Mordecai, and Captain George B. McClellan, of the West Point classes of 1818, 1819, and 1846, respectively—to travel to Europe to observe the Crimean War.
三人抵达克里米亚时，仅目睹了塞瓦斯托波尔围城战的最后阶段，但此后他们考察了欧洲主要军队的设施，并收集了令人印象深刻的细致观察资料，这些资料后来结集出版。德拉菲尔德曾于1838年至1845年以及1856年至1861年担任军事学院院长，并在南北战争后期担任工程兵总司令，因此他的报告自然侧重于工程和防御工事。莫迪凯则专注于炮兵，麦克莱伦则专注于骑兵。他们的报告至今仍是研究19世纪中期欧洲军队组织和装备的最重要资料之一，与丹尼斯·马汉和亨利·瓦格·哈勒克的军事著作一起，构成了专业军事文献的开端，其质量远超人们对一支日常任务主要是在美洲印第安人聚居的零散哨所执行治安任务的军队的预期。然而，与此同时，除了马汉著作中的某些章节外，这些著作反映了一支规模小、孤立无援的军队缺乏自信，以及军事工程师在海岸和加拿大边境建造砖石掩体和在野外建造战壕系统的防御导向。
The trio arrived in the Crimea in time to witness only the closing incidents of the siege of Sevastopol, but thereafter they toured installations of the principal European armies and gathered impressively careful observations, which were subsequently published in book form. Delafield, superintendent of the Military Academy from 1838 to 1845 and from 1856 to 1861, and chief of engineers late in the Civil War, naturally stressed engineering and fortification in his report. Mordecai focused on artillery, McClellan on cavalry.29 Their reports remain among the most useful sources on the organization and equipment of mid-nineteenth-century European armies and, together with Dennis Mahan's and Henry Wager Halleck's military works, constitute the beginnings of a professional military literature of a quality surpassing what might have been expected from an army whose day-to-day chores were mainly those of constabulary duty in scattered outposts among the American Indians. At the same time, however, except for certain sections of Mahan's works, these writings mirrored a small and isolated army's lack of self-confidence and the defensive orientation of military engineers building masonry casemates on the seacoast and the Canadian border and trench systems in the field.
三
III
19世纪60年代，那些受此类文献熏陶的军人投入战争后，许多人很快就让士兵们开始认真地挖掘战壕：1862年春，麦克莱伦对弗吉尼亚州约克镇附近的南方邦联战壕采取了全面的正式围攻战术；此后不久，哈勒克运用他的军事工程知识，谨慎而艰苦地攻克了南方邦联位于密西西比州西部的要塞城市科林斯。就连罗伯特·E·李，尽管他对战壕的重视程度不及大多数同时代的人，也很快激怒了他的士兵，让他们给他起了个绰号叫“黑桃国王”，因为他坚持要求士兵们在守卫南方邦联首都里士满时使用战壕。<sup> 30 </sup>
When the soldiers whose military thought was nurtured by this literature went to war against each other in the 1860s, many of them soon had their troops industriously digging into the ground: McClellan conducting a full-fledged formal siegecraft approach against the Confederate entrenchments around Yorktown, Virginia, in the spring of 1862, Halleck soon thereafter employing his military-engineering knowledge in a cautious and laborious approach to the Confederacy's western fortress city of Corinth, Mississippi. Even Robert E. Lee, less impressed by entrenchments than most of his contemporaries, soon provoked his soldiers to dub him “the King of Spades,” because of the use he insisted they make of those implements in guarding the Confederate capital at Richmond.’30
内战持续了四年之久，到了后期，双方构筑的野战工事体系，尤其是在彼得斯堡和亚特兰大等战略要地周围的工事，预示了1914-1918年西线战场的景象。许多欧洲军事观察家认为，美国战争最显著的特点是士兵倾向于构筑堑壕，他们倾向于将这种现象归因于美国军队训练有素的士兵数量不足。<sup> 31</sup>美国正规军约有16000人，除了313名辞职的军官外，几乎全部效忠于联邦。然而，在萨姆特堡炮击事件发生后的四个月内，联邦军队的兵力就达到了约50万人，这支正规军很快就被淹没了。<sup> 32</sup>
The Civil War dragged on through four years, and by its latter stages the rival systems of field fortifications, particularly those around such much-contested strategic points as Petersburg and Atlanta, offered previews of the western front of 1914–1918. Many European military observers of the war found the propensity to entrench to be the most striking feature of combat in America, and tended to attribute the phenomenon to the paucity of trained soldiers in the American war.31 The Regular Army of the United States, some 16,000 strong, remained almost entirely loyal to the Union except for 313 officers who resigned their commissions, but this force was swamped by a Union war army that reached about 500,000 within four months of the firing on Fort Sumter.32
虽然这些成群结队的志愿者——其中许多人只接受过一些民兵训练，仅此而已——确实需要数月时间才能练就一副训练有素的士兵模样，但挖掘战壕的真正原因远比缺乏军事经验更为深远。事实上，随着士兵们逐渐成长为老兵，战壕反而变得更加显眼。战壕网络的真正成因是线膛枪成为双方军队的标准肩枪，以及线膛炮成为双方约一半的火炮装备。线膛枪将步兵武器的有效射程从略高于50码增加到250码，极限射程则从250码增加到约半英里。面对线膛火力，唯一的安全之所便是战壕或其他掩体。任何较为稳固的防御工事，正面强攻几乎都徒劳无功。即使是精心策划的侧翼进攻，也会因为经验丰富的步枪兵迅速调整阵线，形成新的防线而遭受惨重伤亡，以至于失去了在拿破仑战争时期所拥有的决定性优势。33
Although it is true that these swarms of volunteers—many of them with a modicum of militia training, but no more—required many months to develop a resemblance to trained soldiers, the digging of field fortifications had a far more profound cause than military inexperience. Indeed, the trenches became more, not less, conspicuous as the soldiers developed into veterans. The true cause of the trench networks was the emergence of the rifled musket as the standard shoulder arm in both armies, and of rifled cannons as about half the artillery pieces on both sides. The rifled musket increased the effective range of the infantryman's weapon from not much over 50 yards to 250 yards, and the extreme range from 250 yards to about half a mile. Against rifled firepower, the only safety was in trenches or behind other kinds of protection. To rise up and deliver a frontal attack became almost always futile against any reasonably steady defenders. Even well-executed flank attacks tended to suffer such heavy casualties as experienced riflemen maneuvered to form new fronts against them that they lost the decisiveness they had enjoyed in the Napoleonic Wars.33
线膛枪和大炮的毁灭性威力加剧了士兵们制定切实可行的进攻战略的难度，而这些士兵的军事教育原本就倾向于防御。除了短暂的美墨战争之外，内战前美国士兵面临的实际军事问题，如同他们的教育一样，主要都是防御问题——保护美国免受来自大西洋彼岸、加勒比海地区或加拿大的欧洲列强的入侵。即使在西部边疆，军事问题也基本上是防御性的；定居者不断向西推进边疆，而军队则忙于保护这些定居点。<sup> 34</sup>
The devastating effect of rifled muskets and cannons aggravated the difficulties of developing a workable offensive strategy among soldiers whose military education already favored the defensive. Except during the brief war with Mexico, the practical military problems facing American soldiers before the Civil War had been, like their education, primarily matters of defense—protecting the United States from possible incursions by European powers from across the Atlantic or the Caribbean or from Canada. Even on the western frontier, military problems had been essentially defensive; settlers pushed the frontier westward, with the army then engaged in protecting the settlements.34
这种防御性的军事思想和经验的传承，显然必须被那些在内战中以进攻行动摧毁南方各州独立主权野心为目标的联邦将领们所抛弃。然而，这种传承对麦克莱伦少将来说却格外沉重，他是丹尼斯·马汉的忠实学生。麦克莱伦接替年迈的温菲尔德·斯科特名誉中将，成为美国陆军总司令，并负责在1861年7月对布尔河的临时行军之后，发起联邦军的第一次大规模攻势。然而，麦克莱伦却无法下定决心进攻邦联军在1861年夏末秋初围绕布尔河战场构筑的野战工事。尽管被解除总司令职务，但麦克莱伦仍然保留着野战指挥权。他巧妙地避开了这些工事，率领联邦军在东部的主力野战军——波托马克军团——经海路抵达约克河和詹姆斯河之间的弗吉尼亚半岛。在约克镇这片昔日独立战争战场上，他再次止步于野战工事前。面对兵力远逊于己方的敌军——尽管他并未承认敌军的弱点——他却采用了西点军校工程学课程中惯用的正规围攻战术。正当他准备发动决定性的炮击时，南方邦联军撤退了，但麦克莱伦重新发起进攻，却又在南方邦联首都里士满城外的野战工事前再次戛然而止。1862年5月上半月和几乎整个6月，他都与这些工事对峙，却几乎没有尝试突破。完全有理由相信，他绝不会对这些工事采取比再次围攻更为激进的策略。西点军校让他对工事的价值有了过于深刻的认识。35
This inheritance of defensive military thought and experience obviously had to be left behind by Union generals whose objective in the Civil War was to destroy the southern states' pretensions to independent sovereignty through offensive action. The inheritance nevertheless bore with special heaviness on Major General McClellan, the careful student of Dennis Mahan. Named general-in-chief of the United States Army in succession to the aged Brevet Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, and charged with inaugurating the first major Union offensive after the improvised march against Bull Run in July 1861, McClellan could not bring himself to assault the field fortifications that the Confederates constructed around the Bull Run battlefield in the late summer and autumn of 1861. Relieved as general-in-chief but retaining field command, McClellan avoided those fortifications by carrying the Union's principal field army in the East, the Army of the Potomac, by sea to the Virginia Peninsula between the York and James rivers. There he stopped short again in front of the field fortifications on the old Revolutionary War battleground of Yorktown. Against entrenchments manned by much weaker forces than his own—albeit he did not acknowledge the enemy's weakness—he resorted to a formal siege straight out of the West Point engineering curriculum. The Confederates retreated when he was about to open his climactic artillery bombardment, but McClellan resumed his advance only to halt abruptly yet again in front of field fortifications outside the Confederate capital at Richmond. He confronted these fortifications through half of May and almost all of June 1862 with little effort to penetrate them, and there is every reason to think he would never have essayed anything more vigorous against them than another formal siege. West Point had taught him the value of fortifications almost too well.35
然而，麦克莱伦在里士满前的犹豫不决被南方邦联的反击打断了，因为一些南方邦联领导人认为，邦联在战争中的政治防御目的——捍卫其独立主张——并不一定需要防御战略。在这些准备摆脱传统防御军事思想的南方邦联领导人中，最引人注目的是罗伯特·E·李将军和托马斯·J·“石墙”·杰克逊少将（后晋升为中将）。
McClellan's dallying before Richmond was interrupted, however, by a Confederate counterstroke, because certain of its leaders believed that the Confederacy's politically defensive purpose in the war—to protect its claim to independence—did not necessarily require a defensive strategy. Most notable among the Confederate leaders ready to break loose from the inheritance of defensive military thought were General Robert E. Lee and Major General (later Lieutenant General) Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson.
1862年春，李将军担任南方邦联总统杰斐逊·戴维斯的军事顾问，杰克逊将军则在谢南多厄河谷指挥一支规模不大的南方邦联部队。杰克逊注定会成为美国战略研究的焦点。乔治·F·R·亨德森上校曾在坎伯利参谋学院任教，是英国战略思想发展的重要人物。他所著的《石墙杰克逊与美国内战》与其说是一部传记，不如说是一部战略分析。<sup>36</sup>在他看来，战略与战术的关键区别在于，士兵掌握战术的能力更多地依赖于经验和近乎直觉的素质，而非智力和理论。“战术的本质决定了，有些人可能赢得战役，但却是糟糕的将领。他们可能天生具有领导才能，但却完全不适合独立指挥。” 37与之相反，战略问题涉及“大规模部队的调动、时间和空间的考量，以及将军必须时刻牢记的无数因素，例如粮食、天气、道路、地形和士气……这些因素如此之多，只有习惯于深思熟虑的头脑才能成功应对。” 38当麦克莱伦仍在围攻约克镇时，李将军和杰克逊将军将注意力转向了这些无数因素，尤其是“为实现战争整体目标做好准备并最终取得成功的宏大组合” 。39
In the spring of 1862, Lee was military advisor to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, Jackson commander of a small Confederate force in the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson was destined to become the subject of a penetrating study of American strategy. Colonel George F. R. Henderson, a major figure in the making of British strategic thought through his teaching at the Staff College, Camberley, made his Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War less a biography than a strategic analysis.36 In his view, a critical difference between strategy and tactics lay in the capacity of soldiers to master the latter less through intellect and study than through experience and almost intuitive qualities. “The nature of tactics is such that men may win battles and be very poor generals. They may be born leaders of men, and yet absolutely unfitted for independent command.”37 Problems of strategy, in contrast, involve “the movement of large bodies, considerations of time and space, and the thousand and one circumstances, such as food, weather, roads, topography, and moral, which a general must always bear in mind,…composed of so many factors, that only a brain accustomed to hard thinking can deal with them successfully.”38 To these thousand and one factors, and above all to “the grand combinations which prepare and complete success” in achieving the objectives of war as a whole, Lee and Jackson turned their minds while McClellan still laid siege to Yorktown.39
如此一来，两位南方邦联将领一致认为，他们的军队必须掌握战争的主动权。尽管麦克莱伦小心翼翼地向相对坚固的防御工事推进，但他沿半岛北上的步伐，最终或许能凭借兵力、资源和无情的围攻战术攻克里士满。其他联邦军队正从北部渗透弗吉尼亚，直至拉帕汉诺克河，进入谢南多厄河谷，并从俄亥俄河越过弗吉尼亚州西部的山脉。在弗吉尼亚以西，联邦军队对南方邦联的领土进行了更加危险的渗透。在密西西比河及其支流上的海军炮艇的支援下，联邦军队占领了田纳西州大部分富饶的农业区及其纳什维尔周边的工业区。在沿海地区，邦联最大的城市和港口新奥尔良已经落入联邦海军之手，联邦海军还占领了南卡罗来纳州海岸的皇家港湾，以此加强对查尔斯顿、萨凡纳和所有较小的南大西洋港口的封锁。
Doing so, the two Confederate generals agreed that their armies must grasp the initiative in the war. Notwithstanding the caution with which McClellan limped toward any reasonably strong defenses, his advance up the Peninsula might in time carry him into Richmond through sheer weight of numbers and resources and the inexorability of siegecraft. Other Federal forces were penetrating Virginia from the north to the Rappahannock River and into the Shenandoah Valley and across the Commonwealth's western mountains from the Ohio. Westward beyond Virginia, Union arms had achieved yet more dangerous penetrations of the Confederacy. Aided by naval gunboats on the Mississippi and its tributaries, Union troops had overrun much of the rich agricultural state of Tennessee and its industrial area around Nashville. Along the seacoast, the Confederacy's largest city and port, New Orleans, had fallen to Federal naval power, and the Union navy had also captured Port Royal Sound on the South Carolina coast from which to tighten the blockade of Charleston, Savannah, and all the lesser South Atlantic ports.
李将军本人不久前曾在南卡罗来纳州和佐治亚州沿海地区指挥作战，但他发现自己兵力不足，无法阻止敌军的入侵。敌军掌握了制海权，可以随心所欲地集结兵力。这次经历印证了李将军此前的军事判断和研究：仅仅依靠防御工事是不够的——在沿海地区，联邦海军总能找到绕过旧式永久要塞的方法，即使火力无法压制敌军；邦联无法无限期地依靠被动防御来保全自身；如果允许联邦军队掌握主动权并选择战场，它就能在兵力和资源方面进一步扩大优势，并在交战地点获得更大的优势；即使邦联无法在沿海地区夺取主动权（因为在沿海地区它无法与联邦海军抗衡），至少在陆地上，邦联还可以尝试控制战争的走向。通过将兵力集中在他们而非敌人选择的地点，他们（而非联邦军）就能选择冲突地点，并至少取得一定程度的兵力均势，甚至在这些地点取得局部优势。<sup> 40</sup>因此，在某些地方集中兵力显然意味着会削弱其他地方的防御，从而承担风险。但是，李将军说：“我们必须在不作为的积极损失和行动的风险之间做出选择。” “只有集中兵力，我们才能有望赢得任何决定性的优势。”<sup> 41</sup>
Lee himself had recently commanded on the South Carolina-Georgia coast and had lacked the strength necessary to halt incursions of the enemy, whom command of the sea enabled to concentrate readily wherever he chose. The experience confirmed for Lee what his military judgment and study already told him: that fortification was not enough—on the seacoast the Union navy found ways to bypass the old permanent fortresses when it could not outgun them; that the Confederacy could not protect itself indefinitely by passive defense; that if the Union were allowed to retain the initiative and the choice of battlegrounds, it could enhance its overall superiority in manpower and resources with still greater superiority at the points of collision; and that if the Confederacy could not wrest the initiative away from the Union along the coast, where it could not counter the navy, at least on land the Confederates might attempt to control the shape of the war. By concentrating their forces at points that they, not the enemy, chose, they rather than the Union might select the sites of collision and achieve at least a measure of parity of strength if not even local superiority at those places.40 Thus to concentrate at some places would obviously mean running risks by weakening defenses elsewhere. But, said Lee, “we must decide between the positive loss of inactivity and the risk of action.” “It is only by concentration of our troops that we can hope to win any decisive advantage.”41
因此，李将军向身处谢南多厄河谷的杰克逊将军提议，杰克逊应从弗吉尼亚周边地区调集各支部队，对与他对峙的联邦军发起进攻。如果他能将联邦军从河谷中彻底清除，该地区的地理优势将使他能够威胁到位于华盛顿的联邦首都。“我一直希望，”李将军在1862年4月25日写给杰克逊的信中说，“利用敌军目前分散的局面，在他们能够巩固阵地或获得增援之前，通过迅速集结我军，给予他们沉重打击。”<sup> 42</sup>
To Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, Lee therefore proposed that, reinforced by various detachments from elsewhere around Virginia's periphery, Jackson should take the offensive against the Federals confronting him. If he could sweep them from the Valley, the geography of the region would put him in a position to threaten the Federal capital at Washington. “I have hoped,” Lee wrote to Jackson on April 25, 1862, “in the present divided condition of the enemy's forces that a successful blow may be dealt them by a rapid concentration of our troops before they can be strengthened themselves either in position or by reinforcements.”42
杰克逊长期以来一直提出类似的计划，但在李将军加入杰斐逊·戴维斯麾下之前，里士满无人理会他。杰克逊比李将军更渴望掌握主动权。即使在前一个严冬的严寒中，他也力主入侵北方。正如亨德森所总结的那样，杰克逊指导南方邦联的战略原则是：“集中兵力攻击要害比分散兵力更能确保安全；反击是防御的灵魂；被迫拿起武器对抗强大敌人的州的真正政策是，不给敌人任何喘息之机……”亨德森再次总结了他这位主人公的想法：“北方不应有丝毫喘息之机来重组军队或训练新兵。对要害进行迅速而猛烈的打击，是让这个庞然大物屈服的唯一途径，而这个要害远在里士满之外。”<sup> 43</sup>
Jackson had long been proposing similar plans, but no one in Richmond had heeded him before Lee took his place at Jefferson Davis's side. Jackson was if anything even more intent on seizing the initiative than Lee. He had urged an invasion of the North even during the harsh weather of the previous winter. As Henderson summed them up, Jackson's principles of strategy to guide the Confederacy were: “That a concentrated attack on a vital point is a better measure of security than dissemination along a frontier, that the counter-stroke is the soul of the defence, and that the true policy of the State which is compelled to take up arms against a superior foe is to allow that foe no breathing-space….” “The North should be given no leisure,” Henderson again summarized his protagonist's ideas, “to reorganize the armies or to train recruits. A swift succession of fierce blows, delivered at a vital point, was the only means of bringing the colossus to its knees, and that vital point was far from Richmond.”43
杰克逊在河谷地区对纳撒尼尔·P·班克斯少将的联邦军队发动猛烈反击，随后又击退了另外两支试图包围他的纵队，这使得林肯政府不得不拒绝向麦克莱伦派遣一支横穿弗吉尼亚陆路前来迎战的整个军团。由于这支军团被保留下来，以确保至少能够遏制杰克逊，即便无法彻底惩罚他，麦克莱伦进一步控制里士满的可能性也变得比以往任何时候都更加渺茫。然而，随着联邦的注意力集中到弗吉尼亚北部和西部，杰克逊迅速乘火车抵达里士满附近，增援已在那里的邦联野战部队，并试图与他们一起歼灭麦克莱伦的军队。这一计划也是李将军和杰克逊共同制定的。李将军接管了里士满附近的野战指挥权，并指挥驻扎在那里的南方邦联军队（现称为北弗吉尼亚军）对麦克莱伦的侧翼和后方发动了一系列机动和攻击，目的是切断联邦军队通往其约克河海上基地的交通线，从而使联邦军队面临全军覆没的危险。
Jackson's swift succession of fierce blows against Major General Nathaniel P. Banks's Federal troops in the Valley and then against two additional columns sent to trap him caused Lincoln's government to deny to McClellan in front of Richmond an entire army corps that had been advancing overland across Virginia to meet him. With this corps held back to ensure that Jackson could at least be contained if not punished, any prospect of McClellan's tightening his grip upon Richmond became more remote than ever. But with Union attention thus focused on northern and western Virginia, Jackson moved quickly by railroad to the vicinity of Richmond to reinforce the Confederate field forces already there and together with them to attempt to destroy McClellan's army. This design also was conceived by Lee and Jackson together. Lee had assumed the field command around Richmond, and he directed the Confederate forces there—now named the Army of Northern Virginia—in a series of maneuvers and attacks against McClellan's flank and rear, intended to break the Federal army's line of communications to its maritime base on the York River and thus to expose the Federals to annihilation.
在随后爆发的七日战役中，麦克莱伦的防御作战技巧和勇气远超他进攻指挥能力所展现出的水平。他在西点军校学习的野战工事构筑技巧并非徒劳，这在七日战役的最后阶段，尤其是在马尔文山战役中，发挥了至关重要的作用。此外，他还将基地转移到了詹姆斯河上一个防御更为严密的港口，以巩固军队的防御。七日战役最终迫使麦克莱伦撤离里士满，但李将军向戴维斯总统抱怨说：“在正常情况下，联邦军队本应被歼灭。” <sup> 44 </sup> 李所说的“正常情况”指的是师级指挥和参谋人员的工作水平要达到他自己设定的标准。李认为，未能实现歼灭敌军这一真正目标，并非麦克莱伦能力的不足，而是因为新组建的军队缺乏足够的专业军官。
In the resultant combats, called the Seven Days' battles, McClellan fought far more skillfully and bravely on the defensive than his offensive generalship might have suggested he would. Not for nothing had he learned the West Point teachings on field fortifications, which served him especially well at Malvern Hill during the last of the Seven Days. Behind his army's defensive screen, moreover, he changed his base to a better-protected harbor on the James River. The Seven Days' battles drove McClellan back from Richmond, but Lee lamented to President Davis that “under ordinary circumstances the Federal army should have been destroyed.”44 By “ordinary circumstances,” Lee meant division command and staff work up to his own standards of performance. To the lack of them, in a new army with too few professional officers, rather than to McClellan's awakened abilities, Lee attributed his failure to attain his real objective, the destruction of the enemy army.
李和杰克逊与其说是丹尼斯·马汉、约米尼或其他拿破仑研究者的追随者，不如说是拿破仑本人的追随者。他们通过研究拿破仑的战役，汲取了比以往任何一位美国将领都更具侵略性的战略理念。杰克逊利用墨西哥战争和南北战争之间相对闲暇的几年时间——当时他在弗吉尼亚军事学院担任数学教授——深入研究了拿破仑的战役，并将其置于更广泛的军事史研究框架下进行考察。<sup> 45</sup> 1852年至1855年李担任西点军校校长期间，该校成立了一个拿破仑俱乐部，马汉担任主席和评论员。我们不清楚李与该俱乐部的联系有多密切，但我们知道，在他担任校长期间从西点军校图书馆借阅的十五本军事书籍中，只有七本与拿破仑有关。<sup> 46</sup>
Lee and Jackson were not so much disciples of Dennis Mahan or Jomini or of other interpreters of Napoleon than of Napoleon himself. From their study of his campaigns they drew more aggressive strategic concepts than had any previous American generals. Jackson had utilized his years of relative leisure between the Mexican and Civil Wars, when he was a professor of mathematics at the Virginia Military Institute, to study thoroughly the campaigns of Napoleon within the context of a wider examination of military history.45 When Lee was superintendent of West Point from 1852 to 1855, a Napoleon Club flourished at the Military Academy, with Mahan as chairman and commentator. We do not know how much connection with the club Lee had, but we do know that of fifteen books on military subjects that he borrowed from the academy library during his superintendency, no more than seven concerned Napoleon.46
不仅如此，李将军关于战略和战争的记录性言论以及他的行动都表明他受到了拿破仑的影响。从七日战役开始，在他指挥南方邦联军队期间，李将军的指挥风格，如同拿破仑一样，以“绕后机动”（la manoeuvre sur les derrières）为标志。李将军的目标是利用这一机动攻击敌军的后方和侧翼，给予其心理和物质上的双重打击，从而取得歼灭战的胜利。只要他自己的军队实力允许他以哪怕一丝现实主义的眼光看待这一目标，他的战略目标就始终如一，那就是“摧毁联邦军队”。直到1864年6月初，李将军仍在明确他的近期目标，他说：“我们必须在格兰特的军队到达詹姆斯河之前将其摧毁。”<sup> 47</sup>
More than that, Lee's recorded comments on strategy and war as well as his actions suggest the influence of the emperor. From the Seven Days onward throughout his command of Confederate armies, the hallmark of Lee's generalship, like Napoleon's, was la manoeuvre sur les derrières. Lee's objective was to exploit the maneuver against the enemy's rear and flanks to deal psychological and physical blows that would win a victory of annihilation. As long as his own armies' strength permitted him to contemplate the goal with the slightest element of realism, his strategic purpose remained the same, that “the Federal army should [be] destroyed.” As late as early June 1864, Lee was still defining his immediate objective by saying: “We must destroy this army of Grant's before he gets to James River.”47
为了彻底摧毁联邦军队的战斗力，李将军逐渐转向了杰克逊最初更为彻底的进攻战略。在山谷战役爆发之前，对于杰克逊提出的入侵北方的提议，李将军一直态度暧昧。然而，在七日战役中，作为战略防御手段的战场进攻未能彻底击溃敌军；而在1862年夏末的第二次马纳萨斯战役中，类似的战术主动与战略防御相结合的策略也未能取得类似的结果——尽管李将军和杰克逊在第二次马纳萨斯战役中使出了堪比拿破仑的“后方突袭”战术，但最终还是未能彻底歼灭敌军——李将军由此得出结论：战略防御不足以解决问题。要彻底摧毁联邦军队，就必须将战火烧到敌国境内，并在那里取得类似奥斯特里茨战役或耶拿-奥尔施泰特战役的胜利。如果联邦军队足够顽强，能够在弗吉尼亚的土地上经受住第二次马纳萨斯战役的考验，那么在他们的本土对他们实施一次拿破仑式的扭转战局，可能会成倍放大邦联胜利和联邦失败带来的心理影响，从而迫使联邦政府进行和平谈判。
In the quest to destroy the Federal armies as effective fighting forces, Lee moved closer to what had initially been Jackson's more completely offensive strategy. Before the genesis of the Valley campaign, Lee's response to Jackson's overtures proposing invasion of the North had been noncommittal. After battlefield attacks as part of a strategic defensive failed to destroy the enemy army during the Seven Days, however, and after a similar combination of the tactical initiative with the strategic defensive bore similar results in the Second Manassas campaign later in the summer of 1862—at Second Manassas, Lee and Jackson fell short of destroying the enemy army despite a manoeuvre sur les derrières worthy of Napoleon himself—Lee concluded that the strategic defensive would not suffice. To destroy the Federal army would require carrying the war into the enemy's country and winning an Austerlitz or Jena-Auerstedt victory there. If the Federal forces were resilient enough to survive a Second Manassas on Virginia soil, then to inflict a Napoleonic turning maneuver on them on their own soil might multiply the psychological effects of Confederate victory and Union defeat enough to bring the Federal government into peace negotiations.
因此，在第二次马纳萨斯战役之后，李将军和杰克逊将军率领北弗吉尼亚军团越过波托马克河北上进入马里兰州。由于入侵开始前缺乏足够的增援，加上南方邦联士兵因不理解此次进攻的目的和逻辑而行动迟缓，以及一系列复杂的后勤困难，李将军的实力被严重削弱。在战略攻势的高潮阶段，他被迫于1862年9月17日在安提耶坦河沿岸转入战术防御。他在战场上坚守阵地，但损失惨重，迫使他撤退到波托马克河南岸。然而，他一回到弗吉尼亚，就开始筹划再次入侵北方，并为此向戴维斯总统寻求充足的资源和增援。在更倾向于防御的总统提供必要资源之前，李将军不得不应对联邦军对弗吉尼亚的另一次入侵，最终导致1862年12月13日的弗雷德里克斯堡战役。当时的季节不适宜再次发动进攻，1863年春季，联邦军在弗吉尼亚东南部的活动迫使李将军将詹姆斯·朗斯特里特中将的军团调往该地区，并再次推迟了邦联的进攻。但朗斯特里特一回到部队，李将军就再次率领北弗吉尼亚军向波托马克河进发，发动了他规模最大的进攻——入侵马里兰州和宾夕法尼亚州，即葛底斯堡战役。<sup> 48</sup>
Thus, after Second Manassas, Lee and Jackson led the Army of Northern Virginia northward across the Potomac into Maryland. Lack of adequate reinforcement before the beginning of this invasion, the straggling by Confederate soldiers, who could not understand the purpose or logic of the advance, and a complex of logistical difficulties so eroded Lee's strength that in the climax of his strategic offensive he was obliged to fight on the tactical defensive, along Antietam Creek on September 17, 1862. He held his ground on the battlefield, but his losses obliged him to retreat to the south shore of the Potomac. As soon as he was back in Virginia, however, he began planning to invade the North again, and sought from President Davis adequate resources and reinforcements for this purpose. Before the more defensive-minded president supplied the necessary resources, Lee had to respond to another Federal invasion of Virginia, culminating in the battle of Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862. By that time the season was unpropitious for renewed offensive action, and in the spring of 1863 Federal activity in extreme southeastern Virginia obliged Lee to detach Lieutenant General James Longstreet's corps to that area and to postpone a Confederate offensive yet again. But as soon as Longstreet could rejoin him, Lee turned the Army of Northern Virginia toward the Potomac once more for his supreme offensive effort, the invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania: the Gettysburg campaign.48
在弗雷德里克斯堡战役和葛底斯堡战役之间，朗斯特里特不在期间，李将军再次挫败了联邦军的进攻，随后于1863年5月2日至4日参加了钱瑟勒斯维尔战役。在这场堪比第二次马纳萨斯战役的、以拿破仑式攻势破坏交通线的战役中，杰克逊被己方部队误杀，李将军失去了他这位技艺精湛、进攻性极强的副官。然而，此时的李将军已经深受杰克逊纯粹的进攻战略的影响，毫不犹豫地发动了对北方的入侵。但杰克逊的死也暴露出李-杰克逊战略中一个固有的缺陷，即试图将以往以防御为主的美国战略思想转向进攻的策略存在缺陷，而这个缺陷最终对南方邦联而言是无法克服的。面对19世纪中期的军事技术——尤其是步枪——进攻型战争的代价是巨大的。最终，它对南方邦联最稀缺的资源——人力和军事领导层——造成了致命的打击。49
In the interval between Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, the parrying of still another Federal thrust during Longstreet's absence led Lee to the battle of Chancellorsville on May 2–4, 1863. In the course there of another Napoleonic operation on the lines of communication worthy of ranking with that of Second Manassas, the tragic shooting of Jackson by his own troops deprived Lee of his skillful and aggressive coadjutor. He was by this time so imbued with Jackson's unalloyed offensive strategy, however, that he proceeded unhesitatingly to the invasion of the North. Yet the death of Jackson was symptomatic of an inherent, and for the Confederacy in time insurmountable, flaw in the Lee-Jackson effort to turn hitherto defensively-oriented American strategic thought to the offensive. Against mid-nineteenth-century military technology—particularly the rifle—the cost of an offensive style of war was immense. In the end, it imposed a mortal toll upon the scarcest of all the Confederacy's scarce resources, its manpower and its military leadership.49
如同美国战略思想早期一个显著的例外——美墨战争，尤其是温菲尔德·斯科特少将从韦拉克鲁斯进军墨西哥城——李将军和杰克逊将军都力图在保持进攻的同时，通过机动战术最大限度地减少伤亡。在墨西哥，斯科特刻意避免正面交锋，只有在少数情况下，他对敌军防御的判断使他认为战斗不可避免时才会出兵。在大多数情况下，他采取的是机动战术，而非强攻，迫使墨西哥军队逐个攻破据点，直至攻入首都。此时，敌军因内部诸多弱点和分裂而被迫放弃战争。此外，美墨战争的参战双方当时主要装备的是滑膛枪而非步枪，这也有助于斯科特将伤亡降到较低水平。斯通沃尔·杰克逊可能从他曾共事的斯科特以及他阅读的拿破仑著作中汲取了灵感，在他的山谷战役中，他更多地是通过机动和行军而不是战斗来实现目标；与这场战役的战略影响相比，山谷战役中的战斗规模显得不成比例地小。
As in an earlier conspicuous exception to the defensive focus of American strategic thought—the war with Mexico and particularly Major General Winfield Scott's march from Veracruz to Mexico City—Lee and Jackson sought to sustain the offensive while at the same time minimizing casualties by means of maneuver. In Mexico, Scott had deliberately eschewed battle except on a few occasions when his reading of the nature of the enemy's defenses led him to think combat unavoidable. For the most part, he maneuvered rather than forced the Mexicans out of one stronghold after another until he entered the capital city, whereupon the enemy, beset by numerous internal weaknesses and schisms, gave up the war.50 It helped keep Scott's casualties low, moreover, that the contestants in the Mexican war were still armed mainly with smoothbore muskets, not rifles. Probably taking his cue from Scott, with whom he had served, as well as from his reading of Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson in his Valley campaign similarly attained his objectives more by maneuvering and marching than by fighting; the battles of the Valley campaign were disproportionately small affairs when set against the strategic impact of the campaign.
然而，要赢得的不仅仅是暂时的战略优势，而是要战胜目标远比墨西哥政府坚定、资源更为丰富的美国政府，从而确保南方邦联的独立，仅仅依靠巧妙的机动是不够的。李将军和杰克逊将军之间的一个区别似乎在于，李将军更早地接受了南方邦联的胜利必须包含大规模战役和重大伤亡这一结论。正是对这一严峻前景的接受，或许可以解释为何当杰克逊将军最初呼吁进行战略进攻时，李将军的反应并不那么积极。在战略思想中，长期以来一直存在一种倾向，即认为机动战相对轻松，是一种节省资源和减少伤亡的手段；巴兹尔·利德尔·哈特在20世纪有时也屈服于这种倾向，20世纪后期，许多主张以机动战作为解决西欧防御苏联难题的良方的人也同样如此。但李将军非常现实，他并不指望能轻易赢得像南北战争这样规模的战争。他深知，面对顽强不屈的对手，只有当军事行动最终转化为一场酣畅淋漓的战斗，并彻底摧毁敌军时，才能真正实现战争的战略目标。“我们必须摧毁这支军队”是李将军始终奉行的准则，而他所有军事行动的目标也始终是歼灭战。
To win, however, not merely temporary strategic advantages but Confederate independence against a United States government much firmer of purpose and richer in resources than the Mexican government had been, skillful maneuver proved not enough. One of the differences between Lee and Jackson appears to have been Lee's earlier acceptance of the conclusion that Confederate victory must entail large-scale battles and large casualties. The acceptance of this daunting prospect may help explain Lee's lesser initial exuberance when Jackson was first calling for strategic offensives. There is a longstanding temptation in strategic thought to regard maneuver warfare as relatively painless, a means of economizing on both resources and casualties; Basil Liddell Hart sometimes succumbed to this temptation in the twentieth century, and so in the later twentieth century have many of the proponents of maneuver warfare as a remedy for the difficulties of planning the defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union. But Lee was too realistic to expect war on the scale of the contest between the Union and the Confederacy to be won cheaply. He perceived that against a resolute and resilient opponent, maneuver can achieve the strategic objectives of war only when it culminates in successful battle and in the substantial destruction of the enemy army. “We must destroy this army” was Lee's persistent watchword, and the aim of his maneuvers was always the battle of annihilation.
然而，与斯科特不同，李将军主动寻求战斗而非回避战争。尽管他拥有自拿破仑以来最精湛的拿破仑式战术指挥才能，但在试图重创敌军的过程中，自身也难免遭受惨重伤亡。在七日战役中，李将军将麦克莱伦逐出里士满，但他麾下八万大军却伤亡惨重，达20141人。<sup> 51</sup>在第二次马纳萨斯战役中，李将军击败约翰·波普少将，几乎彻底清除了弗吉尼亚境内的联邦军，但他的参战兵力48527人中，伤亡高达9197人。鉴于李将军在入侵马里兰前后所遭受的损失，安提耶坦战役的风险可想而知，但他最终还是损失了51844人中的13724人。作为一场纯粹的防御战，弗雷德里克斯堡战役的代价相对较小，南方邦联参战的72,500人中仅有约5,300人伤亡。<sup>52</sup>但在钱瑟勒斯维尔战役中，尽管斯通沃尔·杰克逊的军团对联邦军实施了精妙的包围，南方邦联的伤亡仍然达到了60,892人中的12,821人。<sup> 53 </sup>李将军在入侵宾夕法尼亚时再次采取进攻策略，导致了葛底斯堡战役的惨烈战斗，南方邦联约80,000人的军队中伤亡高达28,063人。<sup>54</sup>总损失如此巨大，以至于葛底斯堡战役后，李将军再也无法考虑恢复战略进攻。他或许仍然希望通过战场上更胜一筹的战术，包括局部进攻，来实现他摧毁敌军的既定目标；但他之前的作战方式已经严重消耗了他的军队实力，希望很快就变成了空想。
Seeking battle rather than eschewing it as Scott had done, however, Lee, despite the most skillfully Napoleonic tactical generalship since Napoleon himself, could not avoid suffering heavy casualties in his own ranks in the effort to inflict destructive casualties on the enemy. In the Seven Days' battles, Lee drove McClellan from Richmond but suffered 20,141 casualties in an army of 80,000.51 At Second Manassas, Lee's defeat of Major General John Pope nearly completed the task of clearing the Federals from Virginia but cost casualties of 9,197 out of 48,527 engaged. At Antietam, a dubious hazard in view of Lee's losses just before and during his invasion of Maryland, he lost 13,724 out of 51,844. As a purely defensive battle, Fredericksburg was relatively uncostly, with Confederate losses of only about 5,300 of 72,500 engaged.52 But at Chancellorsville, a brilliantly executed envelopment of the Federals by Stonewall Jackson's corps could not prevent Confederate casualties from reaching 12,821 out of 60,892.53 And Lee's resort to the offensive again in his invasion of Pennsylvania led to the desperate assaults at Gettysburg, in which Confederate casualties were a staggering 28,063 in an army of about 80,000.54 The total losses were so great that after Gettysburg Lee could no longer contemplate a resumption of the strategic offensive. He might still hope through superior tactics on the battlefield, including local attacks, to realize his continuing aim of destroying the enemy army; but his previous method of warfare had already imposed so heavy a drain upon the strength of his army that the hope was fast becoming chimerical.
尽管李将军或许务实地认为，只有毁灭性的战斗才能摧毁联邦军继续与他作战的能力和意志，但李将军和杰克逊将军最初对线膛枪和火炮的威力估计可能都过于乐观。他们在墨西哥战争中的经验并没有让他们做好应对步枪的准备。由于步兵火力的显著提升，在内战中，刺刀近战极为罕见；在战争期间联邦军医院收治的约25万名伤员中，刺刀和马刀造成的伤亡加起来只有922人。<sup> 55</sup>然而，在战争初期，杰克逊将军曾谈到他的战术偏好：“但我认为不应该进行太多的交火。我的想法是，最好的作战方式是保留火力，直到敌人——或者你——逼近他们。然后进行一次致命的、蓄意的射击——并发起刺刀冲锋。” 56即使在雪松山战役（第二次马纳萨斯战役的前奏，发生在山谷战役和七日战役之后）中，杰克逊仍然敦促遭受攻击的轻步兵师不要开火，而是使用刺刀。李将军在侧翼包抄和包围战术未能取得预期效果时，仍然偏爱正面进攻——例如马尔文山战役、皮克特冲锋以及直到1864年9月30日试图夺回哈里森堡的行动——这表明这位原本精明甚至才华横溢的指挥官，在认识到新式武器的威力方面存在迟钝。
Realistic though Lee may have been in believing that no mere maneuver but only destructive battle could break the ability and will of the Union to persist in the struggle against him, he and Jackson as well were probably less than realistic in their initial perceptions of the impact of rifled muskets and artillery. Their experiences of war in Mexico had not prepared them for the rifle. Because of the new effectiveness of infantry fire, closing with the bayonet proved rare in Civil War battles; bayonet and saber wounds combined accounted for only 922 of some 250,000 wounded treated in Union hospitals during the war.55 Early in the war, nevertheless, Jackson said of his tactical preferences: “But my opinion is that there ought not to be much firing at all. My idea is that the best mode of fighting is to reserve your fire until the enemy get—or you get them—to close quarters. Then deliver one deadly, deliberate fire—and charge [with the bayonet].”56 As late as the battle of Cedar Mountain, a prelude to Second Manassas fought after the Valley campaign and the Seven Days, Jackson still urged the Light Division under attack to hold their fire and use their bayonets. Lee's penchant for frontal attacks when flanking and enveloping maneuvers failed to secure the results he hoped for—one thinks of Malvern Hill, Pickett's Charge, and the effort to recapture Fort Harrison as late as September 30, 1864—suggests slowness on the part of this otherwise astute and even brilliant commander to appreciate the power of the new weaponry.
此外，线膛枪火力使得侧翼和后方遭到攻击的敌军能够形成新的战线，从而在包围圈中将伤亡人数减少到与自身大致相当的水平。第二次马纳萨斯战役和钱瑟勒斯维尔战役是李将军和杰克逊将军在拿破仑战争中最杰出的战役，然而，尽管南方邦联军在这些战场上实施了精妙的包围，联邦军仍然给敌人造成了重大损失。在第二次马纳萨斯战役中，南方邦联军的伤亡率约为19%；而兵力严重不足的联邦军则损失了21%，即75,696人中的16,054人（其中大部分失踪；在阵亡和受伤方面，联邦军仅损失了13%，而南方邦联军19%的损失几乎全部是阵亡和受伤）。57在被誉为李将军“绝对杰作”的钱瑟勒斯维尔战役中，南方邦联军的伤亡率实际上高达22%，而战败的联邦军伤亡率仅为13%（133,868人中仅有17,278人阵亡）。58
Rifled firepower, moreover, permitted enemy forces attacked on flank and rear to form a new front whence they could extract from the enveloping force casualties approximately their own. Second Manassas and Chancellorsville were Lee's and Jackson's supreme efforts in Napoleonic battle, yet the superbly executed Confederate envelopments on those battlefields did not prevent the Federals from inflicting heavy losses on their foe. At Second Manassas, the Confederate casualty rate was about 19 percent; the badly outgeneraled Federals lost 21 percent, 16,054 of 75,696 (largely in missing; in killed and wounded, the Federals lost only 13 percent, while almost all of the Confederates' 19 percent losses were killed and wounded).57 At Chancellorsville, which has been called Lee's “Absolute Masterpiece,” the Confederates actually lost 22 percent to casualties to only 13 percent for the defeated Federals (17,278 of 133,868).58
因此，即使是最杰出的将领也无法再对装备步枪、意志坚定的敌人取得足够有利的伤亡率和胜差，从而使任何一场战役的胜负都具有决定性意义。奥斯特里茨战役或耶拿-奥尔施泰特战役那样的胜利已不复存在。李将军坚信在任何一场战役或战役中“联邦军队都将被摧毁”，但事实上，早在他自己军队遭受惨重伤亡、丧失进攻能力之前，这种想法就已经成了空想。
The most skillful generalship thus could no longer achieve against resolute enemies armed with rifles sufficiently favorable casualty rates and margins of victory in battle to make the results of any one battle decisive. There were no more Austerlitz or Jena-Auerstedt victories to be had. Lee's conviction that in any one battle or campaign “the Federal army should have been destroyed” had in fact become chimerical long before the casualties that he exacted from his own forces stripped them of their offensive power.
因此，美国战略思想从以往的防御姿态转向有效进攻模式的首次重大尝试以失败告终。由于李将军和杰克逊将军始终受到南方邦联资源限制，特别是人力资源匮乏的制约，因此，拥有更雄厚兵力和物资的北方联邦将领能否在南方邦联失败的地方取得进攻性胜利，仍有待观察。
Thus the first major effort to move from the previously defensive tenor of American strategic thought toward an effective mode of offensive action ended in failure. Because Lee and Jackson were always handicapped by the limitations of Confederate resources, particularly the scarcity of manpower, it remained to be seen whether the rival Union generals, more richly blessed with men and matériel, might succeed on the offensive where the Confederates had failed.
第四
IV
在联邦将领中，麦克莱伦极度缺乏进取心，自然无法为美国制定成功的进攻性战争战略。在他之后迅速接任的东部将领，以及西部的联邦指挥官，也都做不到这一点。麦克莱伦至少拥有赢得战争的战略构想；他的大多数继任者充其量只是战术家，他们的视野局限于战场上的直接问题，即使他们拥有足以战胜罗伯特·E·李之流的战术才能，也不太可能实现克劳塞维茨对战略的定义——即利用战斗来实现战争目标。（其中最优秀的少将乔治·G·米德在葛底斯堡战役中确实在战术层面上胜过了李。）
Among the Union generals McClellan, so altogether lacking in aggressiveness, certainly could not show the way to a successful American strategy of offensive war. Neither could any of the procession of generals who followed rapidly after him in the East, nor most of the Union commanders in the West. McClellan at least possessed a strategic design for winning the war; most of his successors were at best tacticians, whose vision was limited to the immediate problems of the battlefield and would not have been likely to achieve Clausewitz's definition of strategy, the use of battles to attain the object of the war, even if they had been sufficiently capable tacticians to win in battle against the likes of Robert E. Lee. (Major General George G. Meade, the best of them, did outgeneral Lee on the tactical level at Gettysburg.)
在西部，丹尼斯·马汉最得意的学生哈勒克，时任少将，于1861年11月接管密苏里军区指挥权，并于次年3月实际成为西部战区司令，统领密西西比军区，下辖数支军队。哈勒克作为美国首位系统全面的战略分析家，在一定程度上兑现了人们对他的期望。他支持并鼓励尤利西斯·S·格兰特准将和安德鲁·H·富特海军上将的作战行动，最终于1862年2月攻占了亨利堡和唐纳森堡，从而打通了田纳西河和坎伯兰河，使联邦军队得以深入田纳西州腹地，并向具有重要战略意义的孟菲斯-查尔斯顿铁路推进。哈勒克对战略后勤基础的洞察力始终敏锐。在整个战争期间，他始终敏锐地洞察到联邦军队在后勤方面可行的作战路线，并且他越来越认识到，在那个战斗意味着暴露于线膛火力之下的时代，最有效的进攻战略武器之一，不是直接瞄准敌军，而是瞄准他们的后勤基地。59
In the West, Dennis Mahan's favorite student Halleck, now a major general, received command of the Department of Missouri in November 1861, and the following March became in effect western theater commander as head of the Department of the Mississippi, with several armies operating under him. Halleck partially fulfilled the promise that might have been expected from the first systematic and comprehensive American analyst of strategy. He sponsored and encouraged the operations of Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant and Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote that captured Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862 and thereby opened the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers for Union penetration deep into the state of Tennessee and toward the strategically important Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Halleck's insights into the logistical foundations of strategy proved consistently acute. Throughout the war, he maintained a shrewd eye for logistically viable lines of operation for the Union forces, and he increasingly recognized that one of the most effective weapons of offensive strategy, in an age when battle meant exposure to rifled firepower, was to aim not directly at the enemy armies but at their logistical bases.59
另一方面，哈勒克在1862年4月29日至6月10日亲自率军围攻位于孟菲斯和查尔斯顿一线的密西西比州科林斯城时，却表现出了几乎与麦克莱伦相似的怯懦。1862年7月，他因在西部地区的战功被任命为联邦军队总司令，但他的怯懦却演变成了不愿承担责任。他成为了亚伯拉罕·林肯总统、战争部长埃德温·M·斯坦顿以及前线联邦将领们得力的战略和后勤顾问，但仅此而已。事实上，他几乎完美地诠释了作战士兵中最糟糕的刻板印象——“军人学者”：尽管他的战略理论颇具洞察力，但在付诸实践时却缺乏决断力。
On the other hand, Halleck displayed almost McClellan-like diffidence when he personally took the field to conduct the siege of Corinth, Mississippi, on the Memphis and Charleston line, from April 29 to June 10, 1862, and, after he had been rewarded for his western achievements by being named general-in-chief of all the Union armies in July 1862, his diffidence grew into an unwillingness to accept responsibility. He became a useful strategic and logistical advisor to President Abraham Lincoln, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, and Union generals in the field, but little more. Indeed, he came perilously close to fulfilling the soldier of action's worst stereotype of the soldier-scholar: however perceptive his strategic theories, he lacked resolution when he had to apply them to reality.
他的下属格兰特乍看之下似乎是截然相反的军人，一个行动果断、简单直接的人，缺乏历史研究和理论思考。诚然，格兰特在西点军校时期对战争的了解有限，几乎没有像“石墙”杰克逊那样研读过军事史，但他很快就展现出远超战场直觉的能力。事实上，作为一名战场指挥官，他从未真正出类拔萃，除了在夏洛战役中凭借沉着冷静的勇气力挽狂澜，击退了敌军强大的反攻。然而，尽管缺乏军事训练，格兰特迅速成长为一名战略家，他关于进攻的远见卓识——将具体的战役和行动结合起来以实现战争目标——使他在整体战争指挥方面至少与李将军不相上下。在接下来的一个世纪里，他成为塑造美国战略思想的最具影响力的人物，尽管并非总是带来好的结果。
His subordinate Grant seemed at first glance the opposite type of soldier, a man of action simple and direct, without historical study or theoretical reflectiveness. Although it is true that Grant's limited study of war as a West Point cadet appears to have been buttressed by almost none of the reading in military history of a Stonewall Jackson, Grant soon demonstrated that his capacities reached far beyond a mere intuitive grasp of the battlefield. As a battlefield commander, in fact, he was never to be outstanding, except in the imperturbable courage against adversity with which he saved the day against a powerful enemy counteroffensive at Shiloh. Rather, untutored though he was, Grant rapidly developed into a strategist whose vision of the offensive combining of particular battles and campaigns to achieve the object of the war made him at least Lee's equal in the overall conduct of war. He became the most influential figure in the shaping of American strategic thought for the next hundred years, not always with fortunate results.
格兰特战略家的崛起始于亨利堡-唐纳森堡战役，这场战役由他亲自指挥，并与他的指挥官哈勒克将军共同制定了作战计划。与哈勒克一样，格兰特从战争伊始就意识到贯穿邦联西部的河流的重要性，在当时幅员辽阔、缺乏其他后勤保障的地区，这些河流是可行的作战路线，而其他地区除了少数几条漫长且易受攻击的铁路外，几乎没有其他有效的后勤保障。哈勒克前往东部担任总司令后，格兰特独立指挥的第一次重大进攻战役是攻打邦联位于密西西比河上的要塞维克斯堡。此次战役的目的是打通密西西比河全线，使联邦军能够通航，同时阻断邦联密西西比河以西地区经墨西哥向东部输送农产品和欧洲进口商品。
Grant's emergence as a strategist began with the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson campaign, which he executed and in whose design he shared with his commanding officer, General Halleck. Like Halleck, he grasped from the beginning of the war the importance of the rivers that penetrated the western Confederacy as logistically workable lines of operation in a vast area otherwise lacking in such lines, except for a few long and vulnerable railroads. Grant's first major offensive campaign in autonomous command, after Halleck went east to be general-in-chief, was the campaign against the Confederacy's Mississippi River citadel of Vicksburg. The purpose was to open the entire length of the Mississippi to Union navigation and at the same time to impede the flow of agricultural products and European imports coming via Mexico from the Confederate trans-Mississippi area to the East.
在军事史上，格兰特的形象主要是一位不择手段的消耗战专家，他旨在通过日复一日的残酷伤亡交换来摧毁敌军。他对后世美国战略思想的主要影响也体现在这一方面。然而，在维克斯堡战役中，他的战略却截然不同。他借鉴了斯科特从韦拉克鲁斯进军墨西哥城的经验——格兰特本人也曾像李将军和杰克逊将军一样参与过这场战役——运用机动战术，逐一击溃敌军的防御阵地，最终围困并迫使敌军主力投降。在战役的最后几周，格兰特的机动战表现足以媲美斯科特在墨西哥城或杰克逊在河谷地区的成就。他的部队行军130英里，将密西西比州的南方邦联守军一分为二，并在波特吉布森、雷蒙德、杰克逊、冠军山和大黑河五场战役中取得胜利，而自身伤亡却相对较小。 7月4日维克斯堡投降时，格兰特俘虏了29491名南方邦联军官兵，缴获172门火炮和5万至6万支步枪。此前战役阶段，敌军已损失7000人。与此同时，格兰特本人伤亡仅为8873人：阵亡1243人，受伤7095人，失踪535人。
Grant's image in military history is principally that of an unsubtle practitioner of attrition warfare designed to destroy the enemy army by means of a brutal day-after-day exchange of casualties. His chief impact on subsequent American strategic thought lay in that direction. During his Vicksburg campaign, nevertheless, his strategy was very different. Drawing on the example of Scott's march from Veracruz to Mexico City—in which Grant, like Lee and Jackson, had served—he employed a strategy of maneuver to turn the enemy out of one defensive position after another and ultimately to trap and force the surrender of the principal opposing army.60 In the climactic weeks of the campaign, Grant's conduct of maneuver warfare easily matched the achievements of Scott in Mexico or Jackson in the Valley. His troops marched 130 miles, split the Confederate defenders of the state of Mississippi in two, and won five battles—Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Big Black River—with relatively few casualties. When Vicksburg surrendered on July 4, Grant captured 29,491 Confederate officers and men, with 172 artillery pieces and 50,000 to 60,000 muskets and rifles. The earlier phases of the campaign had cost the enemy another 7,000 losses. Meanwhile Grant's own casualties totaled only 8,873: 1,243 killed, 7,095 wounded, 535 missing.61
在维克斯堡战役中，比伤亡人数更重要的是战役地理目标的实现。但随着这场战役以及随后解除南方邦联对查塔努加的围困，格兰特获得了所有联邦军队的指挥权，他的目标也必须超越占领战略要地。1864年3月，格兰特受命在战争中取得全面军事胜利——这一目标势在必行，因为联邦决心迫使南方邦联彻底放弃其所有主权要求——格兰特感到必须调整战略，力求彻底摧毁南方邦联的战争能力。
More important than the casualty toll in the Vicksburg campaign was the attainment of the campaign's geographic objectives. But when this campaign and his subsequent lifting of the Confederate siege of Chattanooga brought Grant the command of all the Union armies, his objectives had to expand beyond the capture of strategic places. Charged in March 1864 with winning total military victory in the war—a goal necessary because the Union was bent on forcing the complete surrender of all the Confederacy's claims to sovereignty—Grant felt compelled to modify his strategy and to seek the utter destruction of the Confederacy's capacity to wage war.
经历了三年战争的洗礼，格兰特无法再像李将军那样抱有希望——即便他曾经有过这种希望——认为只需一场拿破仑式的战役就能彻底歼灭敌军主力。内战双方的军队规模庞大、韧性十足，而且都得到了民主政府强有力的支持，这种战术根本行不通。尽管如此，格兰特仍然希望能够以某种不那么残酷的方式俘虏或歼灭南方邦联军队，而不是通过一场兵力更雄厚的残酷伤亡交换来取得胜利。与许多拿破仑的崇拜者和研究者不同，格兰特从未对任何形式的战争——无论是决战还是旷日持久的消耗战——抱有狂热；他认为即使是斯科特将军在墨西哥也打过一些不必要的仗，而且他本人始终是一位约米尼式的战略家，而非克劳塞维茨式的战略家。
After the experience of three years of war, Grant could not share Lee's hope—if he had ever shared it—that the destruction of a major enemy army could be achieved in a single Napoleonic battle. The rival armies of the Civil War were too big, too resilient, too thoroughly sustained by the will of democratic governments for that. Grant hoped, nevertheless, that he might capture or destroy all the Confederate armies by some less appalling means than a brutal exchange of casualties in which the Union would triumph because it had more men to expend. Unlike many admirers and students of Napoleon, he was never infatuated with battle in any form, whether climactic or of prolonged attrition; he thought that even Scott in Mexico had fought battles unnecessarily,62 and he himself was always a Jominian rather than a Clausewitzian strategist.
格兰特指派他在西部战役中最信任的下属——威廉·特库姆塞·谢尔曼少将——指挥西部的联邦军队，并消灭那里的南方邦联军队，特别是约瑟夫·E·约翰斯顿将军的田纳西军团。格兰特提议，他自己作为总司令，将留在华盛顿担任新设立的陆军参谋长一职，负责协调作战，而他本人则率领东部的主力联邦军队——波托马克军团——冲锋陷阵，但保留乔治·G·米德少将的指挥权。“李将军的军队将是你们的目标，”格兰特在或许是美国最著名的军事命令中指示米德。但在详细描述他希望如何消灭李将军的军队时，格兰特更多地强调的是俘获而非摧毁。显然，他希望通过在弗吉尼亚发起一场类似于维克斯堡战役的机动战，来战胜李将军。 1864年他在弗吉尼亚的战役，以及他所表达的意图和后来的反思，都表明他希望通过扭转战局，使联邦军队切断李将军的交通线——切断李将军的军队与里士满的联系，或者后来切断李将军的军队和里士满通往南方腹地的铁路——从而像他攻克彭伯顿的维克斯堡军团那样，俘虏北弗吉尼亚军团。他认为摧毁李将军军队的方法是俘虏它，而不是消耗它并最终将其歼灭。
Grant assigned Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, long his most trusted subordinate in his western campaigns, to command the Union forces in the West and to eliminate the Confederate armies there, particularly General Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee. Grant proposed that, leaving Halleck in Washington in the newly created post of army chief of staff to coordinate operations, he himself as general-in-chief would take the field with the principal Union army in the East, the Army of the Potomac, though retaining Major General George G. Meade as its commander. “Lee's army will be your objective point,” Grant instructed Meade in perhaps the most famous of American military orders. But in describing in detail how he hoped to eliminate Lee's army, Grant tended to speak less of destroying than of capturing it.63 Evidently he hoped to outgeneral Lee through a maneuver campaign in Virginia similar to his Vicksburg campaign. The subsequent unfolding of his campaign in Virginia in 1864, as well as his expressions of his intentions and his later reflections, all indicate his hope that by means of turning movements to place the Union forces astride Lee's lines of communications—separating Lee's army from Richmond, or later, separating both Lee's army and Richmond from their railroad lines to the deeper South—he might capture the Army of Northern Virginia as he had captured Pemberton's Army of Vicksburg. The means to the destruction of Lee's army was to be its capture, not its attrition and ultimate annihilation.
不幸的是，李将军并非彭伯顿。这位精通拿破仑式机动战术的南方邦联将领狡猾至极，只要他拥有一支足以继续战斗的强大军队，就绝不会轻易被逼到投降的境地。因此，格兰特只能退而求其次，采取次优方案来实现他的目标。他将李将军的军队困在战场上，几乎从1864年5月3日至4日渡过拉皮丹河开始，一直到战争结束，几乎每天都与李将军交战，双方伤亡不断。格兰特深知，联邦军队拥有更强大的兵力储备，总有一天联邦军队会屹立不倒，而李将军的军队则会被彻底消灭。格兰特曾说，他的目标“注定无法实现”。
Unhappily for this design, Lee was not Pemberton. The Confederate master of Napoleonic maneuver was much too wily to be maneuvered into a position where he had to surrender his army, as long as he had an army strong enough to continue the fight. Grant therefore had to settle for the second-best method of accomplishing his objective. He locked Lee's army in battle and held it there day after day, almost every day from his crossing of the Rapidan River on May 3–4, 1864, until the end of the war, trading casualties with Lee in the knowledge that the Union's superior reserves of manpower meant that someday the Union army would remain and Lee's would not. His objects were “not to be accomplished,” Grant said,
……无需经历世所罕见的殊死搏斗；无需一日、一周、一个月或一个季度即可完成。双方的损失注定惨重；但如今对峙的两军已进行了长达三年的殊死搏斗，伤亡惨重，包括阵亡、病死、被俘和受伤，双方在实现最终目标方面均未取得任何实质性进展……此次战役注定会在一定时间内给双方带来比以往任何战役都更为惨重的损失；但这场浩劫将被限制在一年之内，并在这一年内完成所有预期或期望的目标。为此，我们必须进行艰苦卓绝的战斗。64
…without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, or a single season. The losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded, and neither had made any real progress toward accomplishing the final end…. The campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this.64
李将军最终向格兰特投降，但并非因为他被格兰特击败。相反，李将军于1865年4月9日投降，是因为他的军队已不复存在，不再具备有效的战斗力。只有大约26765名南方邦联士兵在阿波马托克斯降下旗帜、放下武器，这支饥寒交迫、疲惫不堪的军队，与南方邦联通常维持的超过5万人的兵力相比，简直是天壤之别。格兰特的顽强抵抗实现了李将军未能达成的目标——歼灭敌军。
Lee at last surrendered to Grant, but not because he was outmaneuvered. Rather, Lee surrendered on April 9, 1865, because his army no longer existed as an effective fighting force. Only some 26,765 Confederates furled their flags and stacked their arms at Appomattox, the hungry and exhausted shadow of an army that the Confederacy had generally maintained at well over 50,000. Grant's hard fighting had achieved the objective that eluded Lee, the destruction of the enemy army.65
然而，这场战争给联邦军造成了极其惨重的伤亡，以至于战争的结局在政治上岌岌可危：1864年，当选总统的可能不是林肯，而是一位致力于通过谈判达成和平的总统。幸运的是，并非格兰特在弗吉尼亚的消耗战，而是海军少将戴维·格拉斯哥·法拉格特在莫比尔湾、谢尔曼在亚特兰大以及菲利普·H·谢里丹少将在谢南多厄河谷取得的适时胜利，才为林肯的选情提供了必要的军事动力。格兰特与李将军旷日持久的伤亡战所带来的政治隐患——当然，除此之外，这场战争新面貌本身的残酷也不容忽视——必然促使人们寻求更为温和的取胜之道，寻求那些不会让胜利者也像战败者一样伤痕累累、伤痕累累的战略。
It had done so, however, at so high a toll in Union casualties that the outcome of the war was put at risk politically: in 1864, rather than Lincoln, a President might be elected who was committed to a negotiated peace. Not Grant's campaign of attrition in Virginia but fortunately timed victories by Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut at Mobile Bay, Sherman at Atlanta, and Major General Philip H. Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley gave the needed military impetus to Lincoln's prospects at the polling place. The political liabilities of Grant's prolonged exchange of casualties with Lee—and beyond that, of course, the simple hideousness of this new face of war—inevitably prompted a search for less terrible roads to victory, for strategies less calculated to leave the victor almost as battered and bleeding as the vanquished.
格兰特本人之所以采取消耗战策略，是因为他别无选择，只能与李将军对抗。他一直在寻找更有效的战略，以应对其他敌军指挥官——这些指挥官的反击能力不如李将军——以及那些地理范围更广、机动空间更大的战场，这些战场比弗吉尼亚战场更为广阔。他所预见的种种可能性，可以从他下达给西部副将谢尔曼的命令中窥见一斑。谢尔曼要求西部战役与巨人将军和米德将军于1864年5月初对李将军发起的进攻同时展开。米德奉命以李将军的军队为目标，而格兰特给谢尔曼的指示则有所不同。这位西部将领的任务是“进攻约翰斯顿的军队，将其击溃”；同时，他还被要求“尽可能深入敌境，尽可能地破坏他们的战争资源”。<sup> 66</sup>
Grant himself, driven to his campaign of attrition only when he found no alternative against Lee, continued the search for a more satisfactory strategy against other enemy commanders less deft in riposte than Lee and in theaters of war less geographically constricted and offering more scope for maneuver than Virginia. A hint of the possibilities that he perceived is to be found in the orders he gave his lieutenant in the West, Sherman, for the campaign there to begin simultaneously with Giant's and Meade's assaults upon Lee in the first days of May 1864. Where Meade was ordered to make Lee's army his objective, Grant's instructions to Sherman were somewhat different. The western general was “to move against Johnston's army, [and] to break it up”; but he was also “to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can upon their war resources.”66
谢尔曼的个人偏好影响了这些命令的制定，哈勒克将军的偏好可能也起到了一定作用。随着战役的推进，谢尔曼、哈勒克和格兰特共同参与了这一计划的制定。格兰特命令谢尔曼尽一切可能摧毁敌军的战争资源，而谢尔曼最终摧毁亚特兰大及其所有制造和仓储设施的计划，以及由此展开的从亚特兰大到海边，再向北穿越卡罗来纳州的著名行军。在这些行军中，谢尔曼的军队摧毁了横跨六十英里宽的敌军战地资源。随着格兰特的计划在谢尔曼的脑海中日臻完善，这些破坏性的行军也旨在瓦解南方继续战争的意志。谢尔曼蓄意恐吓佐治亚州和卡罗来纳州的人民，目的是“让老少、贫富都感受到战争的残酷，以及他们正规军的威慑力”。67谢尔曼认为，如果得不到战争资源和南方邦联人民的支持，正规军很快就会崩溃。
Sherman's own predilections helped shape these orders, and so probably did General Halleck's. As the subsequent campaign evolved, Sherman, Halleck, and Grant all contributed to building, upon the foundation of Grant's orders to Sherman to inflict all possible damage upon the enemy's war resources, the design for Sherman's eventual destruction of Atlanta with all its manufacturing and storage capacity, and beyond that the famous marches from Atlanta to the sea and then northward through the Carolinas. In these marches, Sherman's armies destroyed the enemy's war resources across a swath of territory as much as sixty miles wide. As Grant's design matured in Sherman's mind, furthermore, the destructive marches aimed also at breaking the will of the South to persist in the war. Sherman aimed deliberately at terrorizing the people of Georgia and the Carolinas, to “make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies.”67 Denied war resources and the supporting will of the Confederate population, Sherman believed, the organized armies would soon collapse.
英国对美国内战战略家的兴趣，在19世纪后期，尤其是在G.F.R.亨德森的领导下，主要集中在南方邦联身上；到了20世纪，这种兴趣转向了北方联邦的领导人，他们认为北方联邦的领导人比南方邦联的领导人更具现代性，更有可能为世界大战时代提供借鉴。J.F.C.富勒将格兰特视为一位预见并有效应对半个世纪前西线问题的将军。<sup>68</sup>与此相反，利德尔·哈特对格兰特嗤之以鼻，认为他不过是西线将领的先驱——道格拉斯·黑格爵士的原型——但他却对谢尔曼赞赏有加。谢尔曼深入敌军后方的行军，似乎是利德尔·哈特本人所推崇的间接战术的绝佳例证。谢尔曼之所以吸引人，恰恰在于他没有预见西线，而是提供了一条避免西线的战略途径。<sup> 69</sup>
British interest in the strategists of the American Civil War, focused in the late nineteenth century under the leadership of G. F. R. Henderson upon the Confederates, shifted in the twentieth century to the Union leaders, who had come to seem more modern than the Confederates, more likely to offer lessons for the era of the world wars. J. F. C. Fuller fixed upon Grant as a general who had foreseen and effectively grappled with the problems of the western front half a century in advance.68 Liddell Hart in contrast scorned Grant as all too literally a forerunner of the generals of the western front—a prototype of Sir Douglas Haig—but found in Sherman much to admire. Sherman's marches deep behind the enemy armies seemed a magnificent demonstration of Liddell Hart's own favored strategy of the indirect approach. Sherman appealed, unlike Grant, precisely because instead of anticipating the western front he offered a strategic avenue for avoiding it.69
利德尔·哈特关于谢尔曼的著述展现了他一贯的雄辩和说服力，但与其说是展现了真实的谢尔曼及其战略，不如说是展现了如果身着联邦军蓝色制服，利德尔·哈特会如何行事。对谢尔曼分析的考察表明，他本人并不认为自己的战略与格兰特的战略有太大差异。谢尔曼的进军战略不仅是在格兰特的建议和鼓励下制定的，而且在阐述其作战方法时，谢尔曼也像格兰特一样，倾向于将歼灭敌军放在首位。<sup> 70</sup>此外，谢尔曼如此安排其优先事项还有一个根本原因，而不仅仅是出于对总司令的顺从。在敌军被彻底歼灭之前，谢尔曼无法深入敌后，利用敌军的战争资源和民意。谢尔曼的进军最终启发了二十世纪的空军力量先驱，也包括利德尔·哈特，因为有了空军力量，就可以越过敌军直接打击敌方的经济和人民。而在美国内战中，首先要解决的仍然是敌军。
Liddell Hart's writings about Sherman display his usual persuasiveness and eloquence, but they tell us less about the real Sherman and his strategy than about how Liddell Hart would have liked to behave had he worn a uniform of Union blue. An examination of Sherman's analyses indicates that he himself saw little divergence between his strategy and Grant's. Not only was the strategy of Sherman's marches developed with the counsel and encouragement of Grant, but in explaining his methods of making war, Sherman like Grant tended to give first priority to disposing of the enemy armies.70 There was a decidedly fundamental reason for Sherman's thus ordering his priorities, furthermore, apart from any inclination on his part to appear appropriately deferential toward his general-in-chief. Sherman was not able to reach behind the enemy armies to the enemy's war resources and popular will until those armies were first substantially destroyed. Sherman's marches would in time help inspire the twentieth-century prophets of air power, as well as Liddell Hart, because with air power it became possible to leap over hostile armies to the enemy's economy and people. In the American Civil War, the armies still had to be dealt with first.
从查塔努加到亚特兰大的谢尔曼战役，在著名的行军开始之前，几乎就将与他对抗的敌军彻底击溃。这其中，约翰斯顿的继任者、该军统帅约翰·贝尔·胡德将军的大力协助功不可没。胡德将军在亚特兰大城外对谢尔曼的部队发动了一系列进攻，试图保住这座城市，但最终徒劳无功。亚特兰大陷落后，胡德将军决定北上田纳西州，希望引诱谢尔曼跟进，这无疑会进一步削弱谢尔曼的实力。然而，此时胡德的军队已元气大伤，谢尔曼得以派遣乔治·H·托马斯少将率领一小部分兵力返回田纳西州集结援军，等待胡德的到来。谢尔曼本人则可以向大海进发，几乎看不到任何有组织的抵抗。但他只有在直接进攻彻底削弱了最初挡在他面前的敌军之后，才能采取间接进攻的策略。
Sherman's campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta almost swept the rival army opposing him from the board before the famous marches began. It did so with considerable assistance from Johnston's successor in command of that army, General John Bell Hood, who mounted a series of assaults against Sherman's forces outside Atlanta in a vain effort to save the city. Hood offered further assistance when after the fall of Atlanta he elected to march northward into Tennessee, hoping to draw Sherman along with him. By that time, however, his army was so weakened that Sherman could counter its maneuver by sending a relatively small part of his force under Major General George H. Thomas back to Tennessee to gather reinforcements there and await Hood. Sherman himself could step off toward the sea with scarcely a shadow of organized resistance remaining before him. But he could adopt the strategy of the indirect approach only after a direct approach had decisively weakened the armed forces initially in front of him.
总而言之，谢尔曼在寻找格兰特战略的替代方案时所受到的种种限制，加上李将军的拿破仑式战略的徒劳无功，以及格兰特摧毁李将军军队的方法所付出的惨重代价，很可能会促使美国战略思想回归到早期阶段的防御导向，而内战的需求迫使美国寻求一种可行的进攻战略。
Altogether, the limitations afflicting Sherman's efforts to find an alternative to Grant's strategy, together with the futility of Lee's Napoleonic strategy and the appalling costs of Grant's method of destroying Lee's army, could well encourage a return to the defensive emphasis that had characterized the beginnings of American strategic thought before the demands of the Civil War imposed a quest for a workable offensive strategy.
V
V
这种防御导向确实回归了。对于美国陆军而言，内战后的日常现实再次变成了巡逻西部边境。他们很少从战略层面思考如何最有效地控制当地的印第安人。与其说这是一支军队的作战行动，不如说更像是一支维护印第安人和定居者之间和平的治安部队；像1876年小巨角河战役那样引人注目的正面交锋实属罕见。或许西点军校和内战后发展起来的陆军研究生院应该将更多精力投入到研究此类印第安人战争所带来的战略和战术问题上；印第安人是非传统的战士，他们的作战方式更接近于游击队而非传统的欧洲军队，但美国陆军的院校和思想家们更向往拿破仑式的欧洲战争的辉煌，而非艰苦的冲突，因此陆军始终未能建立起一套连贯的印第安战争指导原则。71
Such a defensive orientation did return. For the United States Army, the day-to-day realities of existence after the Civil War became again those of patrolling the western frontier. Little strategic thought was given to the most efficacious means of controlling the Indians there. The work was more often that of a constabulary force maintaining the peace between Indians and settlers than that of an army on campaign anyway; spectacular incidents of active warfare like the battle of the Little Big Horn in 1876 were rarities. Perhaps West Point and the postgraduate army schools that developed after the Civil War might profitably have devoted more of their study to the strategic and tactical problems posed by such active Indian warfare as occurred; the Indians were unconventional warriors whose methods more closely resembled those of guerrillas than of conventional European armies, but the American army's schools and thinkers were so much more attracted by the Napoleonic glories of European war than by grubby skirmishes that the army never created a coherent body of guiding principles for Indian war.71
然而，内战结束后，美军在思考欧式战争方面也缺乏活力和创造力。19世纪末的美军没有涌现出任何一位能与海军的阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉相提并论的战略思想家。诚然，当时缺乏足够的动力去培养这样的思想家；印第安边境枯燥乏味的日常工作缺乏吸引力，无法使美国军方的思想从对欧式战争的思考中转移开来；但边境的琐事也占据了美国士兵太多的精力，以至于无暇进行像马汉那样的大规模战略理论思考。美军陷入了进退两难的境地：它过于欧式化，无法在边境发挥应有的效率；它又过于像一支边境警察部队，无法有效地为欧式战争做好准备。
After the Civil War, however, there was not much vigor or creativity in the army's contemplation of European-style war either. The late-nineteenth-century army produced no strategic thinker remotely comparable to the navy's Alfred Thayer Mahan. To be sure, there was little stimulus to produce such a thinker; the uninspiring drudgery of duties on the Indian frontier lacked the magnetism to divert American military thought from the contemplation of European wars, but frontier chores occupied the energies of American soldiers too constantly to encourage grand-scale strategic theorizing of the A. T. Mahan variety. The American army fell between two stools, too European an army to be as efficient on the frontier as it might have been, too much a frontier constabulary to be preparing itself effectively for European-style war.
最终形成的备战策略从李、杰克逊、格兰特和谢尔曼的进攻战略转向了防御战略。这或许仅仅是因为内战中进攻性战争的尝试令人沮丧，但美国自然而然地会以防御的视角来看待与任何欧洲强国的战争前景。即使是阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉的海军著作也几乎没有暗示美国远征军有朝一日会在欧洲战场上作战。因此，美国的军事政策和战略中最古老、最持久的当属加固主要海港，以防止被两栖突袭夺取，并迫使任何来自海外的入侵者必须在开阔的海滩上登陆、增援和补给。
The preparations that did develop turned from the offensive strategies of Lee, Jackson, Grant, and Sherman to the defensive. They might well have done so out of simple discouragement with the Civil War experiments in offensive war, but it was natural, also, that the United States should have conceived of the prospects of war with any European power in defensive terms. Even the naval writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan certainly gave little hint that American expeditionary forces might someday fight on European battlefields. Attention thus returned to the oldest and most continuous of American military policies and strategies, the fortification of the major seaports to prevent their capture by an amphibious coup de main and to impose upon any invader from overseas the necessity to land, reinforce, and resupply across open beaches.
联邦军对邦联军控制下的沿海防御工事的攻击表明，线膛炮使1812年战争后建造的砖石堡垒过时了。线膛炮发射的是圆锥形而非球形炮弹，因此与早期的滑膛炮相比，其单位口径的炮弹重量更大。1862年，联邦军两栖登陆皇家港湾的首席工程师昆西·亚当斯·吉尔摩上尉摧毁了佐治亚州萨凡纳附近普拉斯基堡的几道城墙，证明了线膛炮的威力。同一次远征的海军指挥官，海军准将塞缪尔·弗朗西斯·杜邦早在1861年11月就炮轰进入了皇家港湾，证明堡垒不再像帆船时代那样对海军舰队具有优势，因为蒸汽船可以不断机动躲避炮火。72种种发展似乎需要重新设计沿海堡垒，1885-1886 年，由战争部长威廉·C·恩迪科特担任主席的防御工事或其他防御委员会投入了大量精力来完成这项任务。
Union attacks on coastal fortifications in Confederate hands had demonstrated that rifled artillery rendered obsolete the masonry forts of the post-War of 1812 building program. By firing conical rather than spherical projectiles, rifled cannons could hurl heavier missiles in relation to the diameter of their bore than could the earlier smoothbores. Captain Quincy Adams Gillmore, chief engineer of the Union's amphibious expedition into Port Royal Sound, demonstrated the consequences when he wrecked several of the walls of Fort Pulaski off Savannah, Georgia in 1862. The naval commander of the same expedition, Flag Officer Samuel Francis Du Pont, had already demonstrated when he bombarded his way into the Sound in November 1861 that forts no longer enjoyed the advantages over naval squadrons that they had had in the age of fighting sail, because steamships could maneuver continuously to evade their fire.72 This combination of developments seemed to require redesigning the coastal forts, and in 1885–1886 much labor was devoted to the task by a Board on Fortifications or Other Defenses, chaired by Secretary of War William C. Endicott.
恩迪科特委员会设想了一种以混凝土加固的土方工事为特色的新型堡垒系统。该委员会的报告是一份精美的出版物，配有许多插图，并由此催生了新一代的海岸防御体系。但到了19世纪80年代，对海岸防御的过度关注已成为美国军事活动中又一项与现实脱节的举措，因为蒸汽战舰的航程有限，这意味着强大的欧洲海军威胁远不如美国独立战争和1812年战争时期那么强烈。除了英国之外，没有哪个欧洲强国拥有足够的海上吨位将一支强大的军队运送到美国海岸，而英国可能成为敌人的时期即便尚未过去，也已迅速远去。73
The Endicott Board projected a new system of forts featuring earthworks bolstered by concrete. The report of the board is a handsome publication with many illustrative plates, and a new generation of coastal defenses followed from it. But by the 1880s the preoccupation with coastal defense was yet another American military activity not quite attuned to reality, because the limited range of steam warships meant that a formidable European naval threat was much less likely than it had been during the Revolution and the War of 1812. Nor did any European power except Great Britain possess sufficient maritime tonnage to transport a formidable army to American shores, and the time when Britain might prove an enemy was passing rapidly if it had not already passed.73
因此，无论从哪个方面来看，内战的经验都未能激发战后美国陆战战略思想的任何显著发展。1871年，丹尼斯·哈特·马汉在西点军校去世，此后该军校陷入停滞。当时陆军的主要思想家，上校兼名誉少将埃默里·厄普顿，致力于研究线膛枪火力带来的战术问题，但他并未转向战略研究，而是撰写了两本关于军事组织的著作，并执着于民主和文官统治阻碍美国成为像俾斯麦时代的德国那样强大的军事强国的种种弊端。当时的新兴军事专业期刊，特别是《美国军事学会会刊》和《联合军种》，也同样固守于战术问题，或者陷入厄普顿式的死胡同，哀叹民主政府在军事上的缺陷。新成立的研究生院旨在为军官提供西点军校毕业后的继续教育，它们同样致力于战术教学，而且教授的战术相对来说比较基础。74
In every way, therefore, the experience of the Civil War failed to inspire any impressive flowering of American strategic thought concerning land warfare in the postwar era. At West Point, Dennis Hart Mahan died in 1871, and the Military Academy lapsed into a period of stagnation. The army's principal intellectual of the era, Colonel and Brevet Major General Emory Upton, wrestled with the tactical problems posed by rifled firepower, but rather than moving into strategic studies, he wrote two books about military organization and became obsessed with the impediments that democracy and civilian control put in the way, he thought, of America's ever becoming a mighty military power on the order of Bismarckian Germany. The new professional military journals of the period, particularly The Journal of the United States Military Service Institution and The United Service, similarly clung to tactical matters or to the Uptonian dead end of deploring the military deficiencies of democratic government. Newly founded postgraduate schools intended to continue officers' education beyond West Point similarly busied themselves with tactical instruction, and with relatively elementary tactics at that.74
战后时期，美国仅有一部值得一提的战略专著，它试图结合美国的具体经验，重新审视约明的战略原则。这部著作是约翰·比格洛上尉的《战略原则：主要以美国战役为例》。除了少数几位撰写内战回忆录的作家外，几乎只有比格洛一人尝试评估内战对进攻战略的影响。由于他专注于美国案例，因此他必须找到一种方法，将谢尔曼的行军纳入经典的战略原则框架之中。
Only one American book-length study of strategy worthy of mention came out of the postwar era, an effort to review mainly Jominian principles in the light of specifically American experience. This was Captain John Bigelow's The Principles of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American Campaigns. Bigelow almost alone, except for an occasional Civil War memoirist, tried to assess the implications of the Civil War for offensive strategy. His focus on American examples obliged him to find a way to fit Sherman's marches into the classical principles of strategy.
比格洛将谢尔曼入侵佐治亚州和卡罗来纳州的行动，以及谢里丹对谢南多厄河谷的蹂躏等类似的联邦战役，还有一定程度上的海上封锁，都定义为“政治战略”。他将政治战略分为两类：一是使敌方政府成为战略目标，二是攻击敌方人民的意志。他认为谢尔曼的进军旨在削弱邦联政府保护人民的能力，从而达到这一目的。比格洛引用格兰特的话说，邦联报纸长期以来成功地向内陆民众灌输了一种固若金汤的防御印象，但当谢尔曼到来时，“当人们看到（联邦）军队凯旋而归时……民众的幻想破灭了，他们看清了真相。” 76然而，谢尔曼的进军也符合第二类特征，其目的是“将战争带到南方人民的家园”。比格罗认为，“由于共和国的文官权力优于军事权力，共和国的人民比专制政体或绝对君主制国家的人民更具决定性意义……” 77
Bigelow defined Sherman's incursions through Georgia and the Carolinas, such similar Union campaigns as Sheridan's devastation of the Shenandoah Valley, and to a degree, the naval blockade as “political strategy.” He divided political strategy into two subcategories: efforts to make the enemy's government the object of strategy, and efforts to attack the will of the enemy people. Sherman's marches he perceived as aimed at the Confederate government, in the sense of seeking to undermine confidence in its ability to protect its people.75 Bigelow quoted Grant as saying that the Confederate newspapers long managed to convey to the people of the interior an impression of impenetrable defenses, but when Sherman came, “as the [Union] army was seen marching on triumphantly,…the minds of the people became disabused, and they saw the true state of affairs.”76 Sherman's marches also fitted the second subcategory, however, aiming to bring “the war home to the Southern people.” “On account of the superiority in republics of the civil over the military power,” thought Bigelow, “the people of a republic are a more decisive objective than those of a despotism or absolute monarchy….”77
然而，尽管比格洛试图将谢尔曼的破坏性行军置于战略原则框架内，但他似乎更关注谢尔曼突破敌军补给线的能力，而非行军本身非同寻常的宏大目标。<sup> 78</sup>此外，在比格洛看来，政治战略“往往只是常规战略的一个组成部分”，<sup>79</sup>即针对敌军武装力量的传统战略——但言下之意仅仅是一个组成部分。关于谢尔曼对敌方民众继续作战意志的打击，比格洛表达了在战后胜利的喜悦中，北方很少表达的那种疑虑。在思考现代战争如何将战火蔓延至平民时，这些疑虑仍然值得我们深思：
Yet while trying to place Sherman's destructive marches within the principles of strategy, Bigelow seemed more interested in Sherman's ability to break free from his lines of communications than in the uncommonly broad objectives of the marches.78 Political strategy, furthermore, remained to Bigelow “often an incident of regular strategy,”79 the traditional strategy aimed at the enemy's armed forces—but by implication only an incident. Concerning Sherman's attacks upon the enemy people's will to persist in the war, Bigelow expressed doubts of a kind not often expressed in the North in the glow of victory following the war. The doubts remain worth considering when contemplating modern forms of carrying war to civilian populations:
打击民心的策略究竟能在多大程度上发挥积极作用，取决于诸多不确定因素。对一个能够承受一切苦难的民族施加苦难，只会使其更加怨恨，从而使军事问题更加棘手；因此，施加的苦难不足是一种残酷的错误。80
How far the idea of dispiriting a people may be advantageously carried is a function of most uncertain factors. The infliction of suffering on a people who can stand all that can be inflicted only makes the military problem more difficult by embittering them, and so the infliction of inadequate suffering is a cruel mistake.80
最后，比格罗回归了传统的战略目标：“通常来说，军事行动的首要目标应该是击败敌军，如果可能的话，俘虏或摧毁敌军。” 81
In the end, Bigelow returned to the conventional aim of strategy: “As a rule, the primary object of military operations should be to overpower, and, if possible, to capture or destroy the hostile army.”81
回到这一结论，便可证实尤利西斯·S·格兰特在1864-1865年弗吉尼亚战役中的战略思想以及格兰特本人的回忆录在美国战略思想中的主导地位。比格洛的著作主要关注约米尼式的机动，但他所依赖的美国经验却削弱了人们对这种机动足以达成战争目标的信心——即便它未能帮助格兰特战胜李将军。通过研究格兰特在荒野战役、斯波特西瓦尼亚战役、冷港战役和彼得斯堡战役中的战略，美国士兵在进入20世纪以及美国崛起为世界强国的时代之际，坚信美国能够对几乎任何对手施加的巨大军事力量，是其唯一可靠的军事保障。
To return to that conclusion was to confirm the ascendancy in American strategic thought of the Ulysses S. Grant of the Virginia campaign of 1864–1865 and of Grant's own Memoirs. Bigelow's text concerned itself for the most part with Jominian maneuver, but the American experience on which Bigelow relied for examples tended to undercut confidence that such maneuver could suffice to achieve the object of war, if it had not sufficed for Grant against Lee. Studying strategy from the Grant of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, American soldiers entered the twentieth century and the time of America's emergence into world power believing that the superior weight of military force that America could bring to bear against almost any rival could be their only sure military reliance.
由于没有有影响力的美国战略思想家提出令人信服的相反观点，正是基于格兰特在弗吉尼亚时期制定的战略塑造了美国在第一次世界大战中的军事行动。1918年，美国依靠数量和资源优势占据上风；美国对西线协约国的增援使德军面对的兵力远超其抵抗能力（如果战争持续到1919年），从而导致德军最高指挥部士气低落，并最终要求停战。第一次世界大战的经验似乎证实了格兰特战略的必然性和有效性，正如塔斯克·H·布利斯将军所言，“现代战略家在进行军事联合时受到诸多限制”，这些限制如此严重，以至于机动和奇袭几乎成为不可能。<sup> 82</sup>
With no influential American strategic thinkers presenting a persuasive contrary view, it was a strategy based on Grant's in Virginia that shaped the American military participation in the First World War. American reliance on superior numbers and resources prevailed in 1918; the American reinforcement of the Allies on the western front confronted the German army with force beyond its capacity to resist had the war continued into 1919, thereby precipitating the demoralization of the German high command and its appeal for an armistice. The First World War experience appeared to confirm the inevitability as well as the strength of a strategy derived from Grant in that, as General Tasker H. Bliss commented, “the modern strategist has many limitations upon his freedom in making military combinations,” limitations so severe that maneuver and surprise became almost impossible.82
作为盟军最高战争委员会的美国军事成员，布利斯认为，除非在战争伊始就制定出类似施利芬计划的方案，使交战一方无需正面进攻就能迅速取得胜利——而现代军队的庞大规模使得这种快速取胜的可能性微乎其微——否则接下来的战争将如同第一次世界大战一样，“与其说是对将军战略才能的考验，不如说是对士兵及其身后饱受苦难的平民的勇气和毅力的考验。”<sup> 83</sup>在他看来，第一次世界大战实际上标志着战略家时代的终结，并证实了战争新时代的到来——战争仅仅是敌对联盟组建军队和物资能力的机械较量。<sup> 84</sup>
Bliss, the American military member of the Allied Supreme War Council, believed that unless at the very outset of war a plan on the order of the Schlieffen plan brought rapid victory to one of the belligerents without the need to engage in frontal assaults—a rapid resolution that the sheer size of modern armies rendered unlikely—then the ensuing struggle would become like the First World War, “rather a test of the courage and endurance of the soldier and of the suffering civil population behind him than of the strategical skills of the general.”83 In his opinion, the First World War signified virtually the end of the age of the strategist, and the confirmation of the arrival instead of the age of war as a mere mechanical trial of the ability of rival coalitions to generate armies and matériel.84
布利斯并非孤例。第一次世界大战后，美国战略评论家反复强调，基于优势资源的政治、经济、社会和军事韧性，可能已经取代战略，成为现代战争胜利的基础。同样，在坚持格兰特式摧毁敌军的论调之下，也能听到谢尔曼式战争的暗流。1918年后，美国军方人士屡次质疑，最精妙的机动战术是否还能在战争中发挥决定性作用。海军中校（后晋升为海军上校）霍洛威·H·弗罗斯特（Holloway H. Frost）在1935年英年早逝之前，正逐渐成为继阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉之后美国最重要的海军战略作家。他指出，“我们的内战导致了另一场旷日持久的战争，在这场战争中，通过海军施加的经济压力极大地帮助了我们的野战部队赢得胜利。”<sup> 85 </sup> 弗罗斯特认为，他正是从这种力量的结合中找到了塑造现代战争的模式。第一次世界大战爆发时，他曾说过：
Bliss was far from standing alone with such views. Repeatedly, American strategic commentators after the First World War dwelt on the likelihood that political, economic, social, and military endurance based on superior resources had displaced strategy as the foundation of victory in modern war. Here, too, the undercurrent of a Sherman style of war could be heard beneath the insistence on a Grantian destruction of the enemy armed forces. Repeatedly, American military men after 1918 expressed doubt that the most skillful of maneuver could any longer serve decisively in war. Lieutenant Commander (later Commander) Holloway H. Frost of the navy, who before his premature death in 1935 was emerging as the leading American naval writer on strategy after Alfred Thayer Mahan, noted how “our Civil War resulted in another protracted struggle in which economic pressure, exerted through the Navy, greatly assisted our field armies in winning their decisions.”85 Frost believed that in this combination of forces he had found the pattern shaping modern war. By the time of the First World War, he remarked:
只有当比利时、塞尔维亚或罗马尼亚等较弱的国家遭到攻击时，才能取得纯粹的军事胜利，尽管即使在这种情况下，通常也需要杰出的领导来补充优势资源。
It was only where a lesser power, Belgium, Serbia, or Rumania, was attacked that a purely military decision could be won, although even here brilliant leadership was usually necessary to supplement superior resources.
从以上事实可以推断，当一个大国与一个小国交战时，或许仍然有可能通过摧毁敌方野战军来赢得纯粹的军事胜利；但当两个大国以大致相当的军事力量交战时，则很少能够赢得纯粹的军事胜利。86
From the above facts it may be deduced that when a great power is at war with a small power it will probably still be possible to win a purely military decision by destroying the enemy field armies: but when great nations are at war with approximately equal military forces it will seldom be possible to win a purely military decision.86
陆军上校威廉·肯尼斯·内勒在陆军战争学院向听众发表了美国最早的关于第一次世界大战后兴起的“战争原则”的简明阐述之一。与弗罗斯特相比，内勒更强调敌军仍然是战争的主要目标。但他援引南北战争的经验，承认以联邦海军封锁为代表的经济压力的重要性，并且最重要的是，他驳斥了任何认为在现代战争中依靠巧妙的战术就能取得胜利的观点。只有像格兰特那样进行艰苦卓绝的战斗，才能最终摧毁敌军。
Colonel W. K. Naylor of the army, offering to an Army War College audience one of the first American expositions of the new post-World-War-I vogue of setting forth succinct lists of the “principles of war,” placed more emphasis than Frost on the enemy's armed forces as remaining the major objective in war. But referring to the Civil War experience, he acknowledged the value of economic pressure in the form of the Union naval blockade, and most pertinently he rejected any suggestion that subtleties of maneuver could achieve victory in modern war. Only hard fighting in the manner of Grant could ultimately destroy the enemy armies.
我想强调一点：战争意味着战斗，战争永远无法通过战术行动赢得胜利，除非这种战术行动的目的是最终决战……
I wish to stress this point; that warfare means fighting and that war is never won by maneuver, not unless that maneuvering is carried out with the idea of culminating in battle….
不要抱有侥幸心理，认为只要把军队部署在对敌方至关重要的地区，敌方就会说“这有什么用”，然后求和。历史表明，摧毁一个国家战斗意志的最有效方法是击败其主力部队。所有其他旨在迫使敌人屈服的手段，都只是为了达成这一主要目标，而这一目标无论过去还是现在，始终都是击败其主力部队。87
Disabuse your mind of the idea that you can place an army in a district so vital to the enemy that he will say “What's the use” and sue for peace. History shows that the surest way to take the fighting spirit out of a country is to defeat its main army. All other means calculated to bring the enemy to his knees are contributory to the main proposition, which is now, as it ever has been, namely, the defeat of his main forces.87
在1918年后的一本标准战略教科书中，奥利弗·普雷斯科特·罗宾逊中校以更为简洁的方式阐述了这一观点：“战争意味着战斗；它只有一个目的，那就是击溃敌人，摧毁其抵抗意志。” 88
In a standard strategic textbook of the post-1918 years, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Prescott Robinson put the idea still more succinctly: “War means fighting; it has only one aim, to crush the enemy and destroy his will to resist.”88
二战初期，美国参战不久，1942年1月22日，陆军部总参谋部战争计划司副司长（负责太平洋和远东事务，不久后升任司长）就表达了同样的观点，但措辞更为简洁，并特别强调了刚刚爆发的战争：“我们必须去欧洲作战……”<sup> 89</sup>这位副司长正是德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔准将。后来，他将率领美军远征欧洲——即跨海峡入侵。这次入侵直接攻击了德国在西线最强大的地区，直面其主力，并以美国和盟军的绝对优势将其击溃，标志着格兰特战略在美国军事思想中占据主导地位的巅峰之作。
Early in the American participation in World War II, on January 22, 1942, a deputy chief of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff, charged with Pacific Ocean and Far East concerns but soon to become head of the division, stated the same idea yet more succinctly, and with special reference to the war just commencing: “We've got to go to Europe and fight….”89 The deputy chief was Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower. In time he would lead the journey to Europe to fight—the cross-Channel invasion that, by directly assailing Germany where it was strongest in the West, confronting its main power and overwhelming it with superior American and Allied power, was the culminating event of the ascendancy of the strategy of Grant in American military thought.
但谢尔曼及其破坏性进军的影响暗流依然存在；虽然格兰特式的战略指向了霸王行动和 1944-1945 年横跨欧洲的大战，但对谢尔曼的记忆却导致了对德国和日本的战略轰炸，并最终导致了广岛和长崎的毁灭。
But the undercurrent of the influence of Sherman and his destructive marches also persisted; and while a Grant-style strategy pointed toward Operation Overlord and the great campaign of 1944–1945 across Europe, the memory of Sherman led toward the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan and eventually to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
1这种关于美国人战争态度起源的观点很大程度上借鉴了约翰·W·夏伊的《美国军事经验：历史与学习》，载于《跨学科历史杂志》第1卷（1971年冬季），第205-228页；后重印于约翰·W·夏伊的《人数众多且武装的人民》（纽约，1976年），第225-254页。弗朗西斯·帕克曼的《北美洲的法国和英国》（共9卷，其中第8卷《庞蒂亚克阴谋史》，波士顿和伦敦，1851年；其余各卷，波士顿，1865-1892年；后来有许多版本，卷数不一）仍然是研究美国军事史的基础，也是一部符合宏大文学传统的历史叙事作品。
1 This view of the beginnings of American attitudes toward war draws heavily on John W. Shy, “The American Military Experience: History and Learning,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1 (Winter 1971), 205–28; repr. in John W. Shy, A People Numerous and Armed (New York, 1976), 225–54. Francis Parkman, France and England in North America, 9 vols. (vol. 8, The History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac, Boston and London, 1851; remaining vols., Boston, 1865–92; many later editions exist with varying numbers of volumes) remains a foundation for study of the American military past as well as a historical narrative in the grand literary tradition.
2 Emerich de Vattel，《万国法》（莱顿，1758 年）；Charles G. Fenwick 译为《万国法》（华盛顿特区，1916 年）。
2 Emerich de Vattel, Le droit des gens…(Leyden, 1758); trans. Charles G. Fenwick as The Law of Nations (Washington, D.C., 1916).
3 Reginald C. Stuart，《战争与美国思想：从革命到门罗主义》（俄亥俄州肯特，1982 年），第 9 页。关于正义战争原则的现代解释，参见 Michael Walzer，《正义战争与非正义战争：以历史例证论证的道德论证》（纽约，1977 年）。
3 Reginald C. Stuart, War and American Thought: From the Revolution to the Monroe Doctrine (Kent, Ohio, 1982), 9. For a modern explication of the principles of the just war, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York, 1977).
4 Stuart，《战争与美国思想》，第 9-35 页。关于美国革命，参见 Charles Royster，《战争中的革命人民：大陆军与美国性格，1775-1783》（教堂山，1979 年），尤其是第 1 章。
4 Stuart, War and American Thought, 9–35. For the American Revolution, see Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783 (Chapel Hill, 1979), esp. ch. 1.
5 John W. Shy，“查尔斯·李：激进的士兵”，载于乔治·阿坦·比利亚斯编《乔治·华盛顿的将军们》（纽约，1964 年），第 22-53 页；略作修订后重印于 Shy，《人数众多且武装的人民》，第 133-162 页。
5 John W. Shy, “Charles Lee: The Soldier as Radical,” in George Washington's Generals, ed. George Athan Billias (New York, 1964), 22–53; repr. slightly revised, in Shy, A People Numerous and Armed, 133–62.
6参见我本人的著作《美国战争之道：美国军事战略与政策史》，载《麦克米伦战争史》（纽约和伦敦，1973年），第2章；以及《游击战：1780-1782年南卡罗来纳战役》，三百周年纪念册第2号（南卡罗来纳州哥伦比亚，1970年）。前者第2章评述了伯戈因的战役以及南方战役。关于南方战役的其他现代解读，参见西奥多·塞耶的《纳撒尼尔·格林：美国革命的战略家》（纽约，1960年），第282-430页，以及马丁·F·特雷西的《约克镇前奏：纳撒尼尔·格林的南方战役，1780-1781》（教堂山，1968年）。
6 See my own The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, The Macmillan Wars of the United States (New York and London, 1973), ch. 2; and The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780–1782, Tricentennial Booklet no. 2 (Columbia, S.C., 1970). Chapter 2 of the former comments on Burgoyne's campaign as well as the campaign in the South. For other modern interpretations of the Southern campaign, see Theodore Thayer, Nathanael Greene: Strategist of the American Revolution (New York, 1960), 282–430, and Martin F. Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown: The Southern Campaign of Nathanael Greene, 1780–1781 (Chapel Hill, 1968).
7关于第二次塞米诺尔战争，参见约翰·K·马洪，《第二次塞米诺尔战争史，1835-1842》（盖恩斯维尔，1967 年）和弗朗西斯·保罗·普鲁查，《共和国之剑：美国陆军在边境，1783-1846》，《美国麦克米伦战争》（纽约和伦敦，1968 年），第 14 章。关于菲律宾起义，参见约翰·摩根·盖茨，《教科书与克拉格：美国陆军在菲律宾，1898-1902》，《军事史文集》第 3 号（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特和伦敦，1973 年）和拉塞尔·罗斯，《泥泞的荣耀：美国在菲律宾的印第安战争，1899-1935》（马萨诸塞州西汉诺威，1981 年）。
7 On the Second Seminole War, see John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 1835–1842 (Gainesville, 1967) and Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783–1846, The Macmillan Wars of the United States (New York and London, 1968), ch. 14. On the Filipino Insurrection, see John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902, Contributions in Military History, no. 3 (Westport, Conn., and London, 1973) and Russell Roth, Muddy Glory: America's Indian Wars in the Philippines, 1899–1935 (West Hanover, Mass., 1981).
8华盛顿致国会主席，1776 年 9 月 8 日，载于《乔治·华盛顿著作集（原始手稿来源）1745–1799》，约翰·C·菲茨帕特里克编，39 卷（华盛顿特区，1931–44 年），第 6 卷，第 28 页。关于将华盛顿描绘成一位更大胆的战略家的解释，请参见戴夫·理查德·帕尔默，《狐狸之道：美国在美利坚战争中的战略，1775–1783 年》，军事史文集，第 8 号（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特和伦敦，1975 年）。
8 Washington to the President of Congress, Sept. 8, 1776, in The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1931–44), 6:28. For an interpretation portraying Washington as a more daring strategist, see Dave Richard Palmer, The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America, 1775–1783, Contributions in Military History, no. 8 (Westport, Conn., and London, 1975).
9关于华盛顿1783年5月2日的《关于建立和平的感言》，参见菲茨杰拉德，《华盛顿文集》，第26卷，第374-398页。关于华盛顿革命后军事政策的详细内容，参见道格拉斯·索撒尔·弗里曼，《乔治·华盛顿传》，7卷（纽约，1948-1957年），第6卷和第7卷。关于杰斐逊和西点军校的创立，参见西奥多·J·克拉克尔，《西点军校的创立：杰斐逊与安全政治》，《武装部队与社会：跨学科期刊》第7期（1981年夏季），第529-543页。关于汉斯·德尔布吕克关于消耗战战略的论述，参见他的《伯里克利战略被腓特烈大帝的战略所取代》（柏林，1890年），第27页。
9 For Washington's “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” May 2, 1783, see Fitzgerald, Writings of Washington, 26:374–98. On Washington's post-Revolutionary military policies in detail, see Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 7 vols. (New York, 1948–57), vols. 6 and 7. On Jefferson and the founding of West Point, see Theodore J. Crackel, “The Founding of West Point: Jefferson and the Politics of Security,” Armed Forces and Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal 7 (Summer 1981), 529–43. For Hans Delbrück on a strategy of attrition, see his Die Strategie des Perikles erlautert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin, 1890), 27.
10威廉姆斯引自斯蒂芬·E·安布罗斯，《责任、荣誉、国家：西点军校史》（巴尔的摩，1966年），第34页。克拉克尔在《西点军校的创立》一文中，从结束联邦党在军队中的主导地位的角度解读了杰斐逊的动机；另见同一作者的《杰斐逊、政治与军队：对1802年军事和平建立法案的考察》，载《早期共和国杂志》第2卷（1982年4月），第21-38页。关于西尔瓦努斯·塞耶担任校长的记载有很多；参见安布罗斯，《责任、荣誉、国家》，第4页。
10 Williams quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore, 1966), 34. Crackel, “The Founding of West Point,” interprets Jefferson's motivation in terms of ending Federalist predominance in the army; see also the same author's “Jefferson, Politics, and the Army: An Examination of the Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802,” Journal of the Early Republic 2 (April 1982), 21–38. There are numerous accounts of Sylvanus Thayer as superintendent; see Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, 4.
11 Thomas E. Griess，“丹尼斯·哈特·马汉：西点军校教授和军事专业主义倡导者，1830–1871”（杜克大学博士论文，1969 年）。
11 Thomas E. Griess, “Dennis Hart Mahan: West Point Professor and Advocate of Military Professionalism, 1830–1871” (Ph.D. diss. Duke University, 1969).
12西蒙·弗朗索瓦·盖伊·德·弗农，《战争与防御科学论著……附大战术与作战原则与格言概要》，2卷（纽约，1817年）。约米尼的摘录见第2卷第385-490页。
12 Simon François Gay de Vernon, A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification…to which Is Added a Summary of the Principles and Maxims of Grand Tactics and Operations, 2 vols. (New York, 1817). The excerpt from Jomini appears in 2:385–490.
13丹尼斯·哈特·马汉，《部队先锋队、前哨队和分遣队勤务入门》（纽约，1847 年；修订版，纽约，1864 年）。
13 Dennis Hart Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops…(New York, 1847; rev. ed. New York, 1864).
14野战工事详尽论著……（纽约，1836 年）；土木工程入门教程……（纽约，1837 年）；永久工事及永久工事攻防概要……（西点，1850 年）；工业制图……（纽约，1852 年）；描述几何学在工事制图和立体切割中的应用……（纽约，1864 年）；军事工程入门教程……，2 卷（纽约，1866-67 年）。
14 Notably Complete Treatise on Field Fortification…(New York, 1836); Elementary Course of Civil Engineering…(New York, 1837); Summary of the Course of Permanent Fortification and of the Attack and Defence of Permanent Works…(West Point, 1850); Industrial Drawing…(New York, 1852); Descriptive Geometry as Applied to the Drawing of Fortification and Stereotomy…(New York, 1864); An Elementary Course of Military Engineering…, 2 vols. (New York, 1866–67).
15塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿，《士兵与国家：文官与军事关系的理论与政治》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1957 年），第 195-203 页，第 246-253 页。
15 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 195–203, 246–53.
16李在 1825 年至 1829 年间是一名学员。
16 Lee was a cadet from 1825 to 1829.
17威廉·T·谢尔曼，《威廉·T·谢尔曼将军自传》，2 卷（纽约，1875 年；布卢明顿，1957 年重印，2 卷），第 2 卷，第 396 页。
17 William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman by Himself, 2 vols. (New York, 1875; repr., 2 vols. in Bloomington, 1957), 2:396.
18 DH Mahan，《基础论著》，修订版，185-96。
18 D. H. Mahan, Elementary Treatise, rev. ed., 185–96.
19同上，第 30 页。
19 Ibid., 30.
20同上，第 190、199 页。
20 Ibid., 190, 199.
21 Henry Wager Halleck，《军事艺术与科学要素》（纽约，1846 年；第 3 版，附《墨西哥战争和克里米亚战争评论》，纽约和伦敦，1862 年）。所有引文均出自第三版。
21 Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science…(New York, 1846; 3d ed., With Critical Notes on the Mexican and Crimean Wars, New York and London, 1862). All citations are to the third edition.
22有关工程方面的重点，请参阅 Ambrose 的《责任、荣誉、国家》，第 87-105 页。有关最高级别毕业生的地位，请参阅 George W. Cullum 的《美国军事学院军官和毕业生传记名录》，3 卷（波士顿，1891 年），例如，第 1 卷，第 631 页。
22 For the engineering emphasis, see Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, 87–105 For the status of the highest-ranking graduates, see George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, 3 vols. (Boston, 1891), e.g., 1:631.
23 拿破仑传，作者：Jomini男爵……，HW Halleck译，4卷（纽约和伦敦，1864年）。
23 Life of Napoleon by Baron Jomini…, trans. H. W. Halleck, 4 vols. (New York and London, 1864).
24哈勒克，《军事艺术与科学要素》，尤其是第 7 章，第 155-209 页，以及关于战争初期美国军队的弱点，第 144-154 页。
24 Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science, esp. ch. 7, pp. 155–209, and on the weakness of American forces at the beginning of a war, pp. 144–54.
25同上，第59页。托马斯·劳伦斯·康纳利和阿彻·琼斯，《指挥政治：邦联战略中的派系与思想》（巴吞鲁日，1973年），第27页，引起了我对这一点的注意。他们在第27-28页、第30页、第104页和第176页讨论了查理大公对美国的影响。参见查理大公，《战略原理》，修订版（布鲁塞尔，1840年）。
25 Ibid., 59. Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones, The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy (Baton Rouge, 1973), 27, called my attention to this point. They discuss the American influence of the Archduke Charles on pp. 27–28, 30, 104, and 176. See the Archduke Charles, Principes de la stratégie,…rev. ed. (Brussels, 1840).
26 Halleck，《军事艺术与科学要素》，74。
26 Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science, 74.
27 Connelly 和 Jones，《指挥政治》，第 28-29 页脚注。
27 Connelly and Jones, The Politics of Command, 28–29n.
28 Halleck，《军事艺术与科学要素》，77。
28 Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science, 77.
29理查德·德拉菲尔德，《 1854、1855 和 1856 年欧洲战争艺术报告》（华盛顿特区，1860 年）；阿尔弗雷德·莫迪凯，《 1855 年和 1856 年赴欧洲军事委员会：报告》（华盛顿特区，1861 年）；乔治·B·麦克莱伦，《欧洲军队》（费城，1861 年）。
29 Richard Delafield, Report on the Art of War in Europe in 1854, 1855, and 1856 (Washington, D.C., 1860); Alfred Mordecai, Military Commission to Europe in 1855 and 1856: Report (Washington, D.C., 1861); George B. McClellan, The Armies of Europe (Philadelphia, 1861).
30道格拉斯·索撒尔·弗里曼，《R.E.李传》，4卷（纽约，1934年），第2卷，第86页。
30 Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: A Biography, 4 vols. (New York, 1934), 2:86.
31 Jay Luvaas，《内战的军事遗产：欧洲的遗产》（芝加哥、伦敦和多伦多，1959 年），尤其是第 29-30、46、54、64、66、68-70、73-74、131、132、140、149-50 页。
31 Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance (Chicago, London, and Toronto, 1959), esp. pp. 29–30, 46, 54, 64, 66, 68–70, 73–74, 131, 132, 140, 149–50.
32马克·梅奥·博特纳三世，《内战词典》（纽约，1959 年），第 858 页；肯尼斯·P·威廉姆斯，《林肯找到一位将军：内战军事研究》，5 卷（纽约，1950-59 年），第 1 卷，第 115 页。
32 Mark Mayo Boatner III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York, 1959), 858; Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War, 5 vols. (New York, 1950–59), 1:115.
33关于步枪对南北战争战术的影响，可参见 Stephen E. Ambrose，《厄普顿与军队》（巴吞鲁日，1964 年），第 28-34 页、第 56-60 页；Alfred F. Becke，《战术史导论》（伦敦，1909 年），第 57-108 页；Bruce Catton，《林肯先生的军队》（纽约州花园城，1951 年），第 191-199 页；John K. Mahon，“南北战争步兵突击战术”，《军事事务》25（1961 年秋季），第 57-68 页。Grady McWhiney 和 Perry D. Jamieson 合著的《进攻与死亡：南北战争军事战术与南方传统》（阿拉巴马大学，1982 年）一书基于当时的战术手册，对此进行了精彩本书将扎实的战术史与一个非常可疑的论点（即正是凯尔特人的传承导致南方邦联军队不断进攻）穿插在一起，但这不应该吓退学生。
33 Among many discussions of the impact of the rifle on Civil War tactics, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge, 1964), 28–34, 56–60; Alfred F. Becke, An Introduction to the History of Tactics (London, 1909), 57–108; Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army (Garden City, N.Y., 1951), 191–99; John K. Mahon, “Civil War Infantry Assault Tactics,” Military Affairs 25 (Fall 1961), 57–68. An excellent discussion based on the tactical manuals of the time is in Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (University, Ala., 1982); the student should not be put off by this volume's interspersing of its sound tactical history with its highly dubious thesis that it was their Celtic inheritance that caused the Confederate armies to be consistently on the attack.
34 Prucha，《共和国之剑》和 Robert M. Utley，《蓝衣边疆人：美国陆军与印第安人，1848-1865》，《美国麦克米伦战争》（纽约和伦敦，1967 年）对内战前的军队和印第安边疆进行了最好的论述。
34 Prucha, Sword of the Republic and Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848–1865, The Macmillan Wars of the United States (New York and London, 1967) deal best with the pre-Civil War army and the Indian frontier.
35有关麦克莱伦的正面评价，请参阅小沃伦·W·哈斯勒所著《乔治·B·麦克莱伦将军：联邦之盾》（巴吞鲁日，1957 年）。
35 For a favorable assessment of McClellan, see Warren W. Hassler, Jr., General George B. McClellan: Shield of the Union (Baton Rouge, 1957).
36乔治·F·R·亨德森，《石墙杰克逊与美国内战》，2卷（纽约和伦敦，1898年）。
36 George F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, 2 vols. (New York and London, 1898).
37同上，1:55。
37 Ibid., 1:55.
38同上。
38 Ibid.
39同上，1:56。
39 Ibid., 1:56.
40关于李将军的经历以及他战略思想发展至今的情况，请参阅弗里曼的《李将军》，尤其是第 2:30-40 页。
40 For Lee's experiences and the development of his strategic thought to this point, see Freeman, Lee, esp. 2:30–40.
41李将军于1863年6月8日和11月4日向杰斐逊·戴维斯总统发表了上述声明，这些声明阐述了他从内华达河谷战役开始的战略基础。《叛乱战争：联邦和邦联军队官方记录汇编》，4辑，70卷（华盛顿特区，1880-1901年），第一辑，第27卷，第3部分，第868页；同上，第29卷，第2部分，第819页。以下简称“OR”；所有引文均出自第一辑。
41 Lee made these statements June 8 and November 4, 1863, both to President Jefferson Davis, but they express the basis of his strategy from the Valley campaign onward. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 4 series, 70 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, p. 868; ibid., vol. 29, pt. 2, p. 819. Hereafter cited as O.R.; all citations are of Series One.
42同上，第 12 卷，第 3 部分，第 865 页。
42 Ibid., vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 865.
43 Henderson, Jackson , 2:131, 397。
43 Henderson, Jackson, 2:131, 397.
44 1863 年 3 月 30 日的报告， OR，第 11 卷，第 2 部分，497。
44 Report dated March 30, 1863, O.R., vol. 11, pt. 2, 497.
45亨德森，杰克逊，1:43。
45 Henderson, Jackson, 1:43.
46 Freeman, Lee , 1:352–58。
46 Freeman, Lee, 1:352–58.
47同上，3:398，摘自詹姆斯·威廉·琼斯，《罗伯特·E·李将军的个人回忆录、轶事和信件》（纽约，1874 年），40。
47 Ibid., 3:398, from James William Jones, Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes, and Letters of Gen. Robert E. Lee (New York, 1874), 40.
48参见《俄勒冈史》第19卷第2部分第627页，其中记载了李将军在安提耶坦战役撤退后，表达了再次北上马里兰州的愿望。另见弗里曼著《李将军》，第2卷第425页。
48 See O.R., vol. 19, pt. 2, p. 627, for Lee's expression of his desire to march north into Maryland again immediately after his retreat from Antietam. See also Freeman, Lee, 2:425.
49合格指挥官短缺的问题是道格拉斯·索撒尔·弗里曼在其著作《李将军的副官：指挥研究》（共3卷，纽约，1942-44年）中探讨的主题；参见第1卷第十七页。然而，弗里曼并没有正面面对李将军自身对这一问题的贡献，他采取的战略消耗了大量军官和士兵，而南方邦联却无力承担。
49 The problem of the scarcity of qualified commanders is the theme of Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command, 3 vols. (New York, 1942–44); see 1:xvii. Yet Freeman did not face squarely the issue of Lee's own contribution to his problem through a strategy that expended officers as well as troops at a rate the Confederacy could not afford.
50请参阅我在《美国战争方式》第 74-76 页中的总结。
50 See my summary in The American Way of War, 74–76.
51 Freeman, Lee，2:230，借鉴了 Edward Porter Alexander 的计算，《南方邦联军官的军事回忆录：批判性叙述》（纽约，1907 年），171。
51 Freeman, Lee, 2:230, drawing on the calculations of Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative (New York, 1907), 171.
52 Thomas L. Livermore，《美国内战中的数字和损失》（波士顿和纽约，1901 年），第 88-89 页、第 92-94 页、第 96 页。
52 Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America (Boston and New York, 1901), 88–89, 92–94, 96.
53 Boatner，《内战词典》，140。
53 Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 140.
54利弗莫尔，《数字与损失》，103。
54 Livermore, Numbers and Losses, 103.
55 William F. Fox，《美国内战中的团级损失，1861-1865 年》（奥尔巴尼，1898 年），第 24 页。
55 William F. Fox, Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, 1861–1865…(Albany, 1898), 24.
56 Henderson, Jackson , 1:124，未给出引用。
56 Henderson, Jackson, 1:124, no citation given.
57利弗莫尔，《数字与损失》，88-89。
57 Livermore, Numbers and Losses, 88–89.
58 Boatner，《内战词典》，140。Fletcher Pratt，《烈火考验：内战非正式史》，修订版（纽约：1948 年）称其关于 Chancellorsville 的第 25 章为“绝对杰作”。
58 Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 140. Fletcher Pratt, Ordeal by Fire: An Informal History of the Civil War, rev. ed. (New York: 1948) calls its chapter 25 on Chancellorsville, “The Absolute Masterpiece.”
59赫尔曼·哈塔韦和阿彻·琼斯合著的《北方如何取胜：美国内战军事史》（厄巴纳、芝加哥和伦敦，1983年）对哈勒克进行了精彩的重新评价，并对内战战略进行了富有启发性的探讨。例如，关于哈勒克作为战略家的论述以及他对后勤的特别关注，请参见第54-57页、76-77页、143-150页、205-212页、285-289页和513-515页。
59 An excellent reappraisal of Halleck together with a stimulating discussion of Civil War strategy in general is to be found in Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1983). See for example pp. 54–57, 76–77, 143–50, 205–12, 285–89, and 513–15 on Halleck as a strategist and on his special concern with logistics.
60尤利西斯·S·格兰特，《尤利西斯· S·格兰特个人回忆录》，2 卷（纽约，1885-86 年），第 1 卷，第 154、164-66 页。
60 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant…, 2 vols. (New York, 1885–86), 1:154, 164–66.
61 Boatner，《内战词典》，871–77，关于战役的概述；Grant，《回忆录》，1:325–28，377，关于邦联的损失和投降；JFC Fuller，《格兰特与李：性格与统帅能力研究》，内战百年纪念系列（布卢明顿和伦敦，1957 年），183，关于联邦的伤亡。
61 Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 871–77, for summary of the campaign; Grant, Memoirs, 1:325–28, 377, for Confederate losses and surrenders; J. F. C. Fuller, Grant & Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship, Civil War Centennial Series (Bloomington and London, 1957), 183, for Union casualties.
62 Grant，《回忆录》，第 1 卷：154、164-166 页。
62 Grant, Memoirs, 1: 154, 164–66.
63 1864年4月9日，同上，2:135n； OR，33:828。例如，格兰特在他的回忆录中写道：“夺取李将军的军队是首要目标。一旦俘获他的军队，攻占里士满就指日可待了”（格兰特，《回忆录》，2:141）。“5月3日至4日午夜过后不久，波托马克军团从拉皮丹河北岸的阵地出发，开始了那场意义非凡的战役，这场战役最终攻占了邦联首都及其守军”（同上，2:177）。格兰特在指示谢尔曼向约翰斯顿的军队发起进攻时，并没有使用“摧毁”一词，而是说：“我建议你向约翰斯顿的军队发起进攻，将其击溃……”（1864 年 4 月 4 日，同上，第 131 页脚注； OR，第 32 卷，第 3 部分，第 246 页）。
63 April 9, 1864, ibid., 2:135n; O.R., 33:828. For example, Grant said in his Memoirs: “To get possession of Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily follow” (Grant, Memoirs, 2:141). “Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from its position north of the Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the army defending it” (ibid., 2:177). Rather than using the word “destroy” when instructing Sherman to move against Johnston's army, Grant said: “You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up…” (April 4, 1864, ibid., 131n; O.R., vol. 32, pt. 3, p. 246).
64 Grant，《回忆录》，第 2 卷：177-178 页。
64 Grant, Memoirs, 2:177–78.
65 Boatner，《内战词典》，第22页。
65 Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 22.
66 1864 年 4 月 4 日，格兰特回忆录，2:131n； OR，第 32 卷，第 3 部分，第 246 页。
66 April 4, 1864, Grant, Memoirs, 2:131n; O.R., vol. 32, pt. 3, p. 246.
67 1864年12月24日，谢尔曼，《回忆录》，第2卷，第227页。关于谢尔曼、格兰特和哈勒克三人之间谢尔曼战略思想的发展，参见，例如，谢尔曼致哈勒克，1864年9月20日，同上，第117-118页；哈勒克致谢尔曼，1864年9月28日，同上，第128-129页；谢尔曼致格兰特，1864年10月9日，同上，第152页，以及1864年10月11日，同上，第153-154页；格兰特致谢尔曼，1864年11月1日，同上，第164页；谢尔曼致格兰特，1864年11月2日，同上，第165页；格兰特致谢尔曼，1864年11月3日，同上，第166页。
67 Dec. 24, 1864, Sherman, Memoirs, 2:227. For the development of the ideas for Sherman's strategy among Sherman, Grant, and Halleck, see, e.g., Sherman to Halleck, September 20, 1864, ibid., 117–18; Halleck to Sherman, September 28, 1864, ibid., 128–29; Sherman to Grant, October 9, 1864, ibid., 152, and October 11, 1864, ibid., 153–54; Grant to Sherman, November 1, 1864, ibid., 164; Sherman to Grant, November 2, 1864, ibid., 165; Grant to Sherman, November 3, 1864, ibid., 166.
68 Fuller、 Grant 和 Lee（原版于 1933 年在伦敦出版），以及同一作者的《尤利西斯·S·格兰特将军的生涯》（纽约，1929 年）。
68 Fuller, Grant & Lee (orig. pub. London, 1933), and the same author's The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (New York, 1929).
69 Basil H. Liddell Hart，《谢尔曼：士兵、现实主义者、美国人》（纽约，1929 年）。另见对谢尔曼的赞扬但对格兰特的批评颇多的分析，《哈特的战略》，第二版修订版（纽约，1967 年），第 149-154 页。
69 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American (New York, 1929). See also, for an analysis praising Sherman but highly critical of Grant, Hart's Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (New York, 1967), 149–54.
例如，谢尔曼在谈到他从查塔努加向亚特兰大进军的战役时说：“亚特兰大、奥古斯塔和萨凡纳都不是目标，而是‘约瑟夫·约翰斯顿的军队’，它想去哪儿就去哪儿”（谢尔曼，《回忆录》，2:26）。在与格兰特讨论向大海进军的计划时，谢尔曼坚持认为，他之所以能够考虑这个计划，仅仅是因为敌对的南方邦联军队不够强大，不足以威胁到谢尔曼打算留下的部队（1864年11月2日，同上，164-65页）。
70 E.g., Sherman said of his campaign from Chattanooga toward Atlanta: “Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah, was the objective, but the ‘army of Jos. Johnston,’ go where it might” (Sherman, Memoirs, 2:26). And in discussing with Grant the plan for the march to the sea, Sherman insisted that he could contemplate it only because the rival Confederate army was not strong enough to endanger the force Sherman intended to leave behind (Nov. 2, 1864, ibid., 164–65).
71 Robert M. Utley 在《边疆正规军：美国陆军与印第安人，1866-1891 年，美国麦克米伦战争》（纽约和伦敦，1975 年）第 44-58 页以及《边疆对美国军事传统的贡献》一文中对此进行了很好的阐述，该文收录于《边疆上的美国军队：第七届军事史研讨会论文集，美国空军学院， 1976 年 9 月30 日至 10 月 1 日》，James P. Tate 编辑（华盛顿特区，1978 年）第 3-13 页。
71 Robert M. Utley develops this point well in Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891, The Macmillan Wars of the United States (New York and London, 1975), 44–58, and in “The Contribution of the Frontier to the American Military Tradition,” in The American Military on the Frontier: The Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy 30 September-1 October 1976, ed. James P. Tate (Washington, D.C., 1978), 3–13.
72 John D. Hayes 编，《塞缪尔·弗朗西斯·杜邦：内战书信选集》，3 卷（伊萨卡，1969 年），1:lxix-lxxi，301–302，304–308；2:33。关于普拉斯基堡的炮击，参见 Ralston B. Lattimore，《佐治亚州普拉斯基堡国家纪念碑》，国家公园管理局历史手册系列第 18 号（华盛顿特区，1954 年），尤其是第 23–36 页。
72 John D. Hayes, ed., Samuel Francis Du Pont: A Selection from His Civil War Letters, 3 vols. (Ithaca, 1969), 1:lxix-lxxi, 301–302, 304–308; 2:33. On the bombardment of Fort Pulaski, see Ralston B. Lattimore, Fort Pulaski National Monument, Georgia, National Park Service Historical Handbook Series no. 18 (Washington, D.C., 1954), esp. pp. 23–36.
73 《 关于防御工事或其他防御措施的委员会报告……》，第49届国会第1会期，众议院行政文件，第28卷，第49号（序列号2395、2396）；该报告已重印为《 1885年防御工事委员会报告及随附计划》，美国众议院（纽约，1979年），收录于《美国军事经验》系列丛书，顾问编辑为理查德·H·科恩。陆军总司令菲利普·H·谢里丹将军在1884年《陆军部长报告》中评论说，海外势力几乎不可能发动严重的攻击。 49，引自约翰·比格洛，《战略原则：主要以美国战役为例》，西点军校图书馆（纽约，1968 年；费城，1894 年第二版修订增补本的重印本），第 35 页。
73 Report of the Board on Fortifications or Other Defenses…, 49th Cong. 1st sess., House Exec. Doc., vol. 28, no. 49 (serial 2395, 2396); this report has been reprinted as Report of the Board on Fortifications, 1885 and Plans to Accompany the Report, U.S. House of Representatives (New York, 1979) in The American Military Experience series, Richard H. Kohn, advisory editor. General Philip H. Sheridan as commanding general of the army commented on the near impossibility of a serious attack by an overseas power in Report of the Secretary of War, 1884, p. 49, quoted in John Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American Campaigns, The West Point Military Library (New York, 1968; repr. of 2d ed., rev. and enl., Philadelphia, 1894), 35.
74参见埃默里·厄普顿的《亚洲和欧洲的军队》（纽约，1878 年）和《美国的军事政策》（华盛顿特区，1904 年）。拉塞尔·F·韦格利在其著作《迈向美国军队：从华盛顿到马歇尔的军事思想》（纽约，1962 年）第 137-161 页中详细探讨了厄普顿的影响，尤其是在世纪之交的专业军事期刊中所体现的影响。
74 See Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York, 1878) and The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1904). The influence of Upton, particularly as reflected in the professional military journals around the turn of the century, is examined at length in Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York, 1962), 137–61.
75 Bigelow，《战略原理》，第 224-33 页，尤其是第 225 页关于谢尔曼进军的内容。
75 Bigelow, Principles of Strategy, 224–33, esp. p. 225 on Sherman's marches.
76同上，第 225 页。
76 Ibid., 225.
77同上，第 228 页。
77 Ibid., 228.
78同上，144-47；谢尔曼的行军在第 10 章“独立于基地的作战”中进行了讨论，第 132-51 页。
78 Ibid., 144–47; Sherman's marches are here considered within chapter 10, “Operations Independently of a Base,” pp. 132–51.
79同上，第 223 页。
79 Ibid., 223.
80同上，第 232 页。
80 Ibid., 232.
81同上，第 263 页。
81 Ibid., 263.
82 Tasker H. Bliss，《关于第一次世界大战战略的文章草稿》，1923 年 1 月[?]，第 1 页，Bliss 文稿，国会图书馆，第 274 盒。
82 Tasker H. Bliss, draft of an article on the strategy of World War I, January 1923[?], p. 1, Bliss Papers, Library of Congress, Box 274.
83同上，第 16 页。
83 Ibid., 16.
84同上，尤其是第 1-2 页、15-16 页。
84 Ibid., esp. pp. 1–2, 15–16.
85海军中校霍洛威·H·弗罗斯特，《国家战略》，美国海军学会会刊51（1925 年 8 月），1348。关于弗罗斯特的职业生涯，请参阅霍洛威·H·弗罗斯特所著《日德兰海战》 （安纳波利斯和伦敦，1936 年）中的“他的服役记录简述”
85 Lt. Comdr. Holloway H. Frost, “National Strategy,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 51 (August 1925), 1348. For Frost's career, see “A Brief Transcript of His Service Record” in Holloway H. Frost, The Battle of Jutland (Annapolis and London, 1936), v-vi.
86弗罗斯特，《国家战略》，1351-1352。
86 Frost, “National Strategy,” 1351–1352.
87步兵上校 WK Naylor，“战争原则”，陆军战争学院第 12 号指挥课程，1922 年，第 1 部分，1922 年 1 月 5 日，第 6 页，副本在国会图书馆 Bliss 文集中，第 277 盒。
87 Col. W. K. Naylor, Inf., “The Principles of War,” Command Course no. 12, Army War College, 1922, pt. 1, January 5, 1922, p. 6, copy in Bliss Papers, Library of Congress, Box 277.
88奥利弗·普雷斯科特·罗宾逊，《军事战略基础》（华盛顿特区，1928 年），第 16 页。
88 Oliver Prescott Robinson, The Fundamentals of Military Strategy (Washington, D.C., 1928), 16.
89 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. 编，《德怀特·戴维·艾森豪威尔文集：战争年代》，5 卷（巴尔的摩和伦敦，1970 年），第 1 卷第 73 页；“注释”，1942 年 1 月 22 日。
89 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, 5 vols. (Baltimore and London, 1970), 1:73; “Notes,” January 22, 1942.
16. 阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉：海军历史学家
16. Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian
W亨利·L·史汀生在回忆其担任陆军部长（1940-1945）的华盛顿岁月时，懊悔地写道：“海军部独特的心理状态，似乎常常脱离逻辑的范畴，遁入一个昏暗的宗教世界，在那里，海王星是上帝，马汉是他的先知，而美国海军则是唯一真正的教会。” ¹史汀生在文中提到的那位“先知”当时已去世三十年。他成年后的大部分时间都在美国海军服役，担任军官，并于1896年以海军上校军衔退役。直到五十岁之后，他才从默默无闻的海军生涯中脱颖而出，成为享誉国际的历史学家、战略家、帝国主义者和海军学家，与各国总统、首相甚至欧洲皇室成员交往甚密，其名声在世界各地的海军界都备受尊崇。这是一个关于文字力量的非凡故事。
WRITING OF his years in Washington as secretary of war (1940–1945), Henry L. Stimson ruefully recalled “the peculiar psychology of the Navy Department, which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church.”1 The “prophet” alluded to in Stimson's left-handed tribute had then been in his grave for thirty years. He had spent most of his adult life on active duty as a commissioned officer in the United States Navy, retiring as a captain in 1896. Only after the age of fifty did he emerge from the obscurity of an undistinguished naval career to achieve international renown as a historian, strategist, imperialist, and navalist, rubbing shoulders with presidents, prime ministers, and even European royalty, his name venerated in naval circles the world over. His is a remarkable story of the power of the written word.
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阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉于1840年9月27日出生于纽约州西点军校。他的父亲丹尼斯·哈特·马汉是西点军校的教务长兼土木与军事工程教授。老马汉著有两部军事经典著作：《野战工事》和《战术的兴起与发展入门》，并亲自负责数百名学员的军事训练，这些学员后来在南北战争中指挥过联邦军和邦联军。他的主要著作和教学来源是瑞士战略家安托万-亨利·德·若米尼男爵，但没有证据表明他曾将这些知识传授给他的长子，而这位长子日后将成为美国最杰出的若米尼学派学者。事实上，他几乎没有机会这样做，因为12岁时，阿尔弗雷德就被送往马里兰州黑格斯敦的圣詹姆斯学校寄宿，并于1854年进入纽约市的哥伦比亚学院就读。他在叔叔米洛·马汉（Milo Mahan）的家中住了两年。米洛·马汉是总神学院的教会史教授。这位盎格鲁天主教圣公会牧师、教会历史学家和基督教命理学家，直到1870年去世，一直担任他侄子的精神导师，并深刻影响了后者的宗教信仰，尤其是他对历史的看法，即历史是神圣秩序的体现。
Alfred Thayer Mahan was born on September 27, 1840, at West Point, New York, where his father, Dennis Hart Mahan, was dean of the faculty and professor of civil and military engineering at the United States Military Academy. The elder Mahan was the author of two minor military classics, Field Fortifications and An Elementary Treatise on…the Rise and Progress of Tactics, and was personally responsible for the military indoctrination of hundreds of cadets who would command both Union and Confederate troops in the Civil War. The major source of his writings and teachings was the Swiss strategist, Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, though there is no evidence that he imparted any of this learning to his eldest son who would one day become America's most eminent Jominian. Indeed, there would have been scant opportunity to do so, for at the age of twelve, Alfred was sent off to board at St. James School in Hagerstown, Maryland, and, in 1854, enrolled in Columbia College in New York City, where he lived for two years in the home of his uncle, Milo Mahan, professor of ecclesiastical history at General Theological Seminary. Until his death in 1870, this Anglo-Catholic Episcopal clergyman, church historian, and Christian numerologist served as his nephew's spiritual advisor and was to influence the latter's religious convictions profoundly, especially his view of history as the manifestation of a divinely ordered plan.2
在哥伦比亚大学学习两年后，年轻的马汉不顾父亲的劝阻，进入位于马里兰州安纳波利斯的美国海军学院。三年后，即1859年，他以班级第二名的成绩毕业。他在同僚中树敌多于交友，从此开始了孤独的海军生涯，在这个极其重视社交和战友情谊的职业中，他显得孤僻而孤僻。然而，安纳波利斯却给了他第一次与帆船结缘的快乐体验——随着海军舰艇从帆船转向蒸汽动力，这种船型很快就消失了。在描述他作为海军学员乘坐三桅方帆船“普利茅斯”号巡游的经历时，他写道：“在强劲的微风中，当船身倾斜得很厉害时，有一种我从未体验过的奇妙的快感。” 3二十六年后，在海军当时最先进的蒸汽动力巡洋舰“芝加哥”号上，他抱怨道：“我竟然忘了船是多么可怕的东西，也忘了经常待在船上的人是多么愚蠢。” 4后来，当他开始撰写海军史时，马汉早年对大型方帆船的喜爱，激发并影响了他对帆船时代海军战术的深入研究。同样，他对年轻时驾驶的那些烟雾弥漫、噪音震耳、笨重不堪的燃煤战舰的厌恶，也让他总是乐于逃避海上任务，转而从事在岸上写作书籍和文章这种更为惬意的工作。
After two years at Columbia, the young Mahan, against his father's advice, entered the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, and three years later, in 1859, was graduated second in his class. He made more enemies than friends among his fellow midshipmen, and thus began a lonely career as a Navy misfit, an aloof and solitary figure in a profession that laid much stress on socialization and camaraderie. Annapolis, however, gave him his first joyful experience with sailing ships—a type soon to disappear with the conversion of naval vessels from sail to steam. Of his midshipman cruise aboard USS Plymouth, a three-masted square-rigged frigate, he wrote: “In a stiff breeze when the ship is heeling well over there is a wild sort of delight that I never experienced before.”3 Twenty-six years later, aboard the Navy's most up-to-date steam-powered cruiser, USS Chicago, he would complain: “I had forgotten what a beastly thing a ship is, and what a fool a man is who frequents one.”4 Later, when he turned his hand to writing naval history, Mahan's early affection for the great square-rigged vessels of his youth would inspire and inform his loving treatment of naval tactics in the age of sail. Likewise, his aversion to the smoky, noisy, unwieldy coal-burners of his manhood made him ever ready to avoid sea duty for the more congenial task of writing books and articles ashore.
毕业两年后，南北战争爆发。对马汉而言，战争期间他大多只能在南方邦联沿海进行一些平淡无奇的巡逻。期间，他曾在海军学院（当时暂时调往罗德岛州纽波特）担任航海教官，短暂地受斯蒂芬·B·卢斯指挥。卢斯后来成为马汉的导师和守护天使。战争结束时，马汉26岁，已晋升为海军中校——这是一个难以轻易放弃的军衔。因此，尽管心存疑虑，他还是留在了海军。在接下来的20年里，他晋升为海军少校，先后在海军造船厂、海军学院（此时已迁回安纳波利斯）以及亚洲舰队和南美洲西海岸的舰艇上服役。在秘鲁附近指挥破旧的单螺旋桨纵帆船“瓦楚塞特”号（USS Wachusett）时，马汉收到了卢斯（时任准将）的邀请，加入即将由卢斯在纽波特建立的海军战争学院的教职队伍。马汉获得这一职位的主要资格是他撰写了一本关于美国内战海军史的小册子《墨西哥湾和内陆水域》（The Gulf and Inland Waters），该书于前一年出版。1884年9月4日，马汉思乡心切，厌倦了海上生活，回复道：“是的，我愿意去。” 当时的他不可能知道自己只是卢斯的第三人选。⁵
Two years after graduation came the Civil War, which for Mahan meant mostly uneventful patrols off the Confederate coasts. An interlude as instructor in seamanship at the Naval Academy (temporarily removed to Newport, Rhode Island) put him briefly under the command of Stephen B. Luce, later to become his mentor and guardian angel. At the war's end, Mahan was twenty-six years old and a lieutenant commander—a rank too high to be lightly given up. So, despite misgivings, he stayed in the Navy, and for the next twenty years, by which time he had achieved the rank of commander, he served in navy yards, on the staff of the Naval Academy (now back in Annapolis), and aboard ship on the Asiatic Station and off the west coast of South America. It was while in command of the decrepit, single-screw, schooner-rigged, steam sloop USS Wachusett off Peru that he received from Luce, now Commodore, an invitation to join the faculty of the Naval War College, soon to be established under Luce's command, at Newport. Mahan's major qualification for the position was his authorship of a short book on Civil War naval history, The Gulf and Inland Waters, published the previous year. He could not have known that he was Luce's third choice for the job when, homesick and sea-weary, he replied on September 4, 1884, “Yes—I should like to come.”5
在“瓦楚塞特”号上经历了漫长的等待后，这位初出茅庐的历史学家在纽约市的图书馆里度过了一个冬天，潜心钻研，终于在1886年夏天抵达纽波特报到。在那里，他发现卢斯已被命令重返海上，而他自己，这位新晋升的上校，将同时担任海军历史与战略讲师和美国海军战争学院院长。这成为他人生中的重大转折点。战争学院将成为他开启海军历史学家、战略家、宣传家以及举世闻名的“海权布道者”生涯的跳板。
After an agonizing delay aboard Wachusett, followed by a winter of intense study at libraries in New York City, the novice historian reported for duty at Newport in the summer of x886. There he discovered that Luce had been ordered back to sea, and that he, a newly promoted captain, was to be both lecturer in naval history and strategy and president of the United States Naval War College. It was the major turning point in his life. The War College was to be the launching pad for a new career as naval historian, strategist, publicist, and world-recognized “evangelist of sea power.”6
当他接管这座由救济院改建而成的世界第一所海军战争学院时，这位新校长发现学院空空荡荡，只有几张借来的桌椅和一幅特拉法加海战的地图——这是他最喜欢的海战发生地。第一届学员由八名海军中尉组成，第二年增加到二十名——他们都被派往纽波特接受两到三个月的培训，其中大多数人是被迫的。马汉教授海军历史和战略（主要以英国海军为主）；他那精干的教员团队则负责教授陆军战术和战略、国际法、后勤、海军炮术和战术、加勒比海的战略意义以及海军卫生。然而，这位新校长的大部分精力都耗费在了四处搜寻设备、筹集煤炭资金以及抵御官僚机构的压力上，这些压力迫使学院与附近的海军鱼雷站合并，或迁往安纳波利斯，甚至彻底解散。与此同时，他还在努力将最初的讲稿整理成书。这项努力最终在1890年得到了回报，《海权对历史的影响，1660-1783》一书得以出版。但在此之前，作者险些被航海局勒令重返海上服役。“海军军官的职责并非写书，”航海局局长弗朗西斯·M·拉姆齐准将曾这样说道——这句老生常谈在后来的岁月里饱受嘲讽，但马汉本人却认为它“无可辩驳”，因为“轮到我上海服役了”。8 海军内部对这所学院的反对声浪很高——这未必是出于马汉所怀疑的对他的个人敌意，也并非完全出于官僚主义的愚钝。在科技日新月异的时代，许多海军军官认为诸如纳尔逊勋爵在特拉法加海战中的战略部署之类的历史事件都是过时的无关紧要之事。在这些人看来，马汉对历史的重视是反动的，更糟糕的是，是不切实际的。他的回答是，对于一名海军军官来说，没有什么比通过研究历史来“制定能够最大程度发挥战争优势的原则和方法”更实用的了。9
When he took over the former almshouse that had become home to the world's first naval war college, the new president found the quarters bare except for a scattering of borrowed desks and chairs and a wall chart of Trafalgar—scene of his favorite naval battle. The first class consisted of eight naval lieutenants, the following year's of twenty—all assigned to Newport for two or three months' schooling, mostly against their will. Mahan lectured on naval history and strategy (chiefly British); his tiny staff gave instruction in army tactics and strategy, international law, logistics, naval gunnery and tactics, the strategic significance of the Caribbean, and naval hygiene.7 Much of the new president's energy was spent, however, in foraging for equipment, finding money to pay for coal, and fending off bureaucratic pressures to consolidate the college with the nearby Naval Torpedo Station, or move it to Annapolis, or abolish it altogether. Meanwhile, he was trying to organize his first lectures into book form. The effort paid off with the publication in 1890 of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, but not before the author had narrowly escaped orders from the Bureau of Navigation to return to sea duty. “It is not the business of a naval officer to write books,” said the bureau's chief, Commodore Francis M. Ramsay—a truism much ridiculed in later years, but which Mahan himself found “doubtless unassailable” as “my turn for sea service had come.”8 Opposition to the college was strong within the navy—not necessarily because of personal animus against Mahan, as he suspected, or of sheer bureaucratic obtuseness. In an era of rapidly changing technology, many naval officers considered such matters as Lord Nelson's maneuvers at Trafalgar to be archaic irrelevancies. To such as these Mahan's emphasis on history was reactionary, and still worse, impractical. His response was that nothing could be more practical for a naval officer than “the formulation of the principles and methods by which war may be carried on to the best advantage” through the study of history.9
至少在当时，这个问题似乎对马汉有利。他曾两度担任海军战争学院院长（1886-1889年和1892-1893年），在他离开前往指挥“芝加哥”号巡洋舰时，他在纽波特的教学体系已经相当成熟——甚至在他不在的时候，他的讲稿会被朗读给每一届新学员听。这种奇特的做法引起了拉姆齐准将的不满，他评论说，尽管他完全认可马汉上校著作的价值，“但派军官……（到海军战争学院）去听别人朗读他们的书，这似乎非常愚蠢。”<sup> 10</sup>拉姆齐的冷漠态度在英国却截然不同，《海权对历史的影响，1660-1783 》一书在英国一经出版便广受好评。1893年7月下旬，马汉率领“芝加哥”号抵达南安普顿港，踏上岸后，他发现自己已成为当之无愧的焦点人物。随后，在第二年该舰返回英国时，他受到了维多利亚女王、来访的孙子德皇威廉二世、威尔士亲王（后来的爱德华七世）、首相罗斯伯里勋爵、罗斯柴尔德男爵以及皇家海军俱乐部的热情款待——他是第一位获此殊荣的外国人。牛津大学和剑桥大学在同一周内分别授予他荣誉学位；《泰晤士报》更是称他为“新哥白尼”。英国人自然对一位美国作家如此盛赞英国崛起为帝国感到欣喜，而随着马汉的第二部著作《海权对法国大革命和帝国的影响，1793-1812》于1892年出版，他们更是欣喜不已。海军史学家约翰·诺克斯·劳顿在评价这部两卷本著作时写道，它“从头到尾都是对英国勇气、英国毅力、英国技艺和英国实力的辉煌颂扬”。11随着“不列颠治世”时代的落幕，英国开始出现自我怀疑，这样的赞美之词无疑抚慰了当时的英国。
For the time being, at least, the issue was resolved in favor of Mahan. He served two terms as president of the Naval War College (1886–1889 and 1892–1893) and by the time he left to take command of USS Chicago, his course of instruction at Newport was well established—even to the extent that in his absence his lectures were read aloud to each new class. This curious practice provoked Commodore Ramsay to remark that, although he fully appreciated the value of Captain Mahan's books, “it seems very foolish to send officers…[to the Naval War College] to have them read to them.”10 Ramsay's lack of enthusiasm was not shared in Great Britain, where The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 had received instant acclaim. When Mahan brought Chicago into Southampton in late July 1893 he stepped ashore to find himself the lion of the season. Then, and on the ship's return visit the following year, he was entertained by Queen Victoria; her visiting grandson, Kaiser Wilhelm II; the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VII); Prime Minister, Lord Rosebery; Baron Rothschild; and the Royal Navy Club—the first foreigner to be so honored. Oxford and Cambridge universities awarded him honorary degrees, each in the same week; and the Times of London proclaimed him to be “the new Copernicus.” The British were, of course, gratified that an American author had so fulsomely applauded their country's rise to imperial grandeur, and were to be even more so with the appearance in 1892 of Mahan's second book, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812. Of this two-volume work, the naval historian John Knox Laughton wrote that it was “throughout a splendid apotheosis of English courage and English endurance, of English skill, and of English power.”11 Such flattery was balm indeed to a nation already beginning to suffer self-doubt as the era of Pax Britannica was drawing to a close.
回到美国后，马汉于1895年和1896年在海军战争学院任教，同年他从现役退役。如今他几乎可以全身心投入写作，其作品数量庞大，并因此获得了丰厚的报酬。他的作品总计二十部专著和137篇文章，后者通常是应《大西洋月刊》、《论坛》、《北美评论》和《世纪杂志》等期刊编辑之邀而作。其中最重要的几篇后来以专著形式再版。其他出版物包括五部海军史、两部布尔战争史、三部传记、一部自传和一部基督教灵修小册子。与此同时，赞誉纷至沓来。他先后获得了哈佛大学（1896年）、耶鲁大学（1897年）、哥伦比亚大学（1900年）、麦吉尔大学（1909年）和达特茅斯学院（1903年）的荣誉学位。 1902年，美国历史学会选举他为会长。他的成就也得到了官方的认可。1898年美西战争爆发时，马汉被从意大利的旅行中召回，加入新成立的海军战争委员会，该委员会旨在为海军部长和总统提供战略建议。1899年，他被任命为美国代表团在第一次海牙和会上的顾问。据代表团主席安德鲁·D·怀特称，他的观点起到了“极佳的提神作用”，防止了“任何陷入感伤主义的倾向”。<sup> 12</sup>
Back in the United States, Mahan lectured at the Naval War College in 1895 and again in 1896, in which year he retired from active service. Now he could devote almost full time to his writings, which proved to be voluminous, and for which he was well remunerated. The total corpus of his work comes to twenty books and 137 articles, the latter usually written at the request of the editors of such journals as the Atlantic Monthly, Forum, North American Review, and Century Magazine. Of these, the most important were republished in book form. The other publications included five naval histories, two histories of the Boer War, three biographical studies, one autobiography, and one Christian devotional tract. All the while kudos poured in. Honorary degrees came from Harvard (1896), Yale (1897), Columbia (1900), and McGill (1909) universities, and from Dartmouth College (1903). The American Historical Association elected him its president in 1902. Nor was official recognition lacking. When war with Spain broke out in 1898, Mahan was recalled from an Italian junket to serve on the Naval War Board, newly created to provide strategic advice to the secretary of the navy and the President. In 1899 he was appointed advisor to the American delegation at the first Hague Peace Conference. There, according to the delegation's chairman, Andrew D. White, his views served as “an excellent tonic,” preventing “any lapse into sentimentality.”12
此后，尽管他声名鹊起，却鲜少有人邀请他重返公共服务领域。一位老朋友，西奥多·罗斯福总统，任命他加入几个委员会，以推动海军部的重组，但这些努力最终都无果而终。1906年，国会通过一项法案，将所有参加过南北战争的退役海军上校晋升为退役海军少将。马汉接受了晋升，但保留了“上校”的笔名。第一次世界大战爆发后，他立即投身于支持英国的事业。然而，1914年8月6日，根据伍德罗·威尔逊总统的命令，所有现役和退役军官都被要求不得就战争发表任何公开评论。马汉就此向海军部长约瑟夫斯·丹尼尔斯提出异议：“就我个人而言，我已七十四岁高龄，却发现自己在这样一个时刻被噤声，而我近三十五年的专业经验……本可以为公众服务。” 13但这毫无用处。即使是世界上最杰出的海军历史学家和战略家，也无法例外。三个半月后，1914年12月1日，他在华盛顿海军医院因心脏衰竭去世。
Thereafter, in spite of his growing fame, few calls came for renewed public service. An old friend, President Theodore Roosevelt, appointed him to several committees to promote the reorganization of the Navy Department, but nothing came of the endeavor. In 1906 an Act of Congress advanced all retired navy captains who had served in the Civil War to the rank of rear admiral on the retired list. Mahan accepted the promotion, but kept the title “Captain” as his nom de plume. With the outbreak of World War I, he at once applied his busy pen in the cause of Britain. On August 6, 1914, however, by order of President Woodrow Wilson, all officers, active or retired, were directed to refrain from any public comment on the war. To Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Mahan objected: “Personally, at the age of seventy-four, I find myself silenced at a moment when the particular pursuits of nearly thirty-five years…might be utilized for the public.”13 It was of no use. There was to be no exception to the rule, even for the world's most distinguished naval historian and strategist. Three and a half months later, on December i, 1914, he died of heart failure at the Naval Hospital in Washington.
二
II
马汉作为历史学家的声誉主要建立在他的两部著作之上：《海权对历史的影响，1660-1783》和《海权对法国大革命和帝国的影响，1793-1812》，分别出版于1890年和1892年。这两部著作共计超过1300页，主要论述了1660年至1812年间英国的海军史，仅略微省略了1784年至1793年的内容。叙述主要围绕与荷兰、西班牙、丹麦以及主要是法国的海战展开；引发这些海战的政治事件；以及这些海战的政治、经济和军事后果。尽管这些著作最初是为海军战争学院准备的讲稿，但有证据表明，马汉从一开始就希望将它们出版成书。<sup> 14 </sup>
Mahan's reputation as a historian rests chiefly on his two books, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812, published in 1890 and 1892, respectively. Together they come to more than 1,300 pages, devoted chiefly to the naval history of Britain from 1660 through 1812, with the minor omission of the years 1784–1793. The narrative consists mostly of sea battles fought against Dutch, Spanish, Danish, and chiefly French adversaries; the political events leading thereto; and the political, economic, and military consequences thereof. Though these works originated as lectures to be delivered at the Naval War College, there is evidence that Mahan hoped from the beginning to have them published in book form.14
海军军官学习海事史的最初想法源于卢斯准将，他是海军战争学院的首任院长。虽然他1884年写给马汉的邀请信已遗失，但我们可以从他前一年发表在《美国海军学会会刊》上的文章中推断出这封信的内容。卢斯在信中指出，应该引导海军军官“对海事史进行哲学研究，使他们能够以专业批判的冷静眼光审视世界历史上的重大海战，并能辨别哪些战役体现了海事史的原理，哪些战役因无视既定的战争规则而导致失败和灾难。” 15后来，在对陆军学院学生的开学致辞中，卢斯进一步阐述道：“如今，海军史拥有丰富的素材，足以建立一门科学……毫无疑问，过去的海战提供了大量的史实，足以形成各种规律或原则，一旦这些规律或原则确立，就能通过比较法将海战提升到一门科学的水平。” 16对卢斯而言，“比较法”意味着在陆战和海战之间、在军事和海军“科学”之间、以及在过去和现在之间进行类比。简而言之，他寻求的是一个可用的历史：历史应该以基本原则的形式传授经验教训。
The original idea of instructing naval officers in maritime history came from Commodore Luce in his capacity as the first president of the Naval War College. Though missing, the contents of his 1884 letter of invitation to Mahan can be inferred from his article printed in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings the previous year. In it Luce asserted that the naval officer should be “led into a philosophic study of naval history, that he may be enabled to examine the great naval battles of the world with the cold eye of professional criticism, and to recognize where the principles of the science have been illustrated, or where a disregard for the accepted rules of the art of war has led to defeat and disaster.”15 Later, in his opening address to the War College students, Luce would elaborate: “Now naval history abounds in materials whereon to erect a science…there is no question that the naval battles of the past furnish a mass of facts amply sufficient for the formulation of laws or principles which, once established, would raise maritime war to the level of a science…by the comparative method.”16 The “comparative method” to Luce meant drawing analogies between land warfare and war at sea, between military and naval “science,” and between past and present. He sought, in short, a usable past: history should teach lessons in the form of fundamental principles.
这就是马汉接到的命令，也是他同意在海军战争学院任教时所接受的限制。他对这门学科的了解仅限于对约翰·洛思罗普·莫特利、利奥波德·冯·兰克、弗朗索瓦·皮埃尔·纪尧姆·基佐和罗伯特·康奈尔斯·纳皮尔等人的著作的随意阅读。1884年秋天，当他的军舰停靠在卡亚俄港时，他造访了利马的英国俱乐部，并在俱乐部的图书馆里找到了一本西奥多·蒙森的《罗马史》。他仔细研读了这本书，后来写道：“我突然意识到……如果汉尼拔是从海上入侵意大利，或者他抵达后能够与迦太基保持水路畅通，那情况该有多么不同啊。” <sup>17</sup>这就是帝国兴衰的关键：对海洋的控制权，或者缺乏对海洋的控制权。回到纽约后，这位从水手转型为学者的学者深入研究了其他一些参考文献：乔治·奥古斯都·艾略特爵士、约翰·蒙塔古·伯戈因爵士和查尔斯·埃金斯爵士撰写的皇家海军史；皇家联合军种研究所期刊；伦纳德·L·拉佩鲁斯·邦菲尔斯的《法国海军史》；以及亨利·马丁的三卷本《法国通俗史：从第一次革命到现在》。<sup> 18</sup>最后，在1886年1月下旬，也就是他的系列讲座开始前六个月，他转向了若米尼男爵。<sup> 19</sup>他从若米尼男爵那里学到了“极少数”可以类比应用于海战的陆战原则。<sup> 20</sup>但据马汉回忆，他的主要灵感并非来自上述任何一种来源。在“瓦楚塞特”号上服役期间，他的“内心深处”突然闪现出一个念头：“控制海洋是一个历史因素，但从未得到系统的认识和阐述。”他宣称：“一旦有意识地形成这个想法，它就成为我未来二十年所有写作的核心……这并非我受任何人的启发。” 21
Such were Mahan's marching orders and such were the constraints that he accepted on agreeing to teach at the Naval War College. His own knowledge of the subject had been derived from a casual reading of the works of John Lothrop Motley, Leopold von Ranke, François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, and Robert Cornells Napier. While his ship was in Callao harbor in the autumn of 1884, he visited the English club in Lima to find in its library a copy of Theodor Mommsen's The History of Rome. Perusing it, he later wrote: “It suddenly struck me…how different things might have been could Hannibal have invaded Italy by sea…or could he, after arrival, have been in free communication with Carthage by water.”17 Here was the clue to the rise and fall of empires: control of the sea or lack of it. Back home in New York City, the sailor-turned-scholar delved into other secondary works: Royal Navy histories by Sir George Augustus Elliot, Sir John Montague Burgoyne, and Sir Charles Ekins; the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution; Leonard L. La Peyrouse Bonfils's Histoire de la Marine Française; and Henri Martin's three-volume A Popular History of France from the First Revolution to the Present Time.18 Finally, in late January 1886, six months before his lecture series was to begin, he turned to Baron Jomini.19 From him he learned “the few, very few” principles of land warfare applicable by analogy to war at sea.20 But to none of these sources, according to Mahan's own recollection, did he owe his major inspiration. While still serving aboard Wachusett, a light had dawned on his “inner consciousness,” and “from within” had come the suggestion that “control of the sea was an historic factor which had never been systematically appreciated and expounded.” “Once formulated consciously,” he declared, “this thought became the nucleus of all my writing for twenty years to come…. I owed it to no other man.”21
正如马汉在其第一本“影响力”著作的引言中所述，他的目标是评估“海权对历史进程和国家繁荣的影响”。<sup>22</sup>他声称自己创造了“海权”一词，以便，正如他后来所写，能够“引起人们的注意”。<sup> 23</sup>可惜的是，他并未对“海权”一词进行任何精确的定义。纵观其著作，该词主要有两种含义：(1) 通过海军优势控制海洋；(2) 海上贸易、海外领地以及进入外国市场的特权，这些因素共同造就了国家的“财富和强大”。这两个概念当然有所重叠。马汉在阐述第一种含义时，会写道：“那种在海上拥有绝对优势的力量，能够将敌国的旗帜驱逐出境，或使其只能以逃亡者的姿态出现。” 他对第二种含义的表述则更为简洁：“(1) 生产；(2) 航运；(3) 殖民地和市场——总之，就是海权。” 24然而，读者常常会疑惑，作者在特定情况下究竟指的是哪种含义，或者两者兼而有之。但从另一个角度来看，虔诚的基督徒马汉会把“这种奇妙而神秘的力量”描述为“一个复杂的有机体，拥有自身的生命，接收并传递着无数的冲动，在千条相互交织、无限灵活的暗流中流动”。对于这种力量背后的力量，作者毫不怀疑：它是“一种个人意志的展现，贯穿所有时间，其目的深思熟虑且循序渐进，最终指向尚未可知的结局”，但在过去，“它朝着一个目标发展——英国的海上霸权” 。25
Mahan's object was, as he put it in the introduction to his first “Influence” book, to estimate “the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations.”22 The term “sea power” he claimed to have invented himself, in order, so he later wrote, “to compel attention.”23 Unfortunately, he neglected to define it to any degree of precision. As the term appears throughout his works, two principal meanings emerge: (I) command of the sea through naval superiority; and (2) that combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces national “wealth and greatness.” The two concepts are, of course, overlapping. With the first in mind, Mahan would write of “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive.” His second meaning was more succinctly stated: “(1) Production; (2) Shipping; (3) Colonies and Markets—in a word, sea power.”24 The reader, however, is frequently left in doubt as to which meaning, if not both, the author has in mind in any given instance. But in still another sense, Mahan, the committed Christian, would write of “this wonderful and mysterious Power” as “a complex organism, endued with a life of its own, receiving and imparting countless impulses, moving in a thousand currents which twine in and around one another in infinite flexibility.” Of the power behind that power there was no doubt in the author's mind: it was “the exhibition of a Personal Will, acting through all time, with purpose deliberate and consecutive, to ends not yet discerned,” but in the past “tending toward one end—the maritime predominance of Great Britain.”25
因此，马汉的两部主要著作都以“英国的海上优势”为主题，而英国正是海上力量运作的典范。其核心论点很简单：从1688年到拿破仑战败，在法英两国旷日持久的对抗中，海上霸权（或缺乏海上霸权）决定了战争的最终结果。例如，在奥格斯堡同盟战争（1688-1697）中，路易十四未能为被废黜的英国国王詹姆斯二世入侵爱尔兰提供足够的海上支持，再加上“法国强大舰队逐渐从海洋中消失”，最终导致了对法国极为不利的里斯维克和约。26西班牙王位继承战争（1703-1713）虽然主要由欧洲大陆的军队进行，但最终却主要以英国的胜利告终。英国“为这场欧洲大陆战争支付了费用，甚至还派兵支持，但与此同时，英国也在扩建海军，加强、拓展和保护其商业，夺取海上据点——总之，英国在对手海上力量的废墟上建立并壮大了自己的海上力量。” 27同样，在七年战争（1756-1763）中，海上力量也决定了战争的结局，虽然并非直接决定，“而是间接决定……首先，英国凭借其雄厚的财富和信誉向腓特烈大帝提供了补贴……其次，英国对法国殖民地和本土沿海地区的攻击，摧毁了法国的商业，迫使法国不得不向海军投入巨资，这给法国造成了极大的困扰。” 28至于美国独立战争，其在约克镇的“胜利结束”归功于对海洋的控制——即“法国掌握了海上力量”，从而挫败了英国皇家海军解救康沃利斯勋爵的行动。29
The “maritime predominance of Great Britain,” the supreme example of sea power at work, is the subject, then, of Mahan's two major works. Their central theme is simple: in every phase of the prolonged contest between France and England, from 1688 to the fall of Napoleon, command of the sea by naval domination, or lack of it, determined the outcome. Thus, in the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–1697), Louis XIV's failure to provide adequate naval support to the ousted English King James II's invasion of Ireland, coupled with the “gradual disappearance from the ocean of the great French fleets,” led to the Peace of Ryswick which “was most disadvantageous to France.”26 The War of the Spanish Succession (1703–1713), though waged mainly by armies on the continent of Europe, ended chiefly to the benefit of England, who had “paid for that continental war and even backed it with her troops, but who meanwhile was building up her navy, strengthening, extending, and protecting her commerce, seizing maritime positions,—in a word, founding and rearing her sea power upon the ruins of that of her rivals.”27 Again, in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) sea power dictated the outcome, not directly, “but indirectly…by the subsidies which the abundant wealth and credit of England enabled her to give Frederick [the Great]…and, second, in the embarrassment caused to France by the attacks of England upon her colonies and her own sea-coast, in the destruction of her commerce, and in the money…which France was forced to bestow on her navy.”28 As to the American War of Independence, its “successful ending” at Yorktown was due to the control of the sea—to “sea power in the hands of France,” foiling, as it had, the Royal Navy's relief of Lord Cornwallis.29
海权在军事和经济层面上的最终胜利，便是拿破仑的战败。马汉在此展现了他雄辩的才华。早在纳尔逊勋爵于特拉法加海战（1805年10月19日）取得著名胜利之前，当拿破仑在布洛涅集结远征军，准备对英国发动两栖登陆时，英国海军“远在天边、饱经风暴摧残的战舰，大军从未关注过它们，却横亘在它与世界霸权之间”。特拉法加海战之后，正是海权——“对法国要害施加的无声压力”——切断了法国的资源，摧毁了它，“如同堡垒被封锁而陷落”。具体而言，根据马汉的说法，正是通过海上封锁对法国的经济扼杀，迫使拿破仑采取报复措施，禁止英国的货物和船只进入欧洲港口。而这一“大陆封锁体系”反过来又给欧洲带来了如此巨大的苦难，以至于沙皇亚历山大一世被迫开放港口，公然违抗法国皇帝的命令，法国皇帝随即进军俄国——最终导致了他的覆灭。“英国政治家们确保国家胜利的，并非是通过在陆地上发动大规模军事行动，而是通过控制海洋，进而控制欧洲以外的世界。”<sup> 30</sup>
The final triumph of sea power, both in the military and economic sense, was the defeat of Napoleon. Here Mahan achieved the height of his not inconsiderable eloquence. Even before Lord Nelson's famous victory at Trafalgar (October 19,1805), while Bonaparte was assembling an expeditionary force at Boulogne for an amphibious descent on England, the British navy's “far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world.” After Trafalgar, it was sea power, “that noiseless pressure upon the vitals of France,” that cut off French resources and destroyed it, “as a fortress falls by blockade.” Specifically, according to Mahan, it was the economic strangulation of France by naval blockade that forced Napoleon to retaliate by barring English goods and ships from European ports; and this “Continental System” in turn caused such privations in Europe as to persuade Czar Alexander I to open his ports in defiance of the French emperor, who thereupon marched into Russia—and so to his downfall. “It was not by attempting great military operations on land, but by controlling the sea, and through the sea the world outside Europe,” that English statesmen “ensured the triumph of their country.”30
后世历史学家对这种分析提出了诸多批评，主要理由是其过于简化而忽略了某些重要因素。首先，有人认为，马汉关于海权对历史影响的一般理论无法解释俄罗斯、奥匈帝国、奥斯曼帝国统治下的土耳其以及俾斯麦统治下的德国等明显非海上帝国的崛起。然而，更有力的论点是，要解释英国在1688年至1815年间战胜法国的原因，除了海军优势之外，还必须考虑许多其他因素。制海权固然至关重要，但英国及其盟国在欧洲大陆的军事行动同样不可或缺。此外，英国政治家通过组织和维持其欧洲大陆邻国之间的敌对联盟，操纵力量平衡以对抗法国，其外交上的成功也发挥了重要作用。
Later generations of historians have found considerable fault with this analysis, chiefly on the grounds of oversimplification by omission.31 First, it is argued, Mahan's general theories about the influence of sea power on history do not account for the rise of such obviously nonmaritime empires as Russia, Austro-Hungary, Turkey under the Ottomans, and Germany under Bismarck. More telling, however, is the contention that many factors other than naval superiority must be taken into account to explain Britain's victories over France in the period from 1688 to 1815. Mastery of the seas was no doubt critical, but so were the military (army) operations of England and its allies on the European continent. So too were the diplomatic successes of British statesmen in manipulating the balance of power against France by organizing and sustaining hostile coalitions among its Continental neighbors.
例如，在奥格斯堡同盟战争中，英国派遣了一支规模庞大的军队渡过英吉利海峡，并资助了规模更大的荷兰和德国军队，以至于“正是法国在欧洲大陆长期消耗兵力，才迫使路易十四在1697年媾和。”<sup> 32</sup>在西班牙王位继承战争中，马尔伯勒公爵和萨伏依的欧根亲王的陆上战役胜利是决定战争结果的重要因素。同样，腓特烈大帝的军事才能也不能简单地归因于英国凭借海上霸权带来的巨额利润而提供的资助。杰拉尔德·S·格雷厄姆也指出，“没有任何证据表明（英国皇家海军）对殖民地贸易的封锁实质性地改变了法国在欧洲大陆的战略地位……失去‘制海权’削弱了法国的资源和持久力，但从未造成危险的损失。英国的海上力量并没有‘扼杀’法国。”<sup> 33 </sup> 在美国独立战争中，尽管法国海军在约克镇附近的切萨皮克湾的介入意义重大，但正如保罗·M·肯尼迪所言，“单凭海上力量不足以镇压美国叛乱。”<sup> 34</sup>考虑到抵抗的性质、战争所涉领土的辽阔、交通不便、给宗主国带来的财政负担以及国内对战争的政治反对，约克镇是否是决定美国独立战争结局的关键因素，这一点非常值得怀疑。或许更重要的是，与 1688 年至 1815 年间的其他五次英法战争不同，这次战争中没有任何来自欧洲大陆的敌人分散法国的注意力，因此有可能向殖民地提供至关重要的财政、军事和海军援助。
In the War of the League of Augsburg, for example, Britain dispatched a sizeable army across the Channel and subsidized even larger contingents of Dutch and German troops, so that “it was the long-drawn-out bleeding of France's strength on the continent which more than anything else compelled Louis XIV to make peace in 1697.”32 In the War of the Spanish Succession the victorious land campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy were major factors in determining the outcome. So, too, Frederick the Great's military genius cannot be written off as the byproduct of British subsidies made possible by the profits of maritime supremacy. Nor, according to Gerald S. Graham, “is there any evidence to suggest that the denial of colonial commerce [by the Royal Navy] materially altered the French strategic position on the Continent…. Loss of ‘command of the sea’ diminished but never dangerously reduced French resources and staying power. There was not…a ‘strangulation’ of France by English sea power.”33 In the American War of Independence, notwithstanding the significance of French naval intervention in the Chesapeake Bay off Yorktown, “sea power alone,” in the words of Paul M. Kennedy, “was insufficient to crush the American rebellion.”34 Given the nature of the resistance, the size of the country being fought over, its poor communications, the financial burdens imposed upon the mother country, and political opposition to the war at home, it is very doubtful whether Yorktown was the critical factor deciding the Revolution's outcome. More significant perhaps was the absence in this case, as distinct from the other five Anglo-French wars between 1688 and 1815, of any continental enemies to distract France's attention, thus rendering possible the delivery of crucial financial and military, as well as naval, aid to the colonists.
至于拿破仑战争以及马汉对特拉法加海战的重视，只需指出，波拿巴放弃跨海峡进攻英国的计划是在特拉法加海战之前，而非之后；他在乌尔姆、奥斯特里茨、耶拿和瓦格拉姆取得的重大胜利都发生在1805年至1809年间，当时英国的海上霸权无人能及；也正是在这几年里，法国皇帝对欧洲的统治达到了前所未有的高度。此外，大陆封锁体系并非1812年法俄战争重燃的唯一原因。还有其他一些马汉完全没有提及的因素：俄罗斯贵族普遍存在的强烈反法情绪；拿破仑因未能如愿迎娶沙皇妹妹而产生的怨恨；以及，最为重要的，法俄两国围绕波兰归属问题展开的激烈争夺。35最后，马汉将叙述的终点设在1812年，完全忽略了波拿巴俄国战役的惨败、“解放战争”、法军在莱比锡战役中损失近30万人，以及最终的滑铁卢惨败。在这些事件中，决定胜负的是军队之间的交锋，而不是“遥远而饱经风暴的船只”。
As to the Napoleonic Wars, and the great importance Mahan attached to Trafalgar, it only needs to be pointed out that Bonaparte had abandoned his plans for a cross-Channel attack on England before that battle, not afterwards; that his great victories at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram took place in the years 1805–1809, when Britain's mastery of the seas was uncontested; and that it was during these same years that the French emperor enjoyed his most unchallenged sway over Europe. Nor was the Continental System solely responsible for the renewal of Franco-Russian hostilities in 1812. Other issues were involved, not mentioned by Mahan at all: the acute Francophobia of most of the Russian aristocracy, Napoleon's resentment at the frustration of his hopes for marriage to the czar's sister, and, most importantly, Franco-Russian rivalry over the disposition of Poland.35 Finally, by closing his narrative at 1812, Mahan omits consideration altogether of the disastrous failure of Bonaparte's Russian campaign, the “War of Liberation,” the battle of Leipzig where the French lost nearly 300,000 troops, and of course the final catastrophe at Waterloo. In these events, it was the clash of armies, not “far distant, storm-beaten ships,” that decided the issue.
由此可见，马汉始终犯了戴维·哈克特·费舍尔所说的“还原论谬误”，即混淆了必要原因和充分原因，将复杂性简化为简单性，或将多样性简化为单一性。 <sup> 36 </sup>海权是英国在十七、十八世纪战胜法国的必要原因——或许甚至是最重要的原因。然而，它并非充分原因。马汉作为逻辑学家（进而作为历史学家）的失败，直接源于他的方法论：他以顿悟开篇，灵感乍现，这种顿悟凝固成预设的结论；然后，他罗列事实作为例证和证明。
Mahan, it must be concluded, was consistently guilty of what David Hackett Fischer calls “the reductive fallacy [that] reduces complexity to simplicity, or diversity to uniformity” by confusing a necessary cause with the sufficient cause.’36 Sea power was a necessary cause—perhaps even the most important cause—of Britain's triumph over France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was not, however, the sufficient cause. Mahan's failure as a logician (and therefore as a historian) was the direct result of his methodology: he began his labors with an insight, a light dawning on his “inner consciousness”; the insight hardened into a predetermined conclusion; facts were then mustered as illustration and proof.
必须指出的是，这位历史学家丝毫没有标榜自己具有科学客观性，也没有声称自己的结论是基于详尽的研究得出的。在1902年向美国历史学会发表的就职演说中，马汉直言不讳地断言，历史写作应当是“围绕中心思想对次要细节进行艺术性组合”；有些事实“显然不值得费力”去探究；学者“对确定性的执着追求可能会演变成决策能力的缺失”；而且“事实必须像军队一样被聚集起来”，并始终服从于“中心特征”。<sup> 37 </sup> 最后一点与“矮胖子”对词语及其使用者之间恰当关系的著名训诫惊人地相似：“问题是……谁说了算，仅此而已。”无论如何，这与利奥波德·冯·兰克那句常被引用的“只展现实际发生过的事情”的愿望相去甚远。
There was, it must be said, no pretense on the historian's part to scientific objectivity, nor any claim to having reached his conclusions on the basis of exhaustive research. In his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1902, Mahan baldly asserted that written history should consist of the “artistic grouping of subordinate details around a central idea”; that some facts were “not really worth the evident trouble” of searching them out; that the scholar's “passion for certainty may lapse into incapacity for decision”; and that “facts must be massed as well as troops” and kept subordinate to the “central feature.”37 This last comes embarrassingly close to Humpty Dumpty's well-known stricture on the proper relationship between words and their user: “The question is…which is to be master, that's all.” In any case it is a far cry from Leopold von Ranke's oft-quoted aspiration “only to show what actually happened.”
三
III
“如果海军的存在，正如大家所认同的，是为了保护商业，那么必然意味着，在战争中，海军的目标必须是剥夺敌人的这一重要资源。而且，很难想象海军还能用于何种更广泛的军事用途，能与保护和摧毁贸易相提并论。”这是马汉上校在1890年后发表的众多杂志文章中的一篇早期文章。<sup> 38</sup>虽然他有时也会提及海军在前沿海岸防御中的运用，但这一论断代表了马汉战略思想的主要基础。“商业的停滞，”他后来写道，“迫使和平到来。”战争的胜利在于从海上扼杀敌人的经济——在于确立“海上霸权，迫使敌人的旗帜离开，或使其只能以逃亡者的身份出现”。而失败则在于未能阻止本国遭受这种扼杀。通过掌控海洋来控制海上贸易是海军的首要职能。<sup> 39</sup>
“If navies, as all agree, exist for the protection of commerce, it inevitably follows that in war they must aim at depriving their enemy of that great resource, nor is it easy to conceive what broad military use they can subserve that at all compares with the protection and destruction of trade.” Thus wrote Captain Mahan in one of the earliest of the many magazine articles that flowed from his pen after 1890.38 Though he sometimes adverted to the employment of navies for forward coastal defense, the statement represents the major foundation of Mahan's strategic thought. “The stoppage of commerce,” he wrote later, “compels peace.” Wars are won by the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea—by the assertion of that “overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive.” They are lost by failure to prevent such strangulation of one's own country. Control of maritime commerce through command of the sea is the primary function of navies.39
在马汉看来，这就是历史的主要教训，英国在长达一个半世纪的断断续续的战争中最终战胜欧洲大陆的敌人便是最好的例证。但是，帆船时代英国海军将领们所奉行的战略，在蒸汽时代是否仍然适用？“木制帆船及其简易火炮的经验，在当今的海军中是否还有用处？” <sup>40</sup>当时并没有实证依据。除了1866年7月那场毫无启发意义的利萨海战之外，近期再无蒸汽动力战舰之间进行舰队作战的先例。<sup> 41</sup>因此，马汉出于本能和个人倾向，不得不去寻找能够揭示战争永恒不变的基本真理的类比，即“历史学派中那些始终如一、因此具有普遍适用性，因而可以提升为普遍原则的教诲”。<sup> 42</sup>这些应用于陆军作战的战争原则，此前已被约米尼阐述过。卢斯力主采用“比较法”，即“运用众所周知的军事规则，将其应用于舰队的军事行动”。<sup> 43</sup>马汉向卢斯承诺，“我会时刻牢记陆战和海战之间的类比”。<sup> 44 </sup> 因此，他转而求助于约米尼。
Such, in Mahan's view, was the major lesson of history as illustrated by England's ultimate triumph over its Continental enemies in a century and a half of intermittent war. But were the strategies pursued by its admirals in the age of sail still applicable to the age of steam? Was “the experience of wooden sailing ships, with their pop-guns, useful in the naval present”?40 No empirical evidence was available. Except for the uninstructive battle of Lissa fought in July 1866, there had been no recent instance of fleet action between steam-driven ships of war.41 By default then, as well as by inclination, Mahan was driven to search for analogies that would reveal the unchangeable fundamental truths of warfare, those “teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal application can be elevated to the rank of general principles.”42 Such principles of war, as applied to army operations, had already been elucidated by Jomini. Luce had urged the adoption of the “comparative method”; that is, “resort to the well-known rules of the military art with a view to their application to the military movements of a fleet.”43 Mahan promised Luce to “keep the analogy between land and naval warfare before my eyes.”44 Accordingly, he turned to Jomini.
这位伟大的瑞士战略家的二十七卷军事史，涵盖了腓特烈大帝时期、法国大革命时期以及拿破仑战争，本可为他提供丰富的资料，以便对陆军和海军作战进行类比。然而，即便像马汉这样勤奋的学者，在准备陆军学院讲稿之前，也无暇深入研读这些著作。无论如何，《战争艺术》（Précis de l'art de la guerre）以简洁的形式阐述了他所寻求的基本原则。其中最根本的原则是集中原则，若米尼用四条格言概括了这一原则：
The great Swiss strategist's twenty-seven volumes of military history, covering the wars of Frederick the Great and of the French Revolution and Napoleon, would have provided ample data for drawing analogies between military (army) and naval operations. Time, however, would not have allowed even so diligent a worker as Mahan to explore these works to any depth before preparing his War College lectures. In any case, the Précis de l'art de la guerre (The Art of War) offered in succinct form the fundamental principles he was seeking. Of these the most fundamental was the principle of concentration, outlined by Jomini in four maxims:
1. 通过战略调动，将军队主力依次投入到战区的决定性地点，并尽可能切断敌人的交通要道，同时又不损害己方的利益。
1. Throw by strategic movements the mass of an army successively upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own.
2. 利用己方主力部队与敌军部分兵力交战。
2. Maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's own forces.
3. 在战场上，将大部分兵力投入到决定性的地点，或者投入到必须首先攻克的敌军防线部分。
3. On the battlefield throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow.
4. 因此要安排好这些兵力，不仅要投入到决定性的战斗中，而且要在适当的时机以适当的力度投入战斗。45
4. So arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy.45
尽管约米尼有时强调有利地理位置的“决定性”作用，但他与克劳塞维茨一样，将敌军视为军事行动的首要战略目标。他写道：“进攻方应特别努力通过巧妙选择有利的机动点来分割敌军；然后，它将把或多或少重要的地理位置作为其后续行动的目标。”约米尼的一个推论原则与选择“作战路线”有关，其目的是“将尽可能多的兵力投入到决定性地点”。这种选择当然取决于敌军在战场上的部署，但如果敌军分散了兵力，己方主力应依次攻击敌军的每一部分，同时抽调一支“观察部队”牵制另一部分。这种机动最好从“内线”的中央位置进行。<sup> 46</sup>
Although at times stressing the “decisive” character of favorable geographic positions, Jomini, like Clausewitz, viewed the enemy's army as the primary strategic objective of military operations. “The offensive army,” he wrote, “should particularly endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance.” A corollary Jominian principle had to do with the choice of the “line of operations” to attain the end of “bringing into action upon the decisive point…the greatest possible force.” Such choice depended of course on the enemy's dispositions on the field, but in the event he had divided his forces, each fraction thereof should be attacked successively by the major portion of one's own army, while a “body of observation” was detached to hold the other fraction in check. Such a maneuver could best be accomplished from a central position along “interior lines.”46
最后，尽管后勤问题过于复杂，无法简化为一条简单的格言或原则，但约米尼非常重视后勤。他用“后勤”这个包罗万象的术语来描述众多军事支援职能，包括部队补给、弹药供应、医疗服务，以及确保野战军各组成部分之间以及军队作战基地与战区之间的通信线路畅通。<sup> 47</sup>
Finally, although the subject was too complex to be reduced to a simple maxim or principle, Jomini laid great stress on logistics, the all-inclusive term he used to describe a multitude of supportive military functions, including provisioning of troops, supply of munitions, medical services, and securing lines of communication between separate components of a field army and between the army's base of operations and the theater of war.47
约米尼战争艺术的这三个要素——集中原则、中央阵地和内线战略价值，以及后勤与作战的紧密联系——被马汉借鉴，构建了他自己的海军战略体系。“体系”一词用得过于绝对。与约米尼不同，马汉的战略思想并不系统。他的战略思想散见于他的海军史、传记和杂志文章中。然而，在某种程度上，这些思想被整合到他于1887年在海军战争学院首次发表的一系列讲座中，之后这些讲座又被他本人或其他军官复述，他们朗读的是马汉的著作。这一系列讲座的修订版于1911年出版，书名为《海军战略：与陆地军事行动原则和实践的比较与对比》，这个书名略显拗口。
These three ingredients of Jomini's art of war—the principle of concentration, the strategic value of the central position and interior lines, and the close relationship between logistics and combat—were to be borrowed by Mahan to form the framework of his own system of naval strategy. “System” is too strong a word. Unlike Jomini, Mahan was not systematic. His thoughts on strategy are widely scattered throughout his naval histories, biographies, and magazine articles. To a degree, however, they were brought together in a series of lectures first delivered at the Naval War College in 1887 and thereafter repeated, either by the author himself or else by some other officer reading from Mahan's text. In revised form this series was published in 1911 as a book with the awkward title Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land.
马汉借鉴约米尼的观点，坚持认为集中是海战的“首要原则”。“就像希腊字母A和B一样，它们构成了希腊和我们整个字母表的名称，集中本身就包含了战争中军事效率的所有其他因素，即整个字母表。”他指出，这不仅适用于海军战术，也适用于海军战略。他将二者的分界线划在交战双方的接触点，也就是“舰队碰撞之时”。无论进行战略部署还是战术机动，正确的做法都是“合理分配己方兵力，在某一方面占据优势，同时在另一方面牵制敌军，为己方主力攻击取得最终胜利奠定基础。”这就是英国相对于其欧洲大陆对手所享有的中心位置的主要优势所在：它使得从中心向外沿内线发动海上进攻成为可能，并且使进攻方能够通过“集中兵力攻击一个单位，同时牵制另一个单位”来分散敌军，从而削弱敌军实力。<sup> 48</sup>
Borrowing from Jomini, Mahan insisted that concentration was “the predominant principle” of naval warfare. “Like the A, B of the Greeks, which gave its name to the whole of their alphabet and ours, concentration sums up in itself all the other factors, the entire alphabet, of military efficiency in war.” This, he said, was true of naval tactics as well as naval strategy. The line between the two he drew at the point of contact between opposing forces; that is, “when the fleets come into collision.” In either case, whether engaged in strategic deployment or tactical maneuver, the correct course of action is that “of so distributing your own force as to be superior to the enemy in one quarter, while in the other you hold him in check long enough to permit your main attack to reach its full result.” Here lies the main advantage of a central position such as that enjoyed by England vis-à-vis its Continental rivals: it makes possible a naval offensive along interior lines outward from the center and enables the attacker to keep his enemy separated and therefore inferior “by concentrating against one unit while holding the other in check.”48
但中心位置只是“辅助性的，而非主要的……如果两侧的敌人都比你强大，那么占据中心位置就没什么用处。简而言之，实力加上位置才能比没有位置的实力更有优势……内陆位置能让你更快地到达那里，但优势也就到此为止了。”“海战中真正起决定性作用的因素”只有交战舰队。49
But the central position is “contributory, not principal…. It is of little use to have a central position if the enemy on both sides is stronger than you. In short, it is power plus position that constitutes an advantage over power without position…. The interior position will enable you to get there sooner, but with that its advantage ends.” The “only really determining elements in naval war” are fighting fleets.49
究竟是建造“几艘巨型战舰，还是建造更多中型战舰”的海军，或许尚存争议。<sup> 50</sup>但毫无疑问，要想在战争中取得决定性胜利，海军必须主要由主力舰组成，在马汉的语境中，主力舰指的是装甲战列舰。<sup> 51</sup>同样毋庸置疑的是，“舰队的最大进攻能力……而非单艘战舰的最大火力，才是战列舰建造的真正目标。”<sup> 52</sup>由此引申出马汉那句广为流传的格言：“切勿分割舰队！” 即使海军战争学院“仅仅使海军军官深刻认识到在和平时期或战争时期分割舰队的愚蠢之处，也足以证明其存在的价值，并收回其开支。”<sup> 53</sup>
Whether to build a navy of “a few very big ships, or more numerous medium ships” might be arguable.50 But there could be no doubt that, to be decisive in war, a navy must be composed primarily of capital ships, which in Mahan's lexicon meant armored battleships.51 Nor could there be any doubt that “the maximum offensive power of the fleet…and not the maximum power of the single ship, is the true object of battleship construction.”52 From this proposition followed the much-cited Mahanian dictum: “Never divide the fleet!” If the Naval War College, “had produced no other result than the profound realization by naval officers of the folly of dividing the battle-fleet, in peace or in war, it would by that alone have justified its existence and paid its expenses.”53
如果说舰队的集中火力是展现海军力量的主要手段，那么这种火力的首选目标就是敌方舰队。马汉对此的强调尤为突出：舰队的首要任务就是与敌方舰队交战。“所有海战的目标只有一个，那就是摧毁敌方有组织的舰队，并建立己方对水域的控制。” 他再次强调，“一个合理的普遍原则是，如果有可能击中敌方舰队，那么它就是高于一切的目标；因为通过削弱敌方海军来控制海洋，才是海战的决定性因素。” 54
If the concentrated fire of the battle fleet is the principal means by which naval power is to be asserted, the preferred target of such fire is the enemy's fleet. On no point is Mahan more emphatic: the primary mission of a battle fleet is to engage the enemy's fleet. “The one particular result which is the object of all naval action, is the destruction of the enemy's organized force, and the establishment of one's own control of the water.” And again, he asserts that “the sound general principle that the enemy's fleet, if it probably can be reached, is the objective paramount to all others; because the control of the sea, by reducing the enemy's navy, is the determining consideration in a naval war.”54
因此，无论从战略还是战术层面，海军都应采取进攻性策略。马汉认为，“在海战中，海岸防御是防御手段，海军是进攻手段。”他引用法拉格特的话说：“抵御敌军炮火的最佳防御手段，就是用我方火炮进行精准射击。”十八世纪法国人的最大谬误在于，他们蓄意且持续地“将舰队用于防御”。在战术上，这意味着将风向控制权拱手让给英国人；也就是说，占据下风位置，以便在海战中更好地中止行动或完全避免战斗。在战略上，这意味着过度依赖“航海战”（ la guerre de course），即“使用小型舰船作为商船破坏者，而不是派遣大型舰队攻击敌人”——马汉认为这种做法“无异于放弃任何控制海洋的尝试”。<sup> 55</sup>
Hence, both strategically and tactically, navies should be employed offensively. “In naval war,” according to Mahan, “coast defence is the defensive factor, the navy the offensive.” Quoting Farragut, “‘The best protection against the enemy's fire is a well directed fire from our own guns.’” The great fallacy of the French in the eighteenth century was that they deliberately and constantly “used their fleet for defensive action.” Tactically this meant yielding the weather gage to the English; that is, taking position downwind, the better to break off action during a sea fight or avoid it altogether. Strategically, it meant overreliance on la guerre de course, defined as “using small ships as commerce destroyers rather than sending large fleets against the enemy,”—a practice that Mahan believed “amounts to abandoning any attempt to control the sea.”55
鉴于马汉对海上贸易的重视，他绝不会低估切断敌方海上贸易的价值。“严重干扰一个国家的商业活动所造成的骚扰和痛苦，人人都承认。”但他补充道，“作为一项足以摧毁敌人的首要且根本的措施，（切断商业活动）很可能是一种错觉，而且是一种极其危险的错觉。”掠夺敌方的商船并非耗尽其资源、扼杀其经济的途径。唯有通过交战并击败敌方海军，或者使其瘫痪，才能实现这一目标。届时，海洋将对敌方商船构成威胁。诚然，严密的封锁或许能够将敌方的商船和军舰都困在各自的港口内。但当敌方的军舰最终逃往公海时，必须将其搜寻并摧毁。正如约米尼在另一处所言，战争的基本原则是将己方兵力部署在战区的决定性地点，并安排“在适当的时间以适当的力度投入战斗” 。56
Given the importance he attached to maritime commerce, Mahan would have been the last to minimize the value of its denial to the enemy. “The harassment and distress caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce will be conceded by all.” But, he added, “as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it [commerce destruction] is probably a delusion and a most dangerous delusion.” Preying on the enemy's merchant ships was not the way to dry up his resources and effect his economic strangulation. That could only be accomplished by engaging and defeating, or alternatively by immobilizing, his naval forces. Then the sea would become untenable to his merchant shipping. A close blockade, to be sure, might succeed in keeping both merchant and naval vessels bottled up in their own harbors. But when the enemy's warships inevitably escaped to sea, they must be sought out and destroyed. As Jomini said in another connection, the fundamental principle of war was to throw one's forces upon the decisive point of a theater of war and so arrange that “they shall engage at the proper time and with energy.”56
但约米尼也十分重视后勤。马汉出于未知的原因，更倾向于使用“通信”一词。如同他对“海权”一词的使用一样，他对此定义较为宽泛。一方面，他将通信定义为“一个通用术语，指军事力量……与国家力量保持密切联系的行动路线”。<sup> 57</sup>另一方面，他宣称“通信本质上并非指军队必须行进的地理路线，而是指那些舰船自身无法携带的必需品，其数量有限”。他具体指出，这些必需品“首先是燃料；其次是弹药；最后是食物”。<sup> 58</sup>无论采用哪种定义，合适的海军基地以及舰队对这些基地的通行都是成功实施海上战略的必要条件。自蒸汽动力出现以来，这一点变得尤为重要，原因显而易见：任何舰船都无法在不补充燃料的情况下航行相当长的距离。
But Jomini had also laid great stress on logistics. Mahan, for reasons unknown, preferred the word “communications.” As in the case of “sea power,” he used the term loosely. On the one hand, he defined communications as “a general term, designating the lines of movement by which a military body…is kept in living connection with the national power.”57 On the other, he declared that “communications mean essentially, not geographical lines, like the roads an army has to follow, but those necessaries, supplies of which the ships cannot carry in their own hulls beyond a limited amount.” These are, he specified, “first, fuel; second, ammunition; last of all, food.”58 Under either definition, proper naval bases and access to them by the fleet are essential ingredients to a successful maritime strategy. This had become all the more necessary since the advent of steam power, for the obvious reason that no ship could steam for any considerable distance without refueling.
因此，对于一支想要远航至本土水域之外的舰队而言，至少在战时，远距离的煤炭补给站是必不可少的。然而，马汉虽然承认煤炭补给站的必要性，但对于此类补给站的建设却持谨慎态度，除非是为了半球防御。“防御工事对于舰队而言，与对于陆军一样重要，”他承认，“必须尽可能减少需要重点控制的据点数量，以最大程度地减少母国的兵力消耗，使其能够集中精力于至关重要的据点。” 他在其他地方也警告说，“一旦超出合理必要的限度，此类基地的数量就会成为弱点，增加暴露点，导致兵力分散。” 59
Distant coaling stations, then, were a necessity for a fleet if it were to move very far beyond its home waters, at least in time of war. Mahan, however, though recognizing the necessity for coaling stations, was somewhat leery about their acquisition, except for purposes of hemispheric defense. “Fortified bases of operation,” he conceded, “are as needful to a fleet as to an army,” but “the number of points to be seriously held must be reduced as much as can be, so as to drain as little as possible the strength of the mother country, and to permit her to concentrate on those of vital importance.” Elsewhere, he warned that “the multiplication of such bases, as soon as you pass the limits of reasonable necessity, becomes a source of weakness, multiplying exposed points, and entailing division of force.”59
当然，海军力量的分割对马汉来说是极其不可接受的。因此，他可能对两栖作战的需求及其在海军战略中的地位只是略加关注。考虑到约米尼在《孙子兵法》中专门用一整篇文章论述了他所谓的军事“登陆”敌方海岸，这种疏忽就显得更加令人惊讶了。<sup> 60</sup>无论如何，马汉在论述“远洋作战”时持谨慎态度。他指出，此类作战的“特殊之处在于”“随行的陆军部队在海上处于无助状态”。他警告说，“在确立海上优势之前，你不能认为你的征服是稳操胜券的”，并且他主张在登陆作战后尽早释放海军，以便舰队能够掌控通信，“从而掌控其赖以生存的海洋”。61他警告说，如果舰队的作用仅仅局限于守卫“一个或多个岸上阵地，那么海军就沦为陆军的一个分支”，而“海战的真正目的……在于压制敌方海军，从而控制海洋”，即在任何情况下都应攻击敌方舰船和舰队。62
Division of naval forces was, of course, anathema to Mahan. Hence, probably, his failure to give more than passing attention to the requirements of amphibious warfare and its place in naval strategy. This neglect is all the more surprising in view of Jomini's having included in The Art of War an entire article on what he called military “descents” onto hostile shores.60 In any case, in treating of “maritime expeditions in remote waters” Mahan was cautionary. He noted that the “peculiar characteristic” of such operations was “the helplessness while afloat of the army contingent embarked.” He warned that “you cannot think your conquest secure until you have established your naval superiority,” and he advocated the early release of the navy after a landing operation, so that the fleet could take charge of communications “and so of its own element, the sea.”61 If the fleet's role, he warned, is reduced merely to guarding “one or more positions ashore, the navy becomes simply a branch of the army,” whereas “the true end of naval war…is to preponderate over the enemy's navy and so control the sea” by assailing the enemy's ships and fleets on all occasions.62
事实上，马汉对动用海军力量攻击陆地持怀疑态度。内战期间，他亲身经历过联邦军舰炮击邦联军要塞的行动，这使他对海军炮火对抗海岸炮兵的有效性深表怀疑。他写道：“一艘船不可能对抗造价相同的堡垒，就像堡垒不可能与一艘船赛跑一样。” 他还写道：“海上防御直接的海军攻击相对容易，因为……舰船……在与堡垒的对抗中处于明显的劣势。”<sup> 63</sup>
In truth, Mahan was dubious about any employment of naval forces against the land. Experience in, and knowledge of, Union ship bombardments of Confederate fortifications during the Civil War had made him skeptical of the effectiveness of naval gunnery against coastal artillery. “A ship can no more stand up against a fort costing the same money,” he wrote, “than the fort could run a race with the ship.” And again: “Defence on the sea side against direct naval attack is comparatively easy, because…ships…are at a recognized disadvantage contending against forts.”63
因此，马汉对从海上投射力量这一在二十世纪日益重要的海军任务基本上置之不理。更值得注意的是，他未能认真关注战时陆海军的相互依存关系。尽管他用了大约半页篇幅来描述约翰·摩尔爵士1808年的西班牙远征，但在其两部《影响》著作的大部分篇幅中，他都将皇家海军视为一个独立于欧洲大陆军事行动之外的自主力量，并且很少关注或受陆战结果的影响。诚然，陆海协同作战并非十七、十八世纪战争的显著特征。然而，在一部旨在阐明海战基本且不变原则的著作中，马汉对海军炮兵和海上步兵对岸目标的攻击作用的普遍忽视，无疑是一个明显的疏漏。
Power-projection from the sea, a naval mission of growing significance in the twentieth century, was thus mostly disregarded by Mahan. Even more noteworthy is his failure to give much serious attention to the interdependence of armies and navies in wartime. Although devoting about half a page to Sir John Moore's expedition to Spain in 1808,64 for the most part, throughout his two Influence books, he treated the Royal Navy as an autonomous agent acting independently of military operations on the Continent and not much concerned with, or affected by, the outcome of land battles. Coordination between ground and naval forces, to be sure, was not a salient characteristic of warfare in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nevertheless, in a study devoted to illustrating the fundamental and unchangeable principles of naval warfare, Mahan's general neglect of the utility of naval artillery and of sea-borne infantry assaults against targets ashore stands out as a glaring omission.65
但如果说马汉过分强调了海权作为战争工具的自主性，那么他也不忘提醒读者和听众，海权的确只是一种工具。他的论据再次来自约米尼，约米尼在《孙子兵法》的第一章专门论述了“政治家用来判断战争是否正当、适时或不可或缺，以及确定实现战争目标所需采取的各种行动的考量因素”。<sup>66</sup>马汉作证说，正是从约米尼那里，“我才对那种想当然地接受的格言——政治家和将军所处的领域互不相关——抱有根深蒂固的怀疑”。他补充道：“我用自己的信条取代了这种误解，那就是战争仅仅是一场暴力的政治运动。”<sup> 67</sup>战略服从于政策，这在他思想体系中与卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨的思想体系中一样重要。马汉直到1910年才开始研读克劳塞维茨的著作《战争论》，而且当时只是阅读了其节选版本。 68马汉在1896年写道：“战争只不过是一场政治运动，尽管其性质暴力且特殊。” 他又写道：“只有在达成这一政治决心之后，才能掌握阐述军事问题所需的数据；因为在这里，一如既往，军队服从于国家的政治利益和民事权力。” 69
But if Mahan overstressed the autonomy of sea power as an instrument of war, he did not fail to remind his readers and listeners that it was indeed an instrument. Once again his source was Jomini, who had devoted the first chapter of The Art of War to “those considerations from which a statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of war.”66 It was from Jomini, Mahan testified, that “I imbibed a fixed disbelief in the thoughtlessly accepted maxim that the statesman and general occupy unrelated fields.” “For this misconception,” he added, “I substituted a tenet of my own, that war is simply a violent political movement.”67 The subordination of strategy to policy was as central to his scheme of thought as it was to that of Carl von Clausewitz whose treatise, On War, Mahan did not examine until 1910, and then only in abbreviated form.68 “War,” wrote Mahan in 1896, “is simply a political movement, though violent and exceptional in character.” And again: “It is not until this political determination has been reached that the data for even stating the military problem are in hand; for here, as always, the military arm waits upon and is subservient to the political interests and civil power of the state.”69
在马汉看来，海军也比陆军更适合作为国家政策的工具。海军的行动不那么直接，不那么具有侵略意图的象征意义，机动性更强，因此对政治指令的反应也更灵敏，其影响力“可以延伸到国家陆军无法到达的地方”。这一点对美国尤其如此，因为美国“既没有在海外采取侵略行动的传统，也没有在海外采取侵略行动的意图”，但同时又拥有“非常重要的跨海利益，需要加以保护”。<sup> 70</sup>随着马汉的关注点转向远超海军战争学院学生的更广泛受众，如何界定这些“非常重要的跨海利益”也成为了他主要关注的问题之一。
In Mahan's view, also, navies were better instruments of national policy than were armies. Less blunt, less symbolic of aggressive intent, more mobile and therefore more responsive to political direction, the influence of a navy could “be felt where the national armies cannot go.” This was especially true for the United States, which had “neither the tradition nor the design to act aggressively beyond the seas,” but at the same time had “very important transmarine interests which need protection.”70 As he turned his attention to an audience far wider than the student body of the Naval War College, the definition of these “very important transmarine interests” was to become one of Mahan's major preoccupations.
第四
IV
“就我个人观点而言，”马汉在1901年回顾道，“可以说，直到1885年，我一直都是个反帝国主义者；但到了1890年，对海权及其相关扩张活动对国家命运的影响的研究改变了我的看法。”除了早期对美国在加勒比海和中美洲利益的担忧之外，他的记忆基本正确。“我不知道你的感受如何，”他在1884年7月下旬写信给他唯一的挚友塞缪尔·A·阿什，“但对我来说，仅仅是怀疑帝国主义政策就令人憎恶……虽然不幸的是，我从事的是军事职业，但我对那些需要庞大军事力量来维持的边远殖民地或利益感到恐惧。”但到了1890年，他的观点至少在一定程度上发生了转变。读过他那年出版的第一本《影响力》的读者，不可能不注意到作者对大英帝国的推崇，也不可能忽略他强烈暗示美国可以效仿英国的模式。尽管该书的大部分篇幅都用于叙述英国的海军作战行动，但第一章的说教意味却十分浓厚。在这一章中，作者以讨论“海权要素”为幌子，从十七、十八世纪英国的历史中推断出六项“影响海权的普遍条件”，并指出这些条件具有普遍性和永恒性。这六项条件分别是：（1）地理位置；（2）自然形态；（3）领土范围；（4）人口数量；（5）民族特性；以及（6）政府的性质和政策。71
“As far as my own views went,” wrote Mahan retrospectively in 1901, “I might say I was up to 1885 traditionally an anti-imperialist; but by 1890 the study of the influence of sea power and its kindred expansive activities upon the destiny of nations had converted me.” Aside from an early concern for U.S. interests in the Caribbean and Central America, his memory served him correctly. “I don't know how you feel,” he had written to his only close friend, Samuel A. Ashe, in late July 1884, “but to me the very suspicion of an imperial policy is hateful…. Though identified, unluckily, with a military profession, I dread outlying colonies or interests, to maintain which large military establishments are necessary.” But by 1890 he was changing course, at least to a degree. Readers of his first Influence book, published that year, could not have failed to note the author's admiration for the British Empire or to have overlooked the strong suggestion that the United States might look to Britain as a model for emulation. Though most of the pages are devoted to a narrative account of English naval operations, the first chapter is unmistakably didactic. Here, under the guise of discussing “the elements of sea power,” the author, extrapolating from the history of Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, postulates six “general conditions affecting Sea Power,” which, he indicates, are universal and timeless in character. These are: (1) geographical position; (2) physical conformation; (3) extent of territory; (4) number of population; (5) national character; and (6) character and policy of governments.71
他书中这一部分受到的评论家关注远超其应得——或许是因为马汉在此处的论述比他大多数作品都更加系统。实际上，这一论点与他的主旨略有偏离，而他提出的六项“一般条件”最好被理解为一种巧妙的手段，用来揭露美国令人痛心的落后。作者认为，与法国一样，美国忽视了其海洋利益，而将重心放在内陆开发上；其民主政府不像英国的土地贵族那样热衷于军费开支；其商船队已经消失，海军规模也已萎缩；从事“与海洋相关的职业”的人口寥寥无几；它“既没有殖民地也没有军事机构”，因此也没有军舰可以加煤和维修的“停泊地”。但希望犹存。随着横跨中美洲地峡的运河即将开工建设，加勒比海将成为“世界主要航道之一”。美国的地位“将类似于英国在英吉利海峡的地位”。届时，美国将有动力建立海军，并被迫在该地区获取基地，“使其舰队能够像任何对手一样，始终保持在事发地点附近” 。72
This section of his book has received far more attention from commentators than it deserves—probably because Mahan is more systematic here than in most of his writings. Actually, the argument is tangential to the main line of his thought, and the outline of six “general conditions” can best be understood simply as an artful device for exposing America's woeful backwardness. Like France, the author argues, the United States has neglected its maritime interests in favor of inland development; its government, being democratic, is less inclined to support military expenditures than was the landed aristocracy of England; its merchant marine has disappeared and its navy has dwindled; not enough of its people follow “callings related to the sea”; it has “no foreign establishments, either colonial or military” and therefore no “resting places” where ships of war can coal and repair. But there is hope. With the impending construction of a canal across the Central American Isthmus, the Caribbean Sea will become “one of the great highways of the world.” The position of the United States “will resemble that of England to the Channel.” Then the United States will be motivated to build a navy and be compelled to obtain bases in the area which “will enable her fleets to remain as near the scene as any opponent.”72
这就是马汉“帝国主义”的核心原则。没有任何其他美国海外扩张的前景能像这般吸引他的注意力和热情。早在1880年，他就写信给朋友阿什，说地峡运河“可能会使我们的利益与外国的利益发生冲突”，因此“我们必须立即开始建造一支至少能与英国匹敌的海军……而且必须在巴拿马动工的那一刻就开始建造。”在接下来的十年里，随着美国人对地峡的兴趣日益浓厚，马汉的兴趣也随之高涨。在他发表于1890年8月《大西洋月刊》的第一篇杂志文章《美国向外看》中，他警告说，开通中美洲地峡运河将给西半球的和平带来“许多潜在的、尚未预见的危险”；暗示德国可能入侵该地区；并预言“整个加勒比海的商业活动和运输贸易将大幅增长”。指出“美国严重缺乏准备……在加勒比海和中美洲地区行使与其利益规模相称的影响力”；并主张美国应扩充海军力量以应对威胁。73
Here is the cardinal principle of Mahan's “imperialism.” No other prospect of American overseas expansion so engaged his attention or his enthusiasm. As early as 1880, he had written his friend Ashe that an isthmian canal “may bring our interests and those of foreign nations in collision,” and therefore “we must without any delay begin to build a navy which will at least equal that of England…and must begin to build as soon as the first spadeful of earth is turned at Panama.” In the following decade, as the interest of Americans in the Isthmus quickened, so did Mahan's. In his first magazine article, entitled “The United States Looking Outward,” published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he warned of the “many latent and yet unforeseen dangers to the peace of the western hemisphere” attendant upon the opening of a canal through the Central American Isthmus; hinted at the possibility of German intrusion into the area; predicted “a great increase of commercial activity and carrying trade throughout the Caribbean Sea”; noted that “the United States is woefully unready…to assert in the Caribbean and Central America a weight of influence proportioned to the extent of her interests”; and argued for U.S. naval expansion to meet the threat.73
三年后，同一期刊发表了马汉的《地峡与海权》。马汉认为，雄心勃勃的欧洲国家，尤其是德国，无疑会力图在加勒比海这一关键地区占据海上霸权；运河的主要政治后果是将美国西海岸拉近与欧洲强大海军的距离，从而“从军事角度来看，构成一个很大的弱点”；一条横跨中美洲的人工水道将“使（美国的）大西洋沿岸能够与欧洲在距离上平等地争夺东亚市场”；最后，“我们必须承认，跨洋航行的自由取决于在……加勒比海的主导地位”，而这种主导地位主要由海军力量来保障。74
Three years later the same journal published Mahan's “The Isthmus and Sea Power.” Enterprising European countries, again chiefly Germany, Mahan argued would undoubtedly aim at naval predominance over such a critical region as the Caribbean; the chief political result of the Canal would be to bring the West Coast closer to the great navies of Europe and therefore “present an element of much weakness from the military point of view”; an artificial waterway across Central America would “enable the Atlantic coast [of the United States] to compete with Europe, on equal terms as to distance, for the markets of eastern Asia; and finally “we must gird ourselves to admit that freedom of interoceanic transit depends upon predominance in…the Caribbean Sea,” insured primarily by a naval presence.74
1899年，在与西班牙的战争似乎证实了他对该地区的关注之后，马汉认为，波多黎各之于未来的巴拿马运河和美国西海岸，正如马耳他之于英国在埃及及其他地区的利益。但这还不是全部。直到1909年，也就是西奥多·罗斯福“占领巴拿马”六年之后，马汉仍然写道，美国在加勒比地区的利益“现在比我二十多年前首次着手进行战略研究时还要大”。<sup> 75</sup>
In 1899, after the war with Spain appeared to have vindicated his preoccupation with the area, Mahan argued that Puerto Rico was to the future Panama Canal and to the West Coast what Malta was to British interests in Egypt and beyond. Nor was that the end of it. As late as 1909, six years after Teddy Roosevelt “took Panama,” Mahan would write that the American stake in the Caribbean was “even greater now than it was when I first undertook the strategic study of it, over twenty years ago.”75
在美国的海外利益中，夏威夷群岛位列第二。1890年，马汉警告说，运河的开通将立即危及西海岸的安全，并指出“我们国家政策中不可动摇的原则是，任何外国都不得在旧金山三千英里范围内获得煤炭补给站——这一距离涵盖了夏威夷群岛、加拉帕戈斯群岛以及中美洲沿岸。”1893年1月，在檀香山的美国居民推翻莉露欧卡拉尼女王并建立共和国后，马汉致信《纽约时报》，主张美国吞并“三明治群岛”，并“大幅扩展我们的海军力量”，以应对中国“向东突破防线”，发动“野蛮入侵”的那一天。<sup> 76</sup>
Second in the order of America's overseas interests were the Hawaiian Islands. In 1890 Mahan warned that the opening of the Canal would immediately place the West Coast in jeopardy and that “it should be an inviolable resolution of our national policy, that no foreign state should henceforth acquire a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Francisco,—a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands and the coast of Central America.” In January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U.S. annexation of “the Sandwich Islands” and “a great extension of our naval power” against the day when China “burst her barriers eastward” in “a wave of barbaric invasion.”76
随后，《论坛报》编辑沃尔特·海因斯·佩奇要求这位写信人就此主题撰写一篇长文。他照办了，撰写了《夏威夷与我们未来的海上力量》，发表于三月刊。在指出这些岛屿横亘于太平洋主要贸易航线上的重要性之后，他再次敦促立即吞并夏威夷，理由是西海岸军事脆弱，以及美国需要主导最终将通过运河输送的贸易。四年后，在1897年9月刊的《哈珀斯杂志》上发表的《二十世纪展望》一文中，他再次提及源自中国的“黄祸”，以及任何外国势力在美国西海岸航行范围内获得煤炭补给站的潜在危险。77
Subsequently, Walter Hines Page, editor of the Forum, asked the letter writer for a full-length article on the subject. He complied with “Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power,” published in the March issue. After pausing to note the importance of the islands' position athwart the major trade routes in the Pacific, he again urged immediate annexation on the grounds of the military vulnerability of the West Coast, as well as on America's need to dominate the trade which would ultimately funnel through the Canal. Four years later, in “A Twentieth Century Outlook” appearing in the September 1897 issue of Harper's Magazine, he adverted once more to the “Yellow Peril” emanating from China and to the danger implicit in any foreign power's acquiring a coaling station within steaming range of America's west coast.77
因此，在1898年之前，除了提及美国人在东亚蕴藏的未加解释的商业机会外，马汉的帝国主义野心仅限于加勒比海、中美洲地峡和夏威夷群岛。1898年5月1日，乔治·杜威准将率领“查尔斯顿”号大胆驶入马尼拉湾，并在12小时内摧毁了停泊在卡维特附近的西班牙舰队。到7月底，应杜威的要求，近11000名美军士兵被派往吕宋岛。随后，整个群岛被征服。位于南马里亚纳群岛的关岛在前往马尼拉的途中被“查尔斯顿”号巡洋舰截获。夏威夷最终被吞并；菲律宾也未能幸免。威克岛被占领，原本计划在那里建造一个电缆站，但最终改用了中途岛。美国突然间变成了一个帝国。正如詹姆斯·菲尔德所说，“我们可以说，‘帝国主义’是杜威胜利的产物。” 78
Thus, before 1898, except for references to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. Then on May 1, 1898 Commodore George Dewey steamed boldly into Manila Bay and within twelve hours had destroyed the feeble Spanish squadron lying off Cavite. By the end of July almost eleven thousand American troops had been dispatched to Luzon at Dewey's request. Conquest of the entire archipelago followed. Guam, in the southern Marianas, was picked up by USS Charleston en route to Manila. Hawaii was at last annexed; so were the Philippines. Wake Island was occupied with the intention of building a cable station there, although in the event Midway was used instead. All of a sudden the United States had become an empire. As James Field has put it, “‘Imperialism,’ we may say, was the product of Dewey's victory.”78
马汉对事态快速发展的反应，比一些历史学家笔下典型的帝国主义者要慢得多。79 1898年7月27日，当美军仍在马尼拉城外时，他告诉亨利·卡伯特·洛奇，虽然他“颇具扩张主义倾向”，但他本人“尚未完全接受”吞并菲律宾的想法，并认为“只吞并拉德罗内群岛（马里亚纳群岛）和吕宋岛，将加罗林群岛和菲律宾其他地区让渡给西班牙，以顾及西班牙的‘荣誉’和实际需要，或许是一个明智的折衷方案”。然而，不久之后，马汉便适应了这种变化，他像麦金利总统一样，将吞并视为上帝的旨意。从更世俗的角度来看，他为美国占领整个群岛辩护，认为这是马尼拉港海军基地的权宜之计。但对马汉而言，或许也对他的大多数同时代人来说，是与西班牙的战争激发了美国在西太平洋建立霸权的想法，而不是相反。正如他所承认的，在此之前，他的视野，如同其他海权倡导者和扩张主义者一样，“仅限于夏威夷” 。80
Mahan's own adjustment to this rapid course of events was slower than one might expect of the prototypical imperialist that some historians have made him out to be.79 On July 27, 1898, while U.S. Army troops were still outside Manila, he advised Henry Cabot Lodge that, “though rather an expansionist,” he himself was “not fully adjusted to the idea” of taking the Philippines and thought it might be a “wise compromise to take only the Ladrones [Marianas] & Luzon, yielding to the ‘honor’ & exigencies of Spain the Carolines and the rest of the Philippines.” Before long, however, adjustment came, and Mahan, like President McKinley, saw annexation as the will of God. Along more worldly lines, he defended American acquisition of the entire group of islands as an expedient backup to the naval base in Manila harbor. But to Mahan, as perhaps to most of his contemporaries, it was the war with Spain that provoked thoughts of American dominion in the Western Pacific, and not vice versa. Up to that time, as he acknowledged, his vision, like that of other sea-power advocates and expansionists “reached not past Hawaii.”80
但欲望如潮水般涌来，很快，马汉的思绪便像其他人一样，转向了更遥远的西方——亚洲大陆。就在国务卿约翰·海伊散发门户开放照会，义和团运动在中国爆发之际，这位已退休但仍笔耕不辍的海军上校撰写了四篇文章，后经转载出版，书名为《亚洲问题》。在他看来，最紧迫的“问题”是俄国，其在东亚的扩张野心尚未被日本遏制。马汉承认满洲已落入这个强大的斯拉夫国家之手，并建议德国、日本、英国和美国这四个“海上强国”结成某种联盟，因为“它们在亚洲东部的战略位置严重阻碍了北方的扩张”。正如他向副总统西奥多·罗斯福解释的那样，他具体指的是将海军力量投射到长江流域。展望更遥远的未来，马汉预见到一种比俄罗斯威胁更为可怕的危险，那就是中国本身。他写道：“很难平静地想象，像中国这样拥有四亿人口的庞大群体，集中到一个高效的政治组织中，配备现代化的设施，却被限制在一个原本就狭小的国土上。” 西方列强的解决之道在于，将亚洲人民纳入“基督教国家大家庭”的范畴，而这并非依靠武力展示，而是通过和平的商业渗透，并“希望在此过程中，那些道德和精神理想也能随之而来，而这些理想的获得远比物质福祉更为重要。” 至于这种渗透所能带来的经济利益，“很可能远不及‘四亿人口’这几个字所暗示的贸易繁荣景象。”<sup> 81</sup>
But l'appétit vient en mangeant, and within a very short time Mahan's thoughts, like others', turned still farther westward to the Asiatic mainland. While Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes and the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, the now retired but busy Captain wrote four articles, reprinted and published as The Problem of Asia. The most pressing “problem,” as he saw it, was Russia, whose expansionist aims in eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan. Conceding Manchuria as already lost to the great Slavic state, Mahan suggested a coalition of sorts among the four “maritime states” of Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States which “by their positions on the eastern side of Asia seriously impede advance from the north.” Specifically what he had in mind, as he explained to Vice President Theodore Roosevelt, was the projection of naval power into the Yangtze valley. Looking into the more distant future, Mahan foresaw a danger more ominous even than the Russian threat; that is, China itself. “[I]t is difficult to contemplate with equanimity,” he wrote, “such a vast mass as the four hundred millions of China concentrated into one effective political organization, equipped with modern appliances, and cooped within a territory already narrow for it.” The answer was for the Western powers to bring the Asian peoples “within the compass of the family of Christian states,” not so much by show of military force as by peaceful commercial penetration, in the train of which “we may hope will follow those moral and spiritual ideals, the appropriation of which outweighs material well-being.” As to the economic benefits to be derived from such penetration, they “not impossibly may fall very short of the rosy hopes of trade suggested by the mere words ‘four hundred millions of people.’”81
最后这番话引出了一个问题：马汉关于海军、殖民地和帝国扩张的思想究竟包含哪些经济内容？正如肯尼斯·哈根所说，他“对于殖民地对宗主国究竟有何价值，并没有特别清晰的认识”——事实上，他对帝国主义的任何其他经济层面也同样如此。<sup> 82</sup>但这个问题无法回避，原因之一是一些美国新左派历史学家——尤其是沃尔特·拉费伯——将马汉列为19世纪后期“新帝国”理论倡导者中的重要人物。<sup> 83</sup>简而言之，他们的论点如下：马汉认为，美国的剩余产品必须寻求新的外部市场，而其中最有前景的市场位于南美洲和中国，尤其是在中国。为了利用这些机会，他主张美国控制巴拿马运河、夏威夷和菲律宾，将其作为“通往两大目标——拉丁美洲和亚洲市场——的跳板”。在这种情况下，海军的作用是“提供和保护交通线，并解决因商业竞争而不可避免地爆发的冲突，从而确保剩余商品能够进入国外市场。” 84
This last remark raises the question of the economic content of Mahan's thinking about navies, colonies, and imperial expansion. As Kenneth Hagan says, he “was not particularly lucid about what precisely made colonies so valuable to the mother country,”—nor for that matter about any other economic aspect of imperialism.82 But the question cannot be dodged, if only because some American historians of the New Left—notably Walter LaFeber—have nominated Mahan to high rank among the late nineteenth-century proponents of something called “the New Empire.”83 Briefly, the argument runs as follows: Mahan believed that American surplus production had to seek new external markets and that the most promising of these were to be found in South America and China, especially in the latter. To exploit these possibilities, he advocated U.S. control of the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines as “stepping stones to the two great prizes: the Latin-American and Asian markets.” The role of the navy in this scenario was “to provide and protect lines of communication and to settle the conflicts which inevitably erupt from commercial rivalry, thus ensuring access to foreign markets for the surplus goods.”84
新左派的论点无疑是马汉式“历史处理中的从属”的绝佳例证。然而，如同马汉本人的学术研究一样，它也存在过度选择性和遗漏的问题。这位海权主义的鼓吹者认识到海军、远洋贸易和海外市场之间的相互依存关系，这一点毋庸置疑。正如他自己所说，“政治、商业和军事需求如此交织，以至于它们的相互作用构成了一个问题。”<sup> 85</sup>他对经由巴拿马运河，并经夏威夷延伸至东方的航运量抱有过高的期望，这显然是基于东方终点站存在一个乐于接受的市场这一前提。但他对东亚的商业前景却并不乐观，尽管支持门户开放，但他更担心现代化中国构成的军事威胁，而不是被新增四亿客户的前景所迷惑。至于潜在的南美市场，马汉漠不关心，甚至建议将亚马逊河谷以南的整个南美大陆排除在门罗主义的适用范围之外。<sup> 86</sup>最后，他对加勒比地区的持续关注主要源于他认识到该地区对美国安全和美国海军未来发展具有重要的战略意义。
The New Left thesis is doubtless a fine example of Mahanian “subordination in historical treatment.” Like Mahan's own scholarship, however, it suffers from overselectivity and errs on the side of omission. That the evangelist of sea power recognized the interdependence of navies, oceanic commerce, and overseas markets is clear enough. As he himself puts it, “political, commercial, and military needs are so intertwined that their mutual interaction constitutes one problem.”85 That his extravagant expectations for a flow of traffic through the Panama Canal, and on past Hawaii to the Orient, presumed a receptive market at the eastern terminus is obvious. But he was less than optimistic about the commercial possibilities of East Asia and, though supportive of the Open Door, was more concerned about the military threat posed by a modernized China than beguiled by the prospect of four hundred million added customers. As for the potential South American market, Mahan was so indifferent that he recommended the exclusion of the entire continent south of the Amazon valley from the operation of the Monroe Doctrine.86 Finally, his abiding preoccupation with the Caribbean stemmed mostly from his recognition of the area's strategic importance to the security of the United States and the future of the U.S. Navy.
正如沃尔特·米利斯所总结的那样：“很难不让人觉得，马汉的主要动机仅仅是为扩建海军提供论据。”彼得·卡斯滕也认同他“首先是一位纯粹的海军主义者，其他一切都是其次”。威廉·E·利夫齐也赞同“对他而言，海军至关重要，提升海军地位是首要任务”。甚至他早期的导师斯蒂芬·B·卢斯也发现，到1897年，马汉“已经让海军战略家的观点凌驾于政治经济学家的观点之上”。谈到美国海军时，马汉明确表达了自己的立场：“考虑到可能与我们对抗的人，无论是在东方还是在加勒比海……我们的舰队必须……足够强大……我们必须能够在太平洋和大西洋都发挥海军力量，同时也要记住，未来的运河……可能会遭到武力或阴谋的破坏。”对于一位海军军官来说，通过制海权来捍卫国家安全是他最关心的问题，这并不令人意外。87
Indeed, as Walter Millis concluded: “It is difficult to resist the impression that Mahan's major impulse was simply to produce an argument for more naval building.” Peter Karsten agrees that he was “a simple navalist first and everything else thereafter.” William E. Livezey concurs that “for him the navy was central and the advancement of his service was primary.” Even his early mentor, Stephen B. Luce, found that by 1897 Mahan had “allowed the views of a naval strategist to dominate those of the political economist.” Speaking for himself on the subject of the U.S. Navy, Mahan made his position clear: “Our fleet must be…adequate, considering those who might oppose us, whether in the East or in the Caribbean…we must be able to exert naval power in both the Pacific and the Atlantic, remembering also that the future canal is…open to interruption by force or treachery.” Not surprisingly for a naval officer, national defense through command of the sea was his major concern.87
然而，马汉的著作中还有另一个常被世俗人士忽略的主题，那就是他激进的基督教信仰：他相信战争是一种具有再生精神力量的信念；他将帝国扩张视为神意的体现；并且他坚信，伴随帝国而来的基督徒义务远比物质回报更为重大。尽管马汉并非不熟悉或反对社会达尔文主义的陈词滥调，但他的世界观主要灵感来源并非赫伯特·斯宾塞之流，而是《圣经》。他以“基督的宗教”为权威，写道：“冲突是一切物质和精神生活的必然条件；而精神生活最生动的隐喻和最崇高的灵感都源于士兵的经历。”他谈到美国“不情愿地吞并菲律宾”时写道：“为我们所做的准备，而非我们自己所做的准备……如此显而易见，以至于即使是最不自负的人也会从中看到天意。”对于美国近期获得的所有领土，“与我们之前的领地，或与欧洲列强在几年内吞并的领土相比，面积微不足道”，他怀疑物质收益是否可观；但他肯定地说：“国家在扩张中获得的是一种复兴的理念，一种心灵的提升，一种未来造福世界的种子，一种走出自我、走向世界，分享其所获得的丰厚馈赠的勇气。” 88
Yet there is another dominant theme in Mahan's writings sometimes overlooked by the secular-minded. That is his militant Christianity: his belief in war as a regenerative spiritual force; his view of imperial expansion as a manifestation of the Divine Will; and his conviction that with empire came Christian obligations more weighty than the attendant material rewards. Although not unfamiliar with, or averse to employing the clichés of Social Darwinism, it was not from the likes of Herbert Spencer, but from the Bible that Mahan chiefly drew inspiration for his Weltanschauung. Citing the “religion of Christ” as his authority, he could write: “Conflict is the condition of all life, material and spiritual; and it is to the soldier's experience that the spiritual life goes for its most vivid metaphors and its loftiest inspirations.” Referring to America's “unwilling acquisition of the Philippines,” he writes that “the preparation made for us, rather than by us…is so obvious as to embolden even the least presumptuous to see in it the hand of Providence.” And from all the territories recently acquired by the United States, an “acreage…trivial compared with our previous possessions, or with the annexation by European states within a few years,” he doubted whether the material gain would be substantial; but affirmed: “What the nation has gained in expansion is a regenerating idea, an uplifting of the heart, a seed of future beneficent activity, a going out of self into the world to communicate the gift it has so bountifully received.”88
正是这些话语提醒我们，马汉的世界观是多么过时。经历了两次世界大战的浩劫和第三世界的爆发之后，如今还有哪位公众人物敢于如此发言？这完全是萨拉热窝战役之前的言论。然而，他在海军事务上的睿智声誉却一直延续到二十世纪；至少在海军界，他的影响力在他1914年去世后可能比去世前更大。
It is words like these that remind us of how dated Mahan's world view is. What public figure today, after the carnage of two world wars and the eruption of the Third World, would dare to speak in such manner? This is the voice of a pre-Sarajevo man. Yet his reputation for sagacity on naval matters endured well into the twentieth century; and his influence, in naval circles at least, may have been even greater after, than before, his death in 1914.
V
V
在《现代战略的缔造者》第一卷的文章中，玛格丽特·斯普劳特明确指出：“没有任何一个人能像阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉那样，对海权理论和海军战略产生如此直接而深远的影响。他促成并引导了美国海军政策一场酝酿已久的变革。”<sup> 89</sup>然而，仔细考察就会发现，在19世纪最后十年里，马汉并非唯一“促成”美国海军政策变革的人。但这场“变革”的确“酝酿已久”。
In her essay in the first Makers of Modern Strategy, Margaret Sprout stated unequivocally: “No other single person has so directly and profoundly influenced the theory of sea power and naval strategy as Alfred Thayer Mahan. He precipitated and guided a long-pending revolution in American naval policy.”89 On closer examination, it appears that Mahan was not alone in “precipitating” the change of U.S. naval policy in the last decade of the nineteenth century. That this “revolution” was “long-pending,” however, is true enough.
在李将军于阿波马托克斯投降后的五年里，美国海军的规模从700艘舰艇（总排水量50万吨，装备近5000门火炮）缩减至2艘舰艇（总排水量20万吨，仅配备1300门火炮）。当欧洲乃至南美国家都在建造或购买装甲钢壳蒸汽动力舰艇，并为其配备线膛后装炮时，美国却依然保留着战前建造的木制巡洋舰，这些巡洋舰装备滑膛前装炮，并配备全套帆具作为辅助动力。当时的美国海军战略，如果真能称之为战略的话，主要包括用铁甲浅水重炮舰进行港口防御，以及在远海部署巡洋舰以展示实力。
In the five years after Lee's surrender at Appomattox, the U.S. Navy shrank in size from 700 vessels aggregating 500,000 tons and mounting almost 5,000 guns to a total of 2.00 ships displacing 200,000 tons and carrying only 1,300 guns. While European, and even South American countries were building or buying armored, steel-hulled, steam-powered vessels and arming them with rifled, breech-loading guns, the United States retained its prewar wooden cruisers, armed with smooth-bored, muzzle-loading cannon and carrying full sets of sail for auxiliary power. U.S. naval strategy, such as it was, consisted of harbor defense by ironclad monitors and cruiser deployments in distant waters to show the flag.90
舰船减少意味着人员减少。现役人员在1865年约有58,000名官兵，和平时期则锐减至仅9,361人。<sup> 91</sup>对于正规军官而言，这意味着晋升速度急剧放缓，尤其是那些在战后获得委任的年轻军官。例如，1868届海军学院最优秀的12名毕业生，到1889年仍然只是海军少尉。<sup>92</sup>对于这些人来说，未来职业晋升的唯一希望在于扩大造船规模。马汉作为1859届毕业生，自然避开了这种晋升瓶颈。他于1861年晋升为海军少尉，1865年晋升为海军中校，1872年晋升为海军上校。<sup> 93</sup>对他而言，海军并非一条死路，他在19世纪80年代日益增长的海军情结也并非出于对职业生涯的焦虑。94然而，对于那些在1873年于安纳波利斯成立的美国海军学院中点燃新专业主义之火的年轻军官们来说，情况可能有所不同。
Fewer ships meant fewer men. Active duty personnel, numbering about 58,000 officers and men in 1865, declined to a peacetime level of only 9,361.91 For regular officers this meant an alarming slowdown of promotions, particularly for the younger men who had received their commissions after the war's end. The twelve top graduates of the Naval Academy's class of 1868, for example, were still lieutenants in 1889.92 To such as these, the only hope for future professional advancement lay in an expanded ship-building program. Mahan, as an 1859 graduate, had of course escaped this logjam. He had been promoted to lieutenant in 1861, to lieutenant commander in 1865, and to commander in 1872.93 For him the navy had not been a dead end, and his burgeoning navalism of the 1880s cannot be attributed to career anxiety.94 It may have been otherwise, however, with the younger officers who kindled the fires of a new professionalism centered in the United States Naval Institute founded at Annapolis in 1873.
该研究所每月举行会议，会上宣读论文，这些论文随后出版并在其不断增长的会员中传阅——其中包括该组织曾任副主席的马汉。研究所还会为就指定专业主题提交的最佳论文颁发奖项。发表在该研究所会刊上的文章阐述了远洋贸易与海军力量之间的密切关系，解释了海上实力与国家强盛之间的历史联系，呼吁为美国海军增设煤炭补给站，论证了美国控制中美洲地峡的必要性，并倡导尽快建造主力舰并将其编入作战舰队。事实上，马汉在其早期著作中提出的所有主要论点和思想，在19世纪80年代就已被该研究所的撰稿人预见。其中最活跃的撰稿人之一，尽管并非初级军官，是斯蒂芬·B·卢斯。他发表的文章（1883-1889年）包括呼吁为海军军官提供高等教育、论证海军部重组的必要性，以及强烈主张建造一支战列舰海军。显然，海军内部已经为马汉阐述其海权哲学铺平了道路。他并非孤军奋战，也并非无路可走。95
The Institute held monthly meetings where papers were read, later to be published and circulated among its growing membership—including Mahan, the organization's one-time vice president. Prizes were awarded for the best essays submitted on assigned professional topics. Articles published in the Institute's Proceedings expounded on the intimate relationship between oceanic commerce and naval power, explained the historic connection between maritime strength and national greatness, urged the need for more coaling stations for the U.S. Navy, argued for American control of the Central American Isthmus, and advocated prompt construction of capital ships and their integration into fighting fleets. Indeed, all of the major arguments and ideas promulgated by Mahan in his early books were anticipated in the 1880s by the Institute's contributors. And among the most regular of these, though certainly not a junior officer, was Stephen B. Luce. His published pieces (1883–1889) included pleas for advanced education for naval officers, arguments for the reorganization of the Navy Department, and a strong case for building a battleship navy. Clearly the way had been prepared within the navy for Mahan's articulation of his philosophy of sea power. He was not moving into uncharted waters, nor was he without company.95
然而，在美国，海军军官既不制定海军政策，也不授权建造新舰。这些职责属于国会和联邦政府行政部门。因此，“美国海军政策的革命”并非由马汉促成，而是由海军部长本杰明·富兰克林·特雷西（1889-1893）及其继任者希拉里·A·赫伯特（1893-1897）推动的。必须指出的是，两人都应感谢马汉对国家需要战列舰的有力论证。1889年，特雷西恢复了马汉在海军战争学院的院长职位，并就此咨询了马汉的意见。在同年11月向本杰明·哈里森总统提交报告之前，特雷西可能已经阅读过马汉的第一部著作《影响力》的手稿。该报告敦促建造20艘新的装甲战列舰，并将其编入两个舰队。96哈里森向国会申请建造八艘战舰，结果只得到了三艘——印第安纳号、马萨诸塞号和俄勒冈号——每艘战舰排水量都超过 10,000 吨，并配备了 13 英寸和 8 英寸线膛炮。
Yet, in the United States, naval officers neither make naval policy nor authorize the construction of new ships. Such responsibilities lie with the Congress and the executive branch of the federal government. The “revolution in American naval policy” was “precipitated” therefore, not by Mahan, but by Benjamin Franklin Tracy, secretary of the navy (1889–1893) and continued by his successor, Hilary A. Herbert (1893–1897). Both, it must be said, were indebted to Mahan for his impressive rationalization of the country's need for battleships. Having restored him to the presidency of the Naval War College in 1889, Tracy consulted with Mahan and may have read the manuscript of his first Influence book before submitting his report to President Benjamin Harrison in November of that year, urging the construction of twenty new armored battleships to be organized into two fleets.96 Harrison asked the Congress for eight and got three—Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon—each displacing more than 10,000 tons and mounting 13-inch and 8-inch rifled guns.
1890年的《海军法》标志着新海军的诞生。<sup>97</sup>然而，下一届政府（克利夫兰的第二届政府，1893-1897年）上任后便着手削减海军开支。此外，希拉里·赫伯特还决心废除海军战争学院。巧合的是，1893年8月，在前往纽波特的途中，他被说服阅读了马汉的第二本《影响力》著作，并因此改变了主意。后来，他又阅读了该书的第一卷，并决定（正如他后来向作者解释的那样）“在我即将提交的报告中，运用您在书中阐述的信息来论证建造战列舰的必要性。” <sup>98</sup>在克利夫兰卸任之前，赫伯特已经说服国会拨款建造五艘新的战列舰。他是马汉的第一位主要支持者，或许也是最重要的支持者。
The Naval Act of 1890 had marked the birth of the new Navy.97 The next administration (Cleveland's second—1893–1897), however, took office prepared to reduce naval expenditures. Hilary Herbert was determined, moreover, to abolish the Naval War College. Providentially, en route to Newport in August of 1893, he was persuaded to read Mahan's second Influence book and thereupon changed his mind. Later he read the first of these volumes and decided, as he later explained to the author, “to use in my forthcoming report the information you have therein set forth in my arguments for the building of battleships.”98 Before Cleveland left office, Herbert had persuaded the Congress to supply funds for five more battleships. He was Mahan's first major, and possibly most important, convert.
西奥多·罗斯福和亨利·卡伯特·洛奇无需被说服就支持海军，但他们仍然乐于看到马汉看似详尽的学术研究来佐证自己的观点。洛奇将马汉的文章《夏威夷与我们未来的海上力量》纳入参议院外交关系委员会的报告，并在参议院发言时频繁引用马汉的观点。其他支持海军的国会议员，包括参议员约翰·T·摩根和众议员威廉·麦卡杜，也同样如此。99其他一些有影响力的仰慕者包括《评论评论》的编辑阿尔伯特·肖，以及大使兼后来的国务卿约翰·海，尽管后者曾说过，他“很高兴马汉的成就得到了公开认可，这样西奥多就不用再觉得有义务让我们都去听他的讲座了。” 100
Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge needed no conversion to navalism, but were happy nonetheless to have their opinions buttressed by Mahan's seemingly exhaustive scholarship. Lodge had the article “Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power” incorporated into the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and quoted Mahan frequently on the floor of the Senate. So did other pro-Navy members of Congress, including Senator John T. Morgan and Representative William McAdoo.99 Among other influential admirers were Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of Reviews, and Ambassador and later Secretary of State John Hay, though the latter once remarked that he was “so glad Mahan had been publicly recognized as Theodore would now no longer feel obliged to make [us] all go…to hear his lectures.”100
“西奥多”罗斯福认为马汉是他个人的发现。初读《海权对历史的影响》一书后，罗斯福写信给作者：“这是我所读过的同类著作中最清晰、最有启发性的。这是一本非常好的书——令人钦佩……”他在1890年10月的《大西洋月刊》上发表的书评同样赞誉有加。当罗斯福成为麦金莱总统的海军助理部长后，他敦促马汉“不时”给他写信。“我非常希望有机会能见到你，”他补充道，“因为有很多事情我想听听你的意见。”具体来说，他想听听马汉对海军部即将对西班牙开战的计划有何看法，收到马汉的来信后，罗斯福对他说：“毫无疑问，你比我们其他人都高出一筹！你给我们的建议正是我们想要的。”随后，在他启程加入“莽骑兵”部队之际，罗斯福安排马汉接替他在海军战争委员会的职位。101
“Theodore” considered Mahan to be his own personal discovery. On first reading The Influence of Sea Power upon History, Roosevelt wrote its author: “It is the clearest and most instructive general work of the kind with which I am acquainted. It is a very good book—admirable….” His review in the Atlantic Monthly for October 1890 was equally laudatory. When he became McKinley's assistant secretary of the navy, Roosevelt pressed Mahan to write him “from time to time.” “I wish very much I could get a chance to see you,” he added, as “there are a number of things about which I want to get your advice.” Specifically, he asked for the latter's comments on the Navy Department's plans for the coming war with Spain, and, on receiving them, advised the sender: “There is no question that you stand head and shoulders above the rest of us! You have given us just the suggestions we wanted.” Then, on his departure to join the Rough Riders, Roosevelt saw to it that Mahan replaced him on the Naval War Board.101
然而，说“马汉的海权哲学是通过西奥多·罗斯福本人进入白宫的”未免有些夸张。总统一如既往地认为这位海军上校是论证海军备战必要性的有力权威。但如今，罗斯福的海军理念已超越了马汉。他力主建造全大炮战列舰，堪比英国新型无畏舰，排水量达18000吨，并配备单座12英寸主炮。马汉一如既往地对新技术持怀疑态度，主张投资建造更多小型舰艇。他与一位才华横溢的年轻海军中校威廉·S·西姆斯在《海军学会会刊》上就此问题展开辩论。罗斯福最终站在了西姆斯一边。由于对手拥有更胜一筹的技术知识，马汉最终退出了这场争论。这位海军最杰出的战略家在六十七岁时不得不承认：“我年纪太大，也太忙了，跟不上时代了。”<sup> 102</sup>
It is an exaggeration to say, however, that “Mahan's philosophy of sea power entered the White House in the person of Theodore Roosevelt.” The President, as in the past, found the Captain a useful authority to cite in arguing the case for naval preparedness. But now his own navalism exceeded that of Mahan. Roosevelt urged the construction of all-big-gun battleships, comparable to the new British Dreadnoughts, displacing eighteen thousand tons and mounting single massive batteries of 12-inch guns. Mahan, suspicious as always of new technology, advocated an investment in more ships of smaller size. He debated the issue in the pages of the Naval Institute Proceedings with a bright, young lieutenant commander, William S. Sims. Roosevelt sided with the latter. Outdone by his opponent's superior technological knowledge, Mahan retired from the fray. At the age of sixty-seven, the navy's most eminent strategist had to admit: “I am too old and too busy to keep up.”102
这一事件表明，在第一次世界大战爆发前的最后十年里，马汉在海军中的影响力日渐式微。布拉德利·菲斯克曾在1903年被马汉在纽波特的演讲深深吸引，但到了1907年，他却认为马汉已经“失去了海军智囊的地位”。另一位曾经的支持者，卡斯帕·F·古德里奇上校也指出：“我过去一直认同马汉的观点，但几年前，我改变了看法。”就连卢斯也在建造全主炮舰的问题上与他这位昔日的弟子决裂。<sup> 103</sup>但这还不是全部。1911年，当海军少将雷蒙德·P·罗杰斯请马汉对海军战争学院击败日本的新战略计划（橙色计划）发表意见时，马汉提出了一个从基斯卡岛横跨北太平洋发动海上进攻的复杂方案。但海军战争学院认为这个方案不切实际，予以驳回。马汉大方地接受了拒绝，但他地位的下降显而易见。104
The incident is indicative of Mahan's waning influence within the navy in the final decade before the outbreak of the First World War. Bradley Fiske, who in 1903 had been captivated by Mahan's lectures at Newport, by 1907 considered him to have been “dethroned from his position as the brains of the Navy.” Another former supporter, Captain Caspar F. Goodrich, noted that “I used to think with Mahan, but a couple of years ago, I changed my mind.” Even Luce broke with his former disciple on the matter of the all-big-gun ship.103 And that was not all. When asked in 1911 by Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers to comment on the Naval War College's new strategic plan for the defeat of Japan (Plan Orange), Mahan responded with an elaborate scheme for a naval attack across the northern Pacific from Kiska. This the college rejected as unrealistic. Mahan accepted the rebuff graciously, but his loss of status was obvious.104
在国外，他的早期著作引起了广泛关注，尤其是在海军和政府部门。105这位作者在英国获得的赞誉已在前文提及。但不能说他的著作影响了英国海军政策的走向，除了确认和推广已有的决策之外。1889年，也就是第一本《影响》出版的前一年，议会通过了《海军防御法》，确立了皇家海军“至少应与其他两个国家的海军实力相当”的原则。1889年的威胁是法国和俄罗斯舰队可能在地中海联合行动。到了世纪之交，威胁则变成了德国。106
Abroad, his early books attracted favorable attention, especially in naval and government circles.105 The acclaim awarded their author in Britain has already been noted. But it cannot be said that his writings affected the course of British naval policy, other than to confirm and popularize decisions already reached. In 1889, a year before the first Influence book was published, Parliament had passed the Naval Defence Act establishing the principle that the Royal Navy “should at least be equal to the naval strength of any other two countries.” The threat in 1889 was a possible combination of French and Russian fleets in the Mediterranean. By the turn of the century it was Germany.106
在那个国家，马汉的著作也广为人知。自幼便热爱海军的威廉二世皇帝读了《影响》系列的第一卷后，便被深深吸引。1894年5月，他致电《纽约先驱报》的波特尼·比格洛，写道： “我正在如饥似渴地阅读马汉上校的著作，并试图将其背诵下来。这是一部一流的经典之作。我的所有舰船上都备有此书，我的舰长和军官们经常引用它。” <sup>107</sup>然而，这位皇帝似乎忽略了作者的一个重要观点。1896年2月，他在战争学院发表讲话时，主张建造一支新的巡洋舰舰队。而1897年6月上任的帝国海军部国务秘书阿尔弗雷德·冯·提尔皮茨海军上将，则对海权的需求有着更深刻的理解。他呈递给皇帝的第一份备忘录强调，“与英国的军事形势要求尽可能多地部署战列舰”，并且“巡洋舰与战列舰的比例应尽可能低”。<sup>108 </sup>提尔皮茨在形成这些观点之前是否读过马汉的著作，这一点令人怀疑。在他1919年撰写的回忆录中，他坚称自己关于战列舰部署的战术理论是独立于马汉而形成的，并且当他后来读到这位美国舰长的著作时，他惊讶于两人观点的“惊人巧合”。<sup>109</sup>然而，这位海军上将对德国殖民协会印刷两千册《海权对历史的影响》表示欢迎，将其作为他游说国会批准组建战列舰舰队的宣传活动的一部分。由此产生的1898年海军法是引发与英国海军竞赛的四部海军法中的第一部，而这场竞赛的后果众所周知。然而，马汉在这一切中的作用微乎其微，查尔斯·韦伯斯特爵士（如果杰拉尔德·格雷厄姆的记忆没错的话）所说的“马汉是第一次世界大战的起因之一”只能被理解为夸张的说法。110
In that country too Mahan's works had become well known. Emperor Wilhelm II, a naval enthusiast since boyhood, read the first volume of the Influence series and was entranced. In May 1894 he cabled Poultney Bigelow of the New York Herald: “I am just now, not reading but devouring, Captain Mahan's book; and am trying to learn it by heart. It is a first-class work and classical in all points. It is on board all my ships and constantly quoted by my Captains and officers.”107 The Kaiser, however, must have missed one of the author's major points. Addressing the Kriegsakademie in February 1896, he advocated construction of a new fleet of cruisers. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, secretary of state of the Imperial Naval Office beginning in June 1897, understood better the requirements of sea power. His first memorandum to the emperor stressed that “the military situation against England demands battleships in as great a number as possible” and that “the proportion of cruisers to battleships should be kept as low as possible.”108 It is doubtful that Tirpitz had read Mahan before forming these opinions. In his memoirs, written in 1919, he insisted that his tactical doctrine for battleship deployment had been developed independently of Mahan, and that, when he later read the American captain's work, he was struck by the “extraordinary coincidence” of their identical opinions.109 Nevertheless, the admiral welcomed the German Colonial Society's printing of two thousand copies of The Influence of Sea Power upon History as part of his propaganda campaign to persuade the Reichstag to authorize a fleet of battleships. The resultant Navy Law of 1898 was the first of four that kindled the naval race with Britain with all its well-known consequences. Yet Mahan's role in all this was of marginal significance, and Sir Charles Webster's remark (if correctly recalled by Gerald Graham) that “‘Mahan was one of the causes of World War I’” can only be understood as hyperbole.110
马汉在自传中写道，据他所知，他的作品被翻译成日语的数量超过了其他任何语言。这或许不假；至少他的《海权对历史的影响》一书在日本受到了热烈欢迎。1897年，东京东方学会告知他，他的第一部著作已被海军军官俱乐部翻译，并在该俱乐部成员中传阅，这些成员包括1800名国务大臣、国会议员、文武官员、编辑、银行家和商人。这些书籍被呈献给了天皇和皇太子，并根据天皇的诏令，被放置在日本所有中学、高等中学和师范学校中。或许更重要的是，鉴于后来的事件，《海权对历史的影响》被所有日本海军和军事院校选为教材。
In his autobiography, Mahan wrote that, so far as he knew, more of his works had been translated into Japanese than into any other language. This may have been so; at least the reception there of his Influence books was enthusiastic. In 1897 the Oriental Association of Tokyo advised him that the first of these had been translated by the Club of Naval Officers and circulated among the association's membership, which included 1,800 ministers of state, Diet members, civil and military officers, editors, bankers, and merchants. Copies had been presented to the emperor and the crown prince, and by imperial edict had been placed in every middle, higher middle, and normal school in Japan. Perhaps more importantly, in the light of events to come, The Influence of Sea Power upon History was adopted as a text in all Japanese naval and military colleges.111
第一次世界大战结束后，去世四年的马汉在美国海军界成为了一位颇具传奇色彩的人物。安纳波利斯海军学院以他的名字命名了一座大厅，海军战争学院也以他的名字命名了一座图书馆。然而，他的思想在多大程度上继续影响着海军的思维，则是另一个问题，而且这个问题也难以确定。1918年，海军学院的艾伦·韦斯科特教授出版了一本马汉著作节选集，该书在三年内一直是三年级（大三）海军学员海军史课程的必读书目。然而，19x2年之后，这本书被弃用，取而代之的是一本由韦斯科特教授参与编写的传统教科书。
After the end of World War I, Mahan, dead four years, was to become something of a cult hero in U.S. naval circles. At Annapolis a hall was named in his honor, and at the Naval War College, a library. The extent to which his teachings continued to affect naval thinking, however, is another matter, and one not easy to determine. In 1918 Professor Allan Wescott of the Naval Academy published a collection of excerpts from Mahan's works, which for three years was required reading in the course in naval history taken by all midshipmen of the third (Junior) class. After 19x2, however, the book was dropped in favor of a conventional textbook coauthored by Professor Wescott.112
在海军战争学院，历史研究在20世纪20年代和30年代被弱化。马汉的著作出现在“指定阅读课程”中，但其重要性并不高于其他海军知识分子，如朱利安·科贝特爵士、赫伯特·W·里士满爵士和拉乌尔·卡斯泰克斯海军上将的著作。事实上，在两次世界大战之间的纽波特，任何形式的传统学术研究都让位于战争游戏。学生们年复一年地在棋盘上重演日德兰海战。
At the Naval War College, the study of history was deemphasized in the 192.0s and 1930s. The works of Mahan appeared in the “prescribed reading course,” but no more prominently than those of such other naval intellectuals as Sir Julian Corbett, Sir Herbert W. Richmond, and Admiral Raoul Castex. Actually, during the interwar period at Newport, conventional academic studies of any sort yielded precedence to war gaming. Students year after year replayed the battle of Jutland on the gaming board.113
或许，在人们对第一次世界大战两支舰队之间那场胜负未分的较量如此痴迷之际，还能感受到阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉的幽灵挥之不去。至少，一位心灰意冷的军官是这么认为的，他将美国海军忽视潜艇战研究的原因归咎于马汉对海上战争的厌恶，尽管第一次世界大战的惨痛教训早已昭然若揭。“之所以对第一次世界大战中袭击商船的损失如此缺乏认识，”他总结道，“原因在于……对主力舰的物质执着，以及支撑这种执着的战略理论，即以马汉的决战理念为核心，认为战列舰在决战中占据绝对优势。” <sup>114</sup>同样的“执着”显然也支配着每年举行的“游戏”——一场蓝方（美国）与橙方（日本）之间的模拟海上战争。尽管模拟中假定有航空母舰参战，但其战术高潮始终是战列舰舰队之间的战斗。这些演习均未设想最终入侵或空袭日本；任务以胜利的美国海军建立经济封锁而告终。<sup>115</sup>或许，在人们对马汉著作兴趣明显下降的时期，这些演习确实在参与者中延续了马汉式的战略观。这或许可以解释为何威廉·D·普勒斯顿上校在1939年能够自信地断言：“如今，在美国海军中，每一位准备或讨论战争的军官都遵循马汉的方法并援引他的思想。” <sup>116</sup>或许，这也解释了本文开头引述的战争部长史汀生对海军部的指责。
Perhaps, in this intense preoccupation with an inconclusive duel of World War I battle fleets, one can detect the lingering ghost of Alfred Thayer Mahan. That was the opinion, anyway, of one disillusioned officer who blamed Mahan's aversion to la guerre de course for the U.S. Navy's neglect of the study of submarine warfare despite the bitter lessons of the First World War. “The reason for this obvious lack of appreciation of the commerce raiding loss of World War I,” he concluded, “was…a material fixation on the capital ship, supported by a strategic doctrine which concentrated on the Mahanian concept of a decisive battle in which the battleship was supreme.”114 The same “fixation” apparently governed the annual playing of “The Game,” a simulated war at sea between Blue (the United States) and Orange (Japan). Though the participation of aircraft carriers was assumed, the tactical climax of the simulation was always a fight between fleets of battleships. None of these games envisioned a final invasion or aerial bombardment of Japan; the mission ended with the establishment of an economic blockade by the victorious U.S. Navy.115 Perhaps these exercises did perpetuate among their participants a Mahanian view of strategy at a time of apparently declining interest in Mahan's writings. This may be why Captain William D. Puleston could confidently assert in 1939 that “today, in the American Navy, every officer who prepares for or discusses war, follows the methods and invokes the ideas of Mahan.”116 Perhaps too it explains the charge leveled against the Navy Department by Secretary of War Stimson, as quoted at the beginning of this essay.
然而，令人惊讶的是，一些历史学家仍然坚持将美国在二战中战胜日本帝国描述为“马汉精辟阐述并推广的战略原则”的验证，或“马汉式的海权胜利”。<sup> 117</sup>虽然战时海军作战部长欧内斯特·J·金海军上将或许可以被恰当地称为马汉主义者，但太平洋战争并非完全按照他的意愿进行。<sup>118</sup>战争也并非完全按照马汉严格的理论进行，该理论规定双方主力舰队之间必须进行一场决定性的决战。然而，即使在航空母舰之间，也没有出现这样的决战——无论是中途岛海战、菲律宾海海战还是莱特湾海战。此外，马哈尼主义根本无法解释麦克阿瑟将军收复西南太平洋广袤的日占领土、中太平洋地区一系列依靠海军炮火持续轰击岸上防御工事而得以进行的登陆作战、美国陆军航空队B-29轰炸日本本土，以及美国潜艇对日本商船发动的卓有成效的航海战。太平洋战争的胜利是诸兵种协同作战的结果，而非美国海军单打独斗的产物。
It is surprising, however, that some historians have persisted in describing the United States' victory over the Japanese Empire in World War II as a validation of “the principle of strategy which Mahan had so ably elucidated and popularized,” or as “a Mahanian triumph of sea power.”117 Although the wartime chief of naval operations, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, might properly be labelled a Mahanian, the war in the Pacific was not conducted entirely according to his wishes.118 Nor was it conducted entirely according to the strict Mahanian canon, which prescribed a climactic battle between opposing fleets of capital ships. There was no such climactic battle, even between aircraft carriers—not Midway, nor the Philippine Sea, nor Leyte Gulf. Moreover, Mahanian doctrine simply cannot be stretched to include General MacArthur's re-conquest of the vast Japanese-held territories in the Southwest Pacific, the successive amphibious assaults in the Central Pacific made possible by prolonged naval gunfire against fortifications ashore, or the B-29 bombing of Japan by the U.S. Army Air Forces, or the highly successful guerre de course waged by American submarines against Japanese merchant shipping. Victory in the Pacific was the product of combined arms, not of the autonomous operations of the United States Navy.
自1945年以来的发展进一步加强了各军种之间的相互依存，并模糊了陆基、空基和海基武器之间以往的界限，其程度之深是马汉难以想象的。劳伦斯·W·马丁对此阐述如下：
Developments since 1945 have further enhanced the interdependence of all armed services and have blurred former distinctions between land-, air-, and sea-based weapons to a degree inconceivable to Mahan. Laurence W. Martin states the matter thus:
在本世纪下半叶，海军推进系统、飞机、导弹、炸药和计算技术的飞速发展，彻底颠覆了以舰队作战为战略核心的格局。潜艇、飞机和导弹已成为大型水面舰艇的劲敌，而这些舰艇的主要攻击目标则转移到了陆地。对陆轰炸，这项曾经最不起眼的海军任务，如今已成为大型海军的主要任务——战略上依靠潜艇发射的导弹，战术上则依靠海上飞机。119
In the second half of the century, developments in naval propulsion, in aircraft, missiles, explosives and techniques of computation, have overthrown completely the context in which fleet actions were the focus of strategy. Submarines, aircraft and missiles have become the dangerous enemies of the larger surface ships while those ships find their prime targets on shore. Bombardment of the land, once one of the most humble naval tasks, has become a dominant concern of the larger navies—strategically with missiles launched from submarines, tactically with aircraft based at sea.119
然而，在二战后的几十年里，马汉的名字在海军界依然备受尊敬，甚至被奉为圭臬。他的名字经常出现在《美国海军学会会刊》和《海军战争学院评论》的文章中。在纽波特，诸如“核时代的马汉”之类的讲座也屡见不鲜。甚至到了1972年，在他担任海军战争学院院长之初，斯坦斯菲尔德·特纳海军中将也不得不屈从于传统，宣布：“今年或明年的班级里可能还会出现另一个阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉。我们不能错过他。”<sup> 120</sup>
Yet in naval circles Mahan's name, in the decades following World War II, continued to command respect and even veneration. It appeared with some regularity in articles in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and the Naval War College Review. At Newport, lectures on such subjects as “Mahan in the Nuclear Age” were not uncommon. As late as 1972, at the beginning of his enlightened and innovative presidency of the Naval War College, even Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner bowed to tradition to the extent of announcing: “There may be another Alfred Thayer Mahan in this year's class or the next. We cannot afford to miss him.”120
然而，抛开传统主义不谈，几乎没有迹象表明如今的美国海军仍然坚持马哈尼式的战略观点，即把海权置于所有其他军事行动之上，声称海军在战争领域拥有自主权，并将制海权等同于胜利。根据海军作战部长1984财年的“态势声明”，“我们的海上战略不仅依赖于美国海军力量，也依赖于美国其他空军和陆军力量以及我们盟友和友邦的部队。”<sup> 121</sup>史汀生部长肯定会赞同这一点。战神再次变成了火星，而不是海王星。
Traditionalism aside, however, there is scant indication that the U.S. Navy today holds to the Mahanian view of strategy that exalts sea power over all other forms of military action, claims for navies an autonomous domain in the realm of warfare, and equates command of the sea with victory. “Our maritime strategy,” according to the 1984 fiscal year “posture statement” of the chief of naval operations, “relies not only on U.S. naval forces, but also depends on the contributions of other U.S. air and land assets and the forces of our friends and allies.”121 Secretary Stimson would have approved. Mars, not Neptune, is again the god of war.
然而，必须指出的是，即便马汉的答案已不再适用，他提出的问题依然重要。他始终要求听众和读者认真思考诸如国家利益概念的含义；军事力量的道德维度；世界强权的责任与机遇；美国对海上交通线的依赖性质；舰队的构成；战争的后勤需求；以及，最为重要的，海军作为国家政策工具的运用。“先生们，全世界都知道，”他在1892年海军战争学院的课堂上宣布，“我们正在建造一支新的海军……那么，当我们拥有这支海军时，我们将如何运用它呢？”<sup> 122</sup>这过去是，现在仍然是一个问题。
It must be said, however, that if Mahan's answers are no longer relevant, the questions he raised still are. He consistently asked his listeners and readers to give serious thought to such matters as the meaning of the concept of national interest; the moral dimensions of military force; the responsibilities, as well as the opportunities, of world power; the nature of American dependence on sea-lines of communication; the composition of fleets; the logistical requirements of warfare; and, most importantly, the uses of navies as instruments of national policy. “All the world knows, gentlemen,” he announced to the Naval War College class of 1892, “that we are building a new navy…. Well, when we get our navy, what are we going to do with it?”122 That was—and is—the question.
1 Henry L. Stimson 和 McGeorge Bundy，《现役》（纽约，1948 年），506。
1 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service (New York, 1948), 506.
2关于米洛·马汉的影响，参见罗伯特·西格二世，《阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉：其人及其书信》（安纳波利斯，1977 年），第 10、39-40、68-70、445-52 页。
2 On Milo Mahan's influence, see Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis, 1977), 10, 39–40, 68–70, 445–52.
3 Robert Seager II 和 Doris D. Maguire 编辑，《马汉书信集》，3 卷（安纳波利斯，1975 年），1:4。
3 Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, eds., Letters and Papers of Mahan, 3 vols. (Annapolis, 1975), 1:4.
4同上，2：114。
4 Ibid., 2: 114.
5同上，1：578。
5 Ibid., 1: 578.
6该术语是玛格丽特·斯普劳特提出的。参见《现代战略的缔造者》中的“马汉：海权的布道者”，爱德华·米德·厄尔编辑（普林斯顿，1943 年）。
6 The term is Margaret Sprout's. See “Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943).
7阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《海军行政与战争》（波士顿，1906 年），第 199-213 页。
7 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston, 1906), 199–213.
8阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《从帆船到蒸汽：海军生活回忆录》（伦敦和纽约，1907 年），第 311-312 页。
8 Alfred Thayer Mahan, From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life (London and New York, 1907), 311–12.
9 Mahan，《海军管理》，第 241 页。
9 Mahan, Naval Administration, 241.
10 Ronald Spector，《战争教授：海军战争学院和海军职业的发展》（罗德岛州纽波特，1977 年），第 66 页。
10 Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession (Newport, R.I., 1977), 66.
11引自查尔斯·卡莱尔·泰勒，《马汉海军上将传》（纽约，1920 年），第 50 页。
11 Quoted in Charles Carlisle Taylor, The Life of Admiral Mahan (New York, 1920), 50.
12 Seager， Alfred Thayer Mahan，411。
12 Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, 411.
13 Seager 和 Maguire，《信件和文件》，3:540。
13 Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 3:540.
14信，马汉致卢斯，1885 年 5 月 16 日，同上，1:606–607。
14 Ltr., Mahan to Luce, May 16, 1885, ibid., 1:606–607.
15 Stephen B. Luce，“战争学校”，美国海军学会会刊9，第 5 期（1883 年），656。
15 Stephen B. Luce, “War Schools,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 9, no. 5 (1883), 656.
16 Stephen B. Luce，“论海军战争作为一门科学的研究”，美国海军学会会刊12，第 4 期（1886 年），531-33 页。
16 Stephen B. Luce, “On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 12, no. 4 (1886), 531–33.
17 Mahan，《从帆船到蒸汽船》，277。
17 Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 277.
18 Seager 和 Maguire，《书信与论文集》，1:616–19。
18 Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 1:616–19.
19关于马汉为他的第一次演讲所做的准备，参见马汉，《从帆船到蒸汽》，第 281-82 页、第 384-85 页；威廉·E·利夫齐，《马汉论海权》（俄克拉荷马州诺曼，1981 年），第 40-44 页；威廉·D·普勒斯顿，《马汉：美国海军上校阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉的生平与事业》（纽黑文，1939 年），第 74-80 页；西格，《阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉》，第 164-67 页。
19 On Mahan's preparation for his first lectures, see Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 281–82, 384–85; William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, Okla., 1981), 40–44; William D. Puleston, Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN (New Haven, 1939), 74–80; Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, 164–67.
20 Mahan，《从帆船到蒸汽船》，282-83。
20 Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 282–83.
21同上，275-76。
21 Ibid., 275–76.
22阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《海权对历史的影响，1660–1783》（波士顿，1890 年），v-vi（以下简称马汉，《影响 #1》）。
22 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston, 1890), v-vi (hereafter cited as Mahan, Influence #1).
23信，马汉致罗伊·B·马斯顿，1897 年 2 月 19 日，西格和马奎尔，《信件和文件》，2:494。
23 Ltr., Mahan to Roy B. Marston, February 19, 1897, Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 2:494.
24 Mahan，《影响》第 1 期，第 138 页，第 71 页。
24 Mahan, Influence #1, 138, 71.
25阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《海权对法国大革命和帝国的影响，1793-1812》，2卷（波士顿，1892年），第2卷，第372-373页（以下简称马汉，《影响》第2期）；阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《美国对海权的兴趣，现在和未来》（波士顿，1897年），第307-308页。
25 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812, 2 vols. (Boston, 1892), 2:372–73 (hereafter cited as Mahan, Influence #2); Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston, 1897), 307–308.
26 Mahan，《影响》第 1 期，第 179、180、185-87、197 页。
26 Mahan, Influence #1, 179, 180, 185–87, 197.
27同上，222-23。
27 Ibid., 222–23.
28同上，第 295 页。
28 Ibid., 295.
29同上，第 397 页。
29 Ibid., 397.
30 Mahan，《影响 #2》，2:118、108、184–85、400–402。
30 Mahan, Influence #2, 2:118, 108, 184–85, 400–402.
31例如，参见：查尔斯·A·比尔德，《美国的对外政策》（纽约，1940 年），第 75-76 页；杰拉尔德·S·格雷厄姆，《海军霸权的政治：英国海上霸权研究》（剑桥，1965 年），第 6-8 页、第 19-27 页；保罗·M·肯尼迪，《英国海军霸权的兴衰》（纽约，1976 年），第 3-5 章及其他章节。
31 See, for example: Charles A. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America (New York, 1940), 75–76; Gerald S. Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy: Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy (Cambridge, 1965), 6–8, 19–27; Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York, 1976), chs. 3–5, passim.
32肯尼迪，《兴衰史》，第76页。
32 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 76.
33格雷厄姆，《海军霸权政治》，第19页。
33 Graham, Politics of Naval Supremacy, 19.
34肯尼迪，《兴衰史》，第114页。
34 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 114.
35参见 Vincent Cronin，《拿破仑·波拿巴：一部亲密传记》（纽约，1972 年），第 305-310 页；Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky，《俄罗斯与欧洲，1789-1825 年》（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特，1968 年重印），第 152-197 页。
35 See Vincent Cronin, Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography (New York, 1972), 305–310; Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789–1825 (repr. Westport, Conn., 1968) 152–97.
36 David Hackett Fischer，《历史学家的谬误：走向历史思想的逻辑》（纽约、埃文斯顿和伦敦，1970 年），第 172 页。
36 David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York, Evanston, and London 1970), 172.
37阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，“历史处理中的从属关系”，载于马汉，《海军管理》，第 245-72 页。
37 Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Subordination in Historical Treatment,” in Mahan, Naval Administration, 245–72.
38马汉，《美国对海权的兴趣》，第128页。
38 Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, 128.
39阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《与垃圾邮件的战争教训及其他文章》（波士顿，1899 年），第 106 页；马汉，《影响》第 1 期，第 138 页；威廉·雷泽尔，“马汉论海洋的运用”，《海军战争学院评论》（1973 年 5 月至 6 月），第 73-82 页。
39 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spam and Other Articles (Boston, 1899), 106; Mahan, Influence #1, 138; William Reitzel, “Mahan on the Use of the Sea,” Naval War College Review (May-June 1973), 73–82.
40封信，马汉致威廉·H·亨德森，1890 年 5 月 5 日，西格和马奎尔，《信件和文件》，2:9。
40 Ltr., Mahan to William H. Henderson, May 5, 1890, Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 2:9.
41 Seager， Alfred Thayer Mahan，167，172。
41 Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, 167, 172.
42 Mahan，《影响力》第 1、2部分。
42 Mahan, Influence #1, 2.
43 Stephen B. Luce，“论海军战争作为一门科学的研究”，美国海军学会会刊12，第 4 期（1886 年），534。最初于 1885 年和 1886 年在海军战争学院以讲座形式发表，后重印于John D. Hayes 和 John B. Hattendorf 编辑的《Stephen B. Luce 的著作》（罗德岛州纽波特，1975 年），第 1 卷，第 47-68 页。
43 Stephen B. Luce, “On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 12, no. 4 (1886), 534. First delivered in lecture form at the Naval War College in 1885 and 1886, repr. in The Writings of Stephen B. Luce, ed. John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf (Newport, R.I., 1975), 1:47–68.
44封信，马汉致卢斯，1886 年 1 月 6 日，西格和马奎尔，《信件和文件》，1:619。
44 Ltr., Mahan to Luce, January 6, 1886, Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 1:619.
45安托万-亨利·若米尼，《孙子兵法》（费城，1862 年；康涅狄格州韦斯特波特，1966 年重印），第 63 页。
45 Antoine-Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Philadelphia, 1862; repr. Westport, Conn., 1966), 63.
46同上，196、104、106。
46 Ibid., 196, 104, 106.
47同上，232-34。
47 Ibid., 232–34.
48阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《海军战略：与陆地军事行动的原则和实践的比较和对比》（波士顿，1911 年），第 6 页；马汉，《影响 #1》，第 8-9 页；马汉，《海军战略》，第 49 页、第 31 页。
48 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston, 1911), 6; Mahan, Influence #1, 8–9; Mahan, Naval Strategy, 49, 31.
49马汉，《海军战略》，第 53、55 页；马汉，《与西班牙战争的教训》，第 262 页。
49 Mahan, Naval Strategy, 53, 55; Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain, 262.
50马汉，《与西班牙战争的教训》，第37页。
50 Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain, 37.
51同上，第 264 页；马汉，《海军管理》，第 165 页；马汉，《美国人对海上力量的兴趣》，第 198 页。
51 Ibid., 264; Mahan, Naval Administration, 165; Mahan, The Interest American in Sea Power, 198.
52马汉，《与西班牙战争的教训》，第 38-39 页。
52 Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain, 38–39.
53马汉，《海军战略》，第6页。
53 Mahan, Naval Strategy, 6.
54阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《海权及其与 1812 年战争的关系》，2 卷（纽约，1903 年），第 2 卷，第 51 页；马汉，《与西班牙战争的教训》 ，第 167 页、第 137 页；马汉，《海军战略》，第 189 页、第 199 页、第 254 页；马汉，《影响 #1》，第 287-288 页；马汉，《影响 #2》，第 1 卷，第 155-156 页；马汉，《1812 年战争中的海权》，第 2 卷，第 52 页、第 301 页。
54 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, 2 vols. (New York, 1903), 2: 51; Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain, 167, 137; Mahan, Naval Strategy, 189, 199, 254; Mahan, Influence #1, 287–88; Mahan, Influence #2, 1:155–56; Mahan, Sea Power in the War of 1812, 2:52, 301.
55马汉，《美国对海权的兴趣》，194；阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《法拉格特海军上将》（纽约，1892 年），218；马汉，《海军管理》，194；马汉，《影响 #2》，1:355。
55 Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, 194; Alfred Thayer Mahan, Admiral Farragut (New York, 1892), 218; Mahan, Naval Administration, 194; Mahan, Influence #2, 1:355.
56马汉，《影响》第 1 号，539；约米尼，《孙子兵法》，63。
56 Mahan, Influence #1, 539; Jomini, The Art of War, 63.
57阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《美国独立战争中海军的主要行动》（波士顿，1913 年），第 33 页。
57 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence (Boston, 1913), 33.
58马汉，《海军战略》，第166页。
58 Mahan, Naval Strategy, 166.
59同上，191-92；阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《回顾与展望：国际关系、海军和政治研究》（波士顿，1902 年），46。
59 Ibid., 191–92; Alfred Thayer Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political (Boston, 1902), 46.
60 Jomini，《孙子兵法》第60条，226-30。
60 Jomini, Article 60, The Art of War, 226–30.
61 Mahan，《海军战略》，第 205、213、218、243 页。
61 Mahan, Naval Strategy, 205, 213, 218, 243.
62 Mahan，《影响 #1》，287–88。
62 Mahan, Influence #1, 287–88.
63 Mahan，《海军战略》，第 139、435 页。
63 Mahan, Naval Strategy, 139, 435.
64 Mahan，《影响 #2》，2:296。
64 Mahan, Influence #2, 2:296.
65 James A. Barber，“马汉与核时代的海军战略”，《海军战争学院评论》（1972 年 3 月），83-85 页。
65 James A. Barber, “Mahan and Naval Strategy in the Nuclear Age,” Naval War College Review (March 1972), 83–85.
66约米尼，《孙子兵法》，第12页。
66 Jomini, The Art of War, 12.
67 Mahan，《从帆船到蒸汽船》，283。
67 Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 283.
68虽然《战争论》的英文译本早在 1908 年就已收藏于海军战争学院图书馆，但马汉可能直到两年后才通过戈登高地步兵团的斯图尔特·L·默里少校所著的题为《战争的现实》的评论文章首次接触到克劳塞维茨。（普勒斯顿，《马汉》，293 页。）
68 Although an English translation of On War was in the library of the Naval War College as early as 1908, it was probably not until two years later that Mahan first made his acquaintance with Clausewitz by way of a commentary written by Major Stewart L. Murray of the Gordon Highlanders, entitled The Reality of War. (Puleston, Mahan, 293.)
69 Mahan，《美国对海权的兴趣》，第 177、180 页。
69 Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, 177, 180.
70阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《军备与仲裁，或武力在国家间国际关系中的地位》（纽约和伦敦，1912 年），第 66-67 页。
70 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, or the Place of Force in the International Relations of States (New York and London, 1912.), 66–67.
71马汉，《回顾与展望》，18；马汉致阿什的信，1884 年 7 月 26 日，西格和马奎尔，《信件和文件》，1:154；马汉，《影响 #1》，29-87。
71 Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect, 18; ltr., Mahan to Ashe, July 26, 1884, Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 1:154; Mahan, Influence #1, 29–87.
72同上，33-34。
72 Ibid., 33–34.
73信，马汉致阿什，1880 年 3 月 12 日，西格和马奎尔，《信件和文件》，1:482；马汉，《美国对海权的兴趣》，11-15，20-21。
73 Ltr., Mahan to Ashe, March 12, 1880, Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 1:482; Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, 11–15, 20–21.
74 Mahan，《美国对海权的兴趣》，第 66、81-87、100-103 页。
74 Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, 66, 81–87, 100–103.
75马汉，《与西班牙战争的教训》，第 29 页；马汉，《海军战略》，第 111 页。
75 Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain, 29; Mahan, Naval Strategy, 111.
76 Mahan，《美国对海权的兴趣》，第 26 页；同上，第 31-32 页。
76 Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, 26; ibid., 31–32.
77同上，第 32-58 页，第 217-70 页。
77 Ibid., 32–58, 217–70.
78 James A. Field, Jr.，“美国帝国主义：几乎任何书中‘最糟糕的章节’”，《美国历史评论》83，第3期（1978年6月），666。
78 James A. Field, Jr., “American Imperialism: The ‘Worst Chapter’ in Almost Any Book,” American Historical Review 83, no. 3 (June 1978), 666.
79例如，参见 Julius Pratt，《1898 年的扩张主义者》（巴尔的摩，1936 年），第 12-22 页、第 222-283 页；Walter LaFeber，《新帝国：对 1860-1898 年美国扩张的解释》（伊萨卡和伦敦，1963 年），第 85-101 页。
79 See, for example, Julius Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore, 1936), 12–22, 222–83; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898 (Ithaca and London, 1963), 85–101.
80封信，马汉致洛奇，1898 年 7 月 27 日，西格和马奎尔，《信件和文件》，2:569；马汉，《回顾与展望》，44-45；阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《亚洲问题及其对国际政策的影响》（波士顿，1900 年），7-9。
80 Ltr., Mahan to Lodge, July 27, 1898, Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 2:569; Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect, 44–45; Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia and Its Effects upon International Policies (Boston, 1900), 7–9.
81马汉，《亚洲问题》，第 67 页；马汉致罗斯福的信，1901 年 3 月 12 日，西格和马奎尔，《信件和文件》，第 2 卷，第 707 页；马汉，《亚洲问题》，第 88、154、163、34 页。
81 Mahan, Problem of Asia, 67; ltr., Mahan to Roosevelt, March 12, 1901, Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 2:707; Mahan, Problem of Asia, 88, 154, 163, 34.
82 Kenneth J. Hagan，“阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉：让美国重返海洋”，载于Frank J. Merli 和 Theodore A. Wilson 编辑的《美国外交的缔造者》，2 卷（纽约，1974 年），第 1 卷，第 284 页。
82 Kenneth J. Hagan, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: Turning America Back to the Sea,” in Makers of American Diplomacy, ed. Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, 2 vols. (New York, 1974), 1:284.
83 Walter LaFeber，《新帝国》，全文。然而，该学派的另一位主要成员明智地避免在此背景下提及马汉，只是略微提及：参见 Thomas McCormick，《中国市场：美国对非正式帝国的追求，1893-1901》（芝加哥，1967 年）。
83 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire, passim. Another leading member of this school, however, wisely avoids all but the bare mention of Mahan in this context: see Thomas McCormick, China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901 (Chicago, 1967).
84 Walter LaFeber，《新帝国》，91、93。
84 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire, 91, 93.
85 Mahan，《回顾与展望》，139-40。
85 Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect, 139–40.
86马汉，《亚洲问题》，85-86，138。
86 Mahan, Problem of Asia, 85–86, 138.
87 Walter Millis，《武器与人：美国军事史研究》（纽约，1958 年），第 144 页；Peter Karsten，《海军贵族：安纳波利斯的黄金时代和现代美国海军主义的兴起》（纽约，1972 年），第 337 页；Livezey，《马汉论海权》，第 343 页；John D. Hayes，“现代海权的影响”，《美国海军学会会刊》（1971 年 5 月），第 279 页；Mahan，《亚洲问题》 ，第 198-199 页。
87 Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History (New York, 1958), 144; Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York, 1972), 337; Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 343; John D. Hayes, “The Influence of Modern Sea Power,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1971), 279; Mahan, Problem of Asia, 198–99.
88马汉，《美国对海权的兴趣》，第 268 页；马汉，《亚洲问题》，第 175 页；马汉，《回顾与展望》，第 17 页。
88 Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, 268; Mahan, Problem of Asia, 175; Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect, 17.
89 Sprout，“Mahan”，416。
89 Sprout, “Mahan,” 416.
90哈罗德·斯普劳特和玛格丽特·T·斯普劳特，《美国海军力量的崛起》（普林斯顿，1939 年），169-76 页。
90 Harold Sprout and Margaret T. Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton, 1939), 169–76.
91本杰明·富兰克林·库林，《本杰明·富兰克林·特雷西：美国战斗海军之父》（康涅狄格州哈姆登，1973 年），第 48 页。
91 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of the American Fighting Navy (Hamden, Conn., 1973), 48.
92 Karsten，《海军贵族》，第 280 页。
92 Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 280.
93 Seager 和 Maguire，《信件和论文集》，第 1 卷：371-372 页。
93 Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 1:371–72.
94有关相反的观点，请参阅 Karsten 的《海军贵族》，第 331 页。
94 For a contrary view, see Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 331.
95 Robert Seager II，“马汉之前的十年：新海军的非官方案例，1880-1890”，《密西西比河谷历史评论》（1953 年 12 月），491-512；Seager， 《阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉》，199-203；Hagan，“阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉”，1:287-93；Lawrence C. Allin，“海军学院、马汉和海军职业”，《海军战争学院评论》（1978 年夏季），29-48；Luce 的文章摘要见Hayes 和 Hattendorf 编辑的《Stephen B. Luce 文集》 ，191-205。
95 Robert Seager II, “Ten Years before Mahan; The Unofficial Case for the New Navy, 1880–1890,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review (December 1953), 491–512; Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, 199–203; Hagan, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 1:287–93; Lawrence C. Allin, “The Naval Institute, Mahan, and the Naval Profession,” Naval War College Review (Summer 1978), 29–48; summaries of Luce's articles appear in The Writings of Stephen B. Luce, ed. Hayes and Hattendorf, 191–205.
96 Sprout 和 Sprout，《美国海军力量的崛起》，第 205-213 页；Richard S. West, Jr.，《美国帝国的海军将领》（印第安纳波利斯和纽约，1948 年），第 147 页；Cooling，《本杰明·富兰克林·特雷西》，第 72-74 页；Walter R. Herrick, Jr.，《美国海军革命》（巴吞鲁日，1966 年），第 3-11 页。
96 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 205–213; Richard S. West, Jr., Admirals of American Empire (Indianapolis and New York, 1948), 147; Cooling, Benjamin Franklin Tracy, 72–74; Walter R. Herrick, Jr., The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge, 1966), 3–11.
1883年，美国海军批准建造三艘无装甲钢壳巡洋舰—— “亚特兰大”号、“波士顿”号和“芝加哥”号，以及一艘通讯艇“海豚”号（“白舰队”），但这些舰艇的排水量均不超过6000吨，且全部配备辅助帆。在克利夫兰第一届政府（1885-1889年）期间，又订购了八艘巡洋舰，其中包括“德克萨斯”号和“缅因”号（有时被称为“二等战列舰”）以及“查尔斯顿”号——第一艘完全没有帆布的巡洋舰。然而，这些舰艇都不是真正的战列舰；它们的设计目的主要是为了拦截或摧毁商船，而不是与其他舰队交战。
97 In 1883 three unarmored steel-hulled cruisers, Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago, plus the dispatch boat Dolphin (the “White Squadron”) had been authorized, but none exceeded 6,000 tons and all carried auxiliary sail. During the first Cleveland administration (1885–1889), eight more cruisers were ordered, including Texas and Maine (sometimes called “second-class battleships”) and Charleston, the first to be free of all canvas. None of these, however, was a true battleship; they were designed mostly for the interdiction or destruction of commercial shipping, not engagements with other fleets.
98 Seager Alfred Thayer Mahan，274。
98 Seager Alfred Thayer Mahan, 274.
99 Livezey，《马汉论海权》，181；乔治·T·戴维斯，《首屈一指的海军：现代美国海军政策的发展》（纽约，1940 年），75-76。
99 Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 181; George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy (New York, 1940), 75–76.
100 Peter Karsten，“影响力的本质：罗斯福、马汉和海权概念”，《美国季刊》 23（1971 年 10 月），590。
100 Peter Karsten, “The Nature of Influence: Roosevelt, Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power,” American Quarterly 23 (October 1971), 590.
101 Seager，《阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉》，第 209-210 页；Livezey，《马汉论海权》，第 123-24 页、143-44 页。
101 Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, 209–210; Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 123–24, 143–44.
102 Sprout 和 Sprout，《美国海军力量的崛起》，第 20 页；关于罗斯福“利用”马汉以及马汉对罗斯福的“利用”，参见 Karsten，“影响的本质”，第 585-600 页，以及 Michael Corgan，“马汉和西奥多·罗斯福：影响的评估”，《海军战争学院评论》（1980 年 11 月-12 月），第 89-97 页；Seager，《阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉》，第 519-32 页；马汉致 Bouvene F. Clark 的信，1907 年 1 月 15 日，Seager 和 Maguire，《信件和文件》，第 3 卷，第 203 页。
102 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 20; on Roosevelt's “use” of Mahan and vice versa, see Karsten, “Nature of Influence,” 585–600, and Michael Corgan, “Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt: The Assessment of Influence,” Naval War College Review (November-December 1980), 89–97; Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, 519–32; ltr., Mahan to Bouvene F. Clark, January 15, 1907, Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 3:203.
103 Seager， Alfred Thayer Mahan，532–33。
103 Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, 532–33.
104同上，第 466-68 页；信件，马汉致罗杰斯，1911 年 2 月 22 日、3 月 4 日，西格和马奎尔，《信件和文件》，第 3 卷，第 380-94 页。
104 Ibid., pp. 466–68; ltrs., Mahan to Rodgers, February 22, March 4, 1911, Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 3:380–94.
105 Livezey，《马汉论海权》，60-82。
105 Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 60–82.
106 Ronald B. St. John，“欧洲海军扩张与马汉，1899–1906”，海军战争学院评论（1971 年 3 月），76–78；Arthur J. Marder，《英国海权剖析》（纽约，1940 年），24–43。
106 Ronald B. St. John, “European Naval Expansion and Mahan, 1899–1906,” Naval War College Review (March 1971), 76–78; Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power (New York, 1940), 24–43.
107 Taylor，《马汉海军上将传》，131。
107 Taylor, The Life of Admiral Mahan, 131.
108乔纳森·斯坦伯格，《昨日的威慑：提尔皮茨号与德国战列舰队的诞生》（纽约，1965 年），第 72-74 页，第 125-27 页。
108 Jonathon Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (New York, 1965), 72–74, 125–27.
109 Gordon A. Craig，《德国 1866–1945》（牛津和纽约，1978 年），第 307 页；海军元帅阿尔弗雷德·冯·提尔皮茨，《我的回忆录》，2 卷（纽约，1919 年），第 1 卷，第 72 页。
109 Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866–1945 (Oxford and New York, 1978), 307; Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York, 1919), 1:72.
110格雷厄姆，《海军霸权的政治》，第5页。
110 Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy, 5.
111 Mahan，《从帆船到蒸汽船》，第 303 页；Taylor，《海军上将马汉的一生》，第 114-115 页；Livezey，《马汉论海权》，第 76 页。
111 Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 303; Taylor, The Life of Admiral Mahan, 114–15; Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 76.
112艾伦·韦斯科特编，《马汉论海战》（波士顿，1918 年）；威廉·O·史蒂文斯和艾伦·韦斯科特，《海权史》（纽约，1920 年）；美国海军学院档案馆，第 5 组档案，英语和历史系，学术课程资料。
112 Allan Wescott, ed., Mahan on Naval Warfare (Boston, 1918); William O. Stevens and Allan Wescott, A History of Sea Power (New York, 1920); U.S. Naval Academy Archives, Record Group 5, Division of English and History, Academic Course Materials.
113 Michael Vlahos，《蓝剑：海军战争学院与美国使命，1919-1941》（罗德岛州纽波特，1980 年），第 72-73 页；Spector，《战争教授》，第 144-148 页。
113 Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941 (Newport, R.I., 1980), 72–73; Spector, Professors of War, 144–48.
114 RA Bowling，“马汉对反潜战的负面影响”， RUSI（皇家联合军种国防研究所期刊）（1977 年 12 月），55。
114 R. A. Bowling, “The Negative Influence of Mahan on Anti-Submarine Warfare,” RUSI (Journal of the Royal United Service Institute for Defense Studies) (December 1977), 55.
115弗拉霍斯，《蓝剑》，146。
115 Vlahos, The Blue Sword, 146.
116 Puleston， Mahan，333。
116 Puleston, Mahan, 333.
117 Livezey，《马汉论海权》，第 313 页；Russell F. Weigley，《美国战争方式：美国军事战略和政策史》（纽约和伦敦，1973 年），第 311 页。
117 Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 313; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York and London, 1973), 311.
118 Thomas B. Buell，《海上力量大师：海军上将欧内斯特·J·金的传记》（波士顿和多伦多，1980 年），第 34-35 页，第 51-52 页。
118 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston and Toronto, 1980), 34–35, 51–52.
119 Laurence W. Martin，《现代战略中的海洋》（纽约，1967 年），第 10 页。
119 Laurence W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy (New York, 1967), 10.
120 John B. Hattendorf，“美国海军战略思想中的一些概念，1940-1970”，《扬基水手与海权》 ，美国经验研究中心，安纳伯格传播学院，南加州大学，洛杉矶，1981 年，第 95 页；Stansfield Turner，“挑战！”海军战争学院评论（1972 年 9 月-10 月），第 2 页。
120 John B. Hattendorf, “Some Concepts in American Naval Strategic Thought, 1940–1970,” The Yankee Mariner & Sea Power, The Center for Study of the American Experience, Annenberg School of Communications, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1981, p. 95; Stansfield Turner, “Challenge!” Naval War College Review (September-October 1972), 2.
121美国海军作战部长詹姆斯·D·沃特金斯海军上将关于美国海军态势的报告”，《海军部1984财年向国会提交的报告》 ，华盛顿特区，1983 年，第 16 页。
121 A Report by Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations on the Posture of the U.S. Navy,” Department of Navy Fiscal Year 1984 Report to the Congress, Washington, D.C., 1983, 16.
122 Mahan，《海军管理》，第 229 页。
122 Mahan, Naval Administration, 229.
17. 政治领袖作为战略家
17. The Political Leader as Strategist
T政治领导人在国家战争中应扮演的恰当角色，在理论上难以界定。克劳塞维茨曾指出，“政策是指导思想，战争只是工具……因此，除了将军事观点服从于政治观点之外，别无他法”，尽管这一论断具有重要的理论意义，但对于任何试图制定二十世纪战争决策规则或明确战略制定责任的人来说，却几乎毫无用处。1如果正如戴维·弗雷泽所论证的那样，“战略的艺术在于确定目标（该目标本身是或应当是政治性的）；从该目标中推导出一系列需要实现的军事目标；评估这些目标所产生的军事需求，以及实现每个目标可能需要的先决条件；根据这些需求衡量现有和潜在的资源，并在此过程中制定出一套连贯的优先事项模式和合理的行动方案”，那么难题在于，推导、评估、衡量和制定这些工作中，有多少属于政治领导人的职责范围，又有多少属于军事职能。2显然，这个问题无法用任何绝对化的表述来回答，即使是克劳塞维茨的权威理论也无法解答。
THE PROPER ROLE of the political leader in the direction of a nation's war effort is difficult to establish in theory. Clausewitz's statement that “policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument…. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political,” though of great theoretical significance, is of little use to anyone trying to formulate rules for decision making in twentieth-century warfare or to delineate responsibility for the determination of strategy.1 If, as David Fraser has argued, “the art of strategy is to determine the aim, which is or should be political: to derive from that aim a series of military objectives to be achieved: to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the preconditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to measure available and potential resources against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action,” the difficult question is how much of the deriving and assessing and measuring and charting falls within the political leader's purview and how much of it becomes a military function.2 It is clear that this cannot be answered by any categorical formulation, even one that is invested with the authority of Clausewitz's name.
同样的情况也适用于战争进程中，当战略转化为作战行动时，文职当局和军事当局之间的关系。爱德华·斯皮尔斯爵士曾尖锐地写道：
Much the same can be said of the relationship between civilian and military authority at that moment in the process of war in which strategy is translated into operations. Sir Edward Spears has written with some asperity:
想象一下……平民百姓研究计划和地图，并根据这些计划和地图解读集团军和集团军向各种炮兵、空军、骑兵、步兵、坦克等部队下达的大量命令，这画面真是荒谬至极……只有那些具备最危险的缺陷——业余人士的半吊子知识——的人才会认为，那些完全没有军事训练的政治家，能够在对地形一无所知的情况下，评估己方火力、敌方抵抗能力、进攻步兵的冲击力及其战术部署等问题，并真正理解……那些由训练有素的专业人员花费数周时间研究得出的、高度技术性的参谋工作成果。” ³
The picture…of…civilians examining plans and maps and working out the meaning of the vast number of orders based on these, issued by Army Groups and Armies to artillery of every description, to the air force, the cavalry, infantry, tanks, etc. is ridiculous…. Only one possessed of that most dangerous of disqualifications, an amateur's half-knowledge, would [suggest] that statesmen, innocent of all military training, [were] capable…of estimating such things as the firepower on their own side and the power of resistance of the enemy, the weight of the shock of the attacking infantry and its tactical dispositions, without any knowledge of the ground, of assimilating in fact…the highly technical staff-work which represented many weeks of study by highly trained professionals.”3
这一切固然很好，但人们总觉得有些言过其实。所有军事行动都会产生政治后果。它们可能增强或削弱一个国家实现其目标的能力；可能使国家不明智地投身于新的、未曾预料的目标；可能由于计算或执行失误，打击盟友的士气，或为敌方赢得新的支持。如果政治领导人过度干预作战计划和决策会造成破坏性后果，那么他们无力或不愿对这些计划和决策行使关键控制权，则有可能将权力赋予军方，从而危及政治领导人负有最终责任的国家安全。因此，同样很难对适当的角色做出既不至于过于笼统而失去意义的理论定义。
This is all very well, but one feels that it is overstated. All operations have political consequences. They can increase or diminish a nation's ability to achieve its goals; they can commit it unwisely to new and unforeseen objectives; they can, by failure of calculation or execution, discourage its allies or bring new support to the side of the enemy. If excessive meddling in operational planning and decision making by political leaders can have disruptive consequences, inability or unwillingness on their part to exercise critical control over such plans and decisions runs the risk of placing in military hands powers that can jeopardize the national security for which the political leadership has ultimate responsibility. Here too, then, it is difficult to frame a theoretical definition of appropriate roles that is not so general as to be meaningless.
实际上，这些问题的解决取决于政治体制的性质、军队的效率和威望以及政治领导人的性格和人格等因素的相互作用。在本世纪的两次世界大战中，后一次最为重要。
In practice, these questions have been resolved by the interplay of such factors as the nature of the political system, the efficiency and prestige of the military establishment, and the character and personality of the political leader. In the two world wars of this century, the last of these has been the most important.
我
I
德国在一战中的首任总理特奥巴尔德·冯·贝特曼·霍尔维格的案例，或许可以作为1914年所有参战国政治领导人所面临困境的一个极端例证，但绝非个例。战争一打响，他就发现自己身处这样的境地：几乎所有政党、商界、相当一部分大学教授、绝大多数中产阶级以及相当一部分工人阶级都渴望进行大规模的领土扩张，并且确信战争将使之成为可能。与此同时，他还必须应对一个比世界上任何其他机构都更不受政治控制、更受公众尊崇的军事机构。
The case of Germany's first chancellor in the Great War, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, may serve as an extreme but by no means unique illustration of the difficulties that confronted the political leaders of all belligerent states in 1914. As soon as hostilities commenced, he found himself in a situation in which nearly all the political parties, the business community, a high proportion of the university professoriate, the bulk of the middle class, and significant portions of the working class were desirous of the most ambitious kind of territorial expansion and were sure that the war would make this possible. Simultaneously, he had to deal with a military establishment that had greater freedom from political control and a higher degree of public veneration than any similar body in the world.
从智力和行政才能的角度来看，贝特曼无疑是俾斯麦继任者中最杰出的一位，但正如格哈德·里特所指出的，他也是“一位缺乏完全掌控权力本能的知识分子……他并不享受拥有权力的感觉，他之所以能保住官位，仅仅是因为他认为这是为民族国家和普鲁士-德意志君主制传统服务的一项神圣责任。” ⁴他并非斗士，不是那种意志坚定、毫不犹豫地追求自身目标的强者。他天生的羞怯使他在面对傲慢和自信时束手无策，在危机时刻，他又容易被宿命论所左右。
Judged from the standpoint of intelligence and administrative talent, Bethmann was certainly the best of Bismarck's successors, but he was also, as Gerhard Ritter has pointed out, “an intellectual who lacked a wholly secure instinct for power,…who did not enjoy possessing it, and who [held on to office, only because he] regarded this as an iron responsibility in the service of the national state and the traditions of the Prussian-German monarchy.”4 He was not a fighter, the kind of robust man of will who follows his own objectives without scruple or distraction. His natural diffidence disarmed him when he was opposed by arrogance and self-confidence, and in moments of crisis he was apt to be overcome by fatalism.
因此，贝特曼在1914年8月被士兵们的技术论证所打动，卷入一场他早已认定几乎不可避免的战争，也就不足为奇了。他并未参与制定战争的战略计划，而且似乎也没有公开质疑该计划的基本假设，即在西线发起大规模包围战，六周内就能将法国逐出战争，并阻止英国继续参战；之后，德军主力可以转向东线，以解救奥地利的防御，并粉碎俄军的推进。
It is therefore not surprising that in August 1914 Bethmann allowed himself to be overimpressed by the technical arguments of the soldiers and swept into a war that he had, in any case, convinced himself was all but inevitable. He had had no share in devising the strategical plan for the war, and he does not seem to have questioned openly its basic assumptions, that a massive enveloping movement in the West would knock France out of the war in six weeks and discourage the British from further participation, and that the bulk of German forces could then be turned eastward to relieve the Austrian holding operation and destroy the Russian advance.
然而，必须承认的是，在第一届最高统帅部的战略失败、战壕中陷入长期僵局之后，贝特曼英勇地努力将战争置于理性控制之下，并引导其朝着可实现的目标前进。一度，他似乎取得了成功。他拒绝了总参谋长法尔肯海因的要求，后者要求就所有可能影响前线作战的外交政策问题征询他的意见——这显然是企图以牺牲首相权力为代价来扩大军方权力。1915年，他取得了对提尔皮茨和海军将领们的重大胜利，阻止了当时无限制潜艇战的引入。他竭尽全力游说，防止皇帝完全受制于军方，并且在1917年之前，在这方面并非毫无成效。
What has to be said for Bethmann, however, is that, after the strategy of the First High Command had failed and the long stalemate in the trenches began, he strove valiantly to submit the war to rational control and to direct it to achievable ends. For a time it looked as if he might be successful. He denied Chief of Staff Falkenhayn's demands to be consulted on all matters of foreign policy that might conceivably affect operations in the field, a patent attempt to broaden the powers of the military at the expense of the chancellor. He won a signal victory over Tirpitz and the admirals in 1915, preventing the introduction of unlimited submarine warfare at that time. He used all of his persuasive powers to prevent the emperor from falling completely under the sway of the military and, until 1917, was not ineffective in this effort.
他对吞并派的打击力度较弱，他认为他们的野心既不切实际又危险，因为他们有可能将战争规模扩大到任何通过谈判达成和平都不可能的地步。最终，他对此忧心忡忡，甚至采取了一些削弱自身地位的策略。他萌生了利用军队权威对抗扩张主义游说集团的想法，并计划寻找一位既能支持他温和路线，又能拥有足够民意以迫使吞并派就范的将军。他决定必须说服皇帝解除法尔肯海因的职务——法尔肯海因在凡尔登战役中民意支持率大幅下降——并任命坦能堡战役的英雄兴登堡取而代之。1916年7月，在觐见威廉二世时，他直言不讳地表示，必须立即任命兴登堡为最高统帅。 “这关系到霍亨索伦王朝的命运。有了兴登堡，他就能达成妥协和平；没有兴登堡，他就做不到。” ⁵几周后，皇帝同意了，改变得以实施。
He was less effective with respect to the annexationists, whose ambitions he considered to be unrealistic and dangerous, since they threatened to broaden the scope of the war to a point where any peace by negotiation would become impossible. In the end, he became so concerned about this that he resorted to tactics that helped to undermine his own position. He conceived the idea of using the authority of the military against the expansionist lobbies, of finding a general who would support his own moderate course and would be popular enough to force the annexationists into line. He decided that he must persuade the emperor to dismiss Falkenhayn—whose popular support had seeped away during the wasting Verdun campaign—and to bring in Hindenburg, the hero of Tannenberg, in his place. In an audience with William II in July 1916, he said flatly that Hindenburg must be made supreme commander at once. “This is a matter that involves the fate of the Hohenzollern dynasty. With Hindenburg he could make a compromise peace, without him he could not.”'5 A few weeks later, the emperor agreed, and the change was made.
事实证明，这是一个严重的误判。兴登堡并不想要妥协的和平，他的第一任军需总长埃里希·鲁登道夫也同样如此，后者对领土扩张的狂热甚至超过了那些吞并主义者本身。此外，新最高统帅部的首脑们不像法尔肯海因那样容易被阻止干预政治决策。不久之后，他们便要求并获得了在所有高层政策问题上发表意见的权利，并且他们自己也在推动一些必然会延长和扩大战争的行动方案。1916年11月，鲁登道夫坚持认为，出于军事需要，必须从自1914年以来被德军占领的俄罗斯领土上建立一个卫星国——波兰王国，从而成功地扼杀了与俄罗斯进行和平谈判的可能性。这一决定导致圣彼得堡和平党的垮台，并使俄罗斯又在战争中待了一年。不仅如此，最高统帅部于 1917 年春季下令立即开始无限制的潜艇战。
This proved to be a grave miscalculation. Hindenburg did not want a compromise peace, and neither did his first general quartermaster Erich Ludendorff, who proved to be more rabid about territorial acquisition than the annexationists themselves. Moreover, the chiefs of the new Supreme Command were not as easily barred from intervention in political decisions as Falkenhayn had been. Before long, they were claiming and obtaining the right to be heard on all matters of high policy and were themselves urging courses of action that could not help but prolong and broaden the war. In November 1916, Ludendorff successfully defeated the possibility of a negotiated peace with Russia by insisting that military needs required the creation of a satellite Kingdom of Poland out of Russian lands occupied by German troops since 1914, a decision that led to the fall of the peace party in St. Petersburg and kept the Russians in the war for another year. And not content with that, the Supreme Command, in the spring of 1917, called for the immediate inception of unlimited submarine warfare.
贝特曼曾在1915年坚决反对扩大潜艇作战规模。这一次，他的抵抗有所减弱，最终还是妥协了。他妥协的原因，充分展现了战时平民政治家所面临的残酷困境。在至关重要的皇家委员会会议上，贝特曼被一群海军专家簇拥着，他们挥舞着统计表格和技术图表，所有这些都证明，放弃潜艇将在几个月内带来胜利。他并非一个自负之人，面对这些身着制服的专家们的有力论证，他不禁开始怀疑自己的直觉。他逐渐说服自己，海军部或许是对的，最终选择了让步。这无疑是一种软弱的表现，但里特尔的观点不无道理：要反对所有负责军事的领导人、皇帝、国会多数派以及包括社会民主党在内的大多数具有政治觉悟的德国人所要求的行动方案，需要非凡的意志力和自信。6
Bethmann had fought staunchly against the expansion of submarine operations in 1915. This time his resistance was weaker, and in the end he yielded. His reasons for doing so show the dilemma of the civilian statesman in wartime in all its cruelty. In the crucial Crown Council, Bethmann was surrounded by naval experts who brandished statistical tables and technical charts, all of which proved that to loose the submarines would bring victory in a given number of months. He was not an intellectually arrogant man and, before this massive uniformed assurance, he could not help but doubt his own instincts. He gradually convinced himself that the Admiralty might, after all, be right and gave way. This was doubtless an act of weakness, but Ritter has a point when he writes that it would have taken a person of wholly extraordinary will and self-confidence to oppose a course of action that was demanded by all of the responsible military leaders, as well as by the emperor, the Reichstag majority, and most politically aware Germans, including the Social Democrats.6
贝特曼在这个问题上的让步既未能令最高统帅部满意，他们恼怒于总理竟敢在国家安全问题上反对他们的观点；也未能令吞并派满意，他们知道贝特曼仍然希望达成妥协，从而实现“软和平”。在接下来的几个月里，这些势力结盟，发起了一场精心策划的运动，攻击贝特曼的“软弱”，他们坚称，除非贝特曼下台，否则战争的胜利将无从谈起。他们的阴谋诡计得逞了，这位一直努力将战争控制在理性范围内的领导人最终被迫下台。他下台最引人注目之处并非在于其方式，而在于无人为他发声。扳倒贝特曼的并非只有军人和商业利益集团。魏玛民主的未来领袖，如马蒂亚斯·埃尔茨贝格尔和古斯塔夫·施特雷泽曼，也积极参与了导致他下台的肮脏手段。国会多数派表示赞同，社会党人保持沉默，公众舆论普遍对这一事件表示满意，显然相信兴登堡和鲁登道夫将为他们带来他们渴望的彻底胜利。
Bethmann's capitulation on this issue was not enough to satisfy either the Supreme Command, who were irritated at the chancellor's presumption in opposing their views on a matter of national security, or the annexationists, who knew that he still hoped for a compromise, and hence a “soft,” peace. In the months that followed, these forces allied and launched an elaborate campaign against Bethmann's “flabbiness,” insisting that the successful prosecution of the war would be impossible unless he were dropped. Their intrigues were successful, and the man who had striven to keep the war within rational limits was hounded from office. The striking thing about his fall is not the way in which it was accomplished but rather the fact that no voice was raised in his behalf. It was not only the soldiers and the business interests that brought Bethmann down. Such future leaders of Weimar democracy as Matthias Erzberger and Gustav Stresemann actively participated in the dirty maneuvers that effected his dismissal; the Reichstag majority gave its approval, the Socialists were mute, and public opinion in general greeted the event with satisfaction, apparently convinced that Hindenburg and Ludendorff would bring them the total victory that they craved.
克劳塞维茨的洞见——战争的成功取决于政治领导、武装力量和民众情绪的协调配合——在贝特曼的失败中得到了惊人的印证。正是这三者之间的脱节导致了贝特曼的失败。军方的盲目自信和民众的麻木不仁，使得德国所有试图理性协调政治和军事战略、并使其作战计划朝着可实现的目标前进的努力都付诸东流。其结果是战争顽固地持续下去，造成了数百万不必要的伤亡；1918年发动了一场构思拙劣、国家资源不足以支撑的攻势；最终，德国走向了战败和革命。
In a striking corroboration of Clausewitz's insight that the successful prosecution of war depends upon the proper coordination of political leadership, armed forces, and the passions of the people, it was the disarticulation of these forces that defeated Bethmann. The combination of military self-confidence and public heedlessness nullified all attempts to coordinate Germany's political and military strategies rationally and to direct its operational planning to achievable ends. The result was a stubborn prolongation of the war that caused millions of needless casualties, an ill-conceived offensive in 1918 that the country did not have the resources to support, and, in the end, defeat and revolution.
二
II
尽管人们普遍认为英国人在政治上比德国人更老练，也更反对将权力赋予军队，但第一次世界大战的经验却很难佐证这种观点。事实上，可以说英国首任战时首相贝特曼·霍尔维格从未像他那样竭力确保战争被用作政策工具，并确保重大战略问题始终掌握在政治领导层手中。
Although the British are supposed to be politically more sophisticated than the Germans and more firmly set against vesting authority in the military, the difference is hardly supported by their experience in the First World War. Indeed, it can be fairly said that the country's first wartime prime minister never tried as hard as Bethmann Hollweg did to see that war was used as an instrument of policy and that the great strategical issues remained under the control of the political leadership.
亨利·亨利·阿斯奎斯是一位才华横溢的议员和杰出的党魁，但他既缺乏知识，也缺乏精力成为一位伟大的战争大臣。A·J·P·泰勒曾评价他：“他不理解战争行为所引发的重大问题。尽管他决心取得胜利，但他认为政治家唯一能做的就是置身事外，任由自由企业提供将军们赢得战斗所需的武器。”<sup> 7</sup>这对于一位英国政治家来说是一种奇怪的态度，因为英国是海上强国，而其交战对手主要是陆地强国，因此它拥有多种战略选择，而这些选择不能，或者说不应该，仅仅由军方来决定。阿斯奎斯本人不愿采取强硬立场，这意味着那些将影响战争的性质、地点、持续时间、经济和人员损失以及大英帝国未来的根本决策，将无法以合乎逻辑和负责任的方式做出。相反，这些决策将在各个部委、委员会和参谋人员之间进行讨价还价；最终会找到一些谁都不满意的妥协方案，而且这些方案最终都会被证明是无效的（就像达达尼尔海峡计划一样，由于缺乏信念、精力和资源而失败），最终，无论这种战略姿态在理性上是否站得住脚，国家都会陷入一种无法摆脱的境地。
H. H. Asquith was a gifted parliamentarian and a superb party leader, but he had neither the knowledge nor the energy to be a great war minister. A. J. P. Taylor has said of him that he “did not understand the great issues which the conduct of the war provoked. Though resolved on victory, he supposed that the only contribution that statesmen could make was to keep out of the way, while free enterprise supplied the arms with which generals would win the battles.”7 This was a curious attitude for a British statesman to take, for Great Britain was a sea power and, at war against predominantly land powers, it had strategical options, the choice between which could not, or should not, be made by the military alone. Asquith's diffidence about taking a firm line himself meant that the basic decisions that would affect the nature, locus, length, and financial and human cost of the conflict, and the future of the British Empire, would not be made logically and responsibly. Rather they would be haggled over in various ministries, committees, and staffs; compromise solutions would be found that pleased no one and proved to be ineffective (like the Dardanelles plan, which failed for lack of conviction, energy, and resources), and ultimately the country would drift into a strategical posture from which it was impossible to withdraw, whether it was rationally supportable or not.
战争头两年，在阿斯奎斯松懈的领导下，英国的战局大致如此。经过大量的战略支持和人员补充，以及令人痛心的达达尼尔海峡事件后，军队的指挥权落入了道格拉斯·黑格和威廉·罗伯逊手中。事实证明，这对组合几乎和兴登堡-鲁登道夫团队一样不受文职监督，他们强加给英国的一系列战略理念，其后果几乎与德国同行一样惨重。黑格和罗伯逊都是“西方人”——也就是说，他们认为只有在佛兰德斯杀死德军才能赢得战争，并且他们准备接受由此带来的英国重大伤亡。在他们的领导下，战争不再是攻城略地，而是消耗战。正如罗伊·詹金斯在其所著的阿斯奎斯传记中所写（他的话语既是对传主的评判，也是对其的批评）：“在这种情况下，政治家的职责不再是寻找战略选择，而是集中于为屠杀提供人员和弹药。” 8除非人们将索姆河战役或阿拉斯战役中的流血事件视为为实现可理解的目标而进行的理性战争（而这很难做到），否则人们不得不得出这样的结论：首相早在贝特曼之前就放弃了将战争控制在理性范围内的努力，并且他已将自己的职责拱手让给了士兵，先是让给了基钦纳，后来又让给了罗伯逊-黑格二人组。
This is pretty much what happened under Asquith's lax leadership in the first two years of the war. After much strategical backing and filling, and the unhappy Dardanelles affair, the leadership of the army passed into the firm control of Douglas Haig and William Robertson, a combination that proved to be almost as impervious to civilian supervision as the Hindenburg-Ludendorff team and which imposed a set of strategical concepts upon the country that were very nearly as fatal in their results as those of their German counterparts. Both Haig and Robertson were “westerners”—that is, they believed that the war could be won only by killing Germans in Flanders, and they were prepared to accept the heavy loss in British casualties that this would entail. Under their leadership, the war became not one of movement but of attrition. As Roy Jenkins has written in his biography of Asquith, and his words are a judgment and a criticism of his subject, “In these circumstances, the job of the politician ceased to be that of looking for strategical alternatives and became concentrated upon supplying men and munitions for the slaughter.”8 Unless one regards the bloodletting that went on at the Somme or at Arras as a rational use of war for an intelligible end (and it is difficult to do so), then one is forced to conclude that the prime minister had given up the effort to keep the war within the limits of reason long before Bethmann had done so, and that he had surrendered his proper functions to the soldiers, first to Kitchener, later to the duumvirate Robertson-Haig.
阿斯奎斯是一位精明的政治家，促使他退位的或许并非出于个人懒惰，而是他对民意走向的了解。战争爆发前几天，他曾在日记中轻蔑地写道：“街上人山人海，在白金汉宫为国王欢呼，凌晨一点或一点半还能听到远处震耳欲聋的欢呼声。战争，或者任何可能引发战争的事情，总是受到伦敦民众的欢迎……多么令人厌恶这种轻浮之风！”
Asquith was a shrewd politician, and it was probably his knowledge of the currents of public opinion, rather than personal lethargy, that inspired this abdication. A few days before the outbreak of the war, he had written disdainfully in his diary: “There were large crowds perambulating the streets and cheering the King at Buckingham Palace, and one could hear the distant roaring as late as i or 1:30 in the morning. War or anything that seems likely to lead to war is always popular with the London mob…. How one loathes such levity!”9
战争爆发后，民众的情绪愈发高涨，阿斯奎斯或许认为，任何试图在战略问题上表明立场的举动都会遭到民众的强烈反对，并引发政府危机。而且，无论如何，又该如何证明士兵们对军事形势的估计是错误的呢？这一切都难以捉摸！1916年7月索姆河战役的第一天，超过1000名军官和2万名士兵阵亡、重伤或失踪，另有1300多名军官和3.4万名士兵受伤。战役结束前，英军伤亡人数高达42万人。这些数字令人震惊，也令人望而生畏。然而，当政府就此向驻法英军总司令提出质询时，黑格给出的答复却与1916年以来许多指挥官的答复如出一辙，令政客们难以招架。他指出，索姆河战役缓解了盟军其他战线的压力，并牵制了敌军在其他战线上的兵力。同时，这场战役证明了英国有能力在主战场发动进攻，并将德军精锐部队逐出阵地，这产生了重要的心理影响，并增强了英国的胜利意志。最重要的是，这些进攻消耗了敌军30%的兵力，因此，再过六周，敌军“将很难找到兵力……持续的进攻压力最终将导致其彻底覆灭。”<sup> 10 </sup> 谁又能否认这些自信的断言呢？面对这些断言，阿斯奎斯只是默许了。
Once the war had started, the passions of the mob became more inflamed, and Asquith probably felt that any attempt to assert himself in strategical questions would meet with popular disapproval and lead to a governmental crisis. And, in any case, how could one really prove that the soldiers were wrong in their estimates of military possibilities? It was all so difficult to get at! On the first day of the battle of the Somme in July 1916, more than 1,000 officers and 20,000 men were killed, fatally wounded, or reported missing, and over 1,300 officers and 34,000 other ranks were wounded. Before the battle was over, the British had suffered 420,000 casualties. These were impressive and daunting figures. Yet, when the government remonstrated with the commander in chief in France, Haig gave them the kind of answer that has been heard from many commanders on many occasions since 1916 and is always difficult for politicians to deal with. The Somme battle, he pointed out, had relieved pressure on other parts of the Allied line and had diverted enemy resources from other fronts. At the same time, by proving that Britain could mount an offensive in the main theater of war and drive the cream of German troops from their positions, it had had important psychological effects and had fortified the will to victory. Most important, the attacks had used up 30 percent of the enemy's divisions so that, in another six weeks, he “should be hard put to it to find men…. The maintenance of a steady offensive pressure will result eventually in his complete overthrow.”10 Who was to deny the validity of these confident assertions? Confronted with them, Asquith simply lapsed into tacit acquiescence.
他的继任者，首相戴维·劳合·乔治，在战略方面更有信念，也更渴望为战争带来合乎逻辑的方向，但他同样担心，如果自己过于直言不讳，会遭到公众的反对或否定。他曾与士兵们争论。他对罗伯逊说：“我不会像赶牲口一样把成千上万的人送上屠宰场。三年来，我们一直被承诺在法国和比利时取得胜利。这场永无休止的炮火攻势又能带来什么？我们必须再次攻击薄弱的战线！”<sup> 11</sup>然而，当军队指挥部仍然计划在佛兰德斯发动新的攻势时，他低声咒骂这是“疯狂的军事臆测”、“荒谬的计划”和“愚蠢的冒险”，但他既没有试图阻止士兵们继续挥霍国家资源，也没有敦促他们撤回。正如莱昂·沃尔夫所写，他非常清楚，“如果黑格被立即解职，罗伯逊会同情地辞职，整个国家、议会，甚至战时内阁都会群情激愤。解雇黑格也意味着帝国正在输掉战争，这会鼓舞敌人，并且肯定会重创盟军的士气。”<sup> 12 </sup> 考虑到这些，以及他自身的政治前途，劳合·乔治并没有过多坚持，暗杀仍在继续。
His successor as prime minister, David Lloyd George, had stronger convictions about strategy and a greater desire to bring logical direction to the war effort, but he suffered from the same fear of public disapproval or disavowal if he were to be too outspoken. He argued with the soldiers. He told Robertson, “I will not drive thousands to slaughter like cattle. For three years we have been promised victory in France and Belgium. What is there to show for this ceaseless battery? We must strike again at a soft front!”11 When the army command nevertheless planned new offensives in Flanders, he muttered about “wild military speculation,” “insane enterprises,” and “muddy and muddle-headed ventures,” but he did not try to forbid the soldiers to go on squandering the nation's resources, nor did he urge their recall. As Leon Wolff has written, he knew all too well that “were Haig to be summarily dismissed, Robertson would quit in sympathy, and the entire country, Parliament, even the War Cabinet would hit the ceiling. Firing Haig would also imply that the Empire was losing the war, would encourage the enemy, and was certain to strike a heavy blow at Allied morale.”12 With these thoughts in mind, and that of his own political future, Lloyd George did not insist too much, and the killing went on.
在这种情况下，通过谈判寻求和平的想法在英国和在德国一样，都遭到了冷遇。1916年，兰斯当勋爵向内阁递交了一份备忘录，敦促积极寻找谈判机会。然而，阿斯奎斯与其说是关心如何落实这一想法，不如说是更关心如何防止消息泄露给士兵或公众。一年后，兰斯当采取了更为直接的方式，在一封致《每日电讯报》的信中公开了他的提议。正如他的传记作者所言，这封信引发了“铺天盖地的谩骂和数量惊人的辱骂信，这些信件虽然大多语无伦次，但却充满了在英国政治生活中罕见的暴力”。<sup> 13</sup>当时由诺斯克利夫勋爵拥有的《泰晤士报》对兰斯当进行了毫不留情的谴责，罗瑟米尔和赫尔顿的报刊也纷纷加入，抨击他的信“懦弱”、“无能”且“不合时宜”。在这一波谴责浪潮之前，无论是劳合·乔治政府还是反对党，都无意将谈判作为己任。正如在德国一样，士兵们早已扼杀了战略选择的讨论，任由他们在法国将战争推向非理性的极致，其后果几乎与敌方所遭受的后果一样惨重。
In these circumstances, the idea of seeking a peace by negotiation got as short shrift in Britain as it did in Germany. In 1916, when Lord Lansdowne sent a memorandum to the cabinet, urging a vigorous search for opportunities for negotiation, Asquith was less interested in following up the idea than he was in preventing it from being leaked to the soldiers or the general public. A year later, Lansdowne took a more direct approach and made his proposal public in a letter to the Daily Telegraph. It was received, in the words of his biographer, with “a flood of invective and an incredible mass of abusive correspondence which, though largely incoherent, was marked by a violence rare in English political life.”13 The Times, then owned by Lord Northcliffe, denounced Lansdowne with a quite exceptional lack of moderation, and the Rothermere and Hulton press chimed in to castigate his letter as “craven,” “inept,” and “inopportune.” Before this flood of denunciation, neither the Lloyd George government nor the Opposition had any desire to make the cause of negotiation its own. As in Germany, the soldiers, having already smothered the issue of strategical alternatives, were allowed to carry the war in France to the ultimate in irrationality, with consequences hardly less drastic than those suffered by the enemy.
三
III
在第一次世界大战初期，法国政治领导人的经历几乎与德国和英国的同行如出一辙。在关键的1917年，法国堪称文职人员在军事专家意见面前怯懦屈服的典型例证。然而，在战争的最后一年，法国政治领导层重新确立了权威，因此，法国在战争方向上实现了英国和德国都未能达到的政治军事合作程度。
The experience of French political leaders came close in the first years of the Great War to duplicating that of their counterparts in Germany and Britain, and in the critical year 1917 France provided a quintessential illustration of civilian diffidence and capitulation before military expert opinion. In the last year of the war, however, the political leadership reasserted its authority, and, as a result, France enjoyed a degree of political-military collaboration in the direction of the war that was achieved in neither Britain nor Germany.
杰里·金指出，法国发动战争时实际上实行的是军事独裁统治：
France started the war with what amounted to a military dictatorship, for reasons noted by Jere King:
法国未能更好地应对民主国家在战争中面临的问题，是多种历史因素共同作用的结果。几个世纪以来，军队享有的巨大威望使他们在战争初期就占据了对平民的优势。“神圣联盟”的理念主要有利于保守派，而军队正是保守派的重要组成部分。在1914年8月和9月的关键时期，批评指挥部会被视为不忠，甚至可以说是叛国。政府和议会服从指挥部，从而满足了民众的期望。人们预期战争会很快结束，文官权力也只会暂时被压制。
That France had been no better equipped to meet the problems of a democracy at war was due to a complex of historic circumstances. The great prestige which the military had enjoyed for centuries gave them an advantage over the civilians at the outset of the war. The very idea of the ‘sacred union’ was chiefly to the benefit of conservatives, of which the military were a most important part. Criticizing the command would have been considered disloyal—if not downright treasonable—during the crucial weeks of August and September 1914. The government and Parliament deferred to the command, thus carrying out popular expectation. A short war was anticipated, and only a temporary overshadowing of the civilian power.14
但法国也有着革命传统，人们期望其将领要么取得成功，要么被替换。马恩河战役的悬而未决以及随后的消耗战，引发了人们对法国指挥官的诸多疑虑，从而阻止了军事首脑权力像德国或英国那样显著地凌驾于一切之上。如果出现一位真正功勋卓著的将领，一位新的拿破仑，或许情况会有所不同。即便到了1917年，政治领导人在对待潜在的“拿破仑”时仍然十分谨慎，而将领们仍然保留着足够的权力，可以在作战事务中左右战局。同年4月在贡比涅举行的一次会议上，悲剧性地证明了这一点。在这次会议上，共和国总统雷蒙·普恩加莱、总理里博和陆军部长潘勒韦审查了尼维尔将军提出的对德军防线发动另一次大规模进攻的计划。他们不相信他的计划。他们有权禁止这项计划。然而，他们却无法指出计划的缺陷或提出替代方案，因此也无力阻止它。爱德华·斯皮尔斯爵士写道：“内阁因缺乏技术知识而步履维艰，又受制于公众舆论。公众舆论深知自身在军事事务上的无知，因此无法容忍文官干预军事领域。[这次会议]体现了民主国家即便在为生存而战时，也无法摆脱的可怕缺陷。战争最高指挥权的这一弱点给盟军造成的生命和金钱损失，永远无法估量。”<sup> 15</sup>
But France also had a revolutionary tradition and an expectation that its generals would be successful or would be replaced. The inconclusive battle of the Marne and the coming of the war of attrition aroused enough doubts about French commanders to prevent the ascendancy of the military chiefs from becoming as pronounced as it was in either Germany or Britain. The emergence of a really successful general, another Napoleon, might have made a difference. Even as late as 1917, the political leaders were cautious in dealing with potential Napoleons, and the generals retained sufficient authority to have their way in operational matters, as was tragically demonstrated in April of that year at a conference in Compiègne. At this meeting the President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré, the Prime Minister Ribot, and the War Minister Painlevé reviewed the plan of General Nivelle for another great offensive against the German lines. They had no faith in his project. They had the authority to forbid it. Yet they were incapable of pointing out its failings or suggesting alternatives and hence were impotent to block it. Sir Edward Spears has written, “The Cabinet was hobbled by its lack of technical knowledge and fettered by public opinion, which, aware of its ignorance in military matters, would have been intolerant of civil intrusion into the military sphere. [The conference] epitomizes the terrible disability from which democracies, even when fighting for their existence, are unable to free themselves. What this weakness in the supreme direction of the war cost the Allies in lives and money can never be computed.”15
然而，这次会议造成的灾难性后果，使得法国未能效仿其他国家的做法。民众的疑虑并非毫无道理。在尼维尔攻势的头十天里，34000名士兵阵亡，90000人受伤（其中相当一部分伤亡），另有20000人失踪。不久，整个法军陷入哗变，公众舆论也彻底倒向了军方。在随后的军政大整顿中，乔治·克列孟梭脱颖而出，成为指挥战争的领袖。
The disaster that resulted from the conference, however, prevented the French from following the example of the other countries discussed here. The doubts of the civilians were more than justified. In the first ten days of the Nivelle offensive, 34,000 troops died in the field, 90,000 were wounded, of whom a good percentage died, and 20,000 were missing. Before long the whole French army was wracked with mutiny, and public sympathy had turned decisively against the military establishment. In the resultant shakeup, the man who emerged to direct the war effort was Georges Clemenceau.
这位奇特的人物，既是19世纪80、90年代议会战争中愤世嫉俗的雇佣兵首领，又是热情洋溢的爱国者，他对军队并不十分欣赏。上任伊始，他就明确表示，他认为战争事关重大，绝不能交给将军们掌控。尽管他毫不掩饰地在军事管理的各个领域，包括作战问题上，表达自己的观点，但他对待军队涉足政治领域的态度却十分强硬。“泰泽！！ ”1918年3月，在伦敦举行的最高战争委员会会议上，他怒斥福煦元帅，“我代表法国发言！” 16克列孟梭具备必要的政治技巧，能够争取议会支持他有时略显固执的自我主张。他（主要从他的军事助手莫尔达克将军那里）获得了必要的专业知识，使他能够就战略和战术选择问题发表权威意见。他清晰而有力的观点给阿尔弗雷德·米尔纳勋爵留下了深刻的印象，以至于这位英国政治家在1918年3月提议任命克列孟梭为协约国军队的总司令。17
This odd mixture of cynical condottiere from the parliamentary wars of the 1880s and 1890s and impassioned patriot was no great admirer of the military. Upon assuming office, he made it clear that he regarded war as too serious a matter to be left in the hands of the generals. While having no compunction about making his own views felt in all fields of military administration and on operational questions as well, he treated military ventures into the political realm with brutality. “Taisez-vous!” he snapped at Marshal Foch at a meeting of the Supreme War Council in London in March 1918. “I speak for France here!”16 Clemenceau had all the political skill necessary to rally parliamentary support behind his sometimes willful self-assertiveness, and he acquired (largely from his military aide General Mordacq) the kind of expertise necessary to enable him to speak with authority on questions of strategical and tactical choice, so impressing Lord Alfred Milner with the clarity and force of his views that in March 1918 the British statesman proposed that Clemenceau be made generalissimo of the Allied armies.17
法国总理或许过于意识到自身的局限性，因而未能积极推动这项计划，但这丝毫没有削弱他在1918年法国战争指挥中的至高无上权威。莫尔达克列举的成就包括：重组陆军部，废除大量军事闲职和无用部门，选拔充满活力的新部队指挥官，以合理的方式重组总参谋部，重振法国在意大利和萨洛尼卡的指挥体系，以及大幅扩充坦克和装甲车的生产。<sup> 18</sup>当然，比所有这些成就更重要的是，他对1918年德军春季攻势的毁灭性打击所作出的反应。鲁登道夫的重击使协约国战略委员会陷入混乱，这让克列孟梭确信，贝当和黑格的双重领导模式继续下去，必将导致战争的失败。他成为福煦麾下统一指挥制度最坚定、最有说服力的倡导者，他成功地贯彻了这一理念，并在德军攻势开始减弱后坚持对德军交通线发动协同攻击，这对1988年7月至11月盟军的战略攻势做出了重大贡献。
The French premier had perhaps too great a sense of his own limitations to encourage this plan, but this in no wise diminished his paramount authority in the direction of the French war effort in 1918. Among the achievements attributed to him by Mordacq are the reorganization of the War Ministry, the abolition of many military sinecures and useless commissions, the selection of new and energetic troop commanders, the reorganization of the general staff on a logical basis, the revitalization of the French structures of command in Italy and Salonika, and a great expansion of tank and armored car production.18 More important than any of these, certainly, was his reaction to the shattering impact of the German spring offensive of 1918. The strategical disarray in Allied councils that Ludendorff's hammer blows effected convinced Clemenceau that a continuation of the dual leadership of Pétain and Haig would lead inevitably to the loss of the war. He became the most determined and persuasive advocate of a unified command under Foch, and his success in carrying this through and his insistence, once the momentum of the German offensive began to wane, upon coordinated attacks against the German lines of communication were major contributions to the Allied strategic offensive of July-November 19x8.19
毫无疑问，法国政治领袖在指挥战争中发挥的重要作用，一方面是由于法国公众舆论比德国和英国更加动荡和批判，另一方面是由于没有一位法国将领拥有兴登堡或黑格那样的个人魅力。但比这些因素更为重要的是个人魅力：正是克列孟梭的意志力深深打动了同时代的人，并赢得了他们的合作或服从。
There is no doubt that the enhanced role of the political leader in directing the war in France was influenced by the fact that public opinion was more volatile and critical than in Germany and Britain, and by the additional fact no French general possessed the charisma of Hindenburg or Haig. But greater than these factors was the accident of personality: it was Clemenceau's willpower that impressed itself upon his contemporaries and commanded their cooperation or obedience.
第四
IV
在战争回忆录的最后一卷中，大卫·劳合·乔治反思了各参战国文官与军方关系的总体走向，他写道：“回顾这场毁灭性的战争，审视政治家和军人在战争进程中所扮演的角色，我得出的明确结论是，政治家在对军事领导人行使权力时过于谨慎。”<sup> 20</sup>以下三个例子将清楚地表明，在第二次世界大战中，情况远非如此。在每个例子中，人事因素再次成为解释，尽管行使权力的宪政框架也发挥了不容忽视的作用。
In the final volume of his war memoirs, David Lloyd George, reflecting upon the general course of civil-military relations in the various belligerent nations, wrote: “Looking back on this devastating war and surveying the part played in it by statesmen and soldiers respectively in its direction, I have come definitely to the conclusion that the former showed too much caution in exerting their authority over the military leaders.”20 That this was far less true in the Second World War will become clear from the three examples that follow, in each of which it is again the accident of personality that supplies the explanation, although the constitutional framework in which authority was exercised was not of negligible importance.
以第一个例子为例，阿道夫·希特勒凭借其总理（1934年8月，前帝国总统的权力被纳入总理职位）和德国唯一政党的绝对领袖的双重身份，成为德国的最高政治权威。其他政党以及所有潜在的异议分子都在1933年至1934年的“一体化”（Gleichscbaltung ）过程中被清除。自1934年8月以来，所有军官和士兵都向他本人宣誓效忠，承认他是德意志帝国和人民的领袖以及国防军最高统帅，这进一步巩固了他对军队的权威。此外，1938年2月对武装部队指挥机构的重组也强化了这一权威，重组后设立了由他直接领导的国防军最高统帅部（OKW）。 1941年12月，希特勒解除了冯·布劳希奇将军的陆军总司令（OKH）职务，并亲自接管其职责，从而进一步加强了他对军队作战的直接控制。他还向陆军总参谋长解释说，作战指挥中的“琐事”是“任何人都能胜任的”。<sup> 21</sup>
Adolf Hitler, to take our first example, was the supreme political authority in his country, by virtue of his double role as chancellor (an office to which the powers of the former Reichspräsident had been added in August 1934) and uncontested leader of Germany's only political party, the others having been eliminated, with all other potentially dissident elements, in the process of Gleichscbaltung in the years 1933–1934. His authority over the army was firmly established by the oath of allegiance that all officers and other ranks had, ever since August 1934, made to him personally as leader of the German Reich and Volk and supreme commander of the Wehrmacht and by the reorganization of the command of the armed forces in February 1938, which established a Supreme Wehrmacht Command (OKW) under his direct authority. In December 1941, Hitler made his command over army operations even more immediate by dismissing General von Brauchitsch as commander in chief of the army (OKH) and taking over his duties, explaining to the OKH chief of staff that “the trifles” of operational leadership were something that “anyone could perform.”21
在这种情况下，军方不可能主导战略决策过程。问题在于，元首能否以及在多大程度上允许其国防军最高统帅部（OKW）和陆军最高统帅部（OKH）的作战人员担任战略顾问。很快，他显然并不打算进行真正的合作。国防军最高统帅部作战参谋长阿尔弗雷德·约德尔将军在纽伦堡审判期间口述给妻子的一份备忘录中写道：
In these circumstances, there was no possibility of military domination of the strategical decision-making process. The question became rather whether and how far the Führer could concede to his OKW and OKH operations staffs the role of strategical advisor. It rapidly became apparent that he was little inclined to think in terms of a genuine collaboration. General Alfred Jodl, chief of the OKW operations staff said in a memorandum dictated to his wife during the Nuremberg trials:
希特勒愿意拥有一支能够将他的决定转化为命令的执行团队，然后由他以国防军最高统帅的身份发布这些命令，仅此而已。即便像腓特烈大帝这样的人物，其思想和决策也会受到检验和重新审视，以应对其将领们常常相互矛盾的意见，但这对希特勒来说毫无意义。他厌恶任何形式的关于战争重大决策的建议。他不愿听取任何其他观点；哪怕只是暗示一下，他都会勃然大怒，暴跳如雷。22
Hitler was willing to have a working staff that translated his decisions into orders which he would then issue as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, but nothing more. The fact that even men like Frederick the Great would have their own thoughts and decisions tested and re-examined against the often contradictory ideas of their generals made no difference to Hitler, who resented any form of counsel regarding the major decisions of the war. He did not care to hear any other points of view; if they were even hinted at, he would break into short-tempered fits of enraged agitation.22
早在战前（1936年3月莱茵兰政变成功后，他曾说过：“我像梦游者一样自信地前进”），希特勒作为国家走向世界强权的领袖，其绝对正确的神秘信念，因其在1939年和1940年的战略成功而更加坚定。正如约德尔作证的那样，
Already pronounced before the war (it was after the success of his Rhineland coup in March 1936 that he said, “I go my way with the assurance of a sleep-walker”), Hitler's mystical conviction of his infallibility as the leader of his country's march to world power was enhanced by the successes of his strategy in 1939 and 1940. As Jodl testified,
这位曾在英国舰队眼皮底下，凭借海上优势占领挪威，又在兵力处于劣势的情况下，仅用四十天便将令人闻风丧胆的法国军事力量如纸牌屋般摧毁的男人，在这些胜利之后，不再愿意听从那些曾警告他不要过度扩张军力的军事顾问的建议。从那时起，他只要求他们提供执行其决策所需的技术支持，以及确保军事组织高效运转以贯彻这些决策。23
The man who succeeded in occupying Norway before the very eyes of the British fleet with its maritime supremacy, and who with numerically inferior forces brought down the feared military power of France like a house of cards in a campaign of forty days, was no longer willing, after these successes, to listen to military advisers who had previously warned him against such over-extensions of his military power. From that time on, he required of them nothing more than the technical support necessary to implement his decisions, and the smooth functioning of the military organization to carry them out.23
事实上，这种自信不过是一种高级的妄自尊大。希特勒的战略才能一旦付诸实践，便显露无疑，因为他缺乏对自身能力和成本的现实评估。
In fact, this self-confidence was nothing more than an advanced form of megalomania. Hitler's strategical gifts, once he turned to actual operations, were limited and guided by no realistic assessment of capabilities and costs.
安德烈亚斯·希尔格鲁伯对希特勒为德国未来制定的宏伟战略计划进行了详尽的描述。<sup> 24</sup>希特勒的梦想最早在一本长期不为人知的1928年著作中有所阐述：他梦想使德国成为世界霸主，首先通过征服和巩固欧洲及俄罗斯，最好是在英国保持中立的情况下；然后，在获得殖民地基地并建立起强大的海军之后，通过一场战争——或许会与英国结盟——来对抗唯一能够威胁德国的强权：美国。
Hitler's grand strategical plan for Germany's future has been well described by Andreas Hillgruber.24 Limned for the first time in the long-unknown book of 1928, Hitler's dream was to make Germany the dominant world power, first, by the conquest and consolidation of Europe and Russia, preferably with the benevolent neutrality of Great Britain, and then at a later date, after colonial bases had been acquired and a powerful navy built, by a war—perhaps in alliance with Great Britain—against the only power that could still threaten Germany, the United States of America.
在完成这项雄心勃勃的计划的第一阶段的过程中，希特勒在1933年至1939年间取得了显著进展。最初，他凭借令人眼花缭乱的外交手腕，成功地向西方列强隐藏了自己的真实目标，同时巧妙地利用了他们的分歧和注意力分散；随后，在1938年春季之后，他又巧妙地结合了军事和政治手段。然而，到1939年秋季，他似乎认为不直接动用德国军事力量就能取得的胜利还不够，因此，他是否已经穷尽了这种混合策略的可能性，这一点尚不确定。但显而易见的是，一旦他放弃了政治手段，转而选择仅凭武力来实现目标，他的战略才能很快就被证明不足以解决他自己制造的问题。
Toward the completion of the first stage of this ambitious program, Hitler made remarkable progress in the years from 1933 to 1939, initially by means of a dazzling display of diplomatic virtuosity, by which he succeeded in hiding his real objectives from the Western powers while skillfully exploiting all of their differences and distractions, and then, after the spring of 1938, by an adroit combination of military and political pressures. It is by no means certain that he had exhausted the possibilities of this strategy of mixed means by the fall of 1939, when he seems to have decided that victories won without the direct application of German military might were not satisfying enough. It is evident, however, that once he abandoned the political weapon and chose to seek his objectives by the sword alone, his strategical gifts soon proved inadequate to solve the problems he created for himself.
早在1940年6月，这一点就已昭然若揭。当时，凯特尔将军正盛赞战胜斯堪的纳维亚、低地国家和法国的希特勒是“史上最伟大的统帅”。然而，这位德国最高统帅部（OKW）总司令或许更应该称他的元首为战略破产者，因为英国拒绝像法国那样投降，打乱了他的宏伟计划，而他却没有任何解决由此带来的难题的方案。曼施坦因元帅在战后写道，希特勒总是自信满满地认为，凭借他强大的意志力，他能够克服任何阻碍其野心的障碍，以至于忘记了敌人也拥有意志。<sup> 25</sup>如今，这个棘手的真相第一次摆在了他面前，为战争增添了一个他既不理解也无法掌控的维度。这对他的战略产生了令人不安且持久的影响。从那时起，这种做法日益表现出急躁，计划构思不周，执行缺乏信念，最终又被放弃，人力物力资源挥霍无度，以及冲动任性的行事作风，最终酿成灾难性后果。26
This became abundantly clear as early as June 1940, that is, at the very moment when General Keitel was hailing the victor over Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France as “the greatest commander of all times.” The OKW chief might more accurately have described his Führer as a strategical bankrupt, for the fact that Great Britain refused to surrender as France had done disrupted his grand design, and he had no plan for resolving the difficulties that this posed. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein wrote after the war that Hitler was always so confident that his force of will would be able to overcome any possible obstacle to his desires that he forgot that the enemy possesses a will too.25 Now this awkward truth confronted him for the first time, adding a dimension to the war that he did not understand and could not master. The effect upon his strategy was disturbing and permanent. From now on, it was marked increasingly by impatience, by plans that were ill-conceived, implemented without conviction, and then abandoned, by profligacy in the use of human and material resources, and by an impulsive willfulness that had disastrous results.26
希特勒在1940年下半年展现出的非凡思维能力，恰恰暴露出他缺乏清晰的方向感。进攻不列颠群岛的计划构思粗糙，而其所依赖的空袭行动也未能达到预期目标。种种迹象表明，希特勒对“海狮行动”本身就缺乏真正的决心，因为早在7月，他就已告知最高指挥官，结束英国参战的关键在于苏联，而苏联或许必须先被摧毁。到了10月，当英国遭受空袭的效果明显不佳时，他又另辟蹊径，与墨索里尼、贝当、拉瓦尔以及佛朗哥举行会谈，试图说服他们参与一系列旨在彻底切断英国地中海交通线的袭击；同月，他甚至考虑过劝说苏联对英国在中东的据点发动进攻。希特勒在陆军总司令部（OKH）的参谋策划人员有充分的理由对他们的上司不断变换战线感到困惑，因为在短短五个月内，他们就被命令制定了“海狮行动”、攻占直布罗陀、亚速尔群岛和加那利群岛、保卫芬兰镍矿、支援北非的意大利军队以及入侵苏联的计划。27
The extraordinary ability of Hitler's thinking in the second half of 1940 is indicative of his lack of a clear sense of direction. The plan for an assault on the British Isles was slipshod in conception and the air offensive upon which it depended ill-designed for the objectives it sought to gain. There are indications that Hitler was never very deeply committed to Operation Sea Lion in any case, since, as early as July, he was letting his highest commanders know that the key to ending Britain's participation in the war was Russia, which might have to be destroyed first. In October, when it was clear that the aerial bombardment of Britain was not sufficiently effective, he was off on another tack and was holding conferences with Mussolini, Pétain and Laval, and Franco in an effort to induce them to join in a series of attacks to cut Britain's Mediterranean line of communications completely; and in the same month he was actually considering trying to talk the Russians into an offensive against British holdings in the Middle East. Hitler's staff planners in the OKH had good reason to be bewildered by their master's continual changes of front, since they had, in the course of five months, been ordered to draw up plans for Sea Lion, the capture of Gibraltar, the Azores, and the Canaries, the defense of the Finnish nickel mines, the support of the Italians in North Africa, and the invasion of Russia.27
年底，局势逐渐明朗。11月，苏联外长莫洛托夫访问柏林，使希特勒确信《苏德互不侵犯条约》已失去效力，是时候发动期待已久的对苏联的进攻了。然而，随着“巴巴罗萨行动”详细计划的展开，希特勒手下一些更有远见的官员却难以理解其战略目的。正如哈尔德的日记所揭示的那样，总参谋长哈尔德越来越担心军事目标会屈从于意识形态目标，担心摧毁布尔什维克制度和灭绝犹太人会凌驾于克劳塞维茨式的、旨在以最快捷的方式削弱敌人继续斗争意志的战略之上。28
Clarity came at the end of the year, after Foreign Minister Molotov's visit to Berlin in November convinced Hitler that the Nazi-Soviet Pact had outlived its usefulness and that the time had come for the long-desired assault upon the Soviet Union. As the detailed planning for Operation Barbarossa got under way, however, the more prescient of Hitler's staff had some difficulty in understanding what its strategical purpose was to be, and the OKH chief of staff Halder became increasingly fearful, as his diary reveals, lest military objectives be subordinated to ideological ones, and the destruction of the Bolshevik system and the extermination of the Jews take priority over a Clausewitzian strategy of seeking the most expeditious means of weakening the enemy's will to continue the struggle.28
1941年6月进攻开始后，这种担忧的合理性便显露无疑。1941年和1942年在俄罗斯的战役中，士兵们竭力劝说希特勒认识到统筹协调的重要性，但最终徒劳无功。有人认为，德军在1941年未能攻占莫斯科，是因为南斯拉夫和希腊战役的拖延——这些战役是为了消除德军右翼的潜在威胁；然而，这种观点忽略了7月至9月间更为严重的时间浪费，当时德军就驻俄三大集团军的任务及其优先顺序展开了激烈的辩论。约德尔和哈尔德都主张集中兵力攻占莫斯科，不仅因为莫斯科是苏联首都，更因为苏军会倾尽全力防守，从而为德军提供削弱其军事力量的机会。希特勒对这一方案避而不谈，他多次坚持列宁格勒才是他的首要目标，或者说必须夺取顿涅茨盆地，瘫痪克里米亚半岛，消除其对罗马尼亚油田的威胁。他愤然拒绝了布劳希奇和哈尔德于1941年8月18日提交的备忘录，该备忘录主张在即将到来的冬季到来之前立即向莫斯科发起进攻，以免行动受阻。希特勒还尖刻地批评陆军总司令部（OKH）的成员思想“僵化”，固守过时的理论。<sup>29</sup>这一侮辱导致哈尔德建议布劳希奇和哈尔德辞职。直到9月30日，南方军队攻占基辅之后，希特勒才授权向苏联首都进军，而漫长的拖延最终导致了这次行动的失败。
That there was reason for such concern became abundantly clear once the attack was begun in June 1941, and the campaigns of 1941 and 1942 in Russia were marked by bitter but unavailing attempts by the soldiers to persuade Hitler to recognize the importance of coherence and consistency. It has been argued that the German armies failed to take Moscow in 1941 because of the delays caused by the campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece, which were necessary to eliminate a potential danger to the German right flank; but this overlooks the more serious loss of time that was spent between July and September on debates over the missions of the three German army groups in Russia and the question of priority among them. Both Jodl and Halder favored concentrating upon the capture of Moscow, not only because it was the capital of the Soviet Union but because the Russians would defend it with all of their resources and thus provide an opportunity for the destruction of their military strength. Hitler shied away from this solution, insisting at various times that Leningrad was his chief goal or that it was essential to capture the Donets Basin and immobilize the Crimea and end its threat to the Romanian oil fields. He indignantly rejected a Brauchitsch-Halder memorandum of August 18, 1941, in which they argued for an immediate drive on Moscow before the approaching winter made it impossible, and scathingly described the OKH as being filled with minds that were “fossilized” in obsolete theory,29 an insult that led Halder to suggest to Brauchitsch that they submit their resignations. It was not until September 30, after the southern armies had taken Kiev, that Hitler authorized the advance upon the Soviet capital, and the long delay proved fatal to the enterprise.
希特勒在1942年战役中的指挥也体现了同样的神经质的摇摆不定。元首没有恢复对莫斯科的进攻，而是在4月宣布，主要攻势将转向南方，目标是摧毁顿河盆地的红军部队，然后夺取高加索地区的油田。对帝国燃料短缺的担忧使这一作战计划具有一定的合理性，但一旦在6月下旬实施，希特勒再次展现了他容易被局部机会分散注意力、为了战术胜利而牺牲战略目标的倾向。他的第1942号战争指令就是一个典型的例子。 7月23日第45号命令将他的南方部队一分为二，命令由马克西米利安·冯·魏克斯将军指挥的B集团军群向斯大林格勒进军，而由威廉·李斯特元帅指挥的A集团军群——由于两个装甲师被抽调到魏克斯的第六集团军以及大部分驻克里米亚的第十一集团军（该集团军已被重新调往围攻列宁格勒）而实力削弱——则被要求从克里米亚渡过顿河下游和刻赤海峡，深入高加索地区。30
The same kind of nervous vacillation characterized Hitler's conduct of the 1942 campaign. Instead of resuming the attack on Moscow, the Führer declared in April that the principal thrust would be made in the south with the aim of destroying units of the Red Army in the Don Basin and then seizing the oil fields of the Caucasus. Concern over the Reich's shortages of fuel gave some plausibility to this operational plan, but once it was put into effect in late June Hitler again showed his tendency to be diverted by local opportunities and to sacrifice strategical goals for tactical successes. A fateful example of this is provided by his War Directive no. 45 of July 23, which split his southern forces, ordering Army Group B, commanded by General Maximilian von Weichs, to move on the city of Stalingrad, while Army Group A under Field Marshal Wilhelm List—weakened by the loss of two armored divisions that had been detached and sent to Weichs's Sixth Army and most of the Eleventh Army in the Crimea, which had been reassigned to the siege of Leningrad—was expected to cross the lower Don and the Kerch Strait from the Crimea and penetrate the Caucasus.30
这无疑是自取灭亡。哈尔德在日记中写道：“长期以来低估敌人能力的倾向正逐渐演变成一种怪诞的现象，并发展成一种实实在在的危险。在这里，严肃的工作已经变得不可能。这种所谓的领导方式的特点是对一时冲动做出病态的反应。”<sup> 31</sup>事实上，希特勒对如今严重匮乏的资源的运用以及目标的选择越来越受到任性和情绪波动的影响：列宁格勒和斯大林格勒这两个名字似乎具有一种与其战略重要性完全不成比例的邪恶吸引力；随着元首面临的困境日益加剧，他的计划变得越来越宏大而不切实际；他对挫折的反应也越来越不理智，出于对事实的顽固无视或为了追求声望而挥霍资源。拒绝让保卢斯的第六集团军在还有时间的时候突围斯大林格勒，以及——在另一个战场上——在突尼斯桥头堡陷落后很久，仍然决定继续用部队和装备加强该桥头堡，这些都是战略判断混乱的迹象。
This was a prescription for disaster. Halder wrote in his diary, “The chronic tendency to underrate enemy capabilities is gradually assuming grotesque proportions and develops into a positive danger. Serious work is becoming impossible here. This so-called leadership is characterized by a pathological reacting to the impressions of the moment.”31 Indeed, Hitler's disposition of his now seriously diminished resources and his choice of objectives were increasingly determined by willfulness and volatility of mood: the names Leningrad and Stalingrad appeared to exercise a baleful attractiveness out of all proportion to their strategical importance; as the Führer's difficulties mounted, his designs became more grandiose and unrealistic; and he became ever more irrational in his reaction to setbacks, squandering resources out of obstinate blindness to facts or for reasons of prestige. The refusal to allow Paulus's Sixth Army to break out of Stalingrad while there was still time to do so and—in another theater of war—the decision to go on reinforcing the bridgehead in Tunisia with troops and equipment long after its fall was predictable were signs of a strategical judgment in disarray.
1941年12月，日本偷袭珍珠港后，苏联决定对美国宣战，这一决定更难解释。希特勒12月10日在国会发表的演讲中，充斥着对富兰克林·罗斯福总统的人身攻击和谩骂，这在一定程度上印证了这样一种观点：元首此举是出于对罗斯福在1940年和1941年大西洋亲英行动的长期积怨。此外，希特勒希望借此向日本示好，以期诱使日本进攻苏联远东地区，这无疑也是他宣战的原因之一。但希特勒采取这一关键步骤很可能仅仅是为了这一姿态及其对德国人民的影响，因为他知道这样做不会造成任何伤害：也就是说，他意识到他必须在 1942 年赢得俄国战争，如果他做到了，美国就无法阻止他获得他渴望的全球霸权；如果他做不到，德国的厄运是必然的，而且是咎由自取。
The decision to declare war upon the United States in December 1941, after the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor, is more difficult to explain. A reading of Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on December 10, with its long passages of personal abuse and vituperation of President Franklin Roosevelt, lends some credence to the view that the action was motivated by the Führer's long-bottled-up resentment of Roosevelt's pro-British actions in the Atlantic in 1940 and 1941. A desire to demonstrate solidarity with the Japanese in the hope that they might still be induced to attack the Soviet Far Eastern provinces doubtless played a part also. But it is just as likely that Hitler took this critical step for the sake of the gesture alone and its effect upon the German people and because he knew that it could do no harm: that is, he realized that he must win the war in Russia in 1942, and that if he did so there was nothing that the United States could do to prevent his winning the global mastery that he desired; if he did not, Germany's doom was certain, and deserved.
约德尔在纽伦堡备忘录中写道：“希特勒比世界上任何人都更早地感觉到并知道战争已经失败了。”斯大林格勒战役惨败、隆美尔在阿拉曼战役中战败以及盟军在卡萨布兰卡、奥兰和阿尔及尔登陆之后，战争的势头转向了敌方。正如约德尔所言，希特勒的“战略家活动实际上已经结束。从那时起，他越来越频繁地干预作战决策，甚至深入到战术细节，以毫不妥协的意志力强加给他人，而他认为将军们根本不愿理解：要么奋起，要么失败；每一步自愿的后退本身就是一种罪恶。”<sup> 32</sup>战争此时已达到了非理性的极致，德国的指挥官们正如其中一位所言，沦为了“高薪士官”，而元首则在每个战线的每个区域发号施令，并坚称意志力足以战胜数量和装备上的优势。
“Earlier than any other person in the world,” Jodl wrote in his Nuremberg memorandum, “Hitler sensed and knew that the war was lost.” After the catastrophe at Stalingrad, Rommel's defeat at El Alamein, and the Allied landings at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers, the momentum of the war had shifted to the enemy's side, and, in Jodl's words, Hitler's “activity as a strategist was essentially ended. From then on, he intervened more and more frequently in operational decisions, often down to matters of tactical detail, in order to impose with unbending will what he thought the generals simply refused to comprehend: that one had to stand or fall, that each voluntary step backwards was an evil in itself.”'32 The war now attained the ultimate in irrationality, with Germany's commanding generals reduced, as one of them said, to the status of “highly paid NCOs” and the Führer giving the orders in every sector of every front and insisting that willpower was enough to triumph over superior numbers and equipment.
这种战争方式最好用保卢斯在斯大林格勒的一位下属的话来描述，他将原地战斗和死亡的命令描述为“不仅从军事角度来看是犯罪，而且就我们对德意志民族的责任而言也是犯罪行为”。但希特勒，对战争始终是一场个人戏剧，从未真正理解过这种责任，或许，从根本上说，这才是他作为战略家的最大缺陷。
It was a kind of warfare best characterized in the words of one of Paulus's subordinates in Stalingrad, who described the orders to fight and die in place as “not only a crime from a military point of view but a criminal act as regards our responsibility to the German nation.” But then Hitler, to whom the war had always been a personal drama, had never had a very highly developed sense of that kind of responsibility, and perhaps, at bottom, that was his greatest deficiency as a strategist.
V
V
但温斯顿·丘吉尔的情况则截然不同。他的思想深受两方面的影响：首先，他牢记第一次世界大战给国家带来的惨痛损失，决心不能让战胜希特勒的代价重蹈覆辙；其次，他也深知胜利之后将会面临诸多挑战。因此，他的战略思想比他在华盛顿的朋友和盟友富兰克林·罗斯福更具政治色彩，这一点我们稍后会详细阐述。
One could never say the same of Winston Churchill, whose thinking was deeply influenced, in the first place, by his memory of what the losses of the First World War had meant to his country and a determination that the defeat of Hitler should not be won at the same cost and, in the second, by an awareness of the kind of problems that would have to be faced after victory was achieved. In consequence, his strategical ideas had a more emphatically political cast than was true, as we shall see in due course, in the case of his friend and ally in Washington, Franklin Roosevelt.
在第二次世界大战主要参战国的政治领袖中，丘吉尔的战争经验最为丰富。1895年加入第四骠骑兵团后，短短八年间，他便亲历了古巴、印度西北边境、苏丹和南非的战火，既有作为士兵的经历，也有作为战地记者的报道。25岁时当选下议院议员后，他先是因对军费预算的尖锐批评而声名鹊起，后又成为海军建设的积极倡导者。这一转变恰逢他于1911年从阿斯奎斯自由党内阁的内政大臣调任海军大臣。第一次世界大战期间，他是一位精力充沛的海军大臣，1914年大胆运用英国的两栖作战能力阻止德军占领英吉利海峡港口，一年后又成为夺取达达尼尔海峡、迫使土耳其退出战争计划的有力支持者。这次行动的失败导致内阁改组，他也因此失去了职位。之后他重返军队，被任命为苏格兰皇家第六燧发枪团团长，并赢得了上级的赞赏。1916年春，当黑格就任总司令后，他意识到自己无法再获得一个旅级单位的指挥权，于是他很不情愿地回到了议会。<sup> 33 </sup> 战争的最后一年，劳合·乔治不顾那些仍然认为他应对达达尼尔海峡战役失败负责的人的反对，任命他为军需大臣。
Of all the political leaders of the major belligerents in the Second World War, Churchill had the greatest experience in war. Commissioned in the 4th Hussars in 1895, he had within eight years seen fighting in Cuba, the northwest frontier of India, the Sudan, and South Africa, either as a combatant or as a war correspondent. Elected to the House of Commons at the age of twenty-five, he made his name first as a cogent critic of military budgets and later as a vigorous advocate of naval construction, the change of heart coinciding with his translation in 1911 from the post of Home Secretary in Asquith's Liberal cabinet to that of First Lord of the Admiralty. During the Great War, he was an energetic First Lord, boldly resorting in 1914 to the use of Britain's amphibious capability to prevent German capture of the Channel ports and, a year later, becoming a powerful champion of the plan to take the Dardanelles and drive Turkey out of the war. When the failure of this operation led to a cabinet shakeup and the loss of his position, he went back to the army and was given command of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, earning the praise of his superiors. He returned reluctantly to Parliament in the spring of 1916 when it became apparent that he could not expect a brigade when Haig became commander in chief.33 In the last year of the war, Lloyd George appointed him as minister of munitions, over the objections of those who still held him responsible for the failure at the Dardanelles.
这种多元化的经历对丘吉尔关于战争及其管理的思考产生了两种截然不同的影响。首先，他对阿斯奎斯-基钦纳时期松散冗余的委员会制度所带来的不幸后果记忆犹新，这促使他在1940年就任首相后立即推行结构性改革，大幅集中政府运作，使他同时成为政府首脑和武装部队最高统帅。他通过一个精简的战时内阁，在其下设立了国防作战委员会，成员包括副首相、三位军种大臣以及后来的外交大臣，其他部长在必要时出席，参谋长则始终在场。在新成立的国防部（丘吉尔也兼任国防部长）内，参谋长们组成了一个“联合作战司令部”，该司令部每天在丘吉尔或其副国防部长伊斯梅将军的主持下召开会议。国防大臣对联合计划委员会和联合情报委员会拥有直接管辖权，同时还统领一个独立于各军种部的联合计划参谋部。该参谋部在伊斯梅的主持下，于战时内阁秘书处召开会议。随着战争的持续，权力逐渐集中到丘吉尔和参谋长手中，战时内阁和议会在战略制定中也逐渐失去了任何有效作用。这一事实引发了零星的抗议和抱怨，但这些抗议和抱怨最终都因该体系的高效性而失效。正如美国人在1942年和1943年的阿卡迪亚会议、卡萨布兰卡会议和三叉戟会议上所尴尬地认识到的那样，该体系所实现的协调参谋计划远胜于美国同行的任何成果。罗纳德·莱文曾写道：“丘吉尔兼具政治和军事权威，这为新的最高指挥结构奠定了基石，事实证明，无论在英国还是其他任何国家，这都是有史以来最高效的战争指挥中央系统。”<sup> 34</sup>
This varied experience had two sharply different effects upon Churchill's thinking about war and its management. In the first place, his memory of the unhappy results of the loose and redundant committee system of the Asquith-Kitchener days led him, as soon as he became prime minister in 1940, to introduce structural changes that sharply centralized government operations and had the effect of making him both head of government and supreme commander of the armed forces. Working through a small War Cabinet, he formed under it a Defence Committee (Operations) consisting of the deputy prime minister, the three service ministers and, later, the foreign secretary, with other ministers attending when necessary and the chiefs of staff always present. Within the new Ministry of Defence, whose leadership he also assumed, the chiefs of staff formed a “combined battle headquarters,” which met daily in Churchill's presence or that of his deputy defence minister, General Ismay. The minister of defence had direct authority over both the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee, as well as over a Joint Planning Staff that was independent of the separate service ministries and met, under Ismay's chairmanship, in the War Cabinet Secretariat. As the war continued, the concentration of power in the hands of Churchill and the chiefs of staff gradually excluded both the War Cabinet and Parliament from any effective role in the formulation of strategy, a fact that occasioned intermittent protests and complaints, which were, however, rendered ineffective by the system's proven efficiency. The coordinated staff planning that it made possible was far superior to anything produced by its American counterpart, as the Americans learned to their discomfiture at the Arcadia, Casablanca, and Trident conferences in 1942 and 1943. Ronald Lewin has written that “the embodiment in Churchill of both political and military authority provided the keystone for a new High Command structure which proved to be the most efficient central system for running a war ever evolved, either in Great Britain or any other country.”'34
在丘吉尔掌权的头两年，参谋长们的大部分精力都不得不用于约束这位体制缔造者的冲动，并努力维持他与前线指挥官之间尚可接受的工作关系。因为，尽管第一次世界大战让丘吉尔在指挥战争方面积累了丰富的经验，但也让他对职业军人产生了轻蔑的态度，这与他对自己军事判断和战略战术才能的无限自信格格不入。此外，他本人性格强悍好斗，对作战指挥中枯燥乏味的条条框框毫无耐心，而且他天马行空的想象力也令那些被迫严格把控手段与目标之间关系的指挥官们感到沮丧，因此，他与指挥官之间的冲突在所难免。阿奇博尔德·韦维尔元帅曾说过，丘吉尔“从未意识到在投入战斗前配备齐全装备的必要性。我记得他曾辩称，由于数量相对较少的布尔骑兵在1899年和1900年就曾阻挡过一个英国师的进攻，因此南非旅在1940年投入战斗前无需配备比步枪多得多的装备。事实上，我发现温斯顿的战术理念在某种程度上是在南非战争中得以确立的。他思维活跃，总是能够创造性地或接受新的战术理念和武器，但我认为直到最后，他都没有真正理解战争的行政管理；他总是指责指挥官们组织起来‘只有尾巴没有牙齿’。”<sup> 35</sup>
For the first two years of Churchill's tenure of power, much of the energies of the chiefs of staff had to be directed toward restraining the impetuosity of the system's creator and toward trying to maintain a tolerable working relationship between him and the commanding generals in the field. For, if the Great War had taught Churchill a good deal about effective organization for the direction of the war effort, it had also left him with a low regard for professional soldiers that comported ill with his boundless confidence in his own military judgment and in his talent for strategical and tactical decisions. Since he was also a robust and combative personality who had no patience with the systematic and unexciting aspects of operational command and was further endowed with a powerful imagination that dismayed practitioners who were forced to have a scrupulous regard for the relationship between means and ends, conflict between him and his commanders was inevitable. Field Marshal Archibald Wavell once said that Churchill “never realized the necessity for full equipment before committing troops to battle. I remember his arguing that, because a comparatively small number of mounted Boers had held up a British division in 1899 and 1900, it was unnecessary for the South African Brigade to have much more equipment than rifles before taking the field in 1940. In fact, I found that Winston's tactical ideals had to some extent crystallized in the South African War. His fertile brain was always inventive or receptive of new tactical ideas and weapons, but I do not think that right up to the end he ever understood the administrative side of war; he always accused commanders of organizing ‘all tail and no teeth’.”35
由于丘吉尔怀疑他的将领们缺乏进取心和魄力，便向他们下达了大量命令、备忘录和指示，而这些事项实际上并非他自己的职责，而是他们的职责。例如，1940年8月16日，令帝国总参谋长约翰·迪尔爵士和军事行动总监约翰·肯尼迪少将震惊的是，他下达了一份关于中东战役的指示，这份指示实际上就是一份作战命令，其中包括详细的战术指示，细致到营级部队的前后部署，并对部队的运用下达了极其详尽的命令——这正是希特勒在战争后期惯用的那种凌驾于一线指挥官权力之上的做法。他时刻警惕着手下将领们的怯懦迹象。1941年4月，当他从肯尼迪口中得知韦维尔已制定了在被迫撤出埃及时的撤军计划时，他勃然大怒，怒吼道：“韦维尔有40万大军！如果他们丢掉埃及，必将血流成河！我要派人枪毙这些将军！”肯尼迪辩解说，每个谨慎的将领都必须有这样的计划，他却怒斥道：“这简直让我震惊。我从未听过这样的想法！战争是意志的较量！你这样说，纯粹是失败主义！”<sup> 37</sup>
Because he suspected his generals of lacking enterprise and aggressive spirit, Churchill deluged them with streams of orders, memoranda, and directives on matters that were really their business rather than his own. On August 16, 1940, for instance, to the astonishment of Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir John Dill and Major-General Sir John Kennedy, director of military operations, he sent a directive for the conduct of the campaign in the Middle East that was virtually an operations order, including detailed tactical instructions, down to the forward and rear distribution of battalions, and giving minutely detailed orders for the employment of forces'36—the very kind of supersession of the authority of the field commander to which Hitler was prone in the last stages of the war. He was constantly on the watch for signs of faint-heartedness on the part of his generals, and, in April 1941, learning from Kennedy that Wavell had a plan for withdrawal from Egypt if it should be forced upon him, shouted in rage, “Wavell has 400,000 men! If they lose Egypt, blood will flow! I will have firing parties to shoot the generals!” and—when Kennedy protested that every prudent general must have such a plan—“This comes as a flash of lightning to me. I never heard such ideas! War is a contest of wills! It is pure defeatism to speak as you have done!”37
毫无疑问，在1940年和1941年那段艰难岁月里，温斯顿·丘吉尔不屈不挠的精神为英国做出了巨大贡献。他面对大多数人都会畏惧的逆境，不仅鼓舞了英国同胞的士气，也赢得了美国人民的钦佩和物质支持。即便如此，他的好战精神也付出了代价。他急于抓住一切机会打击敌人，导致优先事项严重混乱。1941年3月，在没有理性评估此举将如何严重消耗中东司令部的力量以及成功几率微乎其微的情况下，就决定援助希腊。事后看来，这几乎是一次轻率的英勇之举。尽管迪尔和韦维尔违背自身判断同意了这一决定，但丘吉尔对最终惨败的责任并不能减轻。丘吉尔后来对隆美尔的迷恋，无疑源于他倾向于从单个作战人员的角度看待这场冲突，这导致他将埃及在英国战略优先事项中的地位从第四位（排在本土、马来亚和好望角之后）提升至第二位，并在未经参谋长协商的情况下发布指令，宣称埃及的沦陷仅次于成功入侵和最终征服。这一结论遭到了国防军事官员肯尼迪的强烈反对。<sup> 38</sup>这并非一时之言。它影响了丘吉尔对资源分配的看法；尤其使马来亚失去了急需的增援；并导致了新加坡的陷落，而新加坡的陷落极大地加速了丘吉尔曾誓言绝不亲眼目睹的大英帝国的瓦解。
There is no doubt that Great Britain was well served by Winston Churchill's indomitable spirit in the grim years of 1940 and 1941, and that his defiance of odds that would have daunted most men not only sustained the courage of his own countrymen but won the admiration and the material support of the people of the United States as well. Even so, his combativeness exacted a price, and his eagerness to get at the enemy wherever an opportunity to do so presented itself led to a serious muddling of priorities. The decision to go to the aid of Greece in March 1941, without any rational estimation of how gravely this would drain the strength of the Middle East Command and how slight the chances of success, seems in retrospect to have been an almost frivolous exercise in gallantry, and Churchill's responsibility for the resultant debacle is not palliated by the fact that Dill and Wavell, against their better judgment, concurred in the decision. And Churchill's later fascination with Rommel, which was doubtless due to his penchant for seeing the conflict in terms of individual combatants, led him to elevate the position of Egypt in Britain's list of strategic priorities from fourth place (after the security of the home islands, Malaya, and the Cape of Good Hope) to second and to declare, in a directive issued without consulting the chiefs of staff, that its loss would be second only to successful invasion and final conquest, a conclusion with which the DMO Kennedy violently disagreed.38 Nor was this merely the rhetoric of the moment. It influenced Churchill's views on the allocation of resources; it deprived Malaya, in particular, of needed reinforcement; it led to the fall of Singapore, an event that went a long way toward advancing that dissolution of the British Empire over which Churchill had vowed he would not preside.
在艾伦·布鲁克爵士接替迪尔担任总参谋长后，丘吉尔涉足作战领域的次数逐渐减少。布鲁克比他的前任更倾向于抵制他认为危险的想法，并且足够狡猾，能够避免让首相注意到那些他认为可能会激怒丘吉尔暴躁脾气的事情。“你跟那个人讲的战争越多，”布鲁克在大幅缩短了给丘吉尔的通话时间后对肯尼迪说，“就越会阻碍战争的胜利。”<sup> 39 </sup> 与此同时，美国参战（与布鲁克的任命在同一个月），标志着战争进入了一个新阶段，在这个阶段，最重要的需求是有效的联合战略规划。丘吉尔应对这一挑战的方式，丝毫没有像他在1940年和1941年那样冲动和缺乏远见。
After Sir Alan Brooke succeeded Dill as CIGS, Churchill's forays into the operational field were gradually limited, for Brooke was more willing than his predecessor to resist notions that he thought were dangerous and was cunning enough to keep from the prime minister's attention matters that he thought might have an excitable effect upon his stormy temperament. “The more you tell that man about the war,” he said to Kennedy after radically reducing a minute to Churchill, “the more you hinder the winning of it.”'39 At the same time, the entrance of the United States into the war, which took place in the same month as Brooke's appointment, marked the opening of a new phase in which the most important requirement was effective joint strategical planning, and Churchill's response to this challenge was flawed by none of the impulsiveness and lack of measure that he had shown in 1940 and 1941.
由于首相自战争伊始便与富兰克林·罗斯福建立了特殊关系，而这种关系最初又因双方在海军事务上的共同兴趣而得以巩固，因此，即便在美国正式参战之前，双方已完成了一定程度的应急计划。1941年1月29日至3月29日，英美参谋部在华盛顿举行会谈，旨在确定“如果美国被迫诉诸战争，美国和英联邦武装部队……击败德国及其盟国的最佳方法”。此次英美参谋部会谈（ABC- i）的指导原则源于美国海军作战部长哈罗德·斯塔克海军上将早前的一份备忘录，该备忘录指出，一旦开战，美国将在大西洋作为英国的盟友采取进攻姿态，而在太平洋采取防御姿态。
Thanks to the special relationship that the prime minister had established with Franklin Roosevelt from the very beginning of the war, which was fostered at the outset by their common interest in naval affairs,40 a certain amount of contingency planning had been accomplished even before the United States became a belligerent. Thus, Anglo-American staff talks were held in Washington from January 29 to March 29, 1941 to determine “the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth…could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.” These ABC-i talks had been guided by the conclusions of an earlier American memorandum of chief of naval operations Admiral Harold Stark that, in the event of war, the United States would adopt an offensive posture in the Atlantic as an ally of Great Britain and a defensive one in the Pacific.41
然而，珍珠港事件后美国民众的情绪令丘吉尔担忧，担心这种优先顺序会被颠倒。他决心立即前往华盛顿，“带着所能抽调的最强专家顾问团队……去说服总统和美国各军种首长，日本战败并不意味着希特勒的战败，而是希特勒战败后彻底消灭日本只是时间问题。”<sup> 42</sup>事实证明，他的担忧是多余的。1942年1月在华盛顿举行的阿卡迪亚会议上，“先解决德国”的原则再次得到确认，继续轰炸、封锁和采取颠覆措施削弱德国的决心也得以重申，直到可以在西欧某地（大概在1943年）进行大规模登陆作战。除了建立一个统领从缅甸到中国南海所有盟军部队的最高司令部（ABDA）之外，会议没有提出任何关于太平洋战区的积极方案，而这个计划很快就被证明是行不通的。
The American mood after Pearl Harbor, however, aroused concern in Churchill's mind lest this order of priorities be reversed, and he resolved to go to Washington at once “with the strongest team of expert advisers who could be spared…. to persuade the President and the American Service chiefs that the defeat of Japan would not spell the defeat of Hitler, but that the defeat of Hitler made the finishing off of Japan merely a matter of time and trouble.”42 As it happened, his fears were groundless. At the Arcadia Conference in Washington in January 1942, the concept of “Germany first” was reaffirmed, as was the continuation of a bombing campaign, a blockade, and measures of subversion to weaken Germany until major landings could take place somewhere in western Europe, presumably in 1943. No positive proposals were made for the Pacific beyond the establishment of a supreme command (ABDA) for all allied forces operating in the area from Burma to the China Sea, a plan that soon proved to be unworkable.
在乘坐“约克公爵”号前往美国的途中，丘吉尔撰写了一系列文件，这些文件几乎印证了伊斯梅的论断：“他对战略全局的把握远超他的专业顾问”，而这些论断也体现了英国未来两年战略的基本假设。<sup> 43</sup>他认识到盟军在短期内的能力有限。“希特勒在俄罗斯的失败和损失是目前战争的主要事实。” 英美行动最有利的领域是大西洋海上航线和空中，以维持补给线并抑制德国的生产，以及北非战场。1942年的主要进攻行动应该是“占领法国在北非和西非的全部属地……英国进一步控制从突尼斯到埃及的整个北非海岸，从而在海军形势允许的情况下，获得通过地中海通往黎凡特和苏伊士运河的自由通道。”应同时制定1943年夏季在西西里岛、意大利、斯堪的纳维亚半岛、低地国家、法国和巴尔干半岛的登陆计划，具体目标的选择则留待日后决定。他明确表示，他认为战争的胜利只能“通过在欧洲击败德军或通过德国内部的动荡”来实现。他设想组建一支由四十个装甲师组成的入侵部队，并由制海权和空中优势力量提供掩护，通过密集的轰炸攻势开辟道路。44
On the voyage to America in Duke of York, Churchill composed a series of papers that came close to justifying Ismay's statement that “in his grasp of the broad sweep of strategy [he] stood head and shoulders above his professional advisers,” and that embodied what came to be the basic assumptions of British strategy for the next two years.43 He recognized the limited capabilities of the Allies in the immediate future. “Hitler's failures and losses in Russia are the prime facts in the War at this time.” The most favorable areas for Anglo-American action were on the Atlantic sea lanes and in the air, to maintain supply lines and inhibit German production, and in the northern African theater. The main offensive action in 1942 should be “the occupation of the whole of the North and West African possessions of France,…further control by Britain of the whole North African shore from Tunis to Egypt, thus giving, if the naval situation allows, free passage through the Mediterranean to the Levant and the Suez Canal.” Planning should simultaneously be made for landings, in the summer of 1943, in Sicily and Italy, as well as in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, and the Balkans, the actual choice of several specific targets to be deferred until later. He made clear his belief that the war could only be won “through the defeat in Europe of the German armies or through internal convulsions in Germany.” He envisaged an invasion army of forty armored divisions, covered by command of the sea and superior air power, with their way prepared by an intensive bombing offensive.44
事实上，这正是盟军在1942年和1943年所采取的战略。尽管在此过程中，他们与美国参谋长们之间也曾出现过激烈的冲突。这些参谋长在4月份与英国方面进行联合磋商后，认为他们已经说服英国同意在1943年（甚至在1942年，如果苏联看起来濒临崩溃）进行跨海峡登陆作战，但他们怀疑英国会反悔，甚至怀疑英国根本没有在西方登陆的意愿。在这样的时刻，丘吉尔与总统的友谊显得尤为重要。正是他在1942年6月华盛顿会议上的雄辩之词，使罗斯福相信，延迟的跨海峡登陆总比失败的登陆要好；也正是他的劝说，最终促使总统接受了北非登陆作战这一可行且有利可图的方案。在卡萨布兰卡，正是他对北非登陆所带来的进攻可能性的巧妙描绘，赢得了罗斯福对在西西里岛登陆以及进而对意大利登陆的支持。45
This was, in fact, the strategy that was followed by the Allies in 1942 and 1943, although there were, along the way, stormy scenes with the American chiefs of staff, who, after joint consultation with the British in April, thought that they had persuaded them to agree to a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 (and even in 1942, if the Russians seemed on the point of collapse) and who suspected them of reneging and, indeed, of having no stomach for a Western landing. At such moments, Churchill's friendship with the President proved to be invaluable. It was his eloquence in the Washington conference of June 1942 that persuaded Roosevelt that a delayed Channel crossing was preferable to one that failed; it was his persuasion that edged the President toward the acceptance of a North African invasion as a feasible and profitable alternative; and, at Casablanca, it was his skillful portrayal of the offensive possibilities opened by the North African lodgment that won Roosevelt's support for a landing in Sicily and, by extension, in Italy.45
从某种意义上说，丘吉尔的战略观点决定了盟军在1942年和1943年的行动，并导致“霸王行动”迟迟未能实施，直到德军实力削弱、航运形势改善，英国参谋长联席会议才认为该行动切实可行。直到1943年11月的德黑兰会议，这种优势才被打破。在斯大林的强力支持下，美国人最终确定了“霸王行动”的确切日期，以及对法国南部进行支援性入侵（“铁砧行动”）的日期。在同意这项协议之前，丘吉尔和布鲁克被明确告知，在其他登陆行动完成之前，意大利的军事行动不会停止，因为这是牵制德军师的唯一手段，否则这些师可能会被调往俄罗斯或法国作战。此外，罗斯福在第一次开罗会议上向蒋介石做出的轻松承诺——在未来几个月内对安达曼群岛发动两栖作战（即“海盗行动”）——也被撤回。正如布鲁克所说，英国人“并未同意这项行动，也对其可行性持怀疑态度”。<sup> 46</sup>
In a real sense, then, Churchill's strategical views were determinant of Allied operations in 1942 and 1943 and had the consequence of preventing the implementation of the Overlord plan until the attrition of German strength and the improvement of the shipping situation made it seem feasible to the British Chiefs of Staff. It was not until the Teheran conference of November 1943 that this ascendancy came to an end, when, with Stalin's strong support, the Americans got a firm date for Overlord and for a supporting invasion of southern France (Anvil). Before agreeing to this, Churchill and Brooke were given a clear understanding that operations in Italy would not be curtailed until the other landings took place, since they were the only means of pinning down German divisions that might otherwise be employed in Russia or France, and that Roosevelt's light-hearted promise to Chiang Kai-shek at the first Cairo conference, to launch an amphibious operation against the Andaman Islands in the next few months—Operation Buccaneer, to which, as Brooke said, the British “had not agreed and of whose merits they were not convinced”—was revoked.46
在随后的时期里，丘吉尔的战略影响力逐渐减弱，他虽强忍着这种衰落，却也日益感到不安。尽管他非常钦佩美国人，但他们对战争带来的问题与解决的问题一样多，以及大战略的艺术在于预见未来轮廓并做好应对准备这一事实的麻木不仁，令他感到恼火。斯大林格勒战役之后，随着东线局势转向苏联一方，他开始意识到战后欧洲将面临苏联过大的压力，并考虑通过边界协议或相互承认的势力范围来限制这种压力。然而，这些建议遭到了国务卿科德尔·赫尔的强烈反对。赫尔于1943年11月从莫斯科外长会议返回后，坚信未来“不再需要势力范围、联盟、权力平衡，或任何其他特殊安排——在过去不幸的岁月里，各国正是通过这些安排来维护自身安全或促进自身利益的。” 47
The diminution of Churchill's strategical influence in the subsequent period he bore manfully but with mounting foreboding. However great his admiration of the Americans, he was exasperated by their insensitivity to the fact that wars create as many problems as they solve and that the art of grand strategy is to foresee the outlines of the future and be prepared to deal with it. After Stalingrad, when the momentum in the east shifted to the Soviet side, he began to apprehend an excessively large Soviet pressure in postwar Europe and to consider plans for limiting it by border agreements or mutually recognized spheres of influence. Such suggestions were, however, vigorously resisted by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who had returned from the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in November 1943 convinced that in the future there would “no longer be any need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or for any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.”47
赫尔并非唯一反对将旧外交理念引入战争的人。美国士兵深信，他们倾向于采用直接而非迂回的方式来处理战斗问题，这表明他们信奉克劳塞维茨的理论。然而，他们显然对这位德国理论家坚持的“战时忽视政治考量会带来危险”的观点缺乏了解。<sup> 48 </sup> 艾森豪威尔在1945年4月拒绝考虑进攻柏林，便证明了这一点。<sup> 49</sup>至于总统本人——丘吉尔曾在1944年7月致电他，呼吁他不要排除任何战略选择：“从长远的政治角度来看，（斯大林）或许更希望英国和美国在即将到来的艰苦战斗中承担起在法国的责任，而东欧、中欧和南欧则自然而然地落入他的控制之下。”<sup> 50 </sup> ——他对战略具有政治性的认识，并不比他的国务卿或士兵们高明多少。在他看来，赢得战争是首要任务，政治问题可以放在后面。
Nor was Hull alone in opposing the intrusion of the concepts of the old diplomacy into the pursuit of the war. American soldiers, who were convinced that their preference for the direct rather than the peripheral approach to battle problems showed their adherence to Clausewitz's doctrines, were all too obviously ill-informed about the German theorist's insistence that political considerations can be forgotten in wartime only with peril,48 as Eisenhower was to prove in April 1945 in refusing to consider an advance on Berlin.49 As for the President himself—to whom Churchill, in an appeal not to foreclose strategical options, had wired in July 1944, “On a long-term political view, [Stalin] might prefer that the British and Americans should do their share in France in this very hard fighting that is to come, and that East, Middle and Southern Europe should fall naturally into his control”50—he was no more open to the idea that strategy had a political side than his secretary of state or his soldiers. In his view, winning the war was the first priority, and politics would come later.
六年级
VI
如果说富兰克林·罗斯福对希特勒的无底线野心认识不足，导致他在1939年之前的外交表现充其量也只是漠不关心，那么，在欧洲战争爆发后，尽管罗斯福的美国政策在策略上犹豫不决、摇摆不定，甚至自相矛盾（考虑到国内的种种限制，这在所难免），但其整体战略却堪称精妙。面对军事形势，他以饱满的热情和十足的信心应对。他长期以来对海军事务和地理学颇感兴趣，1913年至1920年担任海军助理部长的经历，更使他对自身在军事问题和宏观战略方面的决策能力充满信心。 1939年7月，随着战争的确定性日益显现，他以三军统帅的身份发布了一项军事命令，将负责协调两军战略计划的陆海军联合委员会、负责采购项目的陆海军军需委员会以及负责军事生产的文职机构并入新成立的总统行政办公室。这意味着他打算将美国的军事力量牢牢掌握在自己手中，因为作为联合委员会成员，参谋长们现在直接向他负责，而陆军部长亨利·L·史汀生和海军部长弗兰克·诺克斯则基本上被排除在战略决策之外。
If Franklin D. Roosevelt had been slow in appreciating Hitler's boundless ambitions and if, in consequence, his diplomacy before 1939 had been at best indifferent,'51 his direction of American policy after the outbreak of the European war, while hesitant, tentative, and even contradictory in its tactics, inevitably so in view of his domestic restraints, was masterly in its overall strategy. To the military situation, he responded with vigor and assurance. He had long been interested in naval affairs and geography, and his service as assistant secretary of the navy from 1913 to 1920 had given him confidence in his ability to make decisions about military questions and grand strategy.’52 In July 1939, as the certainty of war became apparent, he had issued a Military Order in his capacity as commander in chief, moving the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, the body that coordinated the strategical plans of the two services, and the Army and Navy Munitions Board, which controlled procurement programs, and the civilian agency in charge of military production into the new Executive Office of the President. This meant that he intended to keep the military power of the United States under his own control, for as members of the Joint Board the chiefs of staff were now responsible directly to him, and the secretaries of war and the navy, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, were largely excluded from the area of strategic decision.
对英国人来说，这套体系松散得令人费解。约翰·迪尔爵士在1942年1月3日写给布鲁克的信中提到，美国参谋长联席会议似乎从未定期召开，即便召开，也没有秘书处记录会议内容。与英国不同，他们没有联合计划人员或执行计划人员，与总统的联系也断断续续，而且同样没有记录。“在我看来，”迪尔写道，“整个组织架构还停留在乔治·华盛顿时代，他被任命为所有军队的总司令，然后就直接上任了。如今，总统也是所有军队的总司令，但要做到这一点却并非易事。”<sup> 53</sup>事实上，美国的这套体系比迪尔想象的要高效得多，但毫无疑问，它的协调性不如英国的同类体系。富兰克林·罗斯福总是倾向于保留多种选择，不轻易透露自己的想法，并将最终决定权牢牢掌握在自己手中。尽管随着时间的推移，他逐渐依赖乔治·卡特莱特·马歇尔将军，并越来越依赖他的军事判断，但在1939年7月发布军事命令到珍珠港事件这段时间里，情况并非如此。肯特·罗伯茨·格林菲尔德写道，在此期间，“罗斯福所有关于使用美国军事力量的重要决定，要么是独立于他的军事首脑之外，要么是违背他们的建议，要么是无视他们的抗议。”<sup> 54</sup>
To the British, this was a system of baffling looseness. Sir John Dill wrote to Brooke on January 3, 1942. that the American chiefs of staff never seemed to have regular meetings and, when they did meet, there was no secretariat to record their proceedings. Unlike the British, they had no joint planners or executive planning staff, and their contacts with the President were intermittent and, again, unrecorded. “It seems to me,” Dill wrote, “that the whole organization belongs to the days of George Washington, who was made Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces and just did it. Today the President is Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces, but it is not so easy just to do it.”53 The American system was, in fact, more efficient than Dill supposed, but there is no doubt that it was less coordinated than its British counterpart. Franklin Roosevelt always preferred to keep his options open, his thoughts shrouded, and the right of ultimate decision firmly in his own hands and, although in time he became dependent upon General George Catlett Marshall and relied increasingly upon his military judgments, this was less true in the period between his Military Order of July 1939 and Pearl Harbor, during which, Kent Roberts Greenfield has written, “FDR made all his important decisions regarding the use of American military power either independently of his military chiefs, or against their advice, or over their protests.”54
早在1939年战争爆发之前，总统就已得出结论：一旦战争爆发，美国为了自身利益将被迫支持英国。他希望，如果美国能够足够有力地支持英国，或许就不必进行实际的军事干预。这一战略构想通过三项决策得以实施。第一项是罗斯福总统于1938年11月下令建立一座年产一万架战斗机的工厂，后于1940年5月将产能提升至五万架，这引起了军方高层的强烈不满，他们担心军备的重新武装将导致双方力量严重失衡。第二项是1940年5月至6月间决定全力援助英国。这一举措在6月6日总统于夏洛茨维尔发表的演讲中首次向公众公布，随后通过驱逐舰基地安排和租借法案得以实施。陆军和海军也认为此举危险，他们预料到英国即将崩溃，更倾向于采取半球防御政策。第三个决定是1941年春夏之际，不顾马歇尔的强烈反对，在大西洋建立驻军和护航舰队，并根据需要将其延伸至英国的补给线畅通无阻之处。<sup> 55</sup>这些行动以及英国政府顽固拒绝考虑投降，是破坏希特勒宏伟战略计划并迫使他走上最终走向毁灭的绝路的关键因素。
Even before the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, the President had come to the conclusion that, if war came, the United States would be forced, in its own interest, to support Great Britain. It was his hope that, if it did so vigorously enough, actual military intervention by the country might not be necessary. This strategical concept was implemented by three decisions. The first was Roosevelt's order in November 1938 for the creation of a plant capacity to produce ten thousand combat planes a year, later stepped up, in May 1940, to fifty thousand, to the indignation of the chiefs, who feared that the rearmament of their services would become hopelessly unbalanced. The second was the decision in May-June 1940 to commit the country to all-out assistance to Great Britain, a step revealed to the public for the first time in the President's Charlottesville speech on June 6 and later put in force by means of the destroyers-bases arrangement and the Lend-Lease legislation. This too the army and navy found dangerous, expecting the imminent collapse of Great Britain and preferring a policy of hemispheric defense. The third was the decision in the spring and summer of 1941, against Marshall's strong reservations, to establish garrisons and convoys in the Atlantic and to extend them as far as necessary in order to keep the supply lines to Britain open.’55 These actions and the stubborn refusal on the part of the British government to consider surrender were the crucial factors in disrupting Hitler's grand strategical plan and in forcing him along the desperate course that led to his destruction.
珍珠港事件后，总统最担心的是，民众的情绪可能会迫使美国将兵力集中于对日作战，从而严重损害他完全赞同的ABC-1战略假设。这解释了他在美英参谋部计划人员辩论中所采取的策略。罗斯福始终对1943年从不列颠群岛成功入侵欧洲大陆的可能性持怀疑态度，但他并不认为应该向参谋长们明确表达这种怀疑。出于国内政治原因，他被丘吉尔关于必须在1942年底前与德国交战以及在北非作战可行性的论点所吸引。 1942年7月，马歇尔对英国在跨海峡作战计划上的拖延感到恼火，于是与欧内斯特·L·金海军上将联手，建议将美国的主要作战力量转移到太平洋战场。罗斯福断然否决了他们的提议，尖刻地指出，这就像生气的孩子“收拾碗筷回家”一样。他命令马歇尔、金以及他的首席文职顾问哈里·霍普金斯前往伦敦，达成一项能够让美国地面部队在1942年对德作战的决定，并下达了一系列限制他们行动自由的命令。“请记住三项基本原则——迅速制定计划、计划统一、攻守兼备，而非仅仅防御。这关系到美国地面部队在1942年对德作战的直接目标。我希望你们抵达后一周内能够达成完全一致。” 56由于英国高层在 1942 年已经投票坚决反对跨海峡登陆，这些指示最终促成了“火炬行动”的计划，即 1942 年 11 月的北非登陆行动。
After Pearl Harbor, the President's greatest concern was that popular passions might force a concentration of the American effort upon the war with Japan, thus fatally compromising the strategical assumptions of ABC-1 with which he was in full agreement. This explains the course that he followed in the debates between the American and the British staff planners. Roosevelt was always more skeptical about the possibility of a successful invasion of the European continent from the British Isles in 1943 than he thought it advisable to make clear to his chiefs of staff, and he was, for domestic political reasons, attracted by Churchill's argument about the necessity of engaging the Germans before the end of 1942 and the feasibility of doing so in North Africa. In July 1942, when Marshall, exasperated by what he considered to be British stalling on plans for a cross-Channel operation, joined forces with Admiral Ernest L. King and suggested shifting the major American effort to the Pacific, Roosevelt firmly overruled them, saying tartly that this would be like angry children “picking up their dishes and going home.” He ordered Marshall, along with King and his chief civilian advisor Harry Hopkins, to go to London and reach some decision that would bring American ground forces into action against the Germans in 1942, and he gave them a set of orders that allowed them little freedom of action. “Please remember three cardinal principles—speed of decisions on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense, but not defense alone. This affects the immediate objective of U.S. ground forces fighting against Germans in 1942. I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.”56 Since the British chiefs had already voted firmly against a cross-Channel attempt in 1942, these instructions eventuated in the plan for Operation Torch, the North African landing of November 1942.
罗斯福的主要动机是确保国内对盟军宏大战略构想的支持；这也指导了他另外两项决策，这两项决策很可能像支持“火炬行动”本身一样，推迟了1943年的跨海峡入侵。第一项决策是授权金海军上将一旦机会出现便在太平洋发动攻势，罗斯福总统在卡萨布兰卡会议上说服了英国同意；第二项决策于1943年启动，即在德军于突尼斯战败后，入侵西西里岛和意大利。罗斯福是一位杰出的政治家，他拥有敏锐的民意洞察力，到1943年，他意识到，尽管由中国游说集团操纵的、支持将重点完全放在太平洋战争上的舆论浪潮的危险性已不如以往，但取而代之的是另一种担忧。国内逐渐出现了一种趋势，认为战争几乎已经胜利，但同时也对战争尚未彻底胜利感到越来越恼火。
Roosevelt's primary motive had been to ensure domestic support for the Allies' grand strategical concept; and this also guided him in two other decisions that were likely, like the support of Torch itself, to postpone a 1943 cross-Channel invasion. The first, to which the President persuaded the British to agree at the Casablanca Conference, was to authorize Admiral King to go on the offensive in the Pacific as opportunities presented themselves; and the second, activated in 1943, was to follow up the German defeat in Tunisia with an invasion of Sicily and Italy. Superb politician that he was, Roosevelt had a remarkable ability to gauge the public mood, and he was aware by 1943 that, although the danger of a groundswell of opinion, orchestrated by the China lobby, in favor of an exclusive emphasis upon the Pacific war was no longer as great as it had been, it had been replaced by another source of concern. There was a growing tendency in the country to regard the war as all but won and a growing irritation that it wasn't completely won.
这种新情绪体现在诸多方面，例如1943年12月铁路兄弟会的罢工威胁、民众对有关平民人力立法提案的普遍不满、要求军队延期服役的压力日益增大，以及媒体倾向于报道那些诋毁军队管理的新闻。乔治·马歇尔投入了大量时间来遏制这些趋势，他向国会、媒体、企业、劳工团体和私人团体解释即将面临的任务的艰巨性以及真正举国之力的重要性——他出色地完成了这项任务，以至于在选择“霸王行动”指挥官时，总统认为华盛顿不能没有马歇尔，于是选择了艾森豪威尔，尽管参谋长马歇尔被认为是显而易见的最佳人选。57对公众情绪的担忧也影响了罗斯福的战略选择，这促使他支持丘吉尔的意大利提议，以便欧洲冲突不会出现松懈期，并且每天都能有明显的证据表明朝着最终胜利取得进展。
This new mood was reflected in such things as the threatened strike of the Railway Brotherhoods in December 1943, the widespread resentment against proposed legislation dealing with civilian manpower, the increased pressure for deferment from the armed services, and a tendency on the part of the press to give prominence to news items that discredited the administration of the services. A major part of George Marshall's time was devoted to attempts to check these tendencies by explaining to Congress, the press, and business, labor, and private groups the enormities of the task ahead and the importance of a truly national effort—an assignment that he performed so ably that, when it came time to choose a commander for Overlord, the President felt that he could not do without Marshall in Washington and selected Eisenhower, although the chief of staff had been considered the obvious choice.’57 Concern over the public mood also influenced Roosevelt's strategical choices, persuading him to support Churchill's Italian proposals so that there would be no slack periods in the European conflict and so that there would be demonstrable daily evidence of progress toward final victory.
正是出于同样的原因，在战争的最后两年，他不太愿意像丘吉尔那样担忧苏联迫在眉睫的威胁，以及在东南欧划定势力范围和在波兰采取坚决统一的立场反对苏联意图的必要性。他很清楚，大多数美国人对权力平衡和势力范围之类的概念抱有怀疑，许多人对其他国家发生的事情漠不关心，也不认为其他国家的国内问题是美国理所应当关注的。他担心，任何关于大同盟出现裂痕的迹象都会在国内引起恐慌和愤慨，从而损害战争的努力。他也意识到，德国战败后，还有战胜日本的任务，而在这方面，苏联的合作似乎是必要的。最后，他认识到美国国内强烈希望在战后建立一个能够巩固来之不易的和平的新国际体系。无论采取大国理事会的形式（就像他非常着迷的“四个警察”计划一样）58，还是以国际联盟为蓝本，苏联的参与都是不可或缺的。
It was for the same reason that he was little inclined, in the last two years of the war, to share Churchill's worries about the looming Soviet threat and the necessity of agreements about spheres of influence in southeastern Europe and a firm and united stand against Soviet intentions in Poland. He was well aware that such terms as balance of power and spheres of influence were viewed with distrust by most Americans, and that many of them were uninterested in what went on in other countries and unpersuaded that the domestic problems of other peoples were a legitimate source of concern to the United States. He feared that any intimation of cracks in the Grand Alliance would cause a degree of consternation and indignation at home that would be deleterious to the war effort. He was conscious of the fact also that, after Germany was defeated, there would still be the task of defeating Japan, in which it appeared that the collaboration of the Soviet Union would be necessary. Finally, he recognized the strong sentiment in the United States for a new international system after the war that would secure the hard-won peace. Whether that was to take the form of a Great Power directorate (like the curious Four Policemen plan of which he was so enamored)58 or would be modeled after the League of Nations, Soviet participation would be indispensable.
在总统看来，这些宏伟目标排除了在欧洲划定边界线或波兰敌对政府的领土主张上产生任何争端的可能性。他以他一贯的轻率自信，认为在重大问题上他能够应付“乔叔叔”，但他同时无意采纳温斯顿·丘吉尔的告诫。现实政治绝不能妨碍战争的胜利。美国人民绝不会容忍这种情况发生。
In the President's mind, these great goals precluded disputes over boundary lines in Europe or the claims of rival Polish governments. He was, in his airy way, confident that on matters of high import he would be able to handle “Uncle Joe,” but he had no intention meanwhile of following the cautionary prescriptions of Winston Churchill. Realpolitik must not be allowed to interfere with the winning of the war. The American people would not tolerate that.
第七章
VII
这些观察始于克劳塞维茨关于国家战略中必须将军事服从于政治的论述。从所选案例来看，在这方面最成功的政治领袖是克列孟梭、希特勒、丘吉尔和罗斯福。这是一个成分复杂的群体，恰恰说明了普遍规律的脆弱性。如果我们暂且不谈克列孟梭——因为他与其说是协约国战略的塑造者，不如说是胜利的推动者——那么希特勒的例子似乎证明，将军事服从于政治，其后果可能与相反的情况一样灾难性。另一方面，富兰克林·罗斯福的例子表明，最负责任的战争领导人的合理政治关切可能是相互矛盾且适得其反的，国内政治因素使得处理战争本身造成的政治问题变得不切实际，而这些问题如果不加以处理，从长远来看可能会使战略失效。
These observations began with a quotation from Clausewitz concerning the necessity, in a nation's strategy, of subordinating the military to the political point of view, and it has become clear, from the cases chosen, that the political leaders who were most successful in doing this were Clemenceau, Hitler, Churchill, and Roosevelt. This is such an oddly mixed group that it merely illustrates the fragility of general rules. If we set Clemenceau aside—for he was more an animateur de la victoire than one who put any distinctive stamp upon the strategy of the Entente powers—the case of Hitler would seem to prove that the subordination of the military point of view to the political can be just as disastrous in its results as the opposite state of affairs. The case of Franklin Roosevelt, on the other hand, suggests that the legitimate political concerns of the most responsible of war leaders can be contradictory and self-defeating, domestic political considerations making it inexpedient to attend to political issues that have been created by the war itself and that threaten, unless attended to, to render strategy ineffective in the long run.
温斯顿·丘吉尔的例子则更为复杂。他既是反抗的煽动者，又是具有卓越战略眼光的领袖，成功地掌控了自己的军队，使其成为实现其目标的得力助手。这固然是一项了不起的成就，但并非完美无缺。毕竟，丘吉尔迫于形势不得不与更强大的盟友并肩作战，最终，他们各自不同的胜利与和平战略败给了他。
Even more ambiguous is the example of Winston Churchill, who was both animateur de la défiance and a leader with great strategical vision, and who succeeded in mastering his own military establishment and making it an efficient collaborator in the pursuit of his objectives. This was a notable achievement, but an imperfect one. For Churchill was, after all, forced by circumstances to fight side by side with stronger allies, and, in the end, their conflicting strategies for victory and peace defeated his own.
1卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特编辑和翻译，修订版（普林斯顿，1984 年），第 607 页。
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1984), 607.
2大卫·弗雷泽，艾伦布鲁克（伦敦，1982 年），215。
2 David Fraser, Alanbrooke (London, 1982), 215.
3爱德华·斯皮尔斯，《胜利前奏》（伦敦，1939 年），第 377 页及后续页。
3 Edward Spears, Prelude to Victory (London, 1939), 377f.
4 Gerhard Ritter，《国家艺术与军事工程》（慕尼黑，1964 年），3:586。
4 Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk (Munich, 1964), 3:586.
5同上，第 241 页。
5 Ibid., 241.
6同上，第 383 页及以下。
6 Ibid., 383ff.
7 AJP Taylor，《战时政治》（纽约，1965 年），2.1。
7 A. J. P. Taylor, Politics in Wartime (New York, 1965), 2.1.
8 Roy Jenkins，《阿斯奎斯：一个人和一个时代的肖像》（纽约，1964 年），第 387 页。
8 Roy Jenkins, Asquith: Portrait of a Man and an Era (New York, 1964), 387.
9同上，第 328 页。
9 Ibid., 328.
10 EL Woodward，《大不列颠与 1914-1918 年战争》（伦敦，1967 年），第 148-149 页。
10 E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the War of 1914–1918 (London, 1967), 148–49.
11引自罗伯特·格雷夫斯，《观察家报》，1959 年 3 月 1 日。
11 Quoted by Robert Graves in The Observer, March 1, 1959.
12莱昂·沃尔夫，《在弗兰德斯战场》（纽约，1958 年），第 184 页。
12 Leon Wolff, In Flanders Fields (New York, 1958), 184.
13牛顿勋爵，兰斯当勋爵：传记（伦敦，1929 年），468。
13 Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography (London, 1929), 468.
14 Jere King，《将军与政治家》（伯克利，1951 年），第 242 页。
14 Jere King, Generals and Politicians (Berkeley, 1951), 242.
15 Spears，《胜利前奏曲》，377。
15 Spears, Prelude to Victory, 377.
16 C. Bugnet， Rue St. Dominique et GHQ（巴黎，1937 年），273。
16 C. Bugnet, Rue St. Dominique et GHQ (Paris, 1937), 273.
17关于这一切，请参阅 Harvey A. DeWeerd 的文章“丘吉尔、劳合·乔治、克列孟梭”，载于Edward Mead Earle 编辑的《现代战略的缔造者》（普林斯顿，1943 年），第 303 页。
17 On all of this, see Harvey A. DeWeerd, “Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943), 303.
18 Jean Jules Mordacq 将军， Le Ministère Clemenceau（巴黎，1930 年），2：363-67。
18 General Jean Jules Mordacq, Le Ministère Clemenceau (Paris, 1930), 2:363–67.
19同上，尤其是第 308 页及后续页。
19 Ibid., esp. pp. 308ff.
20大卫·劳合·乔治，《战争回忆录》（伦敦，1933-37 年），第 6 卷，第 3421 页。
20 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1933–37), 6:3421.
21 Generaloberst Franz Halder， Kriegstagebuch，编辑。汉斯·阿道夫·雅各布森（斯图加特，1962 年），3:354, 356–59；希特勒扮演费尔德赫尔（慕尼黑，1949 年），15, 45。
21 Generaloberst Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Stuttgart, 1962), 3:354, 356–59; Hitler als Feldherr (Munich, 1949), 15, 45.
22 Percy Ernst Schramm，《希特勒：马特和军事领袖》，Donald S. Detweiler 译注（芝加哥，1971 年），第 198 页。
22 Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler: The Matt and the Military Leader, trans, and ed. Donald S. Detweiler (Chicago, 1971), 198.
23同上。
23 Ibid.
24安德烈亚斯·希尔格鲁伯 (Andreas Hillgruber)，《希特勒战略：1940-1941 年的政治与战争政策》 (美因河畔法兰克福，1965 年) 和“1938-1941 年希特勒战略中的美国因素”，载于 Hillgruber，《德国大权力与世界政治》，第 19、20 页。 Jahrhundert（杜塞尔多夫，1977 年）。
24 Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941 (Frankfurt am Main, 1965) and “Der Faktor Amerika in Hitlers Strategie 1938–1941,” in Hillgruber, Deutsche Grossmacht-und Weltpolitik im 19, und 20. Jahrhundert (Düsseldorf, 1977).
25埃里希·冯·曼斯坦 (Erich von Manstein)、 Verlorene Stege (波恩，1955 年)，305ff。
25 Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Stege (Bonn, 1955), 305ff.
26这些句子重复了我曾在《德国，1866-1945》（牛津和纽约，1978 年）第 721 页中说过的话。
26 These sentences repeat what I have said in Germany, 1866–1945 (Oxford and New York, 1978), 721.
27 Barry A. Leach，《德国对俄战略，1939-1941》（牛津，1973 年），第 78 页及后续页。
27 Barry A. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 1939–1941 (Oxford, 1973), 78f.
28 Halder, Kriegstagebuch , 2:261, 320, 336。Jürgen Förster 在《Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg》编辑的文章中表明，很大一部分军队领导层并不担心这种区别军事研究，卷。 4； Angriff auf die Sowjetunion（斯图加特，1983 年）。
28 Halder, Kriegstagebuch, 2:261, 320, 336. That a large proportion of the army leadership did not worry about such distinctions is shown by Jürgen Förster in his essay in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, vol. 4; Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart, 1983).
29特朗布尔·希金斯，《希特勒与俄国》（纽约，1966 年），第 156 页。
29 Trumbull Higgins, Hitler and Russta (New York, 1966), 156.
30同上，第 209-210 页。
30 Ibid., 209–210.
31哈尔德，《Krtegstagebuch》，3:489。
31 Halder, Krtegstagebuch, 3:489.
32 Schramm，《希特勒》，第 203 页及后续页。
32 Schramm, Hitler, 203f.
33 Basil Liddell Hart，“军事战略家”，载于 AJP Taylor、Robert Rhodes James、JH Plumb、Basil Liddell Hart 和 Anthony Shore，《丘吉尔修订版》 （纽约，1962 年），第 197 页。另见 Ronald Lewin，《作为军阀的丘吉尔》（纽约，1973 年），第 13 页。
33 Basil Liddell Hart, “The Military Strategist,” in A. J. P. Taylor, Robert Rhodes James, J. H. Plumb, Basil Liddell Hart, and Anthony Shore, Churchill Revised (New York, 1962), 197. See also Ronald Lewin, Churchill as Warlord (New York, 1973), 13.
34 Gordon Wright，《全面战争的考验》（纽约，1968 年），第 238 页及以下；Lewin，《丘吉尔》，第 32 页。
34 Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War (New York, 1968), 238f.; Lewin, Churchill, 32.
35约翰·康奈尔，《韦维尔：士兵和政治家》（伦敦，1964 年），第 256 页。
35 John Connell, Wavell: Soldier and Statesman (London, 1964), 256.
36 RW Thompson，《丘吉尔大元帅》（纽约，1973 年），第 100 页。
36 R. W. Thompson, Generalissimo Churchill (New York, 1973), 100.
37 Connell， Wavell，421。
37 Connell, Wavell, 421.
38汤普森、丘吉尔、izof。
38 Thompson, Churchill, izof.
39约翰·肯尼迪爵士少将，《战争的生意》（伦敦，1957 年），第 108 页。值得注意的是，丘吉尔继续过度批评他在前线的指挥官，布鲁克在 1944 年 7 月听到他对蒙哥马利和亚历山大的辱骂后，“勃然大怒，质问他难道不能信任他的将军们五分钟，而不是不断地辱骂和贬低他们”（弗雷泽，《艾伦布鲁克》，第 442 页）。
39 Major General Sir John Kennedy, The Business of War (London, 1957), 108. It should be noted that Churchill continued to be excessively critical of his commanders in the field and that Brooke, after listening to his abuse of Montgomery and Alexander in July 1944, “flared up and asked him if he could not trust his generals for five minutes instead of continuously abusing and belittling them” (Fraser, Alanbrooke, 442).
40关于这段关系的完整发展，请参阅弗朗西斯·L·洛温海姆、哈罗德·D·兰利和曼弗雷德·乔纳斯编辑的《罗斯福与丘吉尔：他们的战时秘密通信》 （纽约，1975 年）。另请参阅沃伦·F·金博尔编辑的《丘吉尔与罗斯福全集通信》 ，共 3 卷（普林斯顿，1984 年）。
40 For the full development of this relationship, see Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, ed. Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas (New York, 1975). See also Churchill and Roosevelt, The Complete Correspondence, ed. Warren F. Kimball, 3 vols. (Princeton, 1984).
41参见上文马克·S·沃森，《参谋长：战前计划和准备》（华盛顿特区，1950 年）。
41 See above all Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-War Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C., 1950).
42温斯顿·S·丘吉尔，《大联盟》（波士顿，1950 年），第 625、643 页。
42 Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), 625, 643.
43伊斯梅勋爵，《回忆录》（伦敦，1960 年），第 163 页。
43 Lord Ismay, Memoirs (London, 1960), 163.
44 Fraser，《艾伦布鲁克》，231-32；Lewin，《丘吉尔》，127ff。
44 Fraser, Alanbrooke, 231–32; Lewin, Churchill, 127ff.
45 Liddell Hart，《军事战略家》，第 215 页；Fraser，《Alanbrooke》，第 311 页及后续页。
45 Liddell Hart, “The Military Strategist,” 215; Fraser, Alanbrooke, 311ff.
46弗雷泽，艾伦布鲁克，384-92。
46 Fraser, Alanbrooke, 384–92.
47 Maurice Matloff 和 Edwin S. Snell，《1941-1942 年联合战争战略规划》（华盛顿特区，1953 年），第 272-273 页。
47 Maurice Matloff and Edwin S. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 (Washington, D.C., 1953), 272–73.
48参见《战争论》第 1 卷第 1 章，尤其是第 8 卷第 6 章。
48 See On War, bk. 1, ch. 1 and, especially, bk. 8, ch. 6.
49 德怀特·戴维·艾森豪威尔文集：战争年代，阿尔弗雷德·钱德勒编，5卷（巴尔的摩，1970年），4:2592-95。
49 The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, ed. Alfred Chandler, 5 vols. (Baltimore, 1970), 4:2592–95.
50 罗斯福和丘吉尔，548。关于丘吉尔在这方面的担忧日益加剧，参见赫伯特·费斯，《丘吉尔、罗斯福、斯大林：他们发动的战争和他们寻求的和平》（普林斯顿，1957 年），第 338 页及后续页。
50 Roosevelt and Churchill, 548. On the growth of Churchill's fears in this regard, see Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957), 338ff.
51参见 Gordon A. Craig，“罗斯福和希特勒：感知问题”，载于Deutsche Frage und europäisches Gleichgewicht：Festschrtft für Andreas Hillgruber zum 60。Geburtstag，编辑。 Klaus Hildebrand 和 Reiner Pommerin（科隆和维也纳，1985 年）。
51 See Gordon A. Craig, “Roosevelt and Hitler: The Problem of Perception,” in Deutsche Frage und europäisches Gleichgewicht: Festschrtft für Andreas Hillgruber zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Klaus Hildebrand and Reiner Pommerin (Cologne and Vienna, 1985).
52 Robert Dallek，《富兰克林·D·罗斯福与美国外交政策，1932-1945》（纽约，1979 年），第 321 页。
52 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York, 1979), 321.
53 Fraser， Alanbrooke，230。
53 Fraser, Alanbrooke, 230.
54肯特·罗伯茨·格林菲尔德，《第二次世界大战中的美国战略：重新思考》（巴尔的摩，1963年），第52页及以下
54 Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War 11: A Reconsideration (Baltimore, 1963), 52f
55同上，第 53 页。
55 Ibid., 53.
56 Feis，丘吉尔，罗斯福，斯大林，54-55。
56 Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, 54–55.
57关于这一切，请参阅 Forrest G. Pogue 的《乔治·C·马歇尔：胜利的组织者，1943-1945》（纽约，1973 年）。
57 On all this, see Forrest G. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945 (New York, 1973).
58 Gordon A. Craig 和 Alexander L. George，《武力与治国之道：我们时代的外交问题》（纽约，1983 年），第 101 页及后续页。
58 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York, 1983), 101ff.
18. 以人对抗烈火：1914年的进攻理论
18. Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914
W1914年8月，欧洲爆发战争，所有主要参战国立即发动进攻。奥匈帝国军队入侵波兰，俄国入侵东普鲁士，德国经由比利时入侵法国，而法国则试图收复失地阿尔萨斯和洛林。到年底，所有这些进攻都被遏制或击退，造成约90万人失踪、被俘、受伤或死亡。进攻一直持续到1915年，意大利进攻奥地利，结果同样惨重；1916年，德军攻占凡尔登，新组建的英国军队也加入战争，在索姆河发动大规模攻势；直到1917年，随着尼维尔4月的进攻惨败，法军拒绝再次进攻，以及俄罗斯帝国在战争重压下崩溃，战争才开始出现缓和的迹象。这些灾难，再加上1917年8月至11月英国在帕斯尚尔进行的为期四个月的攻势的失败，造成了历史上几乎无与伦比的战略和战术盲目性，而德国在东线的成功攻势和1918年协约国在西线的最后进攻，也未能挽回这一局面。
WHEN WAR broke out in Europe in August 1914, every major belligerent power at once took the offensive. The Austro-Hungarian army invaded Poland. The Russians invaded East Prussia. The Germans invaded France through Belgium; and the French tried to reconquer their lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. By the end of the year every one of these offensives had been checked or repulsed at a cost of some 900,000 missing, prisoners, wounded, or dead. The attacks continued through 1915, when Italy attacked Austria with equally disastrous results; through 1916, when the Germans assaulted Verdun and the new British armies entered the war with their great offensive on the Somme; and began to falter only in 1917, when after Nivelle's disastrous offensive in April the French troops refused to attack again and the Russian Empire collapsed under the strain of the war. These disasters, compounded by the failure of the four-month British offensive at Passchendaele from August to November 1917, have left a historical image of strategic and tactical blindness virtually unparalleled in history, an image that the successful German offensives on the eastern front and the final Allied attacks on the western front in 1918 have done little to redeem.
然而，策划这些行动的军事领导人和批准这些行动的政治领导人，尽管以今天的标准来看可能显得冷酷无情，但他们既没有对袭击可能造成的后果视而不见，也没有对20世纪武器的防御能力一无所知。他们中没有人预料到战争可以在不付出巨大伤亡的情况下取得胜利。“我认为，任何认为在现代战争中无需付出大量生命就能取得重大战术胜利的人都大错特错了，”弗里德里希·冯·伯恩哈迪将军在1912年写道。“对伤亡的恐惧总是会导致失败，而我们可以肯定的是，那些不惧伤亡的部队必然会比那些更吝惜生命的人保持巨大的优势。”其他国家的专家也持同样的观点。“进攻的成功完全取决于你如何事先训练你的士兵‘知道如何赴死或如何避免死亡’，”英国上校F·N·莫德写道； “如果是后者，那就无能为力了，当初最好根本不要发动战争。” ²克劳塞维茨那句令人警醒的话也经常被引用：“屠杀是一场骇人的景象，这一事实必须让我们更加严肃地看待战争，而不是以此为借口，以人道主义的名义逐渐钝化我们的武力。” ³
Yet the military leaders who planned and the political leaders who sanctioned these operations though they may appear callous by later standards, were neither blind to the likely consequences of their attacks nor ill-informed about the defensive powers of twentieth-century weapons. None of them expected that the war could be won without very heavy losses. “Anyone who should think that great tactical success can be achieved in modern war without staking a great deal of human life is, I believe, very much mistaken” wrote General Friedrich von Bernhardi in 1912. “The dread of losses will always ensure failure, while we can assume with certainty that those troops who are not afraid of losses are bound to maintain an enormous superiority over others who are more sparing of blood.”1 Specialists in other nations thought no differently. “Success in the assault is all a case of how you train your soldiers beforehand ‘to know how to die or to avoid dying,’” wrote the British colonel F. N. Maude; “if the latter, then nothing can help you, and it would have been wiser not to go to war at all.”2 And frequently quoted were the somber words of Clausewitz: “The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously and not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity.”3
我
I
自19世纪中叶大西洋两岸发生大规模屠杀以来，武器杀伤力的日益增强就一直受到军事专家的研究和关注：例如美国内战中的安提耶坦战役和弗雷德里克斯堡战役，以及普法战争中的格拉沃洛特-圣普里瓦战役。19世纪80年代和90年代的技术发展使这个问题更加复杂。高爆炸药取代火药作为小型武器和火炮弹药的推进剂，极大地提高了这些武器的射程和精度。更大的爆炸威力使得小口径、低弹道、射程可达2000米的步枪成为可能，不仅对付步兵进攻更加有效，而且对付此前在1000米左右射程内支援步兵进攻的老式野战炮也更加有效。此外，小口径使得步兵能够携带更多弹药上战场，而黄铜弹壳和弹匣装填则提高了射速。
The growing lethality of weapons had been studied and taken into account by military experts ever since the great slaughters of mid-century on both sides of the Atlantic: Antietam and Fredericksburg in the American Civil War, Gravelotte-St. Privat in the Franco-Prussian War. The problem had been further complicated by the technological developments of the 1880s and 1890s. The substitution of high explosive for gunpowder as the propellant for small-arms and artillery ammunition transformed both the range and accuracy of these weapons. Greater explosive power made possible smaller caliber rifles with a low trajectory and a range of up to 2,000 meters, much more effective not only against assaulting infantry but against the older field guns, which, from a range of 1,000 meters or so, had previously supported those assaults. Small calibers made it possible, further, for the infantryman to carry more ammunition into battle while brass cartridges and magazine-loading made for a more rapid rate of fire.
然而，火炮的射程、重量和精度也相应提高。野战炮的射程扩展至6000米，无后坐力炮架的出现使得快速连续射击成为可能；而机动重型火炮的射程则达到了10000米甚至更远。因此，战斗规模从几英里扩大到几十英里，随着铁路将部队运送到战场的能力，甚至扩大到几百英里；而且由于新型炸药燃烧时几乎不产生烟雾，只要交战双方保持静止，他们也几乎完全隐蔽。
However the range, weight, and accuracy of artillery was comparably increased. Field artillery extended its range to 6,000 meters, with “recoilless carriages” making possible rapid and continuous fire, and mobile heavy artillery came into service with ranges of 10,000 meters or more. The scale of the battle was thus increased from a few miles to several score and indeed, with the capacity of railways to bring troops to the battlefield, to several hundred; and since the new explosives combusted with virtually no discharge of smoke, the combatants, so long as they remained immobile, remained also very largely invisible.
在军事专家中，对于这些发展总体上究竟有利于进攻还是防御，争论不休。一方面，扬·布洛赫在其1898年出版的多卷本著作《未来的战争》中，尤其有力地论证了这一点：未来的正面进攻不仅成本高昂，而且在统计学上根本不可能：“交战双方之间将始终存在一个无法逾越的火力区，对双方的杀伤力都同样巨大。” ⁴但布洛赫毕竟是平民，而当时的大多数军事意见认为，新技术对进攻和防御的益处不相上下。人们一致认为，在进攻方取得火力优势之前，任何进攻都不可能成功；而火炮射程、威力和精度的不断提升，使得这一点成为可能；推进步兵的任务是在掩护下从一个阵地移动到另一个阵地，直到能够将火力集中到敌方防御工事上，并在发起进攻之前将其压制。 “这是显而易见的，”费迪南·福煦上校（后来的元帅）在1900年于法国军事学院发表的演讲中写道。
It was hotly contested, among military experts, whether these developments on the whole favored the attack or the defense. On the one hand it was claimed, with particular strength by Jan Bloch in his multivolume study La guerre future, published in 1898, that frontal assaults would in future be not simply prohibitively expensive, but statistically impossible: “Between the combatants will always be an impassable zone of fire deadly in equal degree to both the foes.”4 But Bloch was a civilian, and the weight of military opinion held that the new technology favored the attack no less than the defense. No assault could succeed, it was agreed, until the attackers had achieved superiority of fire; but the increasing range, power, and accuracy of artillery made this possible; it was the task of the advancing infantry to move under cover from position to position until it could bring its own fire to bear on the defenses and overwhelm them before it attacked. “It is evident,” wrote Colonel (later Marshal) Ferdinand Foch in the lectures he delivered at the French Ecole de Guerre in 1900
……如今，火力指挥和火力控制至关重要。火力是决定胜负的关键。士气最高昂、最狂热的部队总是希望通过连续冲锋来夺取阵地。但是，如果他们的局部进攻没有经过猛烈的火力压制，他们将会遭遇巨大的困难，并遭受惨重的伤亡。他们会被击退到出发点，而且损失更加惨重。火力优势……成为步兵战斗力的最重要因素。5
…that today, fire-direction and fire-control have immense importance. Fire is the supreme argument. The most ardent troops, those whose morale has been the most excited, will always wish to seize ground by successive rushes. But they will encounter great difficulties, and suffer heavy casualties, whenever their partial offensive has not been prepared by heavy fire. They will be thrown back on their starting point, with still heavier losses. The superiority of fire…becomes the most important element of an infantry's fighting value.5
然而，总会有那么一个时刻，进攻的步兵既无法躲避己方火力，也无法躲避支援炮兵的火力，无法继续前进。正如福煦所写：“前方是一片几乎无法逾越的区域；没有任何隐蔽的通道；弹雨倾盆而下。” ⁶那么，究竟该如何穿越这片“死亡地带”呢？
Nevertheless, the moment always arrived when the attacking infantry could get no further under cover either of their own fire or that of the supporting artillery. “Before it,” as Foch wrote, “lies a zone almost impassable; there remain no covered approaches; a hail of lead beats the ground.”6 How, if at all, was this “zone of death” to be crossed?
自拿破仑战争时期以来，德军进攻步兵的传统做法总是分三波推进。首先是散兵，他们以松散的队形前进，利用一切掩体，逐步占据射击位置，掩护后续部队的推进。接下来是步兵主力，他们以紧密的队形前进，军官在前鼓舞士气，士官在后威慑士气，鼓声隆隆，号角齐鸣，团旗高高举起，准备插在占领的阵地上。最后是支援部队，即预备队，由指挥官酌情投入战斗。这种战术安排行之有效，直到1870年，法军的步枪火力彻底阻止了德军的进攻；此后，德军再也没有采用过这种传统的队形。取而代之的是，德军接受了第二波推进的方案，但不再采用紧密队形，而是像第一波一样以开阔的阵型前进。它的功能不再是进攻，而是加强和延伸火力线，逐步包抄对手侧翼。只有在敌方防御被火力摧毁并被侧翼包围（这越来越被视为骑兵的职责）之后，才能攻破其阵地。施利芬计划正是将这种战术理念延伸至战略层面。
Traditionally, since the days of the Napoleonic Wars, assaulting infantry always advanced in three waves. First went the skirmishers in loose formation, making use of any cover available, working their way forward to gain firing positions from which to cover the advance of those who came after them. Next came the main body of the infantry in close formation with their officers in front to inspire and their sergeants behind to intimidate them, drums beating, bugles blaring, the regimental colors borne aloft to be planted on the captured positions. Finally came the supports, reserves to be fed in at the discretion of the commander. It was a practical arrangement that proved its worth until 1870, when French rifle fire stopped the attacking German battalions quite literally dead in their tracks; the German army never again reverted to the traditional formations. Instead the Germans accepted that the second line was to advance, not in close formation, but in open, like the first; its function became not to assault but to thicken up and extend the firing line, gradually lapping around its opponents' flanks. Only after the defenses had been crushed by fire and surrounded by flanking formations (which was seen increasingly as the role of the cavalry) would their positions be overrun. It was a tactical doctrine that the Schlieffen plan was to extend into strategy.
1870年之后，法国也立即采用了这些战术。他们1875年的《步兵条例》禁止在敌军射程内使用密集队形，提倡分散部署以利用掩体，并规定散兵线的作用不仅是准备进攻，还要执行进攻。但这一理论在法国军队和其他所有军队中都遭到了强烈反对。不仅普遍认为畏惧刺刀冲锋是“不男子汉”的表现（俄国将军德拉戈米罗夫对此观点的阐述最为雄辩），更重要的是，人们有充分的理由担心，如果步兵分散部署，任其自行行动，是否会趁机“迷失方向”：卧倒后便再也无法起身。对1870年德军作战行动的仔细分析表明，这种情况屡见不鲜。在新式火器带来的更广阔的战场上，面对它们现在构成的无形威胁，在主要由短期服役的征召兵组成的军队中，这种行为似乎很可能不再是例外，而是常态。
In the immediate aftermath of 1870 the French had also adopted these procedures. Their Infantry Regulations of 1875 forbade the use of close formations within range of enemy fire, advocated dispersal to take advantage of cover and prescribed the function of the skirmishing line as being not simply to prepare the attack but to conduct it. But it was a doctrine bitterly opposed in the French army as in all others. Not only was there a general feeling that to shrink from a bayonet attack was “unmanly,” a view most eloquently expounded by the Russian general Dragomirov. More to the point, there was a well-founded uncertainty whether the infantry, if scattered and left to their own devices, would not seize the occasion to “get lost”: go to ground and not get up again. Careful analysis of German operations in 1870 had revealed numerous occasions when this had happened. On the vaster battlefields that the new firearms made possible, and in face of the invisible menace they now posed, such behavior, in armies made up largely of short-service conscripts, seemed likely to become not the exception but the rule.
查尔斯-阿尔当·杜皮克上校于1870年阵亡，他的著作《战斗研究》是为数不多的军事文学经典之一。他早在自己所处的时代就观察到了这种趋势：“士兵常常连最亲密的战友都不知道。在令人迷失方向的硝烟和混乱的战斗中，他与战友失散，可以说，他是在孤军奋战。相互观察不再能确保团队的凝聚力。”<sup> 7</sup>
Colonel Charles-Ardent du Picq, who was killed in action in 1870 and whose Etudes sur le combat is one of the few great classics of military literature, had observed this tendency even on the battlefields of his own day, where “the soldier is unknown often to his closest companions. He loses them in the disorienting smoke and confusion of a battle which he is fighting, so to speak, on his own. Cohesion is no longer ensured by mutual observation.”7
“团结不再是相互监视的借口”：这便是战场上士气问题的症结所在。杜皮克本人认为，为了应对这些新形势，必须培养一支与十九世纪末期发展起来的大规模军队截然不同的军事精英。然而，第三共和国的军事当局却认为这条路行不通。1884年，他们再次为一支仍然由来自外省的农民青年组成的军队规定了旧式的进攻队形，要求士兵“昂首挺胸，不计伤亡……在最猛烈的炮火下，即使面对防守严密的战壕，也要勇往直前，夺取战壕”。十年后，臭名昭著的1894年法令明确规定，步兵必须“肩并肩地组成密集队形，伴着号角和鼓声”发起进攻。这听起来荒谬至极；但除此之外，他们又该如何让新兵冲过那最后的“死亡地带”呢？8
La solidarité n'a plus la sanction d'une surveillance mutuelle: that has been the problem of morale on the battlefield ever since. Du Picq himself believed that to cope with these new conditions it would be necessary to breed a military elite very different from the mass armies that were to develop in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The military authorities under the Third Republic, however, saw no hope of a solution along these lines. In 1884 they once again prescribed, for an army that still consisted of peasant youths from the provinces, attack formations in the old style, which should march forward “with their head held high, regardless of losses…under the most violent fire, even against strongly defended entrenchments, and seize them.” Ten years later the notorious regulations of 1894 specifically prescribed that infantry should advance to the attack “elbow to elbow in mass formations, to the sound of bugles and drums.” It sounds absurd; but how else were they to get their conscripts to charge forward over that final “zone of death”?8
六年后的演讲中，福煦也提出了同样的解决方案：“胜利的桂冠挂在敌人的刺刀上，必须通过一对一的搏斗才能夺取……剩下的只有逃跑或冲锋。冲锋，但要以人数优势，像一个整体一样冲锋，这样才能确保安全。因为人数优势，如果我们懂得如何运用，就能凭借我们所掌握的物资优势，压制敌人的火力。更多的枪支就能让敌人哑火，步枪和刺刀也是如此，只要我们懂得如何正确使用。” 9 人们对福煦作为军事理论家的重要性和影响力过分强调了。他只不过是重复了一些普遍存在的观点，这些观点不仅在法国军队中，也在其他国家军队中。亨德森上校或许是世纪末英国陆军中最睿智、最有学识的理论家，他欣慰地观察到，在1880年的英国步兵条例中，“刺刀再次占据主导地位。如同半岛战争时期一样，第二线部队被赋予了仅依靠冷兵器迅速结束战斗的重任……普鲁士战役的混乱很大程度上是由于他们忽视了战术的基本原则……因此，就战术而言，他们是我们不应效仿的榜样。”<sup> 10</sup>
Foch, in his lectures six years later, was to prescribe the same solution to this problem: “The laurels of victory hang on the enemy's bayonets, and have to be plucked from them, by man to man struggle if need be…. To flee or charge is all that remains. To charge, but to charge in numbers, as one mass, therein lies safety. For numbers, if we know how to employ them allow us, by the superiority of material placed at our disposal, to overcome the enemy's fire. With more guns we can reduce his to silence, and the same is true of rifles and bayonets, if we know how to use them all.”9 Too much emphasis has been placed on the importance and influence of Foch as a military theorist. He did no more than echo views very generally held, not only in the French army, but in others as well. Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, perhaps the most intelligent and literate theorist in the British army at the end of the century, observed with satisfaction how, in the British Infantry Regulations of 1880, “the bayonet has once more reasserted itself. To the second line, relying on cold steel only, as in the days of the Peninsula, is entrusted the duty of bringing the battle to a speedy conclusion…. The confusion of the Prussian battles was in a large degree due to their neglect of the immutable principles of tactics and…therefore, in regard to tactics, they are a bad model for us to follow.”10
亨德森在其军队中推崇的模式是美国内战时期军队的作战方式，这些军队总是以密集阵型发起进攻；他们认识到，“为了防止战斗演变成两支固守阵地的军队之间旷日持久的拉锯战，并取得迅速而决定性的胜利，仅仅发展火力是不够的。” ¹¹诚然，过去二十五年间武器装备发生了变化，但亨德森自信地断言，“无论是无烟火药还是弹匣步枪，都不会带来任何根本性的变革。如果说这些发明确实增强了防御，那么线膛榴弹炮的俯冲火力将为进攻带来不成比例的强大火力。如果说弹匣步枪为战斗引入了一种新的、强大的因素，那么战斗的士气依然不变。” ¹²
The model that Henderson held before his own army was that of the armies in the American Civil War, which had always attacked in massed formations; having learned that “to prevent the battle degenerating into a protracted struggle between two strongly entrenched armies, and to attain a speedy and decisive result, mere development of fire was insufficient.”11 It was true that weapons had changed during the past twenty-five years, but, Henderson asserted confidently, “neither smokeless powder nor the magazine rifle will necessitate any radical change. If the defence has gained, as has been asserted, by these inventions, the plunging fire of rifled howitzers will add a more than proportional strength to the attack. And if the magazine rifle has introduced a new and formidable element into battle, the moral element remains the same.”12
道德因素始终如一：这是世纪之交军事文献中贯穿始终的主题，并在第一次世界大战爆发前的十年间愈发凸显。克劳塞维茨的著作在法国、俄国和德国军队中都备受推崇，被引用最多的段落是他强调战争中道德因素的至高无上地位以及物质因素相对微不足道的部分。阿尔当·杜·皮克的著作篇幅更短，文笔更优美，对军事心理学有着深刻的洞见，在法国也越来越受欢迎，其论述与此相同。杜·皮克写道，战争的胜利并非取决于武器，而是取决于人，如果“不准确了解人这一主要工具及其在战斗关键时刻的道德状况”，就无法有效地制定军队作战计划。 <sup> 13</sup>杜·皮克认为，在战斗中，
The moral element remains the same: this is the theme that we find running through the military literature at the turn of the century, and it was to be sounded ever more strongly in the decade leading up to the First World War. The works of Clausewitz were studied as eagerly in the French and Russian armies as in the German, and the passages most often quoted were those in which he emphasized the overriding importance of moral factors in war, and the relative insignificance of material elements. The briefer, more elegantly expressed works of Ardent du Picq, with their profound insights into military psychology, were gaining popularity in France, and they taught the same lesson. Battles, wrote du Picq, were won not by weapons but by men, and nothing could be effectively planned in an army “without exact knowledge of this primary instrument, man, and his moral condition at the vital moment (cet instant définitif) of combat.”13 In battle, argued du Picq,
两种道德活动而非两种物质活动相互对抗，强者终将获胜……当一方对物质优势的自信——这种优势足以将敌人拒之门外——被敌人决心近身作战、无视你更强大的杀伤手段的决心所背叛时，敌人对你造成的道德冲击会因你信心的丧失而加剧，其道德行动也将压倒你……因此，刺刀冲锋……换言之，在炮火下前进，其效果将与日俱增。14
two moral activities rather than two material activities confront one another, and the stronger will carry the day…. When the confidence one has placed in a superiority of material, incontestable for keeping the enemy at a distance, has been betrayed by the enemy's determination to get to close quarters, braving your superior means of destruction, the enemy's moral effect on you will be increased by all that lost confidence, and his moral activity will overwhelm your own…. Hence it follows that the bayonet charge…in other words the forward march under fire, will every day have a correspondingly greater effect.14
杜皮克在一段不太常被引用的文字中进一步阐述了这一观点：“不要在采取道德行动之前忽视破坏性行动；因此，要尽可能地使用武力，直到最后一刻；否则，以当时的火力强度来看，任何攻击都无法达成目标。” ¹⁵但这恰恰是布洛赫的观点：以当时的火力强度来看，任何攻击都不会成功，也不可能成功。
Du Picq went on to qualify this statement in a less frequently quoted passage. “Do not neglect destructive action before using moral action; so employ fire up till the last possible moment; otherwise, given existing rates of fire, no attack will reach its objective.”15 But this was exactly the point made by Bloch: given existing rates of fire, no attack would, or could succeed.
二
II
布洛赫出版《未来战争》的第二年，南非的布尔战争首次检验了双方使用这些新式武器的能力。正如我们所见，英军认为，无烟火药和弹匣步枪在防御方面带来的优势会被新型速射炮抵消。速射炮的空爆弹片会摧毁所有未构筑工事的防御者，而其高爆弹则会将那些构筑工事的防御者挖出。因此，英军重新采用密集阵型，“第二道防线仅依靠冷兵器，肩负着迅速结束战斗的重任。”<sup> 16</sup>结果是，在莫德河、科伦索、马格斯方丹和斯皮翁科普，英军被布尔人的火力压制，伤亡惨重，在某些地方甚至被迫投降。布尔人的防御工事他们根本看不见，更遑论靠近进攻。欧洲大陆的观察员将此归咎于军队训练不足，不习惯与“文明”对手作战。亨德森上校曾在罗伯茨勋爵的总部观察过这场战役，他对此颇为愤慨，并对他们提出的批评表示愤怒。他写道：“我们注意到，有人顽固地拒绝承认，小口径步枪的平直弹道，加上射手的隐蔽性，已经彻底改变了作战方式，这让我们感到十分惊讶。”<sup> 17</sup>他指出，如今在炮火下保持紧密队形已不可能。步兵在开阔地带进攻时，现在必须以散兵线的形式，间隔较大地推进；而“装备和装备与欧洲大陆骑兵相同的骑兵，也像十字军一样过时了。”至于紧密队形对于保持士气是必要的这种论点，他指出：“当绝大多数人遭受巨大损失时；当他们觉得（他们肯定会这么觉得）本可以采取其他代价更低的手段来实现同样的目标时，他们的士气会如何呢？” ¹⁸这是一项极具远见的观察。
The year after Bloch published La guerre future, the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa provided the first test in which the new weapons were used on both sides. As we have seen, the British army had come to the conclusion that the advantage that smokeless powder and magazine rifles would bring to the defense would be nullified by the employment of the new quick-firing artillery, whose shrapnel air-bursts would destroy any defenders who were not entrenched and whose plunging high-explosive shells would dig out those who were. In consequence they had reverted to close formations, “the second line, relying on cold steel only, [being] entrusted [with] the duty of bringing the battle to a speedy conclusion.”16 The result was that at the Modder River, Colenso, at Magersfontein, and Spion Kop, British forces were pinned down, decimated, and in places forced to surrender by the fire of Boer defenses they could not even see, let alone get close enough to assault. Continental observers attributed this to the inadequate training of an army unused to fighting “civilized” opponents, and a somewhat chastened Colonel Henderson, who had observed the campaign from Lord Roberts's headquarters, reacted angrily to their criticisms. “It is with something more than surprise,” he wrote, “that we note a stubborn refusal to admit that the flat trajectory of the small bore rifle, together with the invisibility of the man who uses it, has wrought a complete revolution in the art of fighting battles.”17 Close formations under fire, he stated, were now impossible. Infantry attacking over open ground now had to move in successive lines of skirmishers at wide intervals; while “cavalry, armed and equipped as the cavalry of the Continent, is as obsolete as the crusaders.” As for the argument that close formations were necessary to keep up morale, he pointed out: “When the preponderant mass suffers enormous losses; when they feel, as they will feel, that other and less costly means of achieving the same end might have been adopted, what will become of their morale?”18 It was a highly prescient observation.
由于战争经验，英国陆军按照亨德森的指示重新修订了步兵条例。德国陆军则无需修改其早已强调包围敌阵而非正面强攻优势的作战理论。令人有些意外的是，法国效仿了英国的做法。1904年12月颁布的法国步兵条例明确废除了1894年的“抱团推进”阵型，代之以更接近法国大革命时期军队散兵的战术：步兵以小组形式推进，最大限度地利用地形，通过火力掩护和机动移动，并将指挥权尽可能下放至下级。然而，这些显著的自由化改革在许多法国高级军官看来，似乎暴露了德雷福斯派的激进甚至社会主义倾向。在德雷福斯事件之后，德雷福斯派开始掌控军队。朗格卢瓦将军创办了一份新刊物《军事评论》（Revue militaire générale），其主要目的是为了对抗他创造的“急性德兰士瓦综合症”（acute transvaalitis），这个词用来描述“对战场损失的异常恐惧”。他认为，这种分散的局面与法国军事传统格格不入，因为它剥夺了指挥官“通过调动其所掌握的物质和精神力量，取得决定性胜利的权利，甚至可能性”。<sup>19 </sup> 但无论如何，这些新规似乎对当时这支混乱且内部分裂的军队的实际运作影响甚微，因为在当时的军队中，任何事情都难以达成共识。
As a result of its wartime experiences, the British army redrafted its infantry regulations along the lines indicated by Henderson. The German army did not need to revise a doctrine that already stressed the advantage of enveloping enemy positions rather than taking them by frontal assault. The French, a little surprisingly, imitated the British. The French Infantry Regulations introduced in December 1904 explicitly abandoned the coude à coude formations of 1894 and substituted tactics more in line with those of the skirmishers of the French Revolutionary armies: infantry advancing in small groups, making maximum use of ground, covering each other by fire and movement, with initiative devolved as low as possible in the chain of command. These remarkably liberal reforms, however, seemed to many senior French officers to betray the radical if not socialistic influence of the Dreyfusards who were beginning to take over control of the army in the aftermath of that unhappy affair. General Langlois founded a new journal, the Revue militaire générale, very largely to combat “acute transvaalitis,” the term he coined to describe “this abnormal dread of losses on the battlefield.” Such dispersion, he argued, was alien to the French military tradition, in that it deprived the commander of “the right or even the possibility of securing a decisive result through the combined efforts of material and moral forces at his disposal.”19« But in any case the new regulations seem to have had little impact on the actual practice of a very confused and internally divided army in which consensus about anything was, at this time, painfully absent.
这种对“急性跨南非炎”的反应，在随后一场使用现代武器的大规模冲突——1904-1905年的日俄战争中得到了强有力的强化。这场战争不仅引起了欧美海军和军事专家的密切关注，也引起了他们各自政府的关注，因为所有这些政府都对这场战争对远东力量平衡的影响及其对欧洲的后续影响深感忧虑。两大洲的报纸读者通过战地记者、摄影师和战地艺术家的报道，全面了解了这场新世纪第一场大战的进程，而这场战争注定不会和平。南非战争或许可以被视为一场非典型的战争，因为参战的军队接受的是殖民战争的训练，而他们的对手几乎算不上是一支正规军。但俄军是欧洲最强大的军队之一，而日本陆军则像其海军一样，接受过德国专家的训练。双方都配备了布洛赫曾自信地断言，从此以后战争将变得不可能，或者至少是自杀式的武器：小口径弹匣步枪、速射野战炮、机动重炮和机枪。俄军在旅顺和奉天构筑了由铁丝网和机枪堡垒保护的战壕，并在正面布设了电雷区，夜间用探照灯照明。双方军队都配备了电报和野战电话。事实上，1905年欧洲军队唯一没有、而到了1914年欧洲军队将拥有的武器，就是那些在第一次世界大战初期开始取代骑兵承担侦察任务的原始飞机。
This reaction against “acute transvaalitis” was to be given powerful reinforcement by the lessons of the next major conflict fought with modern weapons, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. It was a campaign followed with intense interest not only by the naval and military specialists of Europe and the United States but by the governments they served, all of which were deeply concerned with the changes it effected in the power balance of the Far East and its consequent impact on Europe. Newspaper readers in two continents were kept fully informed by their war correspondents, accompanied by photographers and war artists, about the course of this first great war of a new century that no one expected to be very peaceful. The war in South Africa might be dismissed as atypical, fought as it was by an army trained in methods of colonial warfare against an adversary that hardly rated as an organized army at all. But the Russian army was one of the foremost in Europe, and the Japanese army had been trained by German experts as its navy had been by British. Both forces were equipped with all those weapons that Bloch had confidently asserted would henceforth make war impossible, or at least suicidal: small-caliber magazine rifles, quick-firing field artillery, mobile heavy artillery, and machine guns. The Russians fortified their positions at Port Arthur and Mukden with lines of trenches protected by barbed wire and machine-gun redoubts, covering their front with electrically detonated minefields and using searchlights to illuminate them at night. Both armies were equipped with telegraph and field telephones. Indeed the only weapons not available in 1905 that European armies were to possess in 1914 were the primitive aircraft that in the early months of the world war were beginning to take over the function of reconnaissance from the cavalry.
欧洲观察家从日俄战争中得出的主要教训是，尽管新式武器为防御方带来了诸多优势，但进攻仍然完全可行。日军从战争伊始便成功掌握了主动权，并通过一系列精心策划的进攻，将兵力略多于己方的俄军逐出了南满洲。代价固然高昂，但日本也因此跻身世界强国之列；欧洲评论家指出，任何想要保持世界强国地位的国家都必须做好承担类似代价的准备。
The main lesson that European observers deduced from the Russo-Japanese War was that in spite of all the advantages which the new weapons gave the defense, the offensive was still entirely possible. The Japanese successfully took the initiative from the very beginning of the war and in a series of set-piece attacks drove Russian forces slightly larger than their own out of southern Manchuria. The cost had been high, but as a result Japan had graduated as a Great Power; and any nation that wished to remain a Great Power, European commentators pointed out, must be prepared to face comparable costs.
技术要点都经过了仔细研究。双方都曾有效地使用炮兵，但仅限于隐蔽炮兵阵地进行间接射击。炮弹的榴霰弹以及步兵步枪的射击使得任何进入敌军视线和射程范围内的行动都成为不可能，彻底粉碎了在战场上进行密集队形机动的念头。然而，野战炮对构筑坚固工事的步兵几乎无效，只有大规模集中使用的重炮才能突破他们的防线。任何步兵进攻，如果不仅没有充分的准备，而且没有炮火持续到最后一刻的支援，都难以取得成功；但只要准备充分，日军步兵的进攻就能屡屡得胜。日军证明，应对隐蔽防御的最佳方法就是隐蔽进攻。因此，他们夜间推进，在黎明前挖掘工事，白天则保持不动。在进攻的最后阶段，他们像围城一样，一码一码地挖掘前进。然后，他们发起猛攻。伤亡依然惨重：在旅顺港战役中，日军损失了五万人；在为期十天的奉天战役中，损失了七万人。但这些战役表明，只要精心准备，再加上狂热的勇气，现代战场上的进攻问题是可以解决的。
The technical lessons were closely studied. Artillery had been used to great effect on both sides, but only with masked batteries using indirect fire. Its shrapnel fire as well as infantry rifle-fire made any movement within sight and range of the enemy out of the question, and put an end to all idea of close formations maneuvering on the battlefield. On well-entrenched infantry, however, field artillery made little impression, and only heavy artillery used in massive concentrations could break their resistance. No infantry attack could hope to succeed unless it was not only prepared but accompanied up until the last moment by artillery barrages; but with adequate preparation Japanese infantry assaults were repeatedly successful. The Japanese showed that the best answer to the invisible defense was the invisible attack. They therefore carried out their advance by night, digging themselves in before dawn and remaining immobile during the day. In the last stages of the advance they sapped their way forward yard by yard, as if conducting a siege. Then they assaulted. Casualties were still terrible: in the assaults on Port Arthur the Japanese lost fifty thousand men, in the ten-day battle of Mukden, seventy thousand. But they showed that by a combination of careful preparation and fanatical courage the problem of the attack on the modern battlefield could be solved.
第一次世界大战前夕，一位颇具影响力的英国参谋军官，少将E.A. Altham，写下的一段评论，概括了当时欧洲的普遍反应：
One British comment written on the eve of the First World War by an influential staff officer, Major-General E. A. Altham, sums up the general European reaction:
有些人从南非的经验中推断，突击，或者至少是刺刀突击，已经过时，是一种不切实际的战术……满洲战役一次又一次地表明，刺刀绝非过时的武器，单靠火力也并非总能将意志坚定、训练有素的敌人从阵地上击退……突击甚至比其前的火力控制更为重要。它是战斗中最关键的时刻，最终的胜负取决于此。20
There were those who deduced from the experience in South Africa that the assault, or at least the assault with the bayonet, was a thing of the past, a scrap-heap manoeuvre…the Manchurian campaign showed over and over again that the bayonet was in no sense an obsolete weapon and that fire alone could not always suffice to move from a position a determined and well-disciplined enemy…. The assault is even of more importance than the attainment of fire mastery which antecedes it. It is the supreme moment of the fight. Upon it the final issue depends.20
日俄战争的真正教训被广泛认为是：现代战争中真正重要的因素不是技术，而是士气；而且这种士气不仅关乎军队，也关乎其所属国家的士气。西欧工业化国家的军事领导人开始对此深感怀疑。德国上校威廉·巴尔克在其鸿篇巨著《战术论》中警告说：
The real lesson of the Russo-Japanese War was widely seen as being that the truly important element in modern warfare was not technology but morale; and the morale, not of the army alone, but of the nation from which it was drawn. This was a matter on which the military leaders of the industrialized nations of western Europe were beginning to feel grave doubts. The German colonel Wilhelm Balck in his massive textbook on tactics warned that
生活水平的不断提高往往会增强人们的自保本能，削弱自我牺牲的精神……当今快节奏的生活方式往往会损害神经系统，昔日那种狂热的宗教和民族热情已不复存在，最后，人类的体能也在部分衰退……因此，我们应该让士兵们带着足够的道德勇气投入战斗，以防止个人过早地丧失道德和精神能力。21
The steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice…the fast manner of living at the present day tends to undermine the nervous system, the fanaticism and religious and national enthusiasm of a bygone age is lacking, and finally the physical powers of the human species are also partly diminishing…. We should [therefore] send our soldiers into battle with a reserve of moral courage great enough to prevent the premature moral and mental depreciation of the individual.21
在德军内部，以雄辩且极具影响力的冯·伯恩哈迪将军为首的反动势力开始出现，反对施利芬时代谨慎的战术和侧翼包抄战略。伯恩哈迪将其描述为“战争艺术的破产”。他认为，施利芬过分强调物质因素和依赖数量优势，却忽略了“那些能够承受更大损失并比其他部队更积极推进的部队才能最终取得胜利；以及领导才能、胆识和魄力在战争中根本不起作用”这一事实。<sup> 22</sup>
Within the German army a reaction set in, spearheaded by the eloquent and influential General von Bernhardi, against the cautious tactics and outflanking strategy of the Schlieffen era, which Bernhardi described as “a declaration of bankruptcy of the art of war.” Schlieffen's emphasis on material factors and his reliance on numerical superiority, he maintained, failed to take into account the fact “that those troops will prove superior who can bear the greater losses and advance more vigorously than the others; or that boldness, daring and genius of leadership play any role at all in the war.”22
在德军中，施利芬的批评者虽然人数不多，但声音响亮。而在法军中，他们的反对者却势力大增，尤其是在霞飞将军于1911年被任命为总参谋长之后。霞飞的大部分职业生涯都在法国殖民地军队度过，这支军队自诩为一支充满冒险精神的精英部队，其征服更多地依赖于个人的主动性和强大的意志力，而非武力。殖民地军队的军官们鄙视法国本土军队，认为它行动迟缓、效率低下，而且（在德雷福斯事件之后）政治色彩浓厚——这实际上也是整个法国的典型特征。23他们认为，在即将与宿敌德国决战之际，唯有发起一场道德运动，才能重振法国军队和法国民族的雄风和精神。从1911年起，这场决战被普遍认为不可避免。在霞飞看来，为此有必要“赋予陆军一个清晰的战争理论，让所有人都知道并一致接受”：进攻理论。
In the German army the critics of Schlieffen remained a small if vocal minority. Their opposite numbers in the French army became very powerful indeed when General Joffre was appointed chief of the general staff in 1911. Joffre had spent most of his career in the French colonial army, which saw itself as an adventurous elite, achieving its conquests more through individual initiative and force of character than force of arms. Its officers despised the army of the metropole, which they considered to be lethargic, inefficient, and (in the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair) heavily politicized—typical indeed of France as a whole.23 Nothing less than a moral crusade, they believed, was needed to restore the greatness and spirit of the French army and the French nation on the eve of a confrontation with their old enemy which, from 1911 onward, was widely considered to be inevitable. For this it was necessary, in Joffre's view, “to endow the Army with a clear war doctrine, known to all and unanimously accepted”: the doctrine of the offensive.
乔弗雷在南非战争结束后写道：
After the war in South Africa, wrote Joffre,
一系列错误的教条……开始削弱我们战争理论中哪怕是最微弱的进攻意识，损害了军队的精神、对指挥官和规章制度的信心……对一场战争的片面研究，使我军的知识精英们误以为，火器的改进和火力的增强极大地增强了防御的力量，以至于与之对抗的进攻完全失去了意义……[满洲战役之后]，我们年轻的知识精英们终于摆脱了这种扰乱军事界的论调，回归到对战争普遍状况更为健康的认识。24
A whole series of false doctrines…began to undermine even such feeble offensive sentiment as has made its appearance in our war doctrines, to the detriment of the Army's spirit, its confidence in its chiefs and in its regulations…. an incomplete study of the events of a single war had led the intellectual élite of our Army to believe that the improvement in firearms and the power of fire action had so increased the strength of the defensive that an offensive opposed to it had lost all virtue…. [after the Manchurian campaign] our young intellectual élite finally shook off the malady of this phraseology which had upset the military world and returned to a more healthy conception of the general conditions prevailing in war.24
这种“更健康的理念”强调“进攻精神”。霞飞在他的回忆录中承认，这种理念“多少有些不合常理”，尤其是在军事行动总监德·格朗梅松上校于1911年2月发表的两场著名演讲中，这种观点得到了更充分的阐述。他并没有质疑1904年步兵条例的有效性，该条例强调分散阵型的重要性。事实上，这些条例不仅被保留，而且直到1914年4月还在重新颁布。但德·格朗梅松写道，“培养一种必胜的心态比纠结于战术更重要”，而这正是他致力于培养的心态。 “在战场上，人必须时刻准备着去做那些在冷静的环境下根本不可能做到的事情。举个例子：在炮火下前进……在我们现在的心态下，没有什么比这更难想象的了……我们必须训练自己做到这一点，也要训练他人做到这一点，满怀热情地培养一切带有进攻精神的品质。我们必须做到极致：或许即便如此也还不够。”
The “more healthy conception” consisted in an emphasis on “the spirit of the offensive.” This, Joffre admitted in his memoirs, did assume “a somewhat unreasoning character”; especially as expounded by Colonel de Grandmaison, the director of military operations, in two famous lectures that he delivered in February 1911. He did not call in question the validity of the Infantry Regulations of 1904, with their emphasis on the importance of dispersed formations. These were indeed not only retained but reissued as late as April 1914. But “it is more important,” wrote de Grandmaison, “to develop a conquering state of mind than to cavil about tactics,” and it was this state of mind that he set himself to develop. “In battle one must always be able to do things which would be quite impossible in cold blood. To take one example: to advance under fire…. Nothing is more difficult to conceive of in our state of mind now…. We have to train ourselves to do it and train others, cultivating with passion everything that bears the stamp of the offensive spirit. We must take it to excess: perhaps even that will not go far enough.”
两年后，德·格朗梅松起草了《1913年10月主要部队行为准则》，其中包含一句名言：“法国军队回归其传统，只承认进攻法则。”<sup> 25</sup>
Two years later de Grandmaison drew up the Regulations for the Conduct of Major Formations of October 1913, which contained the famous words: “The French Army, returning to its traditions, recognizes no law save that of the offensive.”25
这一理论契合了当时的社会氛围。它迎合了军事精英的口味，他们与阿尔当·杜·皮克一样认为，这种精神只能在一支忠诚的职业军队框架内培养；小说家欧内斯特·普西卡里也表达了类似的观点，他的小说《号召拿起武器》（L'appel aux armes）宣扬需要一支“骄傲而勇猛的军队”，在战争前夕广受欢迎。<sup> 26</sup>但这一理论同样吸引了激进左派，他们一直宣称，军人士气源于民众的爱国热情，并不需要多年的军旅生涯才能培养出来。<sup> 27 </sup> 更广泛地说，哲学家亨利·柏格森在索邦大学举办的广受欢迎的讲座也呼应了这一观点，他以更为优雅的“生命冲动”（l'élan vital）形式，向广大听众传播了尼采的“创造意志”概念。
This doctrine suited the mood of the hour. It appealed to the military elites who believed, with Ardent du Picq, that this spirit could be cultivated only within the framework of a dedicated professional army; their views were expressed by the novelist Ernest Psichari, whose novel L'appel aux armes, preaching the need for “a proud and violent army,” enjoyed huge popularity on the eve of the war.26 But it appealed no less to the radical Left, who had always declared that military morale was a matter of popular patriotic passion and did not require years of service with the colors to produce.27 And more generally it was echoed in the enormously popular lectures the philosopher Henri Bergson was delivering at the Sorbonne, which were diffusing to a wide audience Nietzschean concepts of the Creative Will in the more elegant formulation of l'élan vital.
德·格朗梅松和福煦一样，都曾受到后世历史学家和评论家的猛烈抨击。然而，撇开法国人特有的豪迈不谈，我们也能发现当时英国和德国作家表达的类似观点。在英国，伊恩·汉密尔顿爵士将军——英国最敏感、最睿智、也最具影响力的职业军人之一——也持类似观点：“德·布洛赫先生在1904年之前写的那些关于生灵无法穿越的火力区域的胡言乱语，预示的只有灾难。战争的本质不是夏塞波步枪战胜针枪，也不是铁丝网和火力覆盖的战壕里的士兵战胜暴露在外的士兵，而是意志战胜意志薄弱者……一个国家最好的防御就是一支以进攻为理念组建、训练和激励的军队。”<sup> 28</sup>
De Grandmaison, like Foch, has been much pilloried by subsequent historians and critics, but, allowing for a certain Gallic bravura, one finds much the same sentiments expressed by British and German writers of the time. In England, General Sir Ian Hamilton, one of the most sensitive and intelligent as well as influential of Britain's professional soldiers, argued along very much the same lines: “All that trash written by M. de Bloch before 1904 about zones of fire across which no living being could pass, heralded nothing but disaster. War is essentially the triumph, not of a chassepot over a needle-gun, not of a line of men entrenched behind wire entanglements and fire-swept zones over men exposing themselves in the open, but of one will over a weaker will…the best defence to a country is an army formed, trained, inspired by the idea of attack.”28
在1914年之前，士兵们对于这一切所付出的生命代价毫不怀疑。“如果部队习惯于将微不足道的伤亡……视为领导有方的标志，那总是令人怀疑的，”巴尔克写道。“伟大的胜利通常伴随着巨大的损失。”<sup> 29 </sup> 莫德的观点更进一步：“胜利的几率完全取决于那些必须牺牲自己以换取其他人机会的人的自我牺牲精神……换句话说，一支军队真正的力量本质上在于其每个组成部分，或者任何一个组成部分，承受惩罚的能力，即使必要时濒临灭绝……如果部队训练有素，仅仅根据指挥官在节省士兵生命方面的能力来评判他们，那么又怎能指望有足够的耐力呢？”<sup> 30</sup>
Nor was there any doubt, in the minds of the soldiers before 1914, about the cost of all this in human lives. “It is always suspicious,” wrote Balck, “if troops have become accustomed to consider insignificant losses…as indications of good leadership. Great victories are, as a rule, accompanied by great losses.”29 And Maude went even further: “The chances of victory turn entirely on the spirit of self-sacrifice of those who have to be offered up to gain opportunity for the remainder…in other words the true strength of an Army lies essentially in the power of each, or any of its constituent fractions to stand up to punishment, even to the verge of annihilation if necessary…[W]ith troops trained to judge their leaders merely by the skill they show in economising their men's lives, what hope of adequate endurance can ever exist?”30
因此，欧洲各国军队和国家在1914年卷入战争时，都预料到会遭受惨重的损失。他们灌输给年轻人的精神不仅是为国而战，更是为国捐躯。“牺牲”，尤其是“至高牺牲”，在战争初期主导了交战各方的文学作品、演讲、布道和新闻报道。后世看来触目惊心的伤亡名单，在当时的人们看来，并非军事无能的体现，而是国家决心和实力的象征，是其跻身世界强国行列的有力证明。
The armies and nations of Europe thus went to war in 1914 expecting that there would be heavy losses. The spirit in which their young men were indoctrinated was not simply to fight for their country, but to die for it. The concept of “sacrifice,” above all of “the supreme sacrifice,” was to dominate the literature, speeches, sermons, and journalism of the belligerent societies during the early years of the war. And the casualty lists that a later generation was to find so horrifying were considered by contemporaries not an indication of military incompetence, but a measure of national resolve, of fitness to rank as a Great Power.
三
III
在探讨第一次世界大战的进程时，欧美历史学家往往侧重于西线战场，本文也将沿用这一视角。在东线，俄奥军队的伤亡迅速攀升至数十万人，但这些伤亡主要源于疾病、俘虏和逃兵，而非战场上的英勇牺牲。布洛赫曾预言，未来的战争中，双方军队会在中间的“死亡地带”相互牵制，寸步难行。然而，讽刺的是，这种设想在他最为熟悉的东欧地区却最不适用。在东欧，冲突从未陷入阵地战的泥潭，而是始终以机动战为主，直至战争结束。
In discussing the course of the First World War, European and American historians have tended to focus on the western front, and we shall follow their example here. In the East the losses of the Russian and Austrian armies rapidly mounted into hundreds of thousands, but these were accounted for mainly by sickness, prisoners, and desertion rather than by heroic self-sacrifice on the battlefield. Bloch's expectation of a future war in which armies held one another paralyzed across an intervening “zone of death,” was paradoxically to be least applicable to the part of the world with which he was most familiar. In eastern Europe the conflict never bogged down into a war of positions; it remained one of maneuver until the very end.
施利芬将军希望西欧也能如此。正如我们所见，施利芬计划是将自1870年以来德军奉行的战术原则——避免正面进攻，通过包围战术达成目标——延伸到战略层面，即便这意味着需要数百万兵力。因此，德军几乎未遇抵抗便横扫比利时和法国，即便遭遇抵抗，也用炮火掩护，试图包抄。他们的确以极低的成本夺取了大片领土，但从长远来看，施利芬的批评者们的预言最终应验了。他的战略并未取得任何决定性胜利。
It was the hope and intention of General von Schlieffen that this would be the case in western Europe as well. The Schlieffen plan, as we have seen, was the extension into strategy of the tactical doctrine that had prevailed in the German army since 1870—the avoidance of frontal attack and the attainment of the objective by envelopment, even if that development demanded armies numbered in millions. So the German armies marched through Belgium and France largely unopposed, and when they encountered opposition they masked it with artillery fire and tried to outflank it. They thus won a great deal of territory very cheaply indeed, but in the long run Schlieffen's critics proved right. His strategy achieved no decision.
然而，在法国，那些奉行进攻战术的“教父”——相当于施利芬在德国的对手——掌握着实权，正是在他们的影响下，最高统帅部实施了著名的第十七号计划。该计划背后的总体理念——即法国应该主动出击，而不是被动地等待德军的进攻——颇具可取之处。毕竟，正是这一理念赋予了霞飞足够的灵活性，使其能够迅速从最初的失败中恢复过来，并重新部署兵力，最终赢得了所谓的马恩河战役。1914年法国军队的问题不在于其进攻意识，而在于其效率低下。官僚主义的混乱阻碍了日俄战争中的主要经验教训的吸取。没有为重型火炮的供应做好准备，这意味着德军的火炮射程始终优于法军。没有关于炮兵和步兵密切配合的作战理论，也没有进行任何认真的野战技能训练，尽管相关条例中可能有所规定。因此，战争爆发后，各级法国指挥官的反应都出于本能，而非遵循任何系统的训练计划。正如一位军官所说：“在真正经历枪林弹雨之前，想到我们即将与敌人正面交锋，就让太多军官陷入了极度的兴奋状态，任何经历过这种时刻的人都能感同身受。在这种情况下还能保持冷静的人实属罕见。这与其说是教条的问题，不如说是性情的问题。”<sup> 31</sup>
In France, however, the high priests of the offensive, the equivalent of Schlieffen's opponents in Germany, were in charge, and it was under their influence that the High Command implemented its famous Plan XVII. The general concept behind this plan, that the French should take the strategic initiative rather than passively await the German assault, had much to recommend it. It did after all provide the flexibility that enabled Joffre to recover so rapidly from his initial disasters and redeploy his forces to win the so-called battle of the Marne. The trouble with the French army in 1914 was not so much that it was offensively minded as that it was inefficient. Bureaucratic confusion prevented the main lessons of the Russo-Japanese War from being applied. No provision was made for the supply of heavy artillery, which meant that German guns consistently outranged the French. There was no doctrine for close cooperation between artillery and infantry, and no serious training in fieldcraft was carried out, whatever may have been laid down in the regulations. As a result, when war came French commanders at every level responded instinctively rather than in accordance with any systematic program of training. As one officer put it: “Before being subjected to the actual ordeal of fire, the idea that we were face to face with the enemy threw too many of our officers into a state of wild excitement which anyone who has experienced such moments can well understand. The man who can keep a cool head under such circumstances is a very unusual kind of animal. Much more than a question of doctrine it is a matter of temperament.”31
因此，在1914年8月初投入战斗的150万法国军队中，经过六周的战斗，有38.5万人伤亡，约占总兵力的四分之一。其中，11万人阵亡。<sup> 32</sup>
In consequence, out of the 1,500,000 French troops who went on campaign at the beginning of August 1914, 385,000, or about one in four, were casualties after six weeks of fighting. Of these, 110,000 were dead.32
这些损失大多并非发生在针对预设阵地的正面进攻中，而是在双方行进中的遭遇战中，法军步兵暴露在开阔地带，遭到炮火猛烈攻击而损失惨重。1914年11月在伊普尔爆发的西线第二次大规模冲突，也是一场遭遇战，德军和英军都遭受了重大损失。双方都试图在所谓的“奔向大海”的竞赛中包抄对方。此后，德军才开始加固他们占领的阵地，将匆忙挖掘的战壕改造成复杂的防御工事体系，并用铁丝网加固，首次将大量机枪用于防御。
Most of these losses were suffered, not in set-piece attacks against prepared positions, but in encounter battles when both armies were on the move and the French infantry were caught in the open and destroyed by artillery fire. The second great clash on the western front in 1914, that in November at Ypres when the German and British armies both suffered heavy losses, was also an encounter battle in which each side tried to outflank the other in the so-called race to the sea. Only after that did the Germans begin to fortify the positions they had won, converting the trenches they had hurriedly scratched in the ground into an elaborate system of fortifications, strengthened with barbed wire, and utilizing for the first time large numbers of machine guns in a defensive role.
1915年全年，法英联军的进攻都考验着这些防御工事的强度，但结果始终是徒劳无功。并非他们的进攻从未成功，事实上，他们常常成功。然而，在德军防线上建立的桥头堡无法坚守足够长的时间，也无法及时得到增援，以抵挡德军为夺回失地而发起的快速反击；通常情况下，盟军会被击退至原先的战线，并遭受惨重损失。唯一的出路似乎在于发起足够宽广的进攻，建立一个坚不可摧的反击阵地，并在密集的炮火掩护下，彻底摧毁德军的抵抗能力。1914年的教训已被牢牢铭记：步兵在没有强大炮火支援的情况下，绝不会再次投入战斗。
The strength of these defenses was tested by French and British attacks throughout 1915, and always with the same barren result. It was not that their attacks never succeeded. Often they did. But the bridgeheads thus established in the German defenses could not be held long enough, or reinforced fast enough, to resist the rapid counterattacks that the Germans mounted to regain their lost positions; and usually the Allies were driven back to their start-line with heavy losses. The only answer appeared to be attack on a broad enough front to establish a position invulnerable to counterattack, and to do so behind a curtain of artillery fire so heavy that it would destroy the capacity of the defenders to resist at all. The lesson of 1914 had been well learned; infantry would not be committed to action again without massive artillery support.
1915年初，当被问及英国民众是否能够承受突破德军防线所带来的惨重伤亡时，道格拉斯·黑格爵士将军过于乐观地回答说，这样的伤亡并非必要；“只要我们获得充足的炮弹……[他]认为我们可以从几个地方突破德军防线。”<sup> 33</sup>但四个月后，在1915年5月英军在费斯图贝尔的进攻失败后，他改变了看法。“我们前线的防御工事如此精心坚固，”他在日记中写道，“而且机枪火力相互支援如此全面，为了摧毁这些防御工事，必须先用重炮进行长时间、有条不紊的炮击……之后才能派步兵发起进攻。”<sup> 34</sup>那年秋天，霞飞为了缓解其俄国盟友的压力而发动攻势，试图将这一理论付诸实践。为支援步兵，共发射了约五百万发炮弹，其中一百万发来自重炮。这次进攻也被遏制住了。尽管如此，局部取得的足够胜利使盟军相信，“只要具备一定的奇袭能力，拥有足够的火炮、弹药和其他装备，以及训练有素的部队，就有可能突破敌人的防线。”<sup> 35</sup>
General Sir Douglas Haig, when asked early in 1915 whether he thought the British people could tolerate the heavy losses that would be involved in breaking the German lines, replied with incautious optimism that such losses would not be necessary; “as soon as we were supplied with ample artillery ammunition…[he] thought we could walk through the German lines at several places.”33 But four months later, after the failure of the British assault at Festubert in May 1915, he modified his view. “The defences on our front are so carefully and so strongly made,” he noted in his diary, “and mutual support with machine guns is so complete, that in order to demolish them a long methodical bombardment will be necessary by heavy artillery…before the Infantry is sent forward to the attack.”34 That autumn, in the offensive he launched to relieve pressure on his Russian ally, Joffre attempted to put this doctrine into practice. Some five million artillery rounds were fired in support of the infantry, one million by heavy artillery. That attack also was contained. Nonetheless, sufficient local successes were achieved to encourage the Allies to believe that “it was possible, given some element of surprise, sufficient guns, ammunition and other appliances, and adequately trained troops, to break the enemy's front.”35
1916年春，德军自己树立了如何成功实施此类攻势的典范。他们在凡尔登发动了一次有限的攻势，此前他们进行了猛烈的炮击，几乎摧毁了所有抵抗。然而，德军野战指挥官并没有像最高统帅部所计划的那样转入防御，让法军在反击中自取灭亡，而是继续进攻，结果遭受了惨重的损失。凡尔登战役成为了法德两国的噩梦。但德军在如此猛烈的炮火下仍坚持进攻的战术——正如英国官方史书所言，“人与人之间的较量并非人与人之间的较量，而是与物质的较量”——被英国人奉为圭臬，用于策划他们在1916年夏季索姆河战役中的首次大规模攻势。36在劳合·乔治领导的军需部积极领导下，英国工业界的全部劳动力都被调动起来，以所需的规模生产枪支弹药。到六月底，1437门大炮已沿十八英里长的战线集结完毕，并在为期一周的炮击中发射了超过150万发炮弹。<sup> 37</sup>进攻部队指挥官亨利·罗林森爵士向其下属指挥官保证，“炮击结束后，炮击覆盖区域内将不复存在，步兵只需步行过去即可占领。”<sup> 38</sup>因此，步兵于7月1日发起进攻，但他们并非以进攻部队的身份，而是以庞大的运输队的形式，每人负重超过70磅的装备，最多也只是清理一些惊魂未定的幸存者。
In the spring of 1916 the Germans themselves set a pattern of how this might successfully be done. They launched a limited offensive at Verdun preceded by a bombardment so heavy that all resistance was literally crushed. But instead of then standing on the defensive, as their High Command had intended, and leaving it to the French to break themselves in counterattacks, the German field commanders continued to attack, and suffered punitive losses as a result. Verdun became a nightmare for French and Germans alike. But the German technique of attack under fire so heavy that, in the words of the British official history, “man was not pitted against man, but against material,” was taken as a model by the British in planning their own first great offensive on the Somme in the summer of 1916.36 The whole available work force of British industry, under the energetic direction of Lloyd George at the Ministry of Munitions, was set to produce guns and ammunition on the requisite scale. By the end of June 1,437 guns had been assembled along an eighteen-mile front, and in a week-long bombardment they fired over 1,500,000 shells.37 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the commander of the assaulting troops, assured his subordinate commanders that “nothing can exist at the conclusion of the bombardment in the area covered by it and the infantry would only have to walk over and take possession.”38 So the infantry went over the top on July 1 not as an assaulting force, but as a huge carrying party, each man bearing upward of seventy pounds of equipment, expecting at worst to have to mop up a few dazed survivors.
结果是战争史上最惨烈的日子之一。炮火强度不足以击中德军在索姆河上方白垩山丘深处挖掘的掩体。尽管德军步兵遭受了极其可怕的经历，但他们仍然及时地冲出掩体，架起机枪，扫射一波又一波推进的英军步兵。德军炮兵给英军防线造成了如此巨大的破坏，以至于几天后，最高指挥部才意识到他们面临的灾难有多么严重。在12万名进攻者中，近一半伤亡，2万人阵亡。<sup> 39</sup>
The result was one of the most terrible days in the history of war. The barrage had not been heavy enough to reach the dugouts that the Germans had excavated deep in the chalk hills above the Somme. Appalling as the experience they suffered was, the German infantry were still able to emerge in time to set up their machine guns and mow down the advancing waves of British infantry. German artillery was able to create such havoc in the British lines that it was several days before the High Command understood the scale of the catastrophe they had on their hands. Of the 120,000 men who assaulted, nearly half were casualties, and 20,000 were dead.39
进攻一直持续到11月，此时英法联军已损失近50万人。然而，此时战役的目标已经改变。不再是夺取阵地，而是迫使德军投入兵力，消耗殆尽——这正是德军在凡尔登战役中的初衷。“再过六周，敌人就很难找到兵力了，”黑格在回复伦敦方面焦急的询问时写道，“……持续的进攻压力最终将导致其彻底溃败。”<sup> 40</sup>简而言之，这种战术僵局被用来服务于消耗战战略，该战略不仅考验军队的人力和士气，也考验整个国家的士气。对于那些在20世纪头十年盛行的社会达尔文主义氛围中成长起来的人来说，这并不令人意外。承受巨大损失的准备仍然是衡量一个大国能否生存下去的标准，而这种准备使得欧洲最先进、工业化和受过良好教育的国家能够继续进行艰苦卓绝的两年战争。
The attacks continued until November, by which time the British and French armies engaged had lost nearly 500,000 men. By then, however, the object of the battle had changed. It was no longer to secure ground, but to compel the Germans to commit, and use up, their troops—the original object of the Germans themselves when they attacked at Verdun. “In another six weeks the enemy should be hard put to it to find men,” Haig wrote in reply to anxious inquiries from London; “…the maintenance of a steady offensive pressure will result eventually in his complete overthrow.”40 The tactical deadlock, in short, was utilized to serve a strategy of attrition, in which the manpower and morale not only of the armies but of the entire nation was put to the test. To those brought up in the atmosphere of Social Darwinism, which dominated the first decade of the century, this came as no surprise. Readiness to suffer huge losses remained the criterion of fitness to survive as a Great Power, and this readiness enabled the most advanced, industrialized, and educated nations of Europe to go on fighting for a further grueling two years.
战争结束时，双方的战术都发生了转变。英国人完善了普卢默和莫纳什军队所采用的精心设计的围城战术，并试验了装甲部队和近距离空中支援。德国人则利用堑壕战的新式武器——轻机枪、手榴弹、毒气——赋予步兵极大的灵活性，使其能够突破由较弱、行动迟缓的敌军把守的防线。
By the end of the war, the tactics of both sides had been transformed. The British perfected the careful techniques of siege warfare associated with the armies of Plumer and Monash and experimented with armor and close air support. The Germans exploited the new weapons of trench warfare—light machine guns, grenades, gas—to give their infantry a flexibility that enabled them to break through fronts held by weaker and more ponderous adversaries.
试图将1914年以前的进攻主义理论与第一次世界大战期间的惨重损失直接联系起来是错误的。诚然，鉴于新型火力的强大，重大损失被认为是不可避免的。同样不可否认的是，在1914年那种狂热的氛围中（知识分子历史学家对此进行了深入分析），公众也普遍乐于接受这些损失。<sup> 41</sup>但1914年以前关于士气在战争中至关重要以及在面对一切障碍时保持进攻心态的论述，只不过是重申了在战争各个时期都适用的真理。火力对战术的影响在1914年之前就已经被各参谋部详尽分析，训练有素的正规军也早已明白，应对步枪的最佳方法是用铁锹。最惨重的损失并非源于错误的理论，而是由于效率低下、经验不足以及在必要规模上将火力与机动相结合所面临的组织难题。战争伊始，欧洲的职业军人便开始努力适应战场上的新现实。他们花了极其漫长的时间才解决面临的战术难题。在此之前，由于防御与进攻力量之间极度失衡，战略制定受到了极大的限制，这种情况在战争史上极为罕见。
It would be a mistake to try to establish too close a connection between the doctrine of the offensive current before 1914 and the terrible losses incurred during the First World War. It is true that, given the strength of the new firepower, heavy losses were accepted as inevitable. It is also true that, in the frenetic atmosphere of 1914, which intellectual historians have so thoroughly analyzed, there was a remarkable public readiness to accept them.41 But much of the writing before 1914 about the supreme importance of morale in war and the need to maintain an offensive mentality in the face of all obstacles did no more than restate truths that have been valid in all periods of warfare. The influence of firepower on tactics had been exhaustively analyzed by general staffs before 1914, and well-trained regular forces already knew that the best answer to the rifle was the spade. The worst losses were those due not to faulty doctrine but to inefficiency, inexperience, and the sheer organizational problems of combining fire and movement on the requisite scale. From the very first days of the war, the professional soldiers of Europe were trying to adjust themselves to the new realities of the battlefield. It took them a tragically long time to solve the tactical problems that confronted them. Until they did, strategy was crippled by the adverse balance between defensive and offensive power to a degree rare in the history of war.
1 Friedrich von Bernhardi，《今日战争》（伦敦，1912 年），2:53。
1 Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War Today (London, 1912), 2:53.
2 FN Maude，《步兵战术的演变》（伦敦，1905 年），第 146 页。
2 F. N. Maude, The Evolution of Infantry Tactics (London, 1905), 146.
3卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特译注，修订版（普林斯顿，1984 年），第 1 卷，第 11 章，第 260 页。
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans, and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1984), bk. 1, ch. 11, p. 260.
4 Jan Bloch，《战争的未来及其技术、经济和政治关系》（波士顿，1899 年），第 xxx 页。另见上文第 13 篇论文中对 Bloch 的讨论。
4 Jan Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations (Boston, 1899), xxx. See also the discussion of Bloch in essay 13, above.
5费迪南·福煦，《战争原则》（纽约，1918 年），第 362 页。重点为笔者所加。
5 Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War (New York, 1918), 362. Emphasis added.
6同上，第 365 页。
6 Ibid., 365.
7 Charles-Ardent du Picq'，《战斗研究：古董与现代战斗》（巴黎，1942 年），110。
7 Charles-Ardent du Picq', Études sur le combat: Combat antique et moderne (Paris, 1942), 110.
8 Eugéne Carrias，《法国军事思想》（巴黎，1960 年），275-76。
8 Eugéne Carrias, La pensée militaire française (Paris, 1960), 275–76.
9福煦，《战争原则》，第 365 页。
9 Foch, Principles of War, p. 365.
10 GFR Henderson，《战争科学》（伦敦，1905 年），第 135、148 页。
10 G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War (London, 1905), 135, 148.
11同上，第 150 页。
11 Ibid., 150.
12同上，第 159 页。
12 Ibid., 159.
13杜皮克，练习曲，3。
13 Du Picq, Etudes, 3.
14同上，第 121 页。
14 Ibid., 121.
15同上，第 127 页。
15 Ibid., 127.
16 Henderson，《战争科学》，135。
16 Henderson, Science of War, 135.
17同上，第 371 页。
17 Ibid., 371.
18同上，372–73。
18 Ibid., 372–73.
19 Joseph C. Arnold，“1870-1914 年法国战术理论”，《军事事务》 42，第 2 期（1978 年 4 月）。
19 Joseph C. Arnold, “French Tactical Doctrine 1870–1914,” Military Affairs 42, no. 2 (April 1978).
20 EA Altham，《战争原则的历史图解》（伦敦，1914 年），第 295 页。
20 E. A. Altham, The Principles of War Historically Illustrated (London, 1914), 295.
21 William Balck，《战术》，第 4 版（堪萨斯州莱文沃思堡，1911 年），第 194 页。
21 William Balck, Tactics, 4th ed. (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1911), 194.
22 Bernhardi，《今日战争》，2:158, 179。
22 Bernhardi, On War Today, 2:158, 179.
23道格拉斯·波奇，《进军马恩河》（剑桥，1981 年），151-68 页。
23 Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne (Cambridge, 1981), 151–68.
24 Joseph Joffre，《Joffre元帅回忆录》（伦敦，1932年），第1卷，第26-29页。
24 Joseph Joffre, The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre (London, 1932.), 1:26–29.
25 Carnas，《军事思想》，296；亨利·康塔米恩（Henri Contamine），《复仇》1871-1914（巴黎，1957），
25 Carnas, Pensée militaire, 296; Henri Contamine, La revanche 1871–1914 (Paris, 1957),
26 Raoul Girardet，《当代法国军事社会》（巴黎，1953 年），305。
26 Raoul Girardet, La société militaire dans la France contemporaine (Paris, 1953), 305.
27 Douglas Porch，“法国军队与进攻精神 1900–1914”，载于《战争与社会：军事史年鉴》，Brian Bond 和 Ian Roy 编辑（伦敦，1975 年）。
27 Douglas Porch, “The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive 1900–1914,” in War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History, ed. Brian Bond and Ian Roy (London, 1975)
28伊恩·汉密尔顿，《强制兵役》，第2版（伦敦，1911年），第121页。1909年出版的英国陆军野战勤务条例也表达了同样的观点：“决定性战役的胜利并非由物质或环境因素预先决定，而是由个人意志力指导下的人类素质的运用决定”（引自T.E. Travers，“1870-1915年英国军事思想中的进攻和创新问题”，《当代史杂志》第13卷第3期（1978年7月）。
28 Ian Hamilton, Compulsory Service, 2d ed. (London, 1911), 121. The same view is expressed in the Field Service Regulations of the British army published in 1909: “The success of the decisive battle is not predetermined by material or environmental causes, but by the exercise of human qualities directed by the will-power of individuals” (quoted in T. H. E. Travers, “The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought 1870–1915,” Journal of Contemporary History 13, no. 3 (July 1978).
29布莱克，《战术》，109。
29 Balck, Tactics, 109.
30 Maude，《步兵战术的演变》，x。
30 Maude, Evolution of Infantry Tactics, x.
31 Contamine， Revanche，249。
31 Contamine, Revanche, 249.
32同上，第 276 页。
32 Ibid., 276.
33 Robert Blake 编，《道格拉斯·黑格爵士的私人文件，1914-1919》（伦敦，1952 年），第 84 页。
33 Robert Blake, ed., The Private Papers of Sir Douglas Haig, 1914–1919 (London, 1952), 84.
34同上，第 93 页。
34 Ibid., 93.
35 JE Edmonds 和 GC Wynne，《1915 年法国和比利时军事行动》（伦敦，1927 年），第 2 卷，第 399 页。
35 J. E. Edmonds and G. C. Wynne, Military Operations France and Belgium 1915 (London, 1927), 2:399.
36同上，第 357 页。
36 Ibid., 357.
37 James E. Edmonds，《1916 年法国和比利时军事行动》（伦敦，1932 年），第 1 卷，第 486 页。
37 James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1916 (London, 1932.), 1:486.
38同上，第 289 页。
38 Ibid., 289.
39同上，483。
39 Ibid., 483.
40布莱克，《私人文件》，第 157 页。
40 Blake, Private Papers, 157.
41参见 Roland N. Stromberg 的《战争的救赎：知识分子与 1914 年》（堪萨斯州劳伦斯，1982 年）和 Robert Wohl 的《 1914 年的一代》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1979 年）。
41 See in particular Roland N. Stromberg, Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914 (Lawrence, Kans., 1982), and Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979).
19. 1914-1945年机器战争时代的德国战略*
19. German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945*
T1914年马恩河后的撤退彻底粉碎了人们对这场战争迅速结束的希望，而这场战争的开始却充满了自信。它暴露了战前战略思想的严重缺陷。更糟糕的是，它使人们对自19世纪职业教育体系兴起以来，一代又一代德国军官所接受的战争原则产生了怀疑。当总参谋部未能取得胜利时，军事领域的确定性世界也随之瓦解。
THE RETREAT behind the Marne in 1914 buried all hope for a quick end to a war that had been begun with such self-assurance. It revealed serious shortcomings in the strategic thought of the prewar years.1 Even worse, it raised doubts about the principles of war as they had been taught to each new generation of German officers since the rise of a professional education system in the nineteenth century. When victory eluded the general staff, a world of military certainties fell apart.
对战争和军事技艺的理解，将普鲁士-德国的地缘政治状况与军事考量融合为一个自成一体的体系。尽管这种理解主要体现在军事行动的计划和实施中，但它本身也包含一套内在的参照体系，既涵盖了对国家和国际秩序本质的政治假设，也包括对具体武器的理解。从这个意义上讲，优秀的德国战略家始终是通才。尽管德国的作战视角可以被称为“现实主义”，但它却根植于一个源于19世纪早期关于战争和国家的理想主义哲学的战略框架之中。因此，随着大规模军队的兴起，战略思维日益受到压力。然而，这种全面而整体的方法使德国战略家与军事理论的制定者——即所有那些奉行“经验主义”战争观并通过工具理性来发展武力运用观念的人——区分开来。与德国理想主义传统中的“职业”战略家不同，这些人是军事“管理者”或“技术官僚”。
The knowledge of war and of the military craft fused the geopolitical conditions of Prussia-Germany with military considerations into a self-contained universe. Although this knowledge was expressed primarily in the planning and conduct of military operations, it contained its own internal system of references that encompassed political assumptions about the nature of the national and international order as much as an appreciation of specific weapons. In this sense a good German strategist was always a generalist. Although the German operational outlook may be called “realist,” it was embedded in a strategic framework that derived from the idealistic philosophy about war and the state in the early nineteenth century. As such, strategic thinking increasingly came under pressure with the rise of mass armies.2 However, a comprehensive and holistic approach kept German strategists apart from makers of military doctrine, that is, all those who followed an “empirical” approach to war and developed their notions of the use of force through instrumental reasoning. As opposed to the “professional” strategist in the German idealist tradition, these were military “managers” or “technocrats.”
这种普遍主义的战略方法依赖于军队的自主性以及军民社会二元对立的维持。这种二元论与“自由主义”的军民关系观念并非截然不同。在自由主义传统中，战略与军事理论（即武器和人员最佳运用的指导原则）是分离的。前者被认为是政治的领域，后者则是军人的专属领域。两者之间的鸿沟由精英阶层关于国家承诺的论述来弥合。德国军方不参与关于战争、战略和国防的辩论。它拥有确凿的战争知识——而这种知识在1914年失效了。
The universalist approach to strategy depended on the autonomy of the military and the maintenance of a dichotomy between military and civilian society. The dualism was not all that far removed from a “liberal” notion of civil-military relations. In a liberal tradition, strategy remained separate from military doctrine, the guideline for the optimal use of weapons and men. The former was considered the domain of politics and the latter the proper realm of military men. The gap between the two was bridged by an elite discourse concerning the commitments of the nations. The German military did not entertain debates about war, strategy, and national defense. It possessed the certain knowledge of war—and this knowledge failed in 1914.
1914年之后，我们一次又一次地看到，德国人孜孜不倦地试图重建这种普世主义的战争观念，以寻求一种能够统一战略、作战和战术的连贯军事实践，并以此作为军事职业自主性的内部基础。从1914年到1945年，德国反复尝试重新构建整体战略，并重建实现这一战略所需的政治条件。然而，一旦理想主义思维的确定性被打破，德国的战争实践便呈现出强烈的离心倾向。两次世界大战之间的德国战略思想受到两种战略思潮激烈斗争的驱动：一种思潮旨在重建统一的原则，另一种思潮则致力于建立一种新的战争实践。到1942年，一种截然不同的战略观念和一支变革后的军官队伍已经形成。
After 1914, we see time and again a tenacious effort to rebuild a semblance of this universalist notion of war in the quest for a coherent military practice that would unify strategy, operations, and tactics and form the intramilitary basis for the autonomy of the profession. Efforts to resynthesize a holistic strategy and to re-create the political conditions for it were made repeatedly between 1914 and 1945. However, once the certitudes of idealistic thinking were destroyed, the German practice of war developed strong centrifugal tendencies. German strategic thinking in the interwar years was propelled by intense struggles between two currents of strategy, one aiming at the reconstruction of unifying principles and the other at a new practice of war. By 1942, a radically different notion of strategy and a transformed officer corps had come into existence.
这一发展通常被认为是机械化和装甲战争的“战略革命”。然而，坦克战只是一个更广泛进程的一部分——尽管是至关重要的一部分——在这个进程中，德国统一的战略方针演变成了两个方向：一方面是武器管理，另一方面是意识形态“战略”。前者依赖于武器效能的最大化，后者依赖于社会动员。尽管它们通常被视为现代战争中截然不同甚至不可调和的特征，但实际上它们密切相关。暴力的工程师和意识形态家总是成双成对出现。当这两者的能力在1938年至1941年间融合为一体时，它们便将德国推入了第二次世界大战。
This development has commonly been identified with the “strategic revolution” of mechanized and armored warfare.3 However, tank warfare is only a part—though a critical part—of a more encompassing process in which the unified approach to German strategy devolved into two directions, the management of arms on the one hand and ideological “strategy” on the other. The former rested on the maximization of the effectiveness of arms, the latter on the mobilization of society for war. Even though they are normally kept apart as distinct and even irreconcilable features of modern war, they were birds of a feather. Engineers and ideologists of violence always came in pairs. When the capabilities of the two were fused in a single effort between 1938 and 1941, they propelled Germany into World War II.
这种评估与目前对德国战略的普遍解读相悖。德国总参谋部的“战争天才”<sup> 4</sup>既有拥护者，也有反对者，近一个世纪以来，人们一直在争论应该或不应该接受普鲁士战争革命的哪些方面。他们指出战略概念的延续性<sup> 5</sup>，其潜在的权力政治或“现实主义”逻辑，以及其背后精英军事阶层的政治利益和危险。相反，他们强调战略理想主义日益机械化的基础，这种机械化在19世纪就已经取代了其哲学或形而上学的根源，并着重指出军事职业的弊端：这种职业要求在社会和政治中扮演领导角色，追求“永恒”的战争原则，而这些原则又日益受到工业化战争手段的推动<sup> 6</sup> 。强调这些军事传统和延续性固然有其道理。但传统并非凭空存在，延续性也并非自然而然地发展。在不断变化的国内外环境中，它们必须通过持续更新来维持，而它们自身对武力运用和备战方式的影响也塑造了这一环境。这正是德国战略传统复兴与军事技术官僚和意识形态激进挑战之间持续斗争的前提。在这场斗争中，理想主义战略在很长一段时间内都保持着惊人的活力和吸引力，但其拥护者最终还是失败了。
This assessment runs counter to prevalent interpretations of German strategy. The “genius of war”4 of the German general staff has found both admirers and detractors who have debated for almost a century what one should or should not accept of the Prussian revolution in warfare. They have pointed to the continuity of strategic concepts,5 their underlying power-politics or “realistic” rationale, and the political benefits as well as dangers of the exclusive military caste behind it. Conversely, they have stressed the increasingly mechanistic underpinnings of strategic idealism that in the nineteenth century had already replaced its philosophical or metaphysical roots, and have focused on the nemesis of a military profession which demanded a leading role in society and politics in the pursuit of “timeless” principles of war that were increasingly propelled by industrial means of warfare.6 To emphasize these military traditions and continuities is to make a valid point. But traditions never simply exist and continuities do not just roll along. They have to be maintained by continuous renewal in a changing national and international environment, a setting they have influenced in their use of force and preparation for it. This was the precondition for the continuous struggle between the re-creation of a German tradition of strategy and the radical challenge of military technocrats and ideologues. It was a struggle in which idealistic strategy remained remarkably vigorous and attractive for a long time, but which its adherents ultimately lost.
德国战略思维的对抗性特质，反映了其国内和国际上更为剧烈的变革。1914年至1945年间，德国经历了混合型威权政体的瓦解；1917年至1923年间，德国经历了革命与反革命的交替；多元共和秩序的短暂巩固及其在世界经济危机中的崩溃；侵略性的纳粹政权的兴起和巩固，以及其在六年战争中的覆灭。在同一时期，德军占领了法国北部、比利时和卢森堡，深入东欧直至俄罗斯和罗马尼亚，最终失去了所有这些领土以及部分本国领土。然而，二十年后，德军卷土重来，占领了深入苏联腹地的欧洲大部分地区，最终却眼睁睁地看着自己的国家作为一个独立国家走向灭亡。这的确是一个几乎持续动荡的时期。
The agonistic quality of German strategic thinking echoed far more dramatic changes nationally and internationally. Between 1914 and 1945 Germany saw the demise of a hybrid form of authoritarian regime, a state of revolution and counterrevolution between 1917 and 1923, the temporary consolidation of a pluralistic republican order and its collapse in the world economic crisis, the emergence and consolidation of an aggressive National Socialist state, and its downfall in six years of war. In the same period German armies occupied the northern parts of France, Belgium, and Luxemburg, eastern Europe deep into Russia, and Romania, lost all this and some of their own territory, only to come back after twenty years to occupy most of Europe deep into the Soviet Union and then saw their country wiped out as an independent nation. It was indeed a period of virtually continuous upheaval.
如果我们试图探寻这些快速而剧烈的变化背后的深层结构，我们必然会遇到以下两点：(1) 民众对国家政治参与的追求，这既削弱了精英政治，也削弱了军队的自主性；(2) 在新型国际竞争——主要是民众民族主义的兴起和产业权力集中的形成——的影响下，权力政治的统一性瓦解。这些变化对德国国内和国际政治的影响是矛盾的。德国之所以能成为欧洲大陆的主导力量，并非依靠其军事实力，而是凭借其自19世纪90年代以来作为欧洲人口最多、工业化程度最高的国家的地位。与此同时，从两次世界大战之间的时期开始，德国的国际地位随着欧洲旧核心国家的衰落而下降。德国在国际关系中日益加剧的不对称地位，加上民众对国家自主和福祉的诉求，构成了20世纪上半叶德国政治面临的主要挑战。军事手段能否成功解决这些问题绝非不言而喻，更遑论军方能否制定出彻底解决这些问题的战略。最终，军事手段胜出，却给德国乃至全世界带来了惨重的代价。
If we try to discover the deep structure underneath these rapid and violent changes, we invariably encounter: (1) a quest for mass participation in national politics, which undermined both elite politics and the autonomy of the military institution; and (2) the dissolution of the unity of power politics under the impact of new forms of international competition—primarily the rise of popular nationalism and the formation of industrial concentrations of power. Their impact on national and international politics had contradictory effects on Germany. It was propelled into a position as the predominant power on the Continent by virtue of the fact that from the 1890s on it was Europe's most populous and industrialized nation, rather than by virtue of its arms. At the same time, beginning with the interwar years, Germany's position in the world declined together with that of the old core of Europe. This growing asymmetry of the German position in international relations, reinforced by mass demands for the autonomy and welfare of the nation, posed the major challenge to German politics in the first half of the twentieth century. It was by no means self-evident that a military answer to these problems would succeed, and it was even less clear that the military would ever develop a strategy to master the problem. As it is, military solutions prevailed with terrible costs to Germany and the world.
我
I
1914年以前，军事作家和策划者们长期以来都认为，如果欧洲冲突无法迅速解决，战争就会变成一头吞噬一切的怪兽，吞噬越来越多的人、越来越多的资源，最终甚至连军事领导人也会被吞噬。此外，战争还会深刻地影响，甚至摧毁公民社会的结构。虽然有些人，例如阿尔弗雷德·冯·施利芬将军，认为这对公民社会和军队来说都是一场巨大的灾难，但另一些人，例如德意志国防军协会的成员，却对这场针对腐败、颓废和物质主义世界的末日之战感到欣喜若狂。7老毛奇在国会大厦里激动地高呼：“先生们，这可能会演变成一场七年，甚至三十年的战争！胆敢点燃欧洲战火的人必将遭殃！”但也有人欢呼雀跃，盼望战争能成为一场清洗，在彻底完成民族大清洗、摆脱物质主义和社团主义的枷锁、在纯粹的民族主义精神下铸就新社会之前，战争绝不会结束。8与此同时，弗里德里希·恩格斯咆哮道，战争将如同埃及瘟疫一般，欧洲精英们最好小心谨慎，否则欧洲的王冠将跌入沟渠，政府将垮台，权力将沦落街头。然而，绝大多数德国社会主义者反对以破坏的方式进行革命。9无论他们的政治立场如何，几乎所有人都认为即将到来的战争要么是短暂的，要么是世界末日般的。
Before 1914, military writers and planners had long assumed that if a European conflict could not be brought to a quick solution, war would turn into a monster, devouring ever larger masses of people, ever more resources, and, in due course, the military leaders as well. It would, moreover, affect deeply, if not destroy, the fabric of civil society. Although some, like General Alfred von Schlieffen, considered this to be a major disaster for both civil society and the military, others like the members of the Deutsche Wehrverein rejoiced in the idea of an Armageddon for a corrupt, decadent, and materialistic world.7 The elder Moltke exclaimed in great agitation in the Reichstag: “Gentlemen, it may turn into a seven, even a thirty years' war! Woe betide him who sets Europe ablaze,” but others celebrated and hoped for a war as a purge that could not end before the grand national cleansing was completed, the shackles of materialism and corporatism had fallen off, and a new society was forged in the pure spirit of nationalism.8 Meanwhile Friedrich Engels growled that war would be like an Egyptian plague and the elites of Europe had better take heed before the crowns of Europe rolled into the gutter, governments toppled, and power lay in the street. Yet the overwhelming majority of German socialists opposed revolution through destruction.9 Whatever their political orientation, almost everyone seemed to agree that a coming war was going to be either short or apocalyptic.
每个时代都有其自身的末日景象。的确，人们曾预见过潜在战争带来的惨烈景象。汉堡的教师兼和平主义者威廉·兰苏斯在其当时最杰出的论著之一中，动情地描述了未来战争中的“人类屠杀”（Menschenschlachthäuser）。然而，大多数公众和军方所期待的末日景象却截然不同。与恩格斯一样，他们逐渐认识到，战争是一项风险极高的社会和经济活动，因为它需要社会动员。未来战争的末日景象与其说是物质毁灭带来的极度恐惧，不如说是旧有观念和社会关系的瓦解以及欧洲社会的重塑。战争将改变风俗、社会文化和个人习惯。它将创造一个“新社会”和一个“新人”。<sup> 10</sup>
Every age has its own apocalypse. There were indeed visions of the carnage of a potential war. The Hamburg teacher and pacifist Wilhelm Lamszus movingly described the Menschenschlachthäuser of future wars in one of the more remarkable treatises of the time. Mostly, though, the public and the military expected a different kind of apocalypse. Much like Engels, they had come to understand that fighting war was an immensely risky social and economic undertaking because of the social mobilization that it required. The apocalyptic quality of a future war consisted less in the utter terror of physical destruction than in the notion that old attitudes and social ties would be dissolved and European society reforged. War would change the mores, the social culture, and the habits of individuals. It would create a “new society” and a “new man.”10
各国军事精英都极其重视限制战争，从而控制战争。普鲁士应对战争潜在无限性的方案在于歼灭战（Vernichtungsschlacht），或者如德尔布吕克沿袭克劳塞维茨的说法，称为歼灭战略（Niederwerfungsstrategie）。歼灭战的恰当规模是什么？施利芬似乎找到了一个完美的解决方案，即在专业自主的战争中，军事行动的艺术——以决策为导向的战争、坎尼包围原则——只服务于一个更高的理性：将战争保持为一个专业领域。他建立了一种平民社会与军队之间的权衡：军队独立作战，以换取在自给自足且由军事界定的权力平衡体系内迅速结束军事行动。政治让位于权力平衡机制和作战考量，但军事行动并未干扰平民社会和工业的发展。12对于这种职业战争而言，至关重要的是要排除社会参与战争与和平决策的政治因素，但同样至关重要的是，平民社会作为一个独特、独立且同样重要的“阶层”而存在。
Military elites in all countries put a premium on limiting and thus controlling war.11 The Prussian answer to the potential limitlessness of war lay in the war of annihilation (Vernichtungsschlacht) or, as Delbrück following Clausewitz called it, Niederwerfungsstrategie. What were the proper dimensions of the Vernichtungsschlacht? Schlieffen seemed to have found the perfect solution for a professionally autonomous war in which the art of military operations—decision-oriented warfare, the Cannae principle of envelopment—served only one superior rationale: to preserve war as a professional domain. He established a trade-off between civilian society and the military in which the latter fought the war on their own in return for a quick end of military action within the context of a self-contained and militarily defined balance-of-power system. Politics abdicated in favor of the mechanics of balance-of-power and operational considerations, but military operations did not interfere with the growth of civilian society and industry.12 It was crucial for this kind of professional warfare that politics in the sense of societal participation in decisions on war and peace be cut out, but just as a crucial that civilian society exist as a distinct, separate, and equally important “estate.”
为此，施利芬以一种优雅而典范的方式解决了战争的流动性问题。通过这种向前推进，作战行动的动态性将形成重心，从而升级为对敌军的歼灭战。施利芬将这种战役称为“总体战”（Gesamtschlacht）。尽管他的“总体战”概念为“坎尼原则”提供了理论基础，但其知名度远不及他的作战理论。 “总体战”是对战区扩张和部队机动性增强的回应。这两方面都导致总参谋部日益关注交战规则的控制，因为一旦失去对武力使用的精锐控制，就会功亏一篑。“总体战”将不同的战场和局部战斗整合为一个“整体作战”，军事行动不再是将作战范围缩小到实际战场的机动，而是以与敌军主力进行最终决战为结束。新的“整体作战”只包含一个联合且持续的行动，其目标并非任何特定的战场或特定地点的兵力集结，而是针对整个国家乃至多个国家的军事行动的动态演变。施利芬由此摒弃了以往将战斗累加成战役的算术式作战概念，转而采用一种动态的作战概念，这种概念从部署开始发展，不断推进，自我维持，并在一个涵盖整个欧洲战区的宏大包络行动中不断加速。这彻底改变了单个战斗与整个军事行动之间的关系。如今，不再存在单个战斗，只有不断扩张的战役洪流。在施利芬看来，只有整合且持续的行动才能迫使拥有众多可能集结点的动态局势最终走向决胜——这一概念构成了施利芬最初计划的基础，但却被年轻的毛奇所放弃。战争作为不间断的行动，是施利芬解决两线作战问题的答案。他希望通过击败法国来遏制英国和俄国这两个全球强国。德军的真正使命在于欧洲，在那里，它应该追求有限但无疑是扩张主义的目标。13世界属于工业界和爱国主义压力集团——或许也属于海军，但这些都与德意志帝国陆军参谋长关系不大。
To this end, Schlieffen resolved the problem of the fluidity of war in an elegant and exemplary fashion. The dynamics of operational movement would create, by this forward thrust, the center of gravity and thus escalate into the annihilation of the enemy forces. Schlieffen called this kind of campaign Gesamtschlacht. His notion of the Gesamtschlacht is less well known than his operational doctrine, the Cannae principle, even though the former provided the rationale for the latter. The Gesamtschlacht was an answer to the expansion of the theater of war and the increasing mobility of troops. Both had led to a growing concern of the general staff over controlling the rules of engagement, without which elite control of the use of force would slip away. The Gesamtschlacht combined diverse battlefields and partial battles into an “integral operation,” in which military action no longer consisted of maneuvers that narrowed down the space of an operation to the actual battlefield and culminated in a final and decisive battle with the enemy's main forces. The new “integral operation” knew only one joint and continuous movement, whose object was not any specific battlefield or specific concentration of forces at a given place, but the unfolding dynamics of military action against a whole nation or even nations. Schlieffen thus replaced an arithmetical concept of operations, which added up battles into a campaign, with a dynamic one that developed out of deployment and rolled on, self-sustaining and gathering velocity in a grand enveloping action encompassing the whole European theater of war. This drastically altered the relation between individual battles and the military campaign overall. Now there were no individual battles, but only the expanding torrents of a campaign. Integrated and continuous motion was the only way, in Schlieffen's mind, to force a fluid situation with many possible points of concentration toward a decision—a concept that underwrote the original Schlieffen plan, but was abandoned by the younger Moltke. War as uninterrupted movement was Schlieffen's answer to the problem of a two-front war; by defeating France he hoped to contain the global powers, Great Britain and Russia. The proper role of the German army lay in Europe, and there it was to pursue limited though unquestionably expansionist objectives.13 The world belonged to industry and patriotic pressure groups—or perhaps to the navy, but none of these greatly concerned the chief of staff of the imperial German army.
这些战争原则首先建立在“专家政府”之上，它要求自主权，并承诺在不损害资产阶级和工业利益的前提下取得胜利。它的敌人并非平民社会，而是社会要求参与战略制定过程的诉求，而随着民众参与国家政治和大规模军队的兴起，这一诉求成为一个关键问题。它始终是专业战略以及所有鼓吹精英统治者的重大挑战。当然，施利芬的战略需要“群众”和工业作为战争手段，但并非将他们视为独立的主体。在这方面，他与其说是一位贵族式的“封建”军官，不如说是一位坚持制度理性至上的“官僚”军官。
These principles of war rested foremost on a “government of experts,” which demanded autonomy and promised success without jeopardy for the bourgeoisie and industry. Its enemy was not civilian society, but society's demand to participate in the process of determining strategy, which became a key problem with the concurrent rise of mass participation in national politics and mass armies. It remained a major challenge to professional strategy and all those who pleaded for elite rule. Schlieffen's strategy, of course, needed the “masses” and industry as means of war, but not as subjects in their own right. In this respect he was less an aristocratic-“feudal” officer than a “bureaucratic” one who insisted on the primacy of institutional rationality.
施利芬的战略旨在通过“正确”的作战方式迅速做出决策。重要的并非坎尼战役的既定目标，而是通过军事手段限制战争。作战行动至上，政治无权干涉。然而，帝国军队未能如施利芬所设想的那样形成压倒性的攻势；未能建立控制和指挥；也未能创造速战速决的条件。尽管有限战争的原则令人信服，但其实践却不得不从头开始重建。
Schlieffen's strategy aimed at a quick decision that developed from the “right” operational approach. What matters is not the idée fixe of Cannae, but the limitation of war by military means. Operations reigned supreme; politics had no say. But the imperial army failed to create the crushing dynamics that Schlieffen envisioned; it failed to establish control and command; and it failed to create the conditions for a short war. Although the principles of limited war were compelling, their practice had to be rebuilt from scratch.
1914年8月之后的两年里，军事行动普遍缺乏明确目标，充斥着持续不断的、破坏强度不断升级的行动。军队不再体现统领全局的专业理念，反而沦为社会倾泻其动员资源以及仇恨和偏见的渠道。一旦决定性胜利无望，军事策划者便不知如何运用他们所掌握的大量人力和物质杀伤力。作为统一战争指导的战略彻底瓦解。在缺乏任何特定战略指导的情况下，战争演变为微观政治和微观战略的博弈，成为因发动战争而引发的内外对抗的延伸。
The two years following August 1914 were characterized by a general lack of purpose in military operations, which were punctuated by continuous action with an ever-higher intensity of destruction. Armies ceased to express an overarching professional rationale and became, instead, conduits through which societies poured their mobilized resources as well as their hatred and prejudice. Once decisive victory was precluded, military planners were at a loss how to use the massed manpower and the material means of destruction that had been placed at their disposal. Strategy as a unified and directional guidance of war fell apart. Without the guidance of any particular strategy the war moved on as micropolitics and microstrategies, an extension of the internal and external antagonisms unleashed by the decision to go to war.
未能迅速取得胜利产生了深远的影响。14 1915年，我们看到了权力集团巩固的顶峰，这些集团自19世纪90年代开始塑造欧洲事务，随之而来的是真正全新的国际行为模式。外交手段被日益敌对的意识形态形象所取代，军事战略也更多地依赖于动员经济和社会力量来对抗另一集团，而非19世纪权力政治中有限且局限的“博弈”。仿佛帝国主义时代终于走向成熟，并开始改造欧洲。15这摧毁了施利芬的职业战略。在国内，19世纪90年代的种子也得到了播种。战争越激烈，就越需要社会动员，这反过来又导致了人们要求参与有关战争与和平的政治决策过程。这直接挑战了同盟国的国内秩序和军事职业的自主性。
The failure to achieve a quick victory had far-reaching repercussions.14 In 1915 we see the high point of the consolidation of power blocs that had begun to shape European affairs in the 1890s, and with this came genuinely new forms of international behavior. In lieu of diplomacy, we increasingly find the hostile projection of ideological images against the other camp and a military strategy that relied more on mobilizing the sources of economic and social power against the other bloc than on the limited and limiting “play” of nineteenth-century power politics. It is as if the age of imperialism had finally come to maturity and had begun to transform Europe.15 It destroyed Schlieffen's professional strategy. At home, the seeds of the 1890s were harvested as well. The more intense the war effort became, the more it necessitated a mobilization of society which, in turn, led to demands for participation in the political decision-making process over war and peace. It became a direct challenge to the domestic order of the Central Powers and to the autonomy of the military profession.
正是从这个角度来看，我们才能理解（第二）最高统帅部总参谋长埃里希·冯·法尔肯海因和帝国首相特奥巴尔德·冯·贝特曼·霍尔维格的战略和政治策略。在日益脆弱的精英共识的政治层面，我们发现了一位首相，他曾在1914年达成一项基本共识，即战争应交由政府、军队和外交领域的专家处理。布尔格弗里登（Burgfrieden）的意思是，这些专业人士可以不受阻碍地进行战争。到1914年底，这项政策已经岌岌可危，主要原因是公众要求就战争目标展开辩论。贝特曼·霍尔维格试图扭转局面。但为此，他需要一场军事胜利，而且他倾向于支持任何能够承诺胜利的人。16 1915年，这便是法尔肯海因领导的第二最高统帅部。
It is in this perspective that the strategy and politics of the chief of the general staff in the (Second) Supreme Command, Erich von Falkenhayn, and the imperial chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, should be seen. At the political end of an increasingly tenuous elite consensus we find a chancellor who had been able in 1914 to establish a basic agreement that war should be left to the specialists in government, the military and diplomats. For these professionals, Burgfrieden meant, that they could proceed to fight their war unhindered. This policy was already in jeopardy by the end of 1914 mainly because of the demands for a public war-aims debate. Bethmann Hollweg tried to stem the tide. But for that purpose he needed a military victory, and he was inclined to side with anyone who would promise it.16 In 1915 this was the Second Supreme Command under Falkenhayn.
1915年底，法尔肯海因直言不讳地得出结论：任何直接手段都无法推翻德国的主要且最持久的敌人——英国。鉴于德军当时的资源状况，在西线发动一场决定性的突破战无异于自取灭亡。他也不指望在东线取得决定性的军事胜利。相反，他提出了一项旨在通过间接手段打破英国对其欧洲大陆盟友控制的行动。他建议通过“让法国人民意识到他们在军事上已经没有任何希望”来阻止法国继续战争。<sup> 17</sup>他设想了一项针对凡尔登的行动，旨在通过猛烈打击法国军队来瓦解其“士气”。摧毁法国的民族意志取代了战胜敌军的军事胜利。
Falkenhayn concluded quite bluntly at the end of 1915 that no direct approach could overthrow Germany's main and most enduring enemy, Great Britain, and that the German army, given the state of its resources, was unable to fight a decisive breakthrough battle on the western front without undue hazard. Nor did he expect decisive military victories in the East. Instead he proposed an operation that aimed at breaking the stranglehold of Great Britain over its Continental allies by indirect means. He suggested deterring France from continuing war by “opening the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for.”17 He contemplated an operation against Verdun that aimed at the “morale” of France by pounding away on its army. The destruction of national determination took the place of military victory over enemy forces.
贝特曼·霍尔维格和法尔肯海因在精英战略的框架内，勾勒出一种替代歼灭战的方案。他们突破了职业化的界限，以维护军队和国家的自主性。其关键的作战策略在于说服盟军继续战斗是徒劳的，从而实现自身霸权但有限的目标。这被比作消耗战战略，但法尔肯海因的战略更类似于传统的威慑战略，因为它利用了明确的利益界限来对抗社会灾难的威胁。<sup> 18</sup>这种差异颇具启发性。威廉时代的思想家如德尔布吕克所讨论的消耗战假定交战双方在战争的社会控制方面存在共同利益。而法尔肯海因的战略则寄希望于通过“消耗敌军兵力”来瓦解敌方精英的控制，从而释放社会对和平的诉求。19如果和平谈判能够迅速达成，就可以避免让本国社会参与战争与和平的决策。这是精英阶层对战争专业控制崩溃的回应，同时也是控制民众参与军事事务的一种手段。这是一种试图扭转法国国内局势的尝试，使其无法通过继续战争而自取灭亡。
Bethmann Hollweg and Falkenhayn sketched out an alternative to the Vernichtungsschlacht within the confines of elite strategy. They stretched the limits of professionalism to preserve the autonomy of the military and the state. Its key operational variable consisted in convincing the Allies of the futility of continuing to fight and, by doing so, achieving one's own hegemonic but limited goals. This has been likened to a strategy of attrition, but Falkenhayn's strategy more resembled a conventional deterrence strategy insofar as it played off clearly circumscribed interests against the threat of social calamity.18 The difference is quite revealing. Attritional warfare as discussed by Wilhelmine thinkers like Delbrück assumed a joint interest of the opposing sides in the social control of war. Falkenhayn's strategy, on the other hand, hoped for the collapse of elite control in the enemy's camp by “bleeding its forces to death,” which would set free social pressures for peace.19 If peace negotiations could be achieved quickly enough, the necessity of involving one's own society in the decisions over war and peace could be forestalled. This was an elite response to the collapse of professional control over the war and, at the same time, a means to control mass involvement in military matters. It was an attempt to turn the domestic flank of France, so that it could not turn one's own by continuing the war.
法尔肯海因的构想最终导致了凡尔登战役的惨败。<sup>20</sup>这场灾难始于一个误判：盟军已接近崩溃边缘，因此可以被诱至谈判桌前。然而事实并非如此。行动管理不善加剧了战略上的误判。德军的作战计划和战术都以全面进攻为导向，难以转向精心策划的单方面消耗战。此外，法尔肯海因自身的作战设计也与其战略构想并不完全一致。在作战层面，他希望猛攻凡尔登，以期在其他地区引发盟军的反攻，进而对敌军侧翼发起反击。或许他能够从东线指挥官——埃里希·鲁登道夫和保罗·冯·兴登堡——手中夺取一些具体的胜利，即便无法赢得最终的胜利。
Falkenhayn's concept led to the disaster of Verdun.20 It began with the miscalculation that the Allies were near the breaking point and thus could be coaxed to the bargaining table. They were not. Mismanagement of the operation compounded strategic miscalculations. German operational planning and German tactics were geared to all-out offensives, and found it difficult to shift to a war of calculated and one-sided attrition. Falkenhayn's own operational designs, moreover, were not entirely consistent with his strategic outlook. In operational terms he wanted to knock hard on Verdun, in order to shake loose an Allied counteroffensive elsewhere that, in turn, could initiate a counterassault against the enemy flanks. Perhaps he could snatch the prestige, if not of overall victory at least of some specific victories from the commanders in the East—Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg.
相反，这场旨在打击敌方士气的可控战争，最终演变成一场毫无章法、毫无目的的混战，双方都损失惨重。迫使敌军坐到谈判桌前这一颇具争议的战略，与不契合战略目标的作战计划相悖，最终以适得其反的战术执行。这场战役以十九世纪最传统的进攻性陆战方式展开，而进攻地点正是老派职业战略家们会不惜一切代价避免的战场。它作为威慑战略的失败，在于其一个关键缺陷：法尔肯海因没有派出机器对抗人类，而是派出了士兵攻击一座防御工事坚固的堡垒。凡尔登战役比任何其他战役都更能体现第一次世界大战的军事僵局，战略、作战设计和战术之间的彻底脱节，以及现代战争手段的无力运用。但最重要的是，它以惨痛的代价揭示了职业战略的困境。
Instead, the controlled war against enemy morale turned into an uncontrolled slugging match without decision or purpose that produced staggering losses on both sides. The questionable strategy of pounding the enemy to the negotiation table was matched with operational plans that did not fit the strategic goal, and was executed with tactics that were self-defeating. The battle was fought in the most traditional manner of nineteenth-century offensive land warfare at a point of attack where the old guard of professional strategists would have avoided battle at all costs. It failed as a deterrence strategy because it was flawed in one crucial respect. Falkenhayn did not send machines against human beings, but men against a fortified region. More than any other battle, Verdun showed the military impasse of World War I, the complete disjuncture between strategy, battle design, and tactics, and the inability to use the modern means of war. But most of all, it showed, at horrendous costs, the impasse of professional strategies.
1916年的主要防御战役——索姆河战役——也体现了同样的根本经验。这场惨败不仅表明最高统帅部的战略评估是错误的，也清楚地表明德军的内部结构并未适应工业化战争的新形势。无论是作战手册还是军官们，都强调固守第一道防线的固定防御。他们难以灵活运用能够适应当地情况的战术。德军的防御工事原本旨在像一道坚固的墙一样阻挡进攻，但现在他们开始在第一道防线后方增设第二道、第三道防线，以防敌人突破。21
The same basic experience characterized the main defensive battle of 1916, the battle at the Somme. This debacle not only showed that the strategic estimates of the Supreme Command were wrong, but made it evident that the German army had not adapted its internal structure to defense under the new conditions of industrial war. Manuals and officers alike emphasized stationary defense in which the first line was held. They had difficulties with flexible tactics that adapted to local conditions. The German defenses were organized to block off an attack like a solid wall, only now they began to introduce a second and third wall behind the first, just in case the enemy broke through.21
为何如此固执地坚持如此僵化的战争方式？作战和战术体现了同样的精英保守主义倾向，这种倾向也促成了贝特曼·霍尔维格“城堡和平”政治的兴起以及单方面消耗战的出现。服从指挥链，其顶端是“现代亚历山大”，严格控制行动和调动，从而限制了“自下而上”的集体行动，这似乎是凡尔登惨败和索姆河战役惨重代价的政治和社会意义的关键所在。法尔肯海因和贝特曼·霍尔维格非但没有解决“全面战争”结束后堑壕战的难题，反而加剧了灾难。如果战争要延续到1916年以后，就必须找到解决“全面战争”各个方面问题的办法，并在战略、作战和战术之间寻求新的平衡。战略必须再次将军事行动与目标和手段联系起来。多条战线上的单场战斗必须整合到一个作战设计中，该设计将行动融入到总体战略的方向上。战争本身必须重建，也就是说，武力运用、战术和组织必须以一种新的方式整合起来。然而，这项任务意味着彻底改变军事机构和军事政治事务的根本结构；如果战争要建立在社会和工业动员的基础上，那么两者都必须在战略制定中占有一席之地。
Why this stubborn insistence on such rigid methods of warfare? Operations and tactics reflected the same elitist-conservative approach that informed the turn to Bethmann Hollweg's Burgfrieden politics and a war of one-sided attrition. Subordination to the chain of command, with its “modern Alexander” at the top, strict control of action and movement, and hence limitation of collective initiatives “from the bottom up,” seems to be the key to the political and social meaning of the disaster at Verdun and the extraordinarily high costs of the battle at the Somme. Rather than solving the riddle of the trenches after the demise of the Vernichtungsschlacht, Falkenhayn and Bethmann Hollweg had compounded the disaster. If war was to be continued beyond 1916, a remedy had to be found for all aspects of the Gesamtschlacht and a new balance had to be sought between strategy, operations, and tactics. Strategy had to link military campaigns to goals and means once again. Individual battles at multiple fronts had to be integrated into an operational design that added movement to the direction of the overarching strategy. The battle itself had to be rebuilt, that is, the use of force, tactics, and organization had to be integrated in a new way. This task, however, meant nothing less than to change the very fabric of military institutions and military-political affairs; if war was to be fought on the basis of the mobilization of society and industry, both had to find a place in the making of strategy.
二
II
新成立的（第三）最高统帅部以雷霆手段完成了这三项任务。它将德军现代化改造到几乎完全摒弃了威廉二世时代的旧军队特征。兴登堡和鲁登道夫凭借卓越的军事才能和鲁莽的领导风格避免了灾难的延续，但他们的创新举措最终导致了战败和革命。
A new (Third) Supreme Command did all three with a vengeance. It modernized the German army to a point at which little was left of the old Wilhelmine army. With Hindenburg and Ludendorff, military brilliance and recklessness of leadership avoided a continuation of disaster, but led to defeat and revolution as a result of their innovative measures.
他们的晋升标志着战略新时代的到来。首先，总司令与总参谋部之间的制度关系呈现出新的面貌。兴登堡被广大德国民众誉为东普鲁士的救星，而鲁登道夫则被奉为战争中的浮士德式天才，一手策划了这一切。在东线，一位更年轻的总参谋部军官马克斯·霍夫曼上校已在两人身后掌舵，这一组合的影响力和持久性远超当时任何人的想象。战略成为一种综合体，一方面反映和表达公众情绪，另一方面体现作战技巧，两者由一位卓越工程师的组织才能完美融合。这三者构成了机械化时代战略的制度基础。
Their promotion signalled a new age of strategy. To begin with, the institutional relations between the commander in chief and the general staff took on a new dimension.22 Hindenburg was hailed as the savior of East Prussia by broad segments of German society and Ludendorff became the Faustian genius of war who engineered it all. At the eastern front a younger general staff officer, Colonel Max Hoffmann, already stood behind the two, a configuration that proved to be more enduring and consequential than anyone at the time might have envisioned. Strategy became a composite, reflecting and expressing public sentiments on the one hand and the craft of operations on the other, both being welded together by the organizational talents of a supreme engineer. This triangle became the institutional aspect of strategy in the machine age.
兴登堡和鲁登道夫对德国公众产生了深远的影响。人们敬仰他们，并非因为他们取得的某一场战役，而是因为他们能够做出正确的决策，或者至少表面上看起来如此。他们左右局势的能力也为他们赢得了同僚的拥护。重要的是行动；行动是否具有战略意义则显得无关紧要。随着鲁登道夫和兴登堡的出现，一个战略思维衰落、战略期望值不断上升的时代开始了，只要有所作为，战略思维便会下降。这是机械时代战略的第二个主题。
Hindenburg and Ludendorff made a strong impact on the German public. They were revered not so much for a single battle, as for their ability to do the right things or, at least, appearing to do so. Their ability to shape events also gave them the allegiance of fellow officers. What counted was activity; it mattered remarkably little whether or not the actions made strategic sense. With Ludendorff and Hindenburg an age began in which strategic thinking declined and strategic expectations grew as long as something happened. This is the second theme of strategy in the machine age.
鲁登道夫曾被誉为天才与疯子的结合体。<sup>23</sup>更准确地说，他是一位军事狂热分子。然而，他的狂热与拿破仑和克伦威尔（有时人们会将他与他们相提并论）的狂热有所不同。他拥有卓越的委派能力，毫不犹豫地将任务委派给级别很低的军官或经验丰富的前线军官。鲁登道夫引入的集体管理模式将职能与效率相结合，取代了等级制度，并将军队与社会融合在一起，追求卓越。鲁登道夫尊重指挥军队的高级将领，但他更喜欢与那些“为战争而战”的人在一起。<sup> 24</sup>狂热作为军事工作流程的一部分，是新战争行为中不可或缺的第三个要素。
Ludendorff has been called a combination of genius and madman.23 It would be more accurate to think of him as a military fanatic. Yet his fanaticism was different from that of Napoleon and Cromwell, to whom he is sometimes compared. He possessed a striking ability to delegate tasks, and did not hesitate to delegate them to very junior officers or to experienced front-line officers. The corporate practice that Ludendorff introduced combined function with efficiency instead of hierarchy and fused the military with society in the pursuit of excellence. Ludendorff paid respect to the senior generals who commanded the armies, but he preferred to be with those who “worked for war.”24 Fanaticism, as part of military work routines, was a third element embedded in the new conduct of war.
鲁登道夫期望政治领域也秉持同样的效率导向，但他从未像对待军事指挥官那样对政治家表现出同样的尊重。他倡导“为了进行大规模战争而实行的技术独裁”，也就是我们通常所说的技术官僚统治。25鲁登道夫的政治思想不能仅仅被理解为一位杰出战略家政治上的天真，也不能被理解为对普鲁士原本健全传统的激进化。26在鲁登道夫看来，“为战争而工作”是一项包罗万象的事业，无论对军队还是对社会而言，都必须全力以赴、尽心尽力，并做到极致。在机械化时代，军事工作与政治密不可分。
Ludendorff expected the same efficiency-oriented outlook in politics without ever showing politicians the same deference that he gave to military commanders. He became an advocate of “what may be called a technical dictatorship for purposes of the conduct of mass warfare” or what we more commonly call technocratic rule.25 Ludendorff's politics cannot be understood as a mere expression of political naivété from an otherwise splendid strategist nor as a radicalization of a Prussian tradition that was otherwise sound.26 “Working for war” was, in Ludendorff's mind, an all-encompassing undertaking in which nothing short of total dedication and commitment as well as maximum performance counted for both the military and society. Military work and politics became inseparable in the machine age.
正是军事魅力、狂热和对效率的追求，使得兴登堡和鲁登道夫塑造战略乃至政治格局的那两年显得尤为突出。同时代的人将他们的崛起和政治比作总体战的兴起。战争席卷而来，将整个社会吞噬在一个不断扩张的暴力机器之中。战争对社会的侵蚀越深，对生活的方方面面都造成了影响，战争就越被描绘成一种形而上的，或者至少是超人的状态。<sup> 27</sup>战争的确变得越来越全面。但战争并没有变得形而上，而是与国家的社会动态紧密相连。第三最高统帅部的主要工作就是引导这些社会力量走向胜利。这就是机器时代的战略。像所有优秀的战略家一样，他们并非被动地跟随战争的走向——在这个例子中，战争指的是“总体战”——而是主动地促成了总体战的发生。
It was the combination of military charisma, fanaticism, and quest for efficiency that singled out the two years in which Hindenburg and Ludendorff shaped strategy and, increasingly, politics as well. Contemporaries likened their ascendance and their politics to the rise of total war. The war took over and engulfed all of society in an ever-expanding machine of violence. The more the war effort ground down societies and took hold of every aspect of life, the more war was portrayed as a metaphysical or, in any case, superhuman state.27 It is true that the war became ever more encompassing. But rather than becoming metaphysical, war was linked to the social dynamics of nations. The main effort of the Third Supreme Command centered around channeling these social forces into the pursuit of victory. This was strategy in the machine age. Like all good strategists, they did not follow the lead of war, in this case “total war,” but they made total war happen.
兴登堡和鲁登道夫之所以能身居高位，并非出于任何具体的战略或作战见解，而是因为他们坚持不惜一切代价取得胜利。两人显然都误判了形势，但他们并没有考虑通过谈判结束战争，而是全身心投入到行动中。28他们的典型做法是，战略构想迟迟未能形成。他们最关心的是如何打赢接下来的战役。原本承诺的旨在决定战争胜负的进攻很快就被搁置了。仅仅为了继续作战，德国的防御体系就必须进行重组，以避免索姆河战役的惨重损失重演。为了“提升军队的战斗力”，他们几乎立即采取了激烈的措施。29六个月内，防御战的战术、组织和训练都得到了彻底的改革。这些新措施帮助德军挺过了1917年的战役，实际上，也使法国濒临崩溃的边缘。随后，又推出了一系列改革措施，旨在为1918年的大规模进攻做好准备。根据该战役的标准史料记载，这次进攻几乎取得了胜利，仅因一次作战失误而功亏一篑。这种略带夸张的说法反映了敌我双方对第三最高统帅部改革措施的敬畏之情。30
Hindenburg's and Ludendorff's insistence on victory at any price, rather than any particular strategic or operational insight, had propelled them into their elevated position. Both had clearly misjudged the situation, but rather than contemplating a negotiated end to the war, they threw themselves into activity.28 It is typical of their approach that a strategic outlook emerged only slowly. Their main concern was how to fight the battles ahead. A promised offensive to decide the war was quickly buried. Merely to continue, German defenses had to be reorganized so that the disastrous losses at the Somme did not recur. Drastic measures were taken almost immediately to “improve the fighting power of the army.”29 Within six months tactics, organization, and training for defensive warfare were completely revamped. The new measures helped the German army to withstand the 1917 campaign and, in fact, brought France close to the breaking point. Then another round of innovations was introduced to prepare the army for a major offensive thrust in 1918 which, according to the standard histories of that campaign, came so close to success that only a single operational mistake prevented victory. This doubtful hyperbole reflects the awe with which friend and foe alike evaluated the reforms of the Third Supreme Command.30
一线军官、参谋部军官以及曾试验过新战术和组织结构的预备役军官被召集起来，讨论并制定新的方向。31经过激烈的辩论，最终形成了1916年11月的《野战构筑原则》（用于构筑兴登堡防线）和著名的1916年12月的《阵地战防御作战指挥原则》。这种新的防御作战方法的主要方面可以概括如下：
Front-line and general staff officers as well as reserve officers who had experimented with new tactics and organization were called upon to discuss and formulate new directions.31 An intense debate produced the “Principles of Field Construction” of November 1916, which were employed to construct the Hindenburg line, and the famous “Principles of Command in the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare” of December 1916. The major aspects of the new approach to defensive warfare can be summarized as follows:
[这些原则]旨在削弱[德军]前线兵力，建立主防线，并在更靠后的位置构筑一条预备战壕。这样，敌军的进攻就会被前哨阵地过滤，然后被引诱到阵地深处，远离[炮兵]火力支援，最终在主防线和预备战壕之间被击溃。在敌军巩固战果之前，地方预备队将发起反击。如果无法立即发起反击，则应推迟到经过充分考虑后再进行。理想情况下，德军防线应设在山坡后方，使其位于英法炮兵的观察范围之外，但仍在德军的视野之内。观察员自身应远离防线，以便能够冷静谨慎地指挥德军的炮火。32
[The Principles] proposed to thin the [German] front line, and to create the main line of resistance and a line of reserve trenches further back. The attack would therefore be filtered by a line of outposts, and then would be drawn deeper into the position and away from its [artillery] support to be smashed between the main line of resistance and the line of reserve trenches. Counter-attacks would be launched by local reserves before the enemy could consolidate gains. If a counterattack could not be made immediately, it would be postponed until it could be launched with full deliberation. Ideally the German line should be sited behind the crest of a slope, so that it lay out of British or French artillery observation but within German view. The observers themselves were to be back from the line so as to be able to direct German fire with coolness and circumspection.32
这是一种令人钦佩的弹性纵深作战理念，它鼓励独立行动，并在更广泛的作战决策框架内赋予部队极大的灵活性。随之而来的是组织结构的变革，以及1917年1月颁布的《关于当前战争期间步兵训练的命令》中概述的一项影响深远的训练改革。<sup> 33</sup>个人和小组训练得到加强，自动武器训练也得到重视。机械操练——两百多年来一直是军事训练的主体——被基本废除。甚至连“持枪”的口令和鹅步也被从训练计划中剔除。军事社会化转变为以战斗为导向的在职训练，强调体能以及部队内部和部队之间的协调与合作。<sup> 34</sup>
This was an admirable concept of elastic in-depth warfare, which favored independent action and granted an unusual amount of flexibility within the wider context of operational decisions. With it came organizational changes, which were combined with a far-reaching reform of training outlined in the “Orders Concerning the Training of Infantry during the Current War” of January 1917.33 Individual and small-group training was strengthened, and exercises with automatic weapons were emphasized. Mechanical drill, for over two centuries the mainstay of military training, was largely abolished. Even the command to “present arms” and the goose step were cut from the training program. Military socialization turned into battle-oriented, on-the-job training that stressed fitness as well as coordination and cooperation within and between military units.34
尽管德国纵深防御的军事价值已广为人知，但其本质和后果却鲜为人知。<sup> 35</sup>德国的参谋体系及其对辩论和创新的开放态度，指挥链的彻底重组（强调战区指挥官和步兵师作为基本战术单位），以及由一名士官领导的、由8至11人组成的步兵战斗群的独立性——所有这些都至关重要且令人钦佩。<sup> 36</sup>然而，要理解以下事件的社会和制度意义，则截然不同：当纪律和军事社会化围绕武器技能和作战表现重建；当正式的等级制度被战区职能指挥所取代；当上尉为将军编写手册时，究竟发生了什么？
Although the military value of the German defense-in-depth is well understood, its essence and consequences are little appreciated.35 The German staff system and its openness to debate and innovation, the radical reorganization of the chain of command with its emphasis on commanders in the battle zone and on the infantry division as the basic tactical unit, the independence of the infantry combat group with its eight to eleven men led by a noncommissioned officer—all were important and admirable.36 But it is a different matter to appreciate the social and institutional meaning of what happened when discipline and military socialization were rebuilt around weapons skills and performance; when formal hierarchies were dissolved in favor of functional commands in the battle zone; and when captains wrote manuals for generals. What happened?
防御性战争的重组意味着彻底摒弃了行之有效的等级森严的军事控制模式，转而采用功能性的军事组织方式。在新兴的野战军中，武器的最佳使用方式决定了指挥和部署。武器的使用甚至主导了各部队之间的协调与合作。最高统帅部的改革相当于对战争进行全面“合理化”，其方式与德国工业对生产的“合理化”如出一辙。以机器取代人员迫使军队适应“战争机器”的操控。从等级结构向功能性结构的转变是一项剧烈的、甚至是革命性的举措，因为它在短短半年内就摒弃了一个多世纪的军事传统。最高统帅部开始以“任务”和可用“资源”为依据来制定作战计划，并根据各部队的武器能力进行评估。作战计划也据此制定，强调的是现有武器装备的性能，而非具体的战略原则。武器的最佳使用，而非军事领导的“艺术”或“科学”，被视为确保军事胜利的关键。正如当时的辩论所言，物质战胜了精神——或者更准确地说：技术和工具理性取代了战争整体性方法的残余。作战计划和战略沦为武器管理的问题。正是这套体系，使得鲁登道夫和第三最高统帅部成为军事领域机械文化最激进的倡导者。<sup> 37</sup>
The restructuring effort for defensive warfare implied nothing less than the displacement of the well-tried hierarchical control of men over men in favor of a functional organization of violence. In the newly emerging field army the optimal use of weapons alone shaped command and deployment. The use of weapons even organized the coordination and cooperation among units. The Supreme Command's reforms amounted to a comprehensive effort to “rationalize” warfare much in the same way that German industry “rationalized” production. The substitution of machines for men forced the adaptation of the army to the handling of “war machines.” The shift from hierarchical structures to functional ones was a drastic, even revolutionary step, because it shed more than a century of military traditions within half a year. The Supreme Command began to approach operations in terms of “tasks” and available “resources,” assessing units according to their weapons capabilities. Battle plans were drawn up accordingly, stressing the capabilities of the assembled weaponry rather than specific principles of strategy. The optimal use of weapons, instead of the “art” or “science” of military leadership, was seen as guaranteeing military victory. Material won out over Geist as the contemporary debate put it—or more precisely: technical and instrumental rationality replaced the remnants of a holistic approach to the conduct of war. Operational planning and strategy became a matter of the management of arms. It is this system that made Ludendorff and the Third Supreme Command into the most radical exponents of machine-culture in the military.37
鉴于自第一次世界大战以来军事著述中对技术论证的偏爱，简要探讨一下德国、法国和英国的战争经验差异或许有所裨益。当然，这三个国家都参与了一场物资战争。事实上，在克服了最初的军火危机之后，这两个协约国在这方面获得了并保持了对德国的明显优势。他们能够投入比德国更多的物资用于战场。然而，我们在此并非关注各国能够送往前线的武器数量、质量以及弹药储备。主要区别在于这些工业化战争手段的使用方式。法国和英国的领导层抵制发展新的战术和部队组织形式。他们沿袭欧洲陆战的传统进行工业化战争，并高度重视维护这一传统——为此付出了惨重的代价，不仅使他们的士兵付出了生命的代价，也使他们的国家付出了生命的代价。另一方面，德国领导层则积极寻求与工业化战争手段相匹配的新型武力运用方式。
In view of the predilection for technological arguments in military writing ever since World War I, it may be useful to discuss briefly the differences between the German, French, and British war experience. All three, of course, engaged in a war of matériel. In fact, after overcoming the initial munitions crisis, the two Allies gained and retained a distinct edge over Germany in this respect. They were able to pour more matériel into battle than Germany. However, we are not concerned here with the number and the quality of weapons and the stockpiles of ammunition that each nation was able to send to the front. The main difference consisted in the way these means of industrial warfare were used. The French and the British leadership resisted the development of new forms of tactics and organization of forces. They fought industrial war in the tradition of European land warfare and put a premium on maintaining this tradition—at a very high price for their soldiers and their nations. The German leadership, on the other hand, actively engaged in a search for new ways to use force that was calibrated to the means of industrial war.
从更具推测性的角度来看，我们可以尝试解释这些差异。首先，协约国在整个战争期间似乎都在打一场“富足”战争，即便这种富足越来越多地来自海外——不仅是美国，还有英联邦及其殖民地。另一方面，德国在凡尔登战役中试图通过生产和杀伤力压制敌人的尝试失败后，便开始打一场日益“匮乏”的战争。鲁登道夫应对这种情况的办法是优化现有资源。效率的提升是通过对武力使用进行社会层面的重组，而非技术层面的重组来实现的；也就是说，是军队改革，而非采购革命。考虑到德国工业在过去几十年取得的巨大进步，这种选择着实令人费解。这表明，“匮乏”和“富足”本身并不足以解释德国和协约国对这场物资战争的不同反应。德国军方似乎被困于一套以重工业为中心的采购体系中，这套体系对坦克等新型武器系统及其生产商——即“新兴”资本货物产业——抱有敌意。事实证明，改革军队比打破武器采购体系要容易得多。英国则采取了截然相反的做法。他们似乎利用技术创新，特别是坦克战，来绕过对主力作战部队结构和使用方式的改革，从而维护军队内部现有的等级制度。换句话说，这两种选择都表明，战争中的“摩擦”不再局限于武装部队，而是波及整个武装国家。
On a more speculative plane one might venture an explanation of these differences. It appears first of all that the Allies continued throughout the war to fight a war of “abundance,” even if that abundance was increasingly borrowed from overseas—not just from the United States, but from the Commonwealth and the colonies as well. Germany, on the other hand, fought a war of increasing “scarcity” after the initial attempt at Verdun to outproduce and outkill the enemy had failed. Ludendorff's answer to this situation was the optimization of the available means. Efficiency was achieved in a social, rather than a technical, reorganization of the use of force; that is, an army reform rather than a procurement revolution. This, it might be added, is quite a curious choice, considering the tremendous advances of German industry over the previous decades. It points to the fact that “scarcity” and “abundance” alone do not suffice to explain the German and Allied responses to the war of matériel. It seems that the German military was locked into a procurement system, centered around heavy industry, that was hostile to new weapons systems like tanks and their producers, the “new” capital goods industries. It proved to be easier to change the army than to crack open the system of weapons procurement. The British took exactly the opposite course. It appears that they used technological innovation, tank warfare, in order to bypass a reform of the structure and use of the main bulk of the fighting forces and to preserve the existing hierarchies within the army. Both choices, in other words, indicate “frictions” in warfare that were no longer limited to the armed forces but pertained to the whole nation in arms.
然而，在任何国家，军方领导层都不太关心本国最深切的忧虑。第一次世界大战的惨烈杀戮令幸存者和广大民众难以忘怀。这在战争期间引发了抗议，并在两次世界大战之间的时期滋养了和平主义情绪。几乎所有战争文学作品都触及了这一主题，各国的反应也准确地反映了他们派往战场送死的军队类型。法国人哀悼军饷的耗尽，哀悼法国乡村和省份的生命逝去；德国人缅怀他们的“钢铁战士”，即在1917年至1918年间浴血奋战、日益无产阶级化和城市化的军队；英国人则纪念中上层阶级的“迷失的一代”青年。战争期间，军方领导人关注的与其说是杀戮本身，不如说是士兵在作战中无用的浪费。为了应对工业化战争带来的灾难性后果，法英两国寻求更有效地利用人力资源，并采取了加强纪律和秩序的措施——这或许与他们派往战场的兵种相符。而德军则采取了更为机械化的作战方式，这更符合德军日益增多的征召兵类型。这些改变都未能显著减少伤亡，但却赋予了死亡和破坏一种更具目的性的表象。凡尔登和索姆河战役并未重演，但随后的战役也并非因其人道性而为人所铭记。它们只是在各个层面上都更加目标明确、目标明确而已。因此，生命的贬值是一种普遍现象；区别在于生命被贬低到了何种程度。法英士兵成为了国家祭坛上的牺牲品，或是重建平民生活过程中的悲惨损失。在德国，士兵则成为了战争机器上无名无姓的附属品（雷马克和伦恩语），或者反过来，成为了技艺精湛、引以为傲的工匠（荣格语）。物质战争对各国的影响各不相同，因为战争的实践——其社会学和政治经济学——反映了各国动员社会经济和组织武力使用的不同模式。这就是普遍存在的武力和暴力扩张之下隐藏的战争“摩擦”。
In no country, however, was the military leadership greatly concerned with what troubled their nations most. The terrible carnage of the Great War obsessed its survivors and the popular mind in general. This sparked protest during the war and nourished pacifist sentiments in the interwar years. Not a single book in the genre of war literature failed to address this issue, and the national responses accurately reflected the kinds of armies nations had sent to their deaths. The French mourned the exhaustion of their pays, the loss of life in rural and provincial France; the Germans remembered their “men of steel,” the increasingly proletarian and urban armies that fought and died between 1917 and 1918; and the British commemorated the “lost generation” of young men of the middle- and upper-classes. During the war military leaders were less concerned with the carnage than with the operationally useless waste of soldiers. More discipline and order to counter the cataclysmic aspects of industrial war were the French and the British answers to the search for a better use of their human material—perhaps appropriate to the kind of recruits they sent into battle. A more machine-oriented behavior was the German response, and it fit the kind of soldier whom the German army increasingly conscripted. None of these changes dramatically reduced casualties, but all of them gave death and destruction a more purposeful appearance. Verdun and the Somme were not repeated, but the subsequent battles are not memorable for being more humane. They were simply more directed and purpose-oriented on all levels. Thus the devaluation of life was a universal phenomenon; the difference lay in what life was deflated to. French and British soldiers became human sacrifices on the altar of the nation or tragic losses in the rebuilding of civilian life. In Germany soldiers became appendices to anonymous machines of war (Remarque and Renn) or conversely their skilled and proud craftsmen (E. Jünger). The war of matériel affected nations differently, because the practice of war—its sociology and political economy—reflected different national modes of mobilizing society and economy and of organizing the use of force. This was the “friction” of war underneath the surface of a universal expansion of force and violence.
德国向军事机器文化的转型，到1945年已被所有军队所接受，终结了一个世纪的陆地战争。军事机器文化的形成和部队的工具化组织，动摇了普鲁士-德国军事制度和职业的本质——传统上，这些制度和职业建立在统一性、等级制度和服从性之上。它改变了战争的进行方式和军队的组织方式，并催生了一种新型的军事领导者。这些领导者不再从关于战争和领导的永恒的、科学的作战知识中汲取经验，而是根据现有手段制定作战法则。“战略家”变成了武器的最高组织者——或者，用当时的典型例子来说，他变成了工程师。
The German transition to a military machine-culture, which by 1945 was accepted by all armies, brought to an end a century of land warfare. The formation of a military machine-culture and the instrumental organization of units undermined the very essence of the Prusso-German military institution and profession, traditionally based on uniformity, hierarchy, and subordination. It altered the way battles were fought and armies were organized, and created a new kind of military leader, who developed the laws of operations from the available means rather than deriving them from eternal and scientific laws of operational knowledge about war and leadership. The “strategist” became the supreme organizer of weapons—or, to use the role model of the time, he turned into an engineer.
第三最高统帅部认识到，其改革对军队与社会的关系产生了深远的影响，而且这些改革实际上只有在重塑这种关系的基础上才有可能实现。机械化战争迫使军事组织和作战与工业和民众动员之间原本松散的联系转变为紧密而有效的联系。机械化战争只有在系统地组织经济资源和国家人力资源储备的情况下才有可能实现。“军队的需求越多，后方需要提供的就越多，政府和陆军部的任务就越重。”<sup> 38</sup>政界、军界和工业界长期以来一直在讨论建立独裁政权的计划，但第三最高统帅部在政治中日益增长的作用，即其“无声的独裁”，与这些计划只有间接的联系。<sup>39</sup>前者旨在保护贵族、工业和农业精英的地位，使其免受民众起义的冲击；后者旨在为战争目的对社会和经济进行全面组织。正如鲁登道夫战后所言，武器的生产者和组织者统治着这种战争国家，他们是权力和统治的最高管理者。<sup> 40</sup> 1916年的军队改革与这种由生产和破坏专家统治的诉求不谋而合，而这种统治如今已遍及整个国家。
The Third Supreme Command recognized that its reforms had far-reaching consequences for the relations between army and society and were, indeed, only made possible by the reshaping of these relations. Machine warfare forced the loose nexus between military organization and operation on the one hand and industrial and popular mobilization on the other into a tight and functional linkage. Machine warfare was only possible with the systematic organization of economic resources and national manpower reserves. “The more the army demanded, the more the home front had to give, the greater was the task of the government and of the war ministry.”38 Plans for a dictatorship were discussed in political, military, and industrial circles for a long time, but the Third Supreme Command's growing role in politics, its “silent dictatorship,” was only indirectly linked to them.39 The former aimed at the protection of the elite status of aristocracy, industry, and agriculture against popular insurgence; the latter aimed at the total organization of society and economy for the purpose of war. As Ludendorff stated after the war, the producers and organizers of weapons ruled this kind of warfare state as the supreme managers of power and domination.40 The army reforms of 1916 dovetailed with the demand for rule by the experts of production and destruction that now encompassed the whole nation.
最高统帅部尤其意识到组织改革所带来的军事内部后果。新的原则及其应用赋予士兵和士官前所未有的行动自由，以及前线基层军官非凡的自主权。“战术变得越来越个性化。要求从基层军官到最底层士兵都达到更高的标准是一项冒险之举，尤其考虑到军官、士官和士兵训练水平的下降以及随之而来的纪律的松懈。”<sup> 41</sup>如果应用不当，这些原则可能会“很危险”；只有那些“完全奉献且纪律严明”的部队才能满足这些要求。<sup> 42</sup>在这里，民众士气与军队士气之间的另一个联系变得紧密起来。新的战争实践比以往任何时候都更加依赖于高昂的军队士气，而高昂的军队士气又依赖于民众的情绪。因此，第三最高统帅部加大了在军队内外的宣传力度，并根据围城法加强了审查和刑事诉讼。43.机器战争的最佳作战方式是依靠宣传激励的士兵和意识形态统一的国家的支持。对社会进行宣传动员以及对军队进行思想灌输，都有助于提高战争效率。44 .在最高统帅部看来，机器战争和意识形态动员相辅相成。
The Supreme Command was especially aware of the intramilitary consequences that the organizational reform implied. The new Principles and their application gave unprecedented freedom of action to soldiers and noncommissioned officers, and an extraordinary independence to the lower echelons of front officers. “Tactics became ever more individualized. It was a risky undertaking to demand higher standards from the lower officers down to the last man, especially if one considers the decline in training of officers, NCOs, and soldiers and the concomitant lowering of discipline.”41 The Principles could be “dangerous,” if applied at the wrong place; only those troops who were imbued with “complete dedication and true discipline” could fulfill the demand.42 Here another nexus, the one between popular and army morale, became a tight linkage. The new practice of war depended more than ever on high army morale, which in turn depended on popular sentiments. Consequently the Third Supreme Command stepped up its propaganda efforts inside and outside of the army, and intensified censorship and criminal proceedings under the law of siege.43 Machine warfare was fought best by soldiers fortified by propaganda and backed up by an ideologically unified nation. The propagandistic mobilization of society as well as indoctrination in the army facilitated efficiency-oriented war.44 In the eyes of the Supreme Command, machine war and ideological mobilization complemented each other.
事后看来，我们或许会得出这样的结论：国家动员与技术官僚独裁——至少是技术官僚军事独裁——之间并无必然或自动的联系，正如几乎没有证据表明意识形态的投入，特别是最高统帅部所宣扬的右翼激进民族主义意识形态，能够提升部队的凝聚力一样。但这并非重点。更重要的是，第三届最高统帅部以效率为导向的计划，为了更有效地运用武力，瓦解了传统的控制形式，也随之瓦解了军队的专业自主性。这足以引起人们的严重担忧；机械化战争重塑了军队内部原本脆弱的支配与服从之间的平衡，而国家动员则重构了德国各阶级之间、城乡之间以及各地区之间的关系。<sup> 45</sup>这使得军事领导层更加脆弱，权威更加不确定。最重要的是，它终结了军界显贵的统治。军方领导层不得不接受民众大规模卷入战争的现实，这不仅是因为越来越多的人被卷入战争机器，还因为武力使用权不再完全掌握在军事指挥控制手中。士兵们在总体指导方针下各自作战，工业按照自身逻辑生产武器，而社会动员则充满了威廉时代德国特有的阶级和地域矛盾。战略调和了这些因素，赋予它们目标和方向；它既面向国家内部，也面向敌人。它成为一种政治行为，但由于缺乏任何有组织的政治表达，最终以动员意识形态和技术官僚式的武力运用形式出现。这两种战略形式都忽视了其政治层面，并将战争控制权保留给了军事管理者。
In retrospect we might conclude that there was no necessary or automatic linkage between national mobilization and technocratic dictatorship—in any case, a technocratic military dictatorship—just as there is very little proof that ideological commitment, especially of the right-radical and nationalist type that was propagated by the Supreme Command, improved unit cohesion. But that is not the main point. Rather the efficiency-oriented program of the Third Supreme Command, in facilitating a more optimal use of force, dissolved traditional forms of control and, with them, the professional autonomy of the military. This was reason enough for serious concern; machine warfare reshaped the tenuous balance between domination and subordination within the military, and national mobilization restructured the relations between classes, between city and countryside, and between regions in Germany.45 It made military leadership more vulnerable and authority more uncertain. Most of all, it brought an end to the government of military notables. The military leadership had to come to terms with mass involvement in war, not only because more and more people were sucked into the war machine, but also because control over the use of force no longer lay exclusively with military command and control. Soldiers fought their own war within general guidelines, industry produced weapons according to its own rationale, and social mobilization for war was fraught with all the class and regional tensions that characterized Germany during the Wilhelmine period.46 Strategy mediated between these elements and gave them purpose and direction; it extended both inward to the nation and outward against the enemy. It became a political act, and since it was denied any organized political expression, it surfaced as the ideology of mobilization and the technocratic use of force. Both were forms of strategy that did not acknowledge its political aspects and reserved the control of war for military managers.
在1917年防御战的准备阶段，最高统帅部开始意识到他们误判了德国的军事形势。兴登堡和鲁登道夫看不到击败法国的希望，不得不承认时间对协约国有利。英国和法国的大西洋港口仍然是海外物资的主要通道，而俄国则威胁要再次动员一支庞大的军队，这支军队或许会在协约国的援助下装备更精良，而此时德国的兵力正因西线防御战而捉襟见肘。当然，兴登堡和鲁登道夫本可以选择与国会共同努力寻求和平，但他们拒绝了这一选择，更加坚定地坚持不惜一切代价取得胜利的理念。这种坚持的第一个牺牲品便是作为战争原则分析的战略。
During its preparations for the defensive battles in 1917 the Supreme Command began to realize that it had miscalculated Germany's military situation.47 Hindenburg and Ludendorff could see no way of knocking France out and had to acknowledge that time favored the Allies. Britain and the Atlantic harbors of France continued to be the major conduits for matériel from overseas and Russia threatened to mobilize yet another mass army, perhaps better armed with Allied help while Germany's forces were depleted in the defensive struggles at the western front. Of course, Hindenburg and Ludendorff could have chosen to join the Reichstag in new efforts to bring about peace, but they rejected this option and clung more tightly to the notion of victory at any price. The first casualty of this insistence was strategy as the principled analysis of war.
最高统帅部在摒弃这种意义上的战略时，采取了两条路径。一方面，它通过引入针对盟国士气和社会结构的间接战争手段，丰富和扩展了对以决策为导向的武力使用的理解。另一方面，它瓦解了19世纪指导“理想主义”战略和功利主义战争限制方法的手段与目的之间的工具性联系。新的“战略”将战争扩展到军事机构之外，并为国家动员提供了理论依据。战略失去了其工具性特征，成为解释和合法化总体战的工具。最高统帅部最终将权力政治重新诠释为种族或民族主义对抗。一旦战争被视为动员起来的民族之间以通过征服其他国家来实现民族种族生存为目标的意识形态和文化冲突（文化战争），战争就真正成为了总体战。 <sup>48</sup>
In rejecting strategy in this sense, the Supreme Command proceeded along two paths. On the one hand, it diversified and expanded the understanding of what constituted a decision-oriented use of force by introducing indirect means of warfare against the morale and the social fabric of Allied nations. On the other hand, it dissolved the instrumental nexus between means and ends that had guided “idealist” strategy and the utilitarian approach to limiting warfare in the nineteenth century. The new “strategy” expanded war beyond the confines of the military institution and provided a rationale for national mobilization. Strategy lost its instrumental character and became an explanation and legitimation for total war. The Supreme Command ended up with reinterpreting power politics in terms of racial or völkisch antagonisms. War became truly total once it was seen as an ideological and cultural clash (Kulturkrieg) between mobilized nations whose goal was national-racial survival through the subordination of other nations.48
我们首先来看战争的扩张。最高统帅部在对西线主要对手法国进行德军现代化和重新集中作战的同时，也加大了对英国和俄国的打击力度。这两个国家基本上不受直接攻击，但它们作为盟军在欧洲大陆作战力量的支柱，似乎拥有取之不尽的人力和物力供应，从这个意义上讲，反映了国际关系的变化。对付英国和俄国，必须采用新的作战手段。对付英国的间接策略包括无限制潜艇战，其目标是切断英国与世界市场、其帝国以及美国的联系。这一策略被强加给犹豫不决的贝特曼·霍尔维格，认为这是击败英国的唯一途径。随着这一策略的引入，以战斗和决策为导向的陆地战争时代宣告结束。49同样重要的是，试图通过煽动国内动乱来加强对俄战争，以限制俄军的动员和支援能力。这种策略并非经过系统规划或大规模实施，但值得注意，原因有二：一是社会战争的因素在整个二十世纪日益重要；二是它有效地终结了武装部队之间制度性内战的时代。50欧洲战争的规模显著扩大。
Let us turn to the expansion of warfare first. While the Supreme Command modernized and reconcentrated the war effort of the German army on the western front against France, the major Continental rival, it stepped up efforts against Great Britain and Russia as well. Both remained largely invulnerable to direct attack. Yet they formed the backbone of the Continental fighting power of the Allies as seemingly inexhaustible suppliers of men and matériel, and in this respect reflected the changing conditions of international relations. Against Britain and Russia novel means of warfare had to be employed. The indirect approach against Britain entailed unrestricted submarine warfare with the goal of cutting Britain off from world markets, its empire, and the United States. This was pressed upon a hesitant Bethmann Hollweg as the only means to defeat Britain, and with its introduction into the ensemble of forces the era of battle- and decision-oriented land warfare came to an end.49 Equally important was the attempt to step up the war against Russia by fomenting domestic unrest aimed at limiting the Russian capacity to mobilize and support troops. This approach was not planned or executed in systematic fashion or on a grand scale, but it is worth noting both because the element of social war was to grow in importance throughout the twentieth century, and because it effectively ended the era of institutionally contained warfare between armed forces.50 The dimensions of European warfare were significantly expanded.
随着这一转变，武力使用的计算方式发生了剧烈变化。作战行动如今以“多多益善”为指导，认为必须以最佳且不受限制的方式使用一切可能的战争手段才能击溃敌人——这本质上是一种机会主义的观点，基于这样一种希望：不断增加的武力最终会以某种方式创造出一种局面，从而发动致命一击。根据最高统帅部的战略逻辑，扩大和升级武力的使用，而非集中和限制武力，才能确保胜利。正是在这一点上，对暴力的管理组织和无限制战争结合在一起。<sup> 51</sup>战争的打法变成了蓄意加强武力的使用——而各国采取的应对策略各不相同。<sup> 52</sup>在接下来的三十年里，德国的应对之策在于生产更多其最先进的武器，并动员更多其熟练的人力资源，而不是研发新型武器。战略从限制和集中战争力量的作战计算，转变为扩大和升级武力使用的理论依据。
The calculus of using force underwent drastic changes with this shift. Operations were now guided by the sense that “more is better,” the belief that the optimal and unrestricted use of all possible means of warfare was now necessary to break the enemy—an essentially opportunistic view, based on the hope that more and more force would eventually somehow create a situation that could be exploited for a final and annihilating blow. An expansive and escalating use of force, rather than its concentration and limitation, would ensure victory, according to the Supreme Command's strategic logic. It is at this point that managerial organization of violence and unlimited warfare came together.51 War was now fought by deliberately intensifying the use of force—an approach whose solution differed from nation to nation.52 Germany's answer throughout the next thirty years lay in producing more of its best weapons and mobilizing more of its skilled manpower resources rather than in developing new weapons. Strategy turned from an operational calculus of limiting and concentrating the war effort into a rationale for expanding and escalating the use of force.
武力升级作为新的战略原则，必然要求加强国内的战争努力。最高统帅部迅速启动了扩大军需品生产计划（兴登堡计划）、经济机构（战争局），该机构负责协调工业和人力的全面动员，以及动员德国社会参与战争工作（辅助服务法）。<sup>53</sup>政治成为“通过持续活动提高人民效能（Kraft ）”的手段。 <sup>54</sup>随着战略的目的和意义发生变化，政治也随之跟随战略。它不再以工具性计算为目的，而是力求激励和引导人民投入无限的战争努力。宣传成为其主要工具，在鲁登道夫及其最高统帅部核心成员的脑海中占据越来越重要的位置。施佩尔指出了这一点：
Escalation of force as the new strategic principle necessitated an intensification of the war effort at home. The Supreme Command quickly instituted an expanded munitions program (Hindenburg Program), an economic agency (Kriegsamt), which was to coordinate the total mobilization of industry and manpower, and the mobilization of German society for war work (Auxiliary Service Law).53 Politics became a means to improve “the effectiveness (Kraft) of the people through permanent activity.”54 Politics followed strategy as the purpose and meaning of strategy changed. It no longer calculated instrumentally, but sought to inspire and direct people in an unlimited war effort. Propaganda became its principal tool, looming ever larger in the minds of Ludendorff and his coterie in the Supreme Command. Speier has pointed to this fact:
鲁登道夫将军对战争理论最独创的贡献在于常被误称为“心理战”的领域。鲁登道夫几乎过分关注民众的“凝聚力”问题……他鄙视并认为任何试图通过武力或训练来实现社会团结的尝试都是无效的。他称这些方法为“机械的”或“外在的”。通过强制手段实现的民众外在团结……并非民众和军队在战争中所需要的团结，而是一种对政府和国家构成威胁的机械幻影。55
The most original contribution General Ludendorff made to the theory of war [lay] in the realm of what is often inadequately called “psychological warfare.” Ludendorff is almost excessively concerned with the problem of the “cohesion” of the people…. He despised and regarded as ineffective, any attempt to achieve social unity by force or drill. Such methods he called “mechanical” or “external.” An external unity of the people, achieved by compulsion…is not a unity which people and army need in war, but a mechanical phantom dangerous to the government and the state.55
鲁登道夫用一句著名的反驳之语概括了新战略方法的后果和意义：“克劳塞维茨的所有理论都必须抛弃。战争和政治不仅服务于人民的生存，而且战争是民族生存意志的最高体现。”<sup> 56</sup>升级战略依靠意识形态而非工具理性，其目的是动员全国人民发动无限制战争。
Ludendorff condensed the consequence and the meaning of the new approach to strategy in the famous non sequitur: “All theories of Clausewitz have to be thrown overboard. War and politics not only serve the survival of the people, but war is the highest expression of the racial will of life.”56 Escalatory strategy thrived on ideology rather than on instrumental rationality, its aim being to mobilize the nation for unlimited war.
作为一种社会动员形式的战略，以一种独特的方式调整了目标与手段之间的关系。我们不妨回顾一下，理想主义战略是在军事内部或军民精英的话语体系中确立目标的。<sup>57</sup>军事参谋部的作用在于评估可用手段和实现这些目标的成本。理想情况下，手段服从于目标，即总参谋部确定每次新增暴力投入的边际效用，并在目标（行动或战役的预期收益）和手段（实现目标所需的资源）之间取得平衡。然而，作为一种社会动员形式的战略（以及很快成为一种工业毁灭性力量的技术动员形式，并在核时代达到顶峰）开始颠覆这种计算方式。手段的动员开始以一种更为复杂，并且在理想主义战略看来更为荒谬的方式决定战争目标。其核心是对武器边际效用的技术（以及很快发展为经济）计算。然而，武器和资源的可用性不再取决于对目标的辩论，而是取决于军事和政治领导层动员全国（即社会和工业）的能力。这一过程（如今已演变为战略规划）的界限，由社会抵抗力（社会能够承受多少？）和工业体系（工业能够在不危及再生产的情况下生产多少？）所界定。目标会根据动员程度进行调整。社会和工业动员得越充分，目标就越全面。正如鲁登道夫在其战后著作中所述，全面动员需要全面目标，即一场“全面战争”。这不仅仅是一场更加激烈的战争，而是一场只有彻底征服敌国、真正征服敌方社会并使其完全无条件地臣服于战胜国意志才能结束的战争。君主制和重商主义的扩张时代，以及以领土和人民为筹码、在全欧洲权力博弈中争夺权力的时代，都已成为过去。总体战及其社会动员战略只知对抗和武装阵营间的血腥冲突——正如自诩为后贵族和后资产阶级极权主义时代理论家的卡尔·施密特在两次世界大战期间所阐述的那样，是敌我之间无条件的对抗。
Strategy as a form of social mobilization adjusted goals to means in a peculiar way. Let us recall that idealistic strategy established goals in an intramilitary or civil-military elite discourse.57 The role of the military staffs consisted in evaluating the availability of means and the costs of achieving these goals. Ideally means were subordinated to goals, in that general staffs ascertained the marginal utility of each new increment of violence and established a balance between goals (expected benefits of an operation or campaign) and means (the resources necessary to achieve the goal). Strategy as a form of social mobilization (and soon as a form of technical mobilizaton of industrial forces of destruction, which has reached its high point in the nuclear age) proceeded to turn this calculus on its head. The mobilization of means began to determine the goals of war in a more complex and—in view of idealistic strategy—perverse equation. At its core was the technical (and soon economic) calculation of the marginal utility of weapons. The availability of weapons and resources, however, was no longer determined in a debate over goals, but by the ability of the military and political leadership to mobilize the nation, that is, society and industry. The limits of this process, which now became the process of strategic planning, were defined by social resistance—how much can society take?—and by the industrial apparatus—how much can industry produce without endangering reproduction? Goals were adjusted to the degree of mobilization. The more society and industry were mobilized, the more encompassing became the goals. Total mobilization, as Ludendorff put it in his postwar writing, required total goals, that is, a war à outrance. This was not just a more intensely fought war, but a war that could end only with the Niederwerfung of the enemy nation as a whole, the actual subjugation of enemy societies and their complete and unconditional surrender to the will of the victorious nation(s) in arms. Gone were the days of princely and mercantilistic aggrandizement and of the balance-of-power considerations in which territories and people were the bargaining chips in an all-European power game. Total war and its strategy of social mobilization only knew antagonism and the murderous clash of armed camps—the unconditional antagonism between Freund and Feind, as the self-acclaimed theoretician of a postaristocratic and postbourgeois totalitarian age, Carl Schmitt, elaborated in the interwar years.
这种社会动员策略的影响可以从第一次世界大战期间德国战争目标辩论的演变中看出。激进的泛德意志战争目标不仅获得了新的拥护者，他们将泛德意志分裂团体转变为战争中发展最快的群众运动，其中心是祖国党和基夫豪瑟联盟；而且，动员及其伴随的政治斗争越是激烈，德国战争目标就越是复杂和全面——越是“总体”。1918年，这场辩论达到了前所未有的高潮，其目标比1914年更加扩张和全面——要求征服其他民族，而不仅仅是“获取”领土和资源——同时还伴随着同样深远的社会和民族净化理念。这些战争目标与日益恶化的军事形势形成了鲜明对比。事实上，军事形势越是岌岌可危，战争目标就越是激进和全面。
The ramifications of this strategy of social mobilization can be detected in the evolution of the war-aims debate in Germany during the First World War. Not only did the radical pan-German war aims gain new adherents, who transformed pan-German splinter groups into the quickest-growing mass movement of the war, centered in the Vaterlandspartei and the Kyffhäusser-Bund; the more intense the effort of mobilization and its concomitant political struggles, the more elaborate and encompassing—the more “total”—became the objectives of the German war effort. In 1918 the debate had reached an all-time high with goals far more expansionist and total—demanding the subjugation of nations rather than the “mere” acquisition of territory and resources—than in 1914, coupled with equally far-reaching ideas about social and national purification. These war aims stood in sharp contrast to a deteriorating military situation. In fact, the more precarious the military situation, the more radical and encompassing the war aims.
这种悖论对于秉持暴力边际效用计算的理想主义战略而言是不可想象的。理想主义战略会建议在日益绝望的军事形势下限制和缩减目标。然而，升级战略却摒弃了有限战争和专业战争的核心计算方式。它将目标置于动员手段之下，而忽略了每次新增兵力的实际军事效用价值。“战略”因此依赖于不断升级的动员和武力使用，并在此过程中丧失了其工具性意义。毫无疑问，这种战略本身是“理性”和“合乎逻辑的”，因为它将社会动员的能力和程度置于战略计算的核心，但它与拿破仑时代后被视为军事领导“艺术”和“科学”的理念截然不同。它不是限制战争，而是升级战争，其军事行动侧重于武器管理，并要求对国家资源拥有无限的支配权。
This paradox was unthinkable to idealistic strategy, with its marginal-utility calculus of violence. Idealistic strategy would have counseled the limitation and scaling down of goals in an increasingly desperate military situation. Escalatory strategy, however, discarded this central calculus of limited and professional war. It subordinated goals to the mobilization of means, independent of the actual military use-value of each new increment of force. “Strategy” thus thrived on the escalatory mobilization and use of force and, in this process, lost its instrumental significance. This strategy, no doubt, was “rational” and “logical” in its own right, in that it put the capability and degree of social mobilization at the center of its strategic calculus, but it differed radically from what had been considered the “art” and “science” of military leadership in the post-Napoleonic era. It escalated rather than limited war in a military effort that concentrated on the management of weapons and demanded unlimited disposal over the resources of nations.
新的防御性作战措施在一定程度上削弱了协约国1917年的攻势，但战术和作战机会主义以及技术官僚式动员的代价增长速度超过了其带来的收益。无限制潜艇战的使用将美国拖入了战争，反而扩大了协约国的资源，而非削弱了它们。与此同时，针对俄国的社会战争仅仅取得了表面上的成功。十月革命解放了东线的部队，并首次使德军在西线占据了优势。然而，第三最高统帅部现在还不得不应对俄国革命政府，该政府与最高统帅部的一切主张都截然相反，并毫不掩饰地要求立即媾和。与此同时，不断升级的战争所带来的政治代价也迅速上升。经济和社会动员使德国的分裂程度达到了前所未有的程度。在1917年的防御战中，新组建的军队的作战表现是以削弱其赖以建立的基础为代价的。
The new measures of defensive warfare helped to blunt the Allied offensives of 1917, but the costs of tactical and operational opportunism and technocratic mobilization grew faster than the benefits. The use of unrestricted submarine warfare drew the United States into the war, thus expanding the resources of the Allies rather than diminishing them. At the same time, social war against Russia was successful only on the surface. The October revolution freed units in the east and for the first time gave the German army an advantage on the western front. However, the Third Supreme Command was now also forced to cope with a revolutionary government in Russia that was radically opposed to all the Supreme Command stood for and made no bones about intervening with demands for immediate peace. At the same time the political costs of the escalating war effort rose quickly. Economic and social mobilization polarized Germany to an unprecedented degree. In the defensive battles of 1917 the performance of the new army was paid for by the whittling away of the very foundations on which it had been built.
尽管野战军的作战效能和武器产量有所提高，但整体军事形势却持续恶化，这必须向德国民众解释清楚。国家在战争中投入越多，为何取得的成就反而越少？第三最高统帅部找到了答案，那就是将责任归咎于工人、资产阶级、妇女、知识分子、大学、同性恋者和青年，并日益将自身对局势的无知转化为对“犹太阴谋”的恶毒攻击，声称该阴谋正在蚕食德国军队的命脉。58随着战争对激进民族主义者而言演变为一场将德意志民族从邪恶中解放出来的斗争，他们甚至对最雄心勃勃的领土目标也失去了兴趣。德国开始滑向末日战争的边缘。59
This deterioration of the overall military situation while the performance of the field army and the output in weapons were improving somehow had to be explained to the German people. How was it possible that the more the nation invested in the war effort the less it achieved? The Third Supreme Command found an answer in blaming workers, the bourgeoisie, women, intellectuals, universities, homosexuals, and youth, and increasingly turned its own lack of comprehension of what was happening into venomous attacks against a “Jewish conspiracy” eating away at the vitals of the German army.58 Radical nationalists lost interest in even the most ambitious territorial goals as the war became for them a struggle for the liberation of the German race from evil. Germany began to cross over into apocalyptic war.59
马克斯·鲍尔上校是技术官僚中最冷静的一位，也是最高司令部与工业界联系最有效的渠道，但他同时也是这些意识形态拥护者中最固执己见、最具破坏性的一位，这绝非偶然。<sup> 60</sup>第三最高司令部那些以效率为导向的军官们为了追求武力的最佳运用，不惜一切代价。他们不断升级国家战争投入，以求取得胜利，而这种胜利始终被视为与战争本身一样绝对。这种升级战略指导着一场战争，这场战争既受理性组织（计划性）的影响，也受普遍缺乏思想（思想缺失）的影响。<sup>61</sup>这就是机械时代军事偏执的根源。
It is not by chance that Colonel Max Bauer, one of the coolest of the technocrats and the Supreme Headquarters' most effective link with industry, was one of the most insistent and poisonous of these ideologues.60 The efficiency-oriented officers of the Third Supreme Command knew no limits in their quest for the optimal use of force. They escalated the national war effort in their search for victory, always conceived to be as absolute as the war effort itself. The escalatory strategy guided a war that was shaped in equal measure by rational organization (Planmässigkeit) and by the general lack of ideas (Ideenlosigkeit).61 This was the basis for military paranoia in the machine age.
尽管第三最高统帅部无法解释也从未试图理解军事形势的恶化，但高级将领们意识到形势已对他们不利。他们深知，在防御战的压力下，德军已无力再坚持一年，而通过谈判达成和平协议会对被灌输了“必胜”信念的公众舆论产生危险的政治影响，因此鲁登道夫选择了唯一可行的方案——在西线“迅速做出决定”。这场进攻，这场“世界历史上最艰难的行动”，将决定德意志帝国的命运。<sup> 62</sup>这场行动始于一场赌博，最终却以弗里德里希·恩格斯所言的“将权力拱手让给街头”而告终。
Although the Third Supreme Command could not explain and never tried to understand the deterioration of the military situation, the leading officers recognized that the odds had turned against them. Aware that the German army was incapable of holding out for another year under the pressures of defensive warfare, and that a negotiated peace would have a politically dangerous effect on public opinion indoctrinated in the certainty of total victory, Ludendorff chose the only viable alternative, a “quick decision” on the western front. This assault, the “most difficult operation in world history,” would make or break imperial Germany.62 It began as a gamble and ended by, in Friedrich Engels's words, “Throwing power into the street.”
如同早期的防御战一样，突破的战术和作战理念也是缓慢积累起来的。这些理念都重申了以机械化作战为基础、拥有众多独立火力点的作战方式的有效性。各种要素被整合到新的指导原则中，即一本名为《阵地进攻》的手册。该手册强调出其不意，同时寻找敌方最薄弱的环节，利用速度和纵深突防，以及战术上利用优势。军事实践者开始认真思考如何摆脱堑壕战的僵化局面。63
As earlier in defensive warfare, the tactical and operational ideas for a breakthrough accumulated slowly. They all reaffirmed the efficiency of machine-based warfare with its many independent bases of fire. The various elements were brought together in new guidelines, a manual called “Attack in Position Warfare,” which emphasized surprise combined with searching out the weakest points of the enemy, the use of speed and deep penetration, and the tactical exploitation of advantages. The military practitioners began to take a serious look at ways to escape the rigidity of trench warfare.63
然而，由于无法明确战役目标，这些创新战术大多失效。各种进攻计划被讨论过，但除了突破之外，没有任何迹象表明就其他目标进行过辩论。战后，这导致了两种批评：一是鲁登道夫最终还是没能摆脱消耗战，二是他不知何故被任务压垮了。这两种说法都不太令人信服，因为它们都忽略了1917-1918年“战略”的现状。精心策划的作战行动是意识形态化的战略意图与以战效为导向的武力使用之间矛盾的牺牲品，这使得明确目标的制定成为不可能。由此，我们可以清晰地看到升级战争的作战代价。最高统帅部除了战术层面之外，无法定义行动的目的，因此无法提供方向或领导。鲁登道夫就此问题发表的愤怒言论，既可作为1918年战役的讽刺，也可作为对后世军事技术官僚的警示。“我不想听到‘作战’这个词。我们只需在前线凿个洞，剩下的自然水到渠成。”<sup> 65</sup>
Yet these innovative techniques were largely invalidated by the inability to define a purpose for the campaign. Various offensive plans were discussed, but there is no indication of a debate on any objective except that of a breakthrough.64 After the war, this led to two kinds of criticism: that Ludendorff did not escape attrition warfare after all, or that he was somehow overwhelmed by the task. Neither is very convincing, because both arguments overlook the state of “strategy” in 1917–18. Calculated operations were the victim of the discrepancy between ideologized strategic intent and the performance-oriented use of force, and this made clear formulation of an objective impossible. Here we see the operational costs of escalatory warfare in glaring light. The Supreme Command was unable to define the purpose of action except in tactical terms, and thus did not provide direction or leadership. Ludendorff's angry words about this issue can serve both as an epithet for the 1918 campaign as well as a reminder for generations of military technocrats to follow. “I do not want to hear the word operation. We hack a hole [into the front]. The rest comes on its own.”65
西线的进攻行动仅仅是一系列事件的核心，而这一系列事件既非始于西线，也非止于西线。<sup>66</sup>西线进攻的前提是俄国战线的崩溃以及随后在东线达成的扩张主义和平。1917-1918年的冬天不仅展现了四年战争带来的疲惫，也是社会和意识形态动员以及扩张主义战略的高峰。<sup> 67</sup>历史上从未有过如此多的部队集中于一次行动；也从未有过如此强大的火力集结；尽管德国社会比以往任何时候都更加两极分化，但齐格弗里登派系仍然掌控着局势，横扫议会中的温和派，并以日益激进的方式压制反对派。人们预感到一场革命即将爆发，但同时也强烈暗示着一个拥有群众基础的右翼激进独裁政权的出现。来自被占领东线的繁荣和盈余的愿景，与爆发式的反布尔什维克主义和反犹主义交织在一起。
The offensive operations at the western front were merely the core of a sequence of events that neither ended nor started there.66 The prerequisite for an attack in the West was the collapse of the Russian front and the subsequent expansionist peace in the East. The winter of 1917–18 not only showed the wear and tear of four years of war, but was also the high point of social and ideological mobilization and an expansionist strategy.67 Never before in war had so many troops been concentrated for a single operation; never before had so much firepower been amassed; and although German society was more polarized than ever, the Siegfrieden faction was in control, sweeping the moderates in parliament and containing opposition in increasingly militant fashion. There were premonitions of a revolution, but there were equally strong signs of a right-radical dictatorship with a mass basis. The vision of prosperity and surplus coming from the occupied East was mixed with an explosive anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism.
当西线战败使这些希望破灭时，战争催生的激进运动并未在1918年11月11日戛然而止。相反，激进动员转向了内外两个层面。1918年夏，德军在西线开始撤退，同时在俄国推进，最终抵达高加索地区。这一行动持续到1919年，远超与协约国的停战协定。东线部队与战败的德国失去联系，转变为靠土地为生的武装团伙。<sup> 68</sup>因此，在战争的最后阶段，战争演变成一场十字军东征，德军不仅为争夺土地而战，还对俄国人和布尔什维克发动了一场意识形态和种族主义运动。1919-1920年，他们将这种激进的意识形态和民族主义战争实践带回了德国。<sup> 69</sup>
When defeat in the west brought these hopes crashing down, the militant movements created by the war did not stop dead on November 11, 1918. Rather militant mobilization turned both inward and outward. While German troops began their retreat on the western front in the summer of 1918, they advanced in Russia in a move that eventually led them to the Caucasus. This movement outlasted the armistice with the Allies and extended into 1919. The troops in the East, cut off from defeated Germany, transformed themselves into armed bands that lived off the land.68 Thus in its last stages, the war turned into a crusade in which German troops fought for land and at the same time waged an ideological and racist campaign against Russians and Bolsheviks. In 1919–20 they carried their militant ideology and their völkisch practice of war back to Germany.69
与此同时，国内的苦难演变为反战和反抗领导人的革命。1919年，德国社会关系全面军事化。武装起来的不仅仅是军队、自由军团和工人，而是整个国家——各种民政机构、市政厅、社会团体、帮派——都获得了武器。军队对暴力的垄断被打破。残存的军队——本质上是总参谋部的上层建筑——也同样陷入了武装的泥潭。战争末期接替鲁登道夫的威廉·格罗纳，不过是一位没有军队的元帅；新任总理弗里德里希·艾伯特，则是一位没有实权的政治领袖。战争引发的社会运动成功地削弱并瘫痪了好战的国家及其军事机构。国家权力几乎彻底崩溃。
Meanwhile bitterness on the home front turned into revolt against the war and revolution against its leaders. The year 1919 saw a sweeping militarization of social relations in Germany. It was not just the army, the free corps, and workers who armed. The whole nation—civil authorities of all kinds, city halls, social groups, gangs—acquired weapons. The military monopoly of violence was shattered. What was left of the army—essentially the superstructure of the general staff—was embroiled in the same kind of protective armaments.70 Wilhelm Groener, the successor of Ludendorff in the last months of the war, was a Feldherr without troops; Friedrich Ebert, the new chancellor, a political leader without authority. The war-induced social movements had successfully eroded and paralyzed the militant state and its military institutions. The power of the state all but collapsed.
无论是向外扩张还是向内动荡，都与有组织的军事行动鲜有相似之处，尽管军事领导层在两者中都发挥了重要作用。然而，它们都是战争努力的一部分。这两种运动反映并体现了德国社会在第三最高统帅部追求胜利的过程中所进行的两极动员，以及欧洲人民在民族和意识形态上相互对抗的动员。支持战争和反对战争的动员最终都因民众的疲惫而逐渐消退，而非转化为国内稳定。
Both outward thrust and inward convulsion bore little similarity to organized military campaigns, even though the military leadership played an important role in both. And yet they were part of the war effort. These two movements reflected and expressed the polar mobilization of German society in the Third Supreme Command's quest for victory and the national and ideological mobilization of the European people against each other. Mobilization for and against war petered out due to sheer exhaustion rather than turning into domestic stability.
国内局势的发展与国际层面的发展相呼应，最终达成了停战协议，实现了和平，但东欧和近东地区却从未真正平静下来。战争引发了战后战争——规模较小的是德奥边境的伏击战，规模较大的是带有革命和反革命色彩的俄波战争，而规模最大的则是土耳其的大屠杀。事实上，只有当苏联因内部混乱而力不从心，德国的反革命势力得到控制，东欧和土耳其的野心因社会和经济困境而受挫时，作为第一次世界大战最后阶段的激进社会运动才逐渐平息。经过几年的平静之后，这场战争在国内和国际上再次兴起，并与20世纪30年代的社会动员浪潮交织在一起。
Domestic developments were paralleled on the international level where armistices and peace were eventually concluded, but eastern Europe and the Near East never quieted down. The war led into the postwar wars—on a smaller scale in the ambushes along the German and Austrian borders, on a larger scale in the Russo-Polish war with its revolutionary and counterrevolutionary overtones, and on an apocalyptic level in the massacres in Turkey. Indeed, it was only when the Soviet Union's efforts wore thin because of internal chaos and when the counterrevolutionary thrust was brought under control in Germany—eastern European and Turkish ambitions being frustrated by social and economic difficulties—that the war of militant social movements, the last stage of World War I, died down. After some years of calm, it regained national and international momentum and linked up with the renewed social mobilization of the 1930s.
三
III
两次世界大战之间的德国军事策划者的主要关注点是限制战争，以便再次使战争成为精英控制战略的基础上有目的、有工具性的武力使用。
The primary concern of German military planners in the interwar years was to limit war in order to make it, once again, a purposeful and instrumental use of force on the basis of elite control of strategy.
策划者们面临着极其苛刻的条件。德国当时已解除武装，实力远逊于任何潜在敌人。<sup> 71</sup>与此同时，策划者们坚持认为，只有他们才能组织国防，确保德国的安全——这是恢复德国在欧洲地位的先决条件。然而，这个问题却棘手无解，因为整个欧洲大陆的国际稳定以及各国武装力量角色的妥协都依赖于德国的解除武装。由于欧洲事务紧密相连，国内政治和国际政治往往相互交织，因此，任何旨在解决或控制内部纷争以发动战争的努力，都会导致所有国内和国际安排的重新谈判；同样，国际形势的每一次变化，都会为德国的军事行动带来新的可能性，同时也设定新的限制。
The planners labored under a particularly restrictive set of conditions. Germany was disarmed and much weaker than any of its potential enemies.71 At the same time, the planners insisted that they alone were capable of organizing national defense and ensuring German security—a prerequisite for restoring Germany's status in Europe. This problem proved intractable because the international stability of the Continent as a whole and the compromises governing the role of each nation's armed forces depended on Germany being disarmed. Because Europe's affairs were closely linked and national and international politics tended to dovetail, every effort to resolve or control internal dissension in order to fight wars led to renegotiation of all domestic and international arrangements, just as every change in international conditions opened new possibilities and set new limits for the German military effort.
1918年至1920年间，德国本有机会重新思考武力在国内外关系中的作用，但这一机会从未被利用，甚至在很大程度上也未被承认。那些主张民防和有组织的消极抵抗的人，尽管考虑到德国当时的无力抵抗，他们的论点不无道理，却无人理会。魏玛共和国的军官和文职领导层在经历了战败以及革命和反革命的暴力之后，仍然坚信武力是必要的，甚至是国家生存的必要条件。
The opportunity that Germany had, in the years 1918–1920, to rethink the role of force in domestic and international relations was never exploited and for the most part was not even recognized. Those who argued in favor of civil defense and organized passive resistance were not heard, even though their arguments were plausible in view of Germany's defenselessness.72 The officer corps and the civilian leadership of the Weimar Republic emerged from defeat and revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence with the conviction that military force was necessary, even vital for the survival of the nation.
重建军队的任务落在了总参谋部的肩上。这项工作与首任陆军总司令汉斯·冯·塞克特密切相关。<sup>73</sup>他力图在等级分明、规模庞大且“现代化”的军事组织中重建正式的权威和纪律。纪律严明、指挥体系清晰、对过于独立的高级指挥官进行控制和约束，以及全面、以技能为导向的训练，再加上对广大士兵的家长式福利措施，成为塞克特任期内的标志性特征。与此同时，他还恢复了针对大型军队的宏观战略和战术的理论与实践训练。他总体上支持现代化和机械化，但将这些要素置于德国军事传统的专业化方法之下。
It was up to the general staff to rebuild the army. This effort was closely associated with Hans von Seeckt, the first Chef der Heeresleitung (chief of the Army Command).73 He sought to reestablish formal authority and discipline in a hierarchical, though expansive and “modernizing,” military organization. Discipline and clear lines of command, control and subordination of the too-independent senior commanders, and thorough, skill-oriented training coupled with paternalistic welfare measures for the mass of soldiers became the hallmark of Seeckt's tenure. At the same time, he revived theoretical and practical training in grand strategy and in tactics for a large army. He generally favored modernization and mechanization, but subordinated these elements to a professional approach in the German military tradition.
塞克特不得不应对军队领导层内部的两个少数派系。其中一个派系主张准备一场民族解放战争，复兴并神化普鲁士反抗拿破仑的传统，并像当时的军队改革者一样，将军队完全开放给民众力量。<sup> 74</sup>这个派系由约阿希姆·冯·施图尔普纳格尔和维尔纳·冯·布隆贝格领导，他们贬低制度化战争的首要地位，并愿意重新思考战争的方方面面。他们致力于调动社会力量、民族“意志”及其所有生产力。另一个派系规模很小，依靠其对国防军政治的影响力。该派系的领导人是库尔特·冯·施莱歇尔，但其基本思想是由威廉·格罗纳发展起来的。这个派系坚持认为，只有在经济稳健复苏的基础上才能重建一支新军队，而经济复苏能够重塑民族的团结和凝聚力。施莱歇尔和格罗纳的立场日益国际化，到1924年，他们得出结论：德国的军事复兴——包括德国军队和战略的重建——取决于美国的财政支持。<sup>75</sup>与强调作战和组织改革的军事民粹主义者不同，他们强调需要在不断扩展的权力政治观念下重新思考战略。
Seeckt had to cope with two minority factions within the army leadership. One of them pleaded for the preparation of a nationalist war of liberation, reviving and mythologizing the Prussian tradition of rising against Napoleon, and, like the army reformers of that period, throwing the army wide open to popular forces.74 This faction, led by Joachim von Stülpnagel and Werner von Blomberg, depreciated the primacy of institutionalized warfare and was willing to rethink all aspects of war. It focused on harnessing the powers of society, the “will” of the nation, and all of its productive forces. The other faction was very small and relied on its leverage over the politics of the Reichswehr. Its leader became Kurt von Schleicher, though its basic outlook was developed by Wilhelm Groener. This group insisted that a new army could only be rebuilt on the basis of a solid economic recovery that forged a new unity and a new cohesion of the nation. Schleicher and Groener increasingly shifted to an internationalist position and by 1924 had concluded that a military recovery of Germany—the reconstruction of a German army as well as of a German strategy—depended on American financial initiative.75 As opposed to the military populists who emphasized operational and organizational reforms, they stressed the need to rethink strategy in the light of an expanding notion of power politics.
塞克特的理念深深吸引了绝大多数军人。他的思想也与德国政治和工业精英的坚持不谋而合，即暴力必须在国家层面被垄断和制度化，社会关系必须非军事化，才能战胜来自左右两翼的革命和反革命势力。然而，塞克特的战略思维始终与欧洲的现实脱节。他的作战理论设想了一支并不存在的军队，而他重建一支正统军队的希望也始终是空想。尽管德国国防军努力进行现代化改革，但其内部运作依然僵化刻板。军队的主要机构由一群老顽固把持。正如一位反对者所言，军队领导层编写了“文笔优美”的手册，旨在“用1914年的手段训练领导人打一场新战争”，但这些手段早已不复存在。76塞克特设想与苏联结盟对抗全欧洲联盟，这在强权政治的思维中是合理的，但在战后欧洲是不切实际的。简而言之，塞克特为了重塑军队的自主性和明确的身份，退居国内和国际事务的边缘地带。77
Seeckt's own concepts captivated the great majority of the military. His ideas also conformed to the insistence of German political and industrial elites that violence had to be monopolized and institutionalized in the state, and that social relations had to be demilitarized in order to overcome the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary insurgence from Left and Right. But Seeckt's strategic thinking never conformed to European realities. His operational doctrines posited an army that did not exist, and his hope of reconstituting an orthodox army was always chimerical. Despite efforts at modernization, rigidity and inflexibility characterized the internal practice of the Reichswehr. A gerontocracy ran its main offices. To quote an opponent of this regime, the army leadership produced “beautifully written” manuals, ideal for “training the leaders for a new war with the means of 1914,” but these means were gone.76 Seeckt envisioned an alliance with the Soviet Union against an all-European coalition, which was plausible in the thinking of power politics, but unrealistic in postwar Europe. In short, Seeckt moved to the very fringes of domestic and international affairs in order to reconstitute the autonomy and unequivocal identity of the army.77
这是一场他输掉的赌博。1923年，当法比联军占领鲁尔区后，德国国防军与苏联的联系被证明毫无作用，政治和军事动荡加剧，法国的优势使得宏大战略的理念荡然无存。更糟糕的是，1923年认真的动员计划很快就表明，塞克特的计划和理念是建立在不合理的假设和夸大的估计之上的。他曾天真地认为，德国国防军能够在不损害自身标准和纪律的前提下控制社会动荡，能够在不卷入政治矛盾的前提下影响政治，并且能够促使德国工业界和保守派放弃西方资本，转而投向充满不确定性的军事未来。然而，这些想法最终都被证明是错误的。这支军队重建和战略制定的前提本身就不切实际。脱离国内外事务，建立一支独立自主的军队是不可能的。塞克特原本希望利用反对战后现状的国内和国际力量，但他发现军队无法控制这些力量。
It was a gamble that he lost. When French and Belgian forces occupied the Ruhr area in 1923, the army's ties with the Soviet Union proved ineffective, political and military unrest mounted, and French superiority made the concepts of grand strategy worthless. Worst of all, serious planning for mobilization in 1923 very quickly showed that Seeckt's own plans and concepts were based on unsound assumptions and inflated estimates. His belief that the Reichswehr could control social unrest without jeopardizing its own standards and discipline, could shape politics without getting involved in the contradictions of political affairs, and could induce German industry and conservatives to forsake Western capital in favor of an uncertain military future all proved to be mistaken. The very assumptions on which this army had been rebuilt and its strategy formulated were unrealistic. It was impossible to construct an autonomous army outside of domestic and international affairs. Seeckt had hoped to use the national and international forces that were opposed to the postwar status quo only to discover that the army could not control them.
尽管塞克特的方案并未解决德国的任何军事问题，但它仍然具有强大的吸引力，因为军事正统观念承诺赋予军方阶层自主权，构建了一套令人印象深刻的“战略”知识体系，使军方能够独占战争的控制权，并通过果断的军事行动来保证战争的限制和控制。其显而易见的吸引力甚至在塞克特本人去世后依然存在，因为尽管国防军军官们渴望发动战争，但他们中的大多数人首先希望的是按照自己的方式进行战争。
Still, Seeckt's program remained compelling, even though it solved none of Germany's military problems, because military orthodoxy promised autonomy for the military caste, formulated an impressive body of “strategic” knowledge that gave the military exclusive control over warfare, and guaranteed limitation and control of war through decisive military action. Its evident appeal survived Seeckt himself, because as much as Reichswehr officers wanted to be able to wage war, most of them first and foremost wanted to fight it on their own terms.
只有在经历了一系列极其紧张的内部和政治冲突之后，德国国防军才开始摒弃军事强权政治的幻象，转而采取截然不同的规划方式来应对当前的突发事件和未来的战争。作战规划和战略思维实现了质的飞跃，首先是接受了“人民战争”（Volkskrieg）以及坦克机动作战的可能性，随后发展出了战略威慑的概念。新的作战实践取代了塞克关于自主军队和传统强权政治的理念，并制定了一种与旧模式截然不同的战略。尽管这些新思想的倡导者从未挑战战争原则，也仍然强调专家对战略的控制，但他们提出了一种在当前和未来战争条件下对这些原则进行激进且富有创造性的“重新诠释” 。78
It was only after a series of very tense internal and political conflicts that the Reichswehr began to turn away from the mirage of military power politics and to pursue a radically different course of planning for present contingencies and future war. Operational planning and strategic thinking made a quantum leap, first by embracing the possibilities of a people's war (Volkskrieg) as well as mobile warfare with tanks and subsequently by developing notions of strategic deterrence. Alternative operational practices replaced Seecktian notions of an autonomous army and traditional power politics and a strategy developed that had little in common with the old designs. Although the proponents of these new ideas never challenged the principles of war and continued to emphasize expert control over strategy, they suggested a radical and creative “retranslation” of these principles under current and future conditions of warfare.78
在施图尔普纳格尔的领导下，总参谋部作战部门的军官们是第一波改革的主要推动者，改革的核心是“人民战争”和机动战争。人民战争是一种“绝望的手段……在绝境中”，它实际上抹杀了平民和士兵之间的区别，并将“所有人和所有资源……都变成了战争工具”。79德国策划者指望通过将敌军拖入“纵深极深的区域战”来削弱和瓦解敌军的主力，从而使一支规模虽小但经过适当现代化改造的反击主力部队能够集中且出其不意地发动攻击，从而扭转战局。80这将是一场极其残酷的战争，它不遵循任何规则，并采用恐怖主义手段，包括处决式袭击（针对敌方指挥官和民众）、毒气、绑架、洪水以及对基础设施的全面破坏——简而言之，就是恐怖主义和焦土战术与常规作战的混合体。81因此，敌人将被迫“慢慢蚕食”德国。82这场战争即便以胜利告终，也注定了德国大部分地区的毁灭。
Officers in the operational section of the Truppenamt, the general staff, under Stülpnagel, were the main instigators of the first wave of reforms, centering around Volkskrieg and mobile war. People's war was a “desperate means…in a desperate situation,” which virtually extinguished the difference between civilians and soldiers and turned “all people and all means…into tools of war.”79 German planners counted on weakening and splintering the main thrust of enemy forces by drawing them into “area warfare with extremely deep zones” to a point at which the concentrated and surprising use of even a small counterattacking main force, if appropriately modernized, could make a major difference.80 It was to be a most brutal kind of warfare that knew no rules and employed terroristic means of execution-style attacks (against enemy commanders as much as against the population), poison gas, kidnapping, flooding, and general destruction of infrastructure—in short, a mixture of terrorism and scorched-earth tactics combined with conventional operations.81 The enemy thus would be forced “to eat slowly through” Germany.82 It was a war that, even if it ended in victory, doomed much of the country.
在筹备人民战争的同时，德国国防军对其主力部队进行了现代化改造。军队机械化是更全面计划的一部分，而坦克部队的组建最初只是提升整体机动性的一个次要环节。但坦克战的重要性日益凸显，到1929年，它已成为军队现代化的主要方向。<sup> 83</sup>初创坦克部队的组织和作战构想最初受到法国经验的影响，并由此得出“坦克的主要目的是直接支援步兵推进”的结论。<sup> 84</sup>然而，随着对英国装甲部队演习的评估，这一结论迅速改变。到1926年末，一项指令明确指出，坦克部队可以与“行动缓慢的步兵”分离，坦克的最佳使用方式是与“机动部队”协同作战，或作为独立单位作战。85将摩托化步兵或坦克部队转变为陆军主力突击部队的理念，正中作战计划者的下怀。一支极其重视将少量士兵投入战斗部队的军队，对将摩托化部队纳入后勤补给线的想法深恶痛绝。转折点出现在1927年1月，当时维尔纳·冯·弗里奇领导的作战部门得出结论：必须重新思考坦克战的原则。“装甲快速机动的坦克很可能成为决定作战胜负的进攻性武器。从作战角度来看，如果将这种武器集中部署在坦克旅等独立作战单位中，其效用将最为显著。” 86到1929年，维尔纳·冯·布隆贝格领导的部队司令部训练部门已经制定了作战独立坦克团的训练计划。以施图尔普纳格尔和布隆贝格为首的“青年土耳其党”领导的总参谋部，在博克尔贝格（负责采购和武器研发）以及海因茨·古德里安（负责武器监察）等专家的支持下，全心全意地接受了以决策为导向、作战独立的坦克战理念。87
Concurrently and in close connection with efforts to prepare a people's war, the Reichswehr modernized its main force. Mechanization of the army was part of a more encompassing program, and the creation of tank formations was initially a subordinate element in improving overall mobility. But tank warfare became increasingly important, and by 1929, formed the main thrust of army modernization.83 The organizational and operational outlook for the incipient tank forces was initially shaped by French experience and led to the assessment that “the main purpose of the tank consist[s] in the direct support of the infantry advance.”84 This conclusion quickly changed with the evaluation of English maneuvers with armored forces. By late 1926 a directive set forth that tank units could be separated from a “slowly moving infantry” and that tanks could be best used either in conjunction with “mobile [schnell bewegliche] troops or as independent units.”85 This concept of turning either motorized infantry or tank units into the main assault troops of the army was grist to the mill of the operational planners. An army that set a premium on using the few soldiers it had in fighting units abhorred the idea of motorized units as part of the supply train. The turning point came in January 1927, when the operations section under Werner von Fritsch concluded that the principles of tank warfare had to be rethought. “Armored, quickly moving tanks most probably will become the operationally decisive offensive weapon [schlachtentscheidende Angriffswaffe]. From an operational perspective this weapon will be most effective, if concentrated in independent units like tank brigades.”86 By 1929 the training section of the Truppenamt under Werner von Blomberg had worked out training schedules for operationally independent tank regiments. The general staff, led by the “Young Turks” around Stülpnagel and Blomberg and supported by specialists like Bockelberg (procurement, weapons development) as well as Heinz Guderian (weapons inspectorate) wholeheartedly embraced the concept of decision-oriented, operationally independent tank warfare.87
冯·拉贝瑙少校在其著作《物资密集型战争条件下的作战机动性》中，对当时的先进技术进行了最佳的总结。<sup>88</sup>他试图将一场人民战争——他称之为“人民战争” （Krieg der Nadelstiche） ——与一支高度机动、机械化和装甲化的部队结合起来，形成一种新的综合体。拉贝瑙仍然倾向于以反击为主的进攻，但这部由西克特未来的传记作者撰写的著作，展现了即使在较为传统的军官中，20世纪20年代中期人们的想象力也能达到何种程度。该书强调了前线的瓦解，以及进攻推进向独立运作、持续移动和轮换的部队体系的转变。这些部队不再遵循既定的作战模式，而是以机动性、火力协同以及对战术和作战机会的利用为特征。在这个自由移动的体系中，指挥和权威开始呈现出不同的形态。主要任务不再是实际部署和直接控制部队的行动，而是通过沟通进行协调。
The state of the art was best summarized in a book-length study on “operational mobility under conditions of material-intensive warfare” by Major von Rabenau.88 He sought to combine a people's war—what he called the Krieg der Nadelstiche—with a highly mobile, mechanized and armored force in a new synthesis. Rabenau still favored a mostly counterforce-oriented attack, but this study, written by the future biographer of Seeckt, shows how far the imagination could stretch in the mid-1920s even among more traditionally inclined officers. The book emphasized the dissolution of front lines as well as the transformation of the offensive thrust into a system of independently operating, continuously moving and shifting units that no longer followed set operational patterns but was characterized by mobility and movement in conjunction with firepower, and by the exploitation of tactical and operational opportunities. In this system of freely moving parts, command and authority began to take a different shape. The main task became coordination through communication rather than actual deployment and direct control of movement.
人民战争和机动装甲攻击是青年土耳其党人对德国无法像1914年以来那样继续运作的回应。然而，这一切最终都化为泡影，尽管并非由于制度上的迟缓。新的设计与德国的国内条件格格不入。他们提出的全民征兵和短期训练的前提是国家拥有并不存在的凝聚力。德国社会的阶级分化限制了所有建立军事民族共同体的努力。坦克的发展也遇到了类似的问题。在1928年至1932年间，德国军队预计需要大约7亿帝国马克的预算，但实际采购预算只有4.5亿，大规模机械化根本无法实现。理想情况下，武器监察局计划在第一阶段准备阶段投入360万帝国马克，采购6000辆车辆和800至1000辆坦克；第二阶段投入2.35亿帝国马克；第三阶段投入超过10亿帝国马克。90魏玛共和国不可能在不造成财政混乱的情况下负担得起这支机械化军队。
People's war and mobile, armored attacks were the response of the Young Turks to the discovery that Germany could not act as though nothing had changed since 1914. Yet all came to naught, although not for reasons of institutional sluggishness. The new designs were incompatible with the domestic conditions in Germany. The proposed levée en masse and short-term training assumed a cohesion of the nation that did not exist. The class divisions of German society imposed limits on all efforts to create a military Volksgemeinschaft.89 Tank development ran into similar problems. In an army that expected roughly 700 million Reichsmarks but could spend only 450 million for procurement between 1928 and 1932, large-scale mechanization was out of reach. Ideally the weapons inspectorate had planned for six thousand vehicles and eight hundred to one thousand tanks at an initial cost of 3.6 million Reichsmarks for the first preparatory stage, 235 million for the second, and over one billion for the third.90 The Weimar Republic could not possibly pay for this mechanized army without creating budgetary havoc.
青年土耳其党人吸取了1923年的教训，意识到必须依靠魏玛共和国现有的体制；共和国领导人表现得十分通融，甚至乐于接受士兵们的计划。然而，人民战争和军队机械化很快就与分裂社会中多元政治妥协所造成的障碍发生了冲突。为了实现目标，军事策划者不得不挑战这些妥协。简而言之，德国的军事安全与魏玛共和国的政治稳定是无法兼容的。
The Young Turks had learned the lesson of 1923 that one had to rely on the existing structure of the Weimar Republic; the republican leaders proved to be accommodating, even eager to embrace what the soldiers had planned.91 But people's war and army mechanization quickly ran afoul of the obstacles created by pluralist political compromises in a divided society. In order to pursue their goals, the military planners had to attack these compromises. In short, military security for Germany was incompatible with the political stability of the Weimar Republic.
德国的军事安全与维护其国内和国际现状是相互排斥的。这是20世纪20年代两大战争控制实验——塞克特的传统方法和施图尔普纳格尔及其同僚的激进方法——所得出的主要结论（当然，其目的始终是打仗）。这种不兼容性再次引发了人们的质疑：纯粹依靠军事手段来保障国家安全并可能对战后秩序进行修正，是否从一开始就是错误的做法？德国的权力政治似乎陷入了僵局，魏玛共和国的政治家们试图在战后秩序框架内打破现状的所有努力都以失败告终。92
The military security of Germany and the maintenance of the country's national and international status quo were mutually exclusive. This was the main lesson of the two major experiments of the 1920s—the traditional approach by Seeckt and the radical departure by Stülpnagel and his associates—in controlling war (always, of course, with the intent to fight it). Once again, this incompatibility raised the issue whether the purely military path to national security and potential revision of the postwar order was not the wrong approach in the first place. It seemed that German power politics had reached an impasse, and indeed all efforts by Weimar politicians to overcome the status quo within the context of the postwar order were frustrated.92
面对日益严峻的形势，以及初现的经济危机迹象，德国做出了最后的尝试，试图理解德国的军事传统和战后世界的战略形势。格罗纳是施利芬传统的坚定支持者之一，他提出了对德国战略的新视角。93他的评估简明扼要。德国既没有社会，也没有经济，更没有后勤保障来应对一场旷日持久的消耗战。一旦开战，德国必须迅速果断地采取行动，以便在冲突爆发之前就将其结束。国防军无法打一场“真正的”，也就是欧洲战争。94
Against growing odds, and faced with the first signs of an incipient economic crisis, a last attempt was made to come to grips with both the German military tradition and the strategic conditions of the postwar world. Groener, known as one of the staunchest supporters of the Schlieffen tradition, proposed a new look at German strategy.93 His assessment was brief and blunt. Germany possessed neither the society, nor the economy, nor the logistics to contemplate a long, attritional defensive war. In case of war, it had to act quickly and decisively in order to bring the conflict to an end almost before it had started. The Reichswehr could not fight a “real,” that is to say, a European war.94
格罗纳及其在国防军政治部（Ministeramt）的幕僚得出的结论令人震惊。由于魏玛德国在某些情况下根本无法发动战争，因此必须避免这些情况。之所以有人接受这一建议，是因为总参谋部斯图尔普纳格尔周围的“青年土耳其党”成员的计划已经彻底失败。这些严肃认真的军官们通过两次战争演习检验了他们的计划。结果惨不忍睹。进攻方在两线作战中歼灭了德军，即使是波兰的集中进攻也超出了德军的能力范围。尽管斯图尔普纳格尔和布隆贝格仍然对这些结果持怀疑态度，但格罗纳及其政治幕僚得出结论：在两线作战中，任何手段都无法避免失败，而且军事职业不应该提出自杀式的作战行动；国家的存亡比军事偏好更为重要。96布隆伯格和斯图尔普纳格尔都指责格罗纳不了解强权政治的本质，认为每个国家都有“义务”保护自己免受“军事掠夺”。97外交部反驳说，这些军官既不了解20世纪20年代的国际事务，也不了解德国的利益，更不了解德国的复兴进程。
The conclusions that Groener and his staff in the Ministeramt, the political office of the Reichswehr, reached were startling. Because there were situations in which Weimar Germany simply could not wage war, it was necessary to avoid them. Such a suggestion could be accepted only because the Young Turks around Stülpnagel in the general staff had hit rock bottom with their own designs. Serious officers that they were, they had put their plans to the test of two war games. The results were devastating. The attacking armies annihilated the German forces in a two-front war, and even a concentrated Polish attack proved to be beyond German capabilities.95 Although Stülpnagel and Blomberg remained unconvinced by these results, Groener and his political staff concluded that nothing could stave off defeat in a two-front war, and that it was not up to the military profession to propose suicidal operations; the survival of the nation was more important than military predilections.96 Both Blomberg and Stülpnagel accused Groener of not understanding the nature of power politics, in which each nation had the “duty” to defend itself against “military rape.”97 The Ministeramt countered that these officers neither understood the nature of international affairs in the 1920s, nor German interests, nor the processes of German recovery.
在德国国防部看来，只要德法两国在财政上依赖美国，两国之间爆发战争的可能性就微乎其微。98在经济强国中，信用比民族主义更为重要。此外，在美国的指导下实现经济复苏，可以成为德国重新武装的先决条件，而无需在德国国内引发灾难性的预算重新分配斗争。波兰的情况则截然不同。在国防部看来，波兰融入国际网络的程度较低，更容易爆发民族冲突，也更容易成为德国进攻的合法目标。格罗纳表示，波兰战争是他唯一准备发动的战争，但要取得胜利，战争规模必须缩小到德国的能力范围之内。99就波兰的边境入侵而言，速度是决定性因素。为此，需要在48小时内动员一支“部分加强的国防军”，以便在边境地区迅速而果断地歼灭波兰军队。100发动大规模进攻则更为困难。针对“毕苏斯基方案”的准备工作涵盖了波兰入侵和德国进攻波兰两种情况，前提是“出现有利的政治形势”——即波兰内部崩溃。<sup>101</sup>鉴于德国在面对波兰的直接进攻时处于劣势，正如战争演习所表明的那样，简单的作战应对措施不足以奏效。格罗纳转而主张采取一种类似于施利芬的权宜之计，但将其应用于20世纪20年代的实际情况。由此，一种常规威慑方案应运而生。
In the Ministeramt's view, there was little chance for war between Germany and France as long as both depended financially on the United States.98 Among economically strong nations credit was more important than nationalism. Economic recovery under American tutelage, moreover, could become the prerequisite for rearmament without politically disastrous struggles for budgetary redistribution in Germany. Things were quite different with Poland, which in the Ministeramt's view was less well integrated into international networks, more prone to national outbursts, and also formed a more legitimate target for a German attack. A Polish war was the one war that Groener was ready to fight, but to fight it successfully the war had to be scaled down to German capabilities.99 In the case of Polish border incursions, speed was the decisive element. To this end, a “partly reinforced Reichswehr” needed to be mobilized in 48 hours in order to annihilate the Polish forces in a quick and decisive sweep in the border area.100 A major attack was a more difficult matter. The preparations for this case, Fall Pilsudski, covered both a Polish invasion and an attack by Germany on Poland, “if a favorable political situation should arise”—that is, an internal Polish collapse.101 Given German inferiority in the face of a direct Polish assault, a straightforward operational response would not suffice, as the war games had shown. Groener argued instead for an expedient in the spirit of Schlieffen, but applied to the conditions of the 1920s. A scenario for conventional deterrence thus emerged.
立即部署武装力量进行反击，旨在防止初步遭遇演变为全面战争，因为此次反击表明德国不愿接受对其主权的侵犯；也因为此次反击还能防止德国领土被占领而造成既成事实；最后，也因为此次反击展现出的自卫能力能够威慑其他国家，使其不敢干涉德国，并鼓励相关国家基于对德国的契约义务，运用其影响力支持德国。102
The deployment of the armed forces in an immediate counterstrike [Gegenschlag] is meant to keep an initial encounter from developing into a full-scale war, insofar as this counterassault shows that Germany is not willing to accept a violation of its sovereignty; insofar as it also prevents a fait accompli by the occupation of German territory; finally, insofar as our demonstrated capacity for self-defense deters other nations from intervening against us and encourages interested nations to use their influence in our favor on the basis of contractual responsibilities towards us.102
成功取决于三个因素。首先，必须通过防御性撤退来延缓波兰主力部队的进攻，这是陆军和民兵联合部队的任务。其次，必须准备反击，但反击的目标并非歼灭敌军，而是警示国际社会。为此，德国动用了其唯一优于波兰的要素——海军。海军策划人员奉命准备对格丁尼亚发动海上攻击。这次突袭旨在引起国际社会对德国主权遭到侵犯以及对欧洲稳定构成潜在威胁的足够关注，从而产生结束冲突所需的压力。冲突的第三阶段将在国际联盟展开。德国外交部和内政部都希望通过谈判达成有利于经济实力更强的德国的和平协议。103
Success depended on three factors. First, a Polish main-force assault had to be slowed down by a defensive retreat, which was the task of the combined main army and militia forces. Second, a counterstrike had to be prepared, which, however, could not aim at the annihilation of the enemy forces. Instead, the counterassault had the purpose of alerting the international community. To that end, the one element in which Germany was superior to Poland, the navy, was employed. Naval planners were ordered to prepare a naval attack against Gdynia. This immediate assault was intended to draw sufficient international attention to the violation of German sovereignty and the potential dangers to European stability, thus generating the pressure needed to end the conflict. The stage for the third phase of the conflict would then be the League of Nations. The Ministeramt as well as the Foreign Office expected a negotiated peace in favor of the economically stronger nation—Germany.103
格罗纳的策略打破了德国的战略思维，回归到施利芬“短期战争”理念的本质。格罗纳暗示，至少在可预见的未来，德国无法凭借其有限的资源进行独立战争，而且他对传统的联盟战争持高度怀疑态度，因为德国无论如何都没有做好准备。新的“联盟”应该有所不同，以便利用不断扩展的跨国互动网络。他认为德国和美国的经济实力具有优势，并且双方的利益部分一致。<sup>104</sup>虽然他怀疑经济手段能否改变《凡尔赛条约》，但他认为经济手段是一种限制和约束力量，可以被军事弱国所利用。如果能够恰当地利用这一优势，德国就可以摆脱《凡尔赛条约》的束缚，开始积极的复兴进程，在这个进程中，军事力量将再次发挥作用。<sup> 105</sup>他从未将和平关系置于一切之上，但他认为战争的方式不止一种。他的威慑理论将常规军事行动与非军事手段相结合，表明只有将战略政治化，从而放弃对战争的军事控制，才能维持十九世纪的传统。
Groener's approach broke with German strategic thinking by returning to the essentials of Schlieffen's notion of a short war. Groener implied that—at least for the foreseeable future—Germany was unable to fight autonomous wars with its limited resources, and he was highly skeptical of traditional coalition warfare for which Germany was not prepared in any case. New “alliances” should be of a different kind to exploit the expanding web of transnational interactions. He saw advantages and a partial identity of interests in German and American economic power.104 Although he doubted the potential of economic means to revise the Versailles settlement, he considered them to be a limiting and constraining force that could be exploited by the militarily weak. If this advantage was properly used, Germany could slip away from the Treaty of Versailles and begin an active process of renewal in which military force would, once again, reassert itself.105 He never favored peaceful relations above all else, but he saw more than one way to wage war. His deterrence doctrine, combining conventional military operations with nonmilitary means, suggested that the nineteenth-century tradition could be maintained only by politicizing strategy and hence by abandoning the military control of war.
这种战略上的“新面貌”在其少数拥护者之外鲜有共鸣。德国军官群体普遍不愿分享军事控制权，这或许最能体现当时军官群体的政治情绪。大多数军官并非特别保守，但他们是正统的军人，主要关注的是军队的自主性、特定军事身份的形成，以及在瞬息万变的战争环境下保持制定作战计划和执行作战的特殊技能。在1933年那种情绪化的氛围下，建立一个现代化但又自主的军事机构，并回归以作战为中心的战略，似乎仍然是可行的。
The strategic “new look” found little sympathy outside of its small circle of exponents. The German officer corps at large was not ready to share military control, which is perhaps the strongest indication of the political mood in the officer corps at the time. The majority of officers was not particularly conservative, but they were orthodox soldiers whose main concern was the autonomy of the military, the formation of a specific military identity, and the preservation of the special skills of planning and fighting war under rapidly changing conditions of warfare. In the emotional climate of 1933, the creation of a modernized yet autonomous military institution and the return to an operation-centered strategy still seemed feasible.
战后，人们不再像以往那样务实地努力应对战后局势，而是沉溺于军事怀旧之中。战争回归纯粹的军事领域，恰逢世界经济危机导致国内外局势动荡，格罗纳“新面貌”的政治基础也随之瓦解。国际危机为重塑国家和国际社会开辟了新的可能性，但在德国，它却强化了社会中好战和专制的势力。这些势力塑造了德国的应对方式，使其倾向于军事修正主义。仿佛军方已经放弃了解决魏玛共和国困境的努力。他们转而缅怀更美好的过去，同时更加咄咄逼人地向社会、政府和经济索取资源，以弥合幻想与现实之间的鸿沟。军方领导人曾尝试各种权宜之计来克服德国的弱点，最终却发现，真正能够再次发动战争的，并非“战略”，而是更多的武器和士兵。军备局进入第三帝国时，其坚定目标是恢复过去，以便应对未来的战争。106重整军备，除此之外几乎别无其他，成为接下来几年里最重要的议题。
Military nostalgia replaced realistic efforts to come to grips with the postwar situation. The return to war as an exclusively military domain coincided with the breakup of domestic and international stability caused by the world economic crisis, which destroyed the political basis for Groener's “new look.” While the international crisis opened up new possibilities for reordering national and international society, in Germany it strengthened the militant and authoritarian parts of society. These shaped the German response in favor of military revisionism. It was as if the military had given up trying to solve the Weimar dilemma. Instead they reverted to a better past and became, at the same time, more combative in demanding from society, government, and the economy the means that would allow them to close the gap between fantasy and reality. Military leaders had experimented with various expedients to overcome German weakness, only to discover that not “strategy,” but more arms and more soldiers was the surest way to reach the point at which wars could be fought again. The Truppenamt entered the Third Reich with the firm intent of restoring the past in order to fight the wars of the future.106 Rearmament, and little else, became the major issue of the following years.
随着纳粹党的崛起，军国主义情怀被进一步强化，并带有强烈的攻击性。国防军与纳粹党领导层之间的权宜婚姻，首先是因为希特勒承诺实现军队“庞大军队”的梦想。大多数高级军官并不喜欢希特勒的民粹主义，也不喜欢准军事组织（冲锋队）领导人的自信以及其士兵的粗野作风，但希特勒保证重新武装，新政府随即开始履行这一承诺。军官们很快就被说服，相信新政府对他们有利，从而对德国有利。107在短暂的一段时间里，军队仿佛置身于两全其美的境地。最初顺从温顺的纳粹党领导层——谁听说过德国总理会亲自出席军官大会，向他们宣传其政府的种种好处呢？108——通过镇压一切阻碍军事重建的因素，甚至包括其自身的准军事群众，提供了所需的财政、物资和人力资源。军官团也获得了德国前所未有的自主权，这使得军官们能够充分发挥自身技能重建军队。在夺取政权后的最初六个月经历了一段短暂的动荡期后，总参谋部在这些初期成为重整军备计划、作战理念和战略构想的唯一来源。109
Military nostalgia was given an additional aggressive edge with the National Socialist rise to power. The marriage of convenience between Reichswehr and National Socialist leadership occurred, first, because Hitler promised to fulfill the military dream of a “large army.” Most of the senior officers did not particularly like Hitler's populism or, for that matter, the self-confidence of the paramilitary (SA) leaders and the rowdy style of their rank and file, but Hitler guaranteed rearmament and the new government immediately began to fulfill this promise. Little more was required to convince the officers that the new government was good for them and thus good for Germany.107 For a brief moment the military lived in the best of all worlds. An initially subordinate and docile National Socialist leadership—who had ever heard of a German chancellor attending an assembly of officers to convince them of the benefits of his government?108—provided the financial, material, and personal resources needed by repressing everything that stood in the way of military recovery, even including its own paramilitary mass-following. The officer corps also gained a degree of autonomy unheard of in German, which allowed officers to use all their skills in rebuilding the army. After a short period of insecurity in the first six months following the seizure of power, the general staff became the exclusive source of rearmament plans, operational concepts, and strategic visions during these early years.109
但从一开始，士兵和国家社会主义者对战争的看法就截然不同。他们的冲突不能简单地定义为保守主义与国家社会主义世界观之间的冲突，也不能简单地定义为军事修正主义与国家社会主义领导层更为激进的野心之间的对立，例如希特勒梦想通过征服和剥削东方的“生存空间”来建立一个种族主义帝国。更根本的原因在于，尽管党强调政权作为一种旨在征服和统治的政治体系的战斗动力，但军队则强调对暴力的制度化控制。
But from the beginning soldiers and National Socialists thought differently about war. Their conflict cannot simply be defined as a clash between conservative and National Socialist world views, of military revisionism opposed to the more radical ambitions of the National Socialist leadership, such as Hitler's dream of establishing a racist empire by conquering and exploiting “living space” in the East. More fundamental was the fact that, while the Party stressed the militant dynamics of the regime as a political system geared to conquest and domination, the army emphasized the institutional control of violence.
纳粹分子准备提供军事行动所需的资源，但他们始终不愿完全服从军方策划的战争指令。他们奉行另一种模式，将军事力量的使用置于国家动员之下，从而为战争创造了一种全新且独特的理由。对军方而言，战争是巧妙地准备和利用一个统一且原本沉默的社会所提供的“原材料”；而对纳粹分子而言，战争是一种生活方式。对他们来说，军事行动只是更为宏大的征服战略中的一个具体任务。摧毁潜在敌人的武装力量仅仅是创造新的德意志优等民族的第一步。
The National Socialists were prepared to provide the resources for military action, but they were never ready to accept complete subordination to the imperatives of a war planned by the military. They followed a different model, which subordinated the military use of force to the mobilization of the nation, thus creating a new and distinct rationale for war. For the military, fighting war was a matter of skillfully preparing and using the “raw material” provided by a unified and otherwise silent society; for the National Socialists war was a way of life. For them military action was only one specific task in a more encompassing strategy of conquest. The destruction of the armed power of potential enemies was merely the first step in creating a new German master race.
这种种族主义激进主义源于第一次世界大战中“全面动员”的意识形态和实践。<sup>110</sup>然而，它也成为国家社会主义领导层摆脱以鲁登道夫为代表的技术官僚军事独裁统治的工具。他们坚持为激进社会争取自主权，这标志着技术官僚精英统治与激进民粹主义起义之间的区别。因此，国家社会主义战争与欧洲精英陆地战争的传统截然不同。国家社会主义战争是为了通过摧毁被征服的社会来实现社会重建。对被征服人民的绝对自由支配权是为了维护和保障德国人的社会生活和组织。随着国家社会主义领导人努力发动战争，恐怖主义种族主义成为其政治的本质。在他们看来，这是第三帝国战争能力的基础，正如扩张是战争的主要目标一样。<sup> 111</sup>
This racist militancy grew out of the ideology and practice of “total mobilization” in World War I.110 Yet it also became the vehicle with which the National Socialist leadership emancipated itself from the technocratic military dictatorship, exemplified by Ludendorff. Their insistence upon autonomy for a militant society marked the difference between technocratic elite rule and militant populist insurgence. Thus, National Socialist war was radically different from the elite traditions of European land warfare. National Socialist war was war for the sake of social reconstruction through the destruction of conquered societies. Total discretionary power over subjugated people was to maintain and guarantee the social life and organization of the Germans. A terrorist racism became the essence of National Socialist politics as its leaders strove toward war. In their mind, it was the foundation on which the war-making capabilities of the Third Reich rested, just as its expansion was the major goal that the war would achieve.111
尽管国家社会主义者和军方对战争的理解——两者都源于总体战的经验——截然不同，但它们却相互依存。国家社会主义者和军方在争夺战争控制权的过程中各自为政，但为了使战争成为可能，他们又紧密地联系在一起。如果说军方需要全国动员才能发动战争，那么纳粹就需要军事力量来巩固其种族主义统治。国家社会主义领导人对军事力量的依赖赋予了军方领导层优势，只要他们能够维持对作战计划的垄断，这种优势就得以保持，即便像党卫军这样的国家社会主义武装力量崛起也无济于事。然而，这种垄断取决于总参谋部能否准确评估德国的作战能力。正是这种微妙的平衡塑造了国家社会主义领导层与军方之间的关系。只有当高级军官开始质疑战争是否真的可行时，国家社会主义者才能开始实施他们通过征服进行民族净化的目标，或者如我们所说的，末日战争。
Although National Socialist and military conceptions of war, each emerging from the experience of total war, differed radically, they depended on each other. As much as National Socialists and the military were kept apart in their struggle over the control of war, they were held together by the effort of making war feasible. If the military needed national mobilization to wage war, the Nazis needed the military instrument to secure racist rule. The dependence of National Socialist leaders on the military instrument gave the military leadership an advantage that they preserved as long as they could maintain their monopoly over operational planning, the rise of National Socialist military forces like the SS notwithstanding. Such a monopoly depended, however, on the general staff's ability to assess accurately Germany's capability to fight war. This was the tenuous balance that shaped the relations between the National Socialist leadership and the military. Only when leading officers began to question whether war was feasible at all could the National Socialists begin to put into practice their goals of national purification through conquest or, as we have called it, apocalyptic war.
矛盾的是，对作为主要军事力量的军队建立起牢固的专业控制，反而是纳粹统治第一年最重要的成果。<sup> 112</sup>为了实现这种控制，德国国防军（Reichswehr）做好了充分的准备。在路德维希·贝克（Ludwig Beck）1933年至1938年担任总参谋长期间，军队出版了另一部精辟的手册《部队指挥》 （ Truppenführung），指导军事计划和战争准备工作。<sup>113</sup>该手册回归了经典的运动战争理论，同时又没有忽视不断变化的技术条件。它强调炮兵和步兵的重要性，但也关注坦克部队。事实上，它将坦克称为战场上的主要武器。在评估德国的战略形势和最有可能爆发的战争时，该手册对进攻和防御的优劣给出了异常平衡的观点。然而，最重要的是，该手册强调在计划和执行的各个层面上都要采取系统的方法，这需要“深入的思考，涵盖战争的所有可能性”。唯有如此，作战计划和执行才真正成为一项专业活动，即“建立在科学基础上的自由而富有创造性的事业”。《部队指挥》将专业战略的精髓提炼为既富有创造性又严格控制，既是艺术性的又是科学性的事业。它是德国战略理想主义复兴的最鲜明例证之一。
Paradoxically, the establishment of firm professional control over the army as the main military service was the most important outcome of the first year of Nazi rule.112 For such control the Reichswehr was well prepared. Under Ludwig Beck's tenure as chief of the general staff between 1933 and 1938, the army published yet another incisive manual, Truppenführung, which guided military planning and the preparation for war.113 It returned to the classical doctrines of a war of movement without neglecting changing technological conditions. It emphasized artillery and infantry, but paid attention to tank forces as well. Indeed, it referred to tanks as the leading (tonangebend) weapon in the battle zone. In assessing the strategic situation of Germany and the wars most likely to be fought, it provided an unusually balanced view of the merits of offense and defense. Most of all, however, the manual stressed a systematic approach to operations on all levels of planning and execution that demanded a “penetrating intellectual effort that covers all potentialities of war.” Only this effort made planning and execution of operations into a truly professional exercise, that is, “the free and creative undertaking that rests on a scientific basis.” Truppenführung distilled the essence of professional strategy as creative yet rigorously controlled, an artistic yet scientifically based undertaking. It was one of the clearest examples of the revival of German strategic idealism.
该手册也塑造了总参谋部对潜在战争的看法。总参谋部几乎将其视为一项原则，坚持欧洲战区作战计划和指挥的统一性。欧洲体系的连贯性构成了以一体化军事方式应对强权政治的前提，因此不应将其与作战管理人员的“最坏情况设想”混淆。《部队指挥》一书 对战争的分析基于原则，而非基于对军事理论和行动的选项式评估。欧洲战争始终是一场全欧洲战争，而且由于欧洲各国的动员能力，多线战争往往会旷日持久。在这方面， 《部队指挥》的作者与施利芬关于“总体战”（Gesamtschlacht）的整体概念及其所有作战含义划清了界限。与施利芬相反，他们认为现代国防的机动性和欧洲事务的相互关联性不利于从部署中演变而来的整体战争。他们明确警告不要过分强调作战行动的万能性，这很可能是对鲁登道夫1918年攻势的回应。这并非因为他们不相信任何一次作战行动能够成功，而是因为每一次作战都必须放在赢得战争的整体背景下看待。而如今，战争的定义更加全面，它不仅包括歼灭敌军主力，还包括控制敌军的动员能力。《部队指挥》的作者们充分意识到德国在中欧的战略地位，以及多线作战的严峻性——如果想要取得比赢得几场战役更大的成就，就必须采取全面、系统和整体性的策略。他们的观点当然算不上冒险，但德国当时的形势以及军事专业化程度都不允许他们冒太大的风险。
The manual also shaped the outlook of the general staff on a potential war. Almost as a matter of principle, the general staff insisted on the planning and command unity of the European theater of war. The coherence of the European system formed the premise for an integrated military approach to power politics and, as such, should not be confused with “worst-case scenarios” of operational managers.114 Truppenführung provided an analysis of warfare based on principle rather than an option-oriented assessment of military doctrines and actions. War in Europe would always be an all-European war and, due to the mobilization potentials of European nations, a multifront war would tend to be a long war. In this respect, the authors of Truppenführung distanced themselves from Schlieffen's notion of an integral Gesamtschlacht with all the operational implications that followed from it. Contrary to Schlieffen, they concluded that the mobility of modern defense and the interrelatedness of European affairs did not bode well for an integral battle that evolved out of deployment. They explicitly cautioned against the omnipotence of operations, probably in response to Ludendorff's 1918 offensives, not so much because they did not believe in the possible success of any one operation, but because each had to be seen in the overall context of winning a war, which was now defined much more comprehensively as annihilating the enemy's main forces and controlling his mobilization capabilities. The authors of Truppenführung wrote in full awareness of Germany's strategic position in central Europe, and of the gravity of multifront war that necessitated a comprehensive, systematic, and holistic approach, if one wanted to do more than to win a few battles. Their ideas were certainly not adventurous, but neither did the German situation nor the professionalism of the military craft invite taking great risks.
德国总参谋部以同样系统的方式将重整军备视为作战计划的先决条件。它建立了专业的控制和权威，而这又取决于军队在重建计划完成后能否进行可控的战争。这也构成了与纳粹领导人关系的基础。115
The German general staff approached rearmament as a prerequisite for operational planning in the same systematic fashion. It established professional control and authority, which in turn hinged on the capability of the army to wage a controlled war once the rebuilding program was completed. This also formed the basis for relations with the National Socialist leaders.115
到1935年，军队已经迈出了带领第三帝国走出军事防御“风险区”的第一道坎。<sup> 116</sup>此时，总参谋部已经为急于求成付出了一定的代价，它接受了加速重整军备的方案，尽管这与其国际“中立”的重整军备理念并不完全相符。但它保住了自己的权威，同时也向国家社会主义领导人强调了避免在国内和国际上冒险的必要性。<sup> 117</sup>
By 1935, the army had taken the first hurdle on the path of leading the Third Reich out of the “risk zone” of military defenselessness.116 At this point the general staff had already paid a certain price for its desire to move ahead as quickly as possible by accepting an acceleration of rearmament that did not quite fit its ideas of an internationally “neutral” rearmament, but it preserved its authority while impressing on National Socialist leaders the necessity to abstain from domestic and international adventures.117
1935年夏季，总参谋部开始全面备战，与此同时，总参谋部也开始“打造一支具备最高作战能力（Operationsfähigkeit）和进攻潜力（Angriffskraft）的动员军队”，并进一步加快重整军备。<sup>118</sup>历史学家强调了各军种内部围绕坦克部队独立性的摩擦、这项工作的经济后果、四年计划以及征兵制的引入和莱茵兰军事化所引发的国际动荡，但人们往往忽略了部署计划才是组织和准备一支具备进攻能力的军队的核心，并成为未来战争作战计划的基础。<sup> 119</sup>
In the summer of 1935, the general staff began comprehensive preparations for war, which coincided with the “creation of a mobilized army with the highest possible operational capability (Operationsfähigkeit) and offensive potential (Angriffskraft)” and a further acceleration of rearmament originating in the general staff.118 The intraservice friction over the independence of tank forces, the economic consequences of this effort, the Four Year Plan, and the international drama of the introduction of conscription and the militarization of the Rhineland have all been emphasized by historians, but it has often been overlooked that deployment planning formed the focal point for organizing and preparing an army with offensive capabilities, and became the basis for the operational planning of future war.119
陆军两线作战计划自1936年起以“指令”的形式呈现，与重整军备的进展密切相关，尤其与1936年8月生效的新的四年进攻性军备计划紧密相连。<sup> 120</sup>部署计划的结构基本保持不变，而军事能力则随着每年重整军备的推进而不断增强。在此期间，总参谋部准备接受防御战的挑战，但认为进攻行动应等到重整军备计划完成之后再进行，理想情况下是在1940年。<sup> 121</sup>届时，政治领导层可以理性地决定在中欧作战。1938年，距离理想目标日期还有两年——由于重整军备的瓶颈，目标日期被推迟——贝克批评政治领导层的不负责任，他所指的正是部署计划及其两线作战的战略和作战考量。
The army's plans for a two-front war, which were summed up in “directives” from 1936 on, were linked to the progress of rearmament, particularly to a new four-year plan for offensive armament, which was put into effect in August 1936.120 The structure of the deployment plans remained essentially the same from year to year, while military capabilities grew with every yearly increment of rearmament. The general staff was prepared to accept the challenge of defensive war throughout this period, but believed that offensive operations should wait on the completion of the rearmament plan, ideally in 1940.121 At that time the political leadership could rationally decide to fight a war in central Europe. When in 1938—two years short of the ideal target date, which had been delayed due to bottlenecks in rearmament—Beck spoke of the irresponsibility of the political leadership, he had in mind the deployment plan and its strategic and operational calculus of a two-front war.
这种非常特殊的部署计划误导了纽伦堡审判的法官，此后也一直误导着历史学家，因为它以增长为导向，且带有目的论色彩。它假定在欧洲战争中采取战略防御，并在增长阶段在次要战线上采取潜在的进攻行动。然而，在完成重新武装后，它被彻底颠覆，变成了进攻性战争计划，即“在和平时期计划和准备的蓄意战略攻击”。<sup>122</sup>更重要的是，这些部署计划并非应急计划，而是根据德国军事准备阶段而非潜在敌人的意图来制定行动方案，从而构成了一套全面的战争计算。最后，它们确保了总参谋部在从战略防御向战略进攻过渡的过程中对战争的完全控制，因为这一过渡完全由总参谋部根据对不断变化的力量平衡的评估所确定的军事准备情况来界定。这些计划既展现了军方发动进攻性战争的准备，也体现了他们对战争与和平决策的控制权。当德国总参谋部决定战争准备就绪时，德国就会做好战争准备。
This very peculiar kind of deployment planning misled the judges in Nuremberg and has misled historians ever since, because it was growth-oriented and teleological. It assumed a strategic defense in a European war with potential offensive actions on secondary fronts during the growth phase. Upon completion of rearmament, however, it was turned inside out into a plan for offensive warfare, a “deliberate strategic attack, planned and prepared in peacetime.”122 More important, these deployment plans were not contingency plans but, insofar as they prescribed action according to the stages of German military preparedness rather than in response to the intentions of potential enemies, formed a comprehensive calculus for war. Last, they assured the general staff complete control over war in the transition from strategic defense to strategic offense, because this transition was exclusively defined in terms of military preparedness as specified by the general staff's assessments of the shifting balance of power. These plans show the military's readiness to wage offensive war just as much as their insistence on control over decisions concerning war and peace. Germany would be ready for war when the general staff decided that it was.
部署及其专业战争的理论基础取决于国家在适当时间提供必要军事资源的能力。总参谋部不遗余力地推动增加军备。<sup>123</sup>但尽管竭尽全力，德国的实力仍然无法与欧洲其他国家的联合实力相匹敌。随着紧张局势因德国的重新武装而从欧洲中部向外蔓延，这个问题日益凸显。早在1935年部署计划出台之时，希特勒和德国军方领导层就已经开始质疑军队是否能够获得按照专业技术标准进行战争所需的优势。他们始终担忧德国“或许装备精良……但在其他方面却既无防御能力也无进攻能力”。<sup> 124</sup>
Deployment and its rationale of professional warfare depended on the ability of the nation to provide the necessary military means at the appropriate time. The general staff relentlessly pushed for more armaments.123 But despite all efforts, German strengths could not match those of a combination of other European nations. This increasingly became an issue as tensions spread outward from Central Europe in response to German rearmament. At the very moment when deployment plans were introduced in 1935, Hitler and the German military leadership had already begun to question whether the army would every gain the superiority necessary for fighting war according to standards of professional expertise. They were haunted by the fear that Germany “may be well armed…, but otherwise incapable of either defense or offense.”124
这就是1935年武装部队司令部政治办公室首次对总参谋部作战特权发起攻击的起源。该办公室此前被排除在作战计划之外。政治办公室开始探索更为非常规、最终也更“不专业”的作战方式，首先是关于对捷克斯洛伐克发动突袭（代号“舒隆”）的辩论。舒隆计划是一项奇特的演习——它从来就不是应急计划——尽管总参谋部军官最终还是参与了制定，但总参谋部对此持反对态度。舒隆计划是一系列被称为“特别部署计划”（ Sonderfälle ）的先例。这些计划旨在利用偶然的政治形势，从而“提前”使用武力。人们常常忽略的是，这些特别部署计划从来就不是成熟的应急计划；它们的制定是“根据具体政治形势而定”。126很明显，这些计划与总参谋部所坚持的一切完全背道而驰。
This is the origin of the first assault, in 1935, on the operational prerogatives of the general staff, launched by the political office of the Armed Forces Command, which had been excluded from operational planning. The political office began to explore alternative approaches to warfare along more unconventional and, ultimately, “unprofessional” lines, beginning with the debate on a potential surprise attack against Czechoslovakia (code-named Schulung). Schulung was a curious exercise—it was never a contingency plan—that the general staff opposed, even though general staff officers eventually prepared it. Schulung was the forerunner of a whole series of plans that were named Sonderfälle, special deployment plans. They aimed at the exploitation of fortuitous political circumstances that would allow the “premature” use of force.125 It is often overlooked that these Sonderfälle were never meant to be full-fledged contingency plans; their preparation was “ordered in each specific case according to the political situation.”126 It is quite evident that these plans radically contradicted everything the general staff stood for.
围绕这些计划的争论一直持续到1937年，并与武装部队司令部（布隆伯格）和陆军司令部（弗里奇）之间的权力斗争紧密交织在一起。<sup> 127 </sup> 1937年11月5日，这场争论突然而出人意料地达到高潮，尽管时机也格外恰当。当时，希特勒对整个军事计划体系提出了挑战。<sup> 128</sup>元首质疑军队是否能够做好战争准备，并明确表示，出于诸多国内外原因，他准备放弃精心制定的部署计划，转而采取政治和军事上的即兴作战方式。此外，他还威胁要用政治和意识形态的考量来取代部署计划的基本军事逻辑。这是迄今为止对军事作战计划控制权的最严峻挑战。
The debate over these plans continued until 1937 and was closely intertwined with the power struggles between Armed Forces Command (Blomberg) and Army Command (Fritsch).127 It came to a sudden and surprising head, though the moment was exceptionally appropriate, on November 5, 1937, when Hitler challenged the whole system of military planning.128 The Führer questioned whether the military would ever be ready for war, and made it clear that he was prepared, for a number of domestic and international reasons, to skip the carefully crafted deployment plans in favor of politically and militarily improvised warfare. He threatened moreover to replace the underlying military rationale of deployment planning with a mix of political and ideological considerations. This was the most serious challenge, so far, to the military control of operational planning.
作为参谋长，贝克不同意将战争与和平的决策从其“有意义的背景”中剥离出来。 <sup> 129</sup>他并不太关心希特勒关于东方生存空间的构想——这不仅仅是因为他误解了希特勒冗长的阐述。贝克最担心的是军方失去对战略的控制，因此他开始竭力抵制希特勒推行机会主义战略的企图。但是，在反对希特勒的过程中，他也开始意识到德国军队可能永远无法做好战争准备。在试图证明战争不能按照希特勒的方式进行的同时，贝克越来越有力地指出，以专业的方式进行一场大规模战争超出了军队的能力范围。事实上，他的论点与其说是反对希特勒的冒险主义意图，不如说是反对专业战略。贝克的所有论点都指向同一个结论：就经过计算和有针对性地使用武力而言，系统性的作战计划和相应的重新武装已经走到了尽头。130
Beck, as chief of staff, disagreed with the attempt to tear the decision over war and peace from its “meaningful (sinngebend) context.”129 He was less concerned with Hitler's vision of living space in the East—and not simply because he misinterpreted Hitler's rambling elaborations. Most of all Beck feared the loss of military control over strategy, and he began strenuously to counter Hitler's efforts to introduce an opportunistic approach. But, in opposing Hitler, he too began to realize that the German army might never be ready for war. While trying to prove that war could not be fought in Hitler's way, Beck began to indicate more and more forcefully that fighting a major war in a professional manner was beyond the army's capacity. In fact, his arguments spoke more effectively against professional strategy than against Hitler's adventurist intentions. All of Beck's arguments pointed to the conclusion that systematic operational planning and concomitant rearmament had led to a dead end as far as a calculated and instrumental use of force was concerned.130
贝克详尽描述的困境表明，《部队指挥》一书中阐述的职业战争理念面临着根本性的挑战。如果贝克的观点正确，那么军队的自主性就岌岌可危。如果军队不得不依赖自身无法控制、且其评估结果必须与其他方面共享的军事外因素，那么总参谋部对军队和战争的控制能力就会荡然无存。换言之，1937-38年的实际战略问题——能否对捷克斯洛伐克发动一场孤立战争——实际上是第三帝国内部一场根本性权力斗争的议题。这场斗争的核心在于战略的本质。
The dilemmas that Beck described in great detail indicated a fundamental challenge to professional war as outlined in Truppenführung. If Beck was right, the army's autonomy was in jeopardy. If it had to rely on extramilitary factors that it did not control and whose evaluation it had to share with others, the general staff's ability to control the military and war evaporated. In other words, the actual strategic problem in 1937–38, whether or not one could fight an isolated war against Czechoslovakia, was the agenda for one of the basic power struggles in the Third Reich. It was fought as a struggle over the nature of strategy.
然而，此时贝克在军队中已经孤立无援。他被年轻一代的军官边缘化，这些军官不仅更加鲁莽，而且展现出截然不同的作战风格。贝克在演习中反复批评他们“仅仅”追求武器使用最大化。他抱怨说，他们从未学会从连贯的战略角度评估作战行动，只是轻率地执行上级命令，而不去质疑这些命令在战略形势、技术水平以及武器的战备和可用性方面是否可行。他们是技术官僚，而非战略家。<sup> 131</sup>但正是这些军官成为了闪电战的拥护者，而闪电战既非军事技术的产物，也非德国机动进攻理论的产物，而是作战管理吞噬了专业战略，简而言之，是专业战略破产的体现。
At this point, however, Beck was already isolated in the army. He was sidelined by a younger generation of officers, who not only were more reckless, but displayed a profoundly different operational style. Beck repeatedly criticized them during exercises for “simply” maximizing the use of weapons. He complained that they had never learned to evaluate operations within the context of a coherent strategy and that they lightheartedly followed the orders of their superiors instead of questioning whether these orders were at all feasible given the strategic situation, the state of the craft, and the readiness and availability of weapons. They were technocrats rather than strategists.131 But it was these officers who now became the proponents of blitzkrieg, which was neither an outgrowth of military technology nor of the German doctrine of mobile offense, but operational management devouring professional strategy, in short, a manifestation of the strategic bankruptcy of professional strategy.
一套连贯的军事战略的崩溃也为以意识形态来弥补战略规划的不足提供了可能。诚然，着眼于实战的军事技术官僚与以意识形态战争为目标的纳粹分子虽然立场不同，且常常目标相悖，但他们彼此互补，并在关键时刻，当第三帝国从备战转向作战时，达成了一种共生关系。
The collapse of a coherent military strategy also opened up the possibility of introducing ideology as a surrogate for deficient strategic planning. To be sure, military technocrats with their functional outlook and National Socialists with their goal of ideological war remained apart and often were at cross purposes, but they complemented each other and, in crucial moments, when the Third Reich turned from preparing to fighting war, achieved a symbiosis.
第四
IV
经历了前二十年的动荡之后，第二次世界大战将德国的战略推向了末日般的巅峰。国家和国际秩序都建立在岌岌可危的基础之上。维持了几年的秩序假象很快瓦解，各国纷纷寻求通过高度竞争的经济外交来摆脱世界经济危机，并试图不择手段地确保自身利益。英国和法国利用其帝国扩张；纳粹德国最初将目光投向巴尔干半岛，但其野心远不止于此。只有两个强国转向内顾：在斯大林的统治下，苏联致力于推行社会主义和工业化；美国则努力使资本主义对其本国人民而言安全无虞。整个世界似乎正从一体化走向各自为政的经济和社会集团。
After the turmoil of the preceding twenty years, the Second World War brought German strategy to an apocalyptic climax. National and international order had rested on uncertain grounds. The semblance of order that had existed for a few years gave way to a period in which nations sought recovery from the world economic crisis by means of highly competitive economic diplomacy, each trying to ensure its own well-being by using any means at hand. Great Britain and France exploited their empires; National Socialist Germany turned first to the Balkans, but harbored far more ambitious plans. Only two powers turned inward: under Stalin's rule, the Soviet Union concentrated on the effort to implement socialism and industrialization, and the United States strove to make capitalism safe for its own people. The world as a whole seemed to drift away from integration toward segregated economic and social blocs.
在这种动荡的背景下，第三帝国的“战略”在1938年职业战略崩溃后，也同样在各种选项之间摇摆不定。<sup>132</sup>尽管德国领导人追求雄心勃勃的目标，但他们并不确定如何实现这些目标。只有当德国和日本决定发动进攻时——诚然，出于不同的原因，但其全球后果却相似——世界才再次陷入军事对抗。他们的进攻最终针对的是苏联和美国这两个在20世纪30年代崛起为一体化政治和经济集团的国家，这两个国家依靠自身的国家资源来制定和执行反制战略。德国和日本的进攻决定是那个时代的关键事件。它们将分散的战役融合为一场全球战争，并为未来的世界格局奠定了基础。尽管美国和苏联的反应，如同德国和日本一样，都基于特定的国家原因，且绝非对称，但所有这些强国的战略总体上反映了一种新型战争。这场战争旨在重塑世界秩序，而非维护或调整现有的国际关系结构。无论任何特定国家如何努力，这一激进的目标都将主要参战国与法国、英国或意大利等次要国家区分开来。因此，英国无疑发动了一场比除苏联之外任何其他国家都更为“总体战”的战争，但英国发动这场战争的目标却很有限——旨在遏制对其生存的威胁并重建现状。而主要参战国的目标则更为宏大，在许多方面都带有拿破仑式的色彩，即通过摧毁或征服敌人来建立新的国家和国际秩序。在如此无限的目标下，武力的使用演变成了不可调和的意识形态之间的一场灾难性战争。战争无法用欧洲陆地战争的工具性和专业理性来控制，也无法用其传统的限制武力和损失的计算方法来控制。但只有德国超越了这些极端目标，发动了一场真正意义上的末日战争。
In this tumultuous setting, “strategy” in the Third Reich likewise drifted between a variety of options after the collapse of professional strategy in 1938.132 Although German leaders pursued ambitious goals, they were uncertain how to achieve them. Only when Germany and Japan decided to attack—for different reasons, to be sure, but with similar global consequences—was the world brought back together, in military antagonism. Their attack was ultimately directed against those nations, the Soviet Union and the United States, that had emerged from the 1930s as integrated political and economic blocs, relying on their own national resources in formulating and executing a counterstrategy. Germany's and Japan's decisions to attack were the critical acts of the time. They fused disparate campaigns into a global war, and laid the basis for the world to come. Although the reactions of the United States and the Soviet Union, like those of Germany and Japan, were based on particular national reasons and were in no way symmetrical,133 the strategies of all these powers, taken together, reflected a new kind of war. It was a war fought to reorder the world rather than to preserve or adjust existing structures of international relations. This radical objective distinguished the major protagonists from minor powers like France, Great Britain, or Italy, whatever the exertions of any particular nation. Thus, Great Britain undoubtedly fought a more “total” war than any other nation except, perhaps, the Soviet Union, but Britain fought this war for limited goals—to stave off a threat to its existence and to reestablish a status quo. The far-reaching and, in many ways, Napoleonic, goals of the major combatants involved establishing a new national and international order by destroying or subordinating the enemy. With such unlimited goals, the use of force turned into a cataclysmic war between irreconcilable ideologies. Warfare could not be contained by the instrumental and professional rationality of European land warfare nor by its traditional calculus of limiting force and damage. But Germany alone went beyond these extreme goals, fighting a war that was truly apocalyptic.
我们观察到德国末世论情绪的兴起；也就是说，技术官僚式的武力运用与将战争视为民族净化过程的观念并存。在第三帝国，这种末世论被组织成一套战略考量。国家社会主义领导人发动战争，既是向苏联武装力量的扩张性外推，也是一场旨在奴役东欧人民和对被占领欧洲的犹太少数族裔进行灭顶之灾的灭绝战争。这种战争升级的逻辑——只有当整个社会被征服时才会停止——与民族复兴的恐怖主义逻辑相结合，而民族复兴的逻辑只有在一个“净化”后的德国社会确立其在欧洲的霸权地位后才会结束。
We have observed the rise of apocalyptic sentiments in Germany; that is, the mixture of a technocratic use of force coexisting with the concept of war as a process of national purification. In the Third Reich the apocalyptic vision was organized into a strategic calculus. National Socialist leaders fought their war both in an expansionist outward thrust against Soviet armed forces and as a war of annihilation whose twin goals were the enslavement of the eastern European populations and an Armageddon for the Jewish minorities of occupied Europe. The logic of escalatory war, which only came to a halt when whole societies were subordinated, combined with the terrorist logic of national regeneration, which could end only when a purified German society had established its hegemony in Europe.
从这个角度来看，德国战略在针对苏联的巴巴罗萨行动中达到了“顶峰”<sup> 134</sup>。这场行动将征服、种族统治以及将德国社会重塑为一个优等民族的目标融为一体，形成了一个宏大的同心圆运动，将国家所有先前分散且尚处于萌芽阶段的动态力量汇聚到同一个目标上。俄德战争不仅涵盖了前线，还包括战区和后方地区。战争以迅速的包围战、激烈的近距离战斗以及在波兰和俄罗斯发生的蓄意屠杀和种族清洗的形式展开。战争在犹太人隔离区、集中营和灭绝营中进行。战争也在扩张后的德意志帝国核心地区，利用被占领欧洲的物资和人力资源进行。1941年至1943年间，战争的末日景象在东方变成了战略现实<sup> 135</sup> 。
Seen in this way, German strategy reached its “zenith”134 with the Barbarossa campaign against the Soviet Union, where conquest, racist domination, and the reforging of German society into a master race were brought together, linking in a grand concentric movement all the previously disconnected and nascent dynamics of the state against a single target. The Russo-German war encompassed not just the battlefronts, but also the battle zones and the rear areas. It was fought in swift envelopments and cauldron battles and in the murderous and premeditated pogroms in Poland and Russia. It was fought in the ghettos and in the concentration and annihilation camps. And it was fought in the German core of the expanded Reich with the matériel and human resources of occupied Europe. Between 1941 and 1943, the apocalyptic vision of war became strategic reality in the East.135
这场末日般的战争由不同的组织发起，而这些组织之间往往存在着冲突。历史学家不应被他们的竞争和争吵所误导。正如1866年克尼格雷茨的全面战争（Gesamtschlacht）克服了德国陆军指挥官的嫉妒而取得成功一样，一场全面而末日般的战役也在东方展开，并蔓延至西方，尽管这场战争在许多方面同时进行，且这些方面之间常常存在紧张或冲突。前线、后方和国内的各种行动汇聚成一场由单一战略指导的战争，这场战争与其说是关注军事行动本身，不如说是通过征服和灭绝来建立新的国家和国际秩序。
Apocalyptic war was carried on by different organizations that, more often than not, were at odds with each other. Historians should not be misled by their competition and bickering. Just as the Gesamtschlacht at Königgrätz succeeded in 1866 despite the jealousies of German army commanders, so an integral, apocalyptic campaign was waged in the East and extended back into the West, even though it unfolded in many parts, often in tension or conflict with one another. The diverse operations at the front, in the rear, and at home combined into a single war directed by a single strategy that was concerned less with military operations than with establishing a new national and international order through subjugation and extermination.
尽管1942-43年间战局对德国不利，但破坏和灭绝的顶峰直到1943-44年末才到来。当战争的控制权转移到盟军手中时，希特勒及其亲信集中精力，将一切努力集中于一个根本目标：通过缓慢而残酷的撤退，消灭他们眼中的死敌。即便战争的结局在1944年已成定局，第三帝国仍然固守着其最初的末日战争理念。德国民众，无论身处国内还是前线，都对他们的领导人感到失望和警惕，在对战败必然带来的惩罚的恐惧中继续战斗。
Although the tide of war turned against Germany in 1942–43, destruction and extermination did not reach a peak until near the end of 1943–44. When control over the war passed to the Allies, Hitler and his closest associates responded by concentrating and rationalizing their efforts toward a single elemental aim: behind a slow and grinding retreat to destroy those whom it perceived to be its mortal enemies. Even though the outcome of the war had been decided by 1944, the Third Reich clung to is original concept of apocalyptic war, and the German people at home and in the field, disillusioned and wary of their leaders, fought on in the fear of the retribution that they knew defeat would surely bring.
第三帝国时期德国的战略走向并非由一套理性制定的宏伟目标所决定，而是由一系列赌博塑造而成——赌的是军队能否从国家有限的经济基础中获得足够的支持（由于政权不愿在国内实现绥靖和净化目标上做出妥协，这更增加了获取支持的难度）；赌的是政府能否消除人们对其日益增长的欧洲霸权的担忧，并阻止有效的反德联盟的形成。战略上的种种限制塑造了其选择。尽管征服能够增强第三帝国的经济基础和战略疆界，但同时也增加了反德联盟的可能性。每一次作战上的胜利，对军事指挥官而言既是奖励也是目标，同时也提高了战略家的胜算。这是一个不断升级的阶梯，武力的使用既维持了未来战争的能力，也增强了制衡力量。如何摆脱这种困境，成为战略和作战上的主要难题，也促使德国人热衷于承担大胆的风险。
The course of German strategy during the Third Reich was not determined by a set of rationally formulated grand objectives. Instead it was shaped by a series of gambles—gambles on the army's ability to obtain adequate support from the country's limited economic base, which was made more difficult by the regime's unwillingness to compromise its goal of domestic pacification and purification, and on the government's ability to allay concern over its growing domination of Europe and to prevent the formation of effective anti-German alliances. The constraints on strategy shaped its choices. Although conquest would enhance the economic base and strategic perimeters of the Third Reich, it would, at the same time, increase the potential of coalitions against Germany. Every operational success, for military commanders rewarding and a goal in itself, raised the odds for the strategist. It was an escalatory ladder in which the use of force maintained the ability to fight future wars, but also strengthened the countervailing forces. The major strategic and operational problem—to escape this trap—prompted a penchant for taking audacious risks.
争夺生存空间的竞赛在1938年达到了第一个临界点。尚未完成的重整军备运动已经耗尽了现有资源，并超出了德国的经济和财政承受能力。结果，纳粹政权（而非希特勒本人）与德国人民之间的距离开始拉大。除了经济和政治上的紧张局势外，人们还担心第三帝国的潜在对手，特别是英国，会通过重新武装自己或得到美国的增援来改变欧洲的平衡。在集结遏制力量之前，必须尽快放弃中欧狭小的疆域。这些担忧促成了1938年和1939年一系列迅速且军事上“过早”的行动——吞并奥地利、瓜分捷克斯洛伐克的慕尼黑协定以及德国占领布拉格。
The race to conquer living space reached its first threshold in 1938. The still incomplete rearmament drive had exhausted existing resources and was outgrowing German economic and financial potentials. As a result, the distance between the National Socialist regime—though not Hitler—and the German people began to widen. Added to the economic and political strain was the fear that the probable opponents of the Third Reich, especially Great Britain, would tilt the European balance either by rearming themselves or by being reinforced by the United States. The narrow confines of central Europe had to be left behind as quickly as possible, before containing forces could be mobilized. These concerns conditioned the first swift and militarily “premature” actions of 1938 and 1939—the Anschluss of Austria, the Munich agreement to partition Czechoslovakia, and the German occupation of Prague.
1938-39年的战略成功取决于两个条件：欧洲大陆持续分裂成孤立且相互竞争的国家，以及欧洲“边缘”强国对中欧事务的漠视。这两个条件——源于世界经济危机——随着德国第一阶段的扩张而终结。英国对波兰的担保破坏了德国试图主要依靠国内战略建立欧洲大陆帝国的计划，并加剧了爆发欧洲全面战争的阴影。此外，苏联和美国都开始重新审视各自的政策，以应对这场潜在的战争，这使得美国更接近参战的边缘，也促使苏联走上了加剧甚至可能利用“资本主义帝国主义”阵营内部矛盾的道路。136 1939年的战略选择是在中欧爆发全球战争的可能性显而易见的情况下做出的。137当法国和英国试图创造条件，使欧洲地区战争演变为一场具有全球规模的战争时，第三帝国则努力维护其行动自由，并通过先发制人的战争来维护国家社会主义基本战略的总体方向。138
Strategic success in 1938–39 depended on two conditions: the continued fragmentation of continental Europe into isolated and competing states, and the indifference of the great European “rim” powers to central European affairs. Both conditions—a heritage of the world economic crisis—came to an end with this first phase of German expansion. The British guarantee of Poland undermined Germany's attempt to build a Continental empire on a predominantly domestic timetable and raised the specter of a general European war. Moreover, both the Soviet Union and the United States began to reconsider their policies in light of this potential war, drawing America closer to the point of commitment and setting the Soviet Union on a course of heightening and possibly exploiting the contradictions within the “capitalist-imperialist” camp.136 The strategic choices of 1939 were made with the probability of global war in Central Europe clearly in view.137 While France and Britain attempted to create the conditions for a regionalized European war with global dimensions, the Third Reich struggled to maintain its freedom of action and to preserve through preemptive war the overall direction of basic National Socialist strategy.138
1939-1940年战略博弈的本质与表面现象截然不同。尽管法英两国政府公开表态，但实际上他们试图将冲突边缘化，并让德国陷入一场旷日持久的战争，而这场战争的代价是欧洲小国的利益。这种战争将耗尽德国的资源，削弱其制定针对英法两国战略的决策能力。虽然中央战线——将沿莱茵河而非法国领土建立——被冻结，但军事政治包围将迫使德国在东部（波兰）、北部（斯堪的纳维亚）和地中海地区不断深陷于各种次要的冲突之中。139与第一次世界大战的直接战略相比，1939-1940年这种间接战略的新颖之处体现在两个方面。首先，这不过是法英两国政府的权宜之计。两国政府既无准备也无意愿进行全面战争，其支持北欧、南欧和东欧“代理人”的能力也十分有限，无论是提供武器、派遣远征军，还是通过间接手段向僵持的中央战线施压，都难以奏效。其次，这种间接战略始终存在缺陷，因为它从未将苏联纳入其中。因此，一个漏洞被打开，并立即被第三帝国利用。盟军的外围战略在《苏德互不侵犯条约》的反制下土崩瓦解，该条约有效地终结了冷战的包围圈，并削弱了持久战的关键要素——海上封锁。盟军不愿在主线挑战德国，也暴露了其战略的缺陷。因此，第三帝国得以趁机横扫一个又一个次要目标——这一过程始于对波兰的战争（1939年9月），延续至占领挪威（1940年3月至4月），最终以入侵希腊告终。这些战役为第三帝国带来了辉煌的军事胜利，但它们的战略价值仅仅在于抵御了其他势力的干扰，从而巩固了其战略方向。
The essence of the strategic duel of 1939–1940 was belied by appearances. Despite their public declarations, the French and British governments were really seeking to peripheralize the conflict and to draw Germany into a long war, fought on the backs of the small nations of Europe. This kind of war would stretch German resources and reduce the German ability for a decision-seeking strategy against them. While the central front—to be established along the Rhine rather than on French soil—was frozen, military-political envelopment would force Germany ever deeper into sideshows in the east (Poland), the north (Scandinavia), and in the Mediterranean.139 The novelty in this indirect strategy of 1939–1940, contrasted with the direct strategy of World War I, lay in two aspects. First, it was an expedient of the French and British governments which were neither ready nor willing to fight a general war and had only a limited ability to support their “proxies” in northern, southern, and eastern Europe, either by supplying weapons or sending expeditionary forces, or by the indirect means of putting pressure on the frozen central front. Second, this indirect strategy was always incomplete in that it never included the Soviet Union. Thus, a gap opened that was instantly exploited by the Third Reich. The Allied peripheral strategy collapsed under the counterpressure of the Nazi-Soviet pact, which effectively ended cold war envelopment and devalued the key feature of a protracted war—the naval blockade. Allied strategy was unmasked by the reluctance to challenge Germany on the main front. The Third Reich thus gained the opportunity to sweep through one sideshow after another—a process that began with the war against Poland (September 1939), continued with the occupation of Norway (March-April 1940), and ended with the thrust into Greece. These campaigns brought spectacular military victories for the Third Reich, but their strategic value consisted merely in holding the course against diversions.
尽管盟军的间接战略最终被证明是无效的，而且这些外围威胁也被德军迅速而无情地扼杀在萌芽状态，但战争在1939年9月之后仍在继续，这构成了一个关键的战略问题。毕竟，即使是战争的滑稽之处也削弱了德国在东线实现其战略目标的可能性。盟军的封锁，加上美国日益增长的支持，迫使第三帝国依赖苏联，使其偏离了其发动世界末日战争的目标。在德国扩张和种族清洗之前，与英国争夺欧洲霸权的战争，从军事角度来看是不可行的，而从希特勒的角度来看，则是毫无意义的。140
As ineffective as the Allied indirect strategy proved to be, and as ruthlessly and quickly as these peripheral dangers were nipped in the bud by the German army, the fact that the war continued after September 1939 posed a critical strategic problem. After all, even the drôle de guerre diminished Germany's chances of achieving its strategic objective in the East. The Allied blockade, reinforced by growing American support, pushed the Third Reich into dependence on the Soviet Union, away from its goal of apocalyptic war. A war with Great Britain over hegemony in Europe, fought prior to the expansion and racial purification of Germany was, from a military perspective, not feasible and from Hitler's perspective, pointless.140
这种困扰影响了“黄色行动”的准备工作，以及随之而来的令人费解的、断断续续的决策过程，这种过程持续到1940年5月之前的几个月。<sup>141</sup>作战计划的争议性和最终方案的冒险性掩盖了战略意图的矛盾性。毫无疑问，法国必须被“中立化”，这是争取生存空间的大规模战役的先决条件。从作战层面来看，这十分困难，但战略问题与其说是来自法国，不如说是来自英国。主要的战略目标是通过剥夺英国的欧洲盟友来获得英国对建立德意志大陆帝国的认可，<sup> 142</sup>从这个角度来看，结束战争第一阶段的战役，无论多么壮观，都是一次战略上的失败。尽管法国与比荷卢三国部分被占领、部分被中立化，尽管欧洲大陆落入第三帝国的霸权之下，但英国在英联邦和美国的帮助下，在不列颠战役中击退了德国的直接军事进攻，并抵制了德国的和平试探。143
This vexation shaped the preparations for Operation Yellow and the attendant, and perplexing, stop-and-go decision making that continued for months before May 1940.141 The contentious nature of operational planning and the adventurous character of the final scheme have obscured the ambivalence of the strategic intent. No doubt France had to be “neutralized” as a prerequisite of the great campaign for living space. Operationally this was difficult, but the strategic problem was posed less by France than by Great Britain. The main strategic objective was to gain British consent for a German Continental empire by stripping Britain of its European allies,142 and from this perspective the campaign that ended the first phase of the war, however spectacular, was a strategic failure. Though France, together with the Benelux countries was partly occupied and partly neutralized, and though continental Europe fell under the hegemony of the Third Reich, Britain, helped by the Commonwealth and the United States, fought off a direct military attack in the battle of Britain and resisted German peace feelers.143
事实上，敦刻尔克大撤退后，英国通过让美国更深入地参与英国的军事行动，迈出了扭转战争整体平衡的第一步。正是英国，而非拿破仑，开始将“世界”联合起来对抗德国霸权下的欧洲。英国通过阻止德国取得战略上的成功，为即将到来的全球战争埋下了伏笔。当德国庆祝其胜利，其民众以及军事和工业精英对希特勒的领导能力和战略才能表现出近乎无限的信任时，战略上的劣势再次超过了作战上的成功。德国根本没有为全球战争做好准备，而且时间对它不利。战争升级的陷阱再次开始收紧，就像1916年至1918年那样。可以说，日本几乎在同一时期也陷入了几乎相同的困境。尽管战争的头两年取得了成功，但第三帝国始终未能摆脱这样一个困境：扩张的政治和军事战略成本不断超过新获得的霸权地位所带来的收益。
In fact, by engaging the United States ever more deeply in the British effort after Dunkirk, Britain took the first step in reversing the overall balance of the war. It was Great Britain, as against Napoleon, that began to draw together the “world” against a Europe under German hegemony. By denying strategic success to Germany, Britain set the stage for the global war to come. While Germany celebrated its victories, its people as well as its military and industrial elites showing almost unlimited trust in Hitler's capacities as leader and strategist, the strategic odds once again began to outrun operational successes. Germany was simply not prepared for global war, and time was against it. The trap of escalatory war began to close again, as it had in 1916–1918. Japan, it may be said, found itself in an almost identical predicament at almost the same time. However successful the first two years of the war, the Third Reich never came close to escaping the dilemma posed by the fact that the political and military-strategic costs of expansion continuously outran the benefits of a newly gained hegemonic position.
德国在其鼎盛时期却已落后。事实上，1940年德国的战略地位比两次世界大战之间的任何时期都更加岌岌可危。考虑到德国在1935年之前自诩毫无防备，以及其在1938年至1940年间取得的非凡军事成就，这或许令人惊讶。然而，在过去，军事上的弱点总是能被经济实力，甚至是经济主导地位，以及苏联、美国或两者的默许支持所弥补。到1940年，德国虽然已经称霸欧洲，但却面临着英国、美国和苏联的全球性冲突。希特勒是少数几个能够清晰认识到这些新形势的人之一。他认为，欧洲旧有的核心区域太小，也太脆弱，无法支撑全球冲突。144 要想在全球范围内投射力量，就必须拥有比“旧”欧洲大得多的基地，并更密集地使用毁灭性手段。
At the height of its power, Germany was falling behind. In fact, Germany's strategic position in 1940 was more tenuous than at any time in the interwar years. This may seem surprising in view of Germany's self-acclaimed defenselessness until 1935 and its extraordinary military feats between 1938 and 1940. However, in the past military weaknesses had always been balanced by economic strength, even dominance, and by the tacit support of either the Soviet Union, the United States, or both. By 1940 Germany had achieved hegemony in Europe, but faced Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union in what was now a global conflict. Hitler was one of the few to see these new conditions clearly. He argued that the old core of Europe was too small and too vulnerable to sustain global conflict.144 A much larger base than the “old” Europe and a much more intensive use of the means of destruction were necessary to project force on a global scale.
第三帝国的基本战略决策是如何应对这一挑战。其中一个选项——巩固其对欧洲核心地区的霸权——是不可接受的，因为这将使德国成为一个领先的地区强国，但其全球责任却有限，因为它夹在以苏联为主导的欧亚大陆集团和以美国为主导的大西洋-美洲集团之间。<sup> 145</sup>第二个选项是，由欧亚大陆主要强国——德国及其伙伴意大利、作为欧洲大陆主要陆上力量的苏联以及作为东亚支柱的日本——组成联盟，对抗以美洲为大陆中心的英美海上强国。这个选项在1940-1941年间至少被暂时考虑过，尽管它与希特勒征服东方生存空间的意识形态目标相悖。<sup>146</sup>第三个选项符合长期以来关于一场旨在征服生存空间和净化德意志民族的末日战争的设想。该方案于1940年12月根据第21号指令，即巴巴罗萨行动选定。147
The basic strategic decision for the Third Reich was how to rise to this challenge. One option—to consolidate its hegemony over the European core—was unacceptable because it would make Germany a leading regional power, but one with limited global liabilities between a Eurasian continental bloc, dominated by the Soviet Union, and an Atlantic-American bloc, dominated by the United States.145 A second option, an alliance of the principal Eurasian powers—Germany with its junior partner Italy, the Soviet Union as the major land power on the Continent, and Japan as the East Asian pillar—against the Anglo-American seapowers with their continental center in the Americas, was at least temporarily contemplated in 1940–41, although it ran counter to Hitler's ideological goal of conquering living space in the East.146 The third option fit the long-held visions of an apocalyptic war for the conquest of living space and the purification of the German race. It was chosen with Directive 21, Operation Barbarossa, in December 1940.147
对苏战争如今有了新的意义和新的重要性。第21号指令发布后，战争演变为一场建立新的洲际战略圈的竞赛。战争的这一新维度在1941年6月11日发布的第32号指令“巴巴罗萨行动后的准备”中得到了最清晰的体现，该指令发布于入侵苏联前11天。第32号指令连同海军的命令，概述了三个基本目标：148（1）组织和利用苏联的资源基础，作为进行洲际战争的先决条件；（2）摧毁英国对帝国边缘的控制，并向伊朗和阿富汗方向推进，尽管这仍将是次要战线；149（3）建立新的大西洋“防御”圈，从法国延伸到北非和西非。在大西洋壁垒的庇护下，凭借占领区的资源，作为唯一残存的欧洲大陆强国，第三帝国希望为其海军和空军做好准备，与英美世界展开一场高科技的跨洲际对抗。然而，德国始终未能达到其跨洲际战略得以实施的阶段。苏联红军在1941年的防御战和1941-42年冬季的反攻中，粉碎了这一战略的先决条件。此外，受日本挑衅的美国也比德国领导人预想的更早、更强大地卷入了战争。苏联和美国迅速动员的能力，在1941年后成为了决定性的因素。
The war against the Soviet Union now acquired a new meaning and a new significance. When Directive 21 was issued, it became a race to establish new, intercontinental strategic perimeters. This novel dimension of the war was most clearly expressed in Directive 32, “Preparation for the Time after Barbarossa,” of June 11, 1941, eleven days before the invasion of the Soviet Union began. Directive 32, together with orders to the navy, outlined three basic goals:148 (1) the organization and exploitation of the Soviet resource base as a prerequisite for fighting intercontinental war; (2) the destruction of the British hold over the imperial periphery with a thrust in the direction of Iran and Afghanistan, though this would remain a secondary front;149 and (3) the establishment of new Atlantic “defense” perimeters, reaching from France to North and West Africa. Behind an Atlantic wall and with the resources of the occupied territories, the Third Reich, as the only remaining Continental power, hoped to prepare its navy and air force for a highly technological and intercontinental confrontation with the Anglo-American world.150 But Germany never reached the point at which its intercontinental strategy could unfold. The Red Army denied the prerequisites for such strategy in the defensive battles of 1941 and in the counteroffensives of the winter of 1941–42. Also, the United States, provoked by Japan, entered the war sooner and with greater strength than the German leaders had anticipated. The ability of the Soviet Union and the United States to achieve rapid mobilization made the decisive difference after 1941.
此时，战略主动权转移到了盟军一方，尽管当时还不能确定对德战争能否最终取胜。<sup>151</sup>然而，此前几年屡试不爽的德国战略彻底崩溃。取而代之的是两种截然不同的发展。第三帝国加大了战争力度，寄希望于通过有限的作战胜利来分裂盟军。在军事上，它转向了消耗战策略，并辅以选择性的反攻。北非战役、东线的大规模坦克战以及阿登战役都属于此类。更重要的是，东线的陆军和大西洋的海军成为了第三帝国加强对纳粹领导人眼中最凶猛敌人的攻击的屏障。第三帝国将大规模歼灭战合理化并工业化。<sup> 152</sup>
At this point the strategic initiative shifted to the Allied side, even if it was not yet certain that the war against Germany could actually be won.151 However, German strategy, which had been so successful in the previous years, collapsed. Its place was taken by two distinct developments. The Third Reich escalated its war effort in the faint hope of splitting the Allies through limited operational successes. Militarily, it turned to a course of attrition, punctuated by selective counteroffensives. The events in North Africa, the great tank battles in the East, and the battle of the Bulge all fall into this category. More important, the army in the East and the navy in the Atlantic became a shield behind which the Third Reich stepped up its campaign against what the National Socialist leaders perceived as their most bitter enemy. The Third Reich rationalized and industrialized mass annihilation.152
德国第二次尝试以新的策略，以武力摆脱中欧的束缚。尽管在长达三年的时间里取得了显著的成功，但最终还是再次失败。在20世纪30年代的特殊情况下，欧洲战场的确可以被分割，但世界却无法与欧洲割裂开来。相反，由于第三帝国孤注一掷地试图摆脱这些困境，欧洲和全球的动态关系日益交织在一起。德国无路可逃——至少在军事上无路可逃。无论其武力运用多么巧妙，都使德国陷入了暴力升级的恶性循环，随着战区的扩大，对抗力量最终超越了德国的能力。传统的专业战略最终无法在现代欧洲的背景下取得成功；1938年后的各种权宜之计在随后的洲际对抗中彻底失败。
For a second time, with new approaches, Germany had tried to escape from the constrictions of central Europe by means of force. Although it was remarkably successful for three long years, ultimately it failed once again. The European theater could indeed be fractured under the peculiar conditions of the 1930s, but the world could not be separated from Europe. Rather, European and global dynamics were increasingly intertwined by the Third Reich's desperate dash to escape these conditions. There was no escape—at least no military escape. The use of force, however cunningly it was engineered, involved Germany in a ladder of escalating violence in which, as a result of the expansion of the theater of war, countervailing forces outmatched German capabilities. Traditional professional strategy could not ultimately succeed in the context of modern Europe; the expedients after 1938 ran aground in the ensuing intercontinental confrontation.
甚至在这场旷日持久的战争阶段开始之前，德国的战争时代就已经终结。德国作战计划者声称掌控了战略，因为他们认为已经找到了限制战争的军事手段，从而发现了一种工具性地运用武力的方法。然而，德国的武力运用一次又一次地遭到反制，敌人不断扩大战区，最终使德国的资源无法与敌人匹敌。在第二次世界大战中，新型武器带来的破坏力加剧了这一局面。德国战略家未能找到解决这两个问题的办法，或许可以认为这些问题根本无法通过军事手段解决。一旦越过这个临界点，战争对德国而言就变成了自我毁灭。由于无法与敌人平等对抗，德国领导人转而攻击国内的敌人。
Even before this long drawn-out phase of the war began, an era of German warfare had come to an end. German operational planners had claimed control over strategy, because they thought they had found military means to limit war and thus had discovered a way of using force instrumentally. However, time and again, the German use of force was countered by expanding the theater of war to a point at which Germany was no longer able to match the resources of its enemies. In the Second World War, the intensification of destruction through new weapons created an added dimension. German strategists did not find an answer to either of these problems, and it might be assumed that there was no military solution for them. Once this threshold was passed, war became self-destructive for Germany. Unable to meet its enemies on equal terms, German leaders preyed on their internal foes.
1938年后，专业战略方法的瓦解显而易见。虽然这促成了德国在1941年之前的胜利，并释放了新的活力，但也埋下了灾难的种子。正是这种追求胜利的手段，使得德国军政领导人无法评估成功的极限。事实上，他们被卷入了越来越危险的行动中。
The dissolution of a professional approach to strategy was evident after 1938. While it contributed to the German victories before 1941 and released new energies, it also contained the seeds of disaster. The very means of achieving victory rendered German military and political leaders unable to gauge the limits of success. Indeed, they were pulled into ever more hazardous undertakings.
两项截然不同的发展使德国得以暂时摆脱欧洲的束缚，并利用当时仍四分五裂的欧洲秩序的弱点。这两项发展都是德国形成新的战争实践——一种全新意义上的战略——的重要步骤。军方领导层摒弃了以往对欧洲军事形势的专业评估，日益倾向于希特勒对国内外事务动态的政治和意识形态解读。<sup> 153</sup>与此同时，他们放弃了全面的部署计划，转而将临时性和机会主义的武力使用作为其主要的作战“原则”。这些变化是逐步发生的，最初也遭遇了内部阻力，但到1940年，它们已经取代了施利芬的遗产和军事专业主义。1940年法国战败后（尽管不列颠空战的惨败彻底贬低了德国空军作为战略武器的作用<sup>154</sup>），这些变化融合在一起，形成了一种新的军事实践，彻底改变了战略的政治和军事层面。
Two distinct developments allowed Germany to escape momentarily from its European confinement and to exploit the weaknesses of a still-fractured European order. Both were major steps in the formulation of a new German practice of war—a strategy in a new sense of the word. The military leadership broke with its traditional professional assessments of the European military situation and increasingly inclined toward Hitler's political and ideological interpretations of the dynamics of national and international affairs.153 At the same time, it discarded the comprehensive nature of deployment planning and turned to an ad hoc and opportunistic use of force as its main operational “doctrine.” These changes occurred gradually and against initial internal resistance, but by 1940 they had replaced the heritage of Schlieffen and military professionalism. After France was defeated in 1940 (and despite the blemish of the battle of Britain, which thoroughly devalued the role of the Luftwaffe as a strategic weapon154) they fused and formed a new military practice that transformed the political and military end of strategy.
让我们首先转向这场创新浪潮中更为险恶的部分：政治意识形态战略的兴起。希特勒的战略——深受种族主义信仰的影响，并受到政治经验的制约——摒弃了对敌对双方军事实力的传统分析，转而评估每个“民族”和“种族”的国内和国际矛盾。希特勒打破了军事部署计划的封闭世界，用同样永恒的伪科学种族法则取代了永恒的战略概念。这无疑是一个极其脆弱的战略基础。然而，尽管希特勒可以根据自己的政治倾向或修辞风格，对任何“种族”进行贬损，但这种替代也使他能够运用自己作为政治组织者和战术家的经验，对国内和国际“政治”做出狡猾且有时颇具巧思的评估。155尽管军方统计并比较了各国的军事实力和战争潜力，但希特勒却坚持认为，动员和集中军事资源的政治手段决定了战争能力（以及战争意愿）。一个国家实际的战争能力，尤其是战争意愿，远比其宏观潜力所显示的要有限。换言之，希特勒承认战争中存在摩擦问题，但他试图通过意识形态上的意志宣言来克服这一问题。
Let us turn first to the far more treacherous part of this innovative surge, the rise of political-ideological strategy. Hitler's strategy—steeped as it was in racist beliefs mediated by political experience—rejected the traditional analyses of the military strengths of the opposing sides in favor of assessing the domestic and international contradictions of each “people” and “race.” Hitler cracked open the closed world of military deployment planning by substituting for the eternal concepts of strategy the equally eternal and pseudoscientific laws of race. This was a very feeble basis for strategy. But as derogatory as he could be about any “race” when it pleased his political temperament or his rhetorical style, this substitution also allowed Hitler to employ his experience as political organizer and tactician, producing cunning and, at times, clever assessments of national and international “politics.”155 Whereas the military counted and compared the military strengths and war potentials of nations, Hitler insisted that the politics of mobilizing and concentrating resources for military purposes shaped the ability (and willingness) to fight war. The actual ability and especially the willingness to fight war was more limited than the gross potential of a nation would indicate. In other words, Hitler acknowledged the problem of friction in war, while seeking to overcome it ideologically with assertions of will.
希特勒用对特定国家和国际体系凝聚力的评估取代了军事战备的概念。但这从未提供一种系统性的替代方案，来取代专业战略的工具主义或理想主义的计算方法。事实上，这也不可能，因为希特勒的才能在于直觉而非系统性。诚然，通过将计划和决策的重点从作战行动转移到对国内和国际冲突的政治评估，希特勒发展出了超越最精密军事分析的战略思想。即便如此，他那基于灵感而非逻辑的意识形态和种族主义战略，需要追随者们抱持一种盲目的信仰，而非基于理性信念的接受。衡量这一战略的唯一标准是成功，因为作为战略，它只不过是承诺创造一种有利于军队发动战争的有利政治环境。
Hitler replaced the notion of military readiness by an assessment of the cohesion of particular nations and of the international system. This never provided a systematic alternative to the instrumental or, for that matter, idealist calculus of professional strategy. Nor could it, for Hitler's gifts were intuitive rather than systematic. It is true that in shifting the focus of planning and decision making from operations to the political assessment of national and international conflict, Hitler developed strategic ideas that surpassed the most sophisticated military analyses. Even so, his ideological and racist strategy, based upon inspiration rather than upon logic, required a leap of faith from its followers, rather than acceptance based on rational conviction.156 The only measure for this strategy was success, for as strategy it was nothing more than the promise to create fortuitous political circumstances that would allow the military to wage war.
因此，战略蜕变为其固有组成部分之一：狡诈。希特勒之所以被誉为战略家和元帅，仅仅是因为他一度取得了成功，而非因为他的战略方法有任何特殊之处。没有任何单一的战略方法或原则指导他的政策。战略规划，曾经是德国总参谋部秉持原则和整体性战争方针的标志，如今却沦为好战政治的俘虏。它表现为不断地争夺地位、试探局势、探索各种替代方案和选择。<sup> 157</sup>这种战略——与专业化的战略截然不同——并非由内在的民族和国际秩序意识所指导。它所拥有的指导和方向，是由一种通过战争建立新秩序的愿景所塑造的，这种新秩序将确保德国社会的统治地位和国家社会主义统治的永久性。只要这种优先性得以维持，战略就只能是一种临时性的举措。
Strategy thus degenerated into one of its permanent components: cunning. Hitler became celebrated as strategist and Feldherr, simply because for a time he was successful, not for any particular quality of his approach to strategy. No single method and no principle of strategy guided his policies. Strategic planning, once the hallmark of the principled and holistic approach to war by the German general staff, had become the captive of militant politics. It was expressed in continuous jockeying for position, testing the ground, exploring alternatives and options.157 This kind of strategy—as distinct from the professional approach—was not guided by an inherent sense of national and international order. What guidance and direction it possessed, were shaped by the vision of a new order to be created by war which would secure the dominance of German society and the permanence of National Socialist rule. As long as this priority was maintained, strategy could be no more than an ad hoc enterprise.
这种灵活性与方向性相结合的影响深远。如果说在旧式的专业理论中，战争是精英政治的工具性实践，定期通过军事手段调节和调整国家生活的混乱局面，那么国家社会主义战争则是在暴力无限扩张的背景下建立和维持秩序。战争成为国家和国际关系的基础。因此，战略不再是实现特定目标的理性手段，也不再受理性武力使用理念的指导。相反，战略成为塑造一个以斗争和冲突为基础的世界的主要途径。战略不再是工具性的，而是意识形态导向的，手段机会主义的。
The implications of this combination of flexibility and direction were far-reaching. If, in the old professional school, war was an instrumental exercise of elite politics, periodically regulating and adjusting the disorders of national life by military means, National Socialist war established and maintained order in a limitless expansion of violence. War became the very basis of national and international relations. As a result, strategy was no longer a rational means of achieving specific goals, nor was it guided, in this process, by rational concepts of the use of force. Rather strategy became the main approach for shaping a world whose basic interrelations were based on struggle and conflict. Strategy was no longer instrumental but was ideological in its direction and opportunist in its methods.
将军们始终无法反驳这种做法，部分原因是他们从中直接获益，部分原因是他们不愿承认自己狭隘、局限的“专业”分析所揭示的事实：在当时的国内和国际形势下，德国的未来并不掌握在职业军队手中。相反，他们站在了元首一边，因为元首不顾一切地承诺会采取行动并取得成功。大多数军官仍然对希特勒战略的意识形态基础持怀疑态度，但他们既缺乏挑战或取代这些战略所需的智力，也缺乏相应的正直品格，因为那样就意味着限制在国际政治中使用武力，甚至可能放弃战争。于是，他们将精力和才智集中于战略的一个方面：作战计划。就这样，在军方二十年来试图重建战略、重新掌控战争的努力均告失败之后，技术官僚思维和意识形态战略再次联手。
The generals were never able to counter this approach, partly because they directly benefited from it and partly because they were unwilling to acknowledge what their own limited, narrow, and “professional” analysis discovered: that under the prevailing national and international conditions, the future of Germany did not lie with the professional military. Instead, they sided with the Führer, because against all odds he promised action and success.158 Most officers remained dubious about the ideological bases of Hitler's strategy, but they did not have the intellectual strength or integrity to challenge or replace them, for that would have meant to limit the use of force in international politics and, perhaps, to forsake war. Instead they concentrated their efforts and brilliance on just one aspect of strategy: operational planning. In this way technocratic thinking and ideological strategy joined forces again after twenty years of unsuccessful attempts by the military to reconstruct strategy and regain control of war.
始于1916年的军事幻想在1938年仍在延续，此前所有为战争提供工具理性军事计算的替代方案要么被摒弃，要么彻底崩溃。然而，自第一次世界大战期间第三最高统帅部独裁统治以来，意识形态与技术官僚之间的平衡已经发生了变化。在1916-1917年，意识形态动员服从于技术官僚计划，仅在技术官僚计划和国家在战败中崩溃时短暂占据上风。如今，为建立新的国家和国际秩序而进行的意识形态动员日益界定了技术官僚计划的边界，后者沉迷于最大限度地利用武器，并抛弃了其旧有的传统。
The flight into military fancy that had begun in 1916 continued in 1938 after all alternatives of providing an instrumentally rational military calculus for war either were rejected or collapsed. However, the balance between ideology and technocracy had changed since the dictatorship of the Third Supreme Command in the First World War. In 1916–17, ideological mobilization was subordinated to technocratic planning and only gained the upper hand for a brief moment, when technocratic planning and the state fell apart in defeat. Now, ideological mobilization for the creation of a new national and international order increasingly defined the perimeters of technocratic planning, which consumed itself in maximizing the use of weapons and abandoned its old traditions.
将希特勒的战略综合成一套连贯统一的理论是错误的；同样，将军事作战实践浓缩成新的战争原则也是误导性的。我们很容易就能指出机械化战争中新旧经验的碎片，这些经验构成了成功的要素，其中包括“一种特殊的机械化战争——坦克、飞机、俯冲轰炸机以及动员起来的步兵和炮兵的协同作战——[这]带来了军事行动的革命性变革”。<sup>159</sup>人们对这些要素的结合进行了大量研究，并将其概括为“闪电战”。
It would be wrong to synthesize Hitler's strategy into a coherent and unified doctrine; it is equally misleading to condense the operational practices of the military into new principles of war. It is easy enough to highlight the morsels of old and new experience with mechanized warfare that furnished the elements of success and consisted of “a particular kind of mechanized warfare—cooperation of tanks, aircraft, dive bombers, and mobilized infantry and artillery—[which produced] a revolutionary change in military operations.”159 Much has been made of the combination of these elements, which have been summarized under the label of blitzkrieg.
闪电战的拥护者……强调机动性和速度而非火力，尽管坦克、俯冲轰炸机和高初速反坦克炮或防空炮等武器也旨在关键地点发挥强大的火力。闪电战乐于进行遭遇战。它集中运用空中力量进行进攻和防御，为装甲部队的推进开辟道路。与第一次世界大战末期的德国作战理论类似，闪电战强调步兵和装甲部队的渗透战术和侧翼包抄。与第一次世界大战前的经典德国作战理论一样，新的作战理论追求单次和双重包围。与早期的作战理论不同，它不仅旨在歼灭敌军，更致力于扰乱和瓦解敌军的指挥系统。这可以通过深入敌军后方来实现。人们认为，如果能够造成敌军指挥系统的混乱，就可以避免歼灭战，或者至少可以更容易地进行歼灭战。160
The Blitzkrieg advocates…stressed mobility and speed over firepower, although in the form of the tank, the dive bomber, and high-velocity anti-tank or anti-aircraft gun it aimed for great firepower at decisive points. Blitzkrieg welcomed encounter battles. It employed concentrated air power offensively and defensively, to prepare the way for advancing armor. Like German doctrine at the end of World War I, Blitzkrieg stressed infiltration tactics and flanking movements for both infantry and armor. As in the classic pre-World War I German doctrine, the new doctrine sought single and double envelopments. Unlike the earlier doctrine, it aimed as much at the disorientation and dislocation of the enemy command system as it did at the annihilation of enemy forces. This was to be achieved by deep penetrations into the rear areas of an enemy army. It was believed that if dislocation could be achieved, the battle of annihilation might be avoided, or at least easier.160
闪电战具备所有这些特点，但就其本身而言，它并非全新——我们不妨回顾一下拉贝瑙的观点——即便所有要素都被整合到一项“瘫痪任务”中<sup> 161</sup> ——也就是说，这是一种反指挥而非反兵力“战略”——它们也并未带来决定性的改变。这些行动的核心并非在于对新式战争手段的任何特定运用，而在于一种不遵循预设和标准化方法的作战机会主义，它只追求利用一切可用手段最大限度地取得胜利，以期通过摧毁敌方领导层的意志来推翻敌军的最终目标。闪电战的生存之道在于摧毁军事指挥决策的系统性方法。它与任何军事理论都截然相反。闪电战行动是由一系列行动组成的，这些行动与其说是精心策划，不如说是取决于成功与否。这种作战方式正合那一代野心勃勃的德国指挥官的心意，他们被第三帝国释放出来，并在军事领域效仿希特勒的动员战略。并非他们中有人是坚定的国家社会主义者，而是他们完美契合了那种崇尚征服成功的体系。事后看来——在利德尔·哈特的推波助澜下——这股行动洪流被压缩成了某种它从未真正存在过的东西：作战设计。<sup>162 </sup> 这种设计基于这样一种信念：技术（古德里安）或卓越的指挥能力（曼施坦因）将决定战争的胜负。反过来，这又吸引了一大批袖珍战略家，他们放弃了对战争的深入思考，转而炫耀自己对武器的了解。
Blitzkrieg was all this, but as such it was not new—we may recall Rabenau—and even if all elements were put together in a “mission of paralysis”161—that is, a countercommand rather than a counterforce “strategy”—they did not make the crucial difference. The core of these operations did not consist in any particular use of the new means of warfare, but in a kind of operational opportunism that knew no pre-set and standardized methods, only the fullest possible exploitation of success with all available means in the pursuit of the ultimate goal of overthrowing the enemy by breaking the will of its leadership. Blitzkrieg lived off the destruction of a systematic approach to military command decisions. It was the opposite of a doctrine. Blitzkrieg operations consisted of an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design than by success. This kind of operation befitted a generation of exceedingly ambitious German commanders who were set free by the Third Reich and who emulated, in the military field, the mobilizing strategy of Hitler. Not that any of them was a committed National Socialist, but they fitted well into a system that honored success in the pursuit of conquest. In hindsight—and with some help from Liddell Hart—this torrent of action was squeezed into something it never was: an operational design.162 Such as it was, this rested on the belief that technology (Guderian) or superior command performance (von Manstein) would make the difference in war. This, in turn, has attracted a host of pocket strategists who have given up thinking about war in favor of displaying their knowledge of weapons.
这些即兴作战的代价往往被有意忽略。其成功的关键在于以竞争性计划取代了统一的专业知识体系。闪电战非但没有加强合作，打造运转流畅的机械化战争机器，反而使参谋人员和指挥官在战争计划和实施中相互竞争，以求达到最佳绩效。<sup>163</sup>它催生了相互竞争的作战基地，而且常常难以确定哪一方能够掌握主动权。<sup>164</sup>事实上，塑造闪电战战略的总体条件是两个要素的结合：强调武器的最佳使用和竞争性的军事领导。然而，真正具有创新性的是军事领导层专业统一性的瓦解。这既是闪电战行动取得成功的根本原因，也是导致持续不断的摩擦和争吵的主要原因之一，而这些摩擦和争吵最终成为竞争性军事计划的组成部分。
The cost of these impromptu operations is conveniently overlooked. What made them possible was the replacement a unified body of professional knowledge by competitive planning. Rather than enhancing cooperation and creating a smooth-functioning machine for mechanized warfare, Blitzkrieg pitted staffs and commanders against each other in the quest for optimal performance in the planning and conduct of war.163 It created competing operational bases and very often left undecided which one would capture the initiative.164 Indeed, the general condition that shaped Blitzkrieg strategy was the conjuncture of two elements: the emphasis on the optimal use of weapons and competitive military leadership. What was truly novel, however, was the dissolution of the corporate professional unity of the military leadership. This was the dominant force behind the successes of blitzkrieg operations, but also one of the major reasons for the permanent frictions and quarrels that became integral elements of competitive military planning.
德国军队走到今天这一步，与其说是刻意为之，不如说是迫于无奈。这要归咎于1938年纳粹发动政变推翻“职业”军队。这场政变开启了德国军队漫长转型的最后阶段，也是其作战计划变革的先决条件。技术官僚式的武装部队和接受技能导向型训练的士兵，被置于那些早已放弃、且大多缺乏全面作战思维的军事指挥官的麾下。这些指挥官除了不惜一切代价最大化武力之外，别无其他战争原则。希特勒当然偏爱这种领导方式，并在1938年的军队重组中助长了这种领导方式的兴起。纳粹政权通过强调基于种族理论的领导原则，赋予了这种领导方式合法性，这种理论也促进了在征服过程中的竞争。由此，纳粹战争的两个基本要素——技术官僚和意识形态——被结合到了战略之中。165
The German military reached this point more by default than by design in the wake of the National Socialist coup against the “professional” military in 1938. This coup initiated the last phase of the long transformation of the German army and was a prerequisite for the transformation of its operational planning. Technocratically organized armed forces and soldiers trained in skill-oriented programs were placed under military commanders who had long renounced, and were mostly incapable of, comprehensive operational thinking and who knew no other principle of war than the optimization of force at any cost. Hitler, of course, favored this kind of leadership and contributed to its rise in the reorganization of the armed forces in 1938. The National Socialist regime gave it legitimacy by underscoring the leadership principle grounded in a racial theory that also facilitated competition in the pursuit of conquest. Thus the two essential elements of National Socialist warfare—technocracy and ideology—were combined into strategy.165
随着时间推移，军队对开放其封闭的专业领域的反应也发生了变化。起初，军队内部的强大势力——实际上是绝大多数指挥官——拒绝接受这一发展。即便专业战略框架已经崩溃，他们仍然坚持军事计划的凝聚力、统一性以及自主性和自给自足性。在弗朗茨·哈尔德的领导下，我们看到的是官僚理性与等级制度的原则而非战争原则来维系作战计划。军内竞争和国家社会主义活动暂时被官僚主义的惯例所抑制。然而，军事领导人之间的竞争势头过于强劲。第三帝国早期在政治和军事上的成功本身就蕴含着强大的动力。如果说1938年军队是被迫进入竞争性的“战略”阶段，那么到了1940年，他们则完全依赖于竞争而蓬勃发展。目标越宏大，其实现就越能凸显军事表现的质量。军事计划的技术官僚体制和意识形态开始在动态的互动中融合。两者缺一不可。
The military response to the process of opening up their closed professional world changed over time. At first, strong groups within the military—in fact, the overwhelming majority of the commanding officers—rejected this development. They insisted on the cohesiveness, unity, and the autonomous and self-contained nature of military planning even after the framework of professional strategy had collapsed. Rather than principles of war, we find under Franz Halder the principles of bureaucratic rationality and hierarchy holding together operational planning. Intramilitary competition and National Socialist activism were temporarily blunted by bureaucratic routine.166 But the pull of competition among military leaders was too strong. The early political and military successes of the Third Reich had their own momentum. If in 1938 the military was driven into competitive “strategy” by default, by 1940 they were thriving on competition. The grander the goal, the more its achievement highlighted the quality of the military performance. The technocracy of military planning and ideology began to fuse in a dynamic interplay. One could not exist without the other.
巴巴罗萨行动比任何其他战役都更能体现技术官僚体制与意识形态在竞争性军事计划中的融合。人们对这场战役的意识形态背景进行了大量研究。诚然，军方和希特勒共同的反布尔什维克主义发挥了重要作用。但关键在于，双方都期望从与苏联的战争中获得立竿见影的回报。军方（极少数例外）希望借此展现其专业技能，并期待获得声望、晋升和薪酬等切实利益。<sup>167</sup>在整个计划阶段和战役最初几个月里，他们的行为与管理者无异，认为随着战役的胜利，他们作为个人和集体的价值将大幅提升。因此，任何有助于战役目标的事情都对他们有利。希特勒将苏联视为其征服目标，是他建立种族主义大陆帝国——第三帝国——的巅峰之作。这些预期共同构成了几乎所有人都渴望参与击败苏联的基础，这种渴望压倒了任何犹豫和谨慎。巴巴罗萨计划的策划，正是无止境的贪婪的体现。
More than any other campaign, Barbarossa showed the fusion of technocracy and ideology in the context of competitive military planning. Much has been made of the ideological conditioning for this campaign. Certainly, the shared anti-Bolshevism of the military and of Hitler played an important role. But crucial was the fact that both expected instant rewards from fighting a war against the Soviet Union. The military, with a very few exceptions, hoped to display their professional skills and looked forward to tangible returns in the form of prestige, promotions, and remuneration.167 They acted throughout the planning phase and the first months of the campaign much as managers do, assuming that their value as individuals and as a collective would rise dramatically with the victorious completion of the campaign. Hence, everything that served the purpose of the campaign was good for them. Hitler considered the Soviet Union his object of conquest, the capstone of his efforts to establish the Third Reich as a racist Continental empire. These expectations together formed the basis for an almost universal eagerness to have a hand in the defeat of the Soviet Union that overrode any hesitation and caution. The planning for Barbarossa was a display of unlimited greed.
竞争性战略的本质在于，尽管进行了无数研究，但这场战役的实际目标乃至作战方法却从未明确界定。我们看到的是相互竞争的目标和相互竞争的作战方法，每个人都在观望，期待战役迟早会朝着自己有利的方向发展。毫无疑问，在如何与苏联作战的问题上确实存在严重的实质性分歧，但这些实质性问题都是在高级指挥官之间普遍存在的竞争背景下产生的。因此，哈尔德领导的陆军司令部希望通过将莫斯科作为战役的决定性目标来确立其主导地位（并希望通过在1941年12月放弃莫斯科来维护其声誉）；各个指挥官则希望通过某种能够确保胜利的作战方法来彰显自己的实力。事实上，唯一基于原则的观点是希特勒的意识形态观点，而他的观点又受到种族和征服的驱动。希特勒的意识形态目标虽然始终如一，但在作战决策中却鲜有指导意义。
It was indicative of the nature of competitive strategy that, despite countless studies, the actual objectives and even the operational approaches of the campaign were never clearly defined. Instead we see competing objectives and competing approaches, and everyone hedged his bets in the expectation that the campaign would sooner or later swing in his direction. No doubt serious substantive differences did exist over the manner in which to fight the Soviet Union, but questions of substance arose in the context of a pervasive competitiveness among the senior commanders. Thus, the Army Command under Halder hoped to establish its predominant role by betting on Moscow as the decisive target of the campaign (and hoped to keep its reputation by dropping it in December 1941); individual commanders hoped to make their mark with one or another operational approach that would guarantee victory. In fact, the only point of view based on principle was the ideological one that came from Hitler, and his view was shaped by race and conquest.168 Hitler's ideological aims, while consistent, were not much guidance in operational decisions.
作战策略上的分歧——莫斯科、列宁格勒和乌克兰——反映了双方对战役结果以及希特勒和军队在其中所扮演角色的不同设想。哈尔德的目标是摧毁苏联，从而瓦解民族抵抗力量；而希特勒则着眼于征服苏联的经济和社会中心。然而，如果我们仔细审视实际的作战计划，就会发现希特勒和哈尔德实际上都未曾预料到战役的胜负会取决于能否达成这些目标。他们不同的策略仅仅反映了各自隐藏的野心和潜在的敌意。简而言之，如果目标是攻占莫斯科并摧毁或瘫痪苏联，那么胜利就是军事上的胜利；如果目标是征服乌克兰，那么胜利就是国家社会主义的胜利。因此，关于作战优先事项的冲突最终演变为一场象征性的冲突，双方都不愿去明确达成某个目标究竟会带来什么。169无论如何，这些选择直到战役的第二阶段，也就是 1941 年 7 月之后才变得重要，因为军事和战斗人员的期望必须改变。
The variance of operational opinions—Moscow versus Leningrad and the Ukraine—reflected differing assumptions about the outcome of the campaign and the role Hitler and the military played in it. Halder aimed at the destruction of the Soviet state with a resultant dissolution of national resistance, while Hitler thought in terms of conquering the country's centers of economic and social power. However, if we look carefully at the actual plans, neither Hitler nor Halder actually expected that the campaign would be decided by conquering any of these objectives. Their different approaches merely reflected hidden ambitions and latent antagonism. Simply put, the victory would be a military one if the goal was Moscow and the destruction or paralysis of the Soviet state; the victory would be National Socialist if the Ukraine was conquered. The conflict over operational priorities thus became a symbolic one, and neither side cared to clarify what would be achieved by attaining one or the other goal.169 In any case, these choices became important only in the second stage of the campaign, after July 1941, when military and militant expectations had to be changed.
根据巴巴罗萨行动的最终指令，策划者希望在战役的第二阶段击败苏军，从而使苏军丧失防御能力，使后续的军事进展仅仅成为利用战败的结果。巴巴罗萨行动的最终计划只具体规定了第一阶段，也是被认为是决定性的阶段，其主要任务是“速战速决地击败苏俄”。这一目标将通过大规模钳形攻势来实现，即“迅速而深入的突袭……撕开预计位于俄罗斯西部的俄军主力防线。被这些突袭分割开来的敌军各部将在第聂伯河和德维纳河以西的混战中被歼灭”。这是该战役的主要且唯一真正意义上的作战目标，因为策划者认为，决定性的首轮打击将确保“后续行动的自由”。<sup> 170 </sup>
According to the final directive for Operation Barbarossa, the planners hoped to defeat the Soviet army by the second stage of the campaign and thus to render the nation defenseless, making further military progress only a matter of exploiting the defeat. The final plan for Barbarossa only specified the first, and what was considered to be the decisive, stage of the advance, whose main task was “to defeat Soviet Russia in a quick campaign.” This was to be achieved by large-scale pincer movements, that is, “swift and deep thrusts…to tear open the front of the mass of the Russian army which, it is anticipated, will be in western Russia. The enemy groups separated by these penetrations will then be destroyed” in cauldron battles that were to take place west of the rivers Dnjepr and Dvina. This was the main and only truly operational goal of the campaign, because it was assumed that the decisive first blows would ensure “the freedom of movement for further tasks.”170
这项计划并未令所有参谋军官和集团军指挥官满意。它限制了他们的行动，使他们处于集团军司令部的严密控制之下。他们渴望在作战中发挥更大、更独立的作用，并在战后声称，来自“上级”的过度限制是这场原本可能成功的战役的主要缺陷。因此，一些更具胆识的人强调“必须让俄军疲于奔命，不给他们任何喘息之机”。古德里安“想要直指莫斯科，并且坚信只要不浪费时间就能到达那里。通过向斯大林权力中心发起进攻，俄军的抵抗可能会被瘫痪。” 因此，这些计划未必比实际作战更好或更充分，尽管它们过去是、现在仍然是坦克部队拥护者们所热切期盼的。然而，这些计划主要反映了德国作战计划的竞争性，而这种竞争性在这场战役中达到了顶峰，这场战役的特点与其说是任何特定的作战理论，不如说是各种分歧。
This plan did not satisfy all staff officers and army commanders. It kept them on a short leash and under the tight control of the Army Command. They aimed at a greater and more independent role in operations and after the war claimed that undue restrictions “from above” had been the main flaw in a campaign that otherwise might have been successful. Thus the more daring emphasized “the importance of keeping the Russians on the run and allowing them no time to rally.” Guderian “wanted to drive straight on to Moscow, and was convinced that he could get there if no time was wasted. Russia's resistance might be paralyzed by the thrust at the center of Stalin's power.” As such these plans were not necessarily better or more adequate than the actual operations though they were and still are heartwarming for advocates of tank forces.171 However, they were primarily a reflection of the competitive nature of operational planning in Germany as it reached a climax in a campaign characterized more by its disagreements than by any particular doctrine.
然而，这些争论完全忽略了决定性问题。对苏战争的结局既非装甲部队与联合武器作战之争（内部军事冲突），也非莫斯科与乌克兰之争（军事与意识形态政治之争），而是不断升级、相互竞争的武力使用的结果。第三帝国必须承担其战略和作战计划的后果，而这一战略和计划的基础正是武力与恐怖的竞争性优化。这些局限性在1941年7月至8月就已经显现。
Yet these debates miss the decisive issue altogether. The outcome of the war against the Soviet Union was neither a matter of armor versus operations with combined weapons (the intramilitary conflict) nor a matter of Moscow versus the Ukraine (a conflict between military and ideological politics). It was rather the product of an escalatory and competitive use of force. The Third Reich faced the consequences of a strategy and a process of operational planning grounded in the competitive optimization of force and terror. These limits were already evident in July-August 1941.
战役的第一阶段取得了超出所有人预期的成功。所有人都认为战争实际上已经胜利，至少在几乎所有观察家——不仅仅是德国人——眼中确实如此。考虑到苏联主力部队在最初几周内就被歼灭或俘虏，斯大林的统治也陷入混乱，这种假设完全合情合理。然而，很快人们就发现苏联并没有战败。德军预期的行动自由从未实现。苏联领导层继续进行着殊死搏斗，对本国人民和德国敌人都犯下了极其残暴的罪行。苏联拒绝投降；如果注定要战败，那就只能被占领。只有到了这个时候，空间和时间才真正变得至关重要，这并非因为接下来会有泥泞的季节和漫长的冬季，而是因为每一平方英里的土地都必须从顽强抵抗的敌人手中夺取，并抵御被占领者的抵抗。172
The first stage of the campaign was a success beyond anyone's expectations. Everybody agreed that the war was virtually won, and so it was, at least in the eyes of almost all—and not just German—observers. This assumption was more than reasonable if we consider the fact that the main forces of the Soviet Union were annihilated or captured in the first weeks and that Stalin's rule was thrown into disarray. However, it soon became obvious that the Soviet Union was not defeated. The freedom of movement that the German side expected to gain was never achieved. The Soviet leadership continued the war desperately and with tremendous brutality against its own people as well as against the German enemy. The Soviet Union would not surrender; if it was to be defeated it would have to be occupied. Only at this point did space and time truly begin to matter, not because there was a mud season with a winter to follow, but because every square mile had to be taken from a defiant enemy and held against the resistance of the occupied.172
诚然，如果采取适当的行动，或许可以更快地推进到莫斯科，甚至在雨季和泥泞季节到来之前抵达，瘫痪苏联首都，并有可能在另一场激烈的混战中俘虏更多俄军（这场混战最终确实发生了，但德军付出了越来越高的代价，而且为时已晚，未能抵达莫斯科）。但这只是那些野心勃勃的指挥官们的梦想，他们彼此之间的分歧日益加剧，早已丧失了击败苏联的思路——也就是说，他们根本不知道该如何摧毁这个国家的意志和领导层的意志。希特勒在反思战争最初六周的经验后得出结论：“你无法通过作战上的胜利来击败俄国人……因为他们根本不承认失败。” <sup>173</sup>希特勒的恼怒反映了问题的本质。除了击败俄军的大部分兵力之外，还能做什么呢？如何才能摧毁一个不肯投降、一次又一次地重整旗鼓，而德军却日渐衰弱的民族的意志呢？或许还能赢得更多战役，比如在列宁格勒、莫斯科或乌克兰，但显然，即使赢得了战役，也可能输掉整场战争。这是1941年8月之后的主要作战问题。对于一支军队和一个政治领导层来说，这是一个无法解决的作战难题，因为他们已经相信，仅仅积累胜利就能确保最终的胜利。这是战略颓废的典型例子，但绝非此类颓废的绝无仅有。所有这些颓废都展现出一个共同的特征：对战争的理解被对军事行动的竞争性管理所取代。
To be sure, with appropriate action, it might have been possible to advance on Moscow much faster and perhaps to arrive there before the rain and mud season, paralyzing the Soviet capital and, possibly, capturing even more troops in another major cauldron battle (which eventually did take place, though with rising German costs and too late to reach Moscow). But these were the dreams of ambitious commanders who were increasingly at odds with each other and had long lost any idea how, after all, the Soviet Union could be defeated—that is, how the will of the nation and its leadership could be broken. Hitler, pondering the experience of the first six weeks of the war, concluded “that one cannot beat the Russian with operational successes…, because he simply does not acknowledge defeat.”173 Hitler's exasperation reflected the true issue. What more could be done than to defeat major parts of the Russian army? How could one break the will of a nation that would not surrender, but recuperated again and again, while German forces became weaker and weaker? More battles could be won, perhaps at Leningrad, at Moscow, or in the Ukraine, but obviously one could win battles and lose the war. This was the main operational problem after August 1941. It was the insoluble operational problem for an army and a political leadership that had come to believe that the mere accumulation of success would ensure victory. This is a prime example of strategic decadence, but by no means the last of its kind. All show one common characteristic: the understanding of war is displaced by the competitive management of military action.
人们常常认为，德国领导层低估了苏联的战争潜力，因此发动了一场从一开始就计划不周、注定失败的战役。这种观点忽略了关键一点。德军的弱点并非在于苏联的工业能力，而在于苏联领导层不仅能够维持工厂运转，还能源源不断地向战场输送新兵。苏联军事干部继续率领部队作战，或许不如英德同行那样优雅，但其作战效能却丝毫不逊色。苏联的动员和作战能力促成了战争的决定性转折，即1941年12月对莫斯科的正面进攻被击败，以及苏联开始发动大规模反击。174
It is often argued that the German leadership underestimated the Soviet war potential and thus engaged in a campaign that was poorly planned from the start and doomed to failure. This view misses the crucial point. German forces found their limits not in the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union, but in the ability of the Soviet leadership not only to keep factories going but also to send wave upon wave of recruits into battle. The Soviet military cadres continued to lead their troops into battle, perhaps not as elegantly, but every bit as effectively as their British and German counterparts. Russia's ability to mobilize and fight made possible the decisive turn of the war that came with the defeat of the frontal attack against Moscow and the beginning of massive Soviet counterattacks in December 1941.174
我们几乎不了解苏联领导层在六月至十二月期间的动机，也不了解他们如何在苏联亚洲和苏联南部那些他们几乎尚未平定和控制的地区调动人力和资源，因为苏联历史学家认为苏联的胜利是命中注定的，正如一些德国历史学家认为苏联的失败也是命中注定的一样。但我们确实知道一点：苏联的抵抗和决心起初动摇，导致大规模叛逃，但随着对德国政策和恐怖统治的认识不断加深，抵抗也变得更加坚定。德军推进得越远，击溃和俘虏的敌军就越多，德国镇压不认输的敌人的手段也越残酷，苏联的抵抗就越顽强、越绝望，德军的代价也就越高。
We know next to nothing about what motivated the Soviet leadership in the months between June and December and what enabled them to mobilize manpower and resources even in those areas of Soviet Asia and the southern Soviet Union that it had barely pacified and brought under control, because Soviet historians believe the Soviet victory was predestined just as some German historians believe in a predestined defeat. But we do know this much: Soviet resistance and determination, wavering at first and leading to massive defections, stiffened with the growing awareness of German policy and terror. The more the German army advanced, the more they defeated and captured enemy forces, and the more brutal Germany's efforts were to subdue an enemy that did not recognize defeat, the tougher and more desperate Soviet resistance became and the higher rose the costs on the German side.
德国战败的原因有很多，仅仅考虑军事因素是不够的。其他原因还包括第三帝国开始强加的霸权秩序观念以及战争的作战方式。这是一场恐怖主义式的征服战争，也是一场用纳粹术语来说就是对整个社会进行“特殊待遇”（Sonderbehandlung）的战争。这是一场残酷的饥荒战争，对所有“斯拉夫”民族进行了种族灭绝，完全无视被俘士兵和军官的基本人权。这是一场掠夺和剥削东欧人民的战争，肆意妄为地预估“数百万”人的死亡人数。<sup>175</sup>种族主义战争战略渗透到东线战争的方方面面，增强了苏联人民的决心，实际上也使他们能够在全俄旗帜下团结起来。
The German defeat had many sources, and it is not enough to regard only the military ones. Others were the concept of hegemonic order that the Third Reich began to impose and the way in which the war was fought. It was a war of terrorist subjugation and of what was called, in National Socialist jargon, “special treatment” (Sonderbehandlung) of whole societies. It was a war of ruthless starvation and decimation of all “Slavic” peoples, fought with utter disregard for the basic human rights of captured soldiers and officers. And it was a war of plunder and exploitation of the people in eastern Europe that freely calculated the death of “many millions.”175 The strategy of racist war permeated every aspect of the struggle in the East, strengthening the resolve of the Soviet people and, in fact, making it possible to unite them under an all-Russian banner.
是什么促使德国“战略家”采取了这种适得其反的做法？有人可能会指出是意识形态，但意识形态遵循着一套独特的逻辑，而非一种介入原本“传统”或职业化军队的超历史力量。这场战争从一开始就以极其残酷的方式进行，因为必须迅速取得胜利。<sup> 176</sup>因此，毁灭本身成为了一种目的，人们寄希望于暴力最终能够消灭敌人。军方对此几乎别无选择。如果想要取胜，就必须迅速行动。如果想要对抗顽强抵抗的敌人，就必须升级武力。如果胜利遥遥无期，就只能诉诸进一步升级。然而，最终，这却动摇了成功的根基。无论军方对意识形态恐怖主义的态度多么矛盾，其行动路线都不可避免地从将战争作为实现理性目标的手段，转向了将其作为灭绝手段。
What made German “strategists” pursue this counterproductive course? One might point to ideology, but ideology followed a distinct logic rather than being a metahistorical force that intruded into an otherwise “traditionalist” or professional military. On the front this war was fought with utter brutality from the very beginning, because victory had to be achieved quickly.176 Thus destruction became an end in itself in the hope that unleashing violence would eventually destroy the enemy. The military had little choice in this matter. If it wanted to win, it had to act quickly. If it wanted to do so against a defiant enemy, it had to escalate the use of force. If victory was not forthcoming, it could only resort to further escalation. In the end, however, this undermined the very basis of success. However ambivalent the military might be about ideological terrorism, its course led inexorably from the use of war as a means of attaining a rational end to its use as a means of extermination.
这种不断升级的策略不仅指导着军事行动，也指导着国防军后方部队（安全师）、别动队、党卫军以及后方众多其他文职和军事组织的行动。武力是建立和维持德国对欧洲霸权的唯一手段。军事胜利，即瘫痪敌人集中和投射力量的能力，是其决定性的前提；恐怖则是其主要后果。这两者共同构成了国家社会主义战争的本质。二者相辅相成，后续的分析不应试图将它们割裂开来。它们共同将东线战争变成了一场生存之战，因为意识形态目标是作战的核心，但更重要的是，肆无忌惮的暴力是指导战争的唯一“原则”。
This escalatory practice guided not only the military effort, but also that of the rear formations (Sicherheits Divisionen) of the Wehrmacht and of the Einsatzgruppen, the SS, and the host of other civilian and military organizations in the rear. Force was the only means of establishing and maintaining German hegemony over Europe. Military victory, the paralysis of the enemy's ability to concentrate and project force, was its decisive prerequisite; terror was its main consequence. Together these formed the essence of National Socialist war making. One fed the other, and subsequent analysis should not seek to separate them. Together they turned war on the eastern front into a struggle for survival because ideological goals were at the center of operations, but even more because the unshackling of plain violence was the only “principle” that guided the conduct of war.
战争升级——虽然在第一次世界大战中已有先兆，但由于日益高涨的反战情绪而受到抑制——在1939年后却肆无忌惮地发展起来。无论个别战役和行动多么巧妙，这场战争的核心都是不断扩大的破坏浪潮，这成为其作战和战术的主要逻辑。其主要且唯一的作战目标就是造成破坏和毁灭，摧毁敌国，并迫使敌方社会及其武装力量屈服。在这个过程中，职业战争的根基彻底瓦解。
Escalatory warfare—foreshadowed in the First World War, but held back by a growing opposition to the war—evolved unhindered after 1939. However skillfully individual battles and campaigns were fought, it was a war in which the expanding torrent of destruction became the main operational and tactical rationale. Its main and only operational goal was to inflict damage and destruction, to destroy the enemy state and to batter enemy societies and their armed forces into submission. In this process the very basis of professional warfare evaporated.
那么，第二次世界大战的作战挑战究竟是什么？或许部分在于如何有效运用装甲部队——事实上，装甲部队并未得到最佳运用，因为结合反击力量和反指挥的“高空”战术从未得到充分发展。但世界大战的真正挑战不在于运用武力的技术方法，而在于如何限制武力——即如何结合动员国家的资源和人力，在确保最大限度高效摧毁敌军集结地和瘫痪敌军指挥的同时，避免使用超出实现该目标所需的破坏性武力。总体战的挑战在于如何根据敌军意志的下降程度来调整暴力升级的幅度。德国战争实践的意外结果是，武力和恐怖的升级反而强化了旧敌的抵抗，并催生了新的敌人。
What, then, was the operational challenge of World War II? Perhaps in part, the question of how to employ armor effectively—an arm that was not, in fact, used in the best possible way, since the “high” tactics of combining counterforce and countercommand practices were never properly developed. But the real challenge of the world war consisted less in the technical methods of using force than in its limitation—that is, in combining the use of the resources and manpower of a mobilized nation to ensure maximum efficiency in destroying enemy concentrations and paralyzing enemy command, while using no more destructive force than was needed for that purpose. The challenge of total war was to calibrate the increase of violence to the decline of the enemy's resolve. The unpremeditated outcome of the German practice of war was to escalate force and terror to the point that it stiffened the resistance of old enemies and created new ones.
在德国，战争实践中这一至关重要的问题却鲜少被提及。对这一问题的思考既不符合征服的军事战略，也不符合德国军队的机会主义和竞争特性。就德国军队而言，那些曾帮助他们打破第一次世界大战僵局的方法，反而成为了通往毁灭性战争的阶梯。德国传统中的整体战略方法已无回归，而前进的道路却通往灾难。这场灾难源于一支军队，它有时在武力运用方面展现出卓越的才能，却既无力也无意限制武力的使用，因为限制武力会引发关于战争对德国是否仍然可行的质疑。
This most vital issue of the practice of war was rarely raised in Germany. Its consideration suited neither the militant strategy of conquest nor the operational opportunism and the competitive character of the German military. As far as the German army was concerned, the very methods that helped to overcome the stalemate of the First World War produced the escalatory ladder to apocalyptic war. There was no return to a holistic approach to strategy in the German tradition, but the way forward led into disaster. It was the disaster of a military that was, at times, brilliant in its use of force, but unable and unwilling to limit this use because the limitation of force would have raised the issue of whether war was still feasible for Germany.
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如果说从20世纪30年代到二战中期德国军队的历史“本质上是新战略的拥护者与传统步兵战略的拥护者之间未解决的冲突记录，前者以革命性地运用装甲、摩托化和空军部队为目标，旨在瘫痪敌军”，那么我们或许可以忽略德国战略形成过程中长达三十年的动荡。本文试图分析德国战略如何、为何以及最终如何演变为武器最大化的问题。总之，必须重新强调超越军事技术官僚主义和作战机会主义的战略。那么，在20世纪上半叶，德国究竟有哪些战略选择？又做出了哪些战略抉择？
If the history of the German army from the 1930s to the middle years of the Second World War had indeed been “essentially the record of the unresolved conflicts between protagonists of a new strategy founded on the revolutionary use of armoured, motorized, and air forces engaged in a mission of paralysis, and the adherents of the traditional strategy based on infantry armies…,”177 we might as well forget about thirty years of turmoil in the making of German strategy. How, why, and with what consequences German strategy became a matter of maximizing weapons, this essay has tried to analyze. In conclusion, strategy beyond military technocracy and operational opportunism must be re-emphasized. What exactly were Germany's strategic options in the first half of the twentieth-century, and which strategic choices were made?
德国统一后的发展并非依赖于军备，而是依靠经济和知识两大支柱。然而，这些力量源泉也同时也是德国的弱点所在。狭义的军事层面而言，这些弱点体现在德国地处欧洲中心的地理政治位置，而武器日益增长的威力和破坏力加剧了这一劣势，同时德国也依赖于自身无法掌控的市场和粮食供应。更广义的社会和政治层面而言，这些弱点体现在新兴民族国家在日益国际化的经济环境中丧失自主性，以及社会福祉对全球市场状况的依赖。德国的战略形成，取决于德国民众（而不仅仅是德国精英阶层）及其邻国如何应对德国在欧洲经济和科技领域的崛起，以及这一地位带来的优势和挑战。它是各种限制条件下做出的选择的结果。
Germany's development after unification rested on the twin pillars of its economy and its intellectual life, not on arms. But these sources of strength were also sources of German vulnerability. In a narrow military sense, these consisted in Germany's geopolitical situation in the center of Europe, which was exacerbated by the growing reach and destructiveness of weapons, and by Germany's dependence on markets and food stuffs beyond its control. In a wider social and political sense these weaknesses consisted in a loss of autonomy of the new nation-state in an increasingly internationalized economy and in the dependence of society's well-being on global market conditions. German strategy was shaped by the way in which Germans—and not just German elites—and Germany's neighbors dealt with Germany's rise to a position of economic and scientific predominance in Europe, the advantages that this position brought and the challenges that it created. It was the outcome of choices within constraints.
德国政界有时确实会选择利用其经济实力，并尽可能降低统一带来的军事后果。这种“强硬”的策略最早出现在19世纪80年代末90年代初，当时德国试图冻结欧洲的军事局势，以便让工业——在海军的支持下——能够不受阻碍地扩张。这一选择通常与利奥·冯·卡普里维短暂的总理任期（1890-1894年）联系在一起，但它也是施利芬战略的基础。<sup>178</sup>这一方案既没有带来和平，也没有带来战争，而是在欧洲建立了一种脆弱的平衡，这种平衡建立在相互对立的军事集团和主要关注军备的外交之上。因此，这种选择本身就具有不稳定性。这取决于国际体系维持欧洲平衡的能力，以及国内政府遏制和平主义和社会主义国际主义，并满足经济利益集团对更具支持性和战斗性的政策的需求的能力。最终，这一战略在帝国主义竞争和民粹主义政治的压力下崩溃。值得注意的是，进入20世纪后，欧洲精英阶层日益丧失了建立国际共识并将其强加于本国社会的能力。这是“专业”战略最终崩溃的最重要前提，因为这种战略依赖于限制战争和维护国内军事自主的能力。
German politics could and did, at times, choose to capitalize on its economic strength and to scale down the military consequences of unification. This option appeared, in its “strong” version, for the first time in the late 1880s and the early 1890s with the attempt to freeze the military situation in Europe so that industry—supported by the navy—could expand unhindered. This choice is most commonly linked to the brief chancellorship of Leo von Caprivi (1890–1894), but it was also the basis of Schlieffen's strategy.178 It was a solution that promised neither peace nor war, but produced a fragile balance in Europe based upon opposing military blocs and a diplomacy that was largely preoccupied with armaments. As such, this choice was inherently unstable. It depended on the international system's ability to maintain the balance in Europe and, at the domestic level, on the government's ability to check both pacifism and socialist internationalism, and the demands of economic interests for more supportive and militant policies. In the end the strategy collapsed under the pressures of imperial rivalries and of populist politics. It is worth noting that European elites, entering the twentieth century, increasingly lost their ability to establish international consensus and to impose it on their societies. This was the most important precondition for the eventual collapse of “professional” strategy, which depended on the ability to limit wars and to maintain military autonomy at home.
这种选择的“弱化版”也曾存在，它一度看似前景光明，但很快就黯然失色。这一方案基于德国的裁军，以及20世纪20年代试图在复兴和国际化经济的基础上重建国内和国际稳定的尝试。然而，尽管这一弱化版方案催生了一些精妙的运作理念，但它几乎在构想之初便宣告失败，主要原因有二，值得我们仔细探究。即便采取激进的单方面裁军措施，使德国丧失防御能力，也无法平息民众普遍存在的不信任情绪，毕竟德国仍然是欧洲大陆最强大的经济体，并且仍然具备威胁欧洲现状的所有潜在力量。与此同时，经济稳定也无法使德国民众普遍接受德国国际地位的下降，反而助长了反弹：日益猖獗的激进民族主义。一旦稳定被证明只是海市蜃楼，这种对外不信任和国内激进民族主义的结合便凝结成一团爆炸性的混合物，点燃了欧洲的战火。尽管我们必须强调经济秩序的崩溃是一个破坏稳定的因素，也必须强调德国修正主义和民族主义在这一背景下的作用，但我们也可以得出结论：欧洲作为一个整体失败了。它无法应对试图在军事上“软弱”的国内和国际稳定模式基础上来构建自身秩序的挑战。
A “weak” version of this choice also existed, which looked promising for a moment, but quickly faded. This option was based on the disarmament of Germany and on the attempt in the 1920s to rebuild national and international stability on the foundation of a revitalized and internationalized economy. But the weak version failed almost as soon as it was conceived—though it produced some brilliant operational concepts—mainly for two reasons that repay careful scrutiny. Even the radical, unilateral disarmament of Germany to a point of defenselessness could not calm the general tendency to distrust a nation that remained the strongest economic power in continental Europe and retained all the potential for threatening the European status quo. At the same time, economic stabilization could not reconcile large segments of the German population to Germany's diminished international status, but rather nurtured a reaction: increasingly rampant militant nationalism. Once stabilization proved to be a mirage, this combination of foreign distrust and militant nationalism at home congealed into an explosive mixture that set Europe ablaze. However much we must emphasize the collapse of the economic world order as a destabilizing factor and however much we must stress German revisionism and nationalism in this context,179 we can also conclude that Europe as a whole failed. It could not rise to the challenge of attempting to order its affairs on the basis of a militarily “weak” version of national and international stabilization.
德国的另一种选择是通过军事力量来强化经济实力。由于其经济扩张和国际化的特性，这必然是一种霸权主义路线。<sup>180</sup>这种选择同样存在“弱式”和“强式”两种版本。“弱式”被认为是本世纪德国问题的主要根源。其驱动力源于对军事自主权的追求、对战略安全边界的寻求以及对主要市场和资源的工业控制，以及对左翼政治的恐惧。其主要动机在于国内：维护精英统治，这一点可以从武力准备和使用的具体操作和组织细节中窥见一斑。贝特曼·霍尔维格、法尔肯海因和塞克特是1914年至1945年间这一路线的代表人物。20世纪30年代的重新武装和专业战略的复兴也反映了同样的根本理念。这是精英统治向德国内部政治和国际经济政治事务的延伸。然而，所有这些理念在本世纪战争进入决定性阶段之前就已失效。帝国军队的作战计划在马恩河战役和凡尔登战役中均告失败；塞克特的军队始终未能投入战斗；贝克和弗里奇的部署计划也陷入僵局。这些计划构思精妙，却毫无用处。二十世纪德国战争的真正开端，是整个国家为了寻求权宜之计而动员起来。
The alternative German choice consisted in reinforcing economic power by military might. Because of the nature of an expansive and internationalized economy, this was necessarily a hegemonic approach.180 This choice, once again, came in a “weak” and a “strong” version. The “weak” version has been considered the main source of the German problem in this century. This was fuelled by the quest for military autonomy, by the search for strategically secure borders as well as industrial control of principal markets and resources, and by the fear of left-wing politics. Its primary motivation was domestic: the preservation of elite rule, which may be glimpsed both in the operational and organizational details of the preparation and use of force. Bethmann Hollweg, Falkenhayn, and Seeckt are the best representatives of this course between 1914 and 1945. Rearmament and the resurgence of professional strategy in the 1930s reflected the same basic outlook. It was an extension of elite rule both inward into German politics and outward into international economic and political affairs. However, all these concepts failed before the wars in this century moved into their decisive stage. The imperial army's operational designs unravelled at the Marne and again at Verdun; Seeckt's army was never able to engage in combat, and Beck's and Fritsch's deployment plans ran into a dead end. The plans were beautifully conceived, but useless. The German wars in the twentieth century began in a serious way when, in search for expedients, national society was mobilized.
大规模战争的目标在1916年和1938年开始影响着各种选择。这些选择构成了霸权选择的“强硬”版本，并在第一次世界大战到第二次世界大战期间经历了显著的转变。为了更有效地组织生产和破坏，工业界和军方要求整个德国社会在功能上服从于政府——这是鲁登道夫的技术官僚解决方案。他们试图通过承诺在适当的时候分享效率提升带来的利益来迎合大众政治；也就是说，他们夸大了战争目标，并为一场民族净化战争打开了闸门。国家社会主义者在组织社会方面同样具有极权主义色彩。然而，他们的目标是在征服、歼灭和奴役的基础上重建德国社会和德国国家。最终，德国社会将实现自治，摆脱市场的变幻莫测，并在其广阔的帝国疆域内获得安全保障。国家社会主义对民众参与政治和战争的挑战，以及对两次世界大战之间经济和社会危机的回应，是一种民粹主义和好战的统治形式。由此产生的意识形态战略与德国军队的行动机会主义相结合。
Goals of mass war began to shape the options in 1916 and 1938. These formed the “strong” version of the hegemonic choice that underwent a significant transformation from the First to the Second World War. In demanding the functional subordination of all of German society—Ludendorff's technocratic solution—in favor of a more efficient organization of production and destruction, industry and the military attempted to accommodate mass politics by promising to share the spoils of efficiency in due course; that is, they inflated war goals and opened the floodgates for a war of national purification. The National Socialists were no less totalitarian in their claims for organizing society. However, they aimed at a reconstruction of German society and of the German state on the basis of conquest, annihilation, and subjugation. At last, German society was to be autonomous, free from the vagaries of the market,181 and secure behind its extended imperial borders. The National Socialist answer to the challenge of mass participation in politics and war and their response to the economic and social crisis of the interwar years consisted in a populist and militant form of hegemony. The resulting ideological strategy fused with the operational opportunism of the German military.
这一选择的残酷和不人道似乎超越了历史的解释，然而，只有从战略选择的角度才能理解它：一方面，德国在欧洲的经济主导地位及其对世界市场的依赖；另一方面，德国则要解决国内民众参与的挑战与精英统治的捍卫之间的冲突。
The brutality and inhumanity of this choice seems to transcend historical explanation, and yet it is only comprehensible on the basis of strategic choices made to deal with Germany's position of economic predominance in Europe and its dependence upon world markets, on the one hand, and to come to terms with the domestic conflict between the challenge of mass participation and the defense of elite rule, on the other.
这一方案并非出自军方之手。首先提出这一对德国而言至关重要的战略选择的，是德国知识分子。他们认为，德国唯有掌握自身命运方能生存。德国的主权、社会和文化完整性都依赖于扩张，直至其彻底摆脱依赖。<sup>182</sup>扩张主义的“科学”傲慢与文化绝望的结合，构成了二十世纪德国战争的意识形态议程，而这种议程又通过日益强大的宣传力量不断被放大和庸俗化。这也造成了一个无法解决的作战难题，因为德国从未拥有足够的军事力量来掌控自身命运，其命运反而被全球经济进程所塑造。
This solution was not formulated by the military. It was first of all the German intelligentsia who expressed this fateful strategic choice for Germany in the twentieth century. Germany, they argued, could only survive if it controlled its own destiny. German sovereignty and social and cultural integrity depended on expansion to a point at which it covered all the bases of its dependence.182 The combination of expansive, “scientific” arrogance and cultural despair gave twentieth-century German wars their ideological agenda, which were then endlessly multiplied and vulgarized through the increasing power of propaganda. It also created an insoluble operational problem, for Germany never possessed enough military power to control its own destiny, which instead was shaped by global economic processes.
这些理论只有在被德国社会的关键阶层接受，以及世界末日般的战争景象开始影响国内外事务时，才得以迅速发展壮大。霸权和民族复兴的愿景甚至能够战胜人们内心深处对毁灭和死亡的恐惧。比起任何特定的技术，正是这些愿景决定了第二次世界大战的破坏程度。这场战争是由一个强大到足以挑战世界的国家发动的，但在20世纪上半叶的任何时候，这个国家都无力应对自身的脆弱性，而这些脆弱性正是其非凡崛起的结果。德国战略上的傲慢——以及鲁登道夫、哈尔德、古德里安、隆美尔、曼施坦因及其同僚在作战中的机会主义——源于一种信念：德国人可以统治他国，而不是治理自己；德国作为一个国家，要么统治，要么灭亡。
These doctrines only mushroomed when they were taken up by pivotal segments of German society and when visions of apocalyptic war began to shape domestic and international affairs. Visions of hegemony and national regeneration were able to overcome even the most deep-seated fears of destruction and death. More than any particular technology, they determined the destructive scope of the Second World War. The war was unleashed by a nation strong enough to challenge the world, but unable, at any time in the first half of the twentieth century, to cope with its vulnerabilities, themselves the results of its extraordinary rise. The source of German strategic hubris—and the root for the operational opportunism of Ludendorff, Halder, Guderian, Rommel, Manstein, and their peers—was the conviction that Germans could rule others in lieu of governing themselves and that Germany must either rule or perish as a nation.
*注：我要感谢 John Shy、Charles Bright 和本书的编辑们在撰写本文时给予的友好建议。谨以此文献给我的博士导师 Andreas Hillgruber 教授，以庆祝他六十岁生日。
* NOTE: I should like to thank John Shy, Charles Bright, and the editors of this volume for their kind advice in the preparation of this essay, which is dedicated to my Doktorvater, Prof. Dr. Andreas Hillgruber, on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday.
1 Gotthard Jäschke，“1914 年的军事问题”， Historische Zeitschrift 190 (1960)，311-48；卡尔·兰格，《Marneschlacht und die Öffenthchkeit 1914–1931：Eine verdrängte Niederlage und ihre Folgen》（杜塞尔多夫，1974 年）。
1 Gotthard Jäschke, “Zum Problem der Marneschlacht von 1914,” Historische Zeitschrift 190 (1960), 311–48; Karl Lange, Marneschlacht und die Öffenthchkeit 1914–1931: Eine verdrängte Niederlage und ihre Folgen (Düsseldorf, 1974).
2 Rudolf von Caemmerer，《Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19》。Jahrhundert（柏林，1904 年）；另请参阅本卷中 Hajo Holborn 和 Gunther Rothenberg 的文章。
2 Rudolf von Caemmerer, Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1904); see also the essays by Hajo Holborn and Gunther Rothenberg in this volume.
3 Larry H. Addington，《闪电战时代与德国总参谋部，1865–1941》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克，1971 年）；Charles Messenger，《闪电战的艺术》（伦敦，1967 年）。
3 Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865–1941 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1971); Charles Messenger, The Art of Blitzkrieg (London, 1967).
4 Trevor N. Dupuy，《战争天才：德国陆军和总参谋部，1807–1945》（Englewood Cliffs，1977 年）。
4 Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 (Englewood Cliffs, 1977).
5 Jehuda Wallach，《Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht：Die Lehren von Clausewitz und Schlieffen und ihre Wirkungen in zwei Weltkriegen》（法兰克福，1967 年）。
5 Jehuda Wallach, Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht: Die Lehren von Clausewitz und Schlieffen und ihre Wirkungen in zwei Weltkriegen (Frankfurt, 1967).
6 Gordon A. Craig，《普鲁士军队的政治》（纽约，1964 年）。
6 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (New York, 1964).
7 Alfred von Schlieffen， Gesammelte Schriften（柏林，1913 年），1：11-22（“Vom Krieg der Zukunft”）；罗杰·奇克林，“德国国防军和德国陆军改革，1912-1914 年”， Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 25 (1979)，7-34。
7 Alfred von Schlieffen, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, 1913), 1:11–22 (“Vom Krieg der Zukunft”); Roger Chickering, “Der deutsche Wehrverein und die Reform der deutschen Armee, 1912–1914,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 25 (1979), 7–34.
8 Reichsarchiv，编辑， Kriegsrüstung und Kriegswirtschaft：Die mihtärische、wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Rüstung Deutschlands，1871-1914（柏林，1930 年），Anlagen，44；奥托·尼波尔德，《德意志沙文主义》（斯图加特，1912 年）。另请比较Deutsche Wehrzeitung , 1912ff中的贡献。关于“暴力崇拜”，参见 Hans Barth, Masse und Mythos, die ideologtsche Krtse an der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert und die Theorie der Gewalt: Georges Sorel (汉堡，1959)。
8 Reichsarchiv, ed., Kriegsrüstung und Kriegswirtschaft: Die mihtärische, wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Rüstung Deutschlands, 1871–1914 (Berlin, 1930), Anlagen, 44; Otto Nippold, Der deutsche Chauvinismus (Stuttgart, 1912). Compare also the contributions in Deutsche Wehrzeitung, 1912ff. On the “cult of violence” see Hans Barth, Masse und Mythos, die ideologtsche Krtse an der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert und die Theorie der Gewalt: Georges Sorel (Hamburg, 1959).
9沃尔夫拉姆·韦特（Wolfram Wette），德国社会主义者理论：马克思、恩格斯、拉萨尔、伯恩斯坦、考茨基、卢森堡（斯图加特，1971 年）。关于社民党，请参阅弗里德赫尔姆·波尔（Friedhelm Boll），“德国社会民主党的辞职与革命：Zur Friedensstrategie 1890-1919”，载于Frieden, Gewalt, Sozialismus: Studien zur Geschichte der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung 编辑。沃尔夫冈·胡贝尔 (Wolfgang Huber) 和约阿希姆·施韦特费格 (Joachim Schwertfeger)（斯图加特，1976 年），179–281；弗里德赫尔姆·波尔（Friedhelm Boll），《弗里登革命》（波恩，1980）；赫尔穆特·布莱 (Hellmut Bley)，《倍倍尔与战争战略》（哥廷根，1975 年）。
9 Wolfram Wette, Kriegstheorien deutscher Sozialisten: Marx, Engels, Lasalle, Bernstein, Kautsky, Luxemburg (Stuttgart, 1971). On the SPD see Friedhelm Boll, “Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie zwischen Resignation und Revolution: Zur Friedensstrategie 1890–1919,” in Frieden, Gewalt, Sozialismus: Studien zur Geschichte der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung, ed. Wolfgang Huber and Joachim Schwertfeger (Stuttgart, 1976), 179–281; Friedhelm Boll, Frieden ohne Revolution (Bonn, 1980); Hellmut Bley, Bebel und die Strategie der Kriegsverhutung (Göttingen, 1975).
10 Wilhelm Lamszus，《Das Menschenschlachthaus：Bilder vom kommenden Krieg》（1912 年版repr.，慕尼黑，1980 年）； Carl Bleibtreu， Das Heer（法兰克福，1910 年）； Nahum Goldman，《军事精神》（斯图加特和柏林，1915 年）；弗里德里希·瑙曼 (Friedrich Naumann)，《Wie wir uns im Krieg verändert haben》（维也纳，1916 年）。
10 Wilhelm Lamszus, Das Menschenschlachthaus: Bilder vom kommenden Krieg (repr. of 1912 ed., Munich, 1980); Carl Bleibtreu, Das Heer (Frankfurt, 1910); Nahum Goldman, Der Geist des Militarismus (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1915); Friedrich Naumann, Wie wir uns im Krieg verändert haben (Vienna, 1916).
11 Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr.，《短暂战争的幻觉：1914 年 8 月至 12 月德国的政策、战略和国内事务》（加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉，1973 年）；Jack Snyder，《进攻的意识形态：军事决策和 1914 年的灾难》（伊萨卡和伦敦，1984 年）。
11 Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr., The Short War Illusion: German Policy, Strategy, and Domestic Affairs, August-December, 1914 (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1973); Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disaster of 1914 (Ithaca and London, 1984).
12施利芬，《Gesammelte Werke》，1:17。另请参见 Gerhard Ritter， Der Schlieffenplan：Kritik eines Mythos（慕尼黑，1956 年；Eng.trans.London，1958 年）。
12 Schlieffen, Gesammelte Werke, 1:17. See also Gerhard Ritter, Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos (Munich, 1956; Eng. trans. London, 1958).
13关于战争目标，请参见 Fritz Fischer， Griff nach der Weltmacht，3d ed。 （杜塞尔多夫，1964 年）和同上， Krieg der Illusionen（杜塞尔多夫，1969 年）；从强权政治的角度来看，Andreas Hillgruber, Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler (杜塞尔多夫，1971)。
13 On war aims see Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 3d ed. (Düsseldorf, 1964) and idem, Krieg der Illusionen (Düsseldorf, 1969); and from a power-politics perspective, Andreas Hillgruber, Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler (Düsseldorf, 1971).
14沃尔特·埃尔兹 (Walter Elze)，《1914 年德国战争：1914-1918 年世界战争战略》，卷。 《军事图书馆》第 16 页（奥斯纳布吕克，1968 年），57-77。
14 Walter Elze, Das deutsche Heer von 1914: Der strategische Aufbau des Weltkrieges 1914–1918, vol. 16 of Bibliotheca rerum Militarium (Osnabrück, 1968), 57–77.
15乔治·凯南，《命运的联盟：法国、俄罗斯和第一次世界大战的到来》（纽约，1984 年）。
15 George Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (New York, 1984).
16 Karl-Heinz Janssen，《Der Kanzler und der General》（哥廷根，1967 年）；康拉德·贾劳施，《神秘的财政大臣》（纽黑文和伦敦，1973 年）。
16 Karl-Heinz Janssen, Der Kanzler und der General (Göttingen, 1967); Konrad Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor (New Haven and London, 1973).
17埃里希·冯·法尔肯汉 (Erich von Falkenhayn)，《德国总参谋部及其决策，1914-1916 年》（纽约，1920 年），249。
17 Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916 (New York, 1920), 249.
18约翰·J·米尔斯海默在其著作《常规威慑》 （伊萨卡和伦敦，1983 年）中提出了略有不同的论点
18 A somewhat different argument is presented in John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca and London, 1983).
19 Falkenhayn，德国总参谋部，249； Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr.，“通过疲惫实现和平：凡尔登战役的德国外交动机”， Revue Internationale d'histoire militaire 32 (1972–75), 477–94；迈克尔·萨莱夫斯基 (Michael Salewski)，“凡尔登与佛尔根：军事与精神的 Betrachtung”， Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 25 (1976)，89-96。
19 Falkenhayn, German General Staff, 249; Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr., “Peace through Exhaustion: German Diplomatic Motivation for the Verdun Campaign,” Revue internationale d'histoire militaire 32 (1972–75), 477–94; Michael Salewski, “Verdun und die Folgen: Eine militärische und geistesgeschichtliche Betrachtung,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 25 (1976), 89–96.
20最好的也是唯一可靠的分析仍然是汉斯·温特的《凡尔登 1916》（柏林，1931 年）；在更通俗的层面上，可以参考阿利斯泰尔·霍恩的《荣耀的代价：凡尔登 1916》（伦敦，1962 年）。
20 The best and only reliable analysis still is Hans Wendt, Verdun 1916 (Berlin, 1931); on a more popular level see Alistair Horne, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (London, 1962).
21 Reichsarchiv，编辑， Die Operationsen des Jahres 1916 bis zum Wechsel der Obersten Heeresleitung，卷。 《1914-1918 年世界战争》第 10 期（柏林，1936 年），338-88、674-76；恩斯特·卡比什，索姆河，1916 年（柏林，1937 年）。
21 Reichsarchiv, ed., Die Operationen des Jahres 1916 bis zum Wechsel der Obersten Heeresleitung, vol. 10 of Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (Berlin, 1936), 338–88, 674–76; Ernst Kabisch, Somme 1916 (Berlin, 1937).
22 Karl-Heinz Janssen，“Der Wechsel der OHL 1916”， Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 7 (1954)，337-71；马克斯·霍夫曼 (Max Hoffmann)，《战争日记和其他论文》（伦敦，1929 年），2：242–343；埃里希·鲁登道夫，《我的战争》，1914-1918（柏林，1919），203-227。
22 Karl-Heinz Janssen, “Der Wechsel der OHL 1916,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 7 (1954), 337–71; Max Hoffmann, War Dtaries and Other Papers (London, 1929), 2:242–343; Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 1914–1918 (Berlin, 1919), 203–227.
23诺曼·斯通，“鲁登道夫”，《战争领主：二十世纪的军事指挥官》，编辑。迈克尔·卡弗（伦敦，1976 年），13-74； P. Neame，《第一次世界大战中的德国战略》（伦敦，1923 年），120；沃尔夫冈·福斯特（Wolfgang Foerster），《 Der Feldherr Ludendorff im Unglück：Eine Studie über seine seelische Haltung in der Endphase des Ersten Weltkrieges》（威斯巴登，1952）。
23 Norman Stone, “Ludendorff,” in The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century, ed. Michael Carver (London, 1976), 13–74; P. Neame, German Strategy in the Great War (London, 1923), 120; Wolfgang Foerster, Der Feldherr Ludendorff im Unglück: Eine Studie über seine seelische Haltung in der Endphase des Ersten Weltkrieges (Wiesbaden, 1952).
24鲁登道夫，《Kriegserinnerungen》，419。
24 Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen, 419.
25 Hans Speier，“鲁登道夫：德国的总体战概念” ， 《现代战略的缔造者》 ，Edward Mead Earle 编辑（普林斯顿，1943 年），第 308 页。
25 Hans Speier, “Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War,” Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943), 308.
26 Gerhard Ritter，《剑与权杖：德国军国主义问题》，4 卷（佛罗里达州科勒尔盖布尔斯，1969-73 年）。
26 Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, 4 vols. (Coral Gables, Fla., 1969–73).
27这一概念在弗里德里希·G·荣格的《技术完善》附录：世界大战（第5版，法兰克福，1968年）第180-197页中得到了最清晰的阐述；与之相反的观点参见雷蒙·阿隆的《总体战的世纪》（纽约州花园城，1954年）。另见托尼·阿什沃思的《堑壕战1914-1918：互不干涉的体系》（伦敦，1980年）；埃里克·J·利德的《无人区：第一次世界大战中的战斗与身份认同》（纽约，1981年）。
27 This notion is most clearly expressed in Friedrich G. Jünger, Die Perfektion der Technik, Appendix: Die Weltkriege, 5th ed. (Frankfurt, 1968), 180–97; as counterpoint see Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Garden City, N.Y., 1954). See also Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914–1918: The Live and Let Live System (London, 1980); Eric J. Leed, No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I (New York, 1981).
28鲁登道夫，《军事战争》，208–216, 240–57；保罗·冯·兴登堡元帅，《Aus metnem Leben》（莱比锡，1934 年），第 159–60、176–78 页。
28 Ludendorff, Kriegsertnnerungen, 208–216, 240–57; Generalfeldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg, Aus metnem Leben (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 159–60, 176–78.
29鲁登道夫，《军事行动》，349。
29 Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen, 349.
30 Trevor N. Dupuy，《兴登堡和鲁登道夫的军事生涯》（纽约，1979 年）；Donald Goodspeed，《鲁登道夫：第一次世界大战的天才》（波士顿，1966 年）；GC Wynne，《如果德国进攻：西线的纵深战》（伦敦，1940 年）。
30 Trevor N. Dupuy, The Military Lives of Hindenburg and Ludendorff of Imperial Germany (New York, 1979); Donald Goodspeed, Ludendorff: Genius of World War I (Boston, 1966); G. C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (London, 1940).
31其中，上校。鲍尔和洛斯伯格，少校。韦策尔、布鲁赫米勒和上尉。盖尔、雷德曼和罗尔；参见 Wilhelm Balck， Entwicklung der Takttk im Weltkrteg，第 2 版。 （柏林，1922 年）；尤金·卡里亚斯，《军事思想》（巴黎，1948 年），335-43。
31 Among others, Cols. Bauer and Lossberg, Majs. Wetzell and Bruchmüller, and Capts. Geyer, Reddemann, and Rohr; see Wilhelm Balck, Entwicklung der Takttk im Weltkrteg, 2d ed. (Berlin, 1922); Eugene Carrias, La pensée militaire allemande (Paris, 1948), 335–43.
32 Hew Strachan，《欧洲军队与战争行为》（伦敦，1983 年），第 140 页。
32 Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London, 1983), 140.
33 Timothy T. Lupfer，《条令的动态：第一次世界大战期间德国战术条令的变化》（堪萨斯州福特莱文沃思，1981 年）；有关当代的叙述，请参见 Friedrich Lossberg， Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914–1918（柏林，1939 年）。
33 Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War (Ford Leavenworth, Kans., 1981); for a contemporary account see Friedrich Lossberg, Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Berlin, 1939).
34 Hans-Ludger Borgert，“Grundzüge der Landkriegführung von Schlieffen bis Guderian”，《德国军事史》1648-1939 年，编辑。 Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt（repr. Herrsching，1983），9：517-18。
34 Hans-Ludger Borgert, “Grundzüge der Landkriegführung von Schlieffen bis Guderian,” Deutsche Militärgeschichte 1648–1939, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (repr. Herrsching, 1983), 9:517–18.
35弗里德里希·塞塞尔伯格 (Friedrich Seesselberg)，《Der Stellungskrieg 1914–1918》（柏林，1926 年）； L. Loizeau，《战略成功，战术成功》（巴黎，1931 年）； P. Lucas， L'évolution des idées tactiques（巴黎，1923 年）； S. Pagano，《Evoluzione della tattica durante la grande guerra》（都灵，1929 年）；尼姆，《德国战略》。
35 Friedrich Seesselberg, Der Stellungskrieg 1914–1918 (Berlin, 1926); L. Loizeau, Succès stratégiques, succès tactiques (Paris, 1931); P. Lucas, L'évolution des idées tactiques (Paris, 1923); S. Pagano, Evoluzione della tattica durante la grande guerra (Torino, 1929); Neame, German Strategy.
36 Helmuth Gruss，《Die deutschen Sturmbataillone im Weltkrieg：Aufbau und Verwendung》（柏林，1939 年）；巴尔克，《战术研究》； Seesselberg、 Stellungskrieg，有详细讨论；另请参阅 Lupfer 的《学说动力学》，了解总结性陈述。
36 Helmuth Gruss, Die deutschen Sturmbataillone im Weltkrieg: Aufbau und Verwendung (Berlin, 1939); Balck, Entwicklung der Taktik; Seesselberg, Stellungskrieg, with detailed discussions; see also Lupfer, Dynamics of Doctrine, for a summary statement.
37参见 Ludendorff 在Kriegsertnnerungen中自己的评估，214。
37 See Ludendorff's own assessment in Kriegsertnnerungen, 214.
38同上，第 215 页。
38 Ibid., 215.
39 Martin Kitchen，《沉默的独裁：兴登堡和鲁登道夫统治下的德国最高统帅部的政治，1916-1918》（伦敦和纽约，1976 年）。
39 Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916–1918 (London and New York, 1976).
40这是埃里希·鲁登道夫的《Kriegführung und Politik》（柏林，1922 年）和《 Der totale Krieg》 （慕尼黑，1935 年）的主要信息。
40 This is the main message of Erich Ludendorff, Kriegführung und Politik (Berlin, 1922) and idem, Der totale Krieg (Munich, 1935).
41鲁登道夫，《Kriegserinnerungen》，307。
41 Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen, 307.
42同上。
42 Ibid.
43 Wilhelm Deist，comp.， Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914–1918（杜塞尔多夫，1970 年），卷。 2，特别是。 7、博士。 ＃328、331。
43 Wilhelm Deist, comp., Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (Düsseldorf, 1970), vol. 2, esp. 7, doc. #328, 331.
44埃里希·鲁登道夫主编，《总参谋部及其问题》（纽约，1927 年），2：385-400。 Hans-Dieter Fischer 编辑， Pressekonzentration und Zensurpraxis im Ersten Weltkrieg（柏林，1973 年）。
44 Erich Ludendorff, ed., The General Staff and Its Problems (New York, 1927), 2:385–400. Hans-Dieter Fischer, ed., Pressekonzentration und Zensurpraxis im Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1973).
45 Gerald D. Feldman，《1914-1918 年德国陆军、工业和劳工》（普林斯顿，1966 年）； H. Schäffer, Regionale Wirtschaftspolitik in der Kriegswirtschaft: Staat, Industrie und Verbände in Baden (斯图加特, 1981)。
45 Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918 (Princeton, 1966); H. Schäffer, Regionale Wirtschaftspolitik in der Kriegswirtschaft: Staat, Industrie und Verbände in Baden (Stuttgart, 1981).
46 David Blackbourne 和 Geoffrey Eley，《德国历史的特殊性：19 世纪德国的资产阶级社会和政治》（牛津和纽约，1984 年）；Hans-Ulrich Wehler，《帝国的基督教领袖 1871–1918》（哥廷根，1970 年）。
46 David Blackbourne and Geoffrey Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in 19th-century Germany (Oxford and New York, 1984); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871–1918 (Göttingen, 1970).
47鲁登道夫，《Kriegserinnerungen》，240–57。
47 Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen, 240–57.
48 H. Kellermann 编辑，《Der Krieg der Geister》（德累斯顿，1915 年）；辛辛那图斯， Der Krieg der Worte（斯图加特，1916 年）；克劳斯·施瓦贝 (Klaus Schwabe)，《科学与战争道德：德国霍赫舒勒和政治原则》（哥廷根，1969 年）。
48 H. Kellermann, ed., Der Krieg der Geister (Dresden, 1915); Cincinnatus, Der Krieg der Worte (Stuttgart, 1916); Klaus Schwabe, Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral: Die deutschen Hochschullehrer und die politischen Grundfragen des Ersten Weltkrieges (Göttingen, 1969).
49 Karl Birnbaum，《和平行动与 U 型潜艇战争》（斯德哥尔摩，1958 年）； Bernhard Kaulisch， Die Auseinandersetzungen um den uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieg insidehalb der herrschenden Klasse Deutschlands während des Ersten Weltkrieges（论文，洪堡大学，柏林/东德，1970 年）；兰斯洛特·法勒 (Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr.)，《分而治之：德国为缔结单独和平所做的努力，1914-1918》（纽约，1978 年），72-84。
49 Karl Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare (Stockholm, 1958); Bernhard Kaulisch, Die Auseinandersetzungen um den uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieg innerhalb der herrschenden Klasse Deutschlands während des Ersten Weltkrieges (diss., Humboldt University, Berlin/GDR, 1970); Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr., Divide and Conquer: German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace, 1914–1918 (New York, 1978), 72–84.
50 Fritz Fischer，“1914-1918 年德意志战争、革命和奥斯滕分离”， Historische Zeitschrift 188 (1959)，249-310。
50 Fritz Fischer, “Deutsche Kriegsziele, Revolutionierung und Separatfrieden im Osten 1914–1918,” Historische Zeitschrift 188 (1959), 249–310.
51我将把这一过程称为“升级战争战略”，以区别于限制战争的“专业”战略。关于这一背景，请参阅埃里希·马克斯的《大战中的进攻与防御》（柏林，1923 年）。
51 I will call this process the “strategy of escalatory warfare” as opposed to the “professional” strategy of limiting war. See in this context the discussion of Erich Marcks, Angriff und Verteidigung im Grossen Kriege (Berlin, 1923).
52基思·罗宾斯，《第一次世界大战》（牛津和纽约，1984年），第82-103页；斯特拉坎，《欧洲军队》，第130-150页。目前尚缺乏对德国选择的学术分析。大多数二手文献都基于马克斯·施瓦特的《世界大战中的技术》（柏林，1920年）和卡尔·尤斯特罗的《军官与战争技术》（奥尔登堡，1933年）。关于英国，可参阅谢尔福德·比德韦尔和多米尼克·格雷厄姆的详细研究《火力：英国陆军武器和战争理论，1904-1945》（伦敦，1982年）。这些研究以及大量类似研究均未考虑采购决策变化背后的政治经济因素。
52 Keith Robbins, The First World War (Oxford and New York, 1984), 82–103; Strachan, European Armies, 130–50. A scholarly analysis of the German choice is missing. Most of the secondary literature is based on Max Schwarte, Die Technik im Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1920) and Karl Justrow, Feldherr und Kriegstechnik (Oldenburg, 1933). For Great Britain see the detailed study of Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1945 (London, 1982). None of these or a host of similar studies considers the political-economic aspects of the change in procurement decisions.
53有关最详细的分析，请参阅 Feldman 的《陆军、工业和劳工》 。
53 See Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor for the most detailed analysis.
54鲁登道夫，《军事战争》，349。
54 Ludendorff, Kriegsermnerungen, 349.
55斯派尔，“鲁登道夫”，316。
55 Speier, “Ludendorff,” 316.
56鲁登道夫，《全面战争》，10；另见同上， Kriegführung und Politik，23。
56 Ludendorff, Der totale Krieg, 10; see also idem, Kriegführung und Politik, 23.
57关于升级战争中目标与手段之间的反比关系，参见 Ludendorff, Kriegführung und Politik , 10-23；安德烈亚斯·希尔格鲁伯 (Andreas Hillgruber)，《德国战争史》（哥廷根，1967 年），58–67。
57 On the inverse relation between goals and means in escalatory warfare, see Ludendorff, Kriegführung und Politik, 10–23; Andreas Hillgruber, Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege (Göttingen, 1967), 58–67.
58 Abraham J. Peck，《激进派和反动派：威廉时代德国的保守主义危机》（华盛顿特区，1978 年），第 215 页。
58 Abraham J. Peck, Radicals and Reactionaries: The Crisis of Conservatism in Wilhelmine Germany (Washington, D.C., 1978), 215.
59再次需要指出的是，末日战争不一定是彻底毁灭的战争，而是“遵循技术（或工具）理性，而不遵循任何（实质性的）理性目标”的战争（荣格，《技术的完善》，189）。
59 Once again it should be noted that apocalyptic wars are not necessarily wars of total destruction, but wars that “follow technical [or instrumental] rationality without following any [substantive] rational goal” (Jünger, Perfektion der Technik, 189).
60马丁·基钦（Martin Kitchen），“军国主义与法西斯意识形态的发展：马克斯·鲍尔上校的政治思想，1916-1918”，《中欧历史》 8（1975），199-220；阿道夫·沃格特， Oberst Max Bauer：Generalstabsoffizier im Zwielicht，1869-1929（奥斯纳布吕克，1974）。
60 Martin Kitchen, “Militarism and the Development of Fascist Ideology: The Political Ideas of Colonel Max Bauer, 1916–1918,” Central European History 8 (1975), 199–220; Adolf Vogt, Oberst Max Bauer: Generalstabsoffizier im Zwielicht, 1869–1929 (Osnabrück, 1974).
61荣格，技术完善，184。
61 Jünger, Perfektion der Technik, 184.
62鲁登道夫， Kriegserinnerungen，p。 434、435； Reichsarchiv，编辑， Die Kriegführung im Frühjahr 1917，卷。《1914-1918 年世界战争》第 12 页（柏林，1939 年），560-89。
62 Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen, p. 434, 435; Reichsarchiv, ed., Die Kriegführung im Frühjahr 1917, vol. 12 of Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (Berlin, 1939), 560–89.
63 Lupfer 的摘要，《教义动态》，37-54；信使，闪电战的艺术，9-29。另请参阅 Balck、 Taktik；格鲁斯，《德国风暴》；格奥尔格·布鲁赫穆勒 (Georg Bruchmüller)，《Die Artillerie beim Angriff im Stellungskrieg》（柏林，1926 年）。
63 Summaries in Lupfer, Dynamics of Doctrine, 37–54; Messenger, Art of Blitzkrieg, 9–29. See also Balck, Taktik; Gruss, Die deutschen Sturmbataillone; Georg Bruchmüller, Die Artillerie beim Angriff im Stellungskrieg (Berlin, 1926).
64 K. Krafft von Delmensingen，《 Der Durchbruch：Studie an Hand der Vorgänge des Weltkrieges 1914–1918》（汉堡，1937 年），132–85；瓦拉赫，《Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht》，271–88。
64 K. Krafft von Delmensingen, Der Durchbruch: Studie an Hand der Vorgänge des Weltkrieges 1914–1918 (Hamburg, 1937), 132–85; Wallach, Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht, 271–88.
65鲁普雷希特·冯·拜仁，《Mein Kriegstagebuch》（柏林，1929 年），2:372；兴登堡，《我的生活》，233–44； C. Barnett，《持剑者：最高指挥部研究》（伦敦，1963 年），282。
65 Rupprecht von Bayern, Mein Kriegstagebuch (Berlin, 1929), 2:372; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 233–44; C. Barnett, The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command (London, 1963), 282.
66马丁·米德布鲁克，《卡瑟之战》（伦敦，1978 年）； Reichsarchiv 编辑， 1918 年西线战事，卷。《1914-1918 年世界战争》第 14 条（1944 年[柏林，1956 年]）。
66 Martin Middlebrook, The Katser's Battle (London, 1978); Reichsarchiv, ed., Die Kriegführung an der Westfront im Jahre 1918, vol. 14 of Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (1944 [Berlin, 1956]).
67佩克，《激进派与反动派》，203-221； Jürgen Kocka， Klassengesellschaft im Kriege：Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914-1918（哥廷根，1973）。
67 Peck, Radicals and Reactionaries, 203–221; Jürgen Kocka, Klassengesellschaft im Kriege: Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914–1918 (Göttingen, 1973).
68多米尼克·文纳 (Dominique Venner)，《Baltikum：Dans le Reich de la défaite：Le Battle du Corps-Francs》，1918-1923 年（巴黎，1974 年）； Rüdiger von der Goltz，奥斯滕政治将军，第二版。 （莱比锡，1936 年）。库尔特·费舍尔（Kurt Fischer），《1918/19 年德意志军队和协约国对南德鲁斯兰的干预》（博帕德，1973 年）。
68 Dominique Venner, Baltikum: Dans le Reich de la défaite: Le combat du Corps-Francs, 1918–1923 (Paris, 1974); Rüdiger von der Goltz, Als politischer General im Osten, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1936). Kurt Fischer, Deutsche Truppen und Entente-Intervention in Sudrussland 1918/19 (Boppard, 1973).
69 James Diehl，魏玛德国的准军事政治（布卢明顿，1977 年），75-116。伯恩哈德·托斯，《鲁登道夫县 1919-1923：慕尼黑 als Zentrum der mitteleuropäischen Gegenrevolution zwischen Revolution und Hitler-Putsch》（慕尼黑，1978 年）。
69 James Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany (Bloomington, 1977), 75–116. Bernhard Thoss, Der Ludendorff-Kreis 1919–1923: München als Zentrum der mitteleuropäischen Gegenrevolution zwischen Revolution und Hitler-Putsch (Munich, 1978).
70 Erwin Könnemann，《 Einwohnerwehren und Zeitfreiwilligenverbände：Ihre Funktion beim Aufbau eines neuen Empireistischen Militärsystems 1918–1920》（柏林/东德，1971 年）；迈克尔·盖耶 (Michael Geyer)，“军事工作、民事秩序、激进政治：1914-1945 年德国军事经验”伍德罗·威尔逊中心，ISSP 工作论文第 1 号。 39（华盛顿特区，1982 年），34-36。
70 Erwin Könnemann, Einwohnerwehren und Zeitfreiwilligenverbände: Ihre Funktion beim Aufbau eines neuen imperialistischen Militärsystems 1918–1920 (Berlin/GDR, 1971); Michael Geyer, “Military Work, Civil Order, Militant Politics: The German Military Experience 1914–1945” Woodrow Wilson Center, ISSP Working Paper no. 39 (Washington, D.C., 1982), 34–36.
71 Michael Salewski， Entwaffnung und Militarkontrolle in Deutschland 1919 bis 1927（慕尼黑，1966）； Jürgen Heideking，“Vom Versaille Vertrag zur Genfer Abrustungskonferenz：Das Scheitern der alluerten Militärkontrollpolitik gegenüber Deutschland nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg”， Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 28 (1980)，45-68。
71 Michael Salewski, Entwaffnung und Militarkontrolle in Deutschland 1919 bis 1927 (Munich, 1966); Jürgen Heideking, “Vom Versailler Vertrag zur Genfer Abrustungskonferenz: Das Scheitern der alluerten Militärkontrollpolitik gegenüber Deutschland nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 28 (1980), 45–68.
72 Wolfgang Sternstein，“Der Ruhrkampf”，载于Gewaltloser Widerstand gegen Aggressoren，编辑。 A. Roberts（哥廷根，1971 年），第 50-86 页；另请参见国务秘书哈姆 5 月 14 日至 15 日的备忘录，载于 Karl-Heinz Harbeck, comp., Das Kabinett Cuno，1922 年 11 月 22 日至 1923 年 8 月 12 日（Boppard，1968），260-61； Hermann Oncken，《欧洲历史中的德国政治动机》（柏林，1926 年）；以及 Carl Mertens 的小册子《Reichswehr oder Landesverteidigung》（威斯巴登，1926 年）。
72 Wolfgang Sternstein, “Der Ruhrkampf,” in Gewaltloser Widerstand gegen Aggressoren, ed. A. Roberts (Göttingen, 1971), pp. 50–86; see also the memorandum of State Secretary Hamm of May 14–15, in Karl-Heinz Harbeck, comp., Das Kabinett Cuno, 22 November 1922–12 August 1923 (Boppard, 1968), 260–61; Hermann Oncken, Über das politische Motiv der deutschen Sicherheit in der europaischen Geschichte (Berlin, 1926); and the little pamphlet by Carl Mertens, Reichswehr oder Landesverteidigung (Wiesbaden, 1926).
73 Hans Meier-Welcker， Seeckt（法兰克福，1967 年）； F. von Rabenau， Seeckt：Aus seinem Leben（莱比锡，1940）。
73 Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt (Frankfurt, 1967); F. von Rabenau, Seeckt: Aus seinem Leben (Leipzig, 1940).
74 Helm Speidel， 1813/1814：Etne militärpolitische Untersuchung（Diss，phil.，蒂宾根大学，1924 年）。
74 Helm Speidel, 1813/1814: Etne militärpolitische Untersuchung (Diss, phil., University of Tübingen, 1924).
75 Dorothea Fensch 和 Olaf Gröhler，“帝国主义国家和军事战略：Eine Denkschrift Wilhelm Groeners”， Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 19 (1971)，1167–77。
75 Dorothea Fensch and Olaf Gröhler, “Imperialistische Ökonomie und militärische Strategie: Eine Denkschrift Wilhelm Groeners,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 19 (1971), 1167–77.
76 Michael Geyer，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit：Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolttik 1924–1936》（威斯巴登，1980 年），81。
76 Michael Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit: Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolttik 1924–1936 (Wiesbaden, 1980), 81.
77汉斯·加茨克，《施特雷泽曼与德国的重整军备》（巴尔的摩，1954年）；海因茨·胡尔滕编，《1923年的军备年：1923-1924年的军事与内政》（杜塞尔多夫，1980年）。这里要指出的是，德国社会内部有相当一部分群体支持塞克特，但通过联盟战争实现“国家复兴”的方案既不符合当时的国内形势，也不符合国际形势。
77 Hans Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (Baltimore, 1954); Heinz Hurten, comp., Das Knsenjahr 1923: Militär und Innenpolitik 1923–1924 (Düsseldorf, 1980). The point here is that significant groups within German society supported Seeckt, but the option of “national recovery” through alliance warfare neither fit the national nor the international conditions.
78盖尔，《安全与安全》，85。
78 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 85.
79同上；关于人民战争的文献仍然不足。 Arthur Ehrhardt，《Kiemkrieg：Geschichtliche Erfahrungen und künftige Möglichkeiten》（波茨坦，1935 年）是一个摘要。
79 Ibid.; the literature on Volkskrieg is still inadequate. Arthur Ehrhardt, Kiemkrieg: Geschichtliche Erfahrungen und künftige Möglichkeiten (Potsdam, 1935) is a summary.
80盖尔，《安全性》，86。
80 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 86.
81明确且频繁地提及殖民战争。关于德国灭绝主义战争的形成，请参见 Helmut Bley, Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894–1914 (Hamburg, 1968)。
81 The reference to colonial warfare is explicit and frequent. On the formation of exterminist warfare in Germany see Helmut Bley, Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894–1914 (Hamburg, 1968).
82盖尔，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》，86-87。
82 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 86–87.
83关于军队现代化，参见 Heinz Sperling 的论文， Die Tätigkeit und Wirksamkeit des Heereswaffenamtes der Reichswehr für die materiell-technische Ausstattung eines 21 Divisionen Heeres 1924–1934 (diss., Pädagogische Hochschule Potsdam, 1980)；曼弗雷德·拉赫曼 (Manfred Lachmann)，《Zum Problem der Bewaffnung des Empireistischen deutschen Heeres 1919–1939》（diss, phil.，莱比锡，1965 年）； R. Barthel， Theorie und Praxis der Heeresmotorisierung im faschistischen Deutschland bis 1939（diss，phil.，莱比锡，1967）。问题在于如何理解英国文学界对古德里安的推崇。就目前而言，古德里安只不过是众多支持并协助完善机动（坦克）作战新理论的参谋军官之一，他作为运输部门的军官，致力于克服第一次世界大战中“歼灭思想”的困境。尽管已有卡尔·J·瓦尔德的《古德里安》（法兰克福，1967年）、肯尼斯·麦克西的《古德里安：装甲将军》（伦敦，1975年）、德莫特·布拉德利的《海因茨·古德里安上将与现代闪电战的起源史》（奥斯纳布吕克，1978年）以及瓦尔特·内林的《德国装甲兵历史 1916-1945》（柏林，1969年）等著作，但至今仍缺乏对坦克武器发展进行充分实证研究的文献。现有文献，即便研究了部分现有文件，也大多深陷于德国内部军事冲突之中，其讨论主要集中在二战期间错失良机的争论，而非1935-1936年的争议；或者聚焦于英国关于在法国和英国军队现代化进程中错失良机的辩论。值得注意的是，本文的论点包含两部分：(a) 现有文献歪曲了坦克部队支持者和反对者之间的关系；(b) 对摆脱一战僵局的技术突破的过度关注，反映了战略思维的贫乏。这种关注点从对战争原则的研究转向了对战争实践的教条探讨。
83 On army modernization see the theses of Heinz Sperling, Die Tätigkeit und Wirksamkeit des Heereswaffenamtes der Reichswehr für die materiell-technische Ausstattung eines 21 Divisionen Heeres 1924–1934 (diss., Pädagogische Hochschule Potsdam, 1980); Manfred Lachmann, Zum Problem der Bewaffnung des imperialistischen deutschen Heeres 1919–1939 (diss, phil., Leipzig, 1965); R. Barthel, Theorie und Praxis der Heeresmotorisierung im faschistischen Deutschland bis 1939 (diss, phil., Leipzig, 1967). The problem is to come to terms with the adulation of Guderian in the English literature. Guderian is, at this point, just another general staff officer who supported and, in his special function as officer in the transport section, helped to flesh out a new doctrine of mobile (tank) warfare as a means to overcome the impasse of the Vernichtungsgedanke in World War I. Despite Karl J. Walde, Guderian (Frankfurt, 1967), Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Panzer General (London, 1975), Dermot Bradley, Generaloberst Heinz Guderian und die Entstehungsgeschichte des modernen Blitzkrieges (Osnabrück, 1978), and Walther Nehring, Die Geschichte der deutschen Panzerwaffe 1916–1945 (Berlin, 1969) there exists no sufficiently empirical study of the development of the tank weapon. The available literature, to the extent that it studies at least some of the available documents, is either embroiled in German intramilitary conflicts, dating back mostly to the discussion over missed chances in World War II rather than to the controversies in 1935–36, or in British debates over the missed chances of army modernization in France and Great Britain. It should be noted that the argument here consists of two parts: (a) the available literature skews the relation between proponents and opponents of tank forces; (b) the concentration on a technological escape from the impasse of World War I reflects an impoverishment of strategic thinking. It shifts from a principled study of war to doctrines concerning the practice of war.
84参见 1926 年 11 月 10 日 RWM HL IV Nr. 601.26 geh. In6 (K) 指令；载于联邦军事档案馆（以下简称 BA-MA）RH 39/v.115。[In6 (K) 是摩托化部队武器监察局。]
84 See the directive RWM HL IV Nr. 601.26 geh. In6 (K), 10 November 1926; in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (hereafter cited as BA-MA) RH 39/v.115. [In6 (K) is the weapons inspectorate for motorized troops.]
85同上。
85 Ibid.
86 T1 [作战科] 762/27 g. Kdos. II，1927 年 12 月 5 日 [弗里奇签名]；BA-MA II H 539。在同一份文件中，作战科主张逐步将摩托化部队从运输部队转变为作战部队。
86 T1 [Operations Section] 762/27 g. Kdos. II, 5 December 1927 [signed Fritsch]; BA-MA II H 539. In the same document the operations section argues in favor of a step-by-step conversion of motorized units from transportation to fighting units.
87（计划中的）坦克团的作战序列见 Chef H1 659/29 geh. T411，1929 年 9 月 1 日 [布隆伯格签名；T4 为训练科]；BA-MA II H 540。将摩托化部队改编为作战单位的决定是在 1928 年至关重要的组织兵棋推演中做出的，该推演检验了军队在 1928-1933 年军备阶段的需求；参见 1929 年 1 月 6 日第 7（巴伐利亚）摩托化部队高级军官的简报；BA-MA RH 39/v.294。
87 The order of batle for (planned) tank regiment is in Chef H1 659/29 geh. T411, 1 September 1929 [signed Blomberg; T4 is the Training Section]; BA-MA II H 540. The decision in favor of a conversion of motorized troops into fighting units came with the allimportant organizational war game of 1928, which tested the needs of the army for the armaments phase in 1928–1933; see the briefing of the senior officers of the 7th (Bavarian) motorized unit, 6 January 1929; BA-MA RH 39/v.294.
88盖尔，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》，93-94。
88 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 93–94.
89 Michael Geyer，“Der zur Organization erhobene Burgfrieden”，载于《魏玛共和国的军事与军事主义》，编辑。 Klaus-Jürgen Müller 和 Eckhard Opitz（杜塞尔多夫，1978 年），15-100。
89 Michael Geyer, “Der zur Organisation erhobene Burgfrieden,” in Militär und Militarismus in der Weimarer Republik, ed. Klaus-Jürgen Müller and Eckhard Opitz (Düsseldorf, 1978), 15–100.
90根据 HWaA [陆军采购办公室] 588/28 geh. Kdos “z” WiStb 的数据表计算，日期不详 [1928]；BA-MA RH8/v.892；Wehramt 767/30 g. Kdos “z” Wehramt 的结论性意见，1930 年 7 月 23 日；BA-MA RH8/v.906，该意见将采购削减至野战厨房和运输车辆。
90 Calculations according to the data sheet in HWaA [Army Procurement Office] 588/28 geh. Kdos “z” WiStb, no date [1928]; BA-MA RH8/v.892; concluding remarks of Wehramt 767/30 g. Kdos “z” Wehramt, 23 July 1930; BA-MA RH8/v.906, which slashed procurement to field kitchens and transport vehicles.
91 Ernst W. Hansen， Reichswehr und Industrie（博帕德，1978 年）；卡尔·努斯（Karl Nuss），《魏玛共和国的军事与军事：德国国防军的政治斗争与发展》（柏林/东德，1977 年）。
91 Ernst W. Hansen, Reichswehr und Industrie (Boppard, 1978); Karl Nuss, Militär und Wiederaufrüstung in der Weimarer Republik: Zur politischen Rolle und Entwicklung der Reichswehr (Berlin/GDR, 1977).
92 Jon Jacobson，《洛迦诺外交：德国与西方，1925-1929》（普林斯顿，1972 年）。另见 Karl H. Pohl，《Weimars Wirtschaft und die Aussenpolitik der Republik 1924–1926》（杜塞尔多夫，1979 年）；马丁·恩塞尔，施特雷泽曼的领土修正主义（威斯巴登，1980）。
92 Jon Jacobson, Locarno Dtplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925–1929 (Princeton, 1972). See also Karl H. Pohl, Weimars Wirtschaft und die Aussenpolitik der Republik 1924–1926 (Düsseldorf, 1979); Martin Enssle, Stresemann's Territorial Revisionism (Wiesbaden, 1980).
93 Wilhelm Groener，《Der Weltkrieg und seine Probleme：Rückschau und Ausblick》（柏林，1930 年）；同上， Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen（柏林，1927 年）；参见 Wallach, Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht , 305–323中的摘要
93 Wilhelm Groener, Der Weltkrieg und seine Probleme: Rückschau und Ausblick (Berlin, 1930); idem, Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen (Berlin, 1927); see the summary in Wallach, Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht, 305–323.
第 94 届Mittwochsgesellschaft 会议，1930 年 11 月 5 日：W. Groener，Die Kriegführung der Zukunft，联邦档案馆，吉隆坡。呃。 179-1。
94 Session of the Mittwochsgesellschaft, 5 November 1930: W. Groener, Die Kriegführung der Zukunft, Bundesarchiv, Kl. Erw. 179–1.
95盖尔，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》，191-95；小盖恩斯·波斯特，《魏玛外交政策的军民结构》（普林斯顿大学，1973 年），203-238； TA [陆军/总参谋部] 2.84/29 克。 Kdos.，1929 年 3 月 2.6 日：“1927/29 和 1928/29 冬季总参谋部研究的结论”； BA-MA II H 597。
95 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 191–95; Gaines Post, Jr., The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1973), 203–238; TA [Truppenamt/General Staff] 2.84/29 g. Kdos., 2.6 March 1929: “Conclusions from the studies of the general staff in winter 1927/29 and 1928/29”; BA-MA II H 597.
96盖尔，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》，208-209。
96 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 208–209.
97 TA 284/29 克。 Kdos，参见第 107 英尺。
97 TA 284/29 g. Kdos, see ft. 107.
98 MA [Ministeramt] 221/29 W，1929 年 4 月 22 日； BA-MA II H 597。
98 M.A. [Ministeramt] 221/29 W, 22 April 1929; BA-MA II H 597.
99 Geyer，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》，209-213；邮政，军民结构，101-108。
99 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 209–213; Post, Civil-Military Fabric, 101–108.
100 Post，军民关系，197–98。
100 Post, Civil-Military Fabric, 197–98.
101 “毕苏斯基方案”是根据德国国防军动员计划基本文件 RWM 147.30 WIIA（表明该文件源自“政治”部长办公室，而不是总参谋部或部队办公室）于 1930 年 4 月 16 日发布的《国防军的任务》中的第四个“方案”；BA-MA M16/34072；在 Post 的《民事-军事结构》第 231-237 页中有详细讨论。
101 “Case Pilsudski” was the fourth “scenario” according to the basic document for mobilization planning of the Reichswehr, RWM 147.30 WIIA [indicates that the document originated in the “political” Ministeramt rather than in the general staff or Truppenamt], 16 April 1930: “Tasks of the Wehrmacht”; BA-MA M16/34072; discussed extensively in Post, Civil-Military Fabric, 231–37.
102盖耶尔，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》，221。
102 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 221.
103 Post，《民事-军事结构》，第 204-214 页，第 234-238 页。
103 Post, Civil-Military Fabric, 204–214, 234–38.
104盖尔，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》，182-83。
104 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 182–83.
105海因里希·布吕宁，回忆录 1918-1934（斯图加特，1970 年），552-54。
105 Heinrich Brüning, Memoiren 1918–1934 (Stuttgart, 1970), 552–54.
106 Edward W. Bennett，《德国重整军备与西方，1932-1933》（普林斯顿，1979 年），第 235-41 页，第 338-55 页。
106 Edward W. Bennett, German Rearmament and the West, 1932–1933 (Princeton, 1979), 235–41, 338–55.
107 Michael Geyer，“魏玛共和国的国家社会主义和军队”，载于《纳粹机器》，编辑。彼得·斯塔楚拉（伦敦，1983），101-123；更谨慎的评估见 Andreas Hillgruber，“Die Reichswehr und das Scheitern der Weimarer Republik”，载于魏玛，Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie：Eine Bilanz heute，编辑。卡尔-迪特里希·埃德曼和哈根·舒尔茨（杜塞尔多夫，1980），177-92。
107 Michael Geyer, “National Socialism and the Military in the Weimar Republic,” in The Nazi Machtergreifung, ed. Peter Stachura (London, 1983), 101–123; a more cautious assessment is in Andreas Hillgruber, “Die Reichswehr und das Scheitern der Weimarer Republik,” in Weimar, Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie: Eine Bilanz heute, ed. Karl-Dietrich Erdmann and Hagen Schulze (Düsseldorf, 1980), 177–92.
108 Thilo Vogelsang，“Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933”， Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954)，397-436。
108 Thilo Vogelsang, “Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930–1933,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2 (1954), 397–436.
109 Klaus-Jürgen Müller，《Das Heer und Hitler：Armee und Nationalsoztalistisches Regime 1933–1940》（斯图加特，1969 年）；罗伯特·J·奥尼尔（Robert J. O'Neill）的《德国军队和纳粹党，1933-1939》（伦敦，1966 年）仍然是该主题的最佳英文著作。
109 Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und Nationalsoztalistisches Regime 1933–1940 (Stuttgart, 1969); Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939 (London, 1966) is still the best English treatment of the subject.
110 Ludolf Herbst，《全面战争与经济秩序：政治上的战争，意识形态与宣传 1939-1945》（斯图加特，1982 年），42-61、82-92；汉斯·阿道夫·雅各布森（Hans-Adolf Jacobsen），“1919-1945 年世界观与实践中的克里格”，《希特勒威尔与历史事实》，编辑。 A.曼兹曼（Königstein/Ts.，1979），71-80。
110 Ludolf Herbst, Der totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft: Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939–1945 (Stuttgart, 1982), 42–61, 82–92; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Krieg in Weltanschauung und Praxis des Nationalsozialismus 1919–1945,” in Hitlerwelle und historische Fakten, ed. A. Manzmann (Königstein/Ts., 1979), 71–80.
111安德烈亚斯·希尔格鲁伯 (Andreas Hillgruber)，《希特勒的战略：1940-1941 年的政治与战争》，第 2 版。 （慕尼黑，1982）；同上，德国《战争史》中的罗尔。
111 Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941, 2d ed. (Munich, 1982); idem, Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege.
112 Klaus-Jürgen Müller，“第三帝国的军队：历史解释”，《战略研究杂志》 2（1979），123-52。
112 Klaus-Jürgen Müller, “The Army in the Third Reich: An Historical Interpretation,” Journal of Strategic Studies 2 (1979), 123–52.
113 Truppenführung (TF )（柏林，1936 年）。
113 Truppenführung (T.F.) (Berlin, 1936).
114威廉姆森·默里，《1938-1939 年欧洲权力平衡的变化：走向毁灭之路》（普林斯顿，1984 年），第 174 页。
114 Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938–1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton, 1984), 174.
115 Herrman Rahne， Die militärische Mobilmachungsplanung und -technik in Preussen und im Deutschen Reich（diss.，莱比锡，1972 年）。
115 Herrman Rahne, Die militärische Mobilmachungsplanung und -technik in Preussen und im Deutschen Reich (diss., Leipzig, 1972).
116 Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg，《 Deutsche Rüstungspolitik vom Beginn der Genfer Abrüstungskonferenz bis zur Wiedereinführung der Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht 1932–1935》（diss，phil.，波恩，1973 年），302–319。
116 Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, Deutsche Rüstungspolitik vom Beginn der Genfer Abrüstungskonferenz bis zur Wiedereinführung der Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht 1932–1935 (diss, phil., Bonn, 1973), 302–319.
117克劳斯-尤尔根·穆勒 (Klaus-Jürgen Müller)，路德维希·贝克将军：1933-1938 年政治军事世界和德国将军的研究与文献(Boppard, 1980)，163-84。
117 Klaus-Jürgen Müller, General Ludwig Beck: Studien und Dokumente zur politischmilitärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938 (Boppard, 1980), 163–84.
118 Michael Geyer，“Militär, Rüstung und Aussenpolitik: Aspekte militärischer Revisionspolitik in der Zwischenkriegszeit”，载于《希特勒、德国和马赫特》，第2 版。曼弗雷德·芬克（杜塞尔多夫，1978），239-68。
118 Michael Geyer, “Militär, Rüstung und Aussenpolitik: Aspekte militärischer Revisionspolitik in der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte, 2d ed., ed. Manfred Funke (Düsseldorf, 1978), 239–68.
119 Wilhelm Deist 等人， Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik（斯图加特，1979 年）。
119 Wilhelm Deist et al., Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik (Stuttgart, 1979).
120目前尚无关于1935年至1939年间德国部署计划的详细学术研究。以下内容基于拉内（Rahne）的《动员计划》（ Mobilmachungsplanung）、布克哈特·穆勒-希尔德布兰德（Burkhart Müller-Hildebrand）的《陆军1933-1945》（Das Heer 1933–1945，共3卷，达姆施塔特和法兰克福，1954-1959年）以及唐纳德·希勒（Donald Shearer）的未发表资料《初始军事准备、和平时期动员、动员、部署和运输计划》（手稿）。另见威廉·戴斯特（Wilhelm Deist）的《国防军与德国重整军备》（The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament，伦敦和贝辛斯托克，1981年），第36-53页。
120 A detailed and scholarly study of German deployment planning between 1935 and 1939 does not exist. The following is based on Rahne, Mobilmachungsplanung; Burkhart Müller-Hildebrand, Das Heer 1933–1945, 3 vols. (Darmstadt and Frankfurt, 1954–59) and unpublished material by Donald Shearer, “Initial Military Preparations, Peacetime Activation, Mobilization, Deployment, and Transportation Planning” (ms.). See also Wilhelm Deist, The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London and Basingstoke, 1981), 36–53.
121盖耶尔，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》，446-49。
121 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 446–49.
122 RKM u。 ObdW 55/37 geh。 Kdos.，Chef Sache LIa，1937 年 6 月 24 日，“指令 1937/38”，载于： IMT 34，Doc. #175-C，第 733–47 页。
122 RKM u. ObdW 55/37 geh. Kdos., Chef Sache LIa, 24 June 1937, “Directives 1937/38,” in: IMT 34, Doc. #175-C, pp. 733–47.
123参见 Beck 的“Observations on the Military-Political Conditions in May 1938”，1938 年 5 月 5 日，Müller, Beck，502-511，Michael Geyer，“Rüstungsbeschleunigung und Inflation：Zur Inflationsdenkschrift des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht vom 1938 October 1938”， Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 30 (1981), 121–86。
123 See Beck's “Observations on the military-political situation in May 1938,” 5 May 1938, in Müller, Beck, 502–511, and Michael Geyer, “Rüstungsbeschleunigung und Inflation: Zur Inflationsdenkschrift des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht vom November 1938,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 30 (1981), 121–86.
124 Müller, Beck , 182–83。
124 Müller, Beck, 182–83.
125盖尔，《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》，419–28、429–32。
125 Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, 419–28, 429–32.
126参见 ObdW 94/37 geh. Kdos., Chef Sache Lla, 1937 年 12 月 7 日的附录 2 [1937/38 年指令的第一补充]；BA-MA 案例 1197/33306C。需要注意的是，这些特殊情况原本就不应该事先计划。它们需要“深思熟虑”（ durchdenken）。因此，针对奥地利的行动的临时计划符合指令，尽管这与贝克周围的“专业人士”的要求相悖。
126 See appendix #2 to ObdW 94/37 geh. Kdos., Chef Sache Lla, 7 December 1937 [First supplement to directives, 1937/38]; BA-MA Case 1197/33306C. It should be noted that these Sonderfälle were never supposed to be planned in advance. They were to be “thought through” (durchdenken). Hence, the ad hoc planning for the operation against Austria fit the directives, even though it ran counter to the demands of the “professionals” around Beck.
127 Müller， Beck，225–72。
127 Müller, Beck, 225–72.
128 Niederschrift über die Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei am 5. December 1937, in: IMT 25, Doc. #386-PS，402–413。
128 Niederschrift über die Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei am 5. November 1937, in: IMT 25, Doc. #386-PS, 402–413.
129这一点在他反对准备对奥地利发动军事进攻时表现得最为清楚（1937 年 5 月 20 日备忘录，见 Müller, Beck，493–97）。
129 This was most clearly expressed in his opposition to preparations for a military attack against Austria (Memorandum of 20 May 1937, in Müller, Beck, 493–97).
130同上，503-50。
130 Ibid., 503–50.
131同上，266-70。
131 Ibid., 266–70.
132参见 Manfred Messerschmidt 的调查，“La stratégie allemande 1939-1945”， Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale 25 (1975), 1-26 和 Andreas Hillgruber 的调查， Der Zweite Weltkrieg 1939-1945: Kriegsziele und战略大手笔，第 2 版。 （斯图加特，1982）。
132 See the survey of Manfred Messerschmidt, “La stratégie allemande 1939–1945,” Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale 25 (1975), 1–26 and of Andreas Hillgruber, Der Zweite Weltkrieg 1939–1945: Kriegsziele und Strategie der grossen Mächte, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1982).
133 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen， Zur Konzeption einer Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1939–1945：Disposition mit kritisch ausgewähltem Schrifttum（法兰克福，1964 年）和同上， Deutsche Kriegführung 1939–1945（汉诺威，1961 年）。
133 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Zur Konzeption einer Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1939–1945: Disposition mit kritisch ausgewähltem Schrifttum (Frankfurt, 1964) and idem, Deutsche Kriegführung 1939–1945 (Hanover, 1961).
134 Andreas Hillgruber，《Zweiten Weltkrieges》，1941 年 7 月（威斯巴登，1977 年）。
134 Andreas Hillgruber, Der Zenit des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Juli 1941 (Wiesbaden, 1977).
135 Andreas Hillgruber，“Die 'Endlösung' und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus”，载于希特勒，德国和马赫特，第2 版。曼德雷德·芬克（杜塞尔多夫，1978 年），94-114。
135 Andreas Hillgruber, “Die ‘Endlösung' und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus,” in Hitler, Deutschlandand die Mächte, 2d ed., ed. Mandred Funke (Düsseldorf, 1978), 94–114.
136 Gerhard L. Weinberg，德国和苏联，1939-1941 年，第 2 版。 （莱顿，1972。）； B. Peitrow，《Deutschland in der Konzeption der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik 1933–1941》（diss. rer. pol.，卡塞尔，1981）。
136 Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941, 2d ed. (Leiden, 1972.); B. Peitrow, Deutschland in der Konzeption der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik 1933–1941 (diss. rer. pol., Kassel, 1981).
137 Karl Rohe 主编，《 Die Westmächte und das Dritte Reich 1933–1939》（帕德博恩，1982 年）；安德烈亚斯·希尔格鲁伯（Andreas Hillgruber），“1938-1941 年希特勒战略中的美国因素”，《德国大政治政策》，第 19 期和第 20 期。Jahrhundert（杜塞尔多夫，1977 年），197-222。
137 Karl Rohe, ed., Die Westmächte und das Dritte Reich 1933–1939 (Paderborn, 1982); Andreas Hillgruber, “Der Faktor Amerika in Hitler's Strategie 1938–1941,” Deutsche Grossmachtpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Düsseldorf, 1977), 197–222.
138参见 Gerhard L. Weinberg 的《希特勒德国的外交政策：第二次世界大战的开始，1937-1939 年》（芝加哥，1982 年），第 12-14 章，他强调了外交方面；以及 Murray 的《权力平衡的变化》，他强调了国内制约因素。
138 See Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 1937–1939 (Chicago, 1982), chs. 12–14, who emphasizes the diplomatic aspects and Murray, Change in the Balance of Power, who stresses the domestic constraints.
139参见 Klaus A. Maier 等人， Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent（斯图加特，1979 年），这是对这些活动的直接操作性调查； Walther Hubatsch， “Weserübung”：Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen，nach amtlichen Unterlagen dargestellt，第 2 版。 （哥廷根，1960）；格哈德·施赖伯 (Gerhard Schreiber)，“希特勒 1940 年战略中的中点：‘纲领’和军事规划”， Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 28 (1980), 69–99。
139 See Klaus A. Maier et al., Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart, 1979), a straightforward operational survey of these campaigns; Walther Hubatsch, ‘Weserübung': Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen, nach amtlichen Unterlagen dargestellt, 2d ed. (Göttingen, 1960); Gerhard Schreiber, “Der Mittelmeeraum in Hitlers Strategie 1940: ‘Programm’ und militärische Planung,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 28 (1980), 69–99.
140 Williamson Murray，“‘虚假战争’的策略：重新评估”，《军事事务》 45 (1981)，13-17；格哈特·哈斯 (Gerhart Haas)，“Der 'seltsame Krieg' vom September 1939 bis zum Frühjahr 1940”， Militärgeschichte 18 (1979)，271–80；约瑟夫·亨克 (Josef Hencke)，《希特勒政治卡尔库尔 1935-1939》中的英格兰（博帕德，1973 年）。
140 Williamson Murray, “The Strategy of the ‘Phoney War’: A Re-Evaluation,” Military Affairs 45 (1981), 13–17; Gerhart Haas, “Der ‘seltsame Krieg’ vom September 1939 bis zum Frühjahr 1940,” Militärgeschichte 18 (1979), 271–80; Josef Hencke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül 1935–1939 (Boppard, 1973).
141 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen，《Fall Gelb：Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffective》（威斯巴登，1957 年）。关于早期计划，请参阅查尔斯·B·伯迪克（Charles B. Burdick）“德国军事规划和法国，1930-1938”，《世界事务季刊》（1959-60），299-313。
141 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb: Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive (Wiesbaden, 1957). On early plans see Charles B. Burdick “German Military Planning and France, 1930–1938,” World Affairs Quarterly (1959–60), 299–313.
142 Bernd Martin，《1939-1941 年两次世界战争中的自由倡议和权力政策》，第 2 版。 （杜塞尔多夫，1976 年）。
142 Bernd Martin, Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1941, 2d ed. (Düsseldorf, 1976).
143马丁·吉尔伯特，《温斯顿·丘吉尔：最好的时刻，1939-1941》（波士顿，1983 年）；弗朗索瓦·贝达里达。 La stratégie secrète de la drôle de nuerre：Le Conseil Suprême Interallié。 1939年9月-1940年艾薇儿（巴黎，1979年）； Corelli Barnett，《英国权力的崩溃》（纽约，1972 年）； N. Fieldhouse，“1939-1942 年英德战争：通过谈判和平结束战争的一些运动”，加拿大皇家学会汇刊9 (1971)。
143 Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939–1941 (Boston, 1983); François Bédarida. La stratégie secrète de la drôle de nuerre: Le Conseil Suprême Interallié. septembre 1939-avril 1940 (Paris, 1979); Corelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (New York, 1972); N. Fieldhouse, “The Anglo-German War 1939–1942: Some Movements to End It by Negotiated Peace,” Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 9 (1971).
144弗朗茨·哈尔德上将，《战争阶段书》，汉斯-阿道夫·雅各布森编（斯图加特，1962年），第1卷，第374-375页；希尔格鲁伯，《希特勒的战略》，第144-191页；汉斯-阿道夫·雅各布森和亚瑟·L·史密斯编，《第二次世界大战：政策与战略：精选文献及评注》（圣巴巴拉，1979年），第5章。关于1940年的战略形势，在对英国的直接进攻失败后，参见罗纳德·惠特利，《海狮行动》（牛津，1958年）；关于不列颠之战，参见特尔福德·泰勒的《破浪》（纽约，1967年）中极其精辟的论述，该书阐明了德国试图保持战略主动权的努力，即阻止以中欧为支点的旷日持久的“经济”战争。这一选择既反映了国内考量（民族净化之战），也体现了德国对世界市场的依赖，这一点在默里（Murray）的《欧洲平衡的变化》（Change in the European Balance）第326-334页中有所论述。关于短期战争选项，另见格哈德·福斯特（Gerhard Förster ）的《全面战争与闪电战》（Totaler Krieg und Blitzkrieg，柏林，1967年），该书采用了标准的“工具主义”解释，将闪电战视为平衡手段与目的的尝试。艾伦·米尔沃德（Alan Milward）在其著作《战时德国经济》（The German Economy at War，伦敦，1965年）中沿用托马斯将军的观点，从德国内部“纵深军备”（托马斯）与“广域军备”（希特勒）之争的角度解读了这些战役。
144 Generaloberst Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Stuttgart, 1962), 1:374–75; Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 144–91; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Arthur L. Smith, eds., World War II, Policy and Strategy: Selected Documents with Commentary (Santa Barbara, 1979), ch. 5. On the strategic situation In 1940, after the failure of a direct attack against Great Britain, see Ronald Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion (Oxford, 1958); on the battle of Britain see the remarkably judiciousa ccount of Telford Taylor, The Breaking Wave (New York, 1967), which illuminates the German attempt to maintain the strategic initiative; that is, to prevent a long drawn-out “economic” war from the Central European pivot. This choice reflects both domestic considerations (war of national purification) as well as the acknowledgement of Germany's dependence on world markets, which is discussed by Murray, Change in the European Balance, 326–34. On the short-war option see also Gerhard Förster, Totaler Krieg und Blitzkrieg (Berlin, 1967) wlth the standard “instrumental” Interpretation that explains blltzkrieg as an attempt to balance means and ends. Following General Thomas, Alan Milward, The German Economy at War (London, 1965) interprets these campaigns on the background of the internal German dispute between “armaments in depth” (Thomas) and “armaments in breadth” (Hitler).
145这一选项反映了 1914 年旧的精英目标。参见 Wolfgang Schumann 和 Dietrich Eichholtz 编辑， Anatomy des Krieges: Neue Dokumente über die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Zweiten Weltkrieges (柏林，1969 年)；格哈德·哈斯 (Gerhard Hass) 和沃尔夫冈·舒曼 (Wolfgang Schumann)，《侵略分析：两次世界大战中法西斯主义帝国主义的新文献》（柏林/东德，1972 年）；迪特里希·艾希霍兹，《战争史》1939-194；（柏林/东德，1969 年）。
145 This option reflects the old elite goals of 1914. See Wolfgang Schumann and Dietrich Eichholtz, eds., Anatomie des Krieges: Neue Dokumente über die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Berlin, 1969); Gerhard Hass and Wolfgang Schumann, Anatomie der Aggression: Neue Dokumente zu den Kriegszielen des faschistischen Imperialismus im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin/GDR, 1972); Dietrich Eichholtz, Geschichte der Kriegswirtschaft 1939–194; (Berlin/GDR, 1969).
146 Wolfgang Michalka，《里宾特洛甫和德国世界政治 1933-1940：Aussenpolitische Konzeptionen und Entscheidungsprozess im Dritten Reich》（慕尼黑，1980 年）。
146 Wolfgang Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik 1933–1940: Aussenpolitische Konzeptionen und Entscheidungsprozess im Dritten Reich (Munich, 1980).
147 Hillgruber，《Zweite Weltkrieg》，129–34； Walther Hubatsch，编辑， Hitler Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939–194；：Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht（法兰克福，1962 年），84–88； Auf anti-sowjetischem Kriegskurs: Studien zur militärischen Vorbereitung des deutschen Imperialismus auf die Aggression gegen die UdSSR 1933–1941 (柏林/东德，1970)。另见 Peter Krüger，“Das Jahr 1941 in der deutschen Kriegs- und Aussenpolitik”，载于Das Jahr 1941 in der europäischen Politik，编辑。 Karl Bosl（慕尼黑，1972），738。关于巴尔干插曲，请参阅 Martin Van Creveld，《希特勒的战略 1940-41：巴尔干线索》（剑桥，1973）。
147 Hillgruber, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 129–34; Walther Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939–194;: Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Frankfurt, 1962), 84–88; Auf anti-sowjetischem Kriegskurs: Studien zur militärischen Vorbereitung des deutschen Imperialismus auf die Aggression gegen die UdSSR 1933–1941 (Berlin/GDR, 1970). See also Peter Krüger, “Das Jahr 1941 in der deutschen Kriegs- und Aussenpolitik,” in Das Jahr 1941 in der europäischen Politik, ed. Karl Bosl (Munich, 1972), 738. On the Balkan interlude see Martin Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940–41: The Balkan Clue (Cambridge, 1973).
148 Hubatsch，《希特勒的威松根》，129-34； Michael Salewski，编辑， Die deutsche Seekriegs leitung 1935–1945（法兰克福，1973 年），3：189–214； Gerhard Wagner 编辑， Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939 bis 1945（慕尼黑，1972 年）； Karl Klee，“Der Entwurf zur Führerweisung Nr. 32 vom 11. Juni 1941：Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung”， Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 6 (1976)，127-41。
148 Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen, 129–34; Michael Salewski, ed., Die deutsche Seekriegs leitung 1935–1945 (Frankfurt, 1973), 3:189–214; Gerhard Wagner, ed., Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939 bis 1945 (Munich, 1972); Karl Klee, “Der Entwurf zur Führerweisung Nr. 32 vom 11. Juni 1941: Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 6 (1976), 127–41.
149米兰·豪纳，《轴心国战略中的印度：第二次世界大战中的德国、日本和印度民族主义者》（斯图加特，1981 年），第 133-192 页。
149 Milan Hauner, India in Axts Strategy: Germany, Japan, and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War (Stuttgart, 1981), 133–92.
150 Saul Friedlánder，《Auftakt zum Untergang：Hitler und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amertka 1939–1941》（斯图加特，1965 年）； Richard J. Overy，“从乌拉尔轰炸机”到“美国轰炸机”：德国空军和战略轰炸，《战略研究杂志》1 (1978)，154–78；詹姆斯·V·康普顿 (James V. Compton)，《万字符与鹰：希特勒、美国和第二次世界大战的起源》（波士顿，1967 年）。
150 Saul Friedlánder, Auftakt zum Untergang: Hitler und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amertka 1939–1941 (Stuttgart, 1965); Richard J. Overy, “From Uralbomber' to ‘Amerikabomber’: The Luftwaffe and Strategic Bombing,” Journal of Strategic Studies 1 (1978), 154–78; James V. Compton, The Swastika and the Eagle: Hitler, the United States, and the Origins of World War II (Boston, 1967).
151目前尚无对1941年至1943年间整体战略发展的全面研究，即从莫斯科闪电战结束到斯大林格勒战役、北非失守、大西洋战败以及德国防空系统崩溃这一阶段。汉斯-阿道夫·雅各布森和于尔根·罗尔韦尔主编的《第二次世界大战的决定性战役：德国视角》（纽约，1965年），第180-313页；希尔格鲁伯的《第二次世界大战》，第88-105页；雅各布森和史密斯合著的《第二次世界大战》，第四章，概述了德军方面的主要战略和作战决策。
151 There is no comprehensive study on the overall strategic development between 1941 and 1943, that is, the phase that began with the end of the blitzkrieg before Moscow and ended with Stalingrad and the loss of North Africa, the defeat in the Atlantic, and the collapse of the German air defense. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jürgen Rohwer, eds.. Decisive Battles of World War II: The German View (New York, 1965), 180–313; Hillgruber, Zweite Weltkrieg, 88–105; Jacobsen and Smith, World War II, ch. 4, outline the major strategic and operational decisions on the German side.
152最新的总结是阿尔伯特·西顿的《欧洲堡垒的陷落 1943–1944》（伦敦，1981 年）；关于灭绝运动的发展，请参阅劳尔·希尔伯格的《欧洲犹太人的毁灭》（纽约，1961 年）。
152 The most recent summary is Albert Seaton, The Fall of Fortress Europe 1943–194; (London, 1981); see Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York, 1961) for the development of the annihilationa campaign.
153最清楚的是 Andreas Hillgruber，“Das Russlandbild der führenden deutschen Militars vor Beginn des Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion”，载于俄罗斯—德国—美国，Festschrift für F. Epstein（威斯巴登，1980 年），296-310；格哈德·温伯格 (Gerhard L. Weinberg)，“希特勒的美国形象”，《美国历史评论》69 (1964)，1006–1021。另请参阅曼弗雷德·梅塞施密特 (Manfred Messerschmidt) 的挑衅性文章，“Das Verhültnis von Wehrmacht und NS-Staat und die Frage der Tradltionsbildung”， Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 17/81（1981 年 4 月 25 日），11-23。
153 Most clearly shown by Andreas Hillgruber, “Das Russlandbild der führenden deutschen Militars vor Beginn des Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion,” in Russland—Deutschland—Amerika, Festschrift für F. Epstein (Wiesbaden, 1980), 296–310; Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Hitler's Image of the United States,” American Historical Review 69 (1964), 1006–1021. See also the provocative piece by Manfred Messerschmidt, “Das Verhültnis von Wehrmacht und NS-Staat und die Frage der Tradltionsbildung,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 17/81 (25 April 1981), 11–23.
154威廉姆森·默里，《失败的战略：德国空军，1933-1945》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地，1983 年）；理查德·J·奥弗里，《空战 1939-1945》（纽约，1981 年）。
154 Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1983); Richard J. Overy, The Air War 1939–1945 (New York, 1981).
155珀西·E·施拉姆，《希特勒：其人其事，其军事领袖》（芝加哥，1971年）；马丁·范·克雷费尔德，“战争领主希特勒：一些观点的重新思考”，《欧洲研究评论》4（1974年），57-79页；默里，《欧洲权力平衡的变迁》，全文。关于希特勒作为“元帅”（Feldherr）的文献浩如烟海。其中最全面，同时也最具个人特色和偏见的著作是戴维·欧文的《希特勒的战争》（纽约，1977年）。
155 Percy E. Schramm, Hitler: The Man and Military Leader (Chicago, 1971); Martin Van Creveld, “War Lord Hitler: Some Points Reconsidered,” European Studies Review 4 (1974), 57–79; Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, passim. The Literature on Hitler as Feldherr is endless. The most comprehensive and, at the same time, most idiosyncratica nd biased study is by David Irving, Hitler's War (New York, 1977).
156 Winfried Baumgart，“1939 年 8 月 22 日，希特勒在国防军元首面前的行动”， Viertehahrhshefte für Zeitgeschichte 16 (1968), 120–49；戈登·克雷格 (Gordon A. Craig)，“外交谈判的极权主义方法”，纪念 GP 古奇 (GP Gooch) 的外交历史和史学研究，编辑。 A.0.萨尔基相（伦敦，1961），107-135；另请参见 Jacobsen， Fall Gelb，59-64 和 Jan Kershaw， Der Hitler-Mythos：Volksmeinung und Propaganda im Dritten Reich（斯图加特，1980 年）。
156 Winfried Baumgart, “Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939,” Viertehahrhshefte für Zeitgeschichte 16 (1968), 120–49; Gordon A. Craig, “Totalitarian Approaches to Diplomatic Negotiations,” Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honor of G. P. Gooch, ed. A. 0. Sarkissian (London, 1961), 107–135; see also Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 59–64 and Jan Kershaw, Der Hitler-Mythos: Volksmeinung und Propaganda im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart, 1980).
157在战略、意识形态方向和战术机会主义方面，外交上是相辅相成的；参见 Gerhard L. Weinberg 的《希特勒德国的外交政策》；Klaus Hildebrand 的《德国外交政策 1933–1945：实用主义还是教条？》（斯图加特，1971 年）倾向于将它们区分开来，这源于一项长期的研究传统，该传统试图区分希特勒方法中的意识形态（教条主义）和实用主义（权力政治或机会主义）考虑因素。
157 AS in strategy, ideological direction and tactical opportunism went together In diplomacy; see Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany; Klaus Hildebrand, Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1933–1945: Kalkül oder Dogma? (Stuttgart, 1971) tends to set them apart in a long tradition of studies that try to distinguish ideological (dogmatic) and pragmatic (power-political or opportunistic) considerations in Hitler's approach.
158行动和成功的作用在希特勒 1933 年之前的动员战略中得到了体现（Albrecht Tyrell, Vom Trommler zum Führer: Der Wandel won Hitlers Selbstverstandnis zwischen 1919 und 1924 und die Entstehung der NSDAP [慕尼黑，1975]）。这两个人在他的整个职业生涯中继续发挥着重要作用，并在他后期的演讲中得到了最简洁的概述。参见 Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, ed., “Hitler Ansprache vor Generalen und Offizieren am 26. Mai 1944,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 20 (1976), 123-70 关于“成功”在军事反对派崩溃中的作用，请参见 Harold C. Deutsch,《暮光之城战争中针对希特勒的阴谋》 （明尼阿波利斯，1958）。
158 The role of action and success IS demonstrated in Hitler's mobilization strategy before 1933 (Albrecht Tyrell, Vom Trommler zum Führer: Der Wandel won Hitlers Selbstverstandnis zwischen 1919 und 1924 und die Entstehung der NSDAP [Munich, 1975]). Both continue to play a major role throughout his career and are outlined most succinctly in his late speeches; see Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, ed., “Hitlers Ansprache vor Generalen und Offizieren am 26. Mai 1944,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 20 (1976), 123–70 For the role of “success” in the collapse of the military opposition see Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis, 1958).
159 Murray，《欧洲平衡的变化》，第37页。
159 Murray, Change in the European Balance, 37.
160巴里·R·波森，《军事理论的来源：两次世界大战之间的法国、英国和德国》（伊萨卡和伦敦，1984 年），第 86 页。
160 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca and London, 1984), 86.
161马修·库珀，《德国军队 1933–1945：其政治和军事失败》（纽约，1978 年），第 149 页。
161 Matthew Cooper, The German Army 1933–1945: Its Political and Milrtary Failures (New York, 1978), 149.
162 Basil H. Liddell Hart，《山丘的另一边》，第 2 版（伦敦，1951 年）；Brian Bond，“Liddell Hart 和德国将军们”，《军事事务》 41（1977 年），16-20。
162 Basil H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, 2d ed. (London, 1951); Brian Bond, “Liddell Hart and the German Generals,” Military Affairs 41 (1977), 16–20.
163黄色行动再次是最好的例子；参见 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen 编辑， Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 1939–1940（哥廷根，1956 年）。
163 Once again, Operation Yellow is the best example; see Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 1939–1940 (Göttingen, 1956).
164 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen 编辑， Dokumente zum Westfeldzug 1940（哥廷根，1960 年）；另请参阅古德里安·麦克西， 80-90，以及古德里安的自画像，海因茨·古德里安，《Erinnerungen emes Soldaten》，第 9 版。 （内卡尔格明德，1976）；另外请参阅埃尔文·隆美尔 (Erwin Rommel)所著的《隆美尔文件》，编辑。 BH Liddell Hart（伦敦，1953 年）。
164 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Dokumente zum Westfeldzug 1940 (Göttingen, 1960); see also Macksey, Guderian, 80–90, and Guderian's self-portrait, Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen emes Soldaten, 9th ed. (Neckargemünd, 1976); in addition see Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (London, 1953).
165 Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination (汉堡，1969) 有最详细的分析。竞争和成功的作用在新形式的晋升和特权中变得最为明显。关于点：Olaf Groehler，“Die Güter der Generäle：Dotationen im Zweiten Weltkrieg”， Zeitschrift für Geschichts-wissenschaft 19 (1971)，655–63；晋升：Reinhard Stumpf，《国防军精英：Rang- und Herkunfts-Struktur der deutschen Generale und Admirale 1933–1945》（博帕德，1982 年）。
165 Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg, 1969) has the most detailed analysis. The role of competition and success becomes most evident in new forms of advancement and privilege; on dotations: Olaf Groehler, “Die Güter der Generäle: Dotationen im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Zeitschrift für Geschichts-wissenschaft 19 (1971), 655–63; on promotion: Reinhard Stumpf, Die Wehrmacht Elite: Rang- und Herkunfts-Struktur der deutschen Generale und Admirale 1933–1945 (Boppard, 1982).
166参见 Halder、 Kriegstagebuch、passim，关于决策的官僚性质以及 Eduard Wagner， Der Generalquartiermeister：Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Generalquartiermeisters des Heeres，General der Artillerie Eduard Wagner（慕尼黑，1963 年）。最高统帅部的前景完全不那么官僚化，更注重效率：Walther Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939–1945 (Frankfurt, 1962)。人们可以将这两种风格与高层的个性化内讧进行对比。参见 Nicolaus von Below, Als Hitlers Adlutant 1937–1945 (Mainz, 1980) 和 Hildegard von Kotze, ed., Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943: Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel (斯图加特, 1974)。
166 See Halder, Kriegstagebuch, passim, on the bureaucratic nature of decision making as well as Eduard Wagner, Der Generalquartiermeister: Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Generalquartiermeisters des Heeres, General der Artillerie Eduard Wagner (Munich, 1963). The outlook of the OKW was altogether less bureaucratic and more efficiency-oriented: Walther Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939–1945 (Frankfurt, 1962). One may contrast these two styles wlth the personalized infighting at the top; see Nicolaus von Below, Als Hitlers Adlutant 1937–1945 (Mainz, 1980) and Hildegard von Kotze, ed., Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943: Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel (Stuttgart, 1974).
167巴里·利奇，《1939-1941 年德国对俄罗斯的战略》（牛津，1973 年），87-123。 E. Moritz 编辑， Fall Barbarossa: Dokumente zur Vorberertung der faschistischen Wehrmacht auf die Aggression gegen die Sowjetunion 1940/41（柏林/东德，1970 年）。
167 Barry Leach, German Strategy against Russia 1939–1941 (Oxford, 1973), 87–123. E. Moritz, ed., Fall Barbarossa: Dokumente zur Vorberertung der faschistischen Wehrmacht auf die Aggression gegen die Sowjetunion 1940/41 (Berlin/GDR, 1970).
168参见霍斯特·博格等人所著《对苏联的进攻》（斯图加特，1983年），第202-276页，该书侧重点略有不同，是迄今为止对巴巴罗萨行动最全面的研究。它也是唯一一部强调该行动的末日维度，并将其视为军事战争行为一部分的研究。
168 See a somewhat different emphasis in Horst Boog et al., Der Angriff auf dre Sowjetunion (Stuttgart, 1983), 202–276, which is the most complete study on Operation Barbarossa so far. It is also the only study that highlights the apocalyptic dimensions of the operation as part of the milltary conduct of war.
169同上，233-47。弗朗斯·彼得·十凯特 (Frans Pieter ten Kate)，《1941 年苏联大学的杜伊茨》，第 2 卷。 （格罗宁根，1968）。最详细的讨论是 A. Beer, Der Fall Barbarossa: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Vorbereitungen des deutschen Feldzuges gegen die UdSSR (diss, phil., Münster, 1978)。
169 Ibid., 233–47. Frans Pieter ten Kate, De Duitse aanval of de Sovjet-Unie en 1941, 2 vols. (Groningen, 1968). The most detailed discussion is A. Beer, Der Fall Barbarossa: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Vorbereitungen des deutschen Feldzuges gegen die UdSSR (diss, phil., Münster, 1978).
170 Boog， Angriff auf die Sowjetunion，242-48（1941 年 6 月 8 日的最终部署计划）和 238-42（指令 #21）。
170 Boog, Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, 242–48 (final deployment plan of 8 June 1941) and 238–42 (Directive #21).
171引自库珀，《德国陆军》，第272页；另见赫尔曼·霍特，《装甲作战：第3集团军群及1941年夏季德国军队作战思想》（海德堡，1956年）。关于这些概念的批判性评价，参见布莱恩·富盖特，《第聂伯河上的雷霆：闪电战时代的终结，1941年夏季》（德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校博士论文，1976年）。关于德国领导层的混乱和冲突，参见厄尔·F·齐姆克，《弗朗茨·哈尔德与奥尔沙：德国总参谋部寻求共识》，《军事事务》 39（1975年），第173-176页。
171 Quoted in Cooper, German Army, 272; see also Hermann Hoth, Panzer-Operationen: Die Heeresgruppe 3 und der operative Gedanke der deutschen Fahrung im Sommer 1941 (Heidelberg, 1956). See the critical evaluation of these concepts in Brian Fugate, Thunder on the Dneiper: The End of the Blitzkrieg Era, Summer 1941 (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, Austin, 1976). On confusion and conflict in the German leadership, see Earl F. Ziemke, “Franz Halder and Orsha: The German General Staff Seeks a Consensus,” Military Affairs 39 (1975), 173–76.
172 Albert Seaton，《俄德战争，1941-1945 年》（伦敦，1971 年）；克劳斯·莱因哈特（Klaus Reinhardt），《莫斯科的温德：1941/42 年冬季的希特勒战略计划》（斯图加特，1972 年）。
172 Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941–1945 (London, 1971); Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau: Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/42 (Stuttgart, 1972).
173哈尔德， Kriegstagebuch，3:123。
173 Halder, Kriegstagebuch, 3:123.
174莱因哈特，《莫斯科温德》，197-254；布格， Angriff auf die Sowjetunion，600-51；亚历山大·沃斯 (Alexander Werth)，《战争中的俄罗斯》，1941–1945（纽约，1964 年），225–74；阿尔伯特·西顿，《莫斯科之战，1941-1942》（伦敦，1971 年）。另见约翰·埃里克森，《通往斯大林格勒之路》（纽约，1975 年）。
174 Reinhardt, Wende vor Moskau, 197–254; Boog, Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, 600–51; Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945 (New York, 1964), 225–74; Albert Seaton, The Battle for Moscow, 1941–1942 (London, 1971). See also John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (New York, 1975).
175 Boog, Angriff auf die Sowjetunion , 150。参见同一卷中对意识形态、种族主义和经济战争的详细分析。
175 Boog, Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, 150. See the detailed analysis of the ideological, racist, and economic war in the same volume.
176布格，《Angriff auf die Sowjetunion》，242–58、470–97、959–1021； Hans Hohn，“Zur Entwicklung der Einsatzgrundsätze der Infanterie der Deutschen Wehrmacht im Zweiten Weltkrieg”， Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte 9 (1970)，554-66。 Jürgen Förster，“Zur Rolle der Wehrmacht im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion”， Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 45/80（1980 年 11 月 8 日），3-15；西顿，俄德战争；奥马尔·巴托夫，《东线战场1941–45：德国军队和战争的野蛮化》（贝辛斯托克，1985 年）。
176 Boog, Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, 242–58, 470–97, 959–1021; Hans Hohn, “Zur Entwicklung der Einsatzgrundsätze der Infanterie der deutschen Wehrmacht im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte 9 (1970), 554–66. Jürgen Förster, “Zur Rolle der Wehrmacht im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 45/80 (8 November 1980), 3–15; Seaton, Russo-German War; Omar Bartov, The Eastern Front 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (Basingstoke, 1985).
177库珀，德国陆军，149。
177 Cooper, German Army, 149.
178迈克尔·盖耶 (Michael Geyer)，《德国国家政策》，1860–1980（法兰克福，1984 年），61–63。
178 Michael Geyer, Deutsche Rüstungspolitik, 1860–1980 (Frankfurt, 1984), 61–63.
179 Josef Becker 和 Klaus Hildebrand 编辑， Internationale Beziehungen in der Welt-wirtschaftskrise 1929–1933（慕尼黑，1980 年）。
179 Josef Becker and Klaus Hildebrand, eds., Internationale Beziehungen in der Welt-wirtschaftskrise 1929–1933 (Munich, 1980).
第180章费舍尔，《世界权力的格里夫》。
180 Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht.
181参见 1937 年 11 月 5 日发布的 Niederschrift über die Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei am 5（参见注释 128）。
181 See the Niederschrift über die Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei am 5. November 1937 (see note 128).
182 Rüdiger vom Bruch, Wissenschaft, Politik und öffentliche Meinung: Gelehrtenpolitik im wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890–1914 (Husum, 1980); 《Schwabe、 Wissenschaft 和 Kriegsmoral》。
182 Rüdiger vom Bruch, Wissenschaft, Politik und öffentliche Meinung: Gelehrtenpolitik im wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890–1914 (Husum, 1980); Schwabe, Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral.
20. 利德尔·哈特和戴高乐：有限责任原则与移动防御
20. Liddell Hart and De Gaulle: The Doctrines of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense
D尽管德国在 1918 年惨败，凡尔赛条约也对其武装力量和军备施加了严厉的限制，但德国的复兴势在必行，并且决心推翻这些屈辱，这构成了两次世界大战期间法国军事思想家关注的焦点。
DESPITE THE clear-cut defeat of Germany in 1918 and the severe restrictions placed on its armed forces and armaments by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany's inevitable revival and determination to overthrow these humiliations constituted the focal point for French military thinkers throughout the interwar period.
第一次世界大战使法国付出了超过130万军事人员伤亡的代价，并导致其经济最发达的十个省份被占领。没有其他参战国遭受过如此巨大的损失。法国名义上是战胜国之一，但实际上与其说是胜利，不如说是幸存。战后，法国的安全政策和军事理论自然而然地转向防御，20世纪20年代见证了其回归第三共和国时期传统的军事信条：坚信东部边境的防御、对外联盟以及普遍征兵这三大支柱。
The First World War cost France over 1,300,000 military casualties and the occupation of ten of its economically richest departments. No other combatant power suffered such proportionate losses. France emerged nominally among the victors but in reality had not so much won as survived. In the aftermath its security policies and doctrines naturally became defensive, and the 1920s witnessed a return to the traditional military credo of the Third Republic: faith in the trinity of a fortified eastern border, foreign alliances, and universal conscription.
在采取这种自我防御的紧缩策略的同时，军方当局认为，如果欧洲战争再次爆发，很可能又会演变成消耗战。1917年法国军队的疲惫不堪和兵变记忆犹新，1918年美国军队在击败德国中所发挥的重要作用也历历在目。要想在新的冲突中取得胜利，就需要另一个拥有经济韧性和巨大潜在武装力量的多国联盟。对法国而言，后者一部分在于其庞大的可动员预备役部队，一部分在于其军工产业，一部分在于其中东欧盟友的牵制行动。然而，关键在于摩托化和机械化的发展和组织。在1917-1918年，这些工具被视为可能决定战争胜负的关键，只有充分利用这些潜在优势，才能使法国军队保持领先地位。
Concurrently with this self-imposed defensive retrenchment the military authorities believed that if a European war ever recurred it would probably again assume attritional form. Memories of the exhaustion and mutinies in the French army in 1917 were as fresh as the example of the importance of American forces in defeating Germany in 1918. Victory in a new conflict would require another multinational coalition enjoying economic resilience and immense potential armed strength. For France the latter lay partly in legions of mobilizable reservists, partly in its military industries, and partly in diversionary actions by its central and eastern European allies. Much, nevertheless, depended on the development and organization of motorization and mechanization, the tools presented to the generals in 1917–1918 as possible decisive war winners, if these underlying strengths were to be harnessed to keep the French army in the front rank.
相比之下，20世纪20年代的英国认为近期内没有明显的敌人，因此，当时针对法国、苏联和美国制定的应急计划——如果可以称之为应急计划的话——如今看来都显得不切实际。在巨大的财政压力和战争疲劳的双重打击下，英国以惊人的速度解散了庞大的军队。1918年11月，英国有超过350万名士兵身着军装（不包括由印度政府支付薪水的士兵）；两年后，这一数字锐减至37万人。此后，尽管1918年后的条约带来了沉重的帝国主义和欧洲层面的新义务，但英国的年度国防预算和编制规模却持续削减，直至1932年。不仅开支和兵力大幅缩减，大多数军火企业也被关闭或转型为非军工生产；师级以上的高级军事单位不复存在；而且，英国也没有系统地总结1914年至1918年这场史无前例的全国性战争的主要经验教训。唯一一个陆军部委员会的报告建议至少保留在未来国家紧急情况下组建一支41个师军队的组织架构，但这份报告最终胎死腹中。<sup> 1</sup>尽管占领军一直驻扎在欧洲各地直至1930年，但英国军队已全面扩张，承担起传统的帝国治安职责。这一优先事项的合理性源于“十年规则”的规定。该规则最初是内阁于1919年向各军种部委下达的一项指令，适用于即将到来的财政年度，但后来被改为动态调整（使得十年期限永远不会临近），并一直沿用至1932年。该指令指出：“在制定修订预算时，应假定大英帝国在未来十年内不会卷入任何大规模战争，也不需要为此组建远征军。”<sup> 2</sup>这项宽泛的指令在当时有很多可取之处，它实际上体现了1920年的财政和战略现实，但到20年代末，它的相关性已大大降低。十年规则的影响一直存在争议，但毫无疑问，它抑制了军队内部的激进思想和实验。
In contrast, Britain in the 1920s perceived no obvious enemy in the near future and the contingency plans—if they can be dignified with such a term—made against France, the Soviet Union, and the United States now have an air of unreality. Under acute financial pressure and in a state of war weariness, Britain demobilized its huge armies at a breakneck pace. In November 1918 over 3.5 million men were in uniform (excluding those paid for by the Government of India); two years later they had been reduced to 370,000. Thereafter, despite the onerous new imperial and European commitments undertaken in the post-1918 treaties, annual defense budgets and establishments were steadily reduced until 1932. Not only were expenditures and numbers drastically cut: most of the armaments firms were closed or converted to nonmilitary production; the higher military formations above divisional level disappeared; and no systematic effort was made to record the main lessons of the unprecedented national war effort of 1914–1918. The report of the single War Office Committee that recommended preserving at least the organization for raising an army of forty-one divisions in a future national emergency, was stillborn.1 Although occupation forces were retained in various parts of Europe until 1930, the British army became fully extended in its traditional role of imperial policing. This priority was justified by the stipulation of the Ten Year Rule, a Cabinet directive originally issued to the service ministries in 1919 for the coming financial year, but later placed on a moving basis (so that the end of the ten years never became any nearer) and retained until 1932. The directive stated: “It should be assumed, for framing revised Estimates, that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for this purpose.”2 There was much to be said in favor of such a broad directive, which in effect embodied the financial and strategic realities of 1920, but it was far less relevant by the end of that decade. The effects of the Ten Year Rule have been debated, but there can be little doubt that it put a damper on radical thinking and experiment within the services.
鉴于这些限制以及公众对第一次世界大战后局势日益增长的失望情绪，或许令人惊讶的是，20世纪20年代英国涌现出一些杰出的军事思想家，并在实验性机械力量的实地试验方面也处于领先地位。我们该如何解释这一现象？英国的顶尖理论家们大多是初级军官，他们亲身经历了第一次世界大战行动的无能和浪费。他们深信另一场大战即将到来，并且对国际条约或国际联盟缺乏信心，因此他们执着于从第一次世界大战中吸取“正确的教训”，彻底改革军队结构，并恢复作战的机动性。20世纪20年代英国战术和战略思想的蓬勃发展，很可能有两个主要原因：一是公众强烈希望这些学者分析并从1914-1918年的惨痛经历中获益；二是当时没有直接的敌人，这为理论以一种准科学的方式发展提供了相对宽松的氛围。 20 世纪 20 年代模糊不清的“红国对蓝国”演习与 1933 年后潜在敌人出现时变得显而易见的现实情况之间存在着显著的对比。我们稍后将详细探讨一位杰出的作家巴兹尔·H·利德尔·哈特在从讨论机械化和装甲战的一般理论过渡到制定具体的国家战略时所遇到的困难。
Given these restrictions and the growing public disillusionment with the aftermath of the First World War, it was perhaps surprising that in the 1920s Britain produced some outstanding military thinkers and also led the way in field trials with experimental mechanical forces. How can we explain this phenomenon? Britain's leading theorists had experienced the incompetence and waste of First World War operations, mostly as junior officers. Convinced that there would soon be another great war and reposing little faith in international treaties or the League of Nations, they were obsessed with learning the “correct lessons” from the First World War, overhauling the structure of the army, and restoring mobility to operations. It seems probable that both tactical and strategic ideas flourished in Britain in the 1920s for two main reasons: there was considerable public impetus behind the writers' concern to analyze and profit from the painful experience of 1914–1918; and the absence of an immediate obvious enemy provided a comparatively relaxed atmosphere in which theories could be developed in a quasiscientific way. A marked contrast existed between the unspecific “Redland versus Blueland” exercises of the 1920s and the practical realities that became all too apparent when likely enemies appeared after 1933. We shall later examine in some detail the difficulties that one distinguished writer, Basil H. Liddell Hart, experienced in making the transition from discussing general theories of mechanization and armored warfare to formulating a specific national strategy.
然而，在这次危机爆发之前，英国思想的蓬勃发展和广泛的实验空间，尤其是在机械化问题上，令法国艳羡不已。法国人将JFC·富勒和利德尔·哈特视为杰出的先驱。正如本文将要阐述的，富勒、利德尔·哈特以及他们在法国最亲密的同行——夏尔·戴高乐，并非传统意义上的“现代战略缔造者”，因为他们并未对各自国家的国防政策产生决定性的影响。但他们对军事理论和战争实践的广泛而独到的贡献，无论是在两次世界大战之间还是之后，都足以让他们跻身于这一杰出人物之列。
Before this crisis occurred, however, the ferment of ideas and wide scope for experiment in Britain, particularly on the issue of mechanization, was envied by the French, who regarded J. F. C. Fuller and Liddell Hart as the outstanding pioneers.3 As this essay will suggest, Fuller, Liddell Hart and their closest counterpart in France, Charles de Gaulle, were not “makers of modern strategy” in the sense that they decisively influenced their own nations' defense policies. But they certainly merit inclusion in this distinguished company for their wide-ranging and original contributions to military theory and the conduct of war both in the interwar period and later.
这并非暗示两次世界大战之间的岁月是由少数才华横溢的异见者（他们后来被证明是正确的）与大多数固守旧派、热爱骑兵的顽固分子进行的一场英勇却徒劳的斗争所构成的。仔细查阅英国和法国的档案和服役日志就会发现，现实远比这复杂。进步派或激进派并非在所有问题上都意见一致，而且在某些方面，他们的预测被证明是错误的或不充分的。此外，尽管顽固派或反动派确实存在，但大多数观点可追溯的军官可以被描述为谨慎或温和的进步派；也就是说，他们认识到坦克等机械将在未来的战争中扮演越来越重要的角色，但他们往往强调其中存在的诸多问题和不确定性。例如，装甲部队在远离基地时如何获得补给和维修？它们会不会很快遭到反坦克炮的反制？最重要的是，考虑到资金和装备的短缺以及各军种之间由来已久的竞争，装甲部队在整个军事组织中将扮演什么角色？4
This is not meant to imply that the years between the wars were characterized by a heroic but vain struggle of a handful of brilliant iconoclasts, who were later proved right, against a compact majority of antediluvian cavalry-loving diehards. Closer inspection of the records and service journals in both Britain and France shows that the reality was more complex. The progressives or radicals did not agree with each other on all points and in some respects their predictions proved mistaken or inadequate. Moreover, although diehards or reactionaries certainly existed, the majority of officers whose views can be traced could be described as cautious or moderate progressives; that is, they recognized that machines such as tanks would play an increasingly important part in future war, but they tended to stress the numerous problems and uncertainties. How, for example, would armored forces be supplied and repaired when far from base? Would they not soon be countered by antitank guns? And above all, what part would armored units play in military organization as a whole, given the shortage of funds and equipment, and traditional interservice rivalries?4
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在两次世界大战之间错综复杂的军事思想环境中，坦克领域的先驱者们——尤其是JFC·富勒上校——以令人钦佩的自信和魄力开辟了道路。富勒早已因其革命性的“1919计划”而声名鹊起。该计划设想投入约五千辆重型和中型坦克，并辅以近距离空中支援，发起一次纵深约二十英里的突击，以瘫痪德军的指挥系统。在整个20世纪20年代，富勒在一系列非正统且颇具争议的出版物中，继续担任机械化激进倡导者的主要代言人。例如，在1919年一篇获奖文章中，他断言坦克可以完全取代步兵和骑兵，而炮兵为了生存，必须发展成某种坦克。他估计，将军队改造为机械化师需要五年时间，而克服偏见和既得利益则需要另外五年。然而，他的这一预测过于乐观了。5利德尔·哈特比富勒年轻十七岁，军旅经验也远逊于富勒，在20世纪20年代末之前，他一直是富勒在机械化问题上的后起之秀。两人通过频繁的会面和大量的书信往来，互相帮助完善和发展各自的理念。富勒是一位更大胆、更有活力、更具原创性的思想家；而利德尔·哈特则更为平衡、谨慎，作为军事论辩家也更为内敛。在这一阶段，两位先驱在机械化理念上的两个主要区别显而易见。首先，利德尔·哈特提出了更为详细和务实的计划，分四个阶段逐步过渡到“新模式”军队，尽管他并未完全考虑到财政部施加的严格限制。其次，尽管他优先发展坦克，但他始终强调步兵（或“坦克陆战队”）作为机械化部队不可或缺的一部分的重要性，而富勒则在很大程度上将步兵置于保护交通线和固定基地的次要地位。6
Within the complex environment of military thinking, between the two world wars, the leading tank pioneers—and most particularly Colonel J. F. C. Fuller—blazed the trail with impressive self-confidence and panache. Fuller had already made his name as the author of the revolutionary “Plan 1919,” which envisaged employing about five thousand heavy and medium tanks with close air support for a thrust some twenty miles deep that would paralyze the German command system. Throughout the 1920s, in a variety of unorthodox and controversial publications, Fuller continued to be the chief spokesman of the radical advocates of mechanization. In a prize-winning essay in 1919, for example, he asserted that the tank could completely replace the infantry and cavalry, and that artillery, in order to survive, would have to develop into a kind of tank. He estimated that it would take five years to convert the army into mechanized divisions and another five to overcome prejudices and vested interests. In this forecast he was much too sanguine.5 Liddell Hart, seventeen years younger than Fuller and a far less experienced soldier, was the junior partner on the mechanization issue until the late 1920s. In frequent meetings and a voluminous correspondence the two helped each other to refine and develop their ideas. Fuller was the bolder, more dynamic, and original thinker; Liddell Hart was more balanced, tactful, and less extravagant as a military polemicist. Two main differences between the pioneers' thinking on mechanization may be discerned at this stage. First, Liddell Hart advanced more detailed and realistic plans for the gradual conversion, in four stages, to a “New Model” army though he did not completely allow for the rigid restrictions imposed by the Treasury. Second, though giving precedence to the tank, he always stressed the need for infantry (or “tank marines”) as an integral part of the mechanized force, whereas for the most part Fuller relegated infantry to a strictly subordinate role of protecting lines of communication and fixed bases.6
尽管富勒被不公正地与“全坦克”军队的概念联系在一起，但他对机械化的兴趣，从20世纪20年代初开始，仅仅是他对科技对战争影响这一更广泛问题的关注的一部分。他认为未来在于小型职业军队。他还提出了陆战类似于机械化部队之间海战的设想。他准确地预测，当坦克装甲变得可以被击穿时，这不会导致坦克过时，而是会促使人们更加重视火力和机动性，而牺牲防护能力。在此期间，他的主要目标是确保军队能够以最小的代价取得胜利，甚至完全阻止或遏制战争。不幸的是，正如他的传记作者所强调的那样，性格和职业上的挫败感导致富勒的语气变得越来越尖锐、咄咄逼人。他认为，既然战争关乎种族的生存，而民主国家又不愿进行必要的军事改革，那么或许有必要建立一个更加专制的体制。因此，他于1933年以少将军衔退役后不久，便投身于奥斯瓦尔德·莫斯利爵士和英国法西斯运动，这并不令人意外。7
Although he became unjustly associated with the notion of “all tank” armies, Fuller's interest in mechanization was from the early 192.0s only part of a wider concern with the impact of science and technology on warfare. He believed that the future lay with small professional armies. He also developed the image of a land battle analogous to naval operations between mechanized forces. He predicted, accurately, that when tank armor became penetrable this would lead not to obsolescence but to a greater emphasis on firepower and mobility at the expense of protection. Throughout this period his main concern was to secure armies that could achieve victory at the least cost, or even prevent or deter war altogether. Unfortunately, as his biographer stresses, temperament and professional frustrations caused Fuller to adopt an increasingly strident, hectoring tone. He suggested that since war was a matter of racial survival and since democracies were unwilling to carry out essential military reforms, a more authoritarian system might be necessary. It was not therefore surprising that, soon after retiring in 1933 with the rank of majorgeneral, he threw in his lot with Sir Oswald Mosley and the Fascist Movement in Britain.7
到了20世纪20年代中期，利德尔·哈特退伍后迅速成为一位知名的军事作家，他提出了“新模式”军队的概念，这种军队可以脱离公路和铁路独立作战，一天之内行进一百英里。在他的小册子《巴黎》中，他提炼了自己关于未来战争的理念，并描绘了机械化军队令人振奋的前景：
By the mid-1920s Liddell Hart, who after leaving the army quickly became a well-known writer on military affairs, had evolved the notion of a “New Model” army to operate independently of roads and railways and to advance one hundred miles in a day. In his little book Paris he distilled his ideas about the future of warfare and sketched exciting prospects for mechanized armies:
一旦我们认识到坦克并非步兵的额外武器或辅助工具，而是现代重骑兵的雏形，其真正的军事用途便显而易见——集中兵力，尽可能大规模地投入战斗，对敌军的阿喀琉斯之踵——构成其神经系统的通信和指挥中心——给予决定性打击。如此一来，我们不仅能够看到机动性从堑壕战的泥沼中解放出来，而且还能看到统帅才能和战争艺术的复兴，而非仅仅停留在机械层面。8
Once appreciate that tanks are not an extra arm or a mere aid to infantry but the modern form of heavy cavalry and their true military use is obvious—to be concentrated and used in as large masses as possible for a decisive blow against the Achilles' heel of the enemy army, the communications and command centres which form its nerve system. Then not only may we see the rescue of mobility from the toils of trench-warfare, but with it the revival of generalship and the art of war, in contrast to its mere mechanics.8
20世纪20年代，法国在机械化研究和发展方面也取得了显著进展。在1920年至1923年担任参谋长的埃德蒙·布阿特将军的鼓励下，法国军官们探索了新型机动武器的潜力：汽车运输车、步兵战车、装甲车和坦克。在埃米尔·阿莱奥上校、查尔斯·谢德维尔上校和约瑟夫·杜芒克上校等富有远见的将领的推动下，机械化蓬勃发展。军队的装备主要来自蓬勃发展的汽车工业的战时军用产品，其中以雷诺和雪铁龙为首的两家公司受益匪浅。这两家公司与军方一起，从长途运输和在法属非洲的勘探活动中获益良多。与此同时，杜芒克借鉴了他在1916年凡尔登围城战期间沿圣道组织汽车纵队以缓解补给危机的经验，开始试验大型机械化部队的编制结构。
France also made considerable progress in the 1920s in the study and development of mechanization. Encouraged by an innovative chief of staff from 1920–1923, General Edmond Buat, French officers explored the potential of the new weapons of mobility: motor transport, infantry carriers, armored cars, and tanks. Motorization flourished under visionaries like Colonels Emile Alléhaut, Charles Chedeville, and Joseph Doumenc. The army was equipped from the wartime military output of a burgeoning motor industry, led by Renault and Citroën who, with the military, benefited from long-distance supply and exploration ventures in French Africa. Simultaneously Doumenc, building on his experience of organizing the motor columns along the voie sacrée to relieve the supply crisis at Verdun during the 1916 siege, experimented with structures for large motorized units.
机械化进程也同样蓬勃发展。1915-1916年之后，法国迅速发展出一支装甲部队，到战争结束时，已拥有三千辆雷诺FT-17轻型坦克，以及更重的施耐德和圣钻石坦克。被誉为这支坦克部队“之父”的让-巴蒂斯特·埃蒂安将军，在和平初期继续负责机械化试验。他与布阿特一道，倡导战术机动性，并强调装甲部队在进攻和反击中强大的打击能力。埃蒂安是一位极具远见且不拘一格的军官，这种类型的军官在随后的几十年里，在坦克部队中屡见不鲜。他坚信“坦克无疑是最强大的奇袭武器，因此也是取得胜利的关键”。他力主将装甲部队打造为一个独立的兵种，与步兵截然不同，因为装甲部队在武器装备、作战方式和后勤组织方面都与步兵“毫无相似之处”。他认为“至关重要的是……坦克应作为预备队，由总司令临时指派给进攻部队或执行以往由骑兵执行的任务”；“将坦克编入步兵师既不合理也不可行，因为步兵师的任务是无论如何都要依靠火力和工事进行抵抗。”一支仅由两万人组成的摩托化军团就能保持机动性，“从而比以往笨重的军队拥有巨大的优势。” 9
Mechanization prospered similarly. France had rapidly evolved an armored force after 1915–1916, possessing by the end of the war three thousand Renault FT-17 light tanks, and heavier Schneiders and St. diamonds. General Jean-Baptiste Estienne, “father” of this tank arm, remained responsible for mechanized experimentation in the first years of peace. With Buat, he preached the cause of tactical mobility and the utility of armor's striking power both offensively and in counterattack. A prophetic and unconventional officer of a type characteristically thrown up by tank corps in succeeding decades, Estienne believed that “the tank is undeniably the most powerful weapon of surprise and therefore of victory.” He urged that armor be an independent branch, distinguished from the infantry to which it was “not in the least analogous” by its armament, modes of combat, and logistical organization. He deemed it “essential…that tanks remain in general reserve under the commander-in-chief who assigns them temporarily to an attacking army or to a mission formerly performed by cavalry”; it was “neither rational nor practicable to assign tanks organically to an infantry division whose task is to resist, come what may, by firepower and fortification.” A motorized corps of only twenty thousand men would be mobile, “thereby possessing a formidable advantage over the cumbersome armies of the recent past.”9
受此启发，像让·佩雷上校、约瑟夫·莫利涅上校和波尔-莫里斯·韦尔普里上校这样的年轻军官开始研究未来机械化部队的理论和实际运用。20世纪20年代，法国军事学院的会议室以及科埃基当、迈伊和穆尔梅兰的训练场都充满了关于机动试验理论与实践的讨论。然而，随着时间的推移，创新被停滞所取代。由于技术先进且成本高昂的活动成为战后和平时期军费预算削减的牺牲品，试验活动也随之减少。1925年法德关系的缓和增强了人们对更加和平的欧洲秩序的政治乐观情绪。机械化和摩托化似乎更适合“进攻性”或“侵略性”的军事行动，因此在法国政界受到批评，被认为与公开宣称的防御战略不符。
Thus inspired, younger officers like Colonels Jean Perré, Joseph Molinié, and Pol-Maurice Velpry studied the doctrine and practical employment of the mechanized formations of the future. The conference chambers of the Ecole de Guerre and the training grounds of Coetquidan, Mailly, and Mourmelin were alive in the 1920s to the sound of the theory and practice of mobile experimentation. As the decade wore on, however, stultification replaced innovation. Experimentation diminished as technologically advanced and thus costly activities fell prey to the reductions in military budgets that went with the postwar climate of peace. Franco-German rapprochement in 1925 strengthened political optimism about a more peaceful European order. Mechanization and motorization, appearing more suitable for “offensive” or “aggressive” military action, were criticized politically in France as inappropriate to an avowedly defensive strategy.
最终，十年间，菲利普·贝当元帅和欧仁·德贝内将军在军事政策和思想领域占据了主导地位。前者是“凡尔登的救星”，后者在1923年布阿去世后成为总参谋长，他们倡导静态防御工事的教条，从而影响了军官团。埃蒂安的坦克监察局自1920年起就隶属于步兵，他晋升少将的职位受到限制，被迫于1927年退役。他的地位下降，有点像英国的富勒，沦为局外观察员，只能私下提出一些方案，而这些方案大多被置之不理。在他1936年去世之前，法国独立的重型机械化部队已濒临灭绝。
Finally, the decade culminated in the ascendancy of Marshal Philippe Pétain and General Eugène Debeney over military policy and thought. The former, the “savior of Verdun,” and the latter, who became chief of the general staff when Buat died in 1923, influenced the officer corps by their advocacy of the dogma of static prepared defenses. Estienne, his Tank Inspectorate already subordinated since 1920 to the infantry, was blocked as a major-general and forced to retire in 1927. Reduced, somewhat like Fuller in Britain, to be an outside observer, he could only privately advocate projects, which were most often simply ignored. Before he died in 1936, France's independent heavy mechanized forces would be threatened with extinction.
从1927年到1930年，在贝当和德贝内主导的时期，战术主动性被系统性地压制，取而代之的是集中式的指挥控制。此前福煦元帅和布阿特元帅的政策所倡导的围绕防御工事和据点进行机动反击的战术，被让位于边境的“持续准备战场”和密集部署的防御炮兵。贝当的口号“火力杀敌”（ Le feu tue ）成为了军队的口号，而这支军队的军事思想则陷入了短暂的思维冰河期。
The years from 1927 to 1930, dominated by Pétain and Debeney, saw the systematic suppression of tactical initiative in favor of centralized command control. Maneuver around fortified regions and strong points with some emphasis on mobile counterattack, prescribed by the previous regime of Marshal Foch and Buat, ceded primacy to “continuous prepared battlefields” on the frontiers, and massed defensive artillery. Pétain's watchword, Le feu tue (firepower kills), became the slogan of an army whose military thought froze in a temporary ice age of the mind.10
从瑞士到卢森堡的固定防御工事系统化并象征着这种新的作战模式。这条防线是1922年至1927年间由军事委员会确定的，但其功劳始终归于时任陆军部长安德烈·马奇诺，正是他推动了相关财政法案在议会获得通过。这条防线常年驻扎，由于其纯粹的防御性质，在政治上并无争议。这是一项审慎的投资，因为它不仅为刚刚从德国战乱中恢复过来的脆弱工业区提供了安全保障，也为为期两周的军队动员和预备役集结提供了保护。尽管如此，这一体系以及十二个月服役制的实施，意味着法国此后在提升作战机动性方面鲜有作为。
Systematizing and symbolizing the new mode were the fixed fortifications from Switzerland to Luxembourg. This was the line decided on by military commissions between 1922 and 1927, but always attributed to the war minister, André Maginot, who piloted the laws for its finance through parliament. Permanently garrisoned, the line was politically uncontentious by virtue of appearing strictly defensive. It was a prudent investment, for it afforded not only security to vulnerable industrial regions only recently recovered from Germany but also protection for the two-week process of mobilization and concentration of the army's reserves. Notwithstanding this rationale, the system and the institution of twelve-month service meant that France henceforth did little to develop greater operational mobility.
二
II
到了20世纪20年代末，陆军部和总参谋部越来越担忧英国陆军的兵力和装备日益衰退，以及其无力履行可能的承诺。计划用于欧洲以外地区的远征军规模远小于1914年之前的同类部队，且作战准备也远不及当年。正是在这种不利的条件下，1927年至1931年间，英国开展了一系列意义非凡的机械化和混合部队试验。尽管这些演习规模相对较小，且最终证明只是昙花一现，但它们在当时引起了国际社会的广泛关注和赞赏。
By the late 1920s the War Office and the general staff were becoming increasingly worried about the British army's deterioration in numbers and equipment and its inability to meet possible commitments. The planned expeditionary force for extra-European commitments was much smaller and less ready to take the field than its pre-1914 equivalent. It was in these unpropitious conditions that the remarkable experimental trials with mechanized and mixed units took place between 1927 and 1931. Although these exercises were on a comparatively small scale and proved to be a false dawn, they aroused considerable foreign interest and admiration at the time.
1927年8月，在索尔兹伯里平原进行首次大规模演习的所谓机械化部队，实际上是由装甲车、轻型和中型坦克、骑兵、拖拉机牵引火炮以及由卡车和半履带车运输的步兵等各种装备混杂而成。旅长杰克·柯林斯上校根据车辆的公路速度将部队划分为“快速”、“中速”和“慢速”三个小组，但这与他们的越野能力并不相符。正如利德尔·哈特在《每日电讯报》上报道的那样，结果是形成了一支蜿蜒曲折、绵延32英里的纵队，并且经常在瓶颈路段出现拥堵。缺乏无线电通信和有效的反坦克炮（用彩色旗帜表示）只是众多严重缺陷中的两个，但即便如此，这次演习仍然展现了机械化部队相对于传统步兵和骑兵部队的优势。
The so-called mechanized force that carried out the first serious exercises on Salisbury Plain in August 1927 comprised an ill-assorted miscellany of armored cars, light and medium tanks, horsed cavalry, tractor-drawn artillery, and infantry transported on trucks and half-tracked carriers. The brigade commander, Colonel Jack Collins, distributed the brigade into “fast,” “medium,” and “slow” groups according to their vehicles' road speed, but this did not coincide with their crosscountry capability. The result, as Liddell Hart reported in the Daily Telegraph, was a serpentine column that coiled over a distance of thirty-two miles and frequently became congested at bottlenecks. The lack of radio communications and of effective antitank guns (represented by colored flags) were just two of the serious deficiencies, but even so the exercises demonstrated the superiority of mechanized units over traditional infantry and cavalry units.
1928年，更名为“装甲部队”的部队举行演习，虽然拥有150部无线电台，但合适的坦克和车辆仍然严重短缺。当时只有16辆轻型坦克可用，这些坦克没有炮塔，仅配备机枪。虽然已经设计出能够替代老旧的维克斯中型坦克的优秀方案，但由于资金不足而未能实现。步兵的汽车运输能力不足以使其跟上坦克在全国范围内的行进速度。1928年演习中最成功的部分是精心排练的固定动作，旨在给高级军官、来访的贵宾和议员留下深刻印象。
For its exercises in 1928 the renamed “Armoured Force” had the advantage of 150 wireless sets, but there was still a chronic shortage of suitable tanks and vehicles. Only sixteen light tanks were available, which lacked turrets and were armed only with machine guns. Admirable replacements were designed for the obsolescent Vickers Medium tank but lack of money prevented their development. The infantry's motor transport did not enable it to keep up with tanks across the country. The most successful aspect of the 1928 exercises was the well-rehearsed set-piece maneuvers designed to impress senior officers, visiting dignitaries, and members of Parliament.
这一实验阶段的顶峰出现在1931年，当时皇家坦克团第一旅进行了演习。与之前的部队不同，这支部队完全由履带式车辆组成。另一个显著特点是，每个坦克营的连队都包含一个中型坦克排和一个轻型坦克排，这证明了两种坦克可以协同作战。查尔斯·布罗德准将利用无线电和彩色旗帜进行坦克间的通信，设计了一套演练方法，使整个旅的约180辆坦克能够按照他的命令作为一个整体进行机动。布罗德准将此次演习圆满结束，他率领该旅在浓雾中穿越数英里的索尔兹伯里平原，准时抵达并“以近乎非人的精准度”向陆军委员会检阅。
The culmination of this experimental phase occurred in 1931 with the exercises of the 1st Brigade Royal Tank Regiment. Unlike its predecessors, this force was composed entirely of tracked vehicles. Another significant feature was that each company of the tank battalions comprised a section of medium and a section of light tanks, proving that the two could work together. Using a combination of radios and colored flags for communication between the tanks, Brigadier Charles Broad evolved a drill that enabled the whole brigade of some 180 tanks to maneuver as a unit in response to his orders. Broad brought the exercises to a triumphant conclusion by moving the brigade several miles across Salisbury Plain in a thick fog to emerge on time and to parade past the Army Council “with an almost inhuman precision.”
与这些早期实地演习同等重要的，是1929年出版的第一本官方机械化战争手册。这本手册是布罗德的《机械化和装甲部队》，因其封面颜色而俗称“紫色入门读物”。该手册对20世纪30年代的英国装甲兵理论产生了重要影响，并在德国得到了深入研究。布罗德的核心思想是，坦克的主要用途是发挥其火力优势和冲击力，理想情况下应以独立编队的形式使用。尽管出于可以理解的谨慎，但考虑到当时的坦克能力和组织形式，布罗德关于独立使用装甲部队突破敌军前线、切断其通讯、并在后方制造混乱的设想，确实具有远见卓识。
At least as important as these early field exercises was the publication in 1929 of the first official manual on mechanized warfare. This was Broad's booklet Mechanised and Armoured Formations, popularly known from the color of its covers as the “Purple Primer.” The manual exerted an important influence on British armored doctrine in the 1930s and was carefully studied in Germany. At the core of Broad's thinking lay the belief that tanks should be used primarily to exploit their firepower and shock action in attack and that they should ideally be employed in independent formations. Despite understandable caution, Broad's sketch of armored forces used independently to break through an enemy's front lines, sever his communications, and create chaos in the rear areas was truly visionary in the light of existing tank capabilities and organization.11
在这段短暂而充满活力的实验期之后，陆军领导人明显失去了动力和灵感，部分原因是帝国总参谋长乔治·米尔恩爵士日益谨慎。当他最终于1933年退休时，正规的坦克营只有四个，而步兵营却有136个；20个骑兵团中只有两个完成了从马匹到装甲车的转换。除了传统的军事保守主义之外，1931年的金融危机也严重限制了开支，极大地阻碍了进一步的创新和实验。
After this brief invigorating period of experiment there was a marked loss of impetus and inspiration from the army's leaders, explained in part by Sir George Milne's increasing caution as chief of the Imperial General Staff. When he eventually retired in 1933 there were still only four established tank battalions compared to 136 infantry battalions; and only two out of twenty cavalry regiments had converted from horses to armored cars. As well as traditional military conservatism, the 1931 financial crisis put a severe limit on expenditure and greatly discouraged further innovation and experiment.
20世纪30年代初，法国的军队改革运动主要由马克西姆·魏刚将军、莫里斯·加梅林将军和夏尔·戴高乐上校主导。这三人对法国向机动化转型的模式和程度，以及1940年的动荡局势都起到了决定性作用。魏刚是一位精力充沛、能力卓越、经验丰富的军官，曾是一名骑兵，并在第一次世界大战期间担任福煦元帅的参谋长。1930年，他接替德贝内出任总参谋长。加梅林曾是一名步兵，也是霞飞元帅的副官，同时被任命为副总参谋长。一年后，他们共同晋升至最高职位：魏刚接替贝当担任陆军总监，加梅林则出任总参谋长。1935年魏刚退休后，两人兼任这两个职务，直至第二次世界大战爆发。两位将军都致力于利用机械武器和运输工具的革命性打击能力和机动性，打造一支更具成本效益、训练有素且随时可以投入战斗的军队。
In France in the early 1930s the struggle for army reform was dominated by Generals Maxime Weygand and Maurice Gamelin and Colonel Charles de Gaulle. All three played decisive parts in the form and degree of the French conversion to mobility and in the drama of 1940. Weygand, an officer of great energy, outstanding ability, and much experience, a cavalryman and chief of staff to Marshal Foch throughout the First World War, succeeded Debeney in 1930 as chief of the general staff. Gamelin, an infantryman and former aide to Marshal Joffre, was simultaneously appointed deputy chief. A year later they rose together to the summit, Weygand replacing Pétain as army inspector-general and Gamelin becoming chief of the general staff before, with Weygand's retirement in 1935, combining the two functions until the Second World War. Both generals were committed to harnessing the revolutionary hitting power and mobility of mechanical weapons and transport in pursuit of a more cost-effective, highly trained, and combat-ready army.
最高指挥官们对“现代化”的重新鼓励反映了他们对法国面临的三大潜在威胁的担忧：首先，越来越多的证据表明，魏玛共和国时期的德国违反《凡尔赛条约》秘密囤积军火；其次，1933年1月，纳粹党崛起并掌权，其公开宣称具有侵略性和修正主义的对外野野心；最后，日内瓦裁军会议在德国“权利平等”问题上迅速陷入僵局，导致可核查的军备控制前景黯淡。此外，法国日益显现的财政和人口弱点也加剧了这些困境。法国的国防不仅受到了1929年后世界经济大萧条的冲击，还受到了征兵部队“寒冬”的冲击——这是第一次世界大战期间法国出生率减半二十年后的又一个时期。英国外交部在1933年指出，“法国公众舆论……对1936年、1937年和1938年这三个寒冬时期的兵力状况深感担忧。”<sup> 12</sup>
This resurgence of encouragement for “modernity” by the highest commanders reflected concern over three nascent threats to France: first, the growing evidence of clandestine German military stockpiling under the Weimar Republic, in contravention of the Versailles treaty; second, the rise and accession to power in January 1933 of National Socialism, with its avowedly aggressive and revisionist foreign ambitions; and finally, the diminishing prospect of verifiable arms control issuing from the Geneva Disarmament Conference, which deadlocked rapidly over the issue of German “equality of rights.” Aggravating these difficulties for France were its emergent financial and demographic weaknesses. Not only did the French defense effort feel the chill wind of the world's post-1929 economic depression, but it was also buffeted by the onset of the “lean years” for the conscript contingents, two decades after the halving of France's birthrate during World War I. “French public opinion,” the British Foreign Office noted in 1933, “is…very apprehensive about the level of effectives during the années creuses, 1936, 1937, 1938.”12
在马奇诺防线的政治支持下，魏刚启动了一项军事现代化计划，其中包括在1930年6月对20个现役和平时期步兵师中的7个进行机械化改造。然而，与之形成鲜明对比的是，法国在同月根据白里安-施特雷泽曼协定提前撤出了莱茵兰地区。此外，由于工程的复杂性和规模，马奇诺防线的防御效益直到1934年才开始显现。魏刚的改革精神立竿见影；1930年9月，法国举行了自第一次世界大战结束以来的首次军级演习。正如之前持批评态度的英国武官所言，这些演习标志着“法国军事思维从过度固守1918年堑壕战的模式，转变为更加积极主动的政策……尤其着眼于解决与机动战相关的问题。”尽管参战部队因半履带车辆尚未交付而行动受阻，但英国武官对“坦克机动和隐蔽方式的改进——这些方法此前通常显得幼稚可笑”印象深刻。他总结道，法国人已经“真正觉醒”，认识到现代战争通过机动性而发生的变革。<sup> 13</sup>
Weygand, sustained politically by Maginot, had initiated a program of military modernization, including the motorization of seven of the twenty active peacetime infantry divisions in June 1930. Counterbalancing this, however, was France's premature evacuation in the same month of the Rhineland, in accordance with the Briand-Stresemann agreements. Moreover, the defensive benefits from the Maginot line began to be enjoyed only from 1934, owing to the complexities and scale of the construction work involved. Weygand's invigorating spirit was observed immediately; September 1930 witnessed the first corps-scale maneuvers since the end of the First World War. They marked, according to the previously critical British military attaché, “the transition of French military mentality from an undue tenacity to the methods of trench warfare as practised in 1918 to a more vigorous policy…especially directed towards solving the problems connected with a war of movement.” Although the units involved were hampered by the absence of undelivered half-tracks, the British attaché was impressed “by the improved methods of movement and concealment of tanks which had hitherto usually been puerile.” He concluded that the French had “really woken up” to modern warfare's transformation through mobility.13
20世纪30年代初期，法国在技术和理论方面进行了大量的反思和实验，既有官方的，也有半官方的。1932年在迈伊营举行的演习检验了一支实验性的机械化骑兵旅。演习的成功促使魏刚组建了一支新的“3型2”轻骑兵师。该师包括一个由装甲车和半履带车组成的机械化旅、摩托化龙骑兵和炮兵，以及两个骑兵旅。该师仍然需要5600匹马，而这些马匹与车辆的配合并不理想。因此，陆军五个骑兵师中的四个进行了改装，其中三个在1939年战争爆发时仍保持着这种形式。
The early 1930s were rich in technical and doctrinal reflection and experiment in France, both officially and semiprivately. The maneuvers of 1932 at Mailly Camp tested an experimental mechanized cavalry brigade. Its success encouraged Weygand to establish a new “Type 3 2” Light Cavalry Division. This comprised a mechanized brigade of armored cars and half-tracks, motorized dragoons, and artillery, but also still two mounted brigades. The division continued to require 5,600 horses, which did not integrate easily with the vehicles. Four of the army's five cavalry divisions were thus modified, and three remained in this form when war came in 1939.
魏刚深受鼓舞，成功说服新任陆军部长爱德华·达拉第批准在兰斯对第四骑兵师进行机械化试验。1933年5月30日，该师正式成为德国第一支轻型机械化师（DLM）。它体现了德国陆军最先进的理念，装备了240辆装甲战车，下辖四个摩托化龙骑兵营，以及摩托化工兵、炮兵、通信和后勤部队。这支轻型机械化师于1933年12月正式组建，比德国第一支装甲师的组建时间早得多，由经验丰富的机械化传统拥护者让·弗拉维尼指挥。这支新部队“除了名称之外，其他方面都与1934年的装甲师别无二致”。根据陆军的总体作战理论手册，即1936年8月颁布的《关于大规模部队战术运用的临时指示》，大部队有三项任务：安全保障、战果利用和直接介入主战。14
Heartened, Weygand secured the approval of the new war minister, Edouard Daladier, for the experimental mechanization of the 4th Cavalry Division based at Rheims. By decree of May 30, 1933, this became the first light mechanized division (DLM). It embodied the army's most progressive ideas, being equipped with 240 armored combat vehicles, supported by four motorized dragoon battalions, plus integral motorized engineer, artillery, communication, and logistic units. Established permanently in December 1933, substantially ahead of Germany's first Panzer division, this DLM was commanded by Jean Flavigny, the experienced orthodox exponent of mechanization. The new unit was in “everything but name…the 1934 version of an armoured division.” According to the army's overall doctrinal manual, the Provisional Instructions on the Tactical Employment of Large Units of August 1936, the DLM had three missions: security, exploitation, and direct intervention in the main battle.14
魏刚对机动性的重视持续而卓著。他组建了一个技术内阁，直接就装备采购向监察长提供建议；他还成立了一个坦克研究委员会，负责研究大型装甲部队的编制。尤其值得一提的是，在1932年至1934年左翼政府施加的巨大节约压力下，魏刚坚持保留了装备拨款。这些政府试图通过降低成本和价格以及平衡预算来使法国摆脱经济萧条。最后，为了将法国的军事改革与老盟友中最先进的军事发展进行比较，魏刚于1933年和1934年的夏天访问了英国，考察了维克斯·卡登-劳埃德步兵战车的适用性，观看了桑赫斯特和蒂德沃思的坦克演习，并更加确信自己推动机动性的重要性。简而言之，魏刚致力于使法国具备快速干预以捍卫其重要利益的能力——或许是为了援助其在比利时的军事伙伴，或许是为了重新占领非军事化的莱茵兰地区，以便“向德国人施以他所谓的‘惩罚’，阻止他们重新武装”。<sup> 15</sup>
Weygand's patronage of mobility was sustained and significant. He formed a Technical Cabinet to advise the inspector-general directly on equipment procurement, and a Tank Study Commission to examine organizations for large armored formations. Not least, he preserved the allocations for equipment against enormous pressure for economies from the Leftist governments of 1932 to 1934, which sought to extricate France from the economic depression through a deflation of costs and prices and a balanced budget. Finally, eager to compare France's military reforms with the most modern developments among its old allies, Weygand visited Britain in the summers of 1933 and 1934, inspecting the applicability of Vickers Carden-Lloyd infantry carriers, watching tank maneuvers at Sandhurst and Tidworth, and departing doubly sure of the importance of his promotion of mobility. In short, Weygand worked to furnish France with a capability of rapid intervention in defense of vital interests—perhaps to succor its military partner in Belgium or to reoccupy the demilitarized Rhineland to “administer what he termed a fessée to the Germans to stop their rearming.15
这一时期的挫折令人沮丧。其中最主要的是法国机动部队继续被划分为“步兵”和“骑兵”两类，各自依赖于其所属军种对机械化武器的特定需求。1932年在迈伊进行的“机械化作战分遣队”试验未能提供确凿证据证明组建大型独立坦克部队的必要性。事实上，这支部队表现不佳（诚然，是在人为设置的不利条件下进行的），招致了步兵总监约瑟夫·杜菲厄的严厉批评，以至于魏刚和加梅林被迫解散了该部队。建立独立重型装甲师的进程严重受阻；直到1936年11月，在加梅林坚持法国必须拥有“比装甲师更强大的工具”的情况下，才组建了另一支试验部队。重型B型坦克的研发几乎停滞不前。 1932年使用的三辆原型车，四年后军队装备的坦克数量仅增加到十五辆。同样，D1中型坦克的生产也仅交付了160辆便宣告结束。其改进型Di坦克的产量也仅达到45辆，便在1937年停产，以便将产能转移到骑兵坦克上。
Less encouraging were the setbacks of this period. Chief among these were the continued division of France's mobile forces into “infantry” and “cavalry” types, each dependent on their parent branch's particular interests in mechanized weaponry. Trials at Mailly in 1932, with a “mechanized combat detachment,” failed to offer indisputable evidence of the need for large autonomous tank formations. Indeed this force's unsatisfactory performance, admittedly under artificially unfavorable conditions, prompted such severe criticism from the infantry inspector-general, Joseph Dufieux, that Weygand and Gamelin were forced to disband the unit. Progress toward permanent establishment of independent heavy armored divisions was gravely retarded; another experimental unit was not created until November 1936, under Gamelin's insistence that France acquire a “tool more powerful than the Panzer Division.” Development of the heavy Char B battle tank almost ceased; the three prototypes used in 1932 had increased to only fifteen of the tanks in army hands four years later. Similarly, production of the D1 medium tank ended after delivery of only 160 machines. Output of its improved successor, the Di, reached only 45 vehicles before being halted to divert manufacturing capacity to cavalry tanks in 1937.
与此同时，总参谋部作战处认可了将装甲部队作为独立战略预备队，置于最高统帅指挥之下的想法，但并未予以批准。该处在1935年指出：“这一概念具有合理使用坦克的优势……使指挥部能够根据各师的机动性，并遵循兵力节约原则，为其提供相应的坦克支援。”然而，这仅仅是一个“穷人的方案”，因为它只需要15到20个营的现代化坦克；一旦工业生产能力允许，就将被每个步兵师配备一个装甲营的方案所取代。曾任机械化督察、现任陆军部长的莫兰将军向众议院陆军委员会解释了这一方案的理由：“小型近距离支援坦克必不可少，因为现在如果没有装甲部队的掩护，步兵部队根本无法发起进攻。” 16以上就是军队内部正统流动性倡导者在资源和态度方面面临的一些困难。
Meanwhile the general staff's operations section recognized the idea of husbanding armor in an autonomous strategic reserve under the supreme commander's hand, but withheld approval. “This concept,” it noted in 1935, “offers advantages of a rational use of tanks…permitting the Command to engage divisions with tank support appropriate to their maneuver and in conformity with the principle of economy of force.” However, this was only a “poor man's solution,” since it required only fifteen to twenty battalions of modern tanks; it was to be displaced, when industrial productivity permitted, by dispersion of one armored battalion to each infantry division. General Maurin, formerly inspector of motorization, now war minister, informed the Army Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the rationale for this: “small close-support tanks are indispensable because it is now impossible to launch an infantry unit into attack if it is not preceded by armor.”16 These, then, were some of the difficulties of resources and attitudes facing orthodox exponents of mobility from within the army's own ranks.
三
III
1933年希特勒在德国掌权后，英国也对其武装力量进行了全面评估，以考虑可能的军事行动，但组建强大的装甲师作为先锋的想法并未得到认可。相反，在20世纪30年代中期，陆军部选择逐步推进传统兵种的机械化（包括将骑兵改装为装甲车或轻型坦克），而不是扩充皇家坦克部队。查尔斯·布罗德、派尔、马特尔、珀西·霍巴特，尤其是利德尔·哈特等装甲师的坚定拥护者，倾向于将梦想的破灭视为反动总参谋部蓄意阴谋的结果。1939年和1940年德军闪电战的成功进一步强化了他们的指责，因为德意志国防军恰恰在英国陆军拒绝装甲战理念的同时，采纳了这一理念。然而，从更长远的角度来看，我们就能理解为什么英国在1931年之前的开创性努力在之后未能得到更有效的发挥。首先，政府在1934年认定德国是最危险的潜在敌人，并决定未来五年的国防开支应主要用于应对德国的威胁。理论上，这一决定应该有利于陆军，尤其是在组建一支欧洲大陆远征军的必要性已在原则上得到认可的情况下。然而，实际上，陆军承担这样的角色在政治上不受欢迎，而且在财政上也难以与其他两军的拟议开支相协调。经过漫长的部长级讨论，原本就捉襟见肘的陆军五年拨款4000万英镑用于弥补其最严重的不足，最终被削减至1900万英镑。因此，几乎没有采取任何措施来为欧洲战争的远征军做好准备。
The advent of power in Germany of Hitler in 1933 also led to a thorough review of Britain's armed forces in relation to possible commitments, but the notion of a spearhead of powerful armored divisions did not find favor. Instead, in the mid-1930s, the War Office opted for the gradual mechanization of the traditional arms (including the conversion of the cavalry to armored cars or light tanks) instead of expanding the Royal Tank Corps. Fervent advocates of the latter course and of armored divisions generally, such as Charles Broad, Pile, Martel, Percy Hobart, and above all Liddell Hart, tended to see the frustration of their dreams as the result of a deliberate conspiracy by a reactionary general staff. The success of German blitzkrieg operations in 1939 and 1940 added weight to their indictment, since the Wehrmacht had adopted the armored warfare philosophy at precisely the time when the British army was rejecting it. A longer perspective, however, enables us to understand why Britain's pioneering efforts before 1931 were not developed to more effect thereafter. First, the government decided in 1934 that Germany was the most dangerous potential enemy and that defense expenditure over the next five years should be primarily distributed to counter the German threat. In theory this decision should have assisted the army, particularly as the need for a Continental expeditionary force was now accepted in principle. In practice, however, such a role for the army was politically unpopular and financially hard to reconcile with proposed expenditure on the other two services. After protracted ministerial discussions, the army's already meager allocation of £40 million over five years to remedy its worst deficiencies was cut to £19 million. Little was done to prepare an expeditionary force for a European war.
其次，即便考虑到资金和政治威望的匮乏，也必须指出，20世纪30年代中期陆军领导层的思维缺乏远见。蒙哥马利-马辛伯德（1933-1936年任帝国总参谋长）显然并非坦克和装甲战的积极支持者；事实上，他厌恶富勒，并阻挠其他进步派高级军官的晋升。此外，总参谋部几乎没有考虑过，如果派遣远征军前往欧洲大陆，它将扮演何种角色。批评者有理由指出，陆军似乎一心想要重蹈1914年的覆辙，只不过这一次是用原骑兵团的轻型坦克来执行原骑兵师的侦察任务。
Second, when every allowance has been made for lack of funds and political prestige, it must be said that the army's leadership in the mid-1930s was unimaginative. Montgomery-Massingberd (Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1933–1936) was certainly not a keen supporter of tanks and armored warfare; indeed he detested Fuller and also blocked the advance of other progressive senior officers. Moreover the general staff gave little thought to what role an expeditionary force would play if it was sent to the Continent. Critics could argue, with some justification, that the army seemed bent on repeating the experience of 1914, only this time with the light tanks of former cavalry regiments performing the reconnaissance role of the former cavalry division.
第三，或许也是最严重的一点，当时主要的军事思想家和将领们出于各种原因反对欧洲战场。1936年，已退休的富勒在写给利德尔·哈特的信中表达了当时在役军官如艾恩赛德、伯内特-斯图尔特、派尔和伯纳德·蒙哥马利等人的观点：“我完全同意，在任何情况下我们都不应该将军队投入欧洲大陆战争，因为如果我们这样做，那无异于自杀。”像戈特（1937-1939年任总参谋长）和亨利·波纳尔（1938-1939年任军事行动主任）这样的总参谋部军官认识到，无论和平时期如何表态，一旦战争爆发，远征军几乎肯定会被派往法国；但他们仍然焦虑沮丧，对法国军队和本国政客都缺乏信心。唯一一位明确宣称欧洲的参与至关重要，并要求组建强大的装甲部队执行反击任务的高级军官是珀西·霍巴特爵士少将，但据说他因这些颠覆性观点而受到训斥，不久后被调往埃及。17
Third, and perhaps most serious, the leading military thinkers and generals were themselves opposed to a European role for a variety of reasons. In 1936 Fuller, now in retirement, expressed the view shared by serving officers such as Ironside, Burnett-Stuart, Pile, and Bernard Montgomery when he wrote to Liddell Hart, “I fully agree that in no circumstances should we use it [the army] in a continental war, because, if we do, it will prove nothing short of a suicide club.” Officers serving on the general staff such as Gort (CIGS, 1937–1939) and Henry Pownall (Director of Military Operations, 1938–1939) recognized that whatever was said in peacetime, the expeditionary force would almost certainly be sent to France on the outbreak of war; but they remained anxious and despondent, lacking confidence equally in the French army and their own politicians. The one senior officer who unequivocally declared that the European commitment was vital, and demanded powerful armored forces for the counterattack role was Major-General Sir Percy Hobart, but he allegedly was reprimanded for these subversive views and shortly afterwards posted to Egypt.17
利德尔·哈特反对英国军队在欧洲大陆作战，这从根本上反映了他对英国在第一次世界大战中所扮演角色的解读。到20世纪30年代中期，英国军队对任何形式的战争都准备不足，这无疑加重了这种观点，但利德尔·哈特对这一角色的厌恶早于希特勒的出现以及英国缺乏装甲师的确定。利德尔·哈特是后来被称为“有限责任”政策（即尽可能少地向欧洲联盟派遣军队，理想情况下最好不派遣任何军队）的杰出倡导者，但他表达了各行各业广大民众的担忧。<sup> 18</sup>
Liddell Hart's opposition to a Continental commitment for the British army fundamentally reflected his interpretation of Britain's part in the First World War. The British army's pathetic unpreparedness for any kind of war by the mid-1930s certainly added weight to this viewpoint, but Liddell Hart's aversion to the role preceded both the advent of Hitler and the certainty of Britain's lack of armored divisions. Liddell Hart was the outstanding advocate of what became known as the policy of “limited liability” (the commitment of the fewest possible troops and ideally none at all to a European alliance), but he articulated the fears of a vast number of people in all walks of life.18
利德尔·哈特关于此问题的著作中一个主要论点是，在现代陆战中，防御明显优于进攻，而且武器发展实际上进一步增强了这种优势。在他的著作《武装的欧洲》中，他反驳了这样一种观点：除非敌军措手不及且自身部队未实现机械化，否则机械化师能够在战争初期突破敌军防线。他也不认为空中力量能够扭转战局，使进攻方占据优势。他令人欣慰的推断是，只要受侵略者不盲目地发动进攻，他们就不太可能被击败。富勒在他关于机械化的精彩著作《野战勤务条例讲义》中也指出，将会找到应对坦克进攻的办法，军队将再次面临围城战。与第一次世界大战中由于“部落”军队的运用而导致的静态线性防御不同，富勒预见到机械化部队之间的僵局将转变为对大片区域的机动防御。从这些安全区域或地带，将对敌人及其人民发动空袭。19
A major theme in Liddell Hart's publications on this issue is that the defense is markedly superior to the attack in modern land warfare and that weapon developments actually increase this superiority. In his book Europe in Arms he disputed the view that mechanized divisions would be able to pierce the defenses in the early days of a war unless the enemy was taken by surprise and his own forces were unmechanized. Nor did he believe that air power could tip the scales in favor of the attacker. His comforting deduction was that victims of aggression were unlikely to be beaten provided they refrained from foolish indulgence in attacks. Fuller, in his excellent final word on mechanization, Lectures on Field Service Regulations, also suggested that an antidote would be found to tank offensives and armies would again be faced by siege warfare. In contrast to the static linear defense of the First World War resulting from the employment of “horde” armies, Fuller anticipated that stalemate between mechanized forces would be transformed into the mobile defense of large areas. From these secure areas or zones air attacks would then be launched on the enemy and his people.19
利德尔·哈特对英国在法国的承诺的看法中，一个令人费解之处在于，他认为法国人一心想重演1914年的全面进攻，即便英国远征军及时赶到，也会被卷入致命的战斗。考虑到第一次世界大战造成的惨重损失和破坏、耗资巨大的马奇诺防线建设、对短期征兵制军队的依赖以及缺乏强大的进攻性装甲部队，这种对法国战略思维的解读显得十分怪异。利德尔·哈特对当时法国军事理论的了解显然存在缺陷且不可靠，但必须指出的是，他同样抱有类似的错觉，认为英国总参谋部奉行进攻性战略，而他当时完全有能力核实事实。1937年，英国政府采纳了利德尔·哈特的有限责任政策，结果反而导致了坦克订单的减少。20
A curious aspect of Liddell Hart's thinking about a British commitment to France was his belief that the French were bent on repeating an all-out initial offensive like that of 1914, and that if the British Expeditionary Force arrived in time it would be fatally drawn in. This was a strange interpretation of French strategic thinking in the light of the profound impact of First World War losses and devastation; the construction of the costly Maginot line; reliance on a short-service conscript army; and the lack of powerful offensive armored forces. Liddell Hart's intelligence about current French military doctrine was evidently defective and unreliable, but it must be noted that he held a similar delusion that the British general staff was wedded to an offensive doctrine when he was well placed to check on the facts. The government's adoption of Liddell Hart's limited liability policy in 1937 actually resulted in a reduction in the orders for tanks.20
20 世纪 30 年代，法国与利德尔·哈特最接近的人物是夏尔·戴高乐。戴高乐曾在 20 世纪 20 年代担任贝当的幕僚，并于 1931 年至 1937 年担任国防最高委员会秘书处成员。与这位英国记者对当时英国军事问题的论战一样，戴高乐为建立一支自主的、专业的、机械化的部队（他的“职业军”）而发起的运动在政治上也极具争议性。 1932年，戴高乐在其著作《剑线》（ Le fil de l'épée ）中首次公开阐述了他对军队改革的愿景。一年后，他在《政治与议会评论》（ Revue politique et parlementaire ）上发表了题为《走向职业军队》（Vers l'armée de métier）的文章，该文章于1934年扩展成同名著作。这些著作详细阐述了戴高乐的担忧：对“经济萧条时期”的担忧过于集中，以至于那些肩负法国国防政治责任的人忽视了对军队在质量、理论以及数量上的不足进行彻底分析的必要性。他指出他认为法国的制度以及国家的凝聚力和活力正在衰落，并要求对军队进行根本性改革。
France's closest equivalent to Liddell Hart in the 1930s was Charles de Gaulle, who had served on Pétain's staff in the 1920s and belonged to the Secretariat of the Superior Council of National Defense from 1931 to 1937. As with the British journalist's polemics on current British military issues, de Gaulle's campaign for an autonomous, professionally manned, mechanized corps (his armée de métier) was politically contentious. He first publicized his vision for the transformation of the army in his book Le fil de l'épée in 1932. A year later this was followed by an article in the Revue politique et parlementaire, “Vers l'armée de métier” (Toward the professional army), itself extended into a book of the same title in 1934. These works elaborated de Gaulle's anxiety that concern over the “lean years” had become so consuming as to obscure from those politically responsible for French defense the need for a thorough analysis of the army's qualitative and doctrinal, as well as merely numerical, inadequacies. He pointed to what he regarded as the decay of French institutions and of the country's cohesion and vitality, and demanded fundamental reforms of the army.
他的第一项建议与魏刚的计划颇为相似，即大规模扩充机动汽车部队，并建立常设的和平时期组织架构，将其训练成一支同质化的突击部队。第二项建议是组建一支完全职业化的兵种，来装备这支机械化和摩托化部队。戴高乐力主组建六个机械化步兵师、一个轻型侦察师，以及由突击装甲旅、重炮旅和空中观察群组成的预备队。这支部队将全部采用履带式车辆，需要十万名专业职业军人。这一提议如同投入池塘的石子，在通常平静的总参谋部内部激起了轩然大波。
His first recommendation, resembling Weygand's scheme in progress, was for massive expansion of mobile automotive forces with their permanent peacetime organization and training as a homogenous shock formation. The second was the constitution of an entirely professional corps to man this mechanized and motorized force. De Gaulle urged that there be six mechanized infantry divisions, a lighter reconnaissance division, and reserves comprising an assault armor brigade, a heavy artillery brigade, and an air observation group. The force would have entirely tracked vehicles and would require 100,000 specialist career soldiers. Like a stone cast into a mill pond this proposal sent shock waves rippling through the usually placid backwaters of the general staff.
后者认为职业技能与机械化相结合是不自然的、不必要的，也是行不通的。为了阻止对这种被视为不光彩的结合进行进一步讨论，陆军参谋长路易·科尔松将军采取行动，阻止该计划在军中传播。1934年12月，他拒绝在官方刊物《法国军事评论》上发表戴高乐关于如何建立职业军队的文章。科尔松认为，这篇文章可能会“在军官心中制造职业军队与国民军队之间的冲突”，而国防部“明确拒绝任何此类区分”。<sup> 21 </sup> 戴高乐对此感到犹豫不决，于是在当月转而寻求保罗·雷诺的帮助。雷诺是一位独立的右翼议员，也是一位前部长，他以主张加强法国对德防御而闻名。 1935 年 1 月，雷诺上校得知德国第一支装甲师成立的消息后，被招募为戴高乐改革计划的政治宣传员。
The latter judged the métier-mechanization marriage to be unnatural, unnecessary, and unworkable. To preclude further discussion of what was perceived as a disreputable liaison, General Louis Colson, chief of army staff, acted to block dissemination of the scheme in army circles. In December 1934 he refused to publish in the official Revue militaire française an article by de Gaulle on the means of creating a professional army. Colson reasoned that such a piece might risk “setting a professional army in conflict with the national army in officers' minds” when the ministry “unequivocally rejected any such separate distinction.”21 Balked, de Gaulle turned that month to Paul Reynaud, an independent right-wing parliamentarian and former minister, who was a reputed exponent of strengthening French defenses against Germany. After the colonel learned in January 1935 of the formation of Germany's first Panzer divisions, Reynaud was recruited as political propagandist for de Gaulle's reform project.
1935年3月15日，该方案首次在全国性平台上被提出。当时，众议院正在辩论是否应在1928年的征兵法中实施紧急条款，以恢复两年义务兵役制，应对“经济萧条时期”的人力短缺问题。雷诺辩称，总参谋部只追求“尽可能多的编制相同的部队”。他断言，“正如海军和空军一样，我们的陆军摩托化部队也需要专业化。”<sup> 22</sup>第一个指控带有偏见且不准确；它忽略了魏刚和加麦兰建立的专业摩托化步兵、机械化骑兵和要塞师。雷诺仅得到持不同政见的社会党人菲利普·塞尔和独立人士让·勒库尔·格朗梅松的支持，未能撼动执政多数派的立场。因此，他私下提交了一份议会修正案，重申了他的指控，该修正案还建议将机动部队集中到七个师中。修正案重申，“技术发展要求我军专业化……因此，我军机械化部分需要技术精湛、因而也是专业的劳动力。”<sup> 23</sup>
On March 15, 1935, the scheme was advocated for the first time on a national platform, when the Chamber of Deputies debated the application of emergency articles in the 1928 military recruitment law, in order to restore two-year conscription to combat the manpower shortfall of the “lean years.” Reynaud contended that the general staff sought “only the greatest possible number of identically organized units.” He asserted the “need, as in the navy and airforce, for specialization in the motorized portion of our land forces.”22 The first accusation was tendentiously inaccurate; it disregarded the establishment by Weygand and Gamelin of specialized motorized infantry, mechanized cavalry, and fortress divisions. Supported only by a dissident Socialist, Philippe Serre, and the independent Jean Le Cour Grandmaison, Reynaud failed to shake the governing majority. He therefore reiterated his charges in a privately tabled parliamentary amendment that also recommended concentration of mobile elements into only seven divisions. It restated that “technological development demands specialization of our military…and hence demands technical, consequently professional, manpower for the mechanical part of our forces.”23
戴高乐的著作中并未提及埃蒂安、杜芒克和韦尔普里等早期和当代机动作战的先驱者。然而，他在法国军方领导人中引发的反感并非不可避免。魏刚和加梅林都公开表示对机动作战感兴趣。事实上，如果戴高乐和雷诺能够直截了当地发出紧急重整军备的号召，强调装甲和摩托化装备的重要性，或许会得到广泛的支持。然而，他们却挑衅性地声称机械化和专业化是军事现代化的必然前提。戴高乐对于如何建立新的军事结构含糊其辞，这激起了高级军官的鄙夷。加梅林无法忽视这样一个事实：一支七个师的部队根本无法应对法国本土、北非和黎凡特地区（陆军负责的地区）复杂的防御需求。最关键的是，戴高乐的浪漫主义色彩重新燃起了人们对所谓“侵略性”装甲部队的政治不信任。“归根结底，”加梅林后来强调，“正是大型装甲部队问题与职业军队问题之间的联系，在议会和部分军方人士看来，不利于坦克师的组建。”<sup> 24</sup>
De Gaulle's writings omitted acknowledgment to earlier and contemporary serving pioneers of mobility like Estienne, Doumenc, and Velpry. Nevertheless the antipathy that he evoked within France's military leaders was far from inevitable. Weygand and Gamelin had a declared interest in mobile warfare. Indeed there might have been widespread support if de Gaulle and Reynaud had trumpeted a straightforward clarion call for urgent rearmament centered on the primacy of armored and motorized equipment. Instead they provocatively claimed that mechanization and professionalization were synonymous prerequisites for military modernization. De Gaulle's vagueness over the means of creating his new military structures aroused the scorn of senior officers. Gamelin could not ignore the fact that a seven-division force overlooked the complex defense requirements of the territorial expanses of metropolitan France, North Africa, and the Levant for which the army was responsible. Most decisively, de Gaulle's colorful romanticism rekindled political distrust of supposedly “aggressive” armored forces. “At bottom,” Gamelin subsequently stressed, “it was the conjunction made between the issue of large armored units and the issue of the professional army that was detrimental in parliament and within a section of military opinion to the creation of tank divisions.”24
戴高乐干预的悖论在于，它产生了与预期截然相反的效果。在1935年至1937年的关键时期，他通过政治和理论手段限制了机动性的发展，阻碍了军队的重新装备。关于机动进攻的预言无疑值得比实际得到的更多关注，因为它触及了法国防线可能早期崩溃的关键问题。马奇诺本人就意识到这是一个极其严重的危险，魏刚的高级助手安德烈·拉法格上校甚至在1934年也重申了这一点。雷诺在1937年初也强调：“我们的工业财富主要集中在边境地区……唉，我们的首都既不在布尔日，也不在克莱蒙费朗。”<sup> 25</sup>一次快速突破就可能瞬间抵消所有为持久的联盟战争所做的精心准备，而这场战争似乎是唯一能够战胜德国的希望。
The paradox of de Gaulle's intervention was that it produced an effect precisely opposite to that intended. By activating political and doctrinal brakes on developments in mobility in the crucial years 1935 to 1937 he hindered the army's reequipment. Prophecies of mobile offensives undeniably merited closer attention than they received, since they addressed the key issue of an early rupture of the French defenses. That this was a peril of exceptional gravity had been perceived by Maginot himself and reiterated as late as 1934 by Colonel André Laffargue, a senior aide to Weygand. Reynaud too underlined in early 1937, “Our industrial riches are concentrated chiefly along our frontiers and…alas our capital is neither at Bourges nor at Clermont-Ferrand.”25 A rapid breakthrough could negate, at a stroke, every painstaking preparation for the protracted coalition conflict that alone seemed to promise success against Germany.
然而，戴高乐和雷诺对军队训练能力、指挥意图以及政治上神圣不可侵犯的“全民武装”概念的肆意攻击，引发了激烈的争论，使得这些警告无人理会。于是，像骑兵督察罗伯特·阿尔特迈尔这样对大规模机械化持敌对态度或充其量漠不关心的将领们，便轻易地获得了攻击的武器。
However, these warnings were rendered inaudible by the shrill controversy generated by de Gaulle's and Reynaud's indiscriminate attack on the competence of the army's training, the intentions of the command, and the politically sacrosanct nation-in-arms. Thus rhetorical weapons were gratuitously proffered to generals, like the cavalry inspector Robert Altmayer, who were either hostile or at best apathetic about large-scale mechanization.
军队面临的核心困境在于人员和物资短缺。从德贝内和科尔森等著名怀疑论者到弗拉维尼等拥护者，高级军官们都以军事理由拒绝了建立全职业化部队的呼吁。他们认为，职业化应该仅限于那些需要特殊技能的人员，例如机械师和无线电操作员。陆军部长达拉第的军事参谋部解释说：“军队在技术和社会方面都反映了一个国家；全国拥有超过一百万辆汽车，招募和培训驾驶员应该不难……即使是最先进的坦克，难道也只有指挥官和驾驶员需要是职业军人吗？”此外，参谋部的研究还表明，如果不投入巨额额外资金来改善薪酬和条件，法国的“征兵上限”太低，除了马奇诺防线和步兵骨干所需的10.6万名职业军人之外，根本无法建立一支全职业化部队。 1936年，70%的服役期满的专业人员没有续签合同；因此，大部分招募工作仅仅是为了维持而非扩充现有干部队伍。然而，直到1937年，戴高乐和雷诺仍然对这些薪酬和招募难题轻描淡写，建议从失业人员中招募兵员，并将参谋部大量精力投入到一场关于组织结构和统计数据的备忘录之争中。
Central to the army's difficulties were shortages of men and material. Senior officers, from renowned skeptics like Debeney and Colson to enthusiasts like Flavigny, rejected the call for an all-professional corps on military grounds. They argued that professionalization should be limited to those needing special skills, such as mechanics and wireless operators. The military staff of War Minister Daladier explained, “The army reflects the nation technically as well as socially; with over one million automobiles in the country it should not be…difficult to recruit and train drivers…. Surely in even the most modern tank only the commander and driver need be career soldiers?”26 Staff studies revealed, furthermore, that without implausibly heavy extra expenditure to improve pay and conditions, France had a “recruitment ceiling” too low to make an all-professional force feasible in addition to the 106,000 career soldiers needed for the Maginot line and infantry cadres. In 1936 70 percent of time-served professionals were not re-enlisting; consequently, the bulk of recruitment served only to maintain, not expand, the existing cadres. Yet down to 1937 de Gaulle and Reynaud persistently made light of these pay and recruitment difficulties, suggesting obtaining their corps from the ranks of the unemployed and diverting a disproportionate amount of general-staff energy into a running battle of memoranda over structures and statistics.
重型坦克引发的政治猜疑同样不利于机械化进程。人们普遍认为重型坦克是“侵略性”武器，与民主法国的防御诉求格格不入，这种看法超越了党派界限。从1935年的保守派陆军部长让·法布里到次年的激进派达拉第，整个政治光谱都向加梅兰施压，要求其放弃“夏尔B”坦克计划。此外，重型坦克一旦与职业军人联系在一起，便带有政变的意味。<sup>27</sup>
Equally detrimental to mechanization was the political suspicion aroused by heavy tanks. Perceptions of them as “aggressive” weapons, inappropriate to the defensive pretensions of democratic France, transcended normal party boundaries. Across the political spectrum, from the conservative war minister Jean Fabry in 1935 to the Radical Daladier the following year, pressure was applied to Gamelin to abandon the Char B program. Heavy tanks, moreover, when associated with career soldiers, had coup d'état connotations.27
尽管加梅林试图按照“大无畏”传统维护一支“非政治化军队”，但许多军官的政治立场无疑十分暧昧。在人民阵线动荡时期，法国领导人不可避免地要为应对社会动荡制定应急预案，总参谋部也因此与忧心忡忡的巴黎警察局长罗杰·朗格隆展开了讨论。1935年巴士底日，在史无前例的左翼“人民集会”期间，总参谋部与朗格隆进行了磋商。当天早些时候，负责香榭丽舍大街阅兵式的战争部长法布里遗憾地回忆道：“巴黎早上还充满爱国情怀，到了下午就唱起了《国际歌》。”1936年5月，左翼赢得选举后，工人占领工厂，警察局长和即将卸任的总理阿尔贝·萨罗再次就此咨询了科尔松将军的意见。戴高乐本人在1935年就认为，法国滑向全面危机的进程“正逐渐将公共秩序问题推到首要位置”。他不禁思考：“在人民阵线和右翼联盟日益动荡的局势下，如何才能防止无政府状态，甚至是内战……？”<sup> 28</sup>
Certainly the political stance of many officers was ambiguous, despite Gamelin's attempts to preserve an “apolitical army” in the grande muette tradition. Unavoidably, during the ferment of the Popular Front era, French leaders were troubled by contingency planning for civil unrest and the general staff was drawn into discussion with an “apprehensive” Roger Langeron, Paris prefect of police, during the unprecedented leftist Rassemblement Populaire on Bastille Day in 1935. Fabry, responsible as war minister for the Champs Elysées military pageant earlier that day, reflected ruefully that “Paris, patriotic in the morning, was singing the Internationale by the afternoon.” In May 1936, when workers' factory occupations followed the Left's election victory, there was further consultation of General Colson by the prefect and Albert Sarraut, the outgoing prime minister. De Gaulle himself thought in 1935 that France's slide into generalized crisis was “little by little raising the issue of public order to the forefront of concerns.” He wondered “how, in the growing tumult of the Popular Front and right-wing Leagues, to prevent anarchy, even civil war…?”28
但正值德国推行两年义务兵役制和“戈林计划”以建立战时经济之际，加梅林力求通过一项为期四年的重整军备计划，避免因军事现代化引发的政治争议。这一想法得到了当时主要政治团体的认同。社会党内政部长罗杰·萨朗格罗强调，尽管法国不能对德国的重新军事化袖手旁观，但“重建平衡的关键不在于让年轻的法国人更长时间远离家庭，而在于大力推进法国军队的机械化”。激进派的达拉第于1937年2月在议会中确认，他“无法同意那些要求建立职业军队或主张组建装甲师等专业部队的人”，因为“保持军队各组成部分之间的适当平衡和比例至关重要”。<sup> 29</sup>
But with Germany at that moment introducing two-year conscription and the “Goering plan” for a war economy, Gamelin sought the adoption of a four-year rearmament program unimpeded by political controversy over military modernization. The command's conviction was shared by the dominant political groups. Roger Salengro, the Socialist interior minister, stressed that although France could not remain passive in the face of Germany's remilitarization, an equilibrium “would be reestablished not by keeping young Frenchmen away from their families even longer, but through a prodigious effort to motorize the French army.” Daladier, for the Radicals, confirmed in the Chamber in February 1937 that he “was unable to agree with those…who demanded a professional army or those who advocated a specialist corps of armored divisions” because it was “essential to preserve a proper balance and proportion between the various component parts of the army.”29
1937年夏天，戴高乐-雷诺的军事计划最终定稿于雷诺的著作《法国军事问题》中。当时官方的反应反映了他们对机动性军事的拥护。杜舍纳将军在《巴黎回声报》的一篇评论中高调宣称“防御型军队注定失败”，并敦促“断然摒弃中国长城式的简单体系”；加梅林私下告知雷诺，“我们长期以来一直在努力组建比您提议的还要多的摩托化师、轻机械化师和装甲师。”<sup> 30</sup>
The summer of 1937 witnessed the final incarnation of the de Gaulle-Reynaud projects in the latter's book Le problème militaire français. Reaction reflected officialdom's espousal of mobility by this time. General Duchêne, in a review in L'echo de Paris, trumpeted that “a defensive army is an army for defeat” and urged the “unequivocal rejection of the simplistic system of a Great Wall of China”; Gamelin confidentially informed Reynaud that “for a long time now we have been laboring to establish a larger number than even you propose of motorized, light mechanized, and armored divisions.”30
第四
IV
到了20世纪30年代中期，由于政治上对战时军队优先事项的犹豫不决，加上总参谋部的保守主义，英国错失了打造一支精锐装甲部队的机会，而这支部队正是富勒等理论家和霍巴特等实战军官所倡导的反击作战力量。到1936年底，现存的绝大多数坦克都是轻型坦克，仅适用于殖民地战争。陆军部制定了一份轻骑兵坦克、中型坦克和重型步兵突击坦克的“采购清单”，但在1937年和1938年，几乎没有进行任何新型号坦克的生产。战争爆发时，英国仅有的一个机动师也只不过是由一些没有明确职责的部队拼凑而成。1940年5月，驻法英军仅包含皇家坦克团的两个营和师属轻骑兵团。第一装甲师当时仍在索尔兹伯里平原集结，零零散散地抵达法国，为时已晚，未能参与导致敦刻尔克撤退的一系列事件。31
By the mid-1930S political indecision about the army's priorities in event of war, aided and abetted by the general staff's conservatism, caused Britain to forfeit the opportunity to produce an elite armored force for the counterattack role that theorists like Fuller and practical soldiers like Hobart had advocated. By the end of 1936 the great majority of existing tanks were light models suitable only for colonial warfare. The War Office prepared a “shopping list” of light cavalry tanks, medium models, and heavy infantry assault tanks, but throughout 1937 and 1938 little was done to produce new types. The single Mobile Division that existed on the outbreak of war was little more than a conglomeration of units without a clear role. In May 1940 the British Expeditionary Force in France contained only two battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment and the divisional light cavalry regiments. The 1st Armoured Division was still assembling on Salisbury Plain and arrived piecemeal in France too late to participate in the events that led to Dunkirk.31
回想起来，颇具讽刺意味的是，参谋长们，尤其是总参谋部，虽然都正确地认为英国在西欧仍然拥有至关重要的利益，而有限责任政策无法充分保障这些利益，但他们在机械化问题上却持保守态度，并且对于远征军抵达法国后的行动含糊其辞。相比之下，利德尔·哈特在机械化的必要性及其可能带来的机动作战方面持有进步的观点，但他倾向于否认需要对欧洲大陆做出承诺，而这种承诺本可以为增加陆军开支、打造一支装备精良、能够参与对抗欧洲一流强国的野战部队提供正当理由。32
In retrospect there is an element of irony in the fact that the chiefs of staff, and even more the general staff, were sound in their assumptions that Britain still had vital interests in western Europe that could not be adequately ensured by a policy of limited liability but were conservative as regards mechanization and vague about what the expeditionary force would do after arriving in France. Liddell Hart, in contrast, had progressive ideas on the need for mechanization and the kind of mobile operations to which it could lead, but tended to deny the need for a Continental commitment that could have justified higher expenditure in the Army to create a thoroughly equipped Field Force capable of taking part in operations against a first-class European power.32
从今天的视角来看，历史学家更容易理解利德尔·哈特和戴高乐等批评者的局限性，也更容易对英法两国的高级指挥官抱有同情。具有讽刺意味的是，直到1937年中期，戴高乐被派往加梅林一手创建的洛林重型装甲实验小组时，他才意识到发展机动部队和作战理论所固有的诸多实际问题。他在梅斯指挥第507坦克团期间的信件表明，他当时对正规军面临的技术缺陷、装备不兼容和基本物资短缺等问题感到多么震惊。这些看似平凡却至关重要的障碍，正是他和雷诺在他们那场充满政治色彩和倾向性的“专业部队”运动中所轻描淡写或忽略的。
From today's perspective it is easier for historians to appreciate the limitations of critics such as Liddell Hart and de Gaulle and to have some sympathy for the British and French high commands. Ironically it was only when de Gaulle was posted to one of Gamelin's creations, the heavy armored experimental group in Lorraine in mid-1937, that he realized the many practical problems inherent in developing mobile forces and doctrine. Letters from the period he commanded the 507th Tank Regiment at Metz betray how great a revelation to him were the technical inadequacies, incompatibilities of equipment, and basic shortages confronting orthodox soldiers. These mundane but major obstacles were what he and Reynaud had underplayed or ignored in their politicized and tendentious armée de métier campaign.
对加梅林而言，1935年至1938年这段时期最大的特点是各项装备更新计划的完成进度不断延误。问题的根源在于法国军火制造商的生产能力不足；1936年后的扩张首先受到人民阵线领导下的工业动荡和改革的干扰，随后又因关键军工、工程和钢铁行业熟练劳动力短缺而受到制约。其结果是，1937年和1938年法国军队的装备更新未能达到预期水平。装甲车辆的短缺尤为严重，迫使1937年的机械化演习取消，并将1936年4月批准组建的第二轻型机械化师的部署推迟到1938年秋季。
For Gamelin the period from 1935 to 1938 was characterized by continual delays in the completion schedules of a succession of reequipment programs. At root the problems lay in an insufficiency of appropriate productive capacity among France's munitions manufacturers; expansion after 1936 was first disrupted by industrial unrest and reform under the Popular Front and later cramped by discoveries of shortages of skilled labor in the essential armaments, engineering, and steel trades. The result was to deprive the army throughout 1937 and 1938 of its anticipated levels of reequipment. Shortages were severe enough in armored vehicles to compel cancellation of the mechanized maneuvers of 1937 and to delay the availability of the second light mechanized division, approved in April 1936, until autumn 1938.
在这种情况下，戴高乐方案的不可接受性意味着，它在1937年1月和2月通过雷诺再次出现，给加梅兰、杜芒克、弗拉维尼和韦尔普里等人带来了额外的政治负担，这些人致力于低调但有效地发展和扩充装甲部队。戴高乐方案的呈现方式使其很容易被指责为军事上不切实际、战略上危险，以及政治上具有近乎荒谬的挑衅性。至关重要的是，1935年将坦克和职业军人联系起来，而这种联系在军事上毫无意义。戴高乐不仅在宣传中基于事实上的疑点（例如关于新兵短缺的问题），而且雷诺通过煽动持怀疑态度的议员，实际上恶化了文职军方机构内部正统机械化倡导者的处境。
In these circumstances the unacceptability of de Gaulle's scheme meant that its reemergence in January and February 1937, through Reynaud, imposed additional political burdens on those like Gamelin, Doumenc, Flavigny, and Velpry who were striving for discreet but nonetheless effective development and expansion of armored forces. The manner in which the Gaullist case was presented left it open to denunciation as militarily impracticable, strategically dangerous, and politically provocative to the point of perversity. Of cardinal importance was the militarily irrelevant conjunction given in 1935 to tanks and professional soldiery. Here de Gaulle was not merely on factually dubious ground in his own propagandizing (as over the doubtful availability of recruits), but Reynaud, by agitating suspicious parliamentarians, materially worsened conditions for orthodox pro-mechanization advocates at work inside the civil-military establishment.
戴高乐的方案存在一个最终的致命缺陷，那就是他似乎将机械化视为1914-1918年间那种全面工业化战争的替代方案。他认为质量将取代数量。富勒在其《关于FSR III的讲座》中也曾指出，随着机械化扩大了真正作战部队和占领部队之间的差距，军队规模将会缩小。<sup> 33</sup>一支由六七个师组成的专业机动部队，意味着剩余的法国国民部队将被降级为半民兵，只能执行二线或要塞任务。直到1937年，雷诺才通过重塑其理念，强调一支规模庞大、精锐机动部队以及常规预备役部队，从而消除了这一令人无法接受的推论。加梅林的态度也同样模棱两可，尽管考虑到未来战争的不确定性，这或许可以理解。他坚持认为法国应该发展一支比装甲师更强大的部队，但同时也指出，反坦克武器的改进将大大限制装甲部队在战场上的作用。尽管加梅林的立场模棱两可，但法军仍在为进攻和防御作战做准备。因此，总参谋部有理由抗议“将军队置于一成不变的被动防御状态”的指责。<sup> 34</sup>
De Gaulle's prescriptions harbored a final critical flaw through their apparent casting of mechanization as an alternative to total industrialized war of the 1914–1918 kind. Quality was envisaged as superseding quantity. Fuller too had contended, in his Lectures on F.S.R. III, that armies would grow smaller as mechanization widened the gulf between the truly fighting forces and those that do the occupying.33 With a professional mobile group of six or seven divisions it was implicit that the remaining French national forces would be relegated to semi-militias fit only for second-line or fortress duties. Not until 1937 did Reynaud dispose of this unacceptable corollary through a remolding of his ideas to stress a large, elite, mobile force with the conventional reserve army. Gamelin's attitude was also ambiguous, although this was perhaps understandable in view of the uncertain nature of future warfare. He insisted that France develop a unit more powerful than a Panzer division, but also suggested that improvements in antitank weapons would considerably restrict the role of armor on the battlefield. Despite Gamelin's equivocal stance, the French army was preparing for both offensive and defensive operations. Thus the general staff was justified in protesting against the charge that it had “consigned the army to an attitude of unvaryingly passive defense.”34
然而，尽管戴高乐曾在法国军事学院和国防高级委员会探讨过经济战和国家动员，但他却未能提出任何适用于国家全部武装力量的“新模式”结构。加梅林的成就在于，他既实现了法国军队的现代化，又兼顾了整体防御规划的复杂性以及未来冲突可能出现的特征，而这些在戴高乐的片面分析中却被严重忽视。加梅林的指挥体系显然比戴高乐“更加全面和理性”，戴高乐的《迈向机械化军团……》一书中从未提及他的机械化军团可能被阻挡的可能性，而是热情地设想“永远胜利的进攻”。<sup> 35</sup>
Nevertheless, de Gaulle neglected to volunteer any form of “new model” structure for the full panoply of the nation's armed strength, despite his reflections at the Ecole de Guerre and Superior Council of National Defense on economic warfare and national mobilization. Gamelin's achievement lay in modernizing the French army while attending to those complexities of overall defense planning and the probable characteristics of future conflict so unsatisfactorily ignored in de Gaulle's partial analysis. The command, decisively, was “more comprehensive and rational” than de Gaulle, whose “Vers l'armée de métier…never once deals with the possibility that his mechanized corps might be halted,” enthusiastically envisaging “only ever-victorious offensives.”35
战争爆发时，尽管存在职业选择之争和工业发展滞后等问题，法国机动部队仍在迅速组建。当时已有六个装甲师，加上戴高乐亲自指挥的第4预备胸甲师（于1940年5月10日组建为第七个装甲师），以及七个摩托化步兵师和英国摩托化远征军。而德军则派出一支以十个装甲师为先锋的、主要由非摩托化步兵组成的部队。或许是受到“至少三比一的进攻优势通常是确保胜利的必要条件”这一观念的影响，这种兵力平衡在对1940年战役的解读中占据了越来越重要的地位，在这些解读中，盟军“精锐”部队的部署、协调和指挥问题显得至关重要。<sup> 36</sup>
By the outbreak of war, despite the digressions of the métier controversy and the shortcomings of industry, French mobile units were forming rapidly. There were six armored divisions, plus de Gaulle's own 4th Division Cuirassée de Réserve setting up to make a seventh, on May 10, 1940—together with seven motorized infantry divisions and the motorized British Expeditionary Force. Against them Germany moved a largely unmotorized infantry army spearheaded by just ten Panzer divisions. Perhaps influenced by the notion that at least a three-to-one superiority in attack is usually necessary to ensure success, this equilibrium has underlain more and more interpretations of the 1940 campaign in which questions of the location, coordination, and command of these “quality” Allied forces assume paramountcy.36
但是，即便现有的机动部队可能遏制了德国的胜利企图，对于盟军最终的胜利而言，英国和法国在1939年至1940年间进行的纵深武装同样至关重要。鉴于他们敏锐地意识到面对德国迅速的重新武装，短期内准备不足，以及与德国、意大利和日本爆发全球冲突的现实前景，英国和法国政府依靠皇家空军、马奇诺防线和庞大的法国陆军进行威慑，同时大规模地动员人力和物力资源以应对长期战争，这是可以理解的。
But if the available mobile formations might have seen the German bid for victory checked, no less essential for ultimate Allied triumph was the arming in depth that Britain and France were preparing in 1939–1940. Given their acute consciousness of short-term unpreparedness in face of rapid German rearmament—and the real prospect of a global conflict against Germany, Italy, and Japan—it was understandable that the British and French governments should rely on deterrence through the Royal Air Force, the Maginot line, and the large French army in being, while they mobilized manpower and material resources on a vast scale for the long haul.
V
V
本文挑战了一种颇具吸引力但却过于简化的论点，即英法两国军事机构缺乏想象力且执迷于防御，而富勒、利德尔·哈特和戴高乐这三位杰出的“局外人”提出的闪电战理念却被本国拒绝，却被德国欣然采纳。尽管英法两国在重整军备方面的做法确实值得商榷，但实际上，1939年英法两国最高指挥部确实担忧战争伊始便可能遭遇惨败，这完全可以理解。尽管盟军的战略计划存在缺陷，特别是对冒险进军低地国家的安排以及未能建立一支用于反击的中央装甲预备队，但集结的兵力本应足以遏制德军的初期攻势。如果不是德军在1940年初的几周内大幅改变了进攻计划，盟军很可能已经成功遏制了德军的进攻。37
This essay challenges the attractive but greatly oversimplified thesis that contrasts the unimaginative and obsessively defense-oriented British and French military establishments with the brilliant “outsiders” Fuller, Liddell Hart, and de Gaulle, whose concepts of blitzkrieg were rejected by their own countries but eagerly adopted by Germany. Though certainly open to criticisms for their handling of rearmament, the British and French high commands in reality were understandably preoccupied in 1939 by the possibility of a shock defeat at the very outset of the war. Despite flaws in the Allies' strategic plans, notably the provision for a risky advance into the Low Countries and the failure to create a central armored reserve for the counterattack role, the forces assembled should have sufficed to check the initial German offensive, it is possible, even probable, that they would have done so had not the German plan of attack been drastically altered in the early weeks of 1940.37
至于机械化部队和装甲战的倡导者，他们的理念遭到拒绝的原因远比英法军方保守的保守思想复杂得多。装甲战拥护者所倡导的军队类型和战略理念在政治上难以被接受，而在军事上，他们要么忽视了英法总参谋部面临的诸多财政、物资和人力问题，要么对此一无所知。具有讽刺意味的是，正如我们所见，利德尔·哈特和戴高乐出于好意的论战实际上阻碍了各自军队的现代化进程。
As regards the proponents of mechanized forces and armored warfare, the rejection of their ideas was due to more complex reasons than the reactionary mentality of the British and French military establishments. The type of armies and the strategic concepts the champions of armor advocated were politically unacceptable, while in military terms they did not take account, or were simply ignorant of, many of the financial, material, and manpower problems confronting the British and French general staffs. Ironically, as we have seen, the well-intentioned polemics of Liddell Hart and de Gaulle actually hindered the modernization of their respective armies.
首先，不应假定批评家们对未来战争的设想完全得到了二战初期战役的证实。他们厌恶1914年至1918年间堑壕战的僵局，力图通过组建精锐的小型机械化部队来恢复机动性、最大限度地减少伤亡并迅速取得胜利。即使是富勒，尽管他预见到双方全面机械化后可能会陷入僵局，但也认为五百辆坦克就足以构成一支非常庞大的部队。有了如此规模的坦克部队，仍然可以迂回包抄敌军侧翼，从后方发起攻击：将领的指挥能力将再次发挥决定性作用，战斗将成为“艺术作品，而不仅仅是血腥的战场”。<sup> 38</sup>例如，即使在1939年至1941年的战役中，大规模的非机械化部队也发挥了比装甲理论家们预想的更为重要的作用。
Above all, it should not be assumed that the critics' vision of future warfare was wholly borne out by the early campaigns of the Second World War. In revulsion against the static trench deadlock of 1914–1918, they sought to restore mobility, minimize casualties, and secure a speedy victory by means of small, elite, professional mechanized armies. Even Fuller, who envisaged the likelihood of stalemate when both sides were thoroughly mechanized, suggested that five hundred tanks would constitute a very large force. With tank forces on this scale it would still be possible to turn the enemy's flank and attack him in the rear: generalship would again be decisive and battles would be “works of art and not merely daubs of blood.”38 Even in the campaigns of 1939–1941, for example, large nonmechanized forces played a more important part than the armored theorists had anticipated.
这并非否定理论家作为“搅局者”或催化剂所能发挥的宝贵作用。事实上，在更广泛的研究中，我们可以论证，像富勒、利德尔·哈特和戴高乐这样的“异端”人物，其教育影响对公众和军队都极为有益。本文提出的总体结论是，在实践中，“局外人”很少能对军事改革施加直接影响，因为他们缺乏对改革困难和可行方案的全面了解。例如，利德尔·哈特最终不得不承认，“有限责任”对于英国对抗法国而言并非现实的策略。另一方面，负责军事事务的当局往往非常清楚这些问题，并接受只有零散的或妥协性的措施才是可行的。例如，英国装甲部队的薄弱以及战争爆发时缺乏明确的作战理论。最重要的是，两次世界大战之间的时期证实了克劳塞维茨的观点，即政治态度、优先事项和限制对武装力量和战略理论的发展起着主导作用。
This is not to dispute the valuable role that theorists can play as “gadflies” or catalysts. Indeed, in a study with wider scope, it could be argued that iconoclasts such as Fuller, Liddell Hart, and de Gaulle were immensely beneficial in their educative influence on the general public as well as on the armed forces. The general conclusions suggested by this essay are that in practice “outsiders” can seldom exert a direct influence on military reform because they lack full knowledge of the difficulties and of the options available. Liddell Hart, for example, eventually had to accept that “limited liability” was not a realistic strategy for Britain vis-à-vis France. On the other hand, the responsible military authorities tend to be all too well aware of the problems and to accept that only piecemeal or compromise measures are feasible. An example would be the weakness of Britain's armored forces and their lack of a clear doctrine at the outbreak of war. Most important of all, the interwar period bears out the Clausewitzian perception that political attitudes, priorities, and constraints exert a dominating influence on the development of armed forces and strategic doctrines.
1 1919 年 WO 论文 A2277，战后军队组织委员会，伦敦公共档案馆（以下简称 PRO）。有关本文所用英国资料的更多详情，请参阅 Brian Bond 的《利德尔·哈特：其军事思想研究》（伦敦，1977 年）和 Brian Bond 的《两次世界大战之间的英国军事政策》（牛津，1980 年）。
1 W. O. Paper A2277 of 1919, Committee on the Organisation of the After War Army, Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO). For further details on the British sources used in this essay see Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (London, 1977) and Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980).
2 Cab 23/15，1919 年 8 月 15 日，英国国家档案馆。参见 Bond，《英国军事政策》，第 23-26 页，第 94-97 页。
2 Cab 23/15, 15 August 1919, PRO. See Bond, British Military Policy, 23–26, 94–97.
3参见中校。 Gemeau，“英国陆军的坦克：过去、现在、未来”，《步兵评论》，第 1 期。 63（1923 年 4 月），520–35； Emile Alléhaut，“英国的机动化和军事概念”， Revue d'infanterie，第 1 期。 81（1927 年 10 月至 11 月），418–631；法国驻伦敦武官 R. Voruz 上校的报告，第 1 号。 1930 年 12 月 124 日，助理武官 Cuny 少校于 1932 年 1 月 23 日在伦敦，纸箱 7N2798 和 7N2800，Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Vincennes（以下简称 SHAT）。
3 See Lieut.-Col. Gemeau, “Les tanks dans l'Armée Brittanique: Passé, présent, avenir,” Revue d'infanterie, no. 63 (April 1923), 520–35; Emile Alléhaut, “Motorisation et conceptions militaires britanniques,” Revue d'infanterie, no. 81 (October-November 1927), 418–631; report by Col. R. Voruz, French military attaché London, no. 124, 1930, and by Major Cuny, assistant military attaché, London, 23 January 1932, cartons 7N2798 and 7N2800, Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Vincennes (hereafter SHAT).
4 Bond，《英国军事政策》，117-33。对英国军官关于机械化的观点的最佳分析是 HR Winton 的《约翰·伯内特-斯图尔特爵士将军与英国军事改革，1927-1938》（斯坦福大学博士论文，1977 年）。
4 Bond, British Military Policy, 117–33. The best analysis of British officers' views on mechanization is H. R. Winton, “General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Military Reform, 1927–1938” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1977).
5 “1919 年计划”作为附录发表于 JFC Fuller 的《一个非常规士兵的回忆录》（伦敦，1936 年）。另见 Jay Luvaas 的《军队的教育》（伦敦，1964 年），第 335-375 页和 AJ Trythall 的《“骨头”富勒：知识分子将军》（伦敦，1977 年）。
5 “Plan 1919” is published as an appendix in J. F. C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (London, 1936). See also Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army (London, 1964), 335–75 and A. J. Trythall, ‘Boney’ Fuller: The Intellectual General (London, 1977).
6 Trythall，《'Boney' Fuller》，92-93页。Bond，《Liddell Hart》，27-30页和Bond，《英国军事政策》，137页。
6 Trythall, ‘Boney’ Fuller, 92–93. Bond, Liddell Hart, 27–30 and Bond, British Military Policy, 137.
7 Trythall，《 Boney Fuller》，99，146。
7 Trythall, ‘Boney’ Fuller, 99, 146.
8 BH Liddell Hart，《巴黎，或战争的未来》（纽约，1925年），第79-85页。关于Liddell Hart对20世纪20年代法国和德国军事理论的精辟评论，参见他的《现代军队的重塑》（波士顿，1927年），第250页和第276页。602
8 B. H. Liddell Hart, Paris, or the Future of War (New York, 1925), 79–85. For Liddell Hart's perceptive comments on French and German military doctrines in the 1920s, see his The Remaking of Modern Armies (Boston, 1927), 250, 276. 602
9 Jean-Baptiste Estienne，1931 年 4 月 9 日给 G. Murray Wilson 的序言，《Les chars d'assaut au Battle》，1916-1919，译。 A. Thomazi（巴黎，1931 年），14-15。另见埃斯蒂安的“Conférence faite le 15 février 1920 sur les chars d'assaut: Histoire technology, histoire tactique, vues d'avenir”（巴黎，1920年），重印于Bulletin trimestriel de l'Association des Amis de l'Ecole de Guerre 14（10月） 1961），22-30。比照。皮埃尔-安德烈·布尔热 (Pierre-André Bourget)，《Le général Esttenne: Penseur, ingénieur, sellat》（巴黎，1956 年）； Emile Alléhaut，《Etre prêts：Puissance aérienne，forces de terre》（巴黎，1935 年）；查尔斯·切德维尔（Charles Chedeville），“战斗人员练习曲”，《步兵评论》，第 1 期。 59（1921 年 12 月）、35–61、174–88、290–305、395–405、529–42、650–75； Joseph EA Doumenc，“Les Transport cars dans la guerre de mouvement”，《法国军事评论》，第 1 期。 6（1922 年 10 月至 11 月）、61-76、191-210 和同上，“Puissance et mobilité”， Revue militaire française，nos。 8、9（6 月至 7 月、1923 年 8 月）、342–65、44–45。
9 Jean-Baptiste Estienne, preface of 9 April 1931 to G. Murray Wilson, Les chars d'assaut au combat, 1916–1919, trans. A. Thomazi (Paris, 1931), 14–15. See also Estienne's “Conférence faite le 15 février 1920 sur les chars d'assaut: Histoire technique, histoire tactique, vues d'avenir” (Paris, 1920), reprinted in Bulletin trimestriel de l'Association des Amis de l'Ecole de Guerre 14 (October 1961), 22–30. Cf. Pierre-André Bourget, Le général Esttenne: Penseur, ingénieur, soldat (Paris, 1956); Emile Alléhaut, Etre prêts: Puissance aérienne, forces de terre (Paris, 1935); Charles Chedeville, “Etude sur l'emploi des chars de combat,” Revue d'infanterie, no. 59 (December 1921), 35–61, 174–88, 290–305, 395–405, 529–42, 650–75; Joseph E. A. Doumenc, “Les transports automobiles dans la guerre de mouvement,” Revue militaire française, no. 6 (October-November 1922), 61–76, 191–210 and ibid., “Puissance et mobilité,” Revue militaire française, nos. 8, 9 (June-July, August 1923), 342–65, 44–45.
10参见 Maurice Gamelin， Servir，第一卷。 2、《戏剧序言》（1930 年至1939 年）（巴黎，1946 年），10、120–30；亨利·菲利普·贝当，《凡尔登之战》（巴黎，1941 年），143–54；维克多·布尔雷，《法国军队的悲剧》（巴黎，1947 年），56-61； Marie-Eugène Debeney, Sur la sécurité militaire de la France (巴黎, 1930) 和同上, La guerre et les hommes: Réflexions d'après-guerre (巴黎, 1937), 44–106, 127–45, 163–71, 194–200, 263–308；理查德·格里菲斯，《贝当元帅》（伦敦，1970 年），3–75、97–103、127–39、156–57。比照。让·佩雷 (Jean Perré)，“Essai sur la défense contre les les chars”，《法国军事评论》，第 1 期。 12（1924 年 4 月至 5 月）、119–34、2.35–55； Pol-Maurice Velpry，“Emploi des chars dans la bataille”，《步兵评论》，第 1 期。 61（1922 年 7 月至 8 月），41–55,183–212。比照。还有 Velpry 在Revue militaire française中关于盔甲的文章，第 1 期。 9（1923 年 8 月），205–230；不。 12（1924 年 4 月），92–118；不。 17（1925 年 7 月），52–71；不。 18（1927 年 12 月），305–328。
10 See Maurice Gamelin, Servir, vol. 2, Le prologue du drame (1930-août 1939) (Paris, 1946), 10, 120–30; Henri-Philippe Pétain, La bataille de Verdun (Paris, 1941), 143–54; Victor Bourret, La tragédie de l'Armée Française (Paris, 1947), 56–61; Marie-Eugène Debeney, Sur la sécurité militaire de la France (Paris, 1930) and ibid., La guerre et les hommes: Réflexions d'après-guerre (Paris, 1937), 44–106, 127–45, 163–71, 194–200, 263–308; Richard Griffiths, Marshal Pétain (London, 1970), 3–75, 97–103, 127–39, 156–57. Cf. Jean Perré, “Essai sur la défense contre les chars,” Revue militaire française, no. 12 (April-May 1924), 119–34, 2.35–55; Pol-Maurice Velpry, “Emploi des chars dans la bataille,” Revue d'infanterie, no. 61 (July-August 1922), 41–55,183–212. Cf. also Velpry's articles on armor in Revue militaire française, no. 9 (August 1923), 205–230; no. 12 (April 1924), 92–118; no. 17 (July 1925), 52–71; no. 18 (December 1927), 305–328.
11 Bond，《英国军事政策》，第 141-158 页。Liddell Hart，《回忆录》（伦敦，1965 年），第 1 卷，第 86-136 页。Kenneth Macksey，《坦克先驱》（伦敦，1981 年），第 3 部分。
11 Bond, British Military Policy, 141–58. Liddell Hart, Memoirs (London, 1965), 1:86–136. Kenneth Macksey, The Tank Pioneers (London, 1981), pt. 3.
12 MJ Creswell，1933 年 12 月 28 日由英国武官 TGG Heywood 上校发来的分钟，巴黎，FO 371, 17652, C85/85/17, PRO。比照。 Jeffrey A. Gunsburg，《分裂与征服：法国最高统帅部与西方的失败》，1940 年（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特，1979 年），13-17；亨利·菲利普·贝当，《法国的安全与年月的安全》， Revue des deux mondes，per。 8，卷。 26，1935 年 3 月 1 日，第 i-xx 页；乔治·卡斯特兰 (Georges Castellan)，《帝国秘密武装》，1930-35 年，vu par le 2e Bureau Français (巴黎，1954 年)；爱德华·贝内特（Edward W. Bennett），《德国重整军备与西方，1932-1933》（普林斯顿，1979）； Maurice Vaïsse， Sécurté d'abord：La politique française en matiére de sarmement，1930年12月9日至1934年4月17日（巴黎，1918年）； Judith M. Hughes，《走向马其诺防线：20 年代法国军事准备的政治》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1971 年）； Paul-Emile Tournoux，《边境防御：高级戒律，政府》，1919-39（巴黎，1960 年）。
12 M. J. Creswell, minute on 28 December 1933 despatch from Col. T. G. G. Heywood, British military attache, Paris, FO 371, 17652, C85/85/17, PRO. Cf. Jeffrey A. Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940 (Westport, Conn., 1979), 13–17; Henri-Philippe Pétain, “La sécurité de la France au cours des années creuses,” Revue des deux mondes, per. 8, vol. 26, 1 March 1935, pp. i-xx; Georges Castellan, Le réarmement clandestin du Reich, 1930–35, vu par le 2e Bureau Français (Paris, 1954); Edward W. Bennett, German Rearmament and the West, 1932–1933 (Princeton, 1979); Maurice Vaïsse, Sécurté d'abord: La politique française en matiére de désarmement, 9 décembre 1930–17 avril 1934 (Paris, 1918); Judith M. Hughes, To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920s (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); Paul-Emile Tournoux, Défense des frontiéres: Haut commandement, gouvernement, 1919–39 (Paris, 1960).
13亨利·李约瑟，关于洛林演习的报告，1930 年 9 月 8 日，FO 371, 14902., W9268/38/17, PRO。比照。马克西姆·韦刚，回忆录，卷。 2、《幻影与现实》（巴黎，1957 年），313、340-60；塞维尔·甘默林，2：11-53；弗朗索瓦-安德烈·保利，《1919 年至1939 年法国军队》，卷。 3，《妥协的时代》，1924-30（文森，1974），155-69，188-92。
13 Henry Needham, report on Lorraine manoeuvres, 8 September 1930, FO 371, 14902., W9268/38/17, PRO. Cf. Maxime Weygand, Mémoires, vol. 2, Mirages et réalité (Paris, 1957), 313, 340–60; Gamelin, Servir, 2:11–53; François-André Paoli, L'Armée Française de 1919 à 1939, vol. 3, Le temps des compromis, 1924–30 (Vincennes, 1974), 155–69, 188–92.
14法国，Minisére de la Defense Nationale et de la Guerre-Etat Major de l'Armée（以下简称 MDNG-EMA）， Instruction provisoire sur I'emploi tactique des grandes unityés，1936 年 8 月 12 日（巴黎出版，1940 年），第 14 条。 204–105。比照。杰弗里·约翰斯通·克拉克 (Jeffrey Johnstone Clarke)，《法国共和国的军事技术：法国装甲部队的演变，1917-1940 年》（安娜堡，1970 年，缩微胶卷），第 109-118 页；弗朗索瓦-安德烈·保利，《1919 年至 1939 年法国军队》，卷。 4，《幻象之终》，1930-35（文森斯，1977），78-83。
14 France, Ministére de la Defense Nationale et de la Guerre—Etat Major de l'Armée (hereafter MDNG-EMA), Instruction provisoire sur I'emploi tactique des grandes unités, 12. August 1936 (published Paris, 1940), arts. 204–105. Cf. Jeffrey Johnstone Clarke Military Technology in Republican France: The Evolution of the French Armored Force, 1917–1940 (Ann Arbor, 1970, microfilm), pp. 109–118; François-Andre Paoli, L'Armée Franqaise de 1919 à 1939, vol. 4, La fin des illusions, 1930–35 (Vincennes, 1977), 78–83.
15海伍德上校，1933 年 10 月 25 日的报告，附件为《英国外交政策文件》（以下简称 DBFP），编辑。伍德沃德爵士和罗翰·巴特勒（伦敦，1946 年（及以后），第二辑，第五卷，第 508 号文件，第 737 页。参见巴黎大使馆参赞罗纳德·H·坎贝尔关于 1934 年 4 月 30 日与魏刚谈话的报告，同上，第六卷，第 415 号文件，第 681-82 页；魏刚，《回忆录》，第二卷，第 407-25 页；格里菲斯，《贝当元帅》，第 151-54 页；菲利普·C·F·班克维茨，《马克西姆·魏刚与现代法国的军民关系》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1967 年），第 86-89 页、第 99-115 页。
15 Col. Heywood, report of 25 October 1933, enclosure in Documents on British Foreign Policy (hereafter DBFP), ed. Sir E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London, 1946(ff), 2d ser. v, doc, no. 508, p. 737. Cf. report by Ronald H. Campbell, counsellor, Paris Embassy, on a talk with Weygand, 30 April 1934, in ibid., VI, doc. no. 415, pp. 681–82; Weygand, Memoires, 2:407–25; Griffiths, Marshal Pétain, 151–54; Philip C. F. Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 86–89, 99–115.
16众议院委员会（以下简称 CACD），第 15 届立法机关，1932-36 年，1934 年 12 月 5 日会议：“Audience de M. le General Maurin, Ministre de la Guerre”，第 8-10 页，纸箱 XV/739/48 之二，国家议会档案馆，巴黎（以下简称 AAN）。加莫林的观点出现在战争高级委员会：研究会议，1936 年 10 月 14 日，“Soir—La Division cuirassée”，加莫林论文，纸盒 1K224/8，SHAT。参谋人员的立场见 EMA：Bureau des Operations Militaires et Direction Générale de l'Armée，“Note 有关 l'emploi des chars Modernes”，1935 年 1 月 8 日，Jean Fabry 文件，纸箱 1K93/2，SHAT。比照。塞维尔·加莫林，2：81–83、186–90、244–45、289–94。
16 Commission de l'Armée de la Chambre des Députés (hereafter CACD), 15th Legislature, 1932–36, session of 5 December 1934: “Audience de M. le General Maurin, Ministre de la Guerre,” pp. 8–10, carton XV/739/48 bis, Archives de l'Assemblee Nationale, Paris (hereafter AAN). Gamelin's view occurs in Conseil supérieur de la guerre: study meeting, 14 October 1936, “Soir—La division cuirassée,” Gamelin Papers, carton 1K224/8, SHAT. The staff's standpoint is in EMA: Bureau des Operations Militaires et Instruction Générale de l'Armée, “Note concernant l'emploi des chars modernes,” 8 January 1935, Jean Fabry Papers, carton 1K93/2, SHAT. Cf. Gamelin, Servir, 2:81–83, 186–90, 244–45, 289–94.
17参见邦德，《英国军事政策》，第162-163页、172-175页、189-190页；邦德，《利德尔·哈特》，第78页、106-107页。霍巴特的七页备忘录《装甲车辆与野战部队》附于1937年10月21日写给利德尔·哈特的一封信中，现藏于伦敦国王学院军事档案馆利德尔·哈特文集。关于霍巴特，另见肯尼斯·麦克西，《装甲十字军》（伦敦，1967年）。关于亨利·波纳尔少将（一位能干但保守的参谋军官）的观点，参见布莱恩·邦德主编，《参谋长》，第1卷（伦敦，1972年）。
17 Bond, British Military Policy, 162–63, 172–75, 189–90. Bond, Liddell Hart, 78, 106–107. Hobart's seven-page memorandum, “AFV's and the Field Force,” was enclosed in a letter to Liddell Hart on 21 October 1937, Liddell Hart Papers, Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London. On Hobart see also Kenneth Macksey, Armoured Crusader (London, 1967). For the views of Major-General Henry Pownall, an able but conservative staff officer, see Brian Bond, ed., Chief of Staff, vol. 1 (London, 1972).
18 Bond， Liddell Hart，91-97。另见 Michael Howard，《战争的起因》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1983 年），198-208。106-107，118。
18 Bond, Liddell Hart, 91–97. See also Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 198–208. 106–107, 118.
19利德尔·哈特·邦德，97-98。 JFC Fuller，现场服务条例讲座 III 106–107, 118
19 Bond, Liddell Hart, 97–98. J. F. C. Fuller, Lectures on Field Seruice Regulations III 106–107, 118
20邦德，《利德尔·哈特》，第98-99页。邦德，《英国军事政策》，第176-177页。1937年12月，内阁批准有限责任政策时，据估计，坦克生产开支的减少将超过军队其他所有开支减少的总和。1937年，军队实际军需品预算支出比预算少了近600万英镑。
20 Bond, Liddell Hart, 98–99. Bond, British Military Policy, 176–77. When the Cabinet endorsed the limited liability policy in December 1937, it was estimated that the reduced expenditure on tank production would exceed all other army economies added together. In 1937 the army actually underspent its allowance for warlike stores by nearly £6 million.
21科尔森，给戴高乐的信，1934 年 12 月 17 日，保罗雷诺文件，纸箱 74 AP.12，法国国家档案馆，巴黎（以下简称 AN）。另见 Charles de Gaulle，Vers l'armée de métier（巴黎，1934 年），87-92。
21 Colson, letter to de Gaulle, 17 December 1934, Pau' Reynaud Papers, carton 74 AP.12, Archives Nationales de France, Paris (hereafter AN). See also Charles de Gaulle, Vers l'armée de métier (Paris, 1934), 87–92.
22 法兰西共和国官方杂志：众议院（以下简称JOC）：辩论，巴黎，1935 年 3 月 16 日，第 17 页。 1042. 参见。戴高乐，书信、笔记和通行证，卷。 2、1919年至 1940 年 6 月（巴黎，1980 年），376–81；同上，战争回忆录，卷。 1，《拉佩尔》，1940-42（巴黎，1954），18-25；保罗·雷诺，《法国与欧洲》（巴黎，1947 年），1：308-321。
22 Journal Officiel de la République Française: Chambre des Députés (hereafter JOC): Débats, Paris, 16 March 1935, p. 1042. Cf. Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets, vol. 2, 1919-Juin 1940 (Paris, 1980), 376–81; ibid., Mémoires de Guerre, vol. 1, L'Appel, 1940–42 (Paris, 1954), 18–25; Paul Reynaud, La France a sauvé l'Europe (Paris, 1947), 1:308–321.
23 Amendement par M. Paul Reynaud, Député, au Projet de Loi portant revision à la Lot du 31 mars 1928 sur le recrutement de I'armie , Paris, 1935年3月2.8日，p. 11 5. 另见雷诺，《法国》，1：322-24；戴高乐，《书信、笔记和通行证》 2：382-86；伊芙琳·德梅 (Evelyne Demey)、保罗·雷诺 (Paul Reynaud)，《我的父亲》（巴黎，1980 年），287–91。
23 Amendement par M. Paul Reynaud, Député, au Projet de Loi portant modification à la Lot du 31 mars 1928 sur le recrutement de I'armie, Paris, 2.8 March 1935, p. 5. See also Reynaud, La France, 1:322–24; de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets 2:382–86; Evelyne Demey, Paul Reynaud, mon pére (Paris, 1980), 287–91.
24 Maurice Gamelin，1947 年 12 月 2 日在法国的证词： Commission chargée d'Enquêter sur les Evénements survenus en France de 1933 a 1945。附件：Dépositions de témoiges et 文件recuillts par la Commission d'Enquête Parlementaire，巴黎，1951-52 年，卷。 2，第 14 页。 385.参见。 Mane-Eugène Debeney，“Encore Parmée de metier”，《 Revue de deux mondes》，每。 8，卷。 28，1935 年 7 月 15 日，第 279-95 页，同上，“现代武装机动化”，同上，每。 8，卷。 32，1936 年 3 月 15 日，第 273-91 页。
24 Maurice Gamelin, testimony of 2 December 1947, in France: Commission chargée d'Enquêter sur les Evénements survenus en France de 1933 a 1945. Annexes: Dépositions de témoiges et documents recueillts par la Commission d'Enquête Parlementaire, Paris, 1951–52, vol. 2, p. 385. Cf. Mane-Eugène Debeney, “Encore Parmée de metier,” Revue de deux mondes, per. 8, vol. 28, 15 July 1935, pp. 279–95, and ibid., “La motorisation des armées modernes,” ibid., per. 8, vol. 32, 15 March 1936, pp. 273–91.
25 JOC：辩论，巴黎，1937 年 1 月 27 日，第 27 页。 169. 参见。 Demey, Paul Reynaud，310（戴高乐，给雷诺的信，1937 年 1 月 28 日）；雷诺，《法国》，1：401-415； 1930 年 8 月 16 日，Louis Béraud 在Le Journal上对马其诺的采访，附文于 FO 371, 14902, W8604/38/17, PRO；安德烈·拉法格，《加斯科涅幻想曲：马恩河和多瑙河的花园》（巴黎，1962 年），179-87；亨利·莱梅里，《 D'une république à I'autre：Souvenirs de la mêlée politique》，1894-1944（巴黎，1964），165-66；班克维茨，马克西姆·韦刚，121-31。
25 JOC: Débats, Paris, 27 January 1937, p. 169. Cf. Demey, Paul Reynaud, 310 (de Gaulle, letter to Reynaud, 28 January 1937); Reynaud, La France, 1:401–415; interview of Maginot by Louis Béraud in Le Journal, 16 August 1930, enclosure in FO 371, 14902, W8604/38/17, PRO; Andre Laffargue, Fantassin de Gascogne: De mon jardin à la Marne et au Danube (Paris, 1962.), 179–87; Henry Lémery, D'une république à I'autre: Souvenirs de la mêlée politique, 1894–1944 (Paris, 1964), 165–66; Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand, 121–31.
26 MDNG，内阁：“Analyse d'interpellation de M. Reynaud sur la politique militaire du gouvernement”，Daladier Papers，4DA3/Dr.4/sdr.b，法国国家政治科学基金会，巴黎（以下简称 FNSP）。另见“Note complémentaire au sujet des diffés de recrutement d'une armée de metier”，1936 年 7 月 21 日，同上；戴高乐，《书信、笔记和通行证》，2:387–91, 401–407； Gamelin， Servir，2：153、186、217 和卷。 3、《La Guerre》（1939 年 9 月至 1940 年 5 月 19 日）（巴黎，1947 年），516-27；马克西姆·魏刚， En lisant les mémoires de guerre du Gaulle (巴黎，1955)，13。
26 MDNG, Cabinet du Ministre: “Analyse d'interpellation de M. Reynaud sur la politique militaire du gouvernement,” Daladier Papers, 4DA3/Dr.4/sdr.b, Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, Paris (hereafter FNSP). See also “Note complémentaire au sujet des difficultés de recrutement d'une armée de metier,” 21 July 1936, ibid.; de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets, 2:387–91, 401–407; Gamelin, Servir, 2:153, 186, 217, and vol. 3, La Guerre (septembre 1939–19 mai 1940) (Paris, 1947), 516–27; Maxime Weygand, En lisant les mémoires de guerre du Général de Gaulle (Paris, 1955), 13.
27参见 Griffiths， Pétain，139-40； Pertinax [Andre Géraud]， Les fossoyeurs：Défaite tntlitaire de la France，停战，反革命（纽约，1943 年），1:49； Jean Fabry，杂志，1935 年 9 月 11 日至 20 日，10 月 3 日至 4 日，纸箱 5N581，博士。 2、SHAT； 1936 年 7 月 4 日的“纪念品”，Victor-Henri Schweisguth 将军论文，纸箱 351 AP3/1SC2/dr. 9、AN； CACD，第 16 届立法机关，1936-40 年，1937 年 12 月 1 日会议：“Audience de M. Daladier, MDNG”，第 15-16 页，carton xv，dr. “1937”，AAN；Clarke，《军事技术》，189；Gamelin，《Servir》，1:263–64。
27 See Griffiths, Pétain, 139–40; Pertinax [Andre Géraud], Les fossoyeurs: Défaite tntlitaire de la France, armistice, contre-révolution (New York, 1943), 1:49; Jean Fabry, Journal, 11–20 September, 3–4 October 1935, carton 5N581, dr. 2, SHAT; “Memento” of 4 July 1936, General Victor-Henri Schweisguth Papers, carton 351 AP3/1SC2/dr. 9, AN; CACD, 16th Legislature, 1936–40, session of 1 December 1937: “Audience de M. Daladier, MDNG,” pp. 15–16, carton xv, dr. “1937,” AAN; Clarke, Military Technology, 189; Gamelin, Servir, 1:263–64.
28戴高乐，《信件、笔记和通行证》，2:393, 404–405, 411–12； “纪念品”，1935 年 7 月 16 日，1936 年 5 月 28 日，Schweisguth Papers，纸盒 351 AP2/1SC2/dr. 5 和 351 AP3/1SC2/博士。 9、AN； Jean Fabry，《De la Place de la Concorde au Cours de I'lntendance》，1934 年至 1940 年 6 月（巴黎，1942 年），62–65。比照。格里菲思，贝当元帅，161–65, 169, 175–88, 195–96, 207–11 和雅克·诺贝古，《军队政治史》，卷。 1，《De Pétain a Pétain》，1919-1942（巴黎，1967），226-48。
28 De Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets, 2:393, 404–405, 411–12; “Mementos,” 16 July 1935, 28 May 1936, Schweisguth Papers, cartons 351 AP2/1SC2/dr. 5 and 351 AP3/1SC2/dr. 9, AN; Jean Fabry, De la Place de la Concorde au Cours de I'lntendance, février 1934-juin 1940 (Paris, 1942), 62–65. Cf. Griffiths, Marshal Pétain, 161–65, 169, 175–88, 195–96, 207–11 and Jacques Nobécourt, Une histoire politique de I'armée, vol. 1, De Pétain a Pétain, 1919–1942 (Paris, 1967), 226–48.
29英国驻巴黎大使乔治·克拉克爵士向外交部报告的声明，1937 年 2 月 24 日，FO 371, 20693, C1597/122/17, PRO。萨伦格罗的保证是在德奈恩的一次演讲中做出的，记录于 1936 年 9 月 7 日书记官的快件中，同上，19859，C6327/1/17。比照。马克西姆·韦刚 (Maxime Weygand)，《法国军事报》，《 Revue de deux mondes》，每。 8，卷。 35，1936 年 10 月 15 日，第 721-36 页，同上，“L'armée d'aujourd'hui”，同上，per。 8，卷。 45，1938 年 5 月 15 日，第 325-36 页。
29 Statement reported in Sir George Clerk, British ambassador, Paris, to the Foreign Office, 24 February 1937, FO 371, 20693, C1597/122/17, PRO. Salengro's assurance came in a speech at Denain reported in Clerk's 7 September 1936 despatch, ibid., 19859, C6327/1/17. Cf. Maxime Weygand, “L'état militaire de la France,” Revue de deux mondes, per. 8, vol. 35, 15 October 1936, pp. 721–36, and ibid., “L'armée d'aujourd'hui,” ibid., per. 8, vol. 45, 15 May 1938, pp. 325–36.
30 Maurice Gamelin，1937 年 6 月 1 日的信件，Reynaud Papers，纸箱 74 AP。 12、AN。 Duchêne 于 1937 年 6 月 17 日发布的新闻公告同上。比照。雷诺，《法国》，1：419-28；塞维尔·加莫林， 1：257–62。
30 Maurice Gamelin, letter of 1 June 1937 in Reynaud Papers, carton 74 AP. 12, AN. Duchêne's press notice, dated 17 June 1937, is in ibid. Cf. Reynaud, La France, 1:419–28; Gamelin, Servir, 1:257–62.
31 Bond，《英国军事政策》，第 172-78 页、186-88 页、255-57 页。
31 Bond, British Military Policy, 172–78, 186–88, 255–57.
32 Bond， Liddell Hart，98-99。
32 Bond, Liddell Hart, 98–99.
33 Fuller，《FSR III 讲义》，第 8、29、38 页。
33 Fuller, Lectures on F.S.R. III, 8, 29, 38.
34 EMA，“Note au sujet de l'armée de métier”，1936 年 6 月，Daladier Papers，4DA3/Dr.4/Sdr.b，FNSP。另请参阅 1936 年 4 月 17 日的 Gamelin 备忘录，同上，iDA7/Dr.4/Sdr.b；战争高级委员会，会议记录，1936年4月29日、1937年12月15日、1938年12月2日，纸盒1N22，卷。 17，第 86 页，100–103,120–29，133–34，SHAT；布尔雷，《悲剧》，53–55；戴高乐， Memotres，1：27-34，同上， Lettres，notes et carnets，2：452-61。比照。拉法格，《加斯科涅幻想曲》，122–32；乔治·卢斯托瑙-拉考，《法国反叛回忆录，1914–1948》（巴黎，1948 年），54–58。
34 EMA, “Note au sujet de l'armée de métier,” June 1936, Daladier Papers, 4DA3/Dr.4/Sdr.b, FNSP. See also Gamelin memorandum of 17 April 1936 in ibid., iDA7/Dr.4/Sdr.b; Conseil supérieur de la guerre, minutes, 29 April 1936, 15 December 1937, 2 December 1938, carton 1N22, vol. 17, pp. 86, 100–103,120–29, 133–34, SHAT; Bourret, La tragédie, 53–55; de Gaulle, Memotres, 1:27–34, and ibid., Lettres, notes et carnets, 2:452–61. Cf. Laffargue, Fantassin de Gascogne, 122–32; Georges Loustaunau-Lacau, Mémoires d'un français rebelle, 1914–1948 (Paris, 1948), 54–58.
35 Richard D. Challener，“回顾 1940 年的军事失败”，载于《现代法国：第三和第四共和国的问题》，Edward Mead Earle 编辑（普林斯顿，1951 年），第 417 页脚注。另见戴高乐，《信件、笔记和笔记集》，第 2 卷，第 363-365 页、370-372 页、415-438 页。
35 Richard D. Challener, “The Military Defeat of 1940 in Retrospect,” in Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1951), 417n. See also de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets, 2:363–65, 370–72, 415–38.
36参见 RHS Stolfi，“1940 年法国的胜利装备”，《历史》 55，第 183 期（1970 年 2 月），1-20；Gunsberg，《分而治之》； Robert J. Young，《掌控法国：法国外交政策和军事计划，1933-1940》（马萨诸塞州剑桥和伦敦，1978 年）；Paul Huard，《戴高乐上校和他的盲人：拉昂，1940 年 5 月 15-20 日》（巴黎，1980 年）；Pierre Le Goyet，《加麦兰之谜》（巴黎，1975 年）；Donald W. Alexander，“布雷达变体的影响”，《法国历史研究》 8，第 3 期（1974 年春季），459-88； John C. Cairns，“1940 年重返法国之路”，《美国历史评论》 64，第 3 期（1959 年 4 月），583-603；以及同上，“一些近期历史学家与 1940 年的‘奇怪失败’”，《现代史杂志》 46（1974 年），60-81。
36 See R. H. S. Stolfi, “Equipment for Victory in France in 1940,” History 55, no. 183 (February 1970), 1–20; Gunsberg, Divided and Conquered; Robert J. Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933–1940 (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1978); Paul Huard, Le Colonel de Gaulle et ses blindés: Laon, 15–20 mai 1940 (Paris, 1980); Pierre Le Goyet, Le mystère Gamelin (Paris, 1975); Donald W. Alexander, “Repercussions of the Breda Variant,” French Historical Studies 8, no. 3 (Spring 1974), 459–88; John C. Cairns, “Along the Road back to France 1940,” American Historical Review 64, no. 3 (April 1959), 583–603; and ibid., “Some Recent Historians and the ‘Strange Defeat’ of 1940,” Journal of Modern History 46 (1974), 60–81.
37有关 1939 年 10 月至 1940 年 5 月期间德国在西线发动进攻的计划演变的出色分析，请参阅 John J. Mearsheimer 的《常规威慑》（伊萨卡，1983 年），第 99-133 页。
37 For an excellent analysis of the evolution of German planning for an offensive in the West between October 1939 and May 1940, see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, 1983), 99–133.
38 Fuller，《FSR III讲义》，第8、29、38页。冯·布隆伯格将军在1932年对利德尔·哈特表示，他赞成裁军，因为这将“通过恢复小型精干的军队，将艺术、领导力、‘绅士风度’和真正的战士精神带回战争中”，这充分体现了这种观点。参见邦德，《利德尔·哈特》，第79-80页。
38 Fuller, Lectures on F.S.R. III, 8, 29, 38. General von Blomberg epitomized this outlook when he remarked to Liddell Hart that he favored disarmament (in 1932) because it would “by restoring small and handy armies, bring back art, leadership, ‘gentlemanliness’, and the real warrior spirit into warfare.” See Bond, Liddell Hart, 79–80.
21. 来自中央蓝区的声音：空军理论家们*
21. Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists*
S自有人驾驶飞机问世以来，已过去了七十五年，传统水面作战模式由此延伸至陆军和海军之上的天空——乃至更广阔的领域。尽管“空中力量”这一被广泛用于指代这一现象的通用术语，但在军事或战略理论史上，它仍未找到一个明确且无可争议的地位。理论家们不乏，但在这个领域，技术的影响和实践者的行为从一开始就比理论本身发挥了更大的作用，因此他们的影响力也十分有限。对于思想史研究者而言，关于空军运用方式的多种观点引发的混乱和争议，也带来了更多难题：例如，空军的最佳运用方式是与水面部队协同作战，还是独立于陆军和海军之外开展作战？鉴于这些及其他原因，本文将分为五个篇幅不等的部分进行论述。
SEVENTY-FIVE years have now elapsed since the advent of manned aircraft resulted in the extension of traditional forms of surface warfare into the skies above—and indeed beyond—armies and navies. Air power, the generic term widely adopted to identify this phenomenon, has nonetheless yet to find a clearly defined or unchallenged place in the history of military or strategic theory. There has been no lack of theorists, but they have had only limited influence in a field where the effects of technology and the deeds of practitioners have from the beginning played greater roles than have ideas. For the historian of ideas further difficulties arise from the confusion and controversy that have resulted from differing viewpoints regarding the multiple means of employing air forces: whether, for example, they are best used in cooperation with surface forces or in operations conducted independently of armies and navies. For these and other reasons the approach adopted for this essay divides it into five parts of unequal length.
第一部分对空军力量这一主题及其给历史学家带来的问题进行了一些思考，其中包括其术语、神秘感以及与大多数学者日常经验的脱节。第二部分探讨了一篇关于此主题的早期文章，该文章在作家和教师中广受欢迎，因此具有特殊的地位。第三部分主要论述了空军力量在第二次世界大战中的作用，这是一个似乎永无休止争论的话题。最后，也是更为谨慎的，最后两部分探讨了所有时期中最艰难的时期——此后数十年间，那些经过长时间构思和检验的基本概念不得不适应原子武器、跨大气层（或太空）飞行以及电子技术的革命性发展。
The first part offers some reflections on the topic of air power in general and the problems it has posed for historians, among them its vocabulary, mystique, and remoteness from the day-to-day experience of most scholars. A second part addresses an earlier essay on this topic, whose widespread acceptance among writers and teachers has given it a special prominence. A third part deals primarily with the role played by air power in World War II, a topic of seemingly endless controversy. Finally, and altogether more tentatively, the last two sections address the most difficult period of all—the decades since then during which basic concepts at length conceived and tested had to be adapted to atomic weapons, transatmospheric (or space) flight, and the revolution in electronics.
我
I
克劳塞维茨在其开创性的章节“人民参战”中，开篇便指出，以民众起义发动的战争是十九世纪的现象。如果我们用空中力量取代民众战争，我们可以借用他的这一观点：“任何善用空中力量的国家，通常都会比那些轻视空中力量的国家获得某种优势。如果真是如此，那么剩下的问题就只是：人类整体是否会从战争因素的进一步扩张中获益？这个问题的答案应该与战争本身的问题相同。我们将把这两个问题留给哲学家们……[而我们则要展开一场]与其说是客观分析，不如说是探寻真理的讨论。” ¹
Clausewitz began his innovative chapter “The People in Arms” with the observation that war by means of popular uprisings was a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. If we substitute air power for peoples' wars, we can begin by borrowing his observation that “any nation that uses it intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use. If this is so, the question only remains whether mankind at large will gain by this further expansion of the element of war; a question to which the answer should be the same as to the question of war itself. We shall leave both to the philosophers…. [and proceed to a discussion that is] less an objective analysis than a groping for the truth.”1
当我们考虑到西方国家——尤其是美国——尽管两百年来断断续续地尝试应对战争，却仍然对“人民战争”缺乏深刻理解时，我们就不难理解“空中力量”——二十世纪战争中独有的组成部分——为何至今仍难以被我们分析。即使是分析的第一步——建立一套公认的术语——也依然令我们困惑不已。诸如战略轰炸、空中封锁和制空权之类的常用术语，对不同的作者而言含义各不相同，有时甚至对同一位作者在不同时期也会有不同的解释。其他一些经常引起混淆的术语还包括：空中优势、制空权，以及一大堆笨拙但看似必要的词汇，例如电子反制措施。这些问题将在后续章节中逐一探讨，但读者从一开始就应该明白，现代战略中的空中要素尚未形成一套公认的术语体系，“因此，我们无法根据观察到的用法最终构建出空中力量的语法”。2.造成这种情况的原因有很多。
When we consider how poorly Western nations—in particular the United States—have come to understand peoples' wars, despite two hundred years of fitful attempts to deal with them, we should not be surprised that “air power,” the twentieth century's peculiar contribution to warfare, continues to defy our attempts at analysis. Even the first step in such an analysis—the discovery of an accepted vocabulary—continues to confound our efforts. Common terms like strategic bombing, interdiction, and air superiority mean different things to different writers—and on occasion different things to the same writers at different times. Among other terms that frequently engender confusion are the following: air supremacy, command of the air, and a whole raft of unwieldy but seemingly necessary neologisms like electronic counter-countermeasures. These shall be dealt with as they arise, but the reader should understand from the beginning that the air element of modern strategy is not yet a topic possessing an agreed vocabulary “from which on the basis of observed usage the grammar of air power may eventually be compiled.”2 Many reasons account for this condition.
飞行的概念可以追溯到希腊神话，但从一开始就不得不面对这样一种观念：人类妄图僭越神灵（后来是天使）的特权，未免太过狂妄。然而到了十九世纪，关于人类征服天空可能带来的后果，出现了两种截然不同的观点。一种观点强调死亡和毁灭从天而降的景象，认为战争的性质将发生直接而巨大的改变，通常暗示陆军和海军将变得毫无用处。另一种观点则与第一种观点相呼应，但更为乐观，认为“最终的结果将是大大减少战争的频率，并以更理性的方式解决国际争端。这不仅可能因为战争会带来更多恐怖，还因为战场上的任何角落都将不再安全，无论它距离实际冲突现场有多远。” 3因此，甚至在第一架飞机飞行之前，就存在着涉及情感和激情的争议因素。
The idea of flight, whose expression can be traced back to Greek mythology, had to contend from the very beginning with the feeling that it was somehow presumptuous of mankind to toy with the prerogatives of the gods—and later, angels. By the nineteenth century, nonetheless, two distinct visions arose as to the likely effect of man's conquering the heavens. One view, stressing images of death and destruction raining from the skies, was that the nature of warfare would be directly and vastly changed, often with the implication that armies and navies would be rendered impotent. Another view, reflecting the first yet altogether more sanguine, held that “the ultimate effect will be to diminish greatly the frequency of wars and to substitute more rational methods of settling international misunderstandings. This may come to pass not only because of the additional horrors which will result in battle, but because no part of the field will be safe, no matter how distant from the actual scene of conflict.”3 Thus, even before the first aircraft flew, elements of controversy involving feeling and passion were present.
莱特兄弟等人揭开动力飞行的秘密后，航空业便主要成为年轻人的专属领域，其本身就吸引着那些充满冒险精神、体魄强健、思维敏捷且务实而非空想的年轻人。这些人谈论或书写他们的经历时，通常将天空视为一个全新的探索环境，完全不受过去习俗的束缚。这些航空先驱者中涌现出的作家们，对飞行和航空业的整体发展充满热情，却鲜少进行分析，也从未保持冷静客观。他们对空中力量在战争中作用的设想，总是超越了当时的现实，这既令那些认同他们观点的人感到失望，也招致了那些不认同者的嘲笑。在这方面，飞行员们常常认为自己与众不同，用汤姆·沃尔夫的话来说，他们拥有“正确的品质”，这一事实也让许多圈外人士不敢尝试去探寻飞行员内部秘辛的奥秘。
Once the Wright brothers and others unlocked the secrets of powered flight, aviation became predominantly a young man's game, one that by its very nature attracted adventurous souls who had to be physically adept, mentally alert, and pragmatically rather than philosophically inclined. Insofar as such people talked or wrote of their experiences, it was usually of the air as a new environment of endeavor, utterly untrammeled or impeded by the usages or customs of the past. Passionately committed to flying and the general advancement of aviation, the writers who emerged from among the aviation pioneers were rarely analytical and never dispassionate. Their vision of the role air power could play in warfare invariably outran the reality of the moment, provoking disappointment among the converted and derision from the unbelievers. Also in this respect, the fact that the aviators often deemed themselves a breed apart, possessors in Tom Wolfe's phrase of “the right stuff,” discouraged many outside their limited circle from attempting to fathom the hidden secrets of the inner priesthood of flyers.
然而，促使那些沉思冥想或哲学思辨的人——无论是从业者、历史学家还是分析家——远离军事航空的另一个因素，是对飞行员们似乎冷酷无情的假设感到不安：他们所谈论的未来战争似乎能够以某种方式，为其他人几个世纪以来苦苦挣扎的问题提供快速、干净利落、机械化且不带个人色彩的解决方案。⁴这些印象导致局外人，尤其是学院派历史学家，不愿专门研究军事航空领域，从而使该领域多年来一直由各空军的官方历史学家和那些自称为航空作家的人主导，这些人既有热情但缺乏经验的爱好者，也有如今热衷于在纸上重温昔日荣光的老兵。尽管这些关于空军力量作为严肃分析研究对象的本质的思考可能显得不够全面或缺乏依据，但我们必须在讨论之初提出这些思考。对于该领域的新手来说，这些影响并不总是显而易见的，他们往往在努力初期就感到气馁。5
Yet another factor driving the contemplative or philosophical away from military aviation—whether as practitioners, historians, or analysts—has been a certain uneasiness about what seemed a callous assumption among airmen that the kind of future war of which they spoke could somehow provide quick, clean, mechanical, and impersonal solutions to problems with which others had struggled for centuries.4 One result of these impressions has been a reluctance on the part of outsiders, especially academic historians, to specialize in the field of military aviation, thereby leaving the field for many years to a combination of the official historians of the various air services, and those who style themselves simply aviation writers, a group ranging from excited but inexperienced buffs to veterans now taken to reliving their glory days on paper. These reflections on the nature of air power as a subject for serious analytical study, however incomplete or unwarranted they may seem, must be voiced at the beginning of our discussion. Their implications are not always apparent to those new to the field, who are often discouraged too early in their efforts.5
“空中力量”一词本身至少可以追溯到H·G·威尔斯的《空中战争》（1908年）；其他一些仍在发展中的词汇则更为古老。例如，飞机将迫使各国政府做好应对闪电战的准备，在这种战争中，只有当一个国家掌握“制空权”时，海陆战争才有可能进行。这一观点最早由英国皇家工程兵少校J·D·富勒顿在1893年芝加哥世界哥伦布博览会的军事专家会议上提出。在莱特兄弟成功飞行十年前，富勒顿就谈到了一场“战争艺术的革命”，这场革命将需要改变海军舰艇的设计、分散部署军队以及制定新的要塞建造标准。无论如何，“主要的作战行动将在空中进行，空中舰队抵达敌方首都上空很可能就意味着战役的结束。” 7然而，大多数此类富有远见的预测，除了航空界的一小群有远见的人之外，几乎没有引起任何人的注意。
The term air power itself6 can be traced back at least as far as H. G. Wells's War in the Air (1908); other elements of the still-emerging vocabulary are of even greater antiquity. For example, the notion that the airplane would require governments to be prepared for a lightning war, one in which sea and land warfare would be possible only when a nation has “command of the air,” was first set forth before a conference of military experts at Chicago's World Columbian Exposition of 1893 by Major J. D. Fullerton of the British Royal Engineers. Ten years before the flight of the Wright brothers, Fullerton spoke of a “revolution in the art of war” that would require changes in the design of naval ships, dispersion of armies on battlefields, and new standards for the construction of fortresses. In any case, “the chief work will be done in the air, and the arrival of the aerial fleet over the enemy's capital will probably conclude the campaign.”7 Most such far-seeing predictions, however, received little notice outside a small circle of aeronautical visionaries.
即使二十年后，第一次世界大战前夕，第一批简陋的飞机——主要由木头、帆布和铁丝制成——也并未被大多数军官认真对待。当时，他们正忙于应对机枪、机动地面运输的可能性以及海军装甲和武器装备的革命性变革。他们认为，这种新型飞机充其量只能成为传统战争手段的一个补充。现有的航程、速度、载重能力甚至安全性方面的限制，将会以远超当时任何人想象的速度得到克服。然而，随着第一次世界大战的爆发，飞机唯一可能的用途被认为是作为地面指挥官的延伸视野，就像自法国大革命以来偶尔使用的气球一样。
Even two decades later, on the eve of World War I, the first flimsy aircraft—constructed primarily of wood, canvas, and baling wire—simply were not taken seriously by most officers, who were having trouble enough trying to figure out what to do about machine guns, the possibilities for motorized ground transport, and the concurrent revolutions in naval armor and armament. At most, they reasoned, the new aircraft might eventually become a modest addition to the traditional means of war. Existing limitations of range, speed, lifting capacity, and even safety would be overcome more quickly than anyone could then visualize. As World War I dawned, however, the only probable use for aircraft was deemed to be as extensions of the eyes of the ground commanders, just as balloons had been used on occasion since the French Revolution.
与系留气球相比，动力飞机的机动性和航程优势使其在战争初期便被用于侦察——当时称为观察。很快，炮兵侦察机便对地面部队构成了严重威胁。由于战前尚未研制出专门用于对空作战的火炮，驱逐企图侦察己方阵地的入侵者的唯一方法，就是尝试用机载武器将其击落——最初是手枪和步枪，后来是机枪。因此，侦察和追击任务率先清晰地呈现出来。其他任务也很快随之出现。
The great mobility and range of powered aircraft, as compared to tethered balloons, led to their use in reconnaissance—then called observation—from the beginning of the war. Soon artillery spotter planes became a serious threat to troops on the ground. Since artillery specifically designed for use against aircraft had not been developed before the war, the only way to drive off interlopers intent on reconnoitering one's positions was to attempt to shoot them down with weapons—at first handguns and rifles, later machine guns—mounted on one's own aircraft. Thus the reconnaissance and pursuit roles were the first to emerge clearly. Others quickly followed.
一项创新是为交战部队提供战术支援，即用飞机机炮和炸弹攻击地面部队阵地，目的是协助己方部队推进或阻挠敌军进攻。这种通常被称为攻击任务的作战方式，飞机要么近距离攻击敌军部队，要么在敌军后方短距离攻击集结点、补给站、重要交通枢纽、军事指挥部、铁路枢纽等目标。（今天我们称之为近距离空中支援和空中封锁。）战争末期，在德国对英国的空袭的刺激下，又出现了一种新的设想——飞机独立于陆军和海军作战。这类部队的任务是攻击远离战线的目标，通过轰炸敌军的工厂、交通枢纽和政府中心，摧毁其战争能力的关键要素。 1917 年 8 月的《史末资备忘录》直接促成了英国皇家空军的成立，该备忘录以如下方式讨论了空战：
One innovation was the tactical support of engaged forces in which aircraft guns and bombs would be directed against troop positions on the ground, with the aim either of assisting the advance of one's own troops or of thwarting the advances of the enemy. Used in this manner, usually referred to as the attack role, the aircraft operated either close in to the troops or at short distances in the enemy's rear—against rallying points, supply dumps, key intersections, military headquarters, railheads, and the like. (Today we describe these as close air support and interdiction.) By the end of the war, spurred on largely by the German raids over England, yet another vision arose—that of aircraft operating independently of armies and navies. The task of such forces would be to attack targets far removed from the battle lines, with the aim of destroying essential elements of the enemy's capability to wage war by bombing his factories, transportation hubs, and centers of government. The Smuts Memorandum of August 1917, the paper that led directly to the creation of the Royal Air Force, discussed air warfare in these terms:
就目前可预见的而言，其未来在独立战争中的用途绝对没有限制。或许不久的将来，以空中作战为主导，大规模摧毁敌方领土和工业及人口中心的行动，将成为战争的主要手段，而传统的军事和海军作战方式则可能退居其次，成为次要的。8
As far as can at present be foreseen there is absolutely no limit to its future independent war use. And the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.8
然而，当战争于1918年11月结束时，空军并未取得如此至高无上的地位。作为一种战争手段，它仍处于起步阶段，虽然偶尔发挥了惊人的作用，其重要性也日益凸显，但总体而言，它在战争结果中并非至关重要。比空军对战争的影响更大的，是战争本身对空军后续发展的影响。尤其值得注意的是，在战争过程中，几乎所有将在四分之一世纪后影响空战进程的理论、态度、理想、希望、梦想和争论都已初见端倪。
When the war ended in November 1918, however, air power had achieved no such primacy. As an instrument of warfare it was still in its infancy, having played an occasionally spectacular, increasingly important, but nonetheless largely unessential part in the outcome. Greater than the impact of air power upon the war was the influence of the war itself on the subsequent development of air power. This is particularly true in the sense that during the course of the fighting virtually every theory, attitude, ideal, hope, dream, and debate that would mark the course of air warfare a quarter century later had been foreshadowed.
二
II
“只有在非常有限的意义上，我们才能用字面意义上的精确度来谈论空军理论。”爱德华·华纳1943年的文章《杜黑、米切尔、塞维尔斯基：空战理论》以此开篇，此后该文在军事院校中被广泛引用，使其具有特殊的意义。华纳的开篇论点是，早期的理论家们在1919年后轻率地将时态从将来时切换到现在时，却从未真正认识到，两次世界大战之间的辩论与其说是关于如何运用空军的各种理论的选择，不如说是关于接受或拒绝一个基本原则：“飞机拥有如此广泛的普及性，以及速度和高度方面的优势，以至于它有能力摧毁所有地面或海上设施和设备，同时自身却能相对安全地免受来自地面的任何有效反击。” 10华纳认为，从这个角度来看，他们真正写的是一种战争理论，这种理论假定某种特定武器——飞机——具有根本的力量，是战争的主要工具。
“It is only in a very limited sense that one can speak with literal accuracy of theories of air power.” So began Edward Warner's 1943 essay, “Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare,” whose widespread use in military schools ever since has endowed it with a special significance.9 Warner's opening point was that the early theorists, glibly switching tenses from the future to the present after 1919, never properly acknowledged that the debates of the interwar period were concerned less with choices among various theories for the employment of air forces than with the acceptance or rejection of a fundamental doctrine: “that the airplane possesses such ubiquity, and such advantages of speed and elevation, as to possess the power of destroying all surface installations and instruments, ashore or afloat, while remaining comparatively safe from any effective reprisal from the ground.”10 Looked at in this light, Warner argued, what they were really writing about was a theory of warfare, one that postulated the fundamental power of a particular weapon—the aircraft—as the predominant instrument of war.
以此为出发点，华纳转而分析了朱利奥·杜黑（1869–1930）、威廉·米切尔（1879–1936）和亚历山大·德·塞韦尔斯基（1894–1974）的已出版著作，其中杜黑用了九页，米切尔用了五页，而塞韦尔斯基只用了两页。华纳运用他作为航空工程师的技能，以及他在政府高级职位上的经验，还有他作为麻省理工学院前教授的经历（1923年至1925年间，他的博士生之一是年轻的空军中尉詹姆斯·H·杜立特）。他的背景使他能够独具优势地分析适用于现有空中作战工具的理论和实践局限性。<sup> 11</sup>
From this starting point, Warner moved on to an analysis of the published works of Guilio Douhet (1869–1930), William Mitchell (1879–1936), and Alexander de Seversky (1894–1974), devoting nine pages to the first, five to the second, and only two to the third. To this task Warner brought his skills as an aeronautical engineer along with his experience in high-level government posts and as a former professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (where one of his doctoral students during 1923–1925 had been a young Air Service lieutenant named James H. Doolittle). His background uniquely qualified him to analyze the theoretical and practical limitations applicable to the existing tools of war in the air.11
除了一个例外，华纳关于杜黑的论述至今仍然有效且富有启发性。正如他所概述的，杜黑的战争理论可以归纳为以下几个要点：（1）现代战争不区分战斗人员和非战斗人员；（2）地面部队已无法成功发动进攻；（3）在三维空战中，速度和高度优势使得防御方无法应对空中进攻战略；（4）因此，一个国家必须从一开始就做好准备，对敌方人口中心、政府和工业中心发动大规模轰炸——先发制人，重创敌方，以摧毁敌方平民士气，迫使敌方政府不得不求和；（5）为此，首要条件是拥有一支装备远程轰炸机的独立空军，并保持高度戒备状态。<sup> 12</sup>
With perhaps one exception, Warner's pages on Douhet remain today both valid and helpful. As he outlined it, Douhet's theory of war broke down into a few key points that might be abbreviated as follows: (1) modern warfare allows for no distinction between combatants and noncombatants; (2) successful offensives by surface forces are no longer possible; (3) the advantages of speed and elevation in the three-dimensional arena of aerial warfare have made it impossible to take defensive measures against an offensive aerial strategy; (4) therefore, a nation must be prepared at the outset to launch massive bombing attacks against the enemy centers of population, government, and industry—hit first and hit hard to shatter enemy civilian morale, leaving the enemy government no option but to sue for peace; (5) to do this an independent air force armed with long-range bombardment aircraft, maintained in a constant state of readiness, is the primary requirement.12
华纳正确地指出，杜黑的理论在很大程度上反映了意大利的地理位置，而这一点许多人并未意识到；此外，杜黑未能预见到雷达的出现，导致他低估了防空能力。然而，在谈到1940年至1943年的事件时，华纳或许在某一方面对杜黑的批评并不公平。我指的是他所说的杜黑高估了轰炸对平民士气造成的破坏性和扰乱性影响。在这里，华纳和其他一些追随杜黑的学者似乎未能充分考虑到杜黑的假设：对人口中心和工业中心的袭击将使用三种类型的炸弹——爆炸弹、燃烧弹和毒气弹——他告诉我们，每种炸弹都会“以正确的比例”使用，但他并未对此进行解释。二战期间，敌对双方因害怕遭到报复而拒绝使用化学炸弹，这一点在严格意义上不应被忽视，尤其是在批评一位明确预言化学炸弹将会被使用的作家的预测时。
Warner correctly acknowledged that Douhet's theory reflected Italy's geographic position to an extent greater than many had noticed; also that Douhet's inability to foresee radar led him to underestimate the possibilities for defense against air attack. Speaking to the events of 1940–1943, however, Warner may have chided Douhet unfairly in one instance. I refer to what he called Douhet's overestimation of the destructive and disruptive effect of bombing on civilian morale. Here Warner and other writers who have followed him13 seem to have failed to take fully into account Douhet's assumption that attacks against population and industrial centers would employ three types of bombs—explosive, incendiary, and poison gas—each used, he tells us without explaining himself, “in the correct proportions.” The refusal of the antagonists in World War II to employ chemical bombs—from fear of retaliation—should not, in a strictly logical sense, be ignored when criticizing the predictions of a writer who explicitly presumed they would be used.
华纳对“比利”米切尔的论述远不如他对杜黑的分析那样经得起时间的考验。这部分原因可能是华纳在分析米切尔、塞维尔斯基以及杜黑时，都倾向于强调每位作家都将敌方工业基础和经济结构作为轰炸行动的首选目标。米切尔的这一特点直到后期才变得重要；过分强调这一点，反而会分散人们对他作为领导者、创新者、倡导者以及空中力量主导地面战争各种手段的象征所做出的其他诸多贡献的关注。杜黑将轰炸机以外的飞机视为辅助性武器——或许锦上添花，但并非绝对必要——而米切尔则能为所有类型的飞机辩护。对他而言，重要的不是战略轰炸，而是在一个独立自主的空军司令部控制下，集中协调所有空中力量，使其摆脱对陆军的依赖。他觉得，如果这个目标能够实现，其他一切都会各就各位。
Warner's pages on “Billy” Mitchell have not stood the test of time as well as his analysis of Douhet. In part this may be owing to Warner's tendency to emphasize, with Mitchell and Seversky as much as with Douhet, the degree to which each writer stressed the enemy industrial base and economic structure as the preferred target for bombardment operations. This aspect of Mitchell's writing did not become important until quite late; emphasizing it has the effect of drawing attention away from his many other contributions as leader, innovator, advocate, and symbol for all the means by which air power could dominate surface warfare. Whereas Douhet had looked on aircraft other than bombers as ancillary—nice to have, perhaps, but not absolutely necessary—Mitchell could argue the case for all types. The important thing for him was not strategic bombing, but rather the centralized coordination of all air assets under the control of an autonomous air force command, freed from its dependency on the army. If that goal could be achieved, he felt, everything else would fall into its proper place.
还有一点：当华纳称米切尔为“一位创始者”时，不应将其理解为原创思想家，这一事实直到阿尔弗雷德·F·赫尔利的《比利·米切尔：空军力量的捍卫者》出版后才被广泛理解。<sup>14</sup>虽然赫尔利的副标题突出了米切尔作为空军力量捍卫者的主要意义，但它却掩盖了本书的真正主题，即美国最杰出的军事飞行员的航空思想。赫尔利总结道，米切尔的成就并非在于原创思想；相反，“他的思想主要借鉴于他在第一次世界大战期间加入的国际飞行员群体。”<sup> 15</sup>（这一结论几乎同样适用于杜黑，他的重要性与阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉非常相似，与其说在于他的原创性，不如说在于他是第一个将当时广泛流传的思想汇集在一起，并以结构化的方式呈现出来的人。）<sup> 16</sup>
One further point: when Warner refers to Mitchell as “an originator,” this should not be taken to mean original thinker, a fact that did not become widely understood until the publication of Alfred F. Hurley's Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power.14 Although Hurley's subtitle highlights Mitchell's main significance as a crusader, it tends to hide the volume's true topic, which is the aeronautical ideas of America's foremost military aviator. Hurley concludes that Mitchell's achievements did not lie in the realm of original thought; rather, “he borrowed his ideas largely from an international community of airmen which he joined during World War I.”15 (This conclusion could be applied almost as well to Douhet, whose significance, much like that of Alfred Thayer Mahan, resides less in his originality than in his being the first to pull together, in one place and in a structured order, ideas widely shared at the time.)16
华纳在书中收录了一些关于亚历山大·德·塞维尔斯基的《空中力量的胜利》（1942）的评论，这在当时确实具有现实意义，但多年来却导致初学者过分高估了塞维尔斯基作为理论家的地位。然而，作为一位倡导空中力量优于其他一切作战手段的普遍理论的倡导者，他的影响力之大，恐怕是1935年以后出生的人难以想象的——这源于沃尔特·迪士尼制作的一部战时宣传片。<sup> 17</sup>
Warner's inclusion of some remarks on Alexander de Seversky's Victory Through Air Power (1942) was indeed topical at the time, but has had the effect over the years of leading beginning students to assume a greater place for Seversky as a theorist than is warranted. As a promoter of a generalized thesis favoring air power over all other means of warfare, however, his popular influence was greater than anyone born much after 1935 can probably imagine—deriving as it did from a wartime propaganda film produced by Walt Disney.17
现在回望两次世界大战之间的岁月，并将华纳的研究范围从（1）一般的空军力量扩展到飞机在战斗中的具体运用理论，以及（2）从个人贡献扩展到企业贡献，一些重要的发展至少值得简要提及。18
When one looks back now on the interwar years and widens Warner's focus (1) from air power in general to specific theories for the employment of aircraft in battle, and (2) from individual to corporate contributions, several important developments deserve at least brief mention.18
在这样的名单上，JFC Fuller 和 Basil H. Liddell Hart 在建立装甲战中空地协同作战的理论框架方面所做出的贡献无疑名列前茅。德国的闪电战很大程度上得益于他们的思想，而且与人们普遍的认知相反，飞机在战争中的重要性与坦克和摩托化步兵不相上下。1940 年和 1941 年在法国和苏联的闪电战，很大程度上依赖于协调一致的——实际上是主导性的——空中攻击，这种飞机运用方式米切尔会非常理解，但杜黑和塞维尔斯基则会认为效率低下。<sup> 19 </sup>
Certainly ranking high on such a list would be the work of J. F. C. Fuller and Basil H. Liddell Hart in establishing the theoretical framework for the air-land team in armored warfare. Blitzkrieg warfare as employed by Germany owed much to their ideas and, contrary to popular assumptions, involved aircraft at a level equally important with tanks and motorized infantry. Its employment in France and Russia in 1940 and 1941 depended heavily on coordinated—in fact leading—air attacks applying aircraft in a manner that Mitchell would have understood well but Douhet and Seversky would have thought inefficient.19
在美国和日本，影响舰载航空兵的理论和技术发展几乎同时发生，而米切尔在1921年击沉“奥斯特弗里斯兰”号以及他早年（分别在1912年和1924年）对即将与日本开战的预言，无意中成为了这场战争的催化剂。起初，美国海军认为舰载机的主要用途是为主力舰队侦察。一些特立独行的思想家提出了更为宏大的想法，即如今所谓的对岸投送力量，但没有人真正成功地谈论过舰载机在舰队交战中击沉主力舰的可能性。日本则不太重视传统的战列舰，更关注投送力量而非纯粹的防御，并在1941年12月的珍珠港事件中证明了其战术准备。
Important at the same time in the United States and Japan were theoretical and technological developments affecting carrier-borne naval aviation, in which Mitchell, with his sinking of the Ostfriesland in 1921 and his early prophecies—in 1912 and again in 1924—of impending war with Japan, played the role of unwitting catalyst. At first, the U.S. Navy took the view that carrier-borne aircraft would be useful principally in scouting for the main battle fleet. A few renegade thinkers had more expansive ideas of what is now called a power-projection role against targets ashore, but no one had much success talking about carrier aircraft sinking capital ships in an engagement between fleets. Japan, less committed to traditional ships of the line and more concerned with power projection than with pure defense, proved its tactical readiness at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
第一次世界大战后的英国，皇家空军于1918年由原有军种的航空兵组建而成，此后开始了长达二十年的争取独立地位的斗争。1919年12月，时任陆军和空军大臣的温斯顿·丘吉尔宣布，“皇家空军的首要职责是驻守大英帝国”。空军元帅休·特伦查德爵士（1919年至1929年任空军参谋长）曾就索马里兰问题提出，飞机可以用于帝国的治安维护。1920年，丘吉尔要求为美索不达米亚（伊拉克）制定一套切实可行的“空中管制”方案。该方案于1922年首次实施，强调空中存在、强制力和最小限度使用武力。到1923年，在中东地区以空中力量替代地面部队的策略已使每年维持秩序的成本节省了75万英镑。到20世纪30年代中期，一套完整的作战运用理论已经制定完成，并在英国皇家空军参谋学院和帝国国防学院进行授课。20
In Great Britain following World War I, the Royal Air Force, created in 1918 from the air arms of the older services, began a twenty-year struggle to retain its status as a separate entity. In December 1919 Winston Churchill, then minister for war and air, declared that “the first duty of the RAF is to garrison the British Empire.” Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard (chief of air staff from 1919 to 1929) had first suggested, with regard to Somaliland, that aircraft could be adapted to the policing functions of the empire. In 1920 Churchill asked that a practical scheme for “air control” be worked out for Mesopotamia (Iraq) as well. First employed in 1922, emphasizing presence, coercion, and minimum application of force, the substitution of air for ground forces in the Middle East had by 1923 lopped £750,000 from the annual costs of maintaining order. By the mid-1930s, a thoroughgoing doctrine for employment had been worked out and was being taught at the RAF Staff College and the Imperial Defence College.20
两次世界大战之间，英国皇家空军发展的另一个主要方向是着眼未来，强调独立开展针对敌方物质和精神资源的空中作战。必须不惜一切代价避免重蹈第一次世界大战的覆辙，这种观点在英国广为流传，也为皇家空军参谋部所接受。他们认为，空袭的目标是敌方力量的源头而非表面表现，这样既能使战争更具决定性，又能促成更迅速、最终也更人道的决胜。特伦查德在这方面也发挥了主导作用，他越来越强调打击敌方士气的打击的重要性。在整个20世纪20年代，特伦查德（或许政府并非如此）认定的假想敌是法国，直到希特勒崛起后才被德国取代。特伦查德的民族中心主义观点使他无需担忧双边空战；他坚信法国会“先发出警报”。直到1936-1937年，政府内部，尤其是财政部，一些较为冷静的人士才最终克服了英国皇家空军坚持将大部分资源投入轰炸机司令部的立场。将重点转向防空和战斗机司令部的决定来得正是时候，但这并不符合空军参谋部大多数成员的意见。
The other principal theme of RAF development between the wars centered on the future, and stressed independent air operations against an enemy's material and moral resources. A repetition of the slaughter in the First World War had to be avoided at all costs, a view widely shared in Britain and distinctly amenable to the RAF staff. Air attacks aimed at the sources as opposed to the manifestations of an enemy's strength, it was argued, would both restore decisiveness to warfare and produce a much swifter and hence in the end more humane decision. Here as well Trenchard took the lead, coming more and more to emphasize the decisiveness of an attack aimed at the enemy's morale. The necessary presumed enemy throughout the 1920s, for Trenchard if not for the government, was France, replaced by Germany only after the rise of Hitler. Trenchard's ethnocentric views shielded him from worrying about a two-way air war; the French, he was convinced, would “squeal first.” Not until 1936–1937 would cooler heads in the government, principally in the Treasury, overcome the RAF's insistence on committing the majority of its resources to Bomber Command. The decision to switch the emphasis to air defense, and Fighter Command, came just in time and did not reflect the views of the majority of the air staff.
在美国，将杜黑和米切尔的宏大概念转化为一套针对敌方工业网络作战的详细作战理论，是美国陆军航空兵战术学校的工作。自1920年成立以来，该战术学校的课程涵盖了空中战术和战略的各个方面。但从1926年左右开始，轰炸机独立于地面部队作战的战略作用逐渐成为一个重要主题，并在1932年后占据主导地位。或许是因为一些教官认为杜黑设想的轰炸机群规模难以想象，他们开始思考，是否有可能通过对一个国家的工业进行细致的科学研究，找出特定的目标，摧毁这些目标本身就能使整个或一系列工业瘫痪。如果能够识别并摧毁若干此类“瓶颈”目标，或许就能以相对较小的兵力，以近乎外科手术般的精准度，使敌方的战争生产陷入瘫痪，从而使其丧失进一步抵抗的能力。因此，以美国为案例，设计了一系列案例研究，旨在确定工业集中度、各行业的组成部分、各组成部分的相对重要性，以及那些看似最为关键的目标遭受空袭的脆弱性。
In the United States, the translation of Douhet's and Mitchell's broad concepts into an elaborated doctrine of employment for operations against the enemy industrial web was the work of the U.S. Army's Air Corps Tactical School. From its beginning in 1920, the Tactical School's curriculum treated all aspects of aerial tactics and strategy. But beginning around 1926, the strategic role of bombardment aircraft operating independently of surface forces emerged as an important theme, and after 1932 it became dominant. Perhaps because they found it impossible to envisage bomber fleets of the size implied by Douhet, some of the instructors began to wonder whether it might be possible, through careful, scientific study of a nation's industry, to single out particular targets whose destruction would of itself bring to a halt an entire industry or series of industries. If a number of such “bottleneck” targets could be identified and destroyed, it might be possible, with a relatively small force, to bring an enemy's war production to a halt with almost surgical precision, thereby rendering the enemy incapable of further resistance. Accordingly, case studies were devised using the United States as a test case, to determine the degree of industrial concentration, the component parts of various industries, the relative importance of the parts, and the vulnerability to air attack of what appeared to be the most critical targets.
识别目标是一回事，从空中击中目标又是另一回事。然而，至少在乐观主义者看来，技术似乎正在跟上步伐。新型B-17轰炸机拥有所需的航程、速度、高度和载弹量。1933年，当改进型斯佩里轰炸瞄准器和新型诺登Mark XV轰炸瞄准器的订单下达时，人们似乎看到了这样一种景象：一支由大约100架B-17轰炸机组成的机队，可以从某个友方基地（或许在英国）起飞，在高空（或许25000英尺，目的是为了超越敌方防空炮和战斗机的有效射程）飞行数百英里。在那里，它们会组成一个大型编队，以倍增对目标的打击力度和轰炸机机炮的防御火力。这些轰炸机将使用新型轰炸瞄准器精确瞄准目标，引爆炸弹，然后返回数百英里外的基地。他们所到之处，工业将遭受重创，甚至可能被彻底摧毁（实际上可能只有一家工厂，但选择这家工厂作为目标，其毁灭必然会重创整个工业）。当局决定此类袭击应在白天进行，因为这样可以提高命中率。至于轰炸机群是否应由战斗机护航，最终决定否决，主要是因为当时还没有航程足够远的战斗机。21
Identifying targets was one thing; hitting them from the air was something else. Yet technology, at least for the optimists, seemed to be keeping pace. The new B-17 had the range, speed, altitude, and bomb-carrying capacity deemed necessary. And when orders were placed for improved models of the Sperry bombsight and the new Norden Mark XV bombsight in 1933, it appeared possible that the day might not be far off when a fleet of perhaps 100 B-17s could take off from some friendly base (perhaps in England), fly at high altitudes (perhaps 25,000 feet, the purpose being to get above the effective height of enemy antiaircraft guns and defensive fighters) for several hundred miles. There, grouped together in a large formation to multiply both the amount of force delivered on the target and the defensive firepower of the bombers' guns, they would carefully sight in the target with the new bombsights, trigger their bomb loads, and then return several hundred miles to their base. Behind them they would leave a badly crippled, if not devastated, industry (actually only one factory, perhaps, but so chosen that its destruction must inevitably cripple an entire industry). It was decided that such attacks should take place in daylight because accuracy could be expected to be better. The question whether the bomber fleet should be escorted to the target by fighter aircraft was decided in the negative, primarily because no such aircraft of sufficient range yet existed.21
大致而言，这就是美国陆军航空队在二战中秉持的“白天、高空、精确轰炸选定目标”的理论。后来的事实证明，该理论存在诸多缺陷，其中包括：(1) 未明言的假设是能够获得关于敌方目标的精确情报；(2) 普遍存在一种倾向，即夸大仍在图纸上的设计所预期的能力，同时低估了限制因素可能产生的影响——其中最重要的因素之一便是天气条件对飞行作业的影响；(3) 只关注问题的部分而忽略整体，这种还原论并非航空理论家所独有，但它导致人们过于关注手段而非目的，同时还存在一种将破坏与控制混淆的倾向，并将战略简化为目标选择问题；(4) 严重高估了轰炸机在面对英勇顽强的防御空军时的自卫能力。然而，从理论角度来看，应该很清楚，最初的美国概念，即强调巧妙运用武力以节省成本，不能被视为杜赫坦式的幻想。
Such, in rough outline, was the theory of “daylight, high altitude, precision bombardment of selected targets” that the U.S. Army Air Forces carried with them into the Second World War. Subsequent events would reveal many shortcomings in the theory, among which would have to be included: (1) the unstated assumption that precise intelligence regarding enemy targets would be available; (2) a prevailing tendency to magnify expected capabilities derived from designs still on the drawing boards, at the same time minimizing the likely effects of limiting factors—not the least of which would prove to be the impact of weather conditions on flying operations; (3) a pattern of looking at the parts of the problem at the expense of the whole, a form of reductionism surely not limited to air theorists, but one leading to a concentration on means rather than ends, running parallel with a tendency to confuse destruction with control, and at the same time reducing strategy to a targeting problem; and (4) a gross over-estimate of the self-defending capacity of bomber aircraft against a daring and dedicated defending air force. From the standpoint of theory, however, it should be clear that the initial American concept, with its overriding emphasis on economy of force artfully applied, cannot be dismissed as a Douhetan fantasy.
在两次世界大战之间的岁月里，不同理论家和世界主要强国对空战的不同理解并非源于公认的空军原则。尽管杜黑和米切尔都做出了努力，但他们都未能像马汉或约米尼那样，为空军爱好者揭示战争第三维度的奥秘。相反，飞机的应用是各大国各自选择的产物，反映了各国力图将飞机的独特能力整合起来，以支援陆海部队或独立作战，并使其既经济又符合国家目标。另一个推动因素，尤其是在美国，是建立一支独立的空军，这支空军的建立源于其能够执行其他任何军种都无法完成的独特任务。
In the years between the world wars, the differing approaches to air warfare by the various theorists and among the major powers of the world were not derived from commonly accepted principles of air power. Despite the efforts of Douhet and Mitchell, neither proved to be a Mahan or a Jomini from whom the air power enthusiasts could draw the secrets of the third dimension in warfare. Rather, the airplane's application was a product of separate choice within each major nation, reflecting an effort to integrate the unique capabilities of aircraft in support of land and sea forces, or in independent operations, in a manner that was both affordable and attuned to the achievement of national objectives. A secondary driving force, especially in the United States, was the effort to create an independent air arm, one that would owe its establishment to its ability to perform a unique mission that could not be achieved by any of the other services.
三
III
在爱德华·华纳的论文发表于《现代战略的缔造者》两年后，盟军结束了战争。正如伯纳德·布罗迪后来所写，“空军力量在二战中得到了强有力的证明。但得到证明的并非杜黑的空军概念，而是米切尔的空军概念——即任何能飞的东西。空军在战术运用方面取得了最为辉煌的成功，并赢得了其他军种的完全尊重和钦佩。相比之下，纯粹的战略成功，无论在特定情况下多么意义深远，都无法完全说服那些不持立场的观察家。”<sup> 22</sup>
Within two years after the publication of Edward Warner's essay in Makers of Modern Strategy, the Allied powers brought the war to an end. “Air power,” as Bernard Brodie would later write, “had a mighty vindication in World War II. But it was Mitchell's conception of it—anything that flies—rather than Douhet's that was vindicated. It was in tactical employment that success was most spectacular and that the air forces won the unqualified respect and admiration of the older services. By contrast, the purely strategic successes, however far-reaching in particular circumstances, were never completely convincing to uncommitted observers.”22
理论家和批评家们迅速获取的大量数据，其规模之大在战争史上前所未有。除苏联外，所有主要参战国的空中活动都被公之于众：德国和日本是因为别无选择；意大利和法国是因为没什么可说的；而美国则是因为其政府、高级空军军官和公众都感到新获得的“原子弹盾牌”带来的安全感。在英国，政府一如既往地保持克制，但并未完全压制其高级空军司令亚瑟·哈里斯空军上将直言不讳的评估。23
The mass of data that quickly became available to theorists and critics alike was unmatched in extent in the earlier history of warfare. The air activities of every major participant save Russia were laid bare: for Germany and Japan because they were not offered a choice; for Italy and France because there wasn't much to tell; and for the United States because its government, senior airmen, and public felt secure behind their new-found “atomic shield.” In the United Kingdom, the government exercised its traditional restraint, but not to the extent of holding in check the outspoken assessment of its senior air commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris.23
布罗迪对杜黑和米切尔理论的解读，体现了他对针对德国和日本的战略空袭行动的批判；事实上，到了20世纪50年代中期，他已开始认为这些行动不可避免地源于19世纪和20世纪工业化国家滥用武力的倾向。此外，他认为这些行动预示着一个更加灾难性的未来。尽管布罗迪的批评带有对未来拥有原子弹和热核武器的担忧，但他的批评仍然保持克制，并局限于他所看到的证据。许多其他人的情况也类似，对他们而言，诺布尔·弗兰克兰那句令人难忘的评论——人们宁愿感受战略轰炸，也不愿了解它——更为贴切。虽然这里并非总结关于二战战略轰炸效果的无休止争论的合适地点，但仍需提及几个主要主题。24
Brodie's interpretation of what had happened to the theories of Douhet and Mitchell was that of a critic of the strategic air campaigns conducted against Germany and Japan; indeed, of a critic who by the mid-1950s had come to view those campaigns as having derived inexorably from a tendency among the industrialized nations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to employ force beyond reason. Furthermore, he believed the campaigns pointed the way to an even more devastating future. But although colored by his fears for a future armed with atomic and thermonuclear weapons, Brodie's criticism was nonetheless restrained and limited to the evidence as he saw it. The same could be said for many others, for whom Noble Frankland's memorable comment—people have preferred to feel rather than to know about strategic bombing—is more appropriate. Although this is not the place to summarize the unending debate about the effectiveness of strategic bombing in World War II, a few principal themes should be mentioned.24
关于西欧战争，争议主要集中在以下几点：(1) 英国皇家空军轰炸机司令部公开宣称的区域轰炸政策旨在打击德国平民士气，但其效果不佳且不人道；(2) 美国精确轰炸行动迟迟未能见效；(3) 到1945年初，美国轰炸行动的策略逐渐从精准打击转向棍棒式轰炸；(4) 鉴于在当时的形势下，仅凭空中力量无法取得胜利，投入轰炸行动的大量物质和人力资源是否可以更好地用于其他方面。关于日本，争议主要集中在原子弹的决定上。由于无需入侵就能迫使日本投降，原子弹的有效性已不再重要。美国于1945年3月采取的新战术导致日本城市化为灰烬，但多年来受到的批评远比预期要少。珍珠港事件以及随后日本对战俘的暴行似乎为任何回应都提供了正当理由，而且无论如何，原子弹问题很快就掩盖了所有其他问题。
With regard to the war in Western Europe, controversy has centered on (1) the ineffectiveness and inhumanity of RAF Bomber Command's avowed policy of area bombing directed against German civilian morale, (2) the long-delayed effectiveness of U.S. precision bombing efforts, (3) the drift of the U.S. attacks by early 1945 towards a bombing effort more clublike than swordlike, and (4) given that victory through air power alone proved unattainable in the prevailing circumstances, whether the immense material and human resources devoted to the bombing campaigns might have been better employed in other ways. With regard to Japan, controversy has centered on the atomic bomb decision. Effectiveness, given that surrender was induced without the dreaded invasion, became a moot point. The U.S. adoption in March 1945 of new tactics resulting in the incineration of Japanese cities has received far less criticism over the years than might have been expected. Pearl Harbor and subsequent Japanese atrocities against prisoners of war seemed to justify almost anything in response and in any case, the atomic bomb issue quickly devoured all others.
尽管二战期间美国和英国的战略轰炸行动受到了广泛的关注，并且确实构成了两国战后大部分计划的基础，但至少同样重要——如果从每个战区的投入和战术成功来衡量，则更为重要——的是空战中一些非杜黑式的方面。
Although the American and British strategic bombing campaigns of World War II have received widespread attention, and indeed formed the basis for most postwar planning in both countries, at least equally important—more so when measured in terms of effort expended and tactical success in every theater—were some of the non-Douhetan aspects of the air war.
尽管德国空军在技术上是一个独立的军种，但就其理论发展和装备而言，它从始至终都牢牢地处于最高统帅部的控制之下。其战斗机、空降伞兵和空运部队的作用都是为了支援国防军的作战行动。在整个战争期间，德国几乎没有能力进行任何能够独立于地面部队做出决策的远程空中作战。这并非暗示英国皇家空军赢得不列颠空战轻而易举——那又是一场“你一生中见过的最惊险的战役”——但德国的装备、作战理论和指挥能力剥夺了德国空军任何真正的胜利机会，正如他们后来在斯大林格勒空运行动中所做的那样。诚然，在20世纪30年代，德国也曾出现过一些类似“杜黑主义者”的人物——其中最著名的是沃尔特·韦弗将军，直到他1936年去世——但事实证明，他们与德国空军格格不入。必须记住，希特勒本人至少在 1943 年之前，都曾设想过征服的土地不会变成毫无用处的废墟，而是可以增强德国的经济和军事实力。
Despite its technical status as a separate service, the Luftwaffe from beginning to end remained firmly under the control of the High Command so far as its doctrinal development and equipment were concerned. The roles of its fighting aircraft, its airborne parachutists, and its air transport forces were all designed to support the operations of the Wehrmacht. The German capability to conduct long-range air operations of the sort that had any hope of producing decisions independently of surface forces was nil throughout the war. This is not to suggest that it was easy for the RAF to win the battle of Britain—yet another “nearest run thing you ever saw in your life”—but German equipment, employment doctrine, and leadership deprived the Luftwaffe of any real chance of success, just as they later did in the airlift operations at Stalingrad. It is true that German “Douhetists” of sorts had appeared now and then in the thirties—General Walter Wever being the most prominent until his death in 1936—but had proved out of place. Hitler himself, until at least 1943 it must be remembered, had visions of conquests that would not be useless rubble but that could add to Germany's economic and military strength.
日本陆军和海军都拥有航空兵，但只有海军航空兵发展出了规模庞大的远程打击力量。珍珠港事件发生四个月后，1942年4月，哈尔西和杜立特从“大黄蜂”号航空母舰（罗斯福总统称之为“香格里拉”）起飞，对东京发动空袭，这暴露出日本战略家们未曾预料到的一个新弱点。5月，珊瑚海海战爆发，成为历史上首次交战双方舰队从未在视线范围内交战的海战。1942年6月，中途岛海战中，凭借勇气和运气，四艘日本航空母舰被击沉，这向世人昭示，海战已进入一个新时代。
Japan's army and navy each had an air contingent, but only the naval air arm developed a long-range striking force of formidable proportions. Within four months of its success at Pearl Harbor, the Halsey-Doolittle raid launched from the carrier Hornet (from Shangri-La, said President Roosevelt) against Tokyo in April 1942 signaled a new vulnerability not taken into account by Japanese planners. In May the battle of the Coral Sea became the first naval engagement where the opposing fleets were never in sight of one another. And at Midway in June 1942, the sinking of four Japanese carriers by a combination of courage and luck made it apparent to all that naval warfare had entered a new age.
苏联空军对最终胜利的贡献至今仍笼罩在迷雾之中，这或许可以从其战后初期对美国式空军的轻视中窥见一斑。1945年后的几年里，苏联空军的建设方向与当时并无二致。当时和现在一样，苏联空军主要（但不完全）由支援地面部队的飞机组成，二战期间主要支援地面部队，而现在也包括海军部队。20世纪50年代并不存在的轰炸机差距，正如60年代初同样不存在的导弹差距一样，与1936年至1940年间德国空军的心理优势类似，更多地是人们主观臆断的结果，而非实际力量的体现。
The contributions of the Soviet Union's air forces to final victory remain clouded in an obscurity best revealed by its initial postwar de-emphasis on the kind of air force developed in the United States in the years immediately following 1945. Then as now, the Soviet air forces were composed primarily, but not exclusively, of aircraft designed to support surface forces, during World War II primarily ground forces but now also including naval units. The nonexistent bomber gap of the fifties, like the similarly nonexistent missile gap of the early sixties, was, not unlike the Luftwaffe's psychological superiority of 1936–1940, more a product of the beholders' minds than of the forces in question.
1945年后，美国空军空中力量理论中一个至关重要的方面，却被历史学家们大多忽略了，那就是如今所谓的战术空中力量——特别是其在支援地面部队作战时的指挥与控制。在20世纪30年代的空军战术学校，攻击航空兵（当时如此称呼）被赋予了三项职能。首先，在必要时借助追击航空兵的协助，夺取战区的制空权。对敌方空军取得优势（如果可能，甚至达到绝对优势）本身就被视为空军能够为友军地面部队做出的最大贡献。其次，优先考虑的是通过打击超出炮兵有效射程的敌军及其补给来孤立战场——也就是如今所说的战场封锁。第三，也是最后，是对战场上的敌军进行直接攻击——即近距离空中支援。
An aspect of air power theory of great significance to the U.S. Air Force after 1945, which has been largely neglected by historians, concerns what is now called tactical air power—in particular, its command and control when employed in support of ground forces. At the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s, attack aviation (as it was then called) was assigned three functions. First, with the assistance when necessary of pursuit aviation, was the attainment of air superiority in the theater of operations. Establishing dominance (supremacy if possible) over the enemy air force was seen as in and of itself the single greatest contribution an air force could make to friendly surface forces. Next in order of priority would come efforts to isolate the battlefield by striking enemy forces and supplies that lay beyond the effective range of artillery—what is now called battlefield interdiction. Third, and last, would come attacks directly against enemy troops on the battlefield—or close air support.
1942年末至1943年初北非的战事似乎印证了这种优先事项的安排，至少对空军官兵而言是如此。地面指挥官对此仍持怀疑态度，直到1943年5月突尼斯战役结束，部分原因是他们不满空军指挥官试图对所有空中力量进行集中控制——从而增强在战区总司令眼中关键点上灵活运用空中力量的能力。1943年7月，陆军部发布了《野战手册100-20：空中力量的指挥与运用》，这份由陆军航空兵在没有陆军地面部队协助的情况下编写的文件，对空军官兵来说可谓是一次“政变”。手册开篇便以大写字母强调：陆军和空军是平等且独立的力量，二者互不相干。
Experiences in North Africa in late 1942 and early 1943 seemed to confirm this arrangement of priorities, at least to the airmen. Ground commanders remained skeptical until the end of the Tunisian campaign in May 1943, in part because they resented the efforts of the air commanders to establish centralized control over all air assets—and thereby to enhance flexibility of employment against the decisive points as seen by the overall theater commander. The airmen managed a coup of sorts with the publication by the War Department in July 1943 of Field Manual 100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power, a document prepared by the Army Air Forces without the assistance of the Army Ground Forces. It opened by asserting, in capital letters: Land power and air power are co-equal and independent forces: neither is an auxiliary of the other.
该手册进一步阐明，“固有灵活性”应被视为空军最大的优势；只有当指挥权完全掌握在直接向战区总司令负责的空军人员手中时，这种灵活性才能得到有效发挥。不能再将空中力量的潜在决定性作用分散给下级师级或军级指挥官。此外，该手册还明确列出了战术空军的优先事项层级：（1）空中优势，（2）空中封锁，以及（3）近距离空中支援。1944年6月诺曼底登陆后，欧洲战场上可用的飞机和机组人员数量众多（而德国空军的实力已经十分强大），使得空军人员无需再向地面部队挥舞FM 100-20手册；时机和环境为空军提供了足够的力量去做任何想做的事情，而发生的此类辩论与具体行动有关，而不是与理论分歧有关，尽管后者对双方的理论家来说仍然具有重要的现实意义。
The manual went on to spell out that “inherent flexibility” was to be seen as the single greatest asset of an air force; that such flexibility could be exploited effectively only if command were in the hands of an airman responsible exclusively to the overall theater commander. There could be no more frittering away of air power's latent decisiveness by parcelling out air assets to subordinate division-or-corps-level commanders. Also, the manual spelled out an explicit hierarchy of priorities for the tactical air forces: (1) air superiority, (2) interdiction, and (3) close air support. In Europe after the June 1944 landings in Normandy the abundance of available aircraft and crews (against an already staggering Luftwaffe) made it unnecessary for the airmen to wave FM 100–20 in the faces of their ground forces partners; timing and circumstances had provided enough in the way of air forces to do everything desired and such debates as occurred were related to specific operations rather than doctrinal differences, although the latter retained a lively relevance for doctrinaires on both sides.
就目前而言，在应用于战术空军的空军力量理论发展成熟过程中，有两个方面值得关注：在战后初期，由于重点放在为“新原子时代”发展远程力量上，战术空军及其理论被忽视；到了20世纪60年代中期，在印度支那，1943年围绕中央控制权的斗争不得不再次上演，但这次的战场不再是地面部队，而是海军、陆军和海军陆战队的空军。25
For present purposes, two aspects of the maturation of air power theory as applied to tactical air forces are important to keep in mind: in the immediate postwar period, with the emphasis attached to developing long-range forces for “the new Air Atomic Age,” tactical air forces and doctrine were neglected, and by the mid-1960s in Indochina the battle of 1943 over centralized control would have to be fought out all over again, not with ground forces but with three other air forces—those of the navy, army, and marine corps.25
第四
IV
自1945年8月两颗原子弹在日本爆炸以来，已经过去了数十年。在此期间，关于空战（如今也包括太空战）的理论研究几乎发展成一个独立的产业，其中聚集了大量博弈论专家、统计学行为科学家、经济学家和其他社会科学家——他们中的许多人似乎沉迷于某种术语，而这种术语或许潜意识里旨在将不可思议的事情合理化。尽管与核武器相关的战略问题不在本文的讨论范围之内，但它与1945年后的空中力量密切相关，因此在此有必要提及一些相关内容。
Decades have now passed since two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan in August 1945. In the interim, theorizing about air—and now space—warfare has become almost an industry unto itself, one heavily populated with game theorists, statistically oriented behavioral scientists, economists, and other social scientists—many of whom seem addicted to a jargon that may be subconsciously aimed at making the unthinkable appear rational. Although the topic of strategy as it relates to nuclear weapons falls outside the realm of this discussion, it so closely impinges on air power after 1945 that a few observations are unavoidable here.
在核战略领域，那些思想产生过显著影响（尽管有时只是短暂的）的参与者名单很长。<sup> 26</sup>这些作者大多以不同的方式探讨了核时代的战争问题，而非仅仅或专门探讨空战——在这方面，他们与二十世纪初的航空爱好者有相似之处。大多数重要著作都出自20世纪50年代中期至60年代末，这些人共同构成了所谓战略知识分子的核心。我们不能指望飞行员们会耐心地审视他们的集体努力。这或许是件好事，因为他们天生对理论持怀疑态度，会让他们百思不得其解，不明白这一切究竟有何意义。对于那些真正付出努力的人来说，通常会出现两种结果：要么他们陷入了区分各种“学派”的概念复杂性中，要么他们得出了一个严峻且不太令人信服的结论，即自 1945 年秋季以来出现的真正新思想的数量少得令人不安。
The roster of participants in the field of nuclear strategy whose ideas have had striking if sometimes only momentary impact is a long one.26 In their different ways, most of these writers have addressed the question of war in the nuclear age, rather than air warfare specifically or exclusively—in this respect paralleling the aviation enthusiasts of the early twentieth century. Most of the important writings date from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, and collectively the group makes up the core of the so-called strategy intellectuals. A patient examination of their collective efforts is not something one can expect from pilots. This is probably just as well, since their innate skepticism of the theoretical would leave them wondering what all the fuss is about. For those who do make the effort, one of two results is regularly predictable: either they become enmeshed in the conceptual intricacies separating various “schools,” or they come to the stark and not very confidence-inspiring conclusion that the number of truly new ideas that have surfaced since the fall of 1945 is disconcertingly small.
伯纳德·布罗迪1945年11月发表的论文《原子弹与美国安全》（后经扩充，成为《绝对武器》一书的两章内容）确立了威慑作为核战略主导概念的地位。“迄今为止，我们军事机构的主要目的是赢得战争。从现在起，其主要目的必须是避免战争。它几乎不可能有其他目的。” <sup>27</sup>在接下来的二十年里，布罗迪引领了该领域的思想潮流。他的《导弹时代的战略》至今仍是我们所见过的唯一一部真正意义上的经典之作，探讨了兵力结构（多少才算足够？）和兵力态势（进攻、防御、报复、先发制人等）等关键问题。与一些早期研究原子问题的学者不同，布罗迪正视了一个事实：时间可能无法倒流，当务之急是如何监管这些新型武器，从而最大限度地降低其使用的可能性以及一旦使用所造成的破坏程度。他那令人敬畏的现实主义使他与其他一些理论家——其中就包括爱德华·米德·厄尔——区别开来。后者提出了一种更为绝望的论调，认为除了取缔战争之外别无他法。如今，这种论调令人遗憾地、但不可避免地已被否定，而其积极的拥护者则存在于当代战略思想的军备控制和裁军学派之中。28
Bernard Brodie's November 1945 paper “The Atomic Bomb and American Security,” later included in expanded form as two chapters of The Absolute Weapon, staked out deterrence as the dominant concept of nuclear strategy. “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other purpose.”27 For the next two decades Brodie set the pace among thinkers in the field. His Strategy in the Missile Age remains even today the only true classic we have yet seen on the essential questions of force structure (how much is enough?) and force postures (offensive, defensive, retaliatory, preemptive, etc.). Unlike some early writers on the atomic question, Brodie faced up to the fact that there was probably no way to turn back the clock, and that the imperative question would become how to regulate the new weapons so as to minimize both the chances of their use and the levels of devastation that would result if they were used. His imposing realism separated him from certain other theorists—not the least of whom was Edward Mead Earle—who launched a more despairing line of argument that saw no answer other than the outlawing of war, a now regrettably but inevitably discredited theme whose active pursuers can be found among those who make up the arms control and disarmament school of contemporary strategic thought.28
最初，在1945年至1953年间，关于空战的理论研究被战后重建和美苏之间日益加剧的冷战等更为紧迫的问题所掩盖。美国军队的复员甚至到了瓦解的地步，迅速促使政府转向以原子弹（后来是核武器）报复相威胁的威慑政策。多年来，这种政策在形式和细节上经历了无数次的演变，但在概念实质上却始终未变。<sup> 29</sup>最初，美国的“原子垄断”仅限于少数几种只能由大型轰炸机投掷的武器，而且这些武器的组装过程复杂且耗时。在20世纪40年代末，当时只有不超过六个合格的组装团队能够胜任这项工作。然而，到了20世纪50年代中期，技术突破和朝鲜战争带来的财政投入激增，开启了“核富足”时代，而大规模报复的“理论”正是这一时代的体现。
Initially, theorizing about air warfare between 1945 and 1953 took a back seat to the more urgent problems of postwar recovery and the hardening Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Demobilization to the point of disintegration of American military forces quickly led the government toward a policy of deterrence through the threat of atomic, later nuclear, retaliation, a posture that over the years has gone through innumerable convolutions of form and detail but none of conceptual substance.29 At first America's “atomic monopoly” consisted of a handful of weapons that could be delivered only by very large bombers and required elaborate and time-consuming assembly processes, for which at one time in the late forties no more than six qualified assembly teams were available. By the mid-1950s, however, a combination of technical breakthroughs and the unleashing of the purse strings, brought on by the war in Korea, opened an era of “nuclear plenty” that was reflected in the “doctrine” of massive retaliation.
大规模核武器报复的概念起源可以追溯到1945年秋季亨利·H·阿诺德将军和卡尔·A·斯帕茨将军在美国国会的证词中。<sup> 30</sup> 1951年夏季的预算和兵力结构决策催生了实施这一计划的军事能力。1954年初，在新任艾森豪威尔政府对国防政策进行为期一年的评估之后，该计划正式宣布。这一决定源于朝鲜战争带来的挫败感以及艾森豪威尔对美国经济未来脆弱性的担忧。本质上，这是一项经济决策而非战略决策，旨在“从长远来看获得更大的经济效益”。
The conceptual origins of massive retaliation via nuclear weapons can be seen in testimony by Generals Henry H. Arnold and Carl A. Spaatz before the U.S. Congress as early as the fall of 1945.30 The military capability to carry it out was born of budget and force-structure decisions made in the summer of 1951. And its announcement in early 1954, following the new Eisenhower administration's year-long review of defense policy, was driven by the frustrations of the Korean experience and Eisenhower's fears relating to the future vulnerability of the American economy. Essentially, it was an economic rather than a strategic decision, one that sought “more bang for the buck over the long haul.”
理论家们立即质疑，除了美苏最终决战之外，大规模报复的合理性何在。另一些人则质疑引入“过度杀伤时代”的合理性，他们认为，能够可靠地投送相对少量的核武器就足以满足威慑需求。“有限威慑”理论尽管在1957年美国海军大力推行，但在美国却从未真正流行起来；在欧洲，尤其是在法国，以及一定程度上在英国，该理论是出于无奈而被采纳的。在艾森豪威尔执政时期，大规模报复的威胁逐渐减弱，并采取措施改进常规（非核武器）军事力量，以应对非致命性冲突。这一趋势在肯尼迪政府时期加速发展（“灵活反应”），但与此同时做出的另一个决定是将战略核力量发展到前所未有的水平，主要是通过将重点从轰炸机转向洲际海基和陆基弹道导弹，包括 1000 枚民兵洲际弹道导弹和 54 枚泰坦洲际弹道导弹，以及一支由 41 艘北极星型潜艇组成的舰队，每艘潜艇配备 16 枚潜射弹道导弹。
Theorists immediately questioned the credibility of massive retaliation in instances other than a final face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union. Others questioned the sanity of introducing an “age of overkill,”31 arguing that the ability to deliver with certainty a relatively few nuclear weapons would be sufficient for the needs of deterrence. The “finite deterrence” school, despite a strong effort by the U.S. Navy in 1957, never really got off the ground in the United States; in Europe, particularly in France but also to some extent in the United Kingdom, it was adopted out of necessity. Under Eisenhower, the threat of massive retaliation was muted over time and steps were taken to improve conventional (non-nuclear-armed) military forces for use in less than mortal confrontations. This trend was accelerated under the Kennedy administration (“flexible response”), but another decision made at the same time was to build up the strategic nuclear forces to previously undreamt-of levels, primarily by switching the emphasis from bombers to sea- and land-launched ballistic missiles of intercontinental range, consisting of 1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan ICBMs and a fleet of 41 Polaris-type submarines armed with 16 SLBMs each.
未来的历史学家或许会将1961年肯尼迪/麦克纳马拉的决定视为真正的分水岭：灵活反应能力的提升促使苏联（即便并非只是迫不及待地）在越南尝试运用这种能力；而1962年10月古巴导弹危机期间，苏联冷酷无情地炫耀其战略力量的集结，最终导致苏联下定决心，绝不再与美国手中拥有的绝对优势战略力量正面交锋。这种论点——在苏联问题专家中尚未被广泛接受——必须经受住“事后归因”论证的指责；它必须证明，20世纪70年代苏联的军事集结源于一种“永不再战”的心理，而非出于建立一支能够发动先发制人打击或基于美国对其自身及其盟国指挥控制机制脆弱性的认知而进行“核讹诈”的军队的愿望。32
Future historians may come to see the Kennedy/McNamara decisions of 1961 as true watersheds, the improved flexible response capability contributing to a willingness, if not simply an itch, to try it out in Vietnam, and the strategic force buildup, cold-bloodedly flaunted during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, leading to a Soviet decision never again to be faced down by vastly superior strategic forces in American hands. Such a thesis—not widely accepted among Sovietologists—will have to survive accusations that it represents no more than a post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument; it will have to demonstrate that the Russian buildup of the 1970s derived from a “never again” syndrome rather than from a desire to create forces capable of either a disarming first strike or “nuclear blackmail” based on U.S. perceptions of the vulnerability of its own forces and their allied command-and-control mechanisms.32
因此，涉及核武器的空天战争及其理论研究如今陷入停滞，尽管20世纪80年代初期曾出现过异常高的“噪音”，但这并无改变。两个超级大国似乎都无法克服其内部各派系为加强威慑而采取的行动，这些派系认为，威慑失败的代价将是双方的自杀式行为。与艾森豪威尔时代以来几乎所有旨在恢复核武器建设理性的举措一样，1978-1979年的第二阶段战略武器限制谈判（SALT II）提案也因总统政治和国际危机的双重难题而失败。未来的分析家和历史学家最好牢记至少一个令人不快的现实：试图将核武器空战理论的发展与冷战倡议引发的防御态势变化区分开来，几乎是不可能的。
Air and space warfare involving nuclear weapons, along with theorizing on the subject, is therefore now in limbo, an excessively high “noise level” in the early 1980s to the contrary notwithstanding. Neither superpower seems able to overcome the momentum of internal constituencies bent on improving deterrence by making the costs of its failure mutually suicidal. Like virtually every other initiative since the Eisenhower years to restore sanity to the nuclear arms buildup, the SALT II proposals of 1978–1979 foundered on the twin problems of presidential politics and international crises. Future analysts and historians would do well to keep in mind at least one unwelcome fact: the effort to untangle developments in the theory of nuclear-armed air warfare from changes in defense postures arising from Cold War initiatives is a virtually impossible task.
V
V
自1945年以来，尽管常规空战频繁发生——最显著的例子包括朝鲜战争（1950-1953）、阿以战争（1967和1973）以及印度支那战争（1960-1975）——但理论家们对其关注甚少。尽管航程、速度、载荷和武器投放精度都取得了显著进步，但这些进步却很少对陆地战争的进程产生决定性影响，最显著的例子是1967年埃及上空的空战，以及可以说1972年12月河内上空的空战。
Conventional air warfare in the years since 1945 has attracted far less attention from theorists, despite its having occurred frequently—most notably in Korea (1950–1953), the Arab-Israeli Wars (1967 and 1973), and Indochina (1960–75). Improvements in range, speed, payload, and weapons-delivery accuracy have been phenomenal, but have only rarely exerted decisive effect on the course of war on land, notably over Egypt in 1967 and arguably over Hanoi in December 1972.
朝鲜战争初期几个月的形势要求立即投入使用数量有限的飞机直接支援地面部队。1945年至1950年间，战术飞机的重要性被严重低估，这在作战理论领域也同样存在。美国远东空军司令奥普·韦兰将军在之后的多年里一直感叹，二战的经验教训要么没有被记录下来，要么即使被记录下来也没有被传播出去，或者即使传播出去也没有被阅读或理解。除了中国介入后朝鲜北部地区的情况外，制空权并非主要问题，空军的主要任务是切断敌军的补给和增援力量。在这里，1944年至1945年意大利北部战役的教训再次被吸取：要想有效实施空中封锁，地面部队必须掌握战术主动权。如果没有地面部队的协同作战，飞机单独行动虽然可以骚扰敌人并延缓其补给运输，但无法凭借一己之力取得胜利。33
The prevailing circumstances in the opening months of the war in Korea demanded instant employment of the few available aircraft in direct support of ground forces. The low priority given to tactical aircraft between 1945 and 1950 was matched in the field of doctrine as well, leading General O. P. Weyland, commander of the U.S. Far East Air Forces, to comment for years afterward to the effect that what was remembered from World War II was not written down, or if written down was not disseminated, or if disseminated was not read or understood. Except for the northern reaches of North Korea following the Chinese intervention, air superiority was not much of a problem, and the greatest level of effort by the air forces was devoted to interdiction of enemy supplies and reinforcements. Here the lesson of northern Italy in 1944 and 1945 had to be learned all over again: for air interdiction to be effective, the surface forces had to be in control of the tactical initiative. Operating by themselves without pressure being applied on the enemy by cooperating ground forces, aircraft could harass the enemy and delay the movement of supplies, but could not carry the day by themselves.33
朝鲜战争之后，美国战术空军再次陷入衰落。战略空军司令部的建设被置于绝对优先地位。朝鲜战争的经验被视为一种例外情况，不太可能在未来重演。1955年，曾在朝鲜战争期间担任空军部长的托马斯·K·芬莱特写道，这场战争“是一个特例，空军力量从中几乎无法汲取经验教训，以指导其未来在美国东方外交政策中的角色。”远东空军的最终报告也认同这一观点，指出“任何试图按照朝鲜战争的需求模式来组建空军的做法，都可能对美国造成致命打击。”尽管这些观点最终占据上风，但其他军事思想家试图阻止对战略空军司令部的过度重视。
Following Korea, the American tactical air forces went into decline once again. Overwhelming emphasis was placed on the buildup of the Strategic Air Command. The Korean experience was looked on as an aberration, unlikely to be repeated in the future. In 1955 Thomas K. Finletter, who had been secretary of the air force during the Korean War, wrote that the war had been “a special case, and air power can learn little from there about its future role in United States foreign policy in the East.” The final report of the Far East Air Forces agreed, stating that “certainly any attempt to build an air force from the model of the Korean requirements could be fatal to the United States.34 Although these views prevailed in the end, other military thinkers tried to stem the overriding emphasis being devoted to the Strategic Air Command.
1954年，韦兰将军从远东返回，接管战术空军司令部。此后，他开始了长达五年的斗争，试图为战术空军争取平等的地位，但最终以失败告终。然而，他的大部分精力都集中在为战斗轰炸机研发核能力上。（在20世纪50年代后半期，人们普遍认为“战术”核武器将在“下一场战争”中使用。）因此，专门用于空对空（或空中优势）作战的飞机被忽视，常规弹药的研发也停滞不前。尽管韦兰在1956年曾表示：“近期最有可能发生的冲突将是外围冲突。在这种情况下，它将主要以战术空战为主。”但这种情况依然发生。35在英国，空军元帅约翰·斯莱瑟爵士的观点更为激进：“我们必须预料到会面临其他朝鲜战争……认为强大的空中力量可以在某种程度上替代地面部队艰苦卓绝的战斗和专业技能，这种想法虽然诱人，但却是虚幻的；……对于任何希望空中力量能够提供某种通往胜利的捷径的人来说，这一切都毫无安慰可言。” 36
Returning from the Far East in 1954 to take over the Tactical Air Command, General Weyland began an unsuccessful five-year struggle to gain an equal place for the tactical air forces. Most of his effort, however, was directed toward creating a nuclear capability for fighter-bombers. (Throughout the last half of the 1950s it was accepted as given that “tactical” nuclear weapons would be used in “the next war.”) Consequently, aircraft designed strictly for the air-to-air (or air superiority) role were neglected and the development of conventional munitions was brought to a halt. This occurred despite Weyland's view, expressed in 1956, that “the most likely conflict in the immediate future will be the peripheral type. In this event it will be primarily a tactical air war.”35 In Great Britain, Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor went further: “We must expect to be faced with other Koreas…. The idea that superior air power can in some way be a substitute for hard slogging and professional skill on the ground in this sort of war is beguiling but illusory;…all this is cold comfort for anyone who hopes that air power will provide some kind of short cut to victory.”36
二战后的殖民战争（例如，1945-1954年的印度支那战争、1948-1960年的马来亚战争以及1954-1962年的阿尔及利亚战争）中，空军几乎完全扮演着支援角色。少数研究过这些事件的分析人士普遍认为，空军最有效的用途在于其非火力作战角色——侦察、运输、联络以及为其他兵种提供更高的机动性。然而，这些结论在美国并未引起太多关注。“不要再重蹈朝鲜覆辙！”的呼声引发了其他方面的考量，几乎所有的战前准备都集中在为大规模战争做准备上，而这场战争很可能与苏联发生，并且很可能在欧洲爆发。1967年，以色列空军在六日战争中“偷袭”埃及空军，此时的美国飞行员们已经对在印度支那战争中受到的种种限制感到彻底失望，他们从以色列的计划和执行中看到了他们所熟悉的空战模式。
In the colonial wars after World War II (for example, Indochina, 1945–1954; Malaya, 1948–1960; and Algeria, 1954–1962), air power functioned almost entirely in a supporting mode. The few analysts who studied these events generally concluded that air power's most effective use was in its non-firepower roles—reconnaissance, transport, liaison, and in general providing increased mobility for other arms. Such conclusions attracted little notice in the United States. The cry of “No more Koreas!” sounded out other considerations and virtually all preparatory thought centered on preparing for large-scale warfare, most likely with the Soviet Union and probably in Europe. When the Israeli air force “Pearl Harbored” the Egyptian air force in 1967 in the Six Day War, American airmen, by then thoroughly frustrated by the restraints imposed in Indochina, saw in the Israeli planning and execution the kind of air war they understood.
从空军理论和作战原则的角度来看，美国在1965年至1972年间在印度支那的军事行动存在诸多问题。受外部外交考量和美国军方内部体制需要的双重驱动，指挥控制机制逐渐演变，最终导致表面上五场空战同时进行：一场在南越，投入的兵力和取得的军事成果最为显著；一场在北越；两场当时大多处于秘密状态，分别在老挝北部和柬埔寨；还有一场在老挝南部沿胡志明小道展开。公众的注意力大多集中在北越上空的空战上。
When viewed from the standpoint of air power theory and doctrine, the United States efforts in Indochina from 1965 through 1972 present several problems. The command-and-control arrangements that evolved over time, driven by a combination of external diplomatic concerns and institutional imperatives internal to the U.S. military services, created a situation in which it appeared that five separate air wars were under way simultaneously: one in South Vietnam, involving by far the greatest level of effort and military success; another over North Vietnam; two others, mostly secret at the time, over northern Laos and Cambodia; and a fifth in southern Laos along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Most public attention centered on the air wars over North Vietnam.
该行动的最初目标是：(1) 向河内政府施压，迫使其停止对南方叛军的支持；(2) 切断向南方输送物资和人员的渠道；(3) 通过展现美国对这场斗争的坚定承诺，提振南越亲政府部队的士气。如何实现这些目标的决策完全由华盛顿政府掌控，包括行动的时间、节奏、目标优先级（细化到具体目标），甚至出动架次。从一开始，严格的“交战规则”就限制了现场指挥官的选择，甚至禁止采取必要的措施来夺取制空权，例如，禁止攻击正在建设中的地对空导弹阵地，甚至禁止攻击敌方机场（因为担心误伤驻扎在这些地点的俄罗斯和中国顾问，从而可能导致美苏两大强国之间的紧张局势升级）。如果政府对局势可能意外升级的担忧是合理的，那么它仍然决定动用空军（包括海军和海军陆战队航空兵）进行“可控的、逐步升级的有限压力”行动，则完全是无稽之谈。此前从未有过使用空中力量来实现有限的、本质上是心理战的目标的先例——更何况是在丛林战中，由远在万里之外的指挥部进行指挥。
The initial goals for that campaign were (1) to pressure the government in Hanoi to withdraw support from the insurgents in the South, (2) to interrupt the flow of supplies and men to the South, and (3) to strengthen the morale of progovernment forces in South Vietnam by demonstrating the U.S. commitment to the struggle. The decisions regarding how this was to be accomplished were rigidly controlled by the government in Washington, which dictated the timing, pace, target priorities (down to individual targets), and even sortie rates. From the beginning strict “rules of engagement” limited the options open to commanders on the scene and even prohibited the necessary steps to achieve air superiority by preventing, for example, attacks against surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites under construction and even enemy airfields (for fear of killing Russian and Chinese advisors at those locations, leading to possible escalation of tensions between the superpowers). If the government's concern over the possibilities for unintended escalation were warranted, the same cannot be said of its decision nonetheless to commit its air forces (including naval and marine corps air) to a half-hearted effort of “controlled, gradual escalation of limited pressure.” No precedent existed for using air power to attain limited, essentially psychological, goals—let alone in a jungle campaign directed from a headquarters ten thousand miles away.
飞行员们对这些限制感到不满，但并未反抗。相反，他们在当时的条件下尽力而为，希望政府领导人能够幡然醒悟。例如，在南越，1968年的溪山战役中，以及在北越，例如1972年的“后卫行动”中，空中力量在当时的有限条件下往往发挥了决定性作用。然而，总体而言，尽管在印度支那尝试了各种新战术和武器（例如海上救援技术、武装直升机和固定翼武装直升机、落叶剂、精确制导武器），但印度支那的经验令理论家和实践者都感到失望。当然，除非我们提醒自己，成败并非衡量英雄主义的标准，而印度支那的英雄事迹永远不容玷污。
The airmen chafed under these restrictions, but did not rebel. Instead they performed as best they could in the prevailing circumstances, hoping that their leaders in government would come to see the light. Frequently in South Vietnam, for example at the siege of Khe Sanh in 1968, and on occasion in North Vietnam, as for example during the Linebacker operations in 1972, air power proved individually decisive in the limited circumstances of the moment. On the whole, however, the Indochina experience, for all the experimentation with new tactics and weapons (such as air-sea rescue techniques, helicopter and fixed-wing gunships, defoliation, precision-guided munitions) proved disappointing to theorists and practitioners alike. Except, of course, when we remind ourselves that success or failure is not the yardstick by which to measure heroism, the record of which in Indochina can never be sullied.
以色列在1967年取得的成功在1973年未能重现，这既是因为埃及的出其不意，也是因为地面防空系统（包括地对空导弹和雷达制导速射防空炮）的显著进步。美军在印度支那面对的是上一代地对空导弹，鉴于当时大多数（但并非所有）陆地目标上空相对宽松的空域环境，他们已经证明自己能够应对。然而，仅过去十年间的技术进步，特别是微电子技术的日新月异发展，就足以让进攻与防御孰优孰劣的问题变得扑朔迷离。
Israel's success in 1967 could not be repeated in 1973 owing both to the surprise achieved by the Egyptians and to the great improvements in surface-based antiaircraft defenses (both surface-to-air missiles and radar-directed, rapid-firing antiaircraft artillery). The Americans in Indochina had faced an earlier generation of SAMs, and given a relatively permissive air environment over most (but not all) land targets, had proved able to cope. Technological advances over the past decade alone, however, especially those deriving from all but daily advances in microelectronics, have thrown the whole offense versus defense question into doubt.
这一点在欧洲体现得尤为明显。美国在印度支那之后，大力发展北约空军力量，以对抗华沙条约组织在机械化陆战装备方面的优势（以及苏联令人担忧的正面和远程航空力量的扩张）。北约的战斗机和战斗轰炸机兼具常规和核打击能力，其首要功能是威慑。然而，一旦投入战斗，考虑到可能出现的空域空域空域空域的繁忙程度，以及电子战技术和快速发展的地空导弹技术的不确定性，双方都无法确定最终结果。
This is nowhere more evident than in Europe, where with Indochina behind them the Americans have fostered a large buildup of NATO air power as a counter to the Warsaw Pact's superiority in the accouterments of mechanized land warfare (as well as an alarming buildup of Soviet Frontal and Long Range Aviation). With both conventional and nuclear capabilities, NATO fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft have first and foremost a deterrent function. If called into action, however, no one on either side is very sure what will happen, given what is likely to be the busiest air space ever encountered and the uncertainties of electronic warfare techniques and of rapidly emerging SAM technology.
当前常规空战技术飞速发展的唯一确定性就是其成本的螺旋式上升，单架飞机的价格已飙升至数千万美元。由于成本上涨必然会导致可用飞机数量减少，甚至降低投入战斗的意愿，一些飞行员——通常是特立独行的异类——开始呼吁退守，转而使用数量更多但性能稍逊的飞机。如果这种情况发生，那将是一个真正的转折点，因为在空战史上，飞行员从未愿意提前放弃技术优势。然而，飞机日益增强的防空能力以及高昂的单价，或许会迫使人们重新评估传统的优先事项。
The only thing certain about the current pell-mell pace of technology in conventional air warfare is its spiraling costs, which are driving the price of individual aircraft up into the tens of millions of dollars. Since these cost increases must inevitably have the effect of reducing the numbers that will be made available, if not indeed the willingness to commit them to combat, some airmen—usually lonely renegades—have begun to call for a retreat to greater numbers of slightly less capable aircraft. Should that happen, a true watershed would be at hand, since never yet in the history of air warfare have the pilots who fly and fight been willing to surrender in advance a technological advantage. Nonetheless, the increased vulnerability of aircraft to antiair defenses, along with high unit costs, may combine to force a reevaluation of traditional priorities.
一种可能的重点转移方向是从武器平台（即飞机）转向武器本身，特别是精确制导武器（PGM）。飞行员们倾向于关注平台本身，尤其是在速度、航程、机动性和其他性能方面的改进，这完全可以理解。同样，飞行员们不愿推动遥控飞行器（RPV）领域的快速发展，也是情理之中的事。无论空军官方发言人如何否认，大多数飞行员都认为RPV并非合适的讨论话题，他们坚信有人驾驶飞机在执行任何任务时都优于无人驾驶飞机。
One possible switch of emphasis would be from the weapons platform—that is, the aircraft—to the weapons themselves, in particular precision-guided munitions, or PGMs. It is only natural that airmen have tended to concentrate on the platform itself, especially with regard to improvements in speed, range, agility, and other performance characteristics. It is similarly only natural that airmen have proved reluctant to foster rapid advances in the field of remotely piloted vehicles, or RPVs. However much the official spokesmen of the air services may deny it, RPVs are not considered an appropriate topic for discussion by most pilots, among whom it is an article of faith that a manned aircraft can perform any mission better than an unmanned aircraft.
两位英国高级空军军官最近就空军目前面临的一些问题（包括政治制约、脆弱性和成本问题）对未来的影响进行了思考。他们的结论是，解决当前困境的关键在于提高战术精确度。他们认为，如果能够利用新技术来实现这一目标，政治领导人或许会更愿意将空中力量视为首当其冲的作战手段，而不是最后的手段。关于脆弱性和成本问题，他们写道，这意味着“必须减少投入战斗的攻击机数量，同时攻击更多的地面目标。解决这一困境的方案必须在于采用能够使飞机避开最有效防御系统的战术，同时允许使用多种高精度、高灵活性的武器。因此，从过去强调平台性能转向强调武器性能不仅不可避免，而且势在必行。”<sup> 37</sup>
Two senior British airmen have recently speculated about the implications for the future of some of the problems air forces now face, ranging from political restraints to questions of vulnerabilities and costs. They conclude that the answer to present dilemmas must be found in improved tactical precision. If the new technology can be harnessed to the achievement of such a goal, they argue, political leaders may be less reluctant to look on air power as a ubiquitous arm of the first hour, rather than as a weapon of last resort. With regard to the vulnerability and cost factors, they write, this will mean “that the number of attacking aircraft put at risk must be reduced while at the same time more ground targets are engaged. The solution to that dilemma must lie in tactics that hold aircraft outside the most effective defences yet permit the use of multiple, highly accurate, and flexible weapons. A change from the past emphasis on platform performance and on to weapon performance therefore seems not only inevitable but imperative.”37
近期是否会有重大的战略重点转变，目前仍是一个悬而未决的问题。一个重要的制约因素是过去十年空战经验的相对匮乏。不仅样本量小——从未大到足以作为决定性证据——而且这些经验也具有短暂性。此外，由于目标本身的局限性，这些有限的经验所“证明”的内容也变得模糊不清。另一个问题是，现有的官僚机构、利益集团和权力中心能否很好地适应变化。以美国为例，尽管陆军和空军目前都在研发遥控飞行器，但这两个军种在各自的内部都面临着如何将遥控飞行器纳入其组织架构的难题。
Whether any significant changes in emphasis are close at hand remains an open question. One important inhibiting factor is the relative paucity of experience in air warfare over the past decade. Not only have the samples been small—not once large enough to be considered definitive—but they have been transitory. In addition, any answer to what these limited experiences have “proved” has been muddied by the limited nature of the objectives sought. Another problem is how well existing bureaucracies, interests, and fiefdoms can adapt to change. In the United States, for just one example, although remotely piloted vehicles are presently under development by both the army and the air force, each service has problems within its own constituencies regarding even the organizational implications of incorporating RPVs.
在撰写本文时，空战领域最不确定的莫过于其未来走向。正如前文所述，技术的影响和实践者的行动从一开始就比理念本身发挥了更大的作用。我们甚至可能已经到达了一个技术进步的临界点，这将显著改变空中力量的本质。电子战、新型卫星能力、精确制导武器和无人驾驶飞机预示着航空业新时代的到来——正如它们已经开始创造新的术语一样。事实上，太空旅行、航天飞机以及“星球大战”中激光束和定向能武器等技术的进步，预示着飞行员将迎来全新的发展前景。人们或许会略感担忧地得出这样的结论：技术本身可能才是当今空中力量理论的主要推动者；发明或许在当下正是应用的源泉。
Nothing in the field of air warfare is more uncertain at this writing than its future course. As stated at the outset, the effects of technology and the actions of practitioners have from the beginning played greater roles than have ideas. It is even possible that we have arrived at a threshold of technological advance that may markedly change the identity of air power. Electronic combat, new satellite capabilities, precision-guided munitions, and pilotless aircraft suggest a new era in aviation—just as they have already begun to create a new vocabulary. Indeed, the advances in space travel, the space shuttle, and the “star wars” technologies of laser beams and directed energy weapons presage vastly new horizons for the airman. One might conclude, with some distress, that technology itself may be today's primary air power theorist; that invention may, for the moment, be the mother of application.
*注：作者谨此感谢以下几位同事的评论和建议，并承认他们的清白：James B. Smith、Theodore Ropp、John Schlight、Kenneth J. Alnwick、Donald R. Baucom、RA Mason、Robert F. Futrell、David R. Mets、John F. Shiner、Alan L. Gropman、Dennis M. Drew、Ronald R. Fogleman、Dennis G. Hall、Timothy E. Kline、Thomas A. Fabyanic、Donald D. Stevens、Jack Neufeld、Bernard Nalty 和 Herman S. Wolk。
* NOTE: For their comments and suggestions, the author acknowledges the innocence of several colleagues: James B. Smith, Theodore Ropp, John Schlight, Kenneth J. Alnwick, Donald R. Baucom, R. A. Mason, Robert F. Futrell, David R. Mets, John F. Shiner, Alan L. Gropman, Dennis M. Drew, Ronald R. Fogleman, Dennis G. Hall, Timothy E. Kline, Thomas A. Fabyanic, Donald D. Stevens, Jack Neufeld, Bernard Nalty, and Herman S. Wolk.
1 论战争，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特编辑和翻译，修订版（普林斯顿，1984 年），479、483。
1 On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1984), 479, 483.
2 Noble Frankland，《对德国的轰炸攻势：概述和展望》（伦敦，1965 年），第 16-17 页。
2 Noble Frankland, The Bombing Offensive against Germany: Outlines and Perspectives (London, 1965), 16–17.
3这段话出自奥克塔夫·沙努特1894年的文章，引自查尔斯·H·吉布斯-史密斯的《航空：从起源到二战结束的历史概览》（伦敦，1970年），第221页。1864年，维克多·雨果曾满怀喜悦地写信给法国热气球飞行员纳达尔，预言飞机的发明将终结战争。他认为，科学将带来和平，因为飞机将立即、彻底、瞬间、普遍且永久地消除国界。然而，大多数预言却远没有那么乐观。
3 The words are those of Octave Chanute writing in 1894, quoted in Charles H. Gibbs-Smith, Aviation: An Historical Survey from Its Origins to the End of World War II (London, 1970), 221. In 1864 Victor Hugo had written in joyful phrases to the French balloonist, Nadar, that the invention of aircraft would mean the end of warfare. Out of science would come peace, since aircraft would bring about the immediate, absolute, instantaneous, universal, and perpetual abolition of frontiers. Most prophecy was less sanguine.
4改写自 Robin Higham，《空军力量：简史》（纽约，1972 年），第 233 页。正如熟悉已故伯纳德·布罗迪作品的人所指出的那样，在原子弹和后来的核武器时代，这个问题只会更加严重。
4 Paraphrased from Robin Higham, Air Power: A Concise History (New York, 1972), 233. As those familiar with the work of the late Bernard Brodie will note, this problem would only be exacerbated in the age of atomic and later nuclear weapons.
5即使在今天，该领域的大部分重要工作仍然由官方历史学家完成，他们大多是政府公务员，但也包括一些杰出的军官贡献，尤其是在美国和德意志联邦共和国。当第二次世界大战历史国际委员会在其1983年12月的第19期新闻简报中宣布法国计划于1984年底召开一次关于两次世界大战之间航空史的会议时，该委员会简洁地补充道：“问题在于如何找到民间历史学家。” 关于飞行员与历史学家之间关系的深入探讨，请参阅丹尼斯·E·肖沃尔特（Dennis E. Showalter）的《两个不同的世界：军事历史学家与美国空军》（“Two Different Worlds: The Military Historian and the US Air Force”），载于《空军大学评论》（ Air University Review）第31卷第4期（1980年5-6月），第30-37页。
5 Even today, most of the important work in this field is being done by official historians, most of them government civil servants but including, especially in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, some exceptional contributions by military officers. When the International Committee for the History of the Second World War announced (in its News Bulletin #19, December 1983) a French plan for a conference in late 1984 on aviation in the interwar years, it added succinctly, “The problem is to find civilian historians.” For an informed discussion on airmen in their relation to historians, see Dennis E. Showalter, “Two Different Worlds: The Military Historian and the U.S. Air Force,” Air University Review 31, no. 4 (May-June 1980), 30–37.
“空中力量”一词的用法多种多样。从逻辑上讲，它应该专门用于讨论一个国家在和平时期和战争时期、在民用和军事领域中的全部空中能力潜力。然而，这种用法并不常见，海厄姆的《空中力量：简明历史》是一个值得注意的例外。在本文中，该术语将特指军事应用。“空中力量”作为一个单独的词，其形式似乎带有某种咒语般的意味，可能是阿尔福德·约瑟夫·威廉姆斯少校在其著作《空中力量》（纽约，1940年）中创造的。后来，美国空军少将奥维尔·A·安德森采用了这个词，并将其纳入美国战略轰炸调查的太平洋报告第71A号（1947年）。之后，在1959年7月，他将《空中力量史学家》的标题改为《空中力量史学家》（现为《航空航天史学家》，此更改始于1965年10月）。它仍然是《空军杂志》的编辑用法，现在被写入位于阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地的空军大学航空航天理论、研究和教育中心（CADRE）的空军力量研究所（ARI）。
6 term air power is variously used. Logically, it should be reserved for discussions of the full potential of a nation's air capability, in peace as well as war, in civilian as well as military pursuits. Such usage, however, is rare, Higham's Air Power: A Concise History being a notable exception. In this essay, the term will be used to denote specifically military applications. Airpower as a single word, a form that seems to connote a sense almost of incantation, may have been invented by Major Alford Joseph Williams in his Airpower (New York, 1940). It was later taken up by Major General Orvil A. Anderson, USAF, who adopted it in Pacific Report #71A of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (1947) and later, in July 1959, changed the title of The Air Power Historian to The Airpower Historian (now Aerospace Historian, a change dating from October 1965). It remains the editorial usage of Air Force Magazine and is now enshrined in the Airpower Research Institute (ARI) of the Air University's Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama.
7关于富勒顿，参见阿尔弗雷德·F·赫尔利，《比利·米切尔：空军力量的捍卫者》，新版（布卢明顿，1975 年），第 141-42 页，第 175 页脚注 2。
7 On Fullerton, see Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power, new ed. (Bloomington, 1975), 141–42, 175 n. 2.
8关于斯穆茨备忘录，请参阅沃尔特·雷利和H.A.琼斯的《空中战争》，7卷（伦敦，1932-37年），第7卷第8-14页，以及弗兰克兰的《对德国的轰炸攻势》，第21-46页。
8 For the Smuts Memorandum, see Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, 7 vols. (London, 1932–37), 7:8–14 and Frankland, Bombing Offensive against Germany, 21–46.
9华纳的文章发表在爱德华·米德·厄尔编辑的《现代战略的缔造者》（普林斯顿，1943 年）第 485-503 页，并在军事院校、参谋学院和战争学院的读物中被无数次重印。
9 Warner's essay appeared in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943), 485–503, and has been reprinted countless times in books of readings at the military academies, staff colleges, and war colleges.
10同上，485。
10 Ibid., 485.
11华纳发表这篇文章时，正担任民用航空委员会副主席。此前，他曾担任海军航空助理部长和《航空》杂志编辑。关于他的职业生涯，参见《当代人物传记》（1949年版），第620-622页，以及1958年7月13日《纽约时报》的讣告。
11 Warner was serving as vice-chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board when his essay appeared. Earlier, he had served as assistant secretary of the navy for aeronautics and as editor of Aviation. For his career, see Current Biography, 1949, pp. 620–22, and the obituary in the New York Times, July 13, 1958.
12有关杜黑的著作，请参阅本卷末尾的参考书目。
12 For Douhet's writings see the bibliographical note at the end of this volume.
13一个令人惊讶的例子是，参见伯纳德·布罗迪的《导弹时代的战略》（普林斯顿，1959 年），第 88-90 页。布罗迪的章节“杜黑的遗产”（第 71-106 页）很有帮助，但没有达到他通常的水准。
13 For a surprising example, see Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959), 88–90. Brodie's chapter “The Heritage of Douhet,” pp. 71–106, is helpful but not up to his usual standards.
14赫尔利的传记源自他 1961 年在普林斯顿大学获得的博士学位论文《威廉·米切尔将军的航空思想》。该论文于 1964 年首次出版（纽约）。此处引用的是新版（布卢明顿，1975 年）。
14 Hurley's biography derives from his Princeton Ph.D. dissertation, “The Aeronautical Ideas of General William Mitchell,” 1961. It was first published in 1964 (New York). References here are to the new edition (Bloomington, 1975).
15同上，第 139 页。
15 Ibid., 139.
16参见 Brodie，《导弹时代的战略》，第 71-72 页。
16 See Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 71–72.
17这部时长65分钟的迪士尼动画电影于1943年7月上映，当时《现代战略的缔造者》一书正在印刷出版。影片将卡通化的“航空史”与气势磅礴的“空中力量取胜”（影片的片名也由此而来）动画版相结合。这部电影对公众产生了相当大的影响——尽管如今已无法估量——它暗示，凭借庞大的空军力量摧毁日本、意大利和德国的生产资料，就能迅速、干净利落地战胜轴心国。《生活》杂志对此不加批判地评价道：“历史精彩，娱乐性强”，但一些评论家却对影片的暗示感到不安，其中几位指出，尽管影片描绘了三个国家即将覆灭的景象，但却没有展现任何一方的伤亡。二战结束后，塞维尔斯基的宣传工作仍在继续（例如他的著作《空中力量：生存之道》（纽约，1950年）），直到1974年去世，他一直是美国高级空军军官的密友。
17 The 65-minute animated Disney film, released in July 1943 while Makers of Modern Strategy was in press, combined a cartoon “history of aviation” with a fearsomely animated version of Victory Through Air Power (from which the entire production took its title). The film had a considerable—if now unmeasurable—effect on the public, suggesting a quick, clean, efficient victory over the Axis powers by means of enormous air fleets knocking out the means of production in Japan, Italy, and Germany. Life was uncritical (“good history and fine entertainment”), but some reviewers were rattled by the implications of it all, several noting that although the film illustrated the impending destruction of three nations it managed to do so without showing anyone on either side being killed or maimed. Seversky's promotional work continued after World War II (as in his Air Power: Key to Survival [New York, 1950]) and he remained a close confidant of senior American air officers until his death in 1974.
18在 20 世纪 20 年代和 30 年代初，杜黑、米切尔和特伦查德之后，空军理论和学说的发展成为集体努力而不是个人努力的产物。
18 After Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard in the 1920s and early 1930s, the development of air power theory and doctrine became a product of corporate rather than individual effort.
19关于利德尔·哈特和富勒，请参阅上文第 20 篇论文。
19 On Liddell Hart and Fuller, refer to essay 20, above.
20参见美国空军中校大卫·J·迪安 (David J. Dean) 的文章《小规模战争中的空中力量：英国空中控制经验》，载于《空军大学评论》第 34 卷第 5 期（1983 年 7 月至 8 月），第 24-31 页，以及其中引用的资料。
20 See Lt. Colonel David J. Dean, USAF, “Air Power in Small Wars: The British Air Control Experience,” Air University Review 34, no. 5 (July-August 1983), pp. 24–31 and the sources cited therein.
21有关战术学校的工作及其对二战时期美国空军战略的影响的参与者的描述，请参阅小海伍德·S·汉塞尔少将的《击败希特勒的空军计划》（亚特兰大，1972 年）；在笔者的《二战中的战略轰炸：美国战略轰炸调查的故事》（纽约和伦敦，1976 年）第 4-12 页中也有简要论述，本段和前一段均摘自该书。
21 For a participant's account of the work of the Tactical School and its influence on American air strategy in World War II, see Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, 1972); a brief treatment can be found in the present writer's Strategic Bombing in World War II: The Story of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (New York and London, 1976), pp. 4–12, from which this and the preceding paragraph are drawn.
22布罗迪，《导弹时代的战略》，第107页。这种观点并不会得到普遍认同。一位坚定的观察家，美国第八航空队战时司令艾拉·C·伊克中将，在1977年将这段话描述为“一种带有偏见、与事实完全无关的观点”。
22 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 107. This is a view not calculated to inspire universal assent. One committed observer, Lt. General Ira C. Eaker, wartime commander of the U.S. Eighth Air Force, described this paragraph in 1977 as “a slanted, prejudiced view wholly unrelated to the facts.”
23阿瑟·哈里斯，《轰炸机攻势》（伦敦和纽约，1947 年）。
23 Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (London and New York, 1947).
24在美国，一个总统委员会（美国战略轰炸调查委员会，简称USSBS）在1945年至1947年间共发布了321份报告：其中12份关于欧洲战事，109份关于太平洋战事。麦克尔萨克在其著作《二战中的战略轰炸》中讲述了USSBS的故事，该书还简要介绍了规模较小的英国轰炸调查组（简称BBSU）。另见嘉兰出版社出版的《美国战略轰炸调查：十卷精选报告》（纽约和伦敦，1976年）第一卷第vii-xxix页的总导言，该导言总结了截至1975年关于二战中战略轰炸有效性的持续争议。
24 In the United States a presidential commission (the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, or USSBS) published a total of 321 reports between 1945 and 1947: ziz on the war in Europe and 109 on the war in the Pacific. The story of the USSBS is told in Maclsaac, Strategic Bombing in World War II, which also includes a capsule account of its lesser counterpart, the British Bombing Survey Unit (or BBSU). See also the general introduction to Garland Publishing's The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: Selected Reports in Ten Volumes (New York and London, 1976), 1:vii-xxix, which summarizes, through 1975, the still on-going controversies about the effectiveness of strategic bombing in World War II.
25参见 William W. Momyer，《三次战争中的空军力量》（华盛顿特区，1978 年）和 Thomas A. Cardwell III，《战区战争的指挥结构：寻求统一指挥》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地，1984 年）。
25 See William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington, D.C., 1978) and Thomas A. Cardwell III, Command Structure for Theater Warfare: The Quest for Unity of Command (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1984).
26我自己列出的“候选名单”包括：伯纳德·布罗迪、赫尔曼·卡恩、亨利·A·基辛格、阿尔伯特·J·沃尔斯特特、托马斯·C·谢林、奥斯卡·摩根斯坦、P·M·S·布莱克特、安德烈·博弗雷、阿利斯泰尔·布坎、皮埃尔·加洛瓦、罗伯特·E·奥斯古德、威廉·W·考夫曼、麦克斯韦·泰勒、V·D·索科洛夫斯基、巴兹尔·H·利德尔·哈特、詹姆斯·M·加文、迈克尔·霍华德、约翰·斯莱瑟爵士和雷蒙·阿隆。
26 My own “short list” would include: Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Henry A. Kissinger, Albert J. Wohlstetter, Thomas C. Schelling, Oskar Morgenstern, P. M. S. Blackett, André Beaufre, Alistair Buchan, Pierre Gallois, Robert E. Osgood, William W. Kaufman, Maxwell Taylor, V. D. Sokolovskii, Basil H. Liddell Hart, James M. Gavin, Michael Howard, Sir John Slessor, and Raymond Aron.
27伯纳德·布罗迪，《绝对武器》（纽约，1946年），第76页。1946年3月，当时还只是英国皇家空军一名年轻飞行中尉、对布罗迪的著作一无所知的阿瑟·C·克拉克，得出了基本相同的结论：“抵御未来武器的唯一方法就是阻止它们被使用。换句话说，问题根本不是军事问题，而是政治问题。一个国家的武装力量已经无法保卫国家；他们所能承诺的最多就是摧毁攻击者。”（原文强调。）参见他的《火箭与未来战争》，载《皇家空军季刊》第17卷第2期（1946年3月），第61-69页。
27 Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York, 1946), 76. In March 1946, Arthur C. Clarke, than a young RAF flight lieutenant with no knowledge of Brodie's work, reached essentially the same conclusion: “The only defense against the weapons of the future is to prevent them ever being used. In other words, the problem is political and not military at all. A country's armed forces can no longer defend it; the most they can promise is the destruction of the attacker.” (Emphasis in original.) See his “The Rocket and the Future of Warfare,” Royal Air Force Quarterly 17, no. 2 (March 1946), 61–69.
28厄尔1946年6月发表在《耶鲁评论》上的文章《空军对历史的影响》以这样的观点作结：“断言如果我们不消除战争，战争最终将毁灭我们，这已不再是空谈。”（由于大多数读者是通过尤金·埃姆所著《空军的影响》（纽约，1959年）中的节选版本接触到厄尔的文章，我应该指出，埃姆的省略号完全掩盖了厄尔结论中令人沮丧的基调，例如，他省略了本文引用的结论。）
28 Earle's Yale Review article of June 1946, “The Influence of Air Power upon History,” concluded with the thought that “it is no longer mere rhetoric to assert that unless we destroy war, war will ultimately destroy us.” (Since most readers who come across Earle's essay do so via the excerpted version in Eugene Emme, Impact of Air Power [New York, 1959], I should note that Emme's ellipses thoroughly mask the dismal tone of Earle's conclusions, omitting for example the conclusion quoted in this note.)
29对于我在文中提出的观点，最好的简短陈述是伯纳德·布罗迪在《核战略的发展》一文中对这些问题的最终评论，《国际安全》 2，第4期（1978年春季），第65-83页。
29 For the best short statement of the view I advance in the text, see Bernard Brodie's final comment on these matters in “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security 2, no. 4 (Spring 1978), 65–83.
30参见我的《空军与战略思想，1945-51》，国际安全研究计划工作论文第 8 号，威尔逊中心，华盛顿特区，1979 年 6 月；小塞缪尔·F·威尔斯，《大规模报复的起源》，《政治学季刊》 96，第 1 期（1981 年春季），第 31-52 页；以及 D·麦克尔萨克和小塞缪尔·F·威尔斯，《民兵传统》，《威尔逊季刊》 3，第 2 期（1979 年春季），第 109-124 页。
30 See my “The Air Force and Strategic Thought, 1945–51,” International Security Studies Program Working Paper #8, The Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., June 1979; Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “The Origins of Massive Retaliation,” Political Science Quarterly 96, no. 1 (Spring 1981), 31–52; and D. Maclsaac and S. F. Wells, Jr., “A Minuteman Tradition,” The Wilson Quarterly 3, no. 2 (Spring 1979), 109–24.
31标题是马克斯·勒纳（纽约，1962 年）的，但主题是拉尔夫·E·拉普（例如，《杀戮与过度杀戮》 [纽约，1962 年]）以及多年来《原子科学家公报》的其他撰稿人的主题。
31 The title is Max Lerner's (New York, 1962), but the theme is that of Ralph E. Lapp (e.g., Kill and Overkill [New York, 1962]) and his fellow contributors over the years to The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
32有关 1979 年至 1983 年关于“脆弱窗口”和其他神话的文献综述，请参阅我的《核武器辩论与美国社会》，载《空军大学评论》第 35 卷第 4 期（1984 年 5 月至 6 月），第 81-96 页。
32 For a review of the 1979–1983 literature on the “window of vulnerability” and other myths, see my “The Nuclear Weapons Debate and American Society,” Air University Review 35, no. 4 (May-June 1984), 81–96.
33参见 MJ Armitage 和 RA Mason 合著的《核时代的空军力量》（伊利诺伊州香槟市，1983 年），第 2 章。官方历史著作是 Robert F. Futrell 所著的《美国空军在朝鲜战争中的历史，1950-1953》（纽约，1961 年；修订版，华盛顿特区，1983 年）。Richard H. Kohn 和 Joseph P. Harahan 编辑的《二战和朝鲜战争中的空中优势》（华盛顿特区，1983 年）一书收录了四位高级空军指挥官的宝贵回顾。
33 See M. J. Armitage and R. A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age (Champaign, 111., 1983), ch. 2. The official history is Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953 (New York, 1961; rev. ed. Washington, D.C., 1983). A valuable retrospective by four senior air commanders is provided in Air Superiority in World War II and Korea, ed. Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan (Washington, D.C., 1983).
34引自 Armitage 和 Mason，《核时代的空军》，第 44 页。
34 Quoted in Armitage and Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age, 44.
35同上，44-45。
35 Ibid., 44–45.
36同上，第45页。这段话出自他1954年10月发表在《外交事务》上的文章《空军力量与世界战略》。几年后，在《伟大的威慑》 （纽约，1958年）一书中，他论证说，即使是空军人员最好也把注意力转向应对“白蚁的策略——颠覆、渗透以及利用不成熟的民族主义等因素”。但几乎无人响应。
36 Ibid., 45. This statement comes from his October 1954 Foreign Affairs article, “Air Power and World Strategy.” A few years later in The Great Deterrent (New York, 1958) he was arguing that even the airmen had best turn their attention to countering “the tactics of the termite—subversion, infiltration, and the exploitation of factors like immature nationalism.” There were few takers.
37关于引文和前一段，请参阅 Armitage 和 Mason 合著的《核时代的空军》，第 256-257 页。第 9 章“挑战与机遇”对该主题进行了很好的总结。
37 For both the quotation and the preceding paragraph, see Armitage and Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age, 256–57. Chapter 9, “Challenge and Opportunities,” is an excellent summary of its topic.
22. 苏联战略的形成
22. The Making of Soviet Strategy
F没有任何世俗哲学像马克思主义那样具有整体性。马克思主义用持久的阶级斗争来解释和预测整个人类历史，它明确反对将人类经验割裂开来。将战争与和平、军队与社会截然分开的狭隘军事战略定义，对布尔什维克来说是陌生的。列宁及其同僚对克劳塞维茨关于政治与战争永恒互动关系的系统分析印象深刻。1917年10月，当苏维埃在饱受战争蹂躏的俄罗斯帝国夺取政权时，他们毫不怀疑战争、革命、政治和社会是密不可分的。
FEW SECULAR philosophies are as holistic as Marxism. Explaining and predicting all of human history in terms of enduring class struggle, Marxism explicitly rejects compartmentalization of the human experience. Narrow definitions of military strategy that neatly separate war and peace or the army and society were foreign to the Bolsheviks. Lenin and his cohorts were impressed with Clausewitz's systematic analysis of the permanent interaction of politics and war. When the Soviets seized power in the war-ravaged Russian Empire in October 1917, there was no doubt in their minds that war, revolution, politics, and society were inseparable.
意识形态倾向和历史经验表明，冲突，有时甚至是暴力冲突，是历史进步的引擎。但尽管马克思主义提供了一个框架，却没有提供蓝图。布尔什维克试图认真对待恩格斯的预言，即“解放无产阶级将创造其独特的、全新的军事方法”。然而，革命和新社会主义社会的建立是在复杂多变的环境中进行的。刚刚取得的胜利受到内外敌人的威胁，有时布尔什维克的实验似乎只能持续几个月。面对先是与德国的战争，后是内战，苏联领导人在努力保护萌芽中的社会主义社会的同时，也在“正确地”理解武装力量与社会主义进步之间的关系。他们从意识形态遗产中获得的寥寥线索，常常与现实情况相冲突。如何使意识形态的期望与冷酷的现实相协调，是新兴社会面临的一项根本性任务。在革命时期的俄国，这一点尤为重要，因为在俄国，形势往往是由需要决定的发展方向。
Ideological predilection and historical experience suggested that conflict, sometimes violent, was a locomotive for historical progress. But although Marxism provided a framework, it did not provide a blueprint. The Bolsheviks tried to take seriously Engels's promise that “freeing the proletariat will create its special and entirely new military method.”1 The revolution and the creation of the new socialist society, however, took place in complex and fluid circumstances. The victory, so recently won, was threatened by internal and external enemies and at times it seemed that the Bolshevik experiment would last but a matter of months. Facing first the war with Germany and then civil war, Soviet leaders fought to protect the embryonic socialist society while “correctly” divining the relationship of armed force to socialist progress. The few clues that they received from their ideological heritage often clashed with the reality of their circumstances. To harmonize ideological expectation with cold reality is a fundamental task facing new societies. It was never more critical than in revolutionary Russia, where necessity, more often than not, dictated the direction taken.
我
I
最初的冲突源于对俄国革命本身意义的理解。作为马克思主义者，布尔什维克期望俄国无产阶级的胜利能够引发世界革命。发达资本主义国家的工人阶级将会奋起反抗，推翻统治者，并建立不分国界的社会主义。布尔什维克将大部分精力投入到启动这一进程中。如今掌权后，他们却在世界工人何时才能加入俄国工人的行列这个问题上产生了分歧。这绝非无关紧要的争论。布尔什维克无力与德国开战，自然无法等待太久。
The initial clash between expectation and reality concerned the significance of the Russian Revolution itself. As Marxists, the Bolsheviks expected worldwide revolution to follow the victory of the proletariat in Russia. Workers in the advanced capitalist states would rise up, overthrow their rulers, and construct socialism without regard to national boundaries. The Bolsheviks had devoted most of their energy to starting the chain of events. Now in power, they disagreed over how long it would be before the workers of the world rose up to join the workers of Russia. This was hardly idle debate. The Bolsheviks, in no position to fight Germany, could not wait very long.
左翼激进分子如布哈林认为，可以通过煽动革命从内部击败德国。他们严重高估了工人的团结和德国的软弱，想当然地认为可以通过武装起义取得胜利。一些人因十月革命的胜利而得意忘形，希望对德国发动一场“赤手空拳”的革命战争。列夫·托洛茨基提出了更为温和的方案，他希望以“不战不和”的原则威胁德国，即苏维埃拒绝发动战争，同时允许内部动荡阻止德国的推进。较为保守的列宁则认为，必须立即不惜一切代价确保和平，以使饱受战火蹂躏的俄国获得喘息之机。托洛茨基赢得了辩论，并向德国谈判代表提出了他的条件；德国随即对新生的苏维埃政权发动了大规模进攻。当敌军距离莫斯科不到两周时，列宁向中央委员会成员发出了著名的最后通牒。他说，除了宣布和平别无选择。德国革命不可避免，但无法预测何时爆发。“我们或许还有两周时间，”列宁曾这样说过，“谁能保证工人阶级会在两周内起义？”<sup> 2 </sup> 列宁威胁说，如果不签署《布列斯特-立陶夫斯克条约》，他就辞职，最终赢得了这场争论。布尔什维克批准了一项屈辱的和平条约，俄罗斯失去了三分之一的人口和60%的欧洲领土。
Radicals like Bukharin on the Left believed that Germany could be defeated from within, by fomenting revolution. Seriously overestimating both the solidarity of the workers and the weakness of Germany, they assumed that victory could be achieved by armed insurrection. Some, flushed with the victory of October, wished to fight a “bare-handed” revolutionary war against Germany. More moderate ideas were put forth by Lev Trotsky, who wished to threaten Germany with a dictum of “no war, no peace,” in which the Soviets would refuse to make war while allowing internal instability to halt the German advance. The more conservative Lenin argued that peace had to be secured immediately and at any cost in order to provide a respite for the embattled Russian state. Trotsky won the debate, and delivered his terms to the German negotiators; Germany responded with a massive offensive against the new Soviet state. When the enemy was less than two weeks from Moscow, Lenin delivered a now-famous ultimatum to his fellow Central Committee members. There was no choice but to declare peace, he said. The revolution in Germany was inevitable, but there was no way to gauge when it would occur. “We may have two weeks,” Lenin is reported as saying. “Is there anyone who can guarantee that the workers will rise up in two weeks?”2 Lenin threatened to resign if the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was not signed, and won the argument. The Bolsheviks ratified a humiliating peace in which one-third of Russia's population and 60 percent of its European territory were lost.
列宁的胜利意义重大，不容低估。它不仅挽救了革命，也为苏联未来的发展指明了方向。重大的政治决策并非孤立存在，而是与之前的其他决策息息相关。一旦走上某条道路，其他决策便会随之而来，其累积效应会将社会推向一条既定的道路，同时几乎消除所有平行的可能性。早期布尔什维克决定捍卫俄国社会主义的既有成果，而不是追求世界革命，这是他们做出的最重要的决定。这一决定的影响之一是奠定了第一支武装力量的性质，使苏联走上了一条从未偏离的军事发展道路。
The significance of Lenin's victory cannot be overstated. Not only may it have saved the Revolution, it set the path of future Soviet development. Major political decisions are not made in a vacuum, but in relationship to others made before. Once launched on a particular course, other decisions follow and the cumulative effect is to push a society along one path, while virtually eliminating parallel ones. The decision to protect the existing gains of socialism within Russia, rather than reaching for worldwide revolution, was the single most important decision that the early Bolsheviks made. One of its effects was to set the character of the first armed forces, placing the Soviet Union on a path of military development from which it has never diverged.
尽管《布列斯特-立陶夫斯克条约》带来了一线生机，但布尔什维克既没有足够的武装力量来保障与德国的和平，也没有足够的力量来抵御随时准备发动内战的内部敌人的进攻。军事委员会（苏维埃）在革命前就已经成立，但其主要功能是指挥破坏活动，并在帝国军队内部制造分裂。它们非常适合这项任务，但却缺乏纪律和技能来抵御像高尔察克和邓尼金这样的前帝国将领对革命的攻击。“白军”很快便与政权的外部敌人——来自日本、法国、英国、美国的军队以及奥地利军队中的前捷克斯洛伐克士兵——联合起来。与此同时，波兰军队在西线与布尔什维克交战，威胁着将年轻的苏维埃国家的疆界进一步向东推进。在这种危急情况下，布尔什维克需要一支能够捍卫其革命的军队。
Although the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk provided a respite, the Bolsheviks did not have sufficient armed strength either to guarantee the peace with Germany or to withstand the onslaught of internal enemies ready to launch a civil war. Military councils (soviets) were created before the Revolution, but their primary function was to direct disruptive activities and sow discord among the imperial forces. They were well suited to that task, but lacked the discipline and skill to defend the Revolution against former imperial generals like Kolchak and Denikin. The “White Forces” were soon joined by external enemies of the regime, troops from Japan, France, Britain, the United States, and units of former Czechoslovak soldiers in the Austrian army. At the same time, Polish forces engaged the Bolsheviks in battle on the western front, threatening to push the frontiers of the young Soviet state even further east. In this desperate situation, the Bolsheviks needed an army able to protect their revolution.
他们面临着艰难的选择。集中、纪律严明、训练有素的军队对于胜利至关重要，但在一些人看来，这无异于他们不久前才帮助摧毁的常备军的复活。有人担心，军队在成立之初的形式将决定其在革命内部敌人被击败后的性质。然而，作为人民战争委员的托洛茨基成功地用一支在统一指挥下纪律严明的军队取代了分散的工人组织。
They faced a difficult choice. Centralized, disciplined, and trained forces were critical for victory, but sounded to some like the resurrection of the standing army that they had recently helped to destroy. There were those who worried that the army's form at birth would dictate its character once the internal enemies of the revolution were defeated. Nevertheless, Trotsky, the people's commissar for war, succeeded in replacing decentralized workers' formations with a tightly disciplined army under a unified command.3
布尔什维克在组建红军的过程中做出了重大妥协。当时没有足够的工人和同情者来填满一支志愿军的队伍。在征召志愿者的呼吁未能奏效后，布尔什维克转而采取更为传统的强制动员公民和强征战俘的手段。1918年4月8日，标准化的军事委员部成立，负责执行新的中央指令，而诸如“选举指挥”（士兵可以随意选举和罢免指挥官）等意识形态驱动的理念则被废除。
The Bolsheviks made significant compromises in the creation of the Red Army. There were not enough workers and sympathizers to fill the ranks of a volunteer army. After appeals for volunteers fell short, the Bolsheviks turned to the more traditional means of forced mobilization of citizens and impressment of prisoners of war. On April 8, 1918, standardized Military Commissariats were organized to administer new centralized directives, and ideologically motivated notions like “elective command” (where the men elected and recalled their commanders at will) were revoked.4
将武装部队的领导权委托给“军事专家”（实际上是前沙皇军官的委婉说法）的决定，争议更大，影响也更为深远。到1918年12月，已有22315名前沙皇军官在红军服役；到1920年8月，这一数字增长到48409人。在最高层，招募工作涌现出像A.A.斯韦钦将军这样的未来杰出人物，他曾是沙皇高级军官。像米哈伊尔·图哈切夫斯基这样年轻的军官也被招募，他此前只是沙皇军队的一名少尉。（图哈切夫斯基后来成为传奇人物，他毕生致力于共产主义事业，并始终秉持着一种奇特的混合军事思想，这种思想既源于沙皇的传统，也源于布尔什维克的遗产。）由于他们拥有优越的教育背景和庞大的人数，这些人主导了红军指挥部。布尔什维克还致力于培养一批“红色指挥官”。年轻工人被匆匆送入军事训练体系，到内战结束时，他们的数量也相当可观。但前帝国军官仍然势力强大，处境艰难的布尔什维克竭力确保政治忠诚得以巩固和维系。
The decision to entrust the leadership of the armed forces to “military specialists,” a euphemism for former czarist officers, was however far more controversial and its effects were more long-lasting. By December 1918, 22,315 former imperial officers served in the Red Army and by August 1920 that number had grown to 48,409.5 At the highest levels, the recruitment brought in future luminaries like General A. A. Svechin, who had been a senior imperial officer. Younger men, like Mikhail Tukhachevsky, previously a junior lieutenant in the imperial army, were also recruited. (Tukhachevsky, who became a legendary figure, was thoroughly committed to the communist cause and held, throughout his life, a curious mixture of military ideas from both the imperial and Bolshevik legacies.) Because of their superior educational background and their numbers, these men dominated the Red Army Command. The Bolsheviks also worked to create a cadre of “Red Commanders.” Young workers were put through hastily developed military training academics and by the end of the Civil War, there were significant numbers of them as well. But former imperial officers remained powerful and the troubled Bolsheviks took great care to make certain that political loyalty could be forged and maintained.
对于年轻的苏维埃国家而言，建立常备军本身就是一种令人厌恶的妥协。这种军队被认为是过去时代的遗物，那时统治阶级需要通过内外强制手段来维持其权力。列宁、恩格斯和马克思都宣称，民兵（即公民志愿军——武装工人阶级）才是社会主义时代的合适形式。恩格斯断言：“在共产主义社会，没有人会考虑正规军。”<sup> 6</sup>此外，基于他们对1848年法国大革命的解读，他们认为常备军很容易被颠覆，并被用作反革命力量。“波拿巴主义”这个带有贬义的词汇至今仍在苏联的词典中，用来描述军官与敌对阶级残余势力联合起来镇压萌芽中的革命。布尔什维克眼见国内内战愈演愈烈，无疑从亚历山大·克伦斯基、沙皇将军和外国资本主义列强的联盟中看到了希望。尽管关于是否需要正规军的意识形态问题有所淡化，但人们对正规军潜在危险的担忧却与日俱增。
The very creation of a standing army was a distasteful compromise for the young Soviet state. Such a force was thought to be a reflection of a prior epoch, when the ruling classes needed coercion, internally and externally, to maintain their power. Lenin, Engels, and Marx all declared the militia (the concept of a citizen's volunteer army—the armed working class) to be the appropriate form in the socialist era. Engels stated categorically, “In the communist society, no one will think of a regular army.”6 Moreover, based on their reading of the Revolution of 1848 in France, they believed that standing armies were easily subverted and used as a force of counterrevolution. An unflattering term, “Bonapartism,” is still in the Soviet lexicon to describe the union of military officers with remnants of hostile classes to crush infant revolutions. The Bolsheviks, watching their own civil war, doubtless found their fears confirmed by the alliance of Alexander Kerensky, czarist generals, and the foreign capitalist powers. If the ideological question of the need for regular armed forces was receding, concern for the potential danger they constituted was growing.
为了取代他们理想中的军队，布尔什维克努力将他们迫于无奈建立的军队政治化并加以控制。名义上沿用至今的军事委员制度正是为此目的而建立的。如果红军暂时无法成为一个由武装工人自愿组成的、致力于革命事业的团体，那么政治官员就会确保所有入伍人员都忠于革命事业而战。然而，政治官员往往对军事指挥权表现出浓厚的兴趣，导致这一制度运转不畅。委员和指挥官之间争夺军事行动指挥权的斗争从未停止。在托洛茨基的领导下，军事等级制度往往更倾向于指挥官的专业能力，并坚持统一指挥。这反而加剧了委员和指挥官之间的紧张关系，使原本就十分艰巨的击败俄国敌人的任务更加复杂。直到多年以后，当既是共产主义者又具备专业技能的军官掌权时，这些紧张关系才得以缓解。
As a substitute for the kind of army that they preferred, the Bolsheviks worked to politicize and control the one that they had, of necessity, created. The military commissar system that exists in name to the present day was developed for this purpose. If the Red Army could not be, for the time being, a voluntary association of armed workers committed to the cause, political officers would make certain that those who filled the ranks would fight loyally for it. But the political officers often showed an interest in military command and the system did not operate smoothly. The struggle between the commissar and the commander for the authority to direct military operations was constant. More often than not, the military hierarchy under Trotsky favored the commanders' expertise and insisted on unified command. This only exacerbated tensions between commissars and commanders and complicated the already difficult task of defeating Russia's enemies. Not until many years later, when officers both communist and technically competent were in command, did these tensions subside.7
尽管面临压倒性的劣势，布尔什维克和新成立的红军还是挺过了对政权的威胁。然而，许多布尔什维克对托洛茨基的红军始终不甚满意。红军于1918年作为临时力量建立，旨在内战结束后尽快解散并由民兵取代。此外，尽管红军证明了其能力，但也未能幸免于批评。在1918年3月召开的布尔什维克第八次代表大会上，一股政治反对力量兴起，对托洛茨基、他的指挥官以及红军进行了批判。这位战争人民委员顶住了斯大林、捷尔任斯基等人的攻击，这些人指责他效仿帝国军队，完全忽视了无产阶级战争的特殊性。最终，红军的胜利是托洛茨基最好的辩护，但后来对他构成更大挑战的反对力量早在内战胜利之前就已经开始形成。
In spite of overwhelming odds, the Bolsheviks and the newly created Red Army survived the threats to their power. Many Bolsheviks were never completely satisfied with Trotsky's Red Army, however. It was created as a temporary device in 1918, to be demobilized and replaced by the militia as quickly as possible after the Civil War. Moreover, even though the Red Army proved equal to its task, it did not escape criticism. A body of political opposition grew up at the Eighth Party Congress in March 1918 that criticized Trotsky, his commanders, and the Red Army. The war commissar survived the attacks of Stalin, Dzerzhinski, and others who accused him of mimicking the imperial army and failing to rely at all on the special nature of proletarian warfare. Ultimately, Trotsky's best defense was the Red Army's success, but the opposition that would later challenge him more successfully began to crystallize long before the Civil War was won.
这些紧张局势反映了红军指挥部内部“军事专家”和“红色指挥官”之间的分歧。“红色指挥官”是自学成才的布尔什维克，他们的军事训练是在内战战场上完成的。“专家”因思想反动而受到抨击，但“红色指挥官”也并非完美无缺。其中最严重的错误出自颇具影响力的图哈切夫斯基之手，他在战争后期坚持对华沙发动了一场考虑不周的进攻。如果不是图哈切夫斯基试图借此传达一个重要的政治信息——即“革命”可以用刺刀输出——那么这场进攻或许只会成为苏联军事史上的一个插曲。尽管补给线严重超长、后备力量不足，他仍然力主进攻华沙，或许是过于寄希望于工人阶级会奋起迎接苏维埃军队。即使在当时，他的思想也相当激进，甚至提出了建立一支国际无产阶级军队的设想。这支军队不会是民兵，而是正规的社会主义军队，其使命是输出革命。波兰是抓住政治和军事攻势的第一个机会。
These tensions reflected divisions within the Red Army command between “military specialists” and the “Red Commanders,” self-taught Bolsheviks whose military training had occurred on the battlefields of the Civil War. The “specialists” were assailed for reactionary thinking, but the Red Commanders were not without flaws either. The most important mistake was made by the influential Tukhachevsky, who insisted in the later stages of the war on launching an ill-conceived offensive against Warsaw. This could be relegated to the annals of Soviet military history were it not for the significant political statement Tukhachevsky sought to make with it—that “revolution” could be exported by bayonet. Arguing for an assault on Warsaw in spite of seriously overextended supply lines and insufficient reserves, he may have placed too much weight on the expectation that the working class would rise up to greet the Soviet forces. He held radical ideas, even for his day, going so far as to propose an international proletarian army. The army would not be a militia, but a regular, socialist army whose mission would be the export of revolution. Poland was the first chance to seize the political as well as the military offensive.
图哈切夫斯基疏忽了军事细节。由于缺乏必要的预备队、通讯和运输能力来执行他复杂的战略，红军在后方遭到顽强攻击，被迫撤退，勉强阻止了波兰军队进入俄罗斯领土。尽管图哈切夫斯基为这次进攻辩护，并将失败归咎于“参谋协调中的技术失误”，但这场失败却在红军指挥官们的整个军事生涯中都挥之不去。副总参谋长特里安迪菲洛夫和总参谋长沙波什尼科夫后来发表的评估报告直言不讳地指出，红军的实力不足以发动这次进攻，并警告说“军事”因素被低估了。8 工人在图哈切夫斯基的计划中究竟扮演了多重要的角色尚不清楚。当然，他从军事角度为这场战役辩护。无论如何，输出革命的呼声并没有完全消失；但波兰惨痛的教训之后，那些希望集中精力巩固俄罗斯边境、平息东部动乱的人最终占据了上风。归根结底，波兰惨案最重要的教训是：革命的热情和憧憬并不能取代军事准备。
Tukhachevsky failed to attend to military details. The Red Army, lacking the necessary reserves, communications, and transport to carry out his complicated strategy, fell victim to determined attacks on the rear. It was forced to retreat, and just managed to stop the Poles short of Russian territory. Although Tukhachevsky justified the offensive and blamed its failure on “technical errors in staff coordination,” the defeat haunted the Red Commanders throughout their military careers. Deputy Chief of Staff V. Triandifilov and Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov later produced assessments that stated bluntly that the Red Army was simply not strong enough to undertake the offensive, and cautioned that the “military” factor had been underestimated.8 Just how prominently the workers figured in Tukhachevsky's plan is unclear. Certainly, he defended the campaign on military grounds. Whatever the case, calls for exporting revolution were not completely silenced; but after the sobering experience of Poland, those who wished to concentrate on securing Russia's frontiers and subduing unrest in the East prevailed. Ultimately, the most important lesson of Poland was that revolutionary fervor and expectation were no substitute for military preparation.
二
II
随着内战接近尾声，关于红军未来的争论愈演愈烈。布尔什维克政权终于稳固，他们准备着手解决军事战略的根本问题：下一场战争的性质、红军的形态以及社会主义统治下“新军事方法”的本质。如同1918年一样，托洛茨基站在一方，与另一方——以古谢夫和伏龙芝为首的红军指挥官们——针锋相对。这场争论意义重大；政治和个人恩怨充斥着辩论，其结果对双方而言都关乎政治生死。因此，伏龙芝与托洛茨基的争论不仅在苏联军事史上占据重要地位，而且在其政治发展史上也具有举足轻重的地位。
As the Civil War drew to a close, debate about the future of the Red Army intensified. With their rule stabilized at last, the Bolsheviks were ready to address the fundamental issues of military strategy: the character of the next war, the form of the Red Army, and the nature of the “new military method” under socialist rule. As in 1918, Trotsky stood on one side, confronting the Red Commanders on the other, now led by S. I. Gusev and M. V. Frunze. The stakes were high; political and personal divisions pervaded the debate and made its outcome a matter of political survival for the rivals. The Frunze-Trotsky debates therefore loom large not only in the military history of the Soviet Union, but in its political development as well.
1921年3月，古谢夫向苏共十大提交了一系列提纲，打响了革命的第一枪。这些提纲呼吁建立“统一军事理论”（edinaia voennaia doktrina ），但却未能解释其含义。相反，提纲的作者们攻击了现有的军队，只提出了一些模糊的建议。提纲基于一个相当稳妥的假设，宣称未来必将爆发一场旷日持久且艰苦的战争。内战仅仅是全面战争的第一阶段，因为帝国主义必将反击。帝国主义军队在技术上将占据优势，如果红军不做好准备，最大限度地减少自身的弱点，革命必将失败。红军唯一的希望是成为一个“统一的有机体”，以政治意识形态为纽带，并以第一次无产阶级胜利——内战的经验为基础进行训练。机动和进攻作战赢得了内战，也将赢得未来的战争；红军可以凭借其强大的士气和卓越的战术来抵消帝国主义的技术优势。当时已经开始建立的地方民兵概念被抨击为行不通。社会主义需要一支来自群众的正规军。
The opening salvo was fired in March 1921 with the presentation of a set of theses to the Tenth Party Congress by Gusev.9 The theses called for a “unified military doctrine” (edinaia voennaia doktrina) but failed miserably in trying to explain what this meant. Rather, the authors attacked the existing army, and put forward only vague suggestions of their own. Stating a fairly safe assumption, the theses declared that there would definitely be a protracted and difficult war in the future. The Civil War had been merely a first stage in a general war because the imperialists would counterattack. The imperialist armies would be technically superior and the Revolution would suffer certain defeat if the Red Army was not prepared to minimize its weaknesses. Its only hope was to become a “unified organism,” welded together by political ideology and trained on the basis of the experiences of the first proletarian victory—the Civil War. Maneuver and offensive operations had won the Civil War and would win future wars; the Red Army could draw on its moral strength and superior tactics to neutralize the imperialists' technical expertise. The concept of a territorial militia, which was already being created, was attacked as unworkable. Socialism needed a regular army, drawn from the masses.
托洛茨基对这些论点进行了猛烈抨击，称其理论上错误，实践中毫无意义。他否定了统一军事理论的概念，并认为基于内战特殊经验的训练方法更站不住脚。<sup> 10</sup>大会代表们显然同意他的观点，伏龙芝和古谢夫撤回了他们的论点；伏龙芝承认他们的论点“表述含糊不清，缺乏理解”。<sup> 11</sup>遭到驳斥后，挽救红军指挥官们珍视的理念的重任落在了伏龙芝的肩上。在1921年7月发表的题为《统一军事理论与红军》的文章中，他修正了自己的观点，指出统一的理论对所有国家都至关重要；它反映了国家的生活制度和阶级性质。德国、英国和法国都拥有统一的理论，但由于沙皇统治下糟糕的军事状况，俄国却没有。“甚至连进行任何广泛的学术研究都是不可能的。” 12在这里，伏龙芝试图将他的“统一军事理论”置于更广阔的视角下进行阐述。苏维埃无产阶级的理论会有所不同——但对理论的需求并非革命国家所独有。有趣的是，统一军事理论的必要性在俄国军事思想中由来已久，并且从日俄战争结束到第一次世界大战爆发，一直是沙皇参谋部激烈辩论的问题。伏龙芝并没有排除军事专家在理论制定中可以发挥的作用，但他指出，只有那些能够超越“沙皇思想的庸俗愚昧和陈腐精神”的人才有资格参与辩论。13
Trotsky launched a vigorous attack against these arguments, calling them incorrect in theory and sterile in practice. He rejected the notion of a unified military doctrine and thought training based on the special experience of the Civil War an even less defensible idea.10 The delegates to the congress apparently agreed and Frunze and Gusev withdrew their theses; Frunze acknowledged that they had a “certain vagueness and lack of understanding in formulation.”11 Following this rebuff, it fell to Frunze to salvage the ideas so dearly held by the Red Commanders. In an article in July 1921 called “A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army,” he revised his ideas, noting that a unified doctrine was important to all countries; it reflected the system of life and the class character of the state. Germany, England, and France all had unified doctrines, but Russia did not, owing to the pathetic state of military affairs under the czar. “It was not even possible to have discussion about any broad scientific work.”12 Here Frunze tried to put his “unified military doctrine” into perspective. Soviet, proletarian doctrine would be different—but the need for doctrine was not peculiar to the revolutionary state. Interestingly, the desirability of a unified military doctrine was an old theme in Russian military thought and had been an issue hotly debated by the imperial staff from the end of the Russo-Japanese War until the outbreak of World War I. Frunze did not rule out the role that the military specialist could play in formulating doctrine, but he did note that only those capable of moving beyond the “spirit of Philistine stupidity and dullness of czarist thought should engage in the debate.”13
这一新论述也更加清晰地阐明了红军的性质及其军事战略。伏龙芝主张进行大规模战争——即国家全面动员。他认为，资产阶级国家特有的小型职业军队无法赢得未来的战争，因此预言每个公民都必须“被征召”到战争中来。在此，意识形态的信条显然发挥了作用。大规模战争理论是由恩格斯提出的，他认为只有社会主义社会才敢进行大规模战争。资产阶级过于惧怕工人阶级，不敢指望工人阶级组建一支大规模军队。
This new formulation was also much clearer on the character of the Red Army and the nature of its military strategy. Frunze argued for mass warfare—the total mobilization of the state. Believing that the small, professional army characteristic of bourgeois states could not win the future war, he predicted that every single member of the population would have to be “inducted” into the war effort. Here, ideological tenets clearly played a role. The theory of mass warfare had been developed by Engels, who suggested that only the socialist society dared fight mass warfare. The bourgeoisie would be too fearful of the working class to rely on it for a mass army.
然而，与此同时，伏龙芝认为红军应该是一支干部军队，而不是民兵。他声称，俄国仍然有太多不可靠的农民，而俄国的工人数量又不足以组建一支强大的民兵队伍。此外，伏龙芝援引内战的经验，再次强调进攻的首要地位和机动在战争中的核心作用。内战的胜利是依靠机动性最强的兵种——骑兵——以及巧妙的机动战术取得的。伏龙芝认为，农民具有防御意识；而无产阶级则天生擅长进攻。因此，依靠农民组建地方民兵既危险，也并非备战下一场战争的有效方法。尽管他建议应该研究其他形式的战争，包括游击战（农民战争），但伏龙芝仍然宣称进攻才是正确的战略。只有训练有素的干部军队才能执行这项任务。
At the same time, though, Frunze argued that the Red Army should be a cadre army and not a militia. There were still too many peasants in Russia, he claimed, who were not reliable, and not enough workers in Russia to create sufficient militia strength. Moreover, pointing to the experience of the Civil War, Frunze once again emphasized the primacy of the offensive and the centrality of maneuver in warfare. The Civil War had been won on the strength of the most mobile arm, the cavalry, and on the basis of skillful maneuver warfare. The peasant, Frunze argued, was defense-minded; proletarians were naturally gifted for the offensive. Consequently, it was both dangerous to rely on peasants in territorial militia formations and an ineffective way to prepare for the next war. Although he suggested that other forms of warfare, including partisan (peasant) warfare, should be studied, Frunze declared that the offensive was the appropriate strategy. It could only be carried out by a well-trained cadre army.
伏龙芝对民兵制度的否定是布尔什维克的一次重大转变。根据1920年3月的命令，向民兵制度的过渡已经开始。但那些不愿被流放到地方民兵部队的红军指挥官们的影响力开始显现。他们寻求建立一支正规的社会主义军队的意识形态理由。图哈切夫斯基提出了一套精心设计的意识形态论证，无视恩格斯的告诫，声称民兵制度的理想是第二国际错误结论的遗留产物。令人匪夷所思的是，托洛茨基——他出于对资产阶级战争方式的尊重，曾将军事专家引入红军——却在1920年为民兵制度辩护。然而，事实上，民兵制度的支持者寥寥无几。最终，中央委员会颁布法令，建立了一种混合军事制度。再次做出妥协也是迫不得已，因为弗伦泽想要的干部军队对年轻的苏维埃国家来说过于昂贵。大约十年间，民兵一直是苏维埃军事力量的重要组成部分。然而，干部军队逐渐成为关注的焦点，并逐渐超越了民兵。
Frunze's rejection of the militia system was an important departure for the Bolsheviks. Under an order of March 192.0, the transition to a militia had already begun. But the influence of the Red Commanders, who did not relish being exiled in territorial militia formations, began to be felt. They sought ideological justification for a regular, but socialist army. Tukhachevsky put forth an elaborate ideological justification that ignored Engels's admonition and claimed that the ideal of the militia was a legacy of the erroneous conclusions of the Second International. In a very strange twist, Trotsky, who out of respect for bourgeois methods of waging war had brought military specialists into the Red Army, found himself defending the militia system in 1920. In reality, though, the militia had few proponents. By decree of the Central Committee a mixed military system was established. Again the compromise was one of necessity, for the cadre army that Frunze wanted was too expensive for the young Soviet state. For about ten years, the militia remained a significant portion of Soviet military strength. The cadre army was the center of attention, however, and steadily eclipsed the militia.
撇开民兵的命运不谈，伏龙芝同时捍卫干部军队和群众战争的理念本身就存在一个重要的矛盾。尽管他高度重视“群众军队”的概念，但伏龙芝也承认，技术将在下一场战争中发挥越来越重要，甚至是决定性的作用。尽管他几乎美化了社会主义军队的技术劣势和道德优越性，但伏龙芝还是提出了一项迅速提升红军技术水平的计划。追求技术能力和有针对性的训练使红军距离他所鄙视的专业精锐军队仅一步之遥，然而群众军队却无法打赢这场“技术性”战争。专家部队和精锐部队地位这一悬而未决的问题，在伏龙芝去世后很长一段时间里都困扰着苏联军事策划者。
Quite apart from the fate of the militia, there was an important contradiction in Frunze's simultaneous defense of the cadre army and mass warfare. While paying significant attention to the concept of the “mass army,” Frunze admitted that technology would play an increasingly important, even decisive, role in the next war. Although he almost glorified the technological inferiority and moral superiority of the socialist army, Frunze presented a program to transform the technical level of the Red Army rapidly. The pursuit of technical competence and purposeful training put it just one step away from the specialized elite army he despised, yet the mass army could not fight the “technological” war. This unresolved issue of the place of expert and elite forces haunted Soviet military planners long after Frunze's death.
几个月后，托洛茨基在一篇题为《军事学说还是伪军事学说》的文章中回应了伏龙芝修改后的论点。他指出，红军只不过是“为了工人国家的自保而利用现有历史材料”建立起来的军队。内战“本质上是一场防御和撤退的战争”，正如法国大革命初期那样。托洛茨基抨击了机动战特殊性的观点，提醒伏龙芝，这恰恰是内战的普遍特征。有时需要进攻，有时需要撤退，有时则需要两者兼顾。他援引布列斯特-立陶夫斯克战役——一场无可否认的防御性战役——来佐证自己的观点。他始终认为制定军事学说为时尚早，并指出在动荡时期，唯一需要的学说就是“保持警惕，睁大眼睛”。<sup> 14</sup>
Trotsky answered Frunze's revised theses a few months later in an article entitled “Military Doctrine or Pseudo-Military Doctrinairism.” The Red Army, he said, was nothing but an army created out of “the historical material available…for the self-preservation of the workers' state.” The Civil War had been “overwhelmingly a war of defense and retreat,” as had been the French Revolution in its first stages. Attacking the idea of the special character of maneuver, Trotsky reminded Frunze that this was characteristic of civil wars in general. It was necessary to attack sometimes, retreat sometimes, and mix the two at other times. He summoned the ghost of Brest-Litovsk, undeniably defensive in nature, to support his cause. Throughout, he attacked the formulation of doctrine as premature, stating that in a period of great upheaval the only doctrine needed was “Be on the alert and keep your eyes open.”14
弗伦泽似乎总是被托洛茨基的攻击所困扰，他再次重新阐述了自己的观点。他承认军事理论不应被形式化为教条，而应作为一种指导。托洛茨基并未就此罢休：“新统一军事理论的倡导者不仅错误地制定了总体目标、战略和战术……而且还转移了人们对最实际、最重要任务的注意力。”<sup> 15 </sup> 内战仅仅展现了工人阶级的“热情和无私”；将这些经验提升为理论是宣传。正如他的支持者、前帝国军官A.A.斯韦钦所指出的那样，他警告说，理论会使计划僵化，扼杀辩论。例如，机动战术是“我们的敌人教给我们的”。最后，托洛茨基反问，为什么弗伦泽阐述的原则会出现在伟大的俄国将军苏沃洛夫的著作中，而苏沃洛夫强调的是机动和进攻。最后一点对弗伦泽来说应该相当尴尬，他是苏沃洛夫的忠实拥护者，而且他本人也曾指挥过由农奴组成的军队。然而，弗伦泽虽然为自己措辞含糊（“这些事情必须通过实践来解决”）而道歉，却仍然坚持己见。最终，弗伦泽而非托洛茨基取得了胜利。
Frunze, seemingly always reeling from Trotsky's attacks, recast his ideas once again. He admitted that military doctrine should not become formalized as dogma, but should be a guide. Trotsky was not pacified: “The proponents of a new unified military doctrine not only improperly formulate general goals, strategy, and tactics…but divert attention from most practical and vital tasks.”15 The Civil War had demonstrated only the “enthusiasm and selflessness” of the working class; to elevate these experiences to doctrine was propaganda. He warned, as his supporter A. A. Svechin, a former imperial officer, noted, that doctrine would rigidify planning and stop debate. Maneuver, for example, was “taught to us by our enemies.” Finally, Trotsky asked rhetorically why the principles expounded by Frunze were to be found in the writings of the great Russian general Suvorov, who had emphasized maneuver and the offense. This last point should have been quite embarrassing for Frunze, a well-known devotee of Suvorov, who had, of course, commanded armies composed of serfs. Nevertheless, Frunze, while apologizing for vagueness (“these things must be worked out practically”), doggedly restated his position. Ultimately, Frunze, not Trotsky, triumphed.
表面上看，托洛茨基精辟而尖锐的批评似乎对那些肩负着决定苏联军事未来重任的人来说极具吸引力。但托洛茨基本质上的负面论调以及他告诫人们要处理诸如“如何给靴子抹油”之类的琐事，并没有提供明确的答案。而伏龙芝虽然明显缺乏托洛茨基的才华，却也并非一个无知且不切实际的共产主义者。有时，托洛茨基会利用伏龙芝论点的模糊性来简化和轻视一些重要的概念。进攻的首要性就是一个例证。伏龙芝从未明确指出“进攻”究竟是指导性的政治原则，还是仅仅应该在战争爆发后作为战略依据。事实上，在红色指挥官中确实有人，尤其是图哈切夫斯基，主张掌握进攻主动权，并在遥远的异国他乡发动革命战争。波兰战役就是这样一次灾难性的尝试。弗伦泽谴责鲁莽选择进攻时机的做法，似乎以此表明他与这种极端立场有所区别。
On the surface, Trotsky's cogent and stinging critique would seem irresistible to those charged with deciding the military future of the Soviet Union. But Trotsky's essentially negative campaign and admonitions to deal with mundane matters like “how to grease boots” didn't offer definitive answers, while Frunze, though clearly lacking Trotsky's flair, did not emerge as an ignorant and Utopian communist. At times Trotsky seized upon the imprecise nature of Frunze's theses to simplify and trivialize important concepts. The primacy of the offensive is a case in point. Frunze never made it clear whether the “offensive” was the governing political precept or should merely determine strategy after the outbreak of war. There were indeed those among the Red Commanders, most notably Tukhachevsky, who believed in seizing the offensive and forcefully starting revolutionary wars in far-off lands. The Polish campaign had been one such disastrous attempt. Frunze seemed to separate himself from this extreme position in his condemnation of recklessness in selecting the time for offensive action.
如果伏龙芝指的是战争开始后进攻的首要地位，那么他实际上是在参与当时一场核心的军事辩论。1914年，所有主要强国都倾向于或感到不得不采取进攻策略。然而，第一次世界大战的经验——进攻的专制最终导致了灾难——在国际军事界引起了强烈的反响。许多人认为，防御准备和阵地战才是赢得战争的关键。但显然，“防御”作战的概念对共产主义思想家来说是陌生的；马克思主义作为一种动态的历史进步理论，将防御仅仅视为一种暂时的手段，直到能够掌握进攻的主动权。然而，这种意识形态上的担忧掩盖了一场严肃的军事辩论，图哈切夫斯基、斯韦钦和沙波什尼科夫等军人都参与其中。托洛茨基主要受到他引入军队的军事专家（如斯韦钦）的影响，他对进攻的盲目崇拜感到厌恶，他的结论正是源于第一次世界大战。弗伦泽始终未能阐明其论点的核心究竟是政治攻势还是军事战略攻势。但这场争论却超越了弗伦泽和托洛茨基的时代。这种悬而未决的二元对立至今仍存在于苏联思想中。苏联的政治理论明确带有防御性质，但其军事战略却无疑是进攻性的，甚至具有先发制人的性质。这种防御性的政治理论与旨在通过发动进攻来取得优势的进攻性军事战略之间存在着一种奇特的结合。
If Frunze was referring to the primacy of the offense once the war had begun, he was engaging in a central military debate of his time. In 1914 all major power favored or felt compelled to go on the offensive. But the experience of the First World War, in which the tyranny of the offensive had led to disaster, was reverberating throughout the international military community. Defensive preparation and war of position were thought by many to have won the war. But clearly the notion of “defensive” operations was foreign to communist thinkers; Marxism as a dynamic theory of historical progress saw defense only as a temporary condition until the offensive could be seized. But this ideological concern masked a serious military debate, in which such soldiers as Tukhachevsky, Svechin, and Shaposhnikov took part. Trotsky, influenced primarily by military specialists, like Svechin, whom he brought into the army, found the worship of the offensive repugnant, drawing his conclusions from the world war. Frunze never succeeded in clarifying whether the political offensive or the military strategy of the offensive was at the core of his argument. But the debate survived both Frunze and Trotsky. A version of this unresolved dichotomy lingers in Soviet thought today. Soviet political doctrine is explicitly defensive, but Soviet military strategy is undeniably offensive, even preemptive in character. There is a peculiar wedding of a defensive political doctrine and an offensive military strategy that would seek to gain the upper hand by initiating attack.
尽管托洛茨基的批评尖锐犀利，但他自己却未能提出一个令人满意且政治上可接受的纲领。雪上加霜的是，他的攻击方式是嘲讽对手，而且他表现出的傲慢态度虽然在辩论中颇具优势，却也让他鲜有盟友。托洛茨基未能理解，沉浸在胜利喜悦中的红军指挥官们是多么渴望在内战中找到思想和实践的统一。他轻视了他们的努力，只给他们留下了一条攻击的余地：那就是他是个反动派，不理解布尔什维克革命和内战的历史意义。
In spite of his stinging critique, Trotsky failed to produce a satisfactory and politically acceptable program of his own. It did not help that his attack took the form of ridiculing his opponents and that he displayed an arrogance that, although an effective debating posture, won him few allies. Trotsky failed to comprehend how desperately the Red Commanders, flushed with victory, longed to discover a unity of ideas and practice in the Civil War. He made light of their efforts and left open to them only one line of attack: that he was a reactionary, who did not understand the historic significance of the Bolshevik revolution and the Civil War.
现代苏联史学家指责年轻的红军指挥官们傲慢地曲解了内战的经验，低估了第一次世界大战教训的重要性。<sup> 16</sup>但在20世纪20年代初期，内战是红军指挥部唯一可以借鉴的经验。那些正是因为精通标准军事理论和实践而被招入红军指挥部的“军事专家”，完全有理由否认内战的重要性。虽然不能说托洛茨基及其追随者完全忽视了十月革命的影响，但他们却有意贬低其价值。
Modern Soviet historiographers have accused the young Red Commanders of arrogantly misinterpreting the experience of the Civil War and of underestimating the importance of the lessons of the First World War.16 But in the early 1920s the Civil War was the one experience on which the Red Command could draw. The “military specialists,” brought into the Red Army command precisely because of their knowledge of standard military theory and practice, had every reason to deny the Civil War's importance. Although Trotsky and his followers could not rightly be accused of ignoring the impact of the October Revolution, they were willing to diminish its value.
随着托洛茨基政治地位的削弱，伏龙芝开始掌控战争人民委员部，先是担任托洛茨基的副手，几个月后升任战争人民委员。机动作战原则和进攻优先论被奉为苏联思想的基石。备受争议的“统一军事学说”的必要性也得到了认可。然而，高屋建瓴的理论辩论很快被边缘化，随着1924-1925年改革的推进，伏龙芝发现自己被红军繁杂而又琐碎的问题所淹没。
As Trotsky weakened politically, Frunze began to take control of the War Commissariat, first as Trotsky's deputy, and a few months later as war commissar. The principle of maneuver and the primacy of the offensive became enshrined in Soviet thinking. The need for the much-debated “unified military doctrine” was accepted. But high doctrinal debates quickly receded into the background, and with the reforms of 1924–1925 Frunze found himself consumed by the overwhelming and rather mundane problems of the Red Army.
托洛茨基被一些人奉为红军之父，也被另一些人贬斥为几乎摧毁红军的波拿巴主义者。<sup>17</sup>这两种称谓都不完全恰当。但显然，当托洛茨基担任战争人民委员，讨论军事战略的未来时，红军正在分崩离析。托洛茨基一些较为激进的军队改革方案，包括将其用于劳动营，都以彻底失败告终，并阻碍了合格人员的训练。而更严重的问题则仅仅是由于疏忽造成的。1924年，伏龙芝说：“军队的形势极其严峻，我们不能认为这支军队适合作战。”<sup> 18</sup> 1924年1月召开的军事委员会也支持这一评估。一些委员出于政治原因想要抹黑托洛茨基，他们的评估必须从这个角度来看待。但来自中立观察员（例如德国最高统帅部）的报告也支持红军当时一片混乱的观点。<sup> 19 </sup> 复员后的计划制定得杂乱无章。中低级军官队伍极不稳定；三分之一的人缺乏实战经验，12%的人没有接受过任何正规军事教育。军械和武器研发几乎无人问津。弗伦泽的任务无疑十分艰巨。他曾希望建立一支150万人的正规军，但这一目标在财政上不可行，最终红军正规军的规模被设定为56.2万人。<sup> 20</sup>地方民兵在当时的苏联军事组织中扮演着重要角色，占军队步兵兵力的50%以上。<sup> 21</sup>在工业中心，以正规军为核心，辅以地方部队的混合领土体制，是苏联武装力量近二十年的组织形式，但民兵的作战训练不足。
Trotsky has been glorified as the father of the Red Army by some and vilified as the Bonapartist who almost destroyed it by others.17 Neither designation is completely deserved. But clearly, while as commissar of war Trotsky debated the future of military strategy, the Red Army was disintegrating. Some of Trotsky's wilder schemes for the army, including its use in labor brigades, were complete failures and detracted from the training of qualified personnel. Even more serious problems were caused simply by neglect. In 1924 Frunze said, “The situation in the army is extremely serious and we cannot consider the army fit for combat.”18 The Military Commission that met in January 1924 supported this assessment. Some members wished to discredit Trotsky for political reasons and their evaluation must be seen in that light. But reports of neutral observers, like the German High Command, support the idea that the Red Army was in shambles.19 Post-demobilization planning had been haphazard. There was tremendous instability in the middle and junior officer ranks; a third were without combat experience and 12 percent lacked any formal military education. Virtually no attention had been paid to ordnance and weapons development. Frunze's task was undeniably difficult. The creation of regular forces numbering 1.5 million for which he had hoped was not financially feasible, and the level of the regular Red Army was eventually set at 562,000.20 The territorial militia had to play, for the time being, a major role in Soviet military organization, accounting for over 50 percent of the infantry strength of the army.21 The mixed-territorial system, in which a core of regular forces was augmented by territorial formations in industrial centers, was the organizational form of the Soviet armed forces for almost two decades, but the militia was insufficiently trained for combat.
并非所有这一切都是托洛茨基的错。经济困难和旷日持久的辩论也起了作用。但弗伦泽接任后，迅速采取行动，竭尽所能地将一切资源投入到这支羽翼未丰的干部军队中。弗伦泽深信技术的重要性，并预言机器将在现代战争中扮演越来越重要的角色。他认为技术本身是“没有生命的”，但“未来战争的胜负或许更多地取决于纯粹的科学家，而非指挥官”。<sup>22</sup>因此，这位战争委员投入了大量精力来获取外国技术，同时也致力于奠定本土技术的基础。苏联之所以拥有全民备战、全民驻防的军事化国家，也应归功于弗伦泽。他主张关键产业的军事化和军事决策权的集中化。
Not all of this was Trotsky's fault. Economic difficulties and the protracted debates played a part. But when Frunze took over, he acted quickly to devote whatever resources he could find to the fledgling cadre army. Frunze was convinced of the importance of technology, and predicted that machines would play an ever-increasing role in modern warfare. Technology by itself was “lifeless,” he said, but “the outcome of the future war might depend more on the people of pure science than on the commander.”22 The war commissar therefore devoted considerable attention to acquiring foreign technology while simultaneously laying the foundation of an indigenous base. It is also to Frunze that the Soviet Union owes the legacy of a whole country prepared for war, a garrison state. He argued for the militarization of key industries and the centralization of authority in military decision making.
伏龙芝将红军赖以运转的智力资本的构建重任托付给了精干的军事参谋部。他对内战时期软弱无能、马虎草率的人员配备制度深恶痛绝，因为这种制度往往导致失败。在创建红军参谋部时，他决心要使其成为一支卓越且受人尊敬的队伍。为了增强其公信力，他本人曾短暂担任参谋长一职。因此，在接下来的十年里，苏联军事思想的重心从高层政治的纷争转移到了红军参谋部——军队的大脑。像米哈伊尔·图哈切夫斯基、鲍里斯·沙波什尼科夫和A·A·斯韦钦这样的人物，使参谋部成为红军的精英机构。这或许并非伏龙芝所愿；他曾警告说，参谋部不应封闭，政治工作者也应参与其中。但他坚信，健全的军事计划是未来胜利的关键，并且不允许意识形态的考量阻碍总参谋部的发展。伏龙芝未能亲眼见证红军的变革。他于1925年去世，据称死于斯大林下令进行的一次不必要的手术。但他留下的体系在1927年至1937年间发挥了作用，为新红军的建立奠定了基础。
Frunze entrusted the creation of the intellectual capital on which the Red Army would run to an expert military staff. He had nothing but contempt for the weak and sloppy staffing arrangements of the Civil War, which had often led to defeat. When he created the Red Army staff, he was determined that it would be both excellent and respected, to lend it credibility he himself held the post of chief for a short time. The focus of Soviet military thought for the next decade therefore shifted from the drama of high politics to the Red Army staff, the brain of the army. Men like Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov, and A. A. Svechin made the staff the elite body of the Red Army. This was not perhaps as Frunze wanted it; he warned that the staff should not close itself off and that political workers should be included. But he took it as a matter of fact that sound military planning was the key to future victory, and he did not allow ideological considerations to hinder the development of the general staff. Frunze did not live to see the Red Army transformed. He died in 1925, following an unnecessary medical operation reputedly ordered by Stalin. But the machinery that he left functioned between 1927 and 1937 to lay the foundation for the new Red Army.
三
III
苏联武装力量政治使命的明确，使红军参谋部的工作变得更加轻松。过去那些权宜之计，例如建立正规军和秉持布列斯特-立陶夫斯克精神，在苏联政治中成为永久性的。苏联再次转向国家建设，而非直接进行革命。在这方面，约瑟夫·斯大林的胜利及其“一国建成社会主义”的口号具有极其重要的意义。
The Red Army staff's task was made easier by the clarification of the political mission of the Soviet armed forces. The temporary solutions of the past, a regular army and the spirit of Brest-Litovsk, became permanent in Soviet politics. Once again the Soviets branched in the direction of statehood and away from immediate revolution. In this regard, the victory of Josef Stalin and his dictum of “socialism in one country” is singularly important.
一国社会主义确立了苏联国家的首要任务：捍卫苏联革命。在与反对派就国家未来进行的辩论中，斯大林力图彻底消除苏联若无世界革命便无法生存的观点。托洛茨基等人则认为，在没有世界革命的情况下建立苏联国家，需要一定程度的强制和军事化，而这最终会导致独裁统治。苏联将沦为一个武装营地，被敌对势力包围，并且对内部敌人充满恐惧，以至于会采取残酷镇压。为了讨好敌对阶级，苏联将不得不做出诸多妥协，最终导致右翼资本主义复辟。
Socialism in one country firmly set the priority of the Soviet state: to protect the Soviet revolution. In debates with his opposition over the future of the country, Stalin sought to lay to rest, once and for all, the idea that the Soviet Union could not survive without immediate world revolution. Trotsky and others argued that to build the Soviet state in the absence of world revolution would require a degree of coercion and militarization that would create dictatorship. The Soviet Union would have to be an armed camp, encircled by hostile powers and so fearful of internal enemies that it would be brutally repressive. So many compromises would have to be made to hostile classes that right-wing capitalist restoration would follow.
斯大林认为，1923年随着德国革命运动的失败而急剧退却的革命浪潮并未重现。他援引列宁的《布列斯特-立陶夫斯克条约》及其和平共处政策，指出苏联别无选择，只能尽可能地增强实力、武装自己，等待下一场战争。列宁政策的唯一问题在于苏联过于虚弱，在撤退时期遭受了不必要的损失。斯大林以令人难忘的言辞宣称：“苏联绝不能再次变得软弱无力，向西方卑躬屈膝。”<sup> 23</sup>他认为，资本家的进攻只是时间问题。他承认，“一国社会主义”作为一种永久的解决方案可能会危及革命。只有建立起“兄弟国家联盟”，苏联才能真正安全。但一个强大的苏联能够助力革命，而一个虚弱的苏联则注定会被击败。斯大林由此颠覆了“对无产阶级革命有利的就对苏联有利”的观念。如今，无产阶级国际主义将服务于苏维埃国家。凭借政治手腕和逻辑论证，斯大林取得了胜利。“不断革命论”的支持者几乎找不到任何支持自身论点的理由，到1926年，“一国建成社会主义”似乎成了苏维埃唯一的选择。托洛茨基的警告在一定程度上被苏维埃国家后来的发展所证实。但无产阶级专政的巩固，是在斯大林铁腕统治下付出了惨痛的代价。
Stalin argued that the revolutionary tides, which ebbed dramatically in 1923 with the failure of revolutionary movements in Germany, had not reappeared. Citing Lenin's Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and his policy of peaceful coexistence, he argued that the Soviet Union had no choice but to become as strong as possible, arm, and await the next war. The only problem with Lenin's policy had been that the Soviet Union was too weak and suffered needlessly in its period of retreat. In memorable language Stalin declared, “The Soviet Union must never be toothless and groveling before the West again.”23 It would only be a matter of time before the capitalists attacked. As a permanent solution, he admitted, “socialism in one country” might endanger the revolution. The Soviet Union would never be safe until there was a “ring of brother states.” But a strong Soviet Union could aid revolution while a weak one would simply be overcome. Stalin thereby reversed the notion that what was good for the proletarian revolution was good for the Soviet Union. Now, proletarian internationalism would serve the Soviet state. By political maneuvering and the logic of his argument, Stalin won. The proponents of “permanent revolution” could point to few arguments in their favor and by 1926 “socialism in one country” seemed to be the Soviets' only choice. Trotsky's warnings were, in part, borne out by the subsequent development of the Soviet state. But at great cost, under the fist of Stalin, the dictatorship of the proletariat was secured.
“一国建成社会主义”为伏龙芝1920年提出的“全国准备全面决定性战争”的原则提供了理想的政治理论依据。在伏龙芝的指导下，并得到斯大林的认可，苏联军方开始倡导动员整个经济支持军队，并强调外交在红军取得军事胜利中的作用。在总参谋长鲍里斯·沙波什尼科夫和前总参谋长图哈切夫斯基（两人之间经常存在分歧）的领导下，军方在处理这些对苏联国家发展至关重要的问题时享有相当大的自由。
“Socialism in one country” provided the ideal political rationale for the precept put forth by Frunze in 1920, the preparation of the whole country for total and decisive war. Following in the footsteps of Frunze and with the approval of Stalin, Soviet military men began to advocate the mobilization of the entire economy to support the military and the role of diplomacy in positioning the Red Army for military success. Led by Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov and former Chief of Staff Tukhachevsky, men who were themselves often at odds, the military staff enjoyed remarkable freedom in addressing these issues so fundamental to the development of Soviet state.
尽管图哈切夫斯基和沙波什尼科夫性格迥异，但他们有很多共同之处。沙波什尼科夫是一位技艺精湛的军事专家；在他被任命时，他甚至还不是共产党员。然而，他对政治有着敏锐的洞察力，并且能够根据时代形势调整自己的立场。在他的著作《军队的大脑》（ Mozg armii）中，沙波什尼科夫像伏龙芝一样认为，未来的战争规模将非常庞大。没有任何一个机构能够独自保卫国家；全面的协调至关重要。总参谋部应该参与制定军事和政治目标，因为战争是政治的另一种形式。24
Although very different personalities, Tukhachevsky and Shaposhnikov shared many ideas. Shaposhnikov was the consummate military professional; at the time of his appointment he did not even belong to the Communist Party. He was, however, an astute observer of politics and capable of adapting his position to the climate of the times. In his work Mozg armii (Brain of the army), Shaposhnikov argued, like Frunze, that future wars would be on a vast scale. No single agency was capable of protecting the state; complete coordination was indispensable. The general staff should participate in the formulation of military and political objectives, since war was the continuation of politics by other means.24
沙波什尼科夫较为谨慎的表述在许多方面与图哈切夫斯基的表述相似。但这位坚定的共产主义者则更为大胆，他认为一体化政策应发挥更大的作用。图哈切夫斯基或许稍稍颠倒了优先事项，阐述了经济和外交如何服务于军事目标。25外交可以塑造与资本主义世界的关系，从而孤立最危险的资本主义国家。当时普遍存在的对苏联的“经济封锁”可以通过鼓励部分资本主义国家利用其经济实力援助苏联来避免。
Shaposhnikov's rather cautious formulation was in many ways similar to one put forth by Tukhachevsky. But this committed communist was much bolder, suggesting a still greater role for integrated policy. Perhaps reversing priorities a bit, Tukhachevsky developed theses on how the economy and diplomacy could serve military objectives.25 Diplomacy could fashion relations with the capitalist world so that the most dangerous capitalist countries would be isolated. An “economic blockade” of the Soviet Union, a prevalent fear at that time, could be forestalled by encouraging some portion of the capitalist world to apply its economic strength to aiding the USSR.
图哈切夫斯基进一步指出，要真正确保安全，工业计划和战争计划必须协调一致。需要解决的问题包括不发达的化学工业（这反映了他对化学战日益增长的兴趣）以及交通和通信方面的缺陷。他指出，尽管苏联存在这些弱点，但它是一个幅员辽阔的国家，这使得工业能够进行战略性分散布局。
Tukhachevsky went on to suggest that to be really secure, industrial plans and war plans had to be coordinated. Among the problems to be attacked were underdeveloped chemical industries (reflecting his growing interest in chemical warfare) and defects in transport and communication. He noted that in spite of its weaknesses, the Soviet Union was a vast country, which allowed strategic dispersal of industry.
沙波什尼科夫和图哈切夫斯基都认为，战时经济的规划和管理需要政治和军事专业知识的结合。他们认为，仅凭专业知识无法协调外交、经济和军事政策。然而，图哈切夫斯基也指出，军事科学领域容易受到政治干预或对当前政治路线过于敏感的影响。尽管他持有政治信仰并信奉无产阶级军事理论，但他作为一名军人，仍然希望维护军事计划和准备工作的完整性。例如，众所周知，他对伏龙芝的继任者、斯大林的忠实追随者克莱门蒂·伏罗希洛夫的军事专业知识并不尊重。两人多次发生冲突，在重大军事问题上，图哈切夫斯基往往胜出。伏罗希洛夫发挥了重要作用，但由于缺乏像图哈切夫斯基那样的才能，他的活动仅限于经济建设的管理。图哈切夫斯基在1927年底失宠，被贬至列宁格勒军区担任司令。然而，四年后，他被召回担任军备总司令，负责监督红军的装备计划。他是一位才华横溢的人物，当时的红军离不开他。
Planning and management of the war economy required a union of political and military expertise according to both Shaposhnikov and Tukhachevsky. It was not possible, they thought, to undertake the coordination of diplomatic, economic, and military policy on the basis of specialized knowledge. Tukhachevsky, however, did suggest that military science was an area where political interference or sensitivity to the current political line could be damaging. In spite of his political beliefs and faith in proletarian military doctrine, he was a soldier who wished to guard the integrity of military planning and preparation. He was known, for example, to have little respect for the military expertise of Klementi Voroshilov, Frunze's successor and ardent follower of Stalin. The two clashed repeatedly and on significant military matters Tukhachevsky often won. Voroshilov played an important role, but lacking the talent of men like Tukhachevsky, he confined his activities to the administration of the economic buildup. Tukhachevsky fell out of favor at the end of 1927 and was banished to command of the Leningrad Military District. Four years later, however, he was brought back as chief of armaments to oversee the program to equip the Red Army. He was a man of considerable talents and at that time the Red Army could not do without him.
图哈切夫斯基和沙波什尼科夫坚信战争需要全力以赴。他们认为，战争只是历史进程中的又一步（对于新生的布尔什维克国家而言，这是至关重要的一步），因此必须动员苏联的所有经济资源来支持即将到来的战争。然而，当时启动的工业化运动主要侧重于发展重工业。军工产业固然受益，但在1929年，军工产业在行政上与重工业分离。其目标是为苏联建立稳固的工业基础，使其能够在战争爆发时迅速动员民用工业。1927年至1929年间，军需品的采购速度显著提升，之后增速放缓，并在1932年再次开始增长。至此，苏联走上了军事工业化的道路，并以捍卫“一国社会主义”为基础进行战争准备。
Tukhachevsky and Shaposhnikov believed in the need for total effort in war. Because war was just another step on the continuum (and a vital one for the infant Bolshevik state), they held that all the economic resources of the Soviet Union had to be mobilized to support the effort in the coming war. The industrialization drive that was launched was, however, geared primarily to the development of heavy industry. War industry certainly benefited but in 1929 was administratively separated from heavy industry. The goal was to give the Soviet Union a solid industrial base and the ability to mobilize civilian industries rapidly in the event of war. The rate of procurement of military hardware increased considerably between 1927 and 1929, then slowed, and began to increase again in 1932. The Soviet Union was now launched on the path of military industrialization and the preparation for war as the basis for the protection of “socialism in one country.”
自内战结束以来，苏联发展出了一套广泛且在某些方面独树一帜的军事理论。内战的教训被铭刻在进攻性机动战的备战之中。防御措施退居其次，但对后方防御工事的建设以及交通运输和通信的重视程度日益提高。苏联军事领导层所秉持的最重要的理念是全国上下做好战争准备。苏联大力投资重工业和国产武器生产，以装备红军。同时，通过对儿童进行军事预备训练和建立全民准军事组织，培养民众的尚武精神。地方民兵得到进一步发展，但干部军队作为苏联力量的支柱，其重要性日益凸显。回首往事，很难说究竟是什么对这些形成时期的影响最大。托洛茨基和伏龙芝等人的政治斗争固然重要。沙皇俄国总参谋部的传统以及第一次世界大战灾难后世界军事辩论格局的变迁也产生了显著影响。总的来说，这些早期岁月似乎是由一系列受军事需要驱动、并受意识形态影响的问题的答案所主导，而不是反过来。
In the years since the Civil War an extensive and in some respects unique Soviet military doctrine had developed. The lessons of the Civil War were enshrined in the preparation to fight an offensive war of maneuver. Defensive measures were secondary, but growing attention was paid to fortification of the rear and to transport and communication. The most important concept that had come down to the Soviet military leadership was the preparation of the whole country for war. Investment in heavy industry and in indigenous arms production for the Red Army was undertaken. The population was prepared, too, with a new martial spirit in premilitary training for children and the paramilitary organization of the whole population. The territorial militia was further developed, but increasingly the cadre army was emphasized as the backbone of Soviet strength. It is difficult in retrospect to say what influenced these formative years most. Political struggles between personalities like Trotsky and Frunze were important. The heritage of imperial Russia's general staff as well as the impact of the fluid state of worldwide military debate after the disasters of World War I were certainly felt. On balance these early years seem to have been dominated by a series of answers to questions dictated by military necessity and tempered by ideology, rather than the other way around.
第四
IV
苏联军事战略包含两个方面：政治军事方面，旨在界定军事力量的目的和性质；以及军事技术方面，决定苏联军队在战场上的作战方式。1927年以前，布尔什维克主要关注前者。随着这些问题的解决，战略和作战问题得到了更多重视。20世纪20年代末30年代初的一个显著特点是红军内部的辩论自由。这种辩论的广度和深度与几年后形成鲜明对比，当时斯大林主义军事科学以及斯大林本人的绝对权威扼杀了苏联军事思想。
Soviet military strategy has two parts: the political-military side, which attempts to define the purpose and character of military power, and the military-technical side, which determines how Soviet military forces will operate in the field. Until 1927 the Bolsheviks were preoccupied with the former. Those issues settled, greater attention was given to strategic and operational issues. One of the outstanding characteristics of the late twenties and early thirties was the freedom of debate in the Red Army. The breadth and intensity of the debate is in marked contrast to the period a few years later, when Stalinist military science and the infallibility of Stalin himself crippled Soviet military thought.
思想交流发生在战场格局快速变化的时期。苏联战略家将自己视为国际军事思想家共同体的一员。俄国革命的意义自然得到肯定，但对无产阶级战争特殊性的强调开始让位于对新战场需求的深入分析。
The exchange of ideas took place in a period in which the battlefield was changing rapidly. Soviet strategists regarded themselves as a part of the international community of military thinkers. The significance of the Russian Revolution was naturally upheld, but emphasis on the special character of proletarian warfare began to give way to hard analysis of the requirements of the new battlefield.
欧洲士兵仍对第一次世界大战代价惨重的堑壕战记忆犹新，新技术，尤其是坦克，被认为能够解决这一问题。然而，装甲的有效运用并非显而易见。早期的解决方案仅仅是将装甲融入现有的战场布局，例如用坦克支援步兵突破敌军防线。随着时间的推移，人们逐渐认识到革命性新型战争模式的潜力，其中一种颇具创新性的模式正是在这一时期于苏联发展起来的。
European soldiers were haunted by the costly trench warfare of the First World War, and new technologies, particularly the tank, were thought to provide potential answers to the problem. But the effective use of armor was not self-evident. Early solutions envisioned simply the incorporation of armor into existing battlefield arrangements, using tanks in support of infantry to break through enemy lines, for example. Slowly, the potential for revolutionary new forms of warfare was recognized, one of the more novel of which developed during this period in the Soviet Union.
关于这种新型战争的第一部专著大约写于1928年，作者是红军作战部部长V·特里安迪菲洛夫。<sup> 26</sup>特里安迪菲洛夫阐述了“连续作战”的理论。他认为，只有不给敌人重整旗鼓的机会，才能取得决定性的胜利。因此，他不仅重视突破敌军防线，更重视利用突破口给予敌人致命一击。这种“连续作战”理论认识到，机动性和速度的提升赋予了装甲部队在纵深作战中巨大的潜力。第一次世界大战中，战斗通常是线性推进的，重点在于突破敌军防线。而特里安迪菲洛夫的理论则强调了纵深作战的重要性，即攻击敌军的支援部队和交通线。
The first treatise on this new type of warfare was written around 1928 by the head of the operations administration of the Red Army staff, V. Triandifilov.26 Triandifilov laid out a case for “successive operations” in battle. He argued that decisive victory could only be achieved if the enemy did not have an opportunity to regroup. He devoted considerable attention, therefore, not just to breaking through the enemy lines, but to exploiting the penetration to deliver a decisive and annihilating blow. This theory of “successive operations” recognized the potential that armor, with increased mobility and speed, held for deep operations. In the First World War battle had usually been linear, concentrating on penetrating enemy lines. Triandifilov's formulation recognized the importance of operating in depth against the enemy's supporting units and lines of communication.
图哈切夫斯基、别尔津、尼科沃夫等人进一步发展了这些思想。尽管他们认为特里安迪菲洛夫对当时包围和歼灭敌人的潜力过于乐观，但他们提出的理论将使红军最终能够实施此类突破、包围和决定性胜利的作战行动。<sup> 27 </sup> 图哈切夫斯基设想将摩托化步兵部队、自行火炮和航空兵联合运用以实现突破。轰炸机将用于切断敌军预备队，而一种新型部队——伞兵——将用于夺取目标并阻断敌人的撤退，从而使第二梯队能够给予敌人致命一击。
These ideas were further developed by Tukhachevsky, Berzin, Nikovov, and others. Although they believed Triandifilov too optimistic about the current potential for encircling and crushing the enemy, they developed theories that would enable the Red Army, in time, to carry out such operations for breakthrough, encirclement, and decisive victory.27 Tukhachevsky envisioned the combined use of motorized rifle units, self-propelled artillery, and aviation to achieve breakthrough. Bombers were to be used to interdict enemy reserves and a new type of force, paratroopers, was to be used to seize targets and block the enemy's retreat, allowing a crushing blow to be delivered by the second echelon of forces.
苏联人也认识到机械化部队的潜力，可以将各种类型的装甲车辆整合起来，并保持相同的行军速度。苏联人摒弃了“单一武器”理论，拒绝组建专业精锐部队，转而支持大规模军队。然而，装甲部队也需要专门的训练，苏联人实际上也接受了精锐部队的必要性，这使得他们进一步远离了大规模军队，转而走向了他们出于意识形态原因而拒绝的精锐部队。
The Soviets also recognized the potential of mechanized formations to incorporate various forms of armor that could move at the same speed. The Soviets denounced “one-weapon” theories, rejecting the idea of specialized, elite units in favor of mass armies. Nevertheless, armored formations also required specialized training and the Soviets tacitly accepted the need for elite, well-trained units, pushing them one step further away from mass armies and toward the elite units that they rejected on ideological grounds.
这种对新战场形势的看法赢得了苏联军方高层的拥护，红军的装备和训练计划也越来越多地基于纵深联合作战的理念制定。这种战争形式的吸引力无疑在于其追求决定性、全面胜利的概念，以及它与进攻优先原则的契合性。图哈切夫斯基的意识形态论证可能进一步增强了这一选择的吸引力。他认为，下一场战争的胜利将取决于一次足以震撼那些阶级分化严重、国力衰弱的资本主义国家的进攻性打击。如此一来，便可发动最终的毁灭性打击。然而，意识形态的作用不容忽视。纵深作战首先是一种发挥新技术潜力的途径。这一概念与古德里安等人在德国陆军中的思想有几分相似，尽管经历了第一次世界大战，德国陆军仍然坚信进攻的重要性。
This view of the new battlefield won adherents in the Soviet military hierarchy, and plans for equipping and training the Red Army were increasingly formulated on the basis of combined-arms operations in depth. The attractiveness of this form of warfare doubtless lay in the concept of decisive and total victory and in its compatibility with the primacy of the offense. Tukhachevsky's ideological justification probably further increased the attractiveness of the option. He argued that victory in the next war would depend on an offensive blow that would shock the weakened capitalist countries suffering from deep class divisions. The decisive blow leading to ultimate annihilation could then be delivered. But the role of ideology must not be overstated. Operations in depth were above all a way to exploit the potential of new technologies. The concept bore some resemblance to the thought of Guderian and others in the German army, another service convinced, in spite of the First World War, of the importance of the offense.
然而，这种思路遭到了强烈反对。伏罗希洛夫与前帝国军官斯韦钦之间形成了一种奇特的联盟，这种联盟助长了反对意见，即认为纵深作战无法取得决定性胜利。斯韦钦曾在《战略》一书中论述道，下一场战争将是一场消耗战，国家的“生产力”将起到决定性作用。<sup> 28</sup>全面胜利不可能迅速取得，战争将旷日持久；防御作战也被认为是取得胜利的关键。批评者在装甲部队的使用问题上也与图哈切夫斯基和红军参谋部存在分歧。他们认为装甲部队应该加强步兵和炮兵部队。步兵和骑兵军官可能认为新技术威胁到了他们的地位，这种感觉也影响了这场辩论。最终，图哈切夫斯基的路线取得了胜利，纵深作战的概念主导了苏联的思想。1931年后，军事参谋学院设立了作战系，专门研究诸兵种联合纵深作战的细节。然而，图哈切夫斯基的胜利并非彻底。一些昂贵的新型坦克被调拨用于支援步兵和骑兵。据装甲兵发展研究者称，没有证据表明图哈切夫斯基反对以这种方式使用装甲兵，但这一决定在第二次世界大战的头两年被证明是一个致命的错误。29
This line of thought was, however, strongly opposed. A strange alliance between Voroshilov and the former imperial officer Svechin promoted the opposing view, which was convinced of the fallacy of operations in depth to achieve decisive victory. Svechin had argued in Strategiia that the next war would be of attrition in which the “productive forces” of the country would be decisive.28 Total victory could not be achieved rapidly and the war would be long and protracted; defensive operations were also considered to be key to victory. The critics disagreed as well with Tukhachevsky and the Red Army staff on the use of armor. They believed that armor should reinforce the infantry and artillery units. Possibly the feeling of infantry and cavalry officers that the new technologies threatened their status played a role in the debate. In the end Tukhachevsky's line triumphed and the concept of operations in depth governed Soviet thinking. An operations faculty was created at the military staff academy after 1931 to work out the details of operations in depth with combined arms. Tukhachevsky's victory was not total, however. Some of the expensive new tanks were diverted to infantry and cavalry support. According to students of armor development, there is no evidence that Tukhachevsky opposed the use of armor in this way, but the decision proved to be a critical mistake in the first two years of the Second World War.29
图哈切夫斯基军事理论的发展并非孤立发生。苏联研究了外国军事思想，这些思想在其概念形成过程中发挥了重要作用。其中一个途径是与德国的合作。这种权宜之计的结合始于1922年的《拉帕洛条约》。德国需要一个避开《凡尔赛条约》签署国视线的重新武装的地方，而苏联则需要外国军事援助。这种合作通过联合生产军事装备以及派遣德国教官到苏联教授战术和训练等方式帮助了苏联。苏联方面几乎没有提及合作的规模，但其最重要的时期似乎是20世纪20年代中期。双方就德国飞机的生产达成协议（年产量为300架，其中苏联获得60架）。该工厂由德国技术人员运营，使用俄罗斯的原材料和工人。到 1923-1924 年，合作范围扩大到包括为苏联飞行员开设德国技术课程，以及德国军官在红军参谋部任职。
The development of Tukhachevsky's doctrine did not take place in a vacuum. Foreign military thought was studied by the Soviets and played an important role in the formulation of these concepts. One conduit was the collaboration with Germany. This marriage of convenience existed since the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. The Germans needed a place to rearm out of view of the signatories to the Treaty of Versailles and the Soviets needed foreign military assistance. The collaboration helped the Soviets through joint production of military equipment and through German instructors sent to the Soviet Union who taught tactics and training. The Soviets are virtually silent on how extensive the collaboration was, but its most important period seems to have been in the mid-1920s. Agreements were reached on the manufacture of German aircraft (at an annual rate of three hundred, with the Soviets receiving sixty).30 The plant was run by German technicians with Russian raw materials and laborers. By 1923–1924, cooperation had extended to include German technical courses for Soviet airmen and to the service of German officers on the Red Army staff.
这些政策后来遇到了一些阻力，因为人们认识到自主生产的必要性，而且协调方面也一直存在问题，但合作持续了多年。其中一项可能对苏联军事思想发展产生影响的安排是，设立了旨在测试新式武器和技术、交流和评估信息的训练项目。
These policies later met with some resistance as the need for indigenous production was recognized, and there were always problems of coordination, but the cooperation continued for years. One arrangement that might have had an impact on the development of Soviet military thought was the creation of training programs to test new weapons and technologies, and to exchange and evaluate information.
然而，与德国军队的合作对苏联思想的影响不容低估。无论如何，苏联士兵都会认真阅读有关最新军事发展的外国文献。例如，富勒关于坦克的著作在出版三年后的1923年被翻译成俄语。一位研究苏联装甲发展的学生认为，苏联在坦克部署方面找到了一种与其他国家（特别是德国）的思想有相似之处的方案，但实际上这种方案比其他方案更早出现。<sup> 31</sup>苏联的战略思想似乎主要是针对本国特有的问题而提出的本土化解决方案。<sup> 32</sup>
The impact on Soviet thought of the collaboration with the German army must not be overestimated, however. Soviet soldiers in any case took care to read the foreign literature on new military developments. Fuller's work on tanks, for instance, was translated into Russian in 1923, three years after its publication. A student of Soviet armor development contends that the Soviets arrived at an answer for the deployment of tanks that shared features with other thought, particularly German, but actually antedated other solutions.31 The Soviets' strategic thought appears to have been primarily an indigenous solution to the problems that were peculiar to their country.32
20世纪30年代，能够掌握新技术并保卫苏联免受其他列强侵略的干部军队逐渐取代了日渐萎缩的民兵。到1936年，红军77%的兵力都属于干部部队。<sup> 33</sup>红军迅速向欧洲其他国家的军队靠拢。1935年9月，红军参谋部更名为工农红军总参谋部。一项法令还正式确立了军队的军衔等级。至此，红军的转型完成。
In the 1930s the cadre army, able to incorporate the new technologies and to defend the Soviet Union from other powers, slowly eclipsed the militia, which was shrinking. By 1936, 77 percent of the Red Army's strength was in the cadre force.33 The Red Army moved rapidly into line with other European armies. In September, 1935, the Red Army staff was renamed the General Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. A decree also created formal distinctions of rank in the army. The transformation was complete.
新成立的红军面临着东西两线作战的双重威胁。两线作战被认为是一种切实的可能性；早在1928年，这种担忧就催生了将幅员辽阔的苏联领土一分为二的提议。1928年至1930年间，苏联最终决定使远东地区在经济和行政上独立于欧洲部分。
The new Red Army faced dangers rising in both East and West. A two-front war was regarded as a real possibility; in 1928, this fear had already produced a suggestion that the massive Soviet territory be split into halves. The decision was taken between 1928 and 1930 to make the Soviet Far East economically and administratively independent of the European half of the country.
日本对西伯利亚的野心以及苏联远东防御的薄弱令人担忧。日本人当然早已制定了对苏联开战的计划，但真正引起人们对日本威胁的关注的是他们在1931年9月对满洲的侵略。尽管苏联保持了严格的中立，但苏军仍进入戒备状态，并向苏满边境推进。随着日军占领上海，恐惧与日俱增。为了应对日本在该地区的活动，苏联开始扩充军备，包括组建苏联太平洋舰队和投资建设运输设施。从1933年到1936年，苏日关系紧张，双方军队之间甚至发生了小规模冲突。但最终，凭借高超的外交手段和苏联军备建设的威慑作用，避免了部分人预期的与日本开战。关东军转而南下，进军印度支那和东南亚。因此，苏联在远东地区所做的准备，使苏联拥有了对德战争的剩余产能，这种产能得到了保护，远离了遭受重创的西线战场。
Japan's designs on Siberia and the weakness of Soviet Far Eastern defenses were causes for concern. The Japanese had, of course, developed plans for war against the Soviet Union, but it was their actions against Manchuria in September 1931 that called attention to the Japanese threat. Although the Soviets maintained strict neutrality, Soviet forces were placed on alert and moved toward the Soviet-Manchurian border. Fears grew as the Japanese occupied Shanghai. In reaction to Japanese activity in the area, the Soviets began a buildup of forces, including the creation of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and investment in transport facilities. From 1933 to 1936 relations between the Soviets and the Japanese were strained. Skirmishes actually occurred between forces of the two sides. But eventually skillful diplomacy and the deterrent effect of the Soviet buildup prevented the war with Japan that some expected. The Kwantung Army turned south, instead, toward Indochina and Southeast Asia. The preparations taken in the Far East thus gave the Soviets excess capacity for the war with Germany, capacity that was protected, far away from the decimated western front.
随着希特勒的崛起，欧洲的局势同样令人不安。一些人，包括大多数最高统帅部成员，都确信威胁主要来自西方。西方也采取了相应的准备措施，包括将苏军调往欧洲战区、修建补给设施以及匆忙动员和训练预备役部队。
Trends in Europe were equally disturbing with Hitler's rise to power. Some, among them most members of the High Command, were convinced that the threat lay primarily to the West. Preparatory steps were taken there as well, with the shifting of Soviet forces to the European theater of operations, the construction of supply facilities, and the hurried mobilization and training of reserves.
尽管对德国的威胁感到担忧，苏联指挥官们仍然继续与之前的合作者保持联系，一些人甚至开始质疑西方正在形成的反德阵线。斯大林忙于微妙的外交斡旋，显然对一些军官（包括特立独行的图哈切夫斯基）偏离纯粹军事目标的倾向感到不安。1937年，秘密警察（内务人民委员会）迅速而大规模地对红军司令部展开了清洗。尽管有大量证据表明事实并非如此，斯大林似乎仍然相信许多将军亲德且政治上不可靠。他清洗军队的决定后果极其严重。大约60%的师长及以上军衔的军官在清洗中丧生；整个军官队伍减少了20%到35%。<sup>34</sup>少数指挥官幸存下来，例如后来成为总参谋长的沙波什尼科夫。但苏联许多最杰出的军事人才，包括图哈切夫斯基、乌博列维奇、亚基尔和叶戈罗夫，都被处决了。那些幸免于难的人，比如伊瑟森，则被噤声了。
In spite of their concern about the German danger, Soviet commanders continued their contacts with their former collaborators and some began to question the anti-German front forming in the West. Stalin, engaged in delicately balanced diplomatic maneuvers, was apparently troubled by the tendency of some of his officers, among them the independent Tukhachevsky, to depart from strictly military concerns. In 1937, the secret police (NKVD) moved quickly and massively against the Red Army Command. Stalin seems to have believed, in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that many generals were pro-German and politically unreliable. The consequences of his decision to purge the military were immense. Roughly 60 percent of officers at the level of division commander or above fell victim to the purge; the officer corps as a whole was depleted by 20 to 35 percent.34 A few commanders survived, Shaposhnikov, for instance, who would become chief of staff. But many of the Soviet Union's best military minds, among them Tukhachevsky, Uborevitch, Yakir, and Yegorov, were executed. Those who were not, like Isserson, were silenced.
对于苏联军事思想的发展而言，清洗运动的时机可谓极其不合时宜。1936年，兵种合成纵深作战理论日趋成熟。事实上，图哈切夫斯基的进攻作战理论已取得胜利，他此时正转向纵深防御问题。对内战的盲目崇拜正受到抨击。机动原则就是一个例证；“特殊”机动理论在1937年就受到了挑战。图哈切夫斯基谴责了对内战的盲目崇拜（他自己也曾犯过这种错误），他指出，“特殊机动理论并非基于对潜在敌人新式武器的研究和评估，……而仅仅是基于内战的一些经验教训……更多地是基于英雄主义情怀而非……实际情况。”<sup> 35</sup>防御作战和阵地战被视为应当理解和掌握的作战方法，但应尽可能避免使用。
The purges could not have come at a more inopportune time for the development of Soviet military thought. The theory of combined-arms operations in depth was maturing in 1936. In fact, Tukhachevsky, his concept of offensive operations victorious, was now turning to questions of defense in depth. Slavish worship of the Civil War was under attack. The principle of maneuver is a case in point; the theory of “special” maneuver was challenged in 1937. Decrying the idolization of the Civil War of which he himself had once been guilty, Tukhachevsky noted that “special maneuver [was] a theory based not on the study and appraisal of the new armaments of our potential enemies,…but only on some lessons of the Civil War…based more on ideas suggested by the heroic sentiments than on…present conditions.”35 Defensive operations and the war of position were discussed as methods of warfare that should be understood and mastered, though avoided if at all possible.
清洗运动中断了这一进程，使苏联军事思想陷入混乱。与图哈切夫斯基和其他被处决的指挥官相关的纵深作战原则的阐述立即停止。据当时在总参谋学院就读的彼得罗·格里戈连科回忆，甚至连谈论纵深作战都是被禁止的。36篇基于这些原则的文献被销毁，苏联进攻战略究竟是什么，一度陷入彻底的混乱。在这种氛围下，由于最高统帅部可以理解的怯懦，讨论用新思想取代被否定思想的自由受到了严重限制。
The purges cut this process short and threw Soviet military thought into chaos. Elaboration of the principles of operations in depth, associated with Tukhachevsky and other liquidated commanders, stopped immediately. According to Petro Grigorenko, then a student at the General Staff Academy, it was forbidden to even speak of operations in depth.36 Texts based on these principles were destroyed and for a while there was absolute confusion on what Soviet offensive strategy actually was. In this atmosphere, freedom to discuss new ideas to replace those discredited was severely compromised by the High Command's understandable timidity.
V
V
随着图哈切夫斯基纵深渗透理论的失效，伏罗希洛夫和主张阵地战的拥护者们——这种战略依赖于防御工事和领土阵地的维护——开始重新制定战略。然而，在混乱的环境下，他们没有时间改变苏联的思想和训练方向。结果，苏联军队陷入了机动战和阵地战的双重困境，两者都准备不足。1939-1940年冬季对芬兰战争的惨败充分证明了红军内部的混乱。苏军试图进行纵深进攻，但部队训练不足，所宣称的兵种协同作战也经常失败。伞兵几乎没有得到运用，而坦克与步兵协同作战的策略也被证明是错误的，因为步兵无法承受敌方火力，只能寻找掩体，反而使装甲车辆暴露在炮火之下。38苏军在最后一刻进行了重组和增援，才使红军免于战败。
With the Tukhachevsky doctrine of deep penetration silenced, Voroshilov and the proponents of positional warfare, a strategy dependent on defensive fortification and maintenance of territorial position, began to reformulate strategy.37 Operating in the chaotic environment, however, they did not have time to change the course of Soviet thought and training. As a result, the Soviets were caught between preparation for the war of maneuver and the war of position, and were not ready for either. Evidence of the confusion that reigned in the Red Army was abundant in the disasters of the Winter War against Finland in 1939–1940. Soviet forces sought to fight an offensive war with deep operations, but troops were badly trained, and the heralded cooperation of arms too often broke down. Paratroopers were hardly used at all and the policy of employing tanks with infantry turned out to be faulty as the infantry, unable to withstand enemy fire, took cover and exposed armored vehicles to artillery barrage.38 Only an eleventh-hour reorganization and reinforcement of Soviet forces saved the Red Army from defeat.
芬兰战争的经验促使红军指挥部进行了一些改革。斯大林“提拔”了他的副手伏罗希洛夫，并将红军的实际指挥权交给了铁木辛哥。铁木辛哥启动了一项强化训练计划，并成功地恢复了军事指挥官对政委的领导地位。政委们像内战时期一样，开始在战场上插手干预。动员工业以补充物资，并重视训练，开始扭转清洗运动造成的混乱局面。然而，时间不足以完成这项任务。
The experiences of the Finnish war led the Red Army command to make some changes. Stalin “promoted” his lieutenant Voroshilov and entrusted real responsibility for the Red Army to S. Timoshenko. Timoshenko launched an intensive training program and succeeded in reestablishing the primacy of the military commanders over the commissars, who had, as in the Civil War, begun to take initiatives in the field. Mobilization of industry to replenish matériel and an emphasis on training began to reverse the dislocation caused by the purges. There was not enough time, however, to finish the job.
在战争阴云笼罩之际，斯大林竟愿意发动大规模清洗，这令人费解。当然，“一国社会主义”的主要缔造者绝不会希望苏联走向灭亡。或许，身为马克思主义者的斯大林相信历史造就人，低估了个人的天赋——当然，他自己的天赋除外。他可能认为，只要给新军官们足够的时间，他们就能掌握管理之道。然而，事实远比他预想的要短，这几乎给苏联带来了致命的打击。
Stalin's willingness to launch extensive purges in the midst of a war scare is difficult to understand. Certainly, the chief architect of “socialism in one country” did not intend to have the Soviet Union commit suicide. Perhaps Stalin the Marxist believed that history makes men, and underestimated individual genius—his own excepted, of course. He may have assumed that given time the new officers would learn their art. The fact that there was far less time than he expected almost proved fatal for the Soviet Union.
在德国入侵前的关键几年里，大清洗只是斯大林犯下的一个错误。随着军事精英被噤声，斯大林不得不独自承担起军事准备的全部责任。他坚信即将到来的战争将分为两个阶段。第一阶段将由资本主义列强参与，苏联则保持中立。因此，斯大林的关键任务是尽可能延长第一阶段。他相信自己凭借卓越的外交手腕就能推迟战争，而这也成为了他所有决策的指导原则。他极度害怕挑起与德国的战争，甚至在德军调动的确凿证据摆在眼前时，也拒绝让最高统帅部进行预防性动员。斯大林的盲目自信蒙蔽了他的双眼，使他拒绝接受任何警告。不可否认，苏联的工业动员仍在疯狂进行，斯大林竭力在苏联与西方国家之间的芬兰和波兰领土上攫取每一寸土地。必须从这个角度来理解1939年的《苏德互不侵犯条约》。希特勒认为与资本主义国家开战不可避免，但资本主义固有的矛盾会先导致它们彼此开战。如果与交战一方结成临时联盟能够争取更多时间，那么与纳粹德国签订条约就是合理的。事实上，与希特勒达成协议是明智之举，因为英国和法国攻击苏联的可能性会大大降低。他的外交斡旋确实为苏联争取了几个月的时间和一些宝贵的领土。但这并没有将战争推迟足够长的时间。1941年6月22日战争爆发时，苏联政府并没有做好充分的准备。就像1918年一样，德国人距离摧毁俄国的社会主义政权仅差几百公里。
The purges were but one mistake that Stalin made in the critical years prior to the German attack. With the better military minds silenced, Stalin was left to assume unquestioned responsibility for the conduct of military preparation. He was convinced that the coming war would have two phases. The first would involve the capitalist powers, with the Soviet Union neutral in the conflict. The key task for Stalin, then, was to prolong the first phase as long as possible. He trusted in the infallibility of his personal diplomatic skill to postponing the war and this became the prism through which all decisions were taken. He was so fearful of provoking war with Germany that he refused to allow the High Command to undertake precautionary mobilization of the forces, even when irrefutable evidence of German troop movements was available. His own expectations so blinded Stalin that he refused to accept warnings. Undeniably, the industrial mobilization of the country continued at a frantic pace, and Stalin strove to acquire every inch of territory between the Soviet Union and the West in Finland and Poland. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 must be understood in this light. War with the capitalist states he regarded as inevitable, but the contradictions inherent in capitalism would lead them to war with each other first. If a temporary alliance with one warring faction could buy more time, a pact with Nazi Germany was justified. In fact, it made sense to come to an agreement with Hitler because Britain and France would be far less likely to attack the Soviet Union. His diplomatic maneuvering did buy the Soviet Union a few months and some valuable territory. But it did not postpone the war quite long enough. When it came on June 22, 1941, the Soviet state was not fully prepared. As in 1918, the Germans were only a few hundred kilometers short of destroying socialism in Russia.
事后看来，德军推进失败本身就是一件非同寻常的事，这既是俄军顽强抵抗的结果，也是德军战略和作战失误的产物。初期，苏军作战表现极其糟糕，以至于西方情报部门估计莫斯科将在四周内陷落。苏军当时一片混乱。由于装备缺陷和战术失误，苏军四分之一的装甲部队在最初几周内就损失殆尽。苏军指挥部几乎陷入一片混乱，一位被围困的苏军军官那句著名的话语便道出了当时的困境：“我们正在遭受炮火攻击——我们该怎么办？”<sup> 39</sup>
In retrospect, the fact that the German advance fell short is in itself a remarkable occurrence, the result of Russian tenacity and of German strategic and operational errors. In the early days Soviet forces fought so poorly that Western intelligence estimated the fall of Moscow in four weeks. The Soviet were in a state of utter confusion. One-fourth of Soviet armor was lost in the first few weeks because of faulty equipment and faultier tactics. There was virtual chaos in the Soviet command, captured by the words of a beleaguered Soviet officer that have become famous: “We are being fired upon—what shall we do?”39
二战中苏联的胜利在许多方面都是全国动员起来参战理念的胜利。民众的有效抵抗，充分认识到纳粹对斯拉夫人的暴行，极大地增强了苏联军队在前线的作战能力。游击战——此前苏联战略制定者对此知之甚少——在城乡地区取得了胜利。大规模的工业转移对苏联的胜利做出了被低估的贡献。图哈切夫斯基和其他许多人认为，苏联的优势在于其广袤的领土和工业战略分散的潜力。值得注意的是，在德军推进期间，苏联大量工业设施被转移，有时甚至是一块砖一块砖地转移，使其远离德军的攻击范围。为了争取民众的支持，斯大林摒弃了无产阶级和农民、共产主义者和民族主义者之间的区别。受苏联最杰出的作曲家们专门为战争创作的英雄音乐的鼓舞，与德国人的战斗变成了保卫祖国俄罗斯的斗争，这场斗争在俄罗斯历史上已经发生过很多次。
Russia's victory in World War II was in many ways a victory for the concept of the whole country mobilized for war. Effective resistance by the population, now fully aware of the behavior of the Nazis toward the Slavs, buttressed the effort of the Soviet Union's forces at the front. Partisan warfare, which had been little understood by the makers of Soviet strategy, triumphed in urban and rural areas. An underestimated contribution to the Soviet effort was made through massive industrial relocations. Tukhachevsky and many others had argued that Russia's strength lay in its vast territory and potential for strategic dispersal of industry. Remarkably, during the German advance, large portions of Soviet industry were moved, sometimes brick by brick, out of reach of the Germans. In seeking the support of the population, Stalin dropped distinctions between proletarian and peasant, communist and nationalist. Stirred by the heroic music of the finest Soviet composers that was written expressly for the war effort, the battle against the Germans became a struggle for Mother Russia, a struggle that had been waged many times in Russian history.
苏联指挥部扭转1941-1942年前线灾难性战局的能力，曾被誉为斯大林天才的胜利，直到赫鲁晓夫发起去斯大林化运动。<sup> 40</sup>自1956年以来，击败德国入侵被誉为苏联人民及其制度的胜利。<sup> 41</sup>现代苏联思想在这两种极端观点之间找到了平衡点，并最终得以重构扭转战争局势的因素。
The ability of the Soviet command to reverse the catastrophic events of the 1941–1942 period at the front was hailed as a victory for the genius of Stalin until Khrushchev began the de-Stalinization campaign.40 Since 1956, the defeat of the German invasion has been hailed as a victory for the Soviet people and its system.41 Modern Soviet thought has found a position between these extremes and through it, it is finally possible to reconstruct the factors that reversed the tides of the war.
首先，战争证明了它是甄别人才的绝佳试金石，随着能力不足的指挥官被淘汰，红军的领导水平得到了提升。此外，在如此严峻的形势下，政治裙带关系毫无立足之地，斯大林将许多他曾经的亲信，例如布杰尼和伏罗希洛夫，从前线召回，并用更有能力的指挥官取而代之。
First, the war proved to be an excellent judge of talent, and the leadership of the Red Army improved as commanders who lacked ability failed to survive. Moreover, in these dire circumstances, there was no room for political favoritism and Stalin brought many of his political favorites, such as Budenny and Voroshilov, back from the field and replaced them with more capable commanders.
更重要的是，苏军在战斗过程中表现有所提升；这得益于前线的主动性和灵活性，以及中央层面更完善的计划、准备和协调。前者是大多数战争的特征——足智多谋的指挥官会根据具体冲突情况灵活调整战术。而未能做到这一点，往往是许多战役失败的原因。就苏军而言，这尤其令人瞩目，因为他们必须做出重大调整。
More importantly, Soviet performance improved in the course of the fighting; through initiative and flexibility in the field, and through better planning, preparation, and coordination at the center. The former is characteristic of most wars—ingenious commanders learn to adopt tactics suited to the conditions of the particular conflict. The failure to achieve the latter has been the downfall of many campaigns. In the Soviet case, it was an especially remarkable feat, because major adjustments had to be undertaken.
最重要的变化发生在防御战略和战术领域。战争初期，苏军士兵缺乏防御机动能力，据德国观察员称，他们顽固地坚守阵地，远远超过了撤退的合理时机。<sup> 42</sup>当他们最终撤退时，却发现难以维持秩序。战略撤退的必要性早已被认识到，但对指挥官和士兵的训练却投入甚少。苏军撤退中最成功的部分——焦土政策——也是在经验中摸索出来的，往往是出于挫败感和愤怒，而非中央指挥的结果，因为德军缺乏必要的资源。
The most important alteration occurred in the area of defensive strategy and tactics. In the early stages of the war, Soviet soldiers did not know how to maneuver defensively and, according to German observers, stubbornly held their positions well beyond the point at which retreat would have been advisable.42 When they did retreat, they found it difficult to maintain order. The need for strategic withdrawals had been recognized, but little effort had been devoted to train commanders and troops. The most successful part of the Soviet retreat, the scorched-earth policy, was learned through experience, often out of frustration and anger rather than by central direction facilities were denied to the Germans.
1942年的《野战条例》扭转了对防御重视不足的局面。<sup>43</sup>防御终于被明确地讨论为“正常的作战形式”，尽管进攻被誉为“红军作战行动的基本方面”。苏联竭力鼓励部队进行纵深防御，并采用积极灵活的战术。防御并非一成不变。事实上，那些早期遵循静态、“线性”防御原则作战的部队受到了斯大林的严厉批评，斯大林说：“数万名红军指挥官已成为军事专家……他们摒弃了愚蠢而有害的线性战术，最终采用了机动作战战术。”<sup> 44</sup>
The lack of attention to defense was reversed with the Field Regulations of 1942.43 Defense was finally discussed explicitly as a “normal form of combat,” although offense was hailed as the “fundamental aspect of combat action for the Red Army.” The Soviets went to great lengths to encourage their forces to defend in depth and to use active, flexible tactics. Defense did not have to be static. In fact, those who had fought according to static, “linear” principles of defense in the early days were assailed by Stalin himself, who said, “Tens of thousands of Red Army commanders have become expert military leaders…they have thrown out the stupid and pernicious linear tactics and have finally adopted the tactic of mobile warfare.”44
最终，防御作战能力的提升使苏军得以重拾备受赞誉的进攻战术。1942年后，苏军成功地将反击与防御相结合，但战争的决定性阶段真正到来是在1942年秋季的斯大林格勒战役，这场战役被苏军誉为战争的转折点。在那里，苏军终于展开了他们精心准备的机动战。1943年2月，位于斯大林格勒以西的第六集团军成功包围并击溃了德军，红军的反攻由此开始。后来的历史著作将斯大林格勒战役之前的整个战争过程描述为一场夺回1941年6月失去的主动权的斗争。在斯大林格勒战役以及后来的决定性库尔斯克战役中，苏军依靠奇袭、机动和压倒性的数量优势，力求彻底歼灭敌人。装甲部队在纵深作战中的运用也最终得以实现。战后，这些经验深深植根于苏联的思想体系之中。尽管“伟大的卫国战争”让他们永远不能再忽视防御准备，但斯大林格勒和库尔斯克战役的反攻却证明了进攻至上原则的正确性，而这正是苏联军事思想的基石。
Eventually, the improvement in defensive operations gave the Soviets the opportunity to return to the much-admired offensive. Counterattacks were used successfully in conjunction with defense after 1942, but the decisive phase of the war really arrived in the fall of 1942 at Stalingrad, the battle hailed by the Soviets as the turning point of the war. There, the Soviets finally fought the war of maneuver for which they had prepared. When in February 1943 the Sixth Army, west of Stalingrad, succeeded in encircling and crushing the German forces, the Red Army's counteroffensive began. Subsequent histories describe the whole of the war effort until Stalingrad as the struggle to seize the initiative that had been lost in June 1941. At Stalingrad and later at the decisive battle of Kursk, the Soviets relied on surprise, maneuver, overwhelming quantitative superiority, and aimed at the absolute annihilation of the enemy. The use of armor for operations in depth was finally achieved. These experiences became enshrined in Soviet thinking after the war. Although the “Great Patriotic War” taught them never again to ignore defensive preparation, the counteroffensives launched at Stalingrad and Kursk vindicated the primacy of the offense on which Soviet military thought was founded.
斯大林曾问陆军大将什捷缅科：“我们为什么赢得了战争？”什捷缅科还没来得及回答，一向谦逊的斯大林就说道：“因为我让国家做好了战争准备。”<sup> 45</sup>第二次世界大战的确是社会全面备战的胜利，而这正是伏龙芝在1924年所倡导的。它也是苏联战略和作战的胜利，尽管这些战略和作战后来进行了调整以适应新的形势。但这场战争首先是一场消耗战，正如斯韦钦所设想的那样。动员工业以支持持久战的能力至关重要。苏联士兵的决心以及指挥部动员、训练和投入源源不断的人力的能力最终取得了胜利。德军兵力过度分散，在敌占区内疲于奔命，最终无法与准备充分、幅员辽阔的苏联母亲抗衡。
Stalin once asked army general S. M. Shtemenko, “Why did we win the war?” Before Shtemenko could answer, Stalin, ever modest, said, “Because I prepared the country for war.”45 The Second World War was indeed a victory for the total preparation of the society for war for which Frunze had lobbied in 1924. It was also a victory for Soviet strategy and operations, belatedly adjusted to meet the new contingencies. But the war was above all one of attrition, just as Svechin had imagined. The ability to mobilize industry to support a protracted war was decisive. The determination of the Soviet soldier and the ability of the command to mobilize, train, and commit a never-ending supply of manpower triumphed. German forces, overextended and stretched thinly into hostile territory, were ultimately no match for the vastness of Mother Russia fully prepared for war.
苏联历史上很少提及西方盟国对苏联胜利的贡献。通过租借法案和其他项目提供的巨额战争物资在冷战期间被刻意抹去。然而，事实上，红军确实独自承受了德国入侵的大部分冲击。第二战场的划分超出了本文的讨论范围。但当第二战场在经历了多次延误后最终于1944年打响时，斯大林格勒战役和库尔斯克战役的胜利早已到来。第二战场的开打时机和方向都产生了巨大的政治影响。斯大林最终在谈判桌上赢得了战争中最重大的胜利。如果说政治与战争之间密不可分的联系在什么场合得到了最清晰的展现，那就是德黑兰、雅尔塔和波茨坦会议。红军付出了惨重的代价，实现了像图哈切夫斯基这样的人所作出的承诺，用刺刀将工人革命带到了远在旧俄罗斯帝国疆界之外的国家。随着战胜德国，斯大林终于获得了兄弟国家的拥护，这证明了他“一国建成社会主义”最终将带来社会主义在海外胜利的信念是正确的。仿佛是为了提醒所有人，保卫第一个社会主义国家仍然是红军的使命，1946年，斯大林将工农红军更名为苏联武装力量。至此，“社会主义进步”与苏联国家政权的结合已臻于完美。
Little mention is made in Soviet history of the contribution of the Western allies to the Soviet victory. The tremendous war matériel provided through Lend-Lease and other programs was simply written out of history during the Cold War. In truth, though, the Red Army did face the brunt of the German invasion alone. The issue of the second front lies outside the scope of this essay. But when it was finally launched in 1944, after numerous delays, the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk had already been won. The political ramifications of both the timing and the direction of the second front were immense. Stalin ultimately won the greatest battles of the war at the conference table. If ever the inextricable link between politics and war was made clear, it was at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. At great cost, the Red Army fulfilled the promise that men like Tukhachevsky had claimed for it, delivering, at bayonet point, the workers' revolution to states well outside the boundaries of the old Russian Empire. Together with the victory over Germany, Stalin finally got the ring of brother states that vindicated his insistence that “socialism in one country” would eventually lead to socialist victories abroad. As if to remind all that protection of the first socialist state was still the mission of the Red Army, in 1946 Stalin changed the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. The union of “socialist progress” and Soviet state power was now complete.
六年级
VI
从1917年动荡不安的时期到1945年战胜德国，苏联军事思想的演变构成了我们今天所知的苏联军事力量的基础。二战结束时，苏联要达到具有全球影响力的军事实力，还需要二十多年的时间。新的挑战，尤其是核武器的挑战，将摆在苏联战略制定者的面前。
Soviet military thought, as it evolved from the uncertain days of 1917 to the victory over Germany in 1945, is the basis on which Soviet military power as we know it today is built. At the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union's attainment of military power of global significance was still more than two decades away. New challenges, most importantly the challenge of nuclear weapons, would face the makers of Soviet strategy.
尽管核时代带来了技术革命，苏联思想中仍保留着许多可以追溯到其形成时期的元素。诸兵种合成作战理论仍然渗透在苏联思想中，进攻仍然是其首选的作战方式。事实上，对诸兵种合成作战的强调导致了一种令人不安的倾向，即把核武器当作一种作战手段来讨论，几乎将其与常规武器无异。机动和突袭仍然受到推崇。1941年6月22日，突袭原则深深地烙印在苏联思想中，并在核时代造成了进一步的矛盾。突袭、进攻以及对先发制人必要性的接受构成了一种理论，这与苏联的政治宣言——即只有在受到挑衅时才会使用武器（特别是核武器）——本身就存在内在矛盾。诸如“当战争不可避免时，苏联将动用武力”以及“苏联军队不会坐以待毙”等难以界定的说法比比皆是。46苏联的政治学说无疑是防御性的，它只在“帝国主义”侵略的语境下谈论战争，但其军事战略无疑是进攻性的。自伏龙芝以来，政治活动与军事进攻之间的张力在很大程度上仍未得到解决。现代苏联战略试图区分至高无上的、本质上是防御性的军事政治学说，以及强调进攻优先、需要出其不意和主动性的军事技术学说（类似于战略）。然而，这种区分未能消除混乱，而苏联自身也未对此进行进一步阐述。
But in spite of the technological revolution of the nuclear age, a great deal remains in Soviet thinking that can be traced to its formative period. Combined-arms doctrine still pervades Soviet thinking and the offensive is still the preferred method of warfare. In fact, emphasis on combined arms has led to a disturbing tendency to discuss nuclear weapons as a method of waging warfare, almost indistinguishable from conventional weaponry. Maneuver and surprise continue to be worshipped. The dictum of surprise, indelibly etched on Soviet thinking by June 22, 1941, has led to further contradictions in the nuclear age. Surprise, the offensive, and acceptance of the necessity of preemption form a doctrine that is inherently contradictory with Soviet political pronouncements that they would use weapons (especially nuclear weapons) only in response to provocation. Statements that are difficult to define abound, like the notions that the Soviets will use their forces “when war becomes inevitable” and that their forces will not sit and wait to be attacked.46 Soviet political doctrine is undeniably defensive, speaking of war only in the context of an “imperialist” attack, but its military strategy is undeniably offensive. The tension between political activity and the military offensive has remained largely unresolved since Frunze. Modern-day Soviet strategy attempts to make a distinction between military-political doctrine, which is supreme and essentially defensive, and military-technical doctrine (similar to strategy), which upholds the primacy of the offense and the need for surprise and initiative. This is a distinction that fails to remove the confusion, and the Soviets themselves elaborate no further.
这些矛盾提醒我们，苏联军事战略是在两个层面上构建的：政治层面和军事技术层面。政治层面通常被认为更为重要。但单独考虑任何一方面都可能导致对苏联军事思想复杂性的理解不足。苏联战略的形成时期不仅要理解为列宁、托洛茨基和斯大林的功劳，还要理解为图哈切夫斯基、特里安迪菲洛夫和斯韦钦等军人的贡献。这两个层面并非总是能够和谐共存。理论上，指导苏联军事发展方向的权利掌握在党手中。然而，掌握现代战争科学的专业知识却掌握在职业军官手中。苏联军事理论发展史的大部分篇幅都来自于在这两个层面之间寻求平衡的努力。时至今日，军事政治理论和军事技术理论的并行发展仍在苏联思想中延续。
These contradictions remind us that Soviet military strategy is created on two levels, one political and the other military-technical. The political side is said to be superior. But either considered alone is likely to lead to a failure to understand the complexity of Soviet military thought. The formative years for Soviet strategy must be understood not only as the work of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, but of soldiers like Tukhachevsky, Triandifilov, and Svechin. The two levels have not always coexisted easily. The right to direct the course of Soviet military development theoretically rests with the Party. The expertise to deal with the science of contemporary warfare is found in the professional military officer, however. Much of the history of the development of Soviet doctrine is made up of efforts to find a balance between the two worlds. The parallel development of military-political and military-technical doctrine continues in Soviet thought today.
然而，留给现代苏联战略家的最重要遗产，是让整个社会做好持续斗争的准备这一理念。1956年，苏联政治学说放弃了战争不可避免的信条，取而代之的是与敌对的资本主义阵营“和平竞争与共存”的理念，以及对社会主义最终胜利的预期。由于苏联人承认核战争中“没有赢家”（尽管他们会尽力求生），他们现在认为，只有社会主义阵营犯下致命的错误——甚至可能导致全球毁灭——才会阻碍共产主义的最终胜利。但苏联人并不认为核时代已经消除了资本主义世界对社会主义的根本敌意。因此，即使战争最终能够避免，做好战争准备也是至关重要的。苏联人注定要长期处于这种敌对关系之中。今天，凭借苏联的实力，其领导层得以在曾经病态恐惧的国际体系中发挥积极作用。近期苏联政策的特点是缓和紧张局势，寻求与资本主义世界合作的领域，其前提是相信苏联足够强大，足以使西方的冒险主义成为遥远的威胁。由此得出的结论是：苏联越强大，和平就越安全。只有建立在稳固的国内基础之上，如今更要依靠更广泛的社会主义共同体，苏联才能继续前进。这种首先维护社会主义成果，谨慎寻求其他利益的做法，是列宁和1918年决议的遗产。
The greatest legacy bequeathed to modern Soviet strategists, though, is the concept of the preparation of the whole society for continuous struggle. The inevitability of war was dropped as a tenet of Soviet political doctrine in 1956. It has been replaced by the concept of “peaceful competition and coexistence” with the hostile capitalist camp and the expectation that socialism will, in the long term, win. Since the Soviets accept that there would be “no winners” in a nuclear war (though they would try to survive it), they now believe that only a fatal mistake by the socialist world—perhaps leading to global annihilation—will abort the final communist victory. But the Soviets do not believe that the fundamental hostility of the capitalist world to socialism has been undone by the nuclear age. Consequently, the preparation of the country for war, even if it is to be avoided, is essential. The Soviets are locked into the hostile relationship for the long term. Today, on the basis of Soviet power, the leadership can play an active role in the international system that it once pathologically feared. The relaxation of tensions and search for areas of cooperation with the capitalist world, characteristic of recent Soviet policy, is predicated on the belief that the Soviet Union is strong enough to make Western adventurism a remote possibility. The conclusion is that the stronger the Soviet Union, the more secure the peace. Only from a secure base at home, and now from a broader socialist community as well, can the Soviets hope to move forward. This approach, which protects the gains of socialism first and seeks other gains cautiously, is the legacy of Lenin and the decisions of 1918.
当然，军事实力并非苏联人所谓的“力量对比”——一种衡量历史进程的指标——中的唯一因素。为了确保道德、政治以及最重要的经济增长，必须做出艰难的选择。正如以往一样，马克思列宁主义并没有提供平衡各种因素、为社会主义国家的长期发展做好准备的蓝图。它仅仅提供了一个基本前提：持续斗争和高度警惕的概念。苏联人依靠付出巨大代价才获得的、组织方式与以往军事强国如出一辙的军事力量，这是历史经验的产物。正是这种经验赋予了苏联版本的“持续斗争”一种鲜明的军事色彩。
Certainly, military might is not the only factor in the equation that the Soviets call the correlation of forces, a kind of measurement of how history is progressing. Hard choices have to be made to ensure moral, political, and above all, economic growth as well. Just as before, Marxism-Leninism does not provide a blueprint for balancing the factors and preparing the socialist state for the long term. It provides only the underlying premise: the concept of continuous struggle and extraordinary vigilance. Reliance on the military power of the state, acquired at great cost and organized like that of military powers of the past, was handed down to the Soviets by historical experience. It is this experience that gives the Soviet version of permanent struggle a decidedly martial ring.
1卡尔·马克思和弗里德里希·恩格斯，《社会学》（莫斯科，1960 年），第 8 卷，第 460 页。
1 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Sochineniia (Moscow, 1960), 8:460.
2引自 Adam Ulam，《扩张与共存》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1967 年），第 72 页。
2 Cited in Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 72.
3 LD 托洛茨基，《革命是如何武装起来的》，3 卷（莫斯科，1925 年），第 1 卷。这部基础著作最早由约翰·埃里克森在《苏联最高统帅部》（纽约和伦敦，1962 年）中引用，描述了内战期间军队的建设。
3 L. D. Trotsky, Kak voorazhalas' revoliutsiia (How the revolution was armed), 3 vols. (Moscow, 1925), vol. 1. This basic work, first cited by John Erickson in The Soviet High Command (New York and London, 1962), describes the building of the army during the civil war.
4托洛茨基，卡克·沃拉扎拉斯的《革命》，卷。 1.
4 Trotsky, Kak voorazhalas' revoliutsiia, vol. 1.
5引自埃里克森，《苏联最高指挥部》，第 33 页。
5 Cited in Erickson, The Soviet High Command, 33.
6弗里德里希·恩格斯，《Izbrannye voennye proizvedeniia》（莫斯科，1957 年），xiv。
6 Friedrich Engels, Izbrannye voennye proizvedeniia (Moscow, 1957), xiv.
7蒂莫西·科尔顿，《政委、指挥官和文职当局》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1979 年）对主要政治行政部门的发展和政治政委角色的变化进行了精彩的讨论。
7 Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority (Cambridge, Mass., 1979) provides an excellent discussion of the development of the Main Political Administration and the changing role of the political commissar.
8关于波兰战役的争论在近期出版的苏联史学著作《苏联军事思想史》（ Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mysli，莫斯科，1980年，I.A. Korotkov主编）中的几篇文章中得到了简要而有益的探讨。早期的苏联评论中对这场战役的失败存在更广泛的分歧。例如，N.E. Kakurin和V.A. Melikov合著的《与白波兰人的战争》（ Voina s belopolyakhami ，莫斯科，1925年）就提出了一种观点。
8 The debate concerning the Polish campaign is discussed briefly but usefully in several essays in a recent Soviet historiographic volume, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mysli (History of Soviet military thought), ed. I. A. Korotkov (Moscow, 1980). There is wider disagreement about the failure of the campaign in earlier Soviet commentary. See, for example, N. E. Kakurin and V. A. Melikov, Voina s belopolyakhami (The war with the White Poles) (Moscow, 1925) for one view.
9这些论文主要由古谢夫撰写，可在 SI Gusev, Grazhdanskaia voina 1 krasnaia armiia (莫斯科，1958 年), 216-21 中找到
9 The theses, primarily written by Gusev, can be found in S. I. Gusev, Grazhdanskaia voina 1 krasnaia armiia (Moscow, 1958), 216–21.
10托洛茨基，《卡克·沃鲁扎拉斯的革命》，2:242。
10 Trotsky, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, 2:242.
11弗伦泽对统一军事理论概念的阐述可以在 MV Frunze, Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia armii (莫斯科，1921 年) 中找到。
11 Frunze's formulation of the concept of unified military doctrine can be found in M. V. Frunze, Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia armii (Moscow, 1921).
12同上。后来被整理成专著的文章发表在乌克兰军队发行的期刊《革命军队》（Armiia 1 revoliutsiia ）和核心理论期刊《军事科学与革命》（Voennaia nauka i revoliutsiia）上。参见沃尔特·达内尔·雅各布斯（Walter Darnell Jacobs）的著作《弗伦泽：苏联的克劳塞维茨：1885-1925》（海牙，1969年）。
12 Ibid. The article from which a monograph was later produced appeared in Armiia 1 revoliutsiia, a journal for distribution to troops in the Ukraine and in Voennaia nauka i revoliutsiia, a central theoretical journal. See a volume by Walter Darnell Jacobs, Frunze: The Soviet Clausewitz: 1885–1925 (The Hague, 1969).
13伏龙芝， Edinaia voennaia doktrina，18。
13 Frunze, Edinaia voennaia doktrina, 18.
14托洛茨基，《卡克·沃鲁扎拉斯的革命》，2:202。
14 Trotsky, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, 2:202.
15同上，2:206。
15 Ibid., 2:206.
16几乎所有收录在 IA Korotkov 编辑的《苏联军事思想史》一书中的文章都持这种观点，但对内战经验的盲目崇拜的批判早在很久以前就开始了。例如，参见 MV Tukhachevsky 的《论苏联红军新野战条例》，载《布尔什维克》杂志，第 9 期（1937 年 5 月），第 46-47 页。
16 Virtually all essays in the volume edited by I. A. Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mysli, present this view, but criticism of the worship of the Civil War experience began much earlier. See, for example, M. V. Tukhachevsky, “On the New Field Regulations of the RKKA,” Bol'shevik, no. 9 (May 1937), 46–47.
17当然，托洛茨基在苏联的声誉从未得到恢复。例如，科罗特科夫在《苏联军事思想史》的导言中对托洛茨基进行了诋毁。西方对他的评价褒贬不一，但无疑更为宽容。约翰·埃里克森在《苏联最高统帅部》一书中的评价就是其中之一。
17 Trotsky's reputation has, of course, never been rehabilitated in the Soviet Union. See, for example, the vilification of Trotsky in Korotkov's introduction to Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mysli. Western assessments of his role vary but are certainly more charitable. John Erickson's in The Soviet High Command is one favorable assessment.
18对红军的批评详见 IB Berkhin，《苏联军事改革》（莫斯科，1958 年），第 57-59 页。
18 The criticisms of the Red Army are detailed in I. B. Berkhin, Voennaia reforma vSSSR (Moscow, 1958), 57–59.
19 Enckson，《苏联最高统帅部》，第 173-213 页，讨论了伏龙芝面临的问题。
19 Enckson, The Soviet High Command, discusses the problems that Frunze faced, pp. 173–213.
20 Berkhin， Voennaia Reforma vSSSR，46。
20 Berkhin, Voennaia reforma vSSSR, 46.
21同上。
21 Ibid.
22 MV Frunze， Sobranie sochinenii，编辑。 AS Bubnov（莫斯科，1929 年），1:254。
22 M. V. Frunze, Sobranie sochinenii, ed. A. S. Bubnov (Moscow, 1929), 1:254.
23斯大林，《论反对派》（北京，1974 年），第 325 页。斯大林从意识形态和实践的角度对一国社会主义进行了辩护，这本著作中对此进行了阐述。
23 J. V. Stalin, On the Opposition (Peking, 1974), 325. Stalin's defense of socialism in one country on both ideological and practical grounds can be found in this volume.
24 BM Shaposhnikov， Mozg armii（军队的大脑）（莫斯科，1927 年），1:14。
24 B. M. Shaposhnikov, Mozg armii (Brain of the army) (Moscow, 1927), 1:14.
25 MN Tukhachevsky，“Voina kak Problema vooruzhennoi bor'by”， Boevoi put' Sovestskikh vooruzhennykh sil（莫斯科，1960 年）。
25 M. N. Tukhachevsky, “Voina kak problema vooruzhennoi bor'by,” in Boevoi put' Sovestskikh vooruzhennykh sil (Moscow, 1960).
26 R. Savushkin 上校，“K voprosu o zarozhdenii teorii posledovatel'nykh nastupatel'nykh operatsii”， Voennoe tstoricheskii zhurnal（1983 年 5 月）77-83。
26 Col. R. Savushkin, “K voprosu o zarozhdenii teorii posledovatel'nykh nastupatel'nykh operatsii,” Voennoe tstoricheskii zhurnal (May 1983) 77–83.
27本杰明·米勒在一篇未发表的博士论文中详尽地记录了苏联关于装甲用途的思想演变。本杰明·米勒，《苏联装甲的发展》（康奈尔大学博士论文，1984 年）。
27 Benjamin Miller, in an unpublished dissertation, has documented thoroughly the evolution of Soviet thought on the uses of armor. Benjamin Miller, “The Development of Soviet Armor” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1984).
28 AA Svechin，《战略》（莫斯科，1927 年）。
28 A. A. Svechin, Strategiia (Moscow, 1927).
29参见 Miller，“苏联装甲的发展”，以及 Arthur J. Alexander，《苏联和美国的装甲发展》（加利福尼亚州圣莫尼卡，1976 年）。
29 See Miller, “Development of Soviet Armor,” and Arthur J. Alexander, Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States (Santa Monica, Calif., 1976).
30埃里克森，《苏联最高指挥部》，第 257 页。埃里克森对与德国合作的讨论非常有用（第 247-282 页）。
30 Enckson, The Soviet High Command, 257. Erickson's discussion of the collaboration with Germany is most useful (pp. 247–82).
31关于苏联思想的原创性存在相当大的争议。米勒在其著作《苏联装甲发展史》中，对法国、德国和英国的装甲发展进行了比较研究，并认为苏联的思想非常原创。阿瑟·亚历山大虽然也指出苏联有一些独特的解决方案，但他认为苏联在很大程度上依赖外国的理念（亚历山大，《苏联和美国的装甲发展史》）。
31 There is considerable disagreement about the originality of Soviet thought. Miller, “Development of Soviet Armor,” looks comparatively at French, German, and British development, and contends that the thought was very original. Arthur Alexander, although suggesting that there were some unique solutions, contends that the Soviets relied heavily on foreign ideas (Alexander, Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States).
32 Alexander，《苏联和美国的装甲发展》，第 22-23 页。
32 Alexander, Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States, 22–23.
33埃里克森，《苏联最高指挥部》，763。
33 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, 763.
34同上。
34 Ibid.
35图哈切夫斯基，《1936 年野战条例评注》，“关于苏联红军的新野战条例”，《布尔什维克》，第 9 期（1937 年 5 月），46-47 页。
35 M. V. Tukhachevsky, Commentary on Field Regulations of 1936, “On the New Field Regulations of the RKKA,” Bol'shevik, no. 9 (May, 1937), 46–47.
36彼得罗·格里戈连科，《回忆录》（纽约，1982），第92页。据格里戈连科回忆，他曾是伊瑟森运营学课程的学生，伊瑟森继续深入地以运营理论为基础进行教学。然而，他从未直接提及该理论的名称。
36 Petro Grigorenko, Memoirs (New York, 1982), 92. According to Grigorenko, who was a student in Isserson's class on operations, Isserson continued to teach on the basis of the theory of operations in depth. He did so, however, never calling the theory by name.
37阵地战的支持者很快就在1936年的西班牙内战中找到了他们观点的佐证。在那场战争中，佛朗哥军队的消耗战能力是取得胜利的关键。从这场战争中归来的士兵显然对军官训练中的作战教学产生了重大影响（格里戈连科，《回忆录》，第92页）。格里戈连科还认为，像伏罗希洛夫这样的重要政治军事领导人之所以青睐阵地战，是因为它不会暴露苏联军队的技术落后。
37 The proponents of positional warfare would soon find confirmation of their views in the Spanish Civil War of 1936. There, the ability of Franco's forces to fight a war of attrition was the key to victory. Men returning from this experience apparently made a major impact on the teaching of operations in officer training (Grigorenko, Memoirs, 92). Grigorenko also argues that positional warfare was favored by key political-military leaders like Voroshilov because it did not expose the technological backwardness of the Soviet forces.
38埃里克森，《苏联最高指挥部》，405。
38 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, 405.
39同上。
39 Ibid.
40在任何战后早期历史中都能看到对斯大林的崇拜。一个特别好的例子是克莱门特·伏罗希洛夫的《伟大卫国战争的天才指挥官》（莫斯科，1950年）。
40 The worship of Stalin can be seen in any early postwar history. For a particularly good example, see Klement Voroshilov, A Commander of Genius of the Great Patriotic War (Moscow, 1950).
41党史对战争和斯大林的错误做出了这样的主张（Ministertstva Oborony Soyuza SSR， Istoriya velikoi otechestvennoi voiny sovetskovo soyuza 1941-45，PN Pospelov领导的编辑委员会（莫斯科，1960年）。
41 A party history makes such a claim about the war and Stalin's mistakes (Ministertstva Oborony Soyuza SSR, Istoriya velikoi otechestvennoi voiny sovetskovo soyuza 1941–45, editorial commission headed by P. N. Pospelov (Moscow, 1960).
42 Raymond Garthoff，《苏联军事学说》（加利福尼亚州圣莫尼卡，1953 年），第 76 页。
42 Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Santa Monica, Calif., 1953), 76.
43 Uremennyi polevoi ustav RKKA, 1936（RKKA临时野战条例），引自Garthoff，《苏联军事学说》，74。
43 Uremennyi polevoi ustav RKKA, 1936 (The Provisional field regulations of the RKKA), cited in Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 74.
44 JV 斯大林，《论伟大的卫国战争》（莫斯科，1950 年），第 373 页。译自斯大林战时讲话集。
44 J. V. Stalin, On The Great Patriotic War (Moscow, 1950), 373. Translated from the collected wartime addresses of Stalin.
45 SM Shtemenko，将军刺 v 戈迪沃尼，2 卷。 （莫斯科，1973 年），2：447。
45 S. M. Shtemenko, Generalnni stab v gody voiny, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1973), 2:447.
46有关核时代苏联军事理论发展的精彩论述，请参阅大卫·霍洛威的《苏联与军备竞赛》（纽黑文，1983 年）。
46 For an excellent discussion of the development of Soviet military doctrine in the nuclear age see David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, 1983).
23. 1939-1945年欧洲盟军战略
23. Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939–1945
S第二次世界大战刚刚结束，西方世界就围绕战争的计划、作战和结束方式展开了激烈的辩论。<sup> 1</sup>在冷战的挫败和危机，以及苏联与其昔日同盟国之间猜忌和紧张关系的背景下，这场辩论从秘密的战时会议转移到了公共论坛，并受到大量探讨战争争议问题和决策的著述的推动。大西洋两岸的批评家都指责西方盟国犯下的政治和战略错误导致了和平的丧失。尤其对美国在欧洲的战争战略提出了严厉的批评。温斯顿·丘吉尔猛烈抨击了他所谓的美国“大规模生产式思维”。<sup> 2 </sup> 英国分析家J.F.C.富勒将这种战略描述为“卖国贼”。3澳大利亚记者切斯特·威尔莫特的通俗文章中，鲜明地对比了罗斯福的天真和丘吉尔的远见卓识，以及英国以政治为导向的战略和美国狭隘的教条主义军事战略。在威尔莫特的笔下，美国人将战略重心放在打造一支庞大的“军事压路机”上，这支机器在训练营和工厂中被制造出来，然后被推过大西洋，以大规模正面进攻的方式碾压德国，而他们却很少考虑政治后果。4这些批评塑造了人们对美英二战战略的刻板印象和认知，这些印象和认知深深植根于战后文学作品中，至今仍广为流传。
SCARCELY HAD THE fighting ended in the Second World War when a great debate broke out in the Western world over the way the war had been planned, fought, and concluded.1 Amid the frustrations and crises of the Cold War and the suspicions and strains between the Soviet Union and its former partners in the Grand Alliance, that debate, transferred from secret wartime councils to public forums, was fed by a flood of writing dealing with the controversial issues and decisions of the conflict. Critics on both sides of the Atlantic charged that the peace was lost as a result of political and strategic mistakes made by the Western Allies. Especially heavy criticism was leveled at the American strategy for the war in Europe. Winston Churchill lashed out at what he termed the American “large-scale mass-production style of thought.”2 J. F. C. Fuller, the British analyst, characterized this type of strategy as “ironmongering.”3 Out of the popular writing of Chester Wilmot, an Australian journalist, emerged a sharp contrast—a naive Roosevelt versus a prescient Churchill, a politically oriented British strategy versus a narrow doctrinaire American military strategy. In Wilmot's portrait, the Americans put their strategic faith in fashioning a gigantic “military steamroller” in their training camps and factories that they propelled across the Atlantic to crush the Germans by a massive frontal assault without much thought for the political consequences.4 Such criticisms shaped the stereotypes and images of the American and British approach to Second World War strategy that became imbedded in the postwar literature and still enjoy considerable popular currency.
鉴于持续不断的争议以及自1945年以来岁月的流逝，这些刻板印象需要重新审视。因此，认真评估盟军在二战中制定的战略显得尤为重要——探究其形成过程、影响因素、发展形态以及成败得失。本文将重点探讨盟军作战时所采用的战略理念，尤其关注这些理念在盟军最为集中的战场——欧洲战场——所发挥的作用。文章将分析盟军在各国首都通过联合规划制定的战略，以及在国际会议内外所采取的行动，并着重分析英美在这一规划过程中的经验。
In the light of the lingering controversy and the lengthened perspective of the years that have elapsed since 1945, those stereotypes need to be reexamined. It becomes all the more important to take stock of the strategy developed by the Allies in the Second World War—to consider how it came about, what influences shaped it, what forms it assumed, and in what sense it succeeded or failed. This essay will focus on strategic ideas with which the Allies fought, particularly as they bore on the area of their greatest common effort, the war in Europe. It will deal with the strategy fashioned by coalition planning in the Allied capitals, in and out of the great international conferences, and with special emphasis on the Anglo-American experience in that planning.
我
I
简而言之，盟军击败德国的战略，就是英国、苏联和美国这三个主权伙伴面对共同敌人时寻求共同点的过程。这一战略是大西洋两岸众多思想家的结晶，也是全球战争中不断变化的压力和形势的产物。它是演进过程、一系列妥协以及不断调整目标与手段的结果。最重要的是，它是由拥有不同国家利益的大国共同塑造的。尽管每个参战国在对德作战中追求的国家目标始终如一，但它们实现这些目标的手段和方法却因时而异。此外，在计划和进行对德战争的过程中，大同盟的基础发生了变化，各国之间的关系也随之改变。这些变化构成了这场战争战略史不可或缺的一部分。
The story of Allied strategy for the defeat of Germany is, simply put, the search for common denominators among three sovereign partners—the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States—faced with a common enemy. That strategy was the product of many minds on both sides of the Atlantic, and of changing pressures and circumstances in the global war. It was the result of an evolutionary process and a series of compromises, and of a constant struggle to adjust ends and means. Above all, it was fashioned by powers with diverse national interests. If the national objectives sought by each of the participating powers in the war against Germany were consistently held, the means and methods used by each to achieve them varied from time to time. In the process of planning and waging the war against Germany, moreover, the foundations of the Grand Alliance shifted and the relationships among the powers changed. These shifts are an integral part of the strategic history of the war.
大同盟的本质是什么？每个伙伴国又为之贡献了什么？必须认识到，大同盟是在战争中缔结的，其目的也是为了战争；它是一场战争联姻，一场权宜之计的联姻。共同的危险将这三个伙伴国在1941年联系在一起，但他们的联盟是由不同层次的关系构成的。美国和英国构成了大同盟的核心，代表着联盟中的联盟。这两个大国之间的关系密切，而它们与苏联的关系则正式而疏远。事实上，这两位西方领导人——英国首相温斯顿·丘吉尔和美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福——在战争策略上的共识往往比他们与各自军事参谋部之间的共识还要多。
What was the nature of the Grand Alliance and what did each partner bring to it? It is important to recognize that the Grand Alliance was forged in war and for purposes of war; it was a war marriage, a marriage of expediency. A common bond of danger brought the three partners together in 1941, but their alliance was composed of different levels of relationships. The United States and the United Kingdom formed the inner web of the Grand Alliance and represented an alliance within an alliance. Relations between these two powers were as close as their relationship with the Soviet Union was formal and distant. Indeed, the two Western leaders, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt, were often more in agreement with each other on the conduct of the war than they were with their own military staffs.
大同盟中的每个强国都为了各自的目标而战；它们各自拥有不同的政治军事体系，并在此基础上制定战略。由于其联盟成员身份以及战争形势的变化，每个强国都不得不做出妥协。由于各自的传统、利益、政策、地理位置和资源各不相同，这三个伙伴国看待欧洲战争的视角也各有不同。
Each power in the Grand Alliance fought the war for its own objectives; each had its own politico-military system in which its strategy was produced. Each had to compromise as a result of its membership in the coalition and changing fortunes in the war. Because of their varying traditions, interests, policies, geography, and resources, the three partners looked at the European war through different spectacles.
英国，这个岛国帝国，率先对德宣战。在1940年6月法国沦陷后的整整一年里，它是唯一一个直接对抗德国威胁的主要强国。几个世纪以来，英国一直信奉权力平衡。凭借在战争、外交和联盟方面的丰富经验，英国在欧洲战争中的历史政策是运用利德尔·哈特所说的“间接策略”——利用其经济资源和海军力量，并支持欧洲大陆盟友对抗任何威胁欧洲平衡的大国。通往其远东帝国的生命线在于地中海，英国预计会积极干预地中海和中东局势，中东是英国另一个具有特殊政治和经济利益的地区。英国的生存依赖于海上航线，因此它无法自给自足。如果英国想要继续参战，就必须确保大西洋畅通，以便从美国获得补给。英国的经济虽然高度工业化，但与美国相比规模较小。在全球战争中，英国的资源将会捉襟见肘。英国对第一次世界大战中巨大的人力损失深感忧虑，因此将希望寄托于海军、空军以及一种可称之为外围战略的策略：从欧洲大陆边缘打击德国，逐步削弱其实力，并通过武力和颠覆活动支持被占领国对抗德国，最终直击德国核心。短期内，英国希望被占领国奋起反抗；长期来看，英国则希望恢复战前状态。丘吉尔决心不让大英帝国走向衰亡。英国士兵习惯于与政治领导人密切合作，因此可以预见，英国的战争政策会将政治置于首要地位。
Great Britain, an island empire, first to enter the war against Germany, had been for a whole year after the fall of France in June 1940 the only major power directly opposing the German threat. For centuries it had put its faith in the balance of power. Experienced in war, diplomacy, and coalitions, its historic policy in European war was to utilize what Liddell Hart called “the indirect approach”—to make use of its economic resources and its navy, and to shore up Continental allies against any major power threatening the balance in Europe. The lifeline to its empire in the Far East lay through the Mediterranean, and Britain could be expected to intervene actively there and in the Middle East, another area of special political and economic interest. Dependent upon the sea lanes for its very existence, Great Britain was not self-sufficient. The Atlantic had to be kept open for supplies from America if Britain was to stay in the war. Its economy, although highly industrialized, was small-scale in comparison with that of the United States. In a global war its resources would be stretched thin. Keenly sensitive to its huge manpower losses in the First World War, it put its faith in its navy, air force, and in what might be called a peripheral strategy to hit Germany around the edges of the Continent, gradually to weaken it, to support the occupied countries by arms and subversion against Germany, and eventually to strike at the heart of Germany. For the short run it wanted the occupied countries to rise and revolt; in the long run it wanted to return to the status quo ante bellum. Churchill was determined not to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. British soldiers were accustomed to work closely with their political leadership and Britain's policy in war could be expected to give political matters a primary place.
与英国一样，美国在二战中卷入了20世纪的第二次大规模联盟战争。美国资源丰富，工业化程度高，逐步从英国的主要武器供应国转变为英国的全面军事合作者。因此，当日本偷袭珍珠港时，美国参战是顺理成章的，双方对此也都有着或多或少的准备。
Like Great Britain, the United States in World War II became involved in its second major coalition war in the twentieth century. Rich in resources, and highly industrialized, the United States made the transition by stages from major supplier of Britain to full military collaborator. As a result, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, American entry into the war was a natural step for which the two partners were more or less prepared.
对美国人来说，战争是一种反常现象，是对正常秩序的扰乱。战争与和平被视为截然不同的两个阶段，美国的战争传统是先宣战，后备战。尽管美国传统上反对卷入欧洲的纷争，但它与欧洲却有着深厚的文化联系。基于第一次世界大战的经验，美国对欧洲战争的策略是尽可能地拖延时间，只在必要时介入，击败挑起战争的恶霸，让士兵们回家，然后尽可能地保持与欧洲事务的距离。美国在第一次世界大战后期才加入战争，当时它只是一个盟友，一个联盟中的次要伙伴，并且按照欧洲盟友制定的基本战略进行作战。在战后幻灭的时代，美国民众普遍认为，美国既不应该加入军事联盟，也不应该维持一支具备进攻能力的军队，这种观点深刻地影响了美国的国家政策。
To Americans war was an aberration, a disturber of normalcy. War and peace were viewed as distinct and separate episodes, and American tradition in war had been first to declare, then to prepare. Traditionally opposed to becoming involved in European quarrels, the United States, nevertheless, had strong cultural bonds with Europe. Based on its experience in the First World War, the American approach to European war was to hold off as long as possible, enter only long enough to thrash the bully or bullies who started it, get the boys home, and then try to remain as uninvolved in European affairs as before. Entering late in the First World War, it had been an associate power, a junior partner in the alliance, and had fought the war in accord with the basic strategy set by the European partners. In the era of disillusionment after the war, popular beliefs that the United States should neither enter into military alliances nor maintain military forces capable of offensive action deeply influenced national policy.
自1938年慕尼黑协定签订以来，美国领导人逐渐意识到西方民主国家面临的威胁，并开始动员起来。华盛顿的战略规划者们摒弃了早期的学术规划，开始从全球战争和联盟战争的角度思考问题。在战争与和平的过渡时期，人们对苏联的能力和意图知之甚少——这种情况贯穿了整个战争。在德国入侵苏联后的几个月里，美国军方严重怀疑苏联是否有能力继续积极参与对抗德国的战争。但到了珍珠港事件爆发时，美国规划者们已经开始借鉴英国的战略理论和概念，并调整他们的计划以应对世界大战。美国首次在战略思维方面取得了显著进步，并以此为基础参与了一场战争。
From the Munich settlement in 1938 onward, American leaders gradually became alert to threats to the Western democracies and began to mobilize. Laying aside their earlier academic planning exercises, the strategic planners in Washington began to think in terms of global and coalition warfare. In the uneasy transition between war and peace, little was known about Russian capabilities and intentions—a condition that continued throughout the war. In the months after the German attack on the Soviet Union the American military staff seriously doubted the ability of the Soviets to continue as an active participant against Germany. But by the time of Pearl Harbor American planners had begun to brush up against British strategic theory and concepts and to gear their plans for a world at war. For the first time the United States entered a war considerably advanced in its strategic thinking on how to fight it.
尽管罗斯福在1939年至1941年间展现了果敢的领导力，但在珍珠港事件之前，美国仍处于高度分裂状态。英国和苏联的政治军事体系比美国更为紧密。罗斯福逐渐拉近了军方人员与他的距离，并以他略显非正式和不系统的方式与他们建立了密切关系。他将第二次世界大战称为“生存之战”，从1939年起，他成为一位积极的三军统帅，并在战略问题上保持着独立的声音，即便他的方法有时显得松散和缺乏条理。
Despite Roosevelt's bold leadership between 1939 and 1941, the country was still largely divided until Pearl Harbor. The British and Soviet political-military systems were much more tightly knit than was the American. Gradually Roosevelt drew the military staff closer to him and in his somewhat informal and unsystematic way developed a close relationship with it. Terming the Second World War “the war for survival,” from 1939 onward he became an active commander in chief and reserved his independent voice in strategic matters, even if his methods appeared loose and disjointed.
第二次世界大战期间，美国首次面临真正意义上的全球战争的挑战，事实证明，其面临的挑战甚至超过了主要盟友。从一开始，美国在战争中的利益和沟通渠道就具有全球性。美国对中国抱有强烈的同情，太平洋上的一个属地遭到袭击，美国因此卷入战争。珍珠港事件后不久，在英美两国的战略任务划分中，美国被赋予了对日作战的主要责任。在整个战争期间，罗斯福总统及其军事参谋人员始终无法忘记太平洋和远东的战事。对许多美国人来说，日本而非德国才是天然的敌人。这种执念在美日三大盟友的关系以及最终战胜德国的战略演变中都发挥了重要作用。在国内政治和日本的压力下，美国根本无法在欧洲打一场持久战。正如陆军参谋长乔治·C·马歇尔将军后来简洁地指出：“一个民主国家无法打一场七年战争。” ⁵
In the Second World War the United States was confronted for the first time with the demands of a truly worldwide war, even more so than its major partners, as it turned out. From the beginning American interests and lines of communication in the war were global. Possessed of a strong sympathy for the Chinese, the United States was brought into the war by an attack on a Pacific possession, and in the Anglo-American division of strategic tasks soon after Pearl Harbor, it was given the main responsibility for the war against Japan. Throughout the war President Roosevelt and his military staff could never forget the war in the Pacific and Far East. To many Americans Japan rather than Germany appeared to be the natural enemy. This fixation was to play an important part in the relations among the three partners and in the evolution of the strategy for the defeat of Germany. Under the pressures of domestic politics and the Japanese, the United States simply could not fight a long war in Europe. As General George C. Marshall, the army chief of staff, later succinctly put it, “a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War.”5
苏联作为第三个伙伴，奉行着截然不同的政治和经济意识形态，堪称一个谜。它缺乏空军和海军传统，本质上是一个拥有内部交通线的陆上强国。苏联拥有庞大的人口和丰富的资源，但其工业计划尚未完善。与英国和美国不同，苏联每次只与一个敌人作战，直到二战末期才卷入对日战争。从这个意义上讲，与美国和英国相比，苏联的战略问题相对简单。当然，在与德国的防御阶段，苏联必须确保自身生存，而这依赖于其地理优势、人民的韧性和军队。无论是出于有意还是迫于形势，苏联都采取了历史上惯用的策略，即为了争取时间而放弃部分领土甚至牺牲生命。
The Soviet Union, the third partner, dedicated to a different political and economic ideology, represented an enigma. Lacking air and naval traditions, it was essentially a land power with interior lines of communication. It possessed an enormous population and great resources, but its industrial program was incomplete. Unlike the United Kingdom and the United States, the Soviets were to be at war with only one enemy at a time, staying out of the war against Japan until the closing days of the Second World War. In this sense its strategic problem, next to that of the United States and the United Kingdom, was comparatively simple. Of course, in the defensive phase of its struggle with Germany, it had to ensure its survival and it relied on geography, the endurance of its people, and the army. Whether by design or by force of circumstances, it resorted to the historic policy of yielding territory and even lives to gain time.
尽管苏联外交政策带有浓厚的共产主义色彩和意识形态色彩，但在某些方面却与沙皇时期的外交政策颇为相似。其对德防御战仅仅是其追求安全和扩张双重目标的短暂插曲。这种追求似乎正是苏联发动芬兰战争的动机，甚至在与希特勒签订条约期间也一直存在。希特勒与苏联决裂的主要原因之一是苏联向西扩张至波兰和巴尔干半岛的侵略行径。面对西方顽固的英国，希特勒认为这些扩张过于危险。1941年6月德国入侵苏联进一步强化了苏联加强其在东欧地位的愿望，这一目标深深植根于俄罗斯历史。尽管在纳粹入侵后的头两年，苏联的政治和领土野心并未消失，但在殊死求生的斗争中，军事考量迫于无奈成为了首要考虑因素。由于仍然担心被资本主义包围，对朋友和敌人也都抱有戒心，苏联在整个二战期间始终是美苏之间一个不稳定的盟友。战时美国驻莫斯科军事代表团团长约翰·R·迪恩将军后来将这种伙伴关系称为“奇怪的联盟”。<sup> 6 </sup>
For all its Communist trimmings and ideological connotations, Soviet foreign policy resembled in certain respects that of the czars. Its defensive struggle against Germany was merely a pause in its twin drives for security and expansion. These drives appeared to have motivated the Soviet Union in its war with Finland and to have been at work even during the period of its pact with Hitler. One of the main reasons for Hitler's break with the Soviet Union was the latter's aggressive action in pushing westward into Poland and the Balkans, which Hitler, confronted with a stubborn Britain in the West, regarded as too dangerous. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 reinforced the Soviet desire to strengthen its position in eastern Europe, an objective deeply rooted in Russian history. Although Soviet political and territorial ambitions were not absent during the first two years after the Nazi invasion, military considerations of necessity became paramount in the desperate struggle for survival. Still fearful of capitalist encirclement, suspicious of friend and foe alike, the Soviet Union remained throughout the Second World War an uneasy ally in the partnership that General John R. Deane, head of the wartime U.S. Military Mission in Moscow, later termed “the strange alliance.”6
因此，这三个主权国家在战争的压力下逐渐走到了一起。从一开始，美国和英国之间的紧密联系就构成了大同盟的基石。苏联在制定和指导战争联合战略方面的作用相对较小。造成这种差异至少有两个原因。部分原因是各伙伴国所参与的斗争性质不同——苏联集中精力在欧洲大陆东线对抗德国，而英美则在全球范围内与轴心国作战，且战线分散。部分原因反映了伙伴国之间由来已久的猜疑。从一开始，苏联与美国和英国的关系就是要求对敌施压，并请求和接受物资援助。但即便在这些领域，合作也困难重重。美国和英国的战略决策通常只是笼统地传达给苏联。但他们始终游离于英美联合参谋长体系之外，仅在莫斯科、德黑兰、雅尔塔和波茨坦的国际会议上正式参与决策。由于双方兵力相距甚远，战争的大部分时间里，联盟的西翼和东翼都处于远程作战状态。从一开始，过往的紧张关系和缺乏自由交流就使得双方难以真正理解彼此。一种奇特的“保持距离”的战争伙伴关系由此形成。西方内部关于战略的长期争论导致了双方关系的微妙变化，并成为与苏联争论的焦点。从一开始，深陷东线殊死搏斗的苏联就对西方的正确战略毫不怀疑。他们想要开辟第二战场；他们希望尽快开辟；而且他们希望第二战场设在西方。英美每一次推迟开辟第二战场都火上浇油。
These, then, were the three sovereign powers who gradually came together under the pressure of war. From the beginning the close ties between the United States and Great Britain formed the bedrock of the Grand Alliance. The Soviet Union's role in developing and directing the combined strategy of the war was to be relatively small. There were at least two reasons for this disparity. Partly it resulted from the diverse nature of the struggles in which the partners were involved—the Soviet concentration on the eastern front in continental Europe against Germany, the British and American involvement in worldwide demands and widely scattered fronts in the struggle with the Axis partners. Partly the difference reflected the legacy of suspicion inherited by the partners. From the beginning the Soviet relationship with the United States and Great Britain consisted of demanding pressure on the enemy and asking for and receiving material aid. But collaboration, even in these fields, was to prove difficult. The strategic decisions of the United States and Great Britain were normally transmitted in general terms to the Soviets. But they remained outside the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs system and took formal part in decisions only at the international conferences at Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. With their forces far apart, for most of the war the western and eastern wings of the alliance operated at long range from each other. From the start, the troubled relations of the past and the lack of free interchange made genuine understanding difficult. A curious “arms-length” war partnership came into being. The long debate over strategy in Western circles led to a delicate relationship and became a bone of contention with the Soviet Union. From the beginning the Soviets, locked in a death struggle on the eastern front, had no doubts about the proper Western strategy. They wanted a second front; they wanted it soon; and they wanted it in the West. Each Anglo-American postponement of this second front added fuel to the fire.
西方列强之间紧密军事联系的基础始于1940年美国向英国派遣海军和陆军观察员。珍珠港事件后，英美两国在华盛顿举行了阿卡迪亚会议，会后建立了联合参谋长联席会议（CCS）体系——这是负责日常战争协调和制定西方战略的机制。联合参谋长联席会议由总理和总统领导，他们之间的关系密切而友好，而他们与斯大林的关系则始终保持克制和疏远。这两位西方领导人身兼两职——既是军事领导人，又是政治领导人。联合参谋长联席会议的工作贯穿于总统和总理主持的大型会议内外。当盟军战略和政策的高层决策准备就此召开时，就会举行峰会。
The basis for the close military association between the Western powers began with the dispatch of American navy and army observers to Great Britain in 1940. Out of the Anglo-American meeting in Washington directly after Pearl Harbor (the Arcadia Conference) came the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) system—the machinery for the day-to-day coordination of the war and for hammering out the Western strategy. Over the CCS were the prime minister and the President, whose association became as close and warm as their relationship with Stalin remained reserved and remote. Each of the two Western leaders wore two hats—one military, the other political. The work of the CCS went on in and out of the big conferences with the President and prime minister. The summit meetings occurred when planners were ready for top-level decisions on major items of Allied strategy and policy.
二
II
在盟军伙伴关系和战略发展的三大阶段中，1941-1942年是形成期。这一时期见证了大同盟的诞生，以及苏联与西方之间保持一定距离的合作模式的开端——这种模式在战争剩余时期基本得以延续。对盟军而言，这也是一个防御战略时期。他们最根本的担忧是战败；他们最关心的是苏联的存亡。对西方伙伴而言，这一时期标志着他们最早做出的重要战略决策——“欧洲优先”（或“德国优先”）决策，以及寻求对德战略计划的第一阶段。
Of the three main phases in the development of the Allied partnership and strategy, 1941–1942 represents the formative era. This period witnessed the emergence of the Grand Alliance and the beginning of the pattern of arms-length collaboration between the Soviet Union and the West—a pattern that essentially was to obtain for the remainder of the war. For the Allies this was also the period of defensive strategy. Their basic fear was of defeat; their great concern, the survival of the Soviet Union. For the Western partners it marked the earliest of their important strategic decisions—the “Europe First” (or “Germany First”) decision, and the first stage in the search for a strategic plan against Germany.
在盟军战略的演变过程中，率先击败德国这一原则的采纳，是英美两国在二战政策中最重要、最具决定性的决策。这一基本战略决策的基础早在1941年初——珍珠港事件爆发前近一年——在华盛顿举行的所谓“ABC会议”上就已奠定。在这些英美参谋人员的探索性会谈中，确立了这样一条原则：如果美国参战，盟军将首先寻求击败德国。<sup> 7</sup>基于德国将成为敌对联盟主导力量的信念，英美的主要作战区域将设在大西洋和欧洲。如果日本参战，远太平洋地区的军事战略将采取防御姿态，直到盟军集结足够的力量发起进攻。当战争最终降临美国时，尽管日本在初期取得了一些胜利，且珍珠港事件后太平洋局势十分危急，但这一基本决策在华盛顿举行的阿卡迪亚会议上，经丘吉尔及其幕僚确认后，仍然得以确立。<sup> 8</sup>
In the evolution of Allied strategy, the early adoption of the principle of defeating Germany first was the most significant and controlling decision in Anglo-American polices of the Second World War. The groundwork for that basic strategic decision was laid early in 1941—almost a year before Pearl Harbor—at the so-called ABC Conference in Washington. Out of these exploratory British and American staff talks emerged the principle that if the United States entered the war, the Allies would seek first to defeat Germany.7 On the basis of the belief that Germany would be the predominant member of the hostile coalition, the main Anglo-American effort was to be made in the Atlantic and European area. If Japan entered the war, military strategy in the Far Pacific would be defensive until the Allies could assemble enough strength to take the offensive. When war did come to the United States, despite initial Japanese successes and the critical situation in the Pacific following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the basic decision was confirmed during the meetings with Churchill and his staff at the Arcadia Conference in Washington.8
战后关于盟军战略的辩论中，有人质疑“欧洲优先”决策的明智性。但在战争初期这个关键时期，政治权宜之计和后勤保障的考量强化了这一决策。出于政治、军事、地理和经济等原因，三大盟国能够达成共识。对其中两个盟国而言，直接威胁来自欧洲；在那里可以立即采取行动，而且所有盟国都已正式公开地就敌人达成一致。苏联和英国则根本无法等待与日本战争的决定性结束。盟军已部署了大量兵力，无需像对日作战那样进行调动。因此，击败德国理应成为首要目标。
During the postwar debate over Allied strategy, some questioned the wisdom of the Europe-first decision. But in the critical early period of the war considerations of political expediency combined with logistics to reinforce the decision. For political, military, geographic, and economic reasons, the three Allies could agree. The immediate threat to two of the Allies was in Europe; there immediate action might be taken, and all were formally and publicly agreed on the enemy. The Soviet Union and Great Britain simply could not wait for a decisive ending of the war with Japan. Substantial Allied forces were already at hand and would not have to be moved, as they would have had to be against Japan. It followed, therefore, that the defeat of Germany should be the first major objective.
尽管这一基本决策贯穿整个战争，但如何解读和运用这一决策的问题在战争初期就已出现，并持续到战争结束。其中一个最棘手的问题是如何分配可用资源，以支持欧洲战场和对日战争。这反映了英美两国在政治和军事战略上的分歧。对英国而言，鉴于其在地中海、中东和欧洲大陆的主要利益，对日战争往往被视为次要目标。但对美国而言，由于其在战争初期就承担了对日战争的主要责任，因此在许多方面，对日作战都是更具政治意义的首要目标。因此，美国和英国在资源分配问题上不时出现分歧。
Although that basic decision held throughout the war, the question of how it was to be interpreted and applied arose early in the conflict and continued to the end. One of the most persistent questions concerned the proportion in which available resources should be divided between the war in Europe and the war against Japan. This reflected a divergence of political as well as military factors in Anglo-American strategy. For Britain, given its predominant interests in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and on the Continent, the war against Japan tended to be a sideshow. But for the United States, early given the major responsibility for the war against Japan, Japan was in many ways the politically preferable primary objective. As a result, differences arose from time to time between the United States and Great Britain over the distribution of resources.
尽管珍珠港事件使美国和英国的关系更加紧密，也一致认为必须首先击败德国，但双方仍然没有达成共识，制定出一个彼此都能接受的作战计划。英国提出的速战速决击败德国的方案逐渐清晰。其核心在于依靠封锁、轰炸、颠覆活动和宣传来削弱德国的抵抗意志和能力。重点在于部署机动性强、火力强大的装甲部队，在德占区周边作战，而不是与德军的全部兵力进行大规模地面作战。因此，无需像第一次世界大战那样投入庞大的步兵部队。整个战略方针与丘吉尔的“外围战略”理论相符，该理论是他从1914年至1918年英国惨痛的战争经历中提炼出来的。尽管战后讨论中，外围战略的地中海部分，即所谓的“软肋”，备受关注，但挪威也一直是二战期间首相丘吉尔重点关注的目标。从一开始，英国领导层就设想，只有在德国已走向崩溃之际，才会发动大规模的跨海峡作战，作为对德国的最后一击。英国的这两个理念——重视地中海以及将跨海峡作战作为最后一击——一直延续到诺曼底登陆。英国的这一战略是军事、政治和经济因素的综合体现，既有第一次世界大战和敦刻尔克大撤退带来的谨慎，也体现了首相的个人偏好。它旨在适应分散的利益、小规模的经济以及地面部队兵力有限的特点。
As close together as the United States and the United Kingdom had been drawn by Pearl Harbor, and as agreed as they were on the need to defeat Germany first, they still had no mutually acceptable plan of how to go about it. The British concept of how to defeat Germany early became apparent. Essentially, they proposed relying on blockade, bombing, subversive activities, and propaganda to weaken the will and ability of Germany to resist. The emphasis would be on mobile, hard-hitting armored forces operating on the periphery of German-controlled territory rather than on large-scale ground action in confrontation with the full power of the German military machine. No vast armies of infantry as in the First World War would be needed. This whole approach was in accord with the Churchillian theory of waging war on the Continent with a peripheral strategy, a concept he had developed after the searing British experience between 1914 and 1918. Although the Mediterranean or “soft underbelly” part of the peripheral thesis has received great attention in the postwar debate, Norway was also always a favorite objective of the prime minister in the Second World War. From the beginning the British leadership envisaged a cross-Channel operation in force only as the last blow against a Germany already in process of collapse. These two ideas of the British—emphasis on the Mediterranean, and the cross-Channel operation as a final blow—continued down to the Normandy invasion. The British concept was a compound of military, political, and economic factors, of caution resulting from the experience of the First World War and Dunkirk, and of the prime minister's predilections. It was tailored to suit scattered interests, a small-scale economy, and limited manpower for ground armies.
美国人的想法截然不同。早在1940年11月，海军作战部长哈罗德·R·斯塔克海军上将就认定，要击败德国，就必须进行大规模的陆地作战。9 1941年夏天，陆军战略规划人员得出结论，迟早“我们必须做好与德国作战的准备，真正与德国地面部队交战并将其击败，彻底摧毁其战斗意志”。10尽管他们对初步准备工作语焉不详，但他们已经倾向于正面迎击德军。他们认为，需要一支约215个师的美军才能取得胜利。这正是美国大规模集中作战理论的核心。它反映了美国人的乐观精神，他们对自身工业体系生产军事装备的能力充满信心，以及美国军队对自身招募、装备和训练一支庞大的国民军以进行进攻的信心。
The American ideas were quite different. As far back as November 1940, the chief of naval operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, had decided that large-scale land operations would be needed to beat Germany.9 In the summer of 1941 the army's strategic planners concluded that sooner or later “we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat.”10 Vague as they were about preliminary preparations, they were already disposed to think in terms of meeting the German army head-on. They believed an American army of approximately 215 divisions was needed to win. Here was the core of the American theory of a war of mass and concentration. It reflected American optimism, confidence in its industrial machine to produce the military hardware, and the faith of its military in its ability to raise, equip, and train a large citizen army for offensive purposes.
1942年，欧洲战场上截然不同的作战策略最明显地体现在“博莱罗行动”与“火炬行动”的争论中。“博莱罗行动”是美国陆军的构想。珍珠港事件后，为了应对太平洋、中东、远东和非洲等非欧洲地区的紧急危机，陆军部长史汀生、马歇尔将军和陆军策划人员担心部队、舰船和物资会分散部署。美国参谋长联席会议采纳了从英国大规模入侵欧洲的方案——即所谓的“博莱罗行动”。该方案旨在集结兵力，于1943年春季发动大规模跨海峡入侵（代号“围捕”）。一项名为“铁锤行动”的辅助方案则规定，在1942年秋季，如果出现两种紧急情况——德国或苏联面临崩溃——美国可以小规模紧急返回欧洲大陆。尽管英国在 1942 年 4 月“原则上”批准了《波莱罗舞曲》，但该协议持续不到三个月。
The divergent approaches to the European war were most clearly reflected in 1942 in the struggle over Operation Bolero versus Operation Torch. The Bolero plan was the brainchild of the American army. Secretary of War Stimson, General Marshall, and the army planners became disturbed over the threatened dispersion of troops, ships, and supplies after Pearl Harbor, to meet immediate crises in non-European parts of the globe—the Pacific, Middle East, Far East, and Africa. The concept of invading Europe in force from the United Kingdom—the so-called Bolero plan—was adopted by the American Joint Chiefs as the solution. This plan was designed to assemble forces for a major cross-Channel invasion in force in the spring of 1943 (called Roundup). A subsidiary plan (termed Sledgehammer) provided for an emergency small-scale return in the autumn of 1942 to the Continent in either of two contingencies—the threatened collapse of Germany or the threatened collapse of Russia. Although the British approved Bolero “in principle” in April 1942, the agreement lasted less than three months.
对美国参谋部而言，“波莱罗行动”尤其具有吸引力，原因有几点。它能够满足苏联开辟第二战场的要求。它能为工业和人力动员提供一个明确的长期战略目标。最重要的是，它承诺在1943年初采取决定性行动，并提供了一个符合集中兵力原则的长期计划。第二战场的计划一度推进。1942年6月24日，艾森豪威尔将军抵达英国，接管欧洲战区（ETO）的指挥权，大量美军部队开始抵达。
To the American staff, Bolero was especially desirable for a number of reasons. It would meet the Russian demand for a second front. It would furnish a definite long-range strategic goal for industrial and manpower mobilization. Above all, it promised decisive action by early 1943 and offered a long-range plan that would fulfill the principle of concentration. For a while plans went ahead for the second front. On June 24, 1942, General Eisenhower arrived in England, assumed command in the European theater of operations (ETO), and considerable American forces began to arrive.
但形势很快逆转，军方的计划落空。六月，首相访问华盛顿，力主在北非展开行动。英国蓄意破坏“博莱罗行动”的意图令美国军方高层极为愤怒，以至于七月，参谋长联席会议甚至考虑威胁英国，要在太平洋战场上全力进攻——但总统断然拒绝了这一威胁。七月在伦敦的进一步磋商后，最终决定于1942年秋季发动北非战役。“火炬行动”（入侵北非）取代了“博莱罗行动”。美国军方高层败下阵来，总统否决了他们的意见。
But the tide soon turned against the army's plan. In June the prime minister came to Washington and urged a North African operation. So stirred up was the American military staff over the evident British intention to scuttle Bolero that in July the Joint Chiefs even considered threatening the British with going all-out in the Pacific—a threat the President refused to allow. Out of further discussions in London in July came the decision to launch a North African attack in the autumn of 1942. Torch (the invasion of North Africa) replaced Bolero. The American staff had lost out; the President had overruled them.
“火炬行动”的决定源于两个基本因素：一是罗斯福坚持美国地面部队必须在1942年对德作战；二是丘吉尔及其幕僚断然拒绝接受1942年进行跨海峡作战的想法。双方都意识到，“火炬行动”如果成功，将带来一些积极的好处。盟军的航运资源极其紧张。如果前往中东和印度的护航航线能够经由地中海而非绕过好望角，每月就能节省两百多艘船只。此外，1942年进行跨海峡作战的可行性也引发了严重的质疑。实际因素发挥了重要作用：“火炬行动”的资源充足，而跨海峡作战的资源则更加难以保证。
The Torch decision resulted from two basic factors—Roosevelt's insistence on action for American ground forces against Germany in 1942, and the categoric refusal of Churchill and his staff to accept the notion of a 1942 cross-Channel operation. Both sides recognized that Torch, if successful, could produce some positive advantages. Allied shipping was extremely tight. Savings of over two hundred ships per month could be made if convoy routes to the Middle East and India could go through the Mediterranean instead of around the Cape of Good Hope. Serious questions concerning the feasibility of a cross-Channel operation in 1942 also arose. Practical considerations played an important part: resources existed for Torch; those for the cross-Channel undertaking were more doubtful.
对马歇尔和史汀生而言，“火炬行动”的决定令人无比失望。在他们看来，这意味着采取包围、迂回、以及五角大楼一位高级策划者所称的“分散”战略。这也意味着原定对德直接进攻计划的必然推迟。这一拖延进一步加剧了与处境艰难的苏联之间的紧张关系，并加深了苏联对西方意图的怀疑。当“火炬行动”最终胜出时，丘吉尔在莫斯科的一次激烈会谈中，真切地感受到了斯大林的强烈不满。
To Marshall and Stimson the Torch decision was a bitter disappointment. To them it meant the adoption of a strategy of encirclement, of periphery-pecking, and of what a top Pentagon planner termed “scatterization.” It also meant the inevitable postponement of a definitely scheduled direct thrust against Germany. This delay further complicated relations with the hard-pressed Soviets, and fed their suspicions about Western intentions. When Torch won out, Churchill felt the full weight of Stalin's disapproval in a stormy interview in Moscow.
现在看来，《波莱罗河》行动似乎为时尚早。无论是英国人，还是横渡英吉利海峡的兵力和手段，似乎都尚未准备就绪。但是，正如美国军事策划者所认识到的，现有的兵力往往会自行形成战略，而政治领导人急于行动的压力和急切的心情，可能会凌驾于军事战略之上，即便该战略再合理。发动“火炬行动”的兵力和手段是足够的；西方盟军也确实发动了“火炬行动”。
In retrospect Bolero seems to have been premature. Neither the British nor the forces and means to cross the Channel appeared to be ready. But, as the American military planners learned, forces in being have a way of generating a strategy of their own and the impatience and pressure of political leaders for action may override the strategy of the military, however sound. There were enough forces and means to do Torch; the Western Allies did Torch.
“火炬行动”的启动标志着英美两国寻求对德战略计划的第一阶段告一段落。1941年至1942年，西方伙伴国奉行防御战略，同时也面临着物资匮乏的困境。双方的战争策略存在冲突，英国的机会主义或边缘战略在第一轮较量中胜出。但双方的战略尚未完全决出胜负。英国的战略理念最终占据上风并不令人意外。他们的军队动员得更早，在欧洲战场的兵力也远超美国。他们在北非和中东的处境岌岌可危。此外，英国在军事外交方面也比美国更有经验，丘吉尔也得到了罗斯福的支持。珍珠港事件后，美军花了近一年的时间才在战场上产生显著影响。由于运输和弹药严重短缺，美国的战略规划大多着眼于短期。为了应对迫在眉睫的威胁和危机，部队被零散地调派出去。美国人对军事外交和谈判技巧尚不熟悉，仍然固守着非此即彼的思维模式，要么执行这项行动，要么执行那项行动。他们曾寄予厚望的计划——将盟军的计划置于有序的长期规划之上，并遵循兵力集中和兵力集中的原则——已经失败。由于担心兵力和物资会继续被浪费在他们认为是次要的行动中，他们不得不从头开始，寻找新的策略。
The launching of the Torch operation ended the first stage in the search for an Anglo-American strategic plan against Germany. From 1941 to 1942, a period of defensive strategy, was also the era of a strategy of scarcity for the Western partners. Their two approaches to war had conflicted, and British opportunism or peripheral strategy had won the first round. But the issue was not yet squarely joined. That British notions of strategy had tended to prevail was not surprising. Their forces had been mobilized earlier and were in the European theater of operations in greater numbers than the Americans. Their position in North Africa and the Middle East was desperate. The British were also more experienced in military diplomacy than the Americans, and Churchill found a sympathetic ear in Roosevelt. It had taken the better part of the year after Pearl Harbor for American forces to have any appreciable impact in the theaters. American strategic planning, limited by critical shortages in shipping and munitions, had been largely short-run. Troops had been parceled out piecemeal to meet immediate threats and crises. New to the art of military diplomacy and negotiation, the Americans were still thinking in either-or terms, of this operation or that. The one plan in which they had placed their faith, to put Allied planning on an orderly, long-range basis and observe the principles of mass and concentration, had failed. Fearful of the continued dissipation of their forces and matériel in what they regarded as secondary ventures, they had to start over and find new formulas.
“火炬行动”的决定也使西方与其苏联伙伴的关系更加复杂。1942年，美国和英国都以减轻苏联的压力为由，为其各自的欧洲战争战略辩护。对两国而言，苏联的地理优势和人力资源很快就成为取胜的关键。尽管西方盟国的计划与东线战局息息相关，但西方在对德战略上仍未达成一致，其计划也未与苏联协调。除非合作能够明显有助于双方共同的利益——即尽早击败德国——否则西方无法指望与苏联的军事关系有任何实质性的改善。苏联对开辟第二战场的期望也未能实现。
The Torch decision also complicated Western relations with their Soviet partner. In 1942 the Americans and the British justified their respective strategic approaches toward the European war in terms of relieving pressure on the embattled Soviet Union. For each the geography and manpower of the Soviet Union early became the key to victory. Although the plans of the Western Allies were tied to the outcome of the struggle on the eastern front, the West had still not agreed on strategy against Germany and its plans had not been coordinated with those of the Soviet Union. The West could expect no real improvement in military relations with the USSR except where such collaboration would clearly contribute to their one common interest—the early defeat of Germany. The expectation of the Soviet Union for a second front had not been met.
三
III
1943年，关于欧洲战略的争论进入了第二阶段。这一阶段涵盖了战争中期到诺曼底登陆，其特点是资源更加丰富，且联盟战争进入了进攻阶段。决定战略和选择作战时间和地点的权力从轴心国转移到了盟军联盟手中。美国的动员和生产能力的影响不仅开始在战场上显现，也开始在盟军战略委员会中产生影响。苏联在斯大林格勒坚守阵地，展现了其抵御德军猛攻的能力，苏联对盟军战略的意见也因此更具分量。但随着战争形势的转变，联盟战争的战略开始显得远比美国人最初设想的要复杂得多。
In 1943 the debate over European strategy entered a second stage. This phase, covering the midwar period down to the landings in Normandy, was one of more plentiful means and of the offensive phase of coalition warfare. The power to determine strategy and choose the time and place to do battle passed from the Axis powers to the Allied coalition. The full impact of American mobilization and production began to be felt not only in the theaters but also in Allied strategy councils. Standing fast before Stalingrad, the Soviets demonstrated their ability to survive the German onslaught, and Soviet ideas on Allied strategy also carried more weight. But as the tide of the war turned, the strategy of waging coalition warfare began to appear far more complex than the Americans originally envisaged.
“火炬行动”的决定引发了美英两国之间关于欧洲战略的激烈辩论，这场辩论一直持续到1944年夏天。北非战役的战略目标是西西里岛；西西里岛战役的战略目标是入侵意大利。丘吉尔始终力主在地中海地区继续推进——先攻占西西里岛，然后登陆意大利，再到罗马，然后是比萨-里米尼一线，最后是“向北和东北”推进——这一战略在很大程度上得到了罗斯福的支持，罗斯福本人也对地中海地区充满兴趣，但他的美国参谋长联席会议却只是勉强接受。这位英国领导人巧妙而富有策略的论证始终强调，必须保持削弱敌军的势头，并抓住眼前的有利条件，即在地中海地区可以获得的“巨大战利品”，而盟军则在等待合适的时机跨越英吉利海峡入侵欧洲大陆。盟军在地中海地区拥有相当规模的兵力，并且有机会立即削弱敌军，这些都是强有力的论据。但与此同时，以马歇尔将军为首的美国人逐步限制了地中海战线的推进，将其方向从东方转向西方，并将其与明确的跨海峡作战行动（霸王行动）直接联系起来，最终重新确立了在欧洲大陆进行大规模集中战争的理念。他们的任务之一是与美国总统达成协议，与英国达成协议，最终还要与苏联达成协议。从1943年1月的卡萨布兰卡会议到11月的德黑兰会议，一系列国际会议达成的决议反映了美英两国在机会主义原则与长期承诺之间、在消耗战与大规模集中战争之间做出的妥协。
The decision for Torch opened a great debate on European strategy between the Americans and the British that endured to the summer of 1944. North Africa led to Sicily; Sicily, to the invasion of Italy. Always Churchill urged ever onward in the Mediterranean—Sicily, landing in Italy, to Rome, then to the Pisa-Rimini line, then “north and northeast”—advances that to a considerable extent Roosevelt, himself fascinated by the Mediterranean, seconded, but that the American Joint Chiefs only reluctantly accepted. The skillful and resourceful arguments of the British leader always stressed the need to continue the momentum of the softening-up process and the immediate advantages, the “great prizes” to be picked up in the Mediterranean, while the Allies waited for the right opportunity to invade the Continent across the Channel. The existence of sizeable Allied forces and the immediate chance to weaken the enemy in the Mediterranean were telling arguments. But at the same time the Americans, with General Marshall as their foremost spokesman, gradually made progress toward limiting the Mediterranean advance, pointing it to the west rather than the east, linking it directly with a definite cross-Channel operation (Overlord), and winning their way back to the notion of waging a war of mass and concentration on the Continent. Part of their task was securing agreement with the President, part with the British, and eventually with the Soviets. The series of decisions reached at the international conferences of 1943, from Casablanca in January to Teheran in November, reflected the compromises of the Americans and British between the principle of opportunism and long-range commitments, between a war of attrition and a war of mass and concentration.
在辩论和谈判的过程中，尽管战略理念仍存在差异，但战争中期美国人的计划技巧和方法越来越接近其英国盟友。美国人在军事外交、互惠互利，或者说战略规划的策略方面变得更加娴熟。与此同时，他们的战略思维也更加复杂。他们开始将思考范围从单一的作战行动扩展到多种行动的组合——一位美国计划员恰如其分地称之为“排列组合”。当时悬而未决的战略问题不再局限于地中海作战或跨海峡入侵，而是要明确这些行动与各方一致同意的联合轰炸攻势之间的具体关系。
In the course of debate and negotiation, the planning techniques and methods of the Americans in midwar became more nearly like those of their British ally, even if their strategic ideas still differed. The Americans became more skilled in the art of military diplomacy, of quid pro quo, or what might be termed the tactics of strategic planning. At the same time their strategic thinking became more sophisticated. They began to broaden the scope of their thinking from this or that operation to terms of this and that—what one American planner fittingly called “permutations and combinations.” The outstanding strategic questions were no longer to be phrased in terms of either a Mediterranean operation or a cross-Channel invasion, but in terms of defining the precise relations between those undertakings and the combined bomber offensive, on which all were agreed.
在辩论中，美国参谋长联席会议以进一步发展太平洋攻势相威胁，以此反驳英国要求更加重视地中海，特别是东地中海的要求。保留“太平洋备选方案”意味着完全禁止跨海峡作战，这与英国的意愿背道而驰。太平洋战争因此为美国参谋部提供了一个重要的杠杆，以控制地中海局势。与此同时，马歇尔将军也意识到，仅靠北非或西西里岛的战事无法彻底阻止地中海攻势，而击败意大利、进一步为盟军航运开辟地中海通道以及扩大对德空袭范围，都将带来显著优势。
In the debate, the American Joint Chiefs countered British demands for more emphasis upon the Mediterranean, particularly the eastern Mediterranean, by threatening further development of Pacific offensives. Holding open the “Pacific alternative” carried with it the threat of no cross-Channel operation at all, which was contrary to British wishes. The war in the Pacific thereby offered the U.S. staff a significant lever for keeping the Mediterranean issue under control. At the same time General Marshall recognized that the Mediterranean offensive could not be stopped completely with North Africa or Sicily and that definite advantages would accrue from knocking out Italy, opening the Mediterranean further for Allied shipping, and widening the air offensive against Germany.
德黑兰会议是决定欧洲战略的关键会议。战争期间，罗斯福、丘吉尔及其幕僚首次与斯大林及其幕僚会面。丘吉尔慷慨陈词，力主在意大利、爱琴海和东地中海展开军事行动，即便这意味着“霸王行动”的延期也在所不惜。但苏联出于自身考量，毫不含糊地支持美国的欧洲战略构想。苏联自信自身实力，作为联盟的平等成员，展现了其全部力量。斯大林则强烈支持“霸王行动”，并主张将地中海地区的进一步行动仅限于一项直接支援“霸王行动”的行动——入侵法国南部。作为回报，苏联承诺将在东线发动全面进攻，以配合“霸王行动”。斯大林的立场奠定了英美欧洲战略的基调，从某种意义上说，他也确立了西方的战略。英美高层一致同意在1944年春季发起“霸王行动”，同时在法国南部展开军事行动，并将此视为当年最重要的军事行动。盟军在欧洲取得最终胜利的蓝图已经成型。德国将被钳形攻势彻底击溃——英美军队从西线发起进攻，苏军从东线发起进攻。艾森豪威尔将军被任命为“霸王行动”的最高统帅，大规模进攻的准备工作随即展开。
Teheran was the decisive conference for European strategy. There, for the first time in the war, Roosevelt, Churchill, and their staffs met with Stalin and his staff. Churchill made eloquent appeals for operations in Italy, the Aegean, and the eastern Mediterranean, even at the expense of a delay in Overlord. But the Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, unequivocally put its weight behind the American concept of European strategy. Confident of its capabilities, it asserted its full power as an equal member of the coalition. Stalin came out strongly in favor of Overlord and limiting further operations in the Mediterranean solely to the one undertaking, an invasion of southern France, that directly assisted Overlord. In turn, the Soviets promised to launch an all-out offensive on the eastern front to go with them. Stalin's stand put the capstone on Anglo-American European strategy, and in a real sense, therefore, he fixed Western strategy. The Anglo-American chiefs agreed to launch Overlord in the spring of 1944, in conjunction with a southern France operation, and to consider these the supreme operations for that year. The final blueprint for Allied victory in Europe had taken shape. Germany was to be crushed by a great pincers—an Anglo-American drive in the West and a Soviet drive from the East. General Eisenhower was appointed the supreme commander for Overlord, and preparations for the big blow began.
这场旷日持久的英美争论中最后一个悬而未决的问题，直到1944年夏天才最终解决。在德黑兰战役后的几个月里，由于英国希望进一步扩张在意大利乃至巴尔干地区的兵力，南法战役几乎被放弃。但马歇尔将军和美国参谋人员态度坚决，罗斯福也坚持己见。最终协议直到1944年8月才达成——此时距离英吉利海峡战役已过去两个月，距离南法战役正式开始也仅几天之遥，丘吉尔才勉强让步。战争已经进入了一个新时代，这最后一次尝试代表着一种带有新意且政治色彩更为鲜明的边缘战略。丘吉尔的目光已经投向欧洲大陆，一只眼盯着节节败退的德军，另一只眼盯着步步逼近的苏军。
The last lingering element in the long drawn out Anglo-American debate was not fully settled until the summer of 1944. In the months following Teheran, the southern France operation came perilously close to being abandoned in favor of the British desire for further exploitation in Italy and possibly the Balkans. But General Marshall and the American staff remained adamant and Roosevelt held firm. Final agreement was not reached until August 1944—two months after the cross-Channel attack, and just a few days before the southern France operation was actually launched, when Churchill reluctantly yielded. The war had already entered a new era and this last attempt represented peripheral strategy with a new twist and in a starker political form. Churchill was already looking at the European continent with one eye on the retreating Germans, and the other on the advancing Soviets.
战争中期争论的焦点并非是否应该进行跨海峡作战，而是：这场作战应该是美国人所期望的、在明确目标日期发起的、优先级最高的全面进攻，还是英国人所希望的、在消耗战中对已被严重削弱的敌人进行最后一击？换句话说，这场作战是“强力进攻”还是“扫尾”？认为英国人从一开始就不希望进行跨海峡作战是错误的。事实恰恰相反。英美之间的分歧主要集中在准备行动的时机、规模和方向上。认为美国人一直反对所有地中海作战也是错误的。事实上，他们在1943年投入了大量的计划工作，以协调这些行动与跨海峡进攻，并将两者与联合轰炸攻势结合起来。
At stake in the midwar debate was not whether there should be a cross-Channel operation. Rather the question was: should that operation be the full-bodied drive launched with the highest priority on a definite target date that the Americans desired, or a final blow to an enemy critically weakened in a war of attrition that the British wanted? In other words, was it to be a “power drive” or a “mop up”? It is a mistake to assume that the British did not from the first want a cross-Channel operation. The evidence points the other way. Anglo-American differences revolved essentially around timing and the extent and direction of preparatory operations. It is also a mistake to believe that the Americans remained opposed to all Mediterranean operations. In fact, a considerable part of their planning labors in 1943 was spent in reconciling those operations with the cross-Channel attack and weaving both with the combined bomber offensive.
关于巴尔干战役的争议值得关注。通过巴尔干半岛入侵欧洲大陆，从而阻止苏联控制东欧，难道不是更明智的选择吗？必须强调的是，这是一场战后辩论。盟军战略委员会中任何一位负责任的领导人都从未提出过巴尔干入侵作为“霸王行动”的替代方案，盟军也从未就此进行过任何辩论或联合计划。证据确凿。丘吉尔在其战后著作中始终否认他想要入侵巴尔干半岛，而总体而言，证据似乎也支持他的说法。然而，他的立场中仍存在一些模糊之处，有待解释。显然，他赞成发动突袭、援助当地居民，以及在巴尔干地区部署几个装甲师，但他在战时或战后著述中，始终没有正视令美国参谋部极为担忧的问题：在巴尔干地区——一个地形崎岖、通讯落后的地区——开展军事行动的最终成本和所需条件。鉴于地中海战役的经验，这一因素显得尤为重要，地中海战役有力地证明了消耗战的代价有多么巨大。无论如何，美国总统及其军事参谋部都不愿卷入巴尔干地区棘手的政治纷争。
The controversy that has arisen over the question of the Balkan operation demands some attention. Would it not have been wiser to have invaded the Continent through the Balkans, thereby forestalling Soviet domination of Eastern Europe? It must be emphasized that this is a postwar debate. The Balkan invasion was never proposed by any responsible leader in Allied strategy councils as an alternative to Overlord and no Allied debate or combined planning occurred with it in mind. The evidence is clear on this matter. Churchill steadfastly denied in his postwar writings that he wanted a Balkan invasion and the evidence, on the whole, seems to bear him out.11 But there were ambiguities in his position that remain to be explained. Clearly, he was in favor of raids, assistance for native populations, and throwing in a few armored divisions in the Balkans, but nowhere in his wartime or postwar writing did he face up to the question that so frightened the American staff: the ultimate costs and requirements of an operation in the Balkans, an area of difficult terrain and poor communications. This factor becomes all the more important in the light of the experience with Mediterranean operations, a striking demonstration of how great the costs of a war of attrition can be. In any event, neither the American President nor his military staff wanted to get involved in the thorny politics of the Balkan area.
战后时期，对欧洲战争的诸多批评大多集中在美国的“大打击”战略上。美国的做法，尤其是受到英国批评家的抨击，被认为目光短浅、过于直接和粗暴，过于注重军事胜利，而忽略了战争的更宏大目标。这种批评引出了一个问题：丘吉尔式的策略——即外围策略——尽管适合英国的人力、经济、传统和目标，是否也适合美国的经验、能力和传统？正如戈登·哈里森（Gordon Harrison）在其著作《跨海峡进攻》（Cross-Channel Attack，美国陆军官方二战系列丛书之一）中所言：“指责美国人抱持大规模生产思维，实际上就是指责他们拥有大规模生产的经济模式，并认识到这种经济模式的军事优势。美国人是典型的强权主义者。”<sup> 12</sup>从一开始，他们就想着要与德军主力交战并将其击败。在他们看来，在确定的日期发动大规模跨海峡进攻，是迅速结束战争并最大限度减少伤亡的最佳希望。在他们看来，这个日期神圣不可侵犯，因为它是他们其他全球战争计划和方案的核心。美国参谋部反对对德进行消耗战和边缘战争，其背后是他们对战争最终造成的人员、金钱和时间损失的持续担忧，而他们对日作战的责任更加剧了这种担忧。他们思想的根本在于，他们日益意识到美国可用于战争的人力资源终究是有限的。<sup> 13</sup>这一因素以及对长期动员影响的担忧，强化了他们的军事集中理论，并使他们对英国重视地中海作战、偏爱巴尔干半岛作战以及迟迟未能确定跨海峡进攻日期的做法产生了怀疑。
Most of the criticisms that have been raised in the postwar era on the conduct of the war in Europe have centered on the American strategy of the “big blow.” The American approach was attacked, particularly by British critics, as too shortsighted, too direct and blunt, too intent on military victory, too forgetful of the larger objectives of war. Such criticism begs the question of whether the Churchillian approach—the peripheral approach—however suitable to British manpower, economy, traditions, and objectives, was suited to American experience, capacities, and traditions. As Gordon Harrison, author of Cross-Channel Attack, a volume in the official American Army series on the Second World War, put it: “To accuse Americans of mass-production thinking is only to accuse them of having a mass-production economy and of recognizing the military advantage of such an economy. The Americans were power-minded.”12 From the beginning they thought in terms of taking on the main German armies and beating them. To launch a major cross-Channel attack on a definite target date represented to them the best hope of ending the war quickly and with the fewest casualties. That target date in their view was sacrosanct since it was the pivot about which their other plans and programs for the global war revolved. In back of the American staff's opposition to attritional and peripheral warfare against Germany lay their continued anxiety over its ultimate costs in men, money, and time, a concern heightened by their responsibility for the war against Japan. Basic in their thought was a growing realization of the ultimate limits of American manpower available for war purposes.13 This factor and the anxiety about the effects of a long-term mobilization confirmed their doctrine of military concentration, and made them suspicious of British stress on Mediterranean operations, of what they regarded as a penchant for Balkan operations, and of the delays in definitely setting the cross-Channel attack.
总之，最终对德战略是美英两国观点的妥协——英国奉行外围战略，而美国则坚持集中兵力。由于美方希望在地中海推进并继续削弱德军，跨海峡作战被推迟了一年，这在一定程度上是英国的意愿。英国还为“霸王行动”设定了条件，特别是对西线德军最大兵力的预测。但在决定跨海峡进攻的性质、时间和优先级方面，美国的意见最终占了上风。“霸王行动”成为首要作战行动，并设定了明确的目标日期。它被赋予最高优先级，所有力量都集中于确保其成功。它被赋予了最大的兵力，直指德军的核心力量。
In any event, the final strategy against Germany was a compromise of American and British views—of British peripheral strategy and the American principle of concentration. To the extent that the cross-Channel operation was delayed a year later than Americans wished in order to advance in the Mediterranean and continue the softening-up process, the British prevailed. The British also set the conditions for Overlord, notably, the maximum enemy strength to be expected in the West. But the American views triumphed in determining the nature, timing, and priority of the cross-Channel attack. Overlord became the overriding operation in force with a fixed target date. It was given the highest priority and all efforts were concentrated on making it successful. It was given the maximum force to drive directly at the heart of German power.
在英美中期战争辩论的背后，盟军内部的军事力量平衡发生了重大变化——这些变化对战争战略的制定以及战时盟国未来的关系都产生了同样重要的影响。1943年底，美国凭借其强大的工业和军事机器高速运转，在苏联的帮助下迫使英国接受了其大陆战略的构想。美国向欧洲战场输送的军事力量和物资日益增多，确保了美国参谋部提出的集中决定性军事战争理念的胜利。自1943年1月卡萨布兰卡会议以来，罗斯福坚持要求德国无条件投降，进一步强化了这一理念。苏联在斯大林格勒战役后稳步增强实力和信心，并在盟军决策的关键时刻发挥了其在战略天平上的重要作用。英国在1943年底实际上已经完成了动员，其经济开始出现疲软迹象。战争中期，美国在欧洲战场的兵力部署已逼近英国，并威胁要超越英国。英国的军事实力及其战争理念都已落后。克里姆林宫和五角大楼的战略家们通过集中兵力的军事理论找到了共同点。联盟的基础正在发生变化。
Behind the Anglo-American midwar debate, significant changes had taken place in the balance of military power within the coalition—developments that had as important implications for the determination of war strategy as for the future relations among the partners in the wartime coalition. At the close of 1943, the Americans, with their mighty industrial and military machine in high gear, had with Soviet help made the British yield to their notions of Continental strategy. The growing flow of American military strength and supplies to the European theater ensured the triumph of the American staff concept of a concentrated, decisive military war, a concept reinforced by the addition, from the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 onward, of Roosevelt's insistence on Germany's unconditional surrender. The Soviet Union, steadily gathering strength and confidence after Stalingrad, had been able to make its weight felt on the strategic scales at a critical point in Allied councils. Britain had practically completed its mobilization at the end of 1943, and strains had begun to show in its economy. The Americans in midwar drew up to and threatened to overtake the British in deployed strength in the European theater. Britain's military power, along with its notions of fighting the war, was being outstripped. By way of the military doctrine of concentration, the strategists of the Kremlin and the Pentagon had found common ground. The foundations of the alliance were changing.
第四
IV
盟军对德战略的第三阶段，也是最后一个阶段，标志着欧洲冲突的最后九个月——这段时期是追求胜利和战略实践的阶段。在此期间，赢得战争的问题开始与赢得和平的问题交织在一起，因为战争的进程开始影响和平的条件。1944年6月6日诺曼底登陆成功后，西方盟军突破滩头阵地，横扫欧洲大陆，意图追击德军主力；与此同时，苏军向西推进，在东欧和中欧接连攻占各大城市，抢在西军之前占领了柏林、维也纳和布拉格，并涌入巴尔干半岛，填补德军撤退留下的权力真空。苏军的攻势表明，其力量集中于关键政治和战略要地绝非偶然。在这一时期，盟军在战后关于其战略的辩论中引起了很大的争议，盟军内部不同的国家目标和战争目标开始逐渐显露出来。
The third and final phase of the Allied strategy against Germany marked the last nine months of the European conflict—the period of the pursuit of victory and the unfolding of the strategy in practice. In this period the problems of winning the war began to come up against the problems of winning the peace, as the course of the war began to shape the conditions of the peace. After the successful landings on Normandy on June 6, 1944, the Western Allied forces broke out of their beachheads and advanced across the Continent, intent on the pursuit of the main German armies, while the Russians, driving westward, picked up capital after capital in eastern and central Europe, beating the Western forces to Berlin, Vienna, and Prague, and pouring into the Balkans to fill the vacuum left by the retreating Germans. The direction of the Soviet drives suggests that the flow of their power against key political and strategic positions was more than merely coincidental. In this period, which has aroused much controversy in the postwar debate over Allied strategy, the curtain began to lift on the divergent national objectives and war aims of the Allies.
到1944年夏天，盟军对德战略的格局已经形成并开始付诸实施。但美国理念的全部影响将在接下来的几个月里，直至1945年5月德国投降，才会更加显著地显现出来。一旦盟军在欧洲大陆站稳脚跟，对于马歇尔将军及其参谋人员而言，战争基本上就变成了后勤和战术问题，而欧洲盟军最高统帅艾森豪威尔将军则根据战场上的军事形势接管指挥权并做出决策。然而，对于密切关注苏联迅速推进至波兰和巴尔干地区的丘吉尔来说，这场战争比以往任何时候都更像是一场关乎重大政治利益的较量，他希望西方盟军的力量能够被调往填补德军撤退留下的权力真空，从而阻止苏联的攻势。随着战略在战场上的展开，两种战争策略最终归结为军事战术与政治博弈之争。
By the summer of 1944 the pattern of Allied strategy against Germany was complete and in the process of realization. But the full impact of American concepts was to be felt even more strongly in the subsequent months down to the surrender of Germany in May 1945. Once the Allied forces became firmly ensconced on the European continent, the war became for General Marshall and his staff essentially a matter of logistics and tactics, with General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to take over and make his decisions as military circumstances in the field dictated. But to Churchill, warily watching the swift Soviet advance into Poland and the Balkans, the war had become more than ever a contest for great political stakes and he wished Western Allied strength diverted to fill the vacuum left by the retreating Germans and thereby to forestall the Soviet surge. As the strategy unrolled in the field, the two approaches to the war boiled down to a question of military tactics versus political maneuvers.
如果总统像以往那样与首相联手，美国军方或许还能缓和急于迅速结束对德战争的军事倾向，并将战争引向更直接的政治方向。但罗斯福不愿这样做，丘吉尔单凭一己之力也无能为力。到了1944-1945年，美国总统陷入了政治困境。他并非对苏联单方面试图左右战后欧洲格局的努力漠不关心，尤其是在波兰政府重建问题上的争端。但从国内政治角度来看，他必须打一场速战速决的战争，以此证明美国参战和向海外派遣军队的合理性。他希望结束对德战争，转而投入对日战争。他已经向美国民众阐明了积极参与欧洲冲突的必要性，但他能否领导美国民众应对一场旷日持久的战争或占领——而这恰恰是首相所希望的美国在东南欧扮演更积极的角色——则更令人怀疑。此外，罗斯福的和平政策似乎与伍德罗·威尔逊的政策方向一致——即民族自决和建立维护和平的国际组织，而非依赖权力平衡。为了实现这一目标，他必须承担一定的风险，即能否妥善处理与斯大林的关系，以及赢得并维持与苏联的友谊。尽管丘吉尔似乎也愿意朝着同样的方向努力，但他似乎更倾向于传统的权力平衡理论。无论如何，美国在最后一年的国家政策并未阻碍欧洲冲突的彻底结束。
Had the President joined with the prime minister as he often had in the past, the American military staff's concentration on bringing the war against Germany to a swift military conclusion might still have been tempered and the war steered into more direct political channels. But Roosevelt would not, and Churchill by himself could not. By 1944–1945 the American President was caught in a political dilemma. He was not unconcerned about the unilateral efforts of the Soviet Union to put its imprint on the shape of postwar Europe, notably in the dispute over the reconstruction of the Polish government. But from the viewpoint of domestic political considerations he had to fight a quick and decisive war that would justify American entry and the dispatch of American troops abroad. He wanted to wind up the war against Germany and get on with the war against Japan. He had educated the American public about the need for active participation in the European conflict, but whether he could have led it in a prolonged war or occupation that might have resulted from the more active American role in southeastern Europe desired by the prime minister is more doubtful. Besides, Roosevelt's policy for peace seemed to lie in the same direction as Woodrow Wilson's—national self-determination and an international organization to maintain the peace, rather than a reliance on the balance of power. To achieve this aim he had to take the calculated risk of being able to handle Stalin and winning and maintaining the friendship of the Soviet Union. Although Churchill appeared willing to go a long way in the same direction, he seemed to want to hedge more toward traditional balance-of-power theory. In any event, American national policy in the final year placed no obstacle in the way of a decisive ending of the European conflict.
到1944年夏天，未来的种种迹象已经显现。艾森豪威尔将军抵达欧洲大陆后，被赋予了越来越多的政治决策权，或者说，他实际上是被迫承担了这些决策。由于缺乏来自华盛顿的明确而一致的指导，他只能基于军事考量做出决策，并采纳了美国参谋部提出的将敌人逼入绝境、以最小伤亡迅速而果断地结束战争的理念。这一趋势在1945年变得更加明显，当时他决定止步于易北河，而不是抢在苏军之前攻占柏林或布拉格。<sup> 14</sup>与往常一样，马歇尔将军和美国参谋部支持前线指挥官的决定。<sup> 15</sup>无论最终的政治影响如何，从彻底结束对德战争的军事角度来看，究竟是美军还是苏军攻占柏林或布拉格，其实并无太大区别。
By the summer of 1944 the signs of things to come were already apparent. Once on the Continent, General Eisenhower was given more and more responsibility for political decisions, or fell heir to them by default. Lacking clear and consistent guidance from Washington, he made decisions on the basis of military considerations, and fell back on the American staff notions of bringing the enemy to bay and ending the war quickly and decisively with the fewest casualties. This trend became even more marked later, in 1945, in his decision to stop at the Elbe and not to take Berlin or Prague ahead of the Soviets.14 As usual, General Marshall and the American staff backed the decisions of the commander in the field.15 Whatever the ultimate political implications, from the military viewpoint of decisively ending the war against Germany it made little difference whether the forces of the United States or those of the Soviet Union took Berlin or Prague.
丘吉尔在战争最后一年无力扭转战局，反映了美英军方关系的变化以及大同盟基础的转移。尽管美国参谋部为在欧洲大陆发动大规模进攻而保留的军事力量是一枚强大的武器，但美国领导层并未选择将其用于政治目的；而首相丘吉尔虽然有此意图，却缺乏相应的权力。1944年中期以后，英国的生产能力日益紧张，英国在经济萎缩的情况下继续进行战争。美国经济和人口更有能力支撑盟军持续的大规模进攻，这一点在欧洲战争的最后一年表现得尤为明显。凭借美国已积累的庞大生产资料以及对欧洲大陆日益增长的美军兵力的控制，盟军最高统帅艾森豪威尔将军得以将美国参谋部的理念贯彻到战争的最终胜利之中。丘吉尔希望赋予西方盟军军事行动的任何政治方向都不得不让步。随着对德战争持续到1944年，未能如期结束，英国在盟军高层决策中的影响力进一步下降。美国军事机器日益强大，向东推进，意图摧毁德军；而苏联在中欧和东欧的影响力也日益增强。面对这样的局面，英国基本上只能依靠自身力量来挽救其欧洲和地中海政策。显然，战争的最后一年标志着联盟基础的进一步转变；英国的影响力日渐式微，而美国和苏联则崛起为欧洲最强大的两个军事力量。美国决心在德国战败后尽快从欧洲大陆撤军，而苏联则日益表现出巩固自身地位的迹象，这令丘吉尔开始感到担忧。尽管战争的政治色彩日益浓厚，但华盛顿最高指挥部的目标却一成不变，这令首相极为沮丧。他在回忆录中抨击道：“尤其是在华盛顿，应该有更长远、更广阔的视野。”<sup> 16</sup>
The inability of Churchill in the last year of the war to reverse the trend reflected the changed relationship between the American and British military and the shifting bases of the Grand Alliance. If the military strength that the American staff had conserved for the major blow on the Continent offered a powerful weapon, American leadership did not choose to use it for political purpose; the prime minister, on the other hand, had the purpose but not the power. After the middle of 1944 British production came under increasing strain and the British fought the remainder of the war with a contracting economy. The greater capacity of the American economy and population to support a sustained large-scale Allied offensive effort showed up clearly in the last year of the European war. Through the huge stockpile of American production already built up and through control of the increasing U.S. military manpower on the Continent General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, could put the imprint of American staff notions on winning the war. Whatever political orientation Churchill hoped to give the character of the Western Allied military effort had to yield. As the war against Germany lengthened out beyond the hoped-for conclusion in 1944, British influence in high Allied councils went into further decline. Between the growing power of the American military machine driving eastward, intent on the destruction of the German armies, and the Soviets making their weight felt in central and eastern Europe, the British were largely left to their own devices to salvage what they could of their European and Mediterranean policy. Clearly the last year of the war saw the foundations of the coalition in further transition; British influence was waning, and the United States and the Soviet Union were emerging as the two strongest military powers in Europe. With the Americans determined to withdraw from the Continent as quickly as possible after the defeat of Germany and the Russians showing increasing signs of entrenching themselves, Churchill began to be alarmed. To the prime minister the singleness of purpose of the Washington High Command, despite the growing political character of the war, was most frustrating. In his memoirs he lashed out: “In Washington especially longer and wider views should have prevailed.”16
在没有相反的政治指示的情况下，美国军方只能依靠现有的资源和人力，尽快结束这场令人不快的战争。因此，对德战争——在西方一方——最终将按照美国军方高层从一开始就希望的方式结束：一场集中兵力的常规战争，一场技术性的军事博弈。苏联始终坚持以自己的方式，为自己的利益而战。
In the absence of political instructions to the contrary, the American military staff fell back upon the task of applying the given resources and manpower to get the disagreeable business over with as quickly as possible. Thus the war against Germany was to be concluded—on the Western side—as the American military chiefs had wished to wage it from the beginning, a conventional war of concentration, a technical military game. To the end the Soviet Union showed its determination to fight the war in its own way, and for its own objectives.
在欧洲大陆战争的最后一年，随着大同盟内外力量平衡的转变，三大盟国在欧洲问题上的立场也出现了显著分歧。美国奉行在战后两年内撤军的政策，反对在和平会议召开和新的国际组织成立之前承认任何领土争端。英国则更倾向于接受苏联较为温和的要求，甚至愿意与苏联达成临时协议，将势力范围原则应用于巴尔干地区。苏联开始更加公开、强硬地提出其政治诉求。凡是谈判无法达成的目标，它都诉诸单方面行动。从这个角度来看，至今仍存在争议的雅尔塔会议，可以被视为西方阵营分裂和苏联实力及影响力日益增强的征兆。
As the power balance in and out of the Grand Alliance shifted in the last year of the war on the Continent, the three Allied partners stood considerably apart on European issues. American policy, intent on withdrawing American troops within two years after the end of the fighting, remained opposed to recognizing territorial settlements before a peace conference and the establishment of a new international organization. The British were more amenable to accepting moderate Soviet demands and even to entering into temporary expedients with the Soviet Union, applying the sphere-of-influence principle to the Balkans. The Soviet Union began to make its political claims more openly and strongly. What it could not obtain by negotiation, it sought through unilateral action. From that standpoint, the Yalta Conference—about which controversy still revolves—may be regarded as a symptom of Western divergence and disunity and increasing Soviet strength and influence.
V
V
那么，我们能对二战盟军战略的特点得出什么结论呢？证据表明，无论是美国还是英国，都没有从一开始就制定出完整的战略蓝图。他们为取得胜利而构建的模式，是在不断变化的战争形势下，受制于形势、必要性、反复试验以及彼此之间和与盟友之间的妥协。每一种战略都反映了各国的传统、利益、地理环境、资源以及政治和军事领导人的偏好——是在形势的熔炉中锻造而成的。随着各国国力在战争的熔炉中时而衰弱时而增强，联盟中每个国家的相对地位和影响力也随之改变。
What, then, may we conclude about the character of Allied strategy in the Second World War? The evidence suggests that neither the Americans nor the British started with a fully developed strategic blueprint. The patterns they fashioned for victory were molded by circumstances, necessity, trial and error, and compromises among themselves and with their allies in the changing context of the war. Each strategic case reflected national traditions, interests, geography, resources, and the predilections of its political and military leaders—an amalgam molded on the anvil of necessity. The relative position and influence of each power in the alliance changed as its national strength weakened or increased in the crucible of war.
回顾历史，第一次世界大战对第二次世界大战中各国采取的联合战略的影响需要得到更多重视。每个协约国在很大程度上都受制于自身的历史，而此前的冲突及其后果在其战略遗产中产生了深远的影响：经历了那场旷日持久、血腥残酷的战争——一个典型的战略停滞案例——之后，没有哪个协约国希望再次陷入旷日持久的战争。英国在第一次世界大战中遭受的大规模军队和地面战役的巨大损失，使其政治和军事领导层变得谨慎，并促使英国在国际联合战争形势允许的范围内，回归到更为传统的“间接战略”，以对抗并击败破坏欧洲力量平衡的纳粹敌人。
In retrospect the impact of the First World War on national approaches to coalition strategy in the Second World War needs more emphasis. Each Allied power was to a considerable degree a captive of its own past, and in its strategic legacy the earlier conflict and its aftermath exerted a strong influence: after that drawn-out bloody struggle, a classic case of arrested strategy, no Allied power wanted another long war. The huge losses suffered by Britain in the great carnage of mass armies and ground battles in the First World War bred caution in its political and military leadership and a return, insofar as circumstances in the global coalition war permitted, to a more traditional “indirect approach” to counter and defeat the Nazi foe that had upset the European balance of power.
1917年末，美军参战时相对毫发无损，潘兴将军在进攻性战争中取得的胜利也令美军士气大振，这场长期僵持的战争再次演变为一场以机动为主的战争。对于美国军方而言，第一次世界大战巩固了其集中兵力和争取彻底胜利的作战原则，而欧洲战场也奠定了美军战略信念的基础，像乔治·C·马歇尔将军这样的军事领导人试图将这些信念应用于第二次世界大战的多战区作战中。对德意志帝国的战争提升了美国军队在战略层面的重要性，参与这场战争也增强了美军在海外组建、部署、支援和作战大规模国民军的信心。这种战略与罗斯福总统1941年后的政策完美契合，罗斯福的政策与威尔逊总统的政策截然不同，他力求迫使德国无条件投降，彻底击败其军队，并且不再提供任何“十四点原则”作为逃避条件。
Entering late in 1917, the Americans had emerged relatively un-bloodied and flushed with Pershing's victories in offensive warfare, as the long-stalemated conflict became a war of movement again. For the American military, the First World War confirmed the doctrines of concentration and of fighting for complete victory, and out of the battlefields of Europe came the foundations of strategic faith that military leaders like General George C. Marshall sought to apply in the multitheater context of the Second World War. The war against imperial Germany raised the American army in importance on the strategic scales, and participation in that conflict bred confidence and faith among the military in their ability to raise, deploy, support, and fight large citizen armies overseas in offensive warfare. That approach meshed neatly with Roosevelt's policy, after 1941, in studied contrast with that of President Wilson, to exact unconditional surrender from Germany this time, to defeat its forces thoroughly in the field, and to offer no “escape clauses” of another Fourteen Points.
尽管第一次世界大战给美国人留下了乐观的遗产，给英国留下了谨慎的遗产，但苏联在1917年的经历以及战后的反革命浪潮加剧了其对资本主义列强的不信任，并影响了其领导层对第二次世界大战的态度。在整个战争期间，苏联领导层对盟友和敌人都抱有戒心，决心收复在《布列斯特-立陶夫斯克条约》中失去的西部边疆，并加强其在东欧的地位。这些目标在第二次世界大战中仍然是苏联政治军事战略的根本。从很多方面来看，第二次世界大战——这场战争主要使用第一次世界大战中改进的武器——可以被视为对这一战略的印证，而两次冲突之间的战略联系需要进一步探讨。
Although participation in the First World War left a legacy of optimism to the Americans and caution to the British, Soviet experience in 1917 and the counterrevolutionary aftermath heightened its distrust of capitalistic powers and conditioned the approach of its leadership to the Second World War. Throughout that war the Soviet leadership, suspicious of both partner and enemy, was determined to recover the western borderlands it had lost in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and to strengthen its position in eastern Europe. These objectives remained fundamental in Soviet politico-military strategy in the Second World War. In many ways the Second World War, fought largely with the refined weapons of the First World War, may be regarded as its confirmation, and the strategic links between the two conflicts need further exploration.
批评美国政府的做法的人指责美国军方对英国的意图过于疑神疑鬼，对英国的帝国主义抱有过高的怀疑——巴尔干问题被描绘成一个毫无事实依据的幽灵。他们认为，英国在战争和外交方面都更加老练，如果当初采纳了英国的建议，战争的政治结果将会截然不同。
Critics of the American case have charged that the American military were overly paranoid about British intentions, too suspicious of British imperialism—that the Balkan question became a specter that had little basis in fact. They argue that the British were more sophisticated in warfare and diplomacy and that had their advice been followed, the political results of the war would have been far different.
人们或许会提出这样的问题：英国是否存在一套连贯的对德战争战略？这套战略在战争和战后规划方面是否优于美国的战略？英国官方历史学家关于大战略的著述表明，二战期间英国的战略，与美国的战略一样，本质上是在不断变化的机遇和压力以及领导人之间立场妥协的背景下发展起来的。英国似乎并非只有一个理由支持地中海行动，而是有多种理由；英国高层和丘吉尔在巴尔干半岛或爱琴海的作战行动上也并非完全一致。迈克尔·霍华德曾为英国官方二战史撰写了一部关于战略的专著，他指出，尽管英国在1943年的大部分时间里都出于机会主义而支持地中海行动，并将其合理化为“霸王行动”的铺路手段，但到那年年底，地中海战略似乎已经形成了自身的发展方向和逻辑。他否认英国领导人在1943年将地中海战役视为“阻止俄国人的手段”，也否认他们的地中海战略是基于“预言性的洞见”，并总结道：“他们似乎越来越放弃了自己早期的论点，并将地中海战场视为最终目标，而非次要目标，其战役的成功本身就是正当的理由。”<sup> 17</sup>
The question may well be raised: Was there a coherent British strategy for the war against Germany, and did it present a better alternative to the American strategy for war and postwar purposes? The writings of the official British historians on grand strategy indicate that the British strategy in the Second World War, like its American counterpart, grew essentially in response to changing opportunities and pressures and to compromises among the position of its leaders. There appears to have been not one but a number of British cases for the Mediterranean; the British chiefs and Churchill were not in total agreement over Balkan or Aegean operations. Michael Howard, who has contributed a volume on strategy to the British official history of the Second World War, has suggested that however opportunistically Mediterranean operations were supported by the British during most of 1943 and justified as paving the way for Overlord, by the end of that year the Mediterranean strategy appeared to be taking on a direction and rationale of its own. Denying that the British leaders in 1943 viewed Mediterranean operations “as a way of forestalling the Russians,” or that their Mediterranean strategy was based on “prophetic insights,” he concluded: “Increasingly they appear to have abandoned their own earlier arguments and to have regarded the Mediterranean theatre, not as subsidiary, but as an end in itself, the success of whose operations was its own justification.”17
丘吉尔是否真的想入侵巴尔干半岛至今仍存在争议。可以肯定的是，即便在1943年，当丘吉尔的理念被广泛采纳、外围战略盛行之时，英国的实力也已日渐衰弱。“软肋”在意大利的案例中，最终却变成了坚硬的后盾。正如美国人所担心的那样，每一次地中海战役都耗费了比最初预想更多的兵力和物资。如上所述，任何形式的巴尔干战役都引起了美国人的真正担忧。批评美国战略的人往往低估了美国战略家们的成熟度、他们战略规划的全球背景，以及他们在太平洋战场上所采取的机会主义战争策略——这与英国在地中海战场上所倡导的策略并无二致。这些批评者也往往高估了英国战略的连贯性，并忘记了美国人所倡导的直接、全面解决方案的战略，既源于他们所继承的欧洲战前理论，也源于他们自身的传统。美国参谋长联席会议将政治事务交由总统处理，自身从未制定过一套连贯的政治军事战略。但战后一些学者强调美军参谋人员完全缺乏政治智慧，这种说法未免有些夸大其词。事后看来，尽管人们普遍认为英美两国在政治和军事智慧方面存在差距，但事实上，在二战期间，英美两国都没有发展出一套完整的政治军事战略。
Whether Churchill really wanted to invade the Balkans is still being debated. Certainly the British were growing weaker even in 1943, when Churchillian notions were largely being followed and peripheral strategy was in its heyday. The “soft underbelly” turned out, in the case of Italy, to be a hard-shelled back. Each Mediterranean operation absorbed more troops and supplies than originally contemplated, as the Americans had feared. Balkan operations in any form, as noted above, aroused genuine anxieties among the Americans. Critics of the American case tend to minimize the U.S. planners' maturation as strategists, the global context of their planning, and the war of opportunism they fought in the Pacific, not unlike that advocated by the British for the Mediterranean. The same critics also tend to overestimate the coherence of the British case and to forget that the strategy the Americans espoused for direct, total solutions was born of European prewar doctrine to which they had fallen heir as well as of their own traditions. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff left politics to the President and never advanced a coherent politico-military strategy of their own. But postwar writers who have stressed the complete absence of political sophistication on the part of the U.S. military staff have overdrawn the case. It would appear in retrospect that, despite the alleged disparity in political and military sophistication, neither the British nor the Americans evolved and presented a fully developed politico-military strategy in the Second World War.
对日战争，主要由美国主导，其对盟军战略的影响需要特别关注。从一开始，对日战争就威胁到英美基本战略的平衡，由此产生的压力导致战略理论和概念上出现更多妥协和调整。尽管欧洲战略地位已得到公认，但日本偷袭珍珠港以及遏制日军推进的必要性从一开始就动摇了“先打德”的战略。美国人接受了对日采取战略防御的原则，但却缺乏如何进行有限战争的理论。在德国战败之前，美国公众舆论也不会支持对日采取完全防御性的有限战争。随着美国军事资源迅速涌入太平洋，美国战略家们逐渐意识到，太平洋战区的各方力量，如同在地中海战区一样，会自行形成战略。日军在西太平洋早期推进后，集结在澳大利亚的地面和空军部队不能闲置。随着美国在太平洋的海军力量从珍珠港事件的灾难中恢复过来，美国海军战略家们力主执行“橙色计划”中期太平洋攻势的构想。与此同时，总统加强对华军事支持的决定进一步消耗了美国的军事资源。有限战争终究无法长久。珍珠港事件后的两年里，对日战争的需求几乎与对欧洲轴心国的战争需求不相上下。尽管奉行“先德后德”的原则，但直到1944年，美国的大部分军事力量才转向击败德国。
The war against Japan, predominantly an American affair, needs special attention in connection with its impact on coalition strategy. From the beginning the war against Japan threatened to overturn Anglo-American basic strategy and the pressures led to further compromises and adjustments in strategic theories and concepts. Despite the agreed primacy of Europe, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the need to stem the Japanese advance compromised the Germany-first concept from the outset. The Americans accepted the principle of fighting a strategically defensive war against Japan but had no doctrine on how to fight a limited war. Nor would American public opinion condone a completely defensive, limited war against Japan, pending the defeat of Germany. As U.S. military resources poured swiftly into the Pacific, American strategists learned that forces in that theater, as in the Mediterranean, had a way of generating their own strategy. Ground and air forces concentrated in Australia after the early advance of the Japanese through the Western Pacific could not be left idle. As American naval power in the Pacific recovered from the disaster at Pearl Harbor, American naval strategists pushed for the execution of the old Orange plan concept of a Central Pacific offensive. Meanwhile, the President's decision to bolster China led to a further drain on American military resources. The limited war would not stay limited. For two years after Pearl Harbor the requirements of the war against Japan almost equalled those of the war against the European axis. Despite the Germany-first principle, not until 1944 did the preponderance of American military strength shift to the task of defeating Germany.
尽管美国海军凭借其在太平洋地区的传统利益承担了制定该地区进攻战略的主要责任，但中太平洋的海军计划必须与道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟将军通过新几内亚-棉兰老岛轴线进攻日本的构想相协调。因此，双管齐下的战略取代了最初的单轴战略，这种战时临时调整导致了机会主义战略的出现，这与英国在欧洲战场上所倡导的战略颇为相似。日本是否仅靠炮击和封锁就能击败，还是必须入侵日本——这一关键问题，美国战前理论并未给出明确答案——一直争论不休，直到日本投降才使之成为学术问题。
While the U.S. Navy with its traditional interests in the Pacific carried the main burden in developing the offensive strategy for the area, naval plans for the Central Pacific had to be reconciled with General Douglas MacArthur's concept of advancing on Japan via the New Guinea-Mindanao axis. Thus, a two-pronged strategy replaced the original single-axis approach, and this wartime improvisation led to a strategy of opportunism, not unlike that urged by the British for the war in Europe. The critical question whether Japan could be defeated by bombardment and blockade alone or whether an invasion would be necessary, to which American prewar theory had not given a definitive answer, was debated until the Japanese surrender rendered the subject academic.
可以说，英美两国在二战中的成败，是其体制及其根深蒂固的战争与和平理念的产物。美国人在战争压力下建立的关系，赋予了军队强大的力量，使其能够取得罗斯福所期望的决定性胜利。这使得他们能够将两次世界大战之间发展起来的技术、战术和理论革命应用于二战这场大规模、高机动性的战争。美国在自身及其盟友之间制定的军事战略的灵活性一直被低估了。自第一次世界大战以来的四分之一世纪里，美国军事力量取得了长足的进步，这体现在美国的转变上：从第一次世界大战中依附欧洲盟国战略的次要角色，到在塑造欧洲战略中扮演重要角色，并在第二次世界大战中主导太平洋战争。
The successes and failures of British and American leadership in the Second World War, it may be argued, were a product of their systems and their ingrained approaches to war and peace. The relationship forged by the Americans under the stress of war empowered the military to secure the decisive victory Roosevelt wanted. It enabled them to apply the revolution in technology, tactics, and doctrine that had developed between the world wars to the war of mass and mobility that the Second World War turned out to be. American flexibility in terms of the military strategy they forged among themselves and with their allies has been underestimated. How far the American military had come in the quarter century since the First World War was reflected in the transformation of the United States from its role of junior partner in that war, fought in conformity with a strategy set by the European allies, to its large share in shaping European strategy and its preeminent role in directing the war in the Pacific in the Second World War.
美国战略在1941年至1945年间日臻成熟。他们带着一套融合了欧洲理论和美国经验与创新的战略框架进入战争。没有哪位美国战略大师挺身而出，号召美国宣布脱离欧洲教条，宣告独立。但美国人在与欧洲人共享的战略思想体系中强调的原则，与自身的传统和国家政策完全契合。他们始终倾向于快速、直接、全面的解决方案。秉承其民族传统，他们将战争视为一种反常现象，一种对正常秩序的干扰，必须尽快结束。随着美国力量以压倒性优势涌入战场，他们在盟军决策中赢得了信任，将美国模式和方法强加于全球战争和战略，迫使其联盟伙伴正视这一现实。实际上，这支来自新世界的新兴军事力量确立了其战略独立于旧世界的力量。
American strategies came of age between 1941 and 1945. They had entered the war with a strategic framework fashioned out of a patchwork of European theory and American experience and innovation. No American master strategist emerged to issue a call for an American declaration of independence from European doctrine. But the principles Americans chose to stress in the common body of strategic thought they shared with Europeans were entirely in harmony with their own traditions and national policies. Throughout they showed a preference for quick, direct, total solutions. In accord with their national tradition, they regarded war as an aberration, an interruption to normality to be concluded as swiftly as possible. As American power flowed into the field in overwhelming strength, they gained confidence in Allied councils, imposed an American style and approach on global war and strategy, and forced the partners in their coalition to reckon with them. In effect the rising military power from the New World asserted its strategic independence from the old.
归根结底，从西方视角来看，第二次世界大战似乎是一场道德运动与强大力量结合的巅峰之作，这场结合释放出的力量和预期，是其决策者和战略家自身都无法掌控的。棘手的政治和领土调整问题随之出现，而这些问题此前并无任何解决方案。总统政策的基本假设——苏联的合作、英国作为强国的存续以及中国在不久的将来崛起为大国——都受到了质疑。最终，美国领导层批准使用原子弹，而原子弹的计划是在常规战略渠道之外酝酿的，当时既没有发展出相关的军事理论或准则，也没有充分理解其在未来战争或国际关系中的地位。
In the final analysis, the Second World War may appear from the Western standpoint to have been the climax of the joining of a moral crusade with massive power that let loose forces and expectations that neither their policy makers nor their strategists could by themselves control. Thorny problems of political and territorial adjustments emerged for which no solutions had been foreseen. The basic assumptions of presidential policy—the cooperation of the Soviet Union, the survival of Britain as a strong power, and China's elevation as a great power in the near future—came into question. In the end American leadership sanctioned the use of the atomic bomb, planning for which had grown up outside regular strategic channels, before a military theory or doctrine for it had been developed or its place in the future of warfare or international relations had been fully comprehended.
二战结束后，美国崛起为全球强国，实力空前强大，但其领导人也比以往任何时候都更加意识到自身力量的局限性。即使在战争初期，他们也发现无法如愿以偿地发动大规模跨海峡进攻。他们也无法在亚洲大陆开展大规模作战的同时，在欧洲开辟第二战场。通过雅尔塔会议，他们请求苏联协助牵制驻扎在亚洲大陆的日军，然后再入侵日本本土。与美国规划者最初在1941年设想的215个陆军师相比，美国最终只动员了90个师，而且这些师最终全部部署到了海外。此外，尽管美国拥有强大的工业实力，但始终无法完全克服困扰盟军整个计划的运输和登陆艇短缺问题。
The United States emerged from the Second World War as a global power, stronger than ever, but with its leaders more conscious than ever of the limits of power. Even in waging the war they found that they could not launch a major cross-Channel attack as early as they wished. Nor could they support a large operation on the mainland of Asia along with establishing a second front in Europe. Through the Yalta Conference they called for Soviet help in pinning down Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland before an invasion of Japan. In contrast to the 215 Army divisions the American planners had originally projected in 1941, the United States was able to mobilize only ninety, all of which were deployed overseas at the end. Nor, despite its great industrial strength, could it completely overcome the shortages of shipping and landing craft that plagued Allied planning throughout.
第二次世界大战中的军事理论与实践，如同以往的许多战争一样，最终证明并不完全一致。尽管战前英美两国的空军爱好者大肆宣扬，但空军击败敌人的能力并未得到证实。另一方面，珍珠港事件后，航空母舰而非战列舰成为了舰队的女王。事态发展往往决定战略，反之亦然。西方盟军的战略是在一系列国际会议上通过妥协敲定的，而这些会议的特点是不断地调整目标和手段。
Military theory and practice in the Second World War, as in so many previous wars, turned out not to be in full accord. Despite the claims of prewar British and American air enthusiasts, the ability of air power to defeat enemies was not proved. On the other hand, after Pearl Harbor aircraft carriers, not battleships, proved to be queens of the fleet. Events almost as often determined strategy as the reverse. Western Allied strategy was hammered out in a series of compromises at the international conferences marked by a constant struggle to adjust ends and means.
在许多方面，第二次世界大战是一系列战争中的战争。事实上，可以说西方列强各自打着自己的战争，苏联也各自打着自己的战争；盟军从未有过统一的战略；英美战略和苏苏战略恰好相容；在军事层面上，他们的努力取得了成功，但他们的国家利益和政治目标实际上并不契合；而且，当1941年将盟军凝聚在一起的共同危险纽带开始松动时，大同盟在战争结束前就开始瓦解。
In many ways the Second World War was a series of wars within wars. Indeed, it may be argued that the Western powers fought their war and the Soviets theirs; that there never was an overall Allied strategy; that the two strategies—Anglo-American on the one hand, and Soviet on the other—just happened to be compatible; that on a military plane their efforts proved successful but their national interests and political objectives were not really meshed; and that the Grand Alliance began to break up before the war was over, when the common bond of danger that had brought the Allies together in 1941 began to loosen.
与苏联的谈判最终证明十分艰难。尽管战后美国对战时领导层饱受诟病，但即便在当时的条件下，任何不同的战略或政策是否能够更快地取得对德国的决定性胜利，并使西方在与苏联的博弈中占据更有利的地位，或者克服战时伙伴从一开始就存在的相互猜疑——这种猜疑至今仍然存在，并且还因第二次世界大战的创伤而更加根深蒂固——都令人怀疑。从苏联的角度来看，尽管盟军推迟了第二战场的开辟，但苏联却遭受了两千万人的伤亡。战争结束后，总统及其军事参谋人员面临着诸多困境；欧洲的政治问题日益严重，而无论是以胜利为目标的军事战略，还是总统推迟政治决策的政策，都无法提供解决之道。无论“无条件投降”作为战争口号和战争目标有何可取之处，它都未能成为一项良好的和平目标。它掩盖了盟国在国家目标和利益上的分歧，也未能为调和这些分歧提供任何基础。
To the end negotiations with the Soviets proved difficult. Despite the postwar criticism of American wartime leadership, it is doubtful whether, within the means available, any different strategy or policy would have produced a faster decisive victory over Germany and put the West in a fundamentally better position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, or would have surmounted the legacy of mutual suspicion that the wartime partners had inherited from the outset—a legacy that remains, with added scars from the Second World War. From the Soviet standpoint, while the Allies postponed the second front, the Russians suffered twenty million casualties. The war ended with dilemmas piling up for the President and his military staff; political problems in Europe mounted for which neither the military strategy of victory nor the President's policy of postponing political decisions provided answers. Whatever virtue unconditional surrender had as a war slogan and war aim, it did not prove to be a good peace aim. It cloaked the divergence in national objectives and interests of the Allies and offered no basis for reconciling them.
第二次世界大战并未揭示苏联政策的动机和意图，这些问题也一直困扰着战后西方领导层。罗斯福寄希望于利用战时伙伴关系，使苏联摆脱战前的孤立状态。他曾引用拉尔夫·沃尔多·爱默生的话说：“要想拥有朋友，唯一的办法就是先成为朋友。”<sup> 18</sup>但在战争后期，由于担心苏联在波兰问题上的顽固立场，他主张对苏联采取强硬态度——这与马歇尔将军在1945年1月敦促艾森豪威尔“以朴实无华的方式”对待苏联的做法有些类似。<sup> 19</sup>然而，罗斯福及其主要军事顾问从未提议将军事力量用于针对苏联的直接且具体的政治目的。
The Second World War shed no certain light on the motivations and intentions of Soviet policy, problems that have also troubled postwar Western leadership. Roosevelt staked much on using the wartime partnership to bring the Soviet Union out of its prewar isolation. “The only way to have a friend,” he once quoted Ralph Waldo Emerson, “is to be one.”18 But at the very end, wary of Russian intransigence over Poland, he advocated firmness in dealing with the Soviet Union—somewhat akin to General Marshall's urging in January 1945 that Eisenhower treat the Russians “in simple Main Street Abilene style.”19 At no point, however, did Roosevelt or his chief military advisors propose to use military power for direct and specific political purposes vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
1945年的事件表明，盟军有能力制定一项在军事上完全成功的战略。这项战略是多种因素的混合体——融合了美国的直接、英国的谨慎和苏联的直率。其共同目标是通过对欧洲大陆的强力压制击败德国。然而，随着盟军部队的集结日益紧密，德国战败已成定局，彼此间的政治分歧也愈发明显，维系联盟的纽带开始瓦解。东西方盟军共同的目标是击败德国，而他们也成功实现了这一目标。1945年5月8日，德国投降。但在西方看来，德国仅仅获得了一半的解放，波兰和东欧仍然处于苏联独裁者的掌控之下。战时的并肩作战精神逐渐消退，取而代之的是新的权力竞争，而真正的和平仍待实现。
The events of 1945 demonstrated the capacity of the Allies to forge a strategy that was completely successful in a military sense. That strategy was a hybrid product—a composite of American directness, British caution, and Soviet bluntness. It found its common denominator in the defeat of Germany by a giant nutcracker squeeze on the Continent. But as the forces of the coalition partners came closer and the defeat of Germany more certain, their political differences became more apparent and the cement that had held them together crumbled. What the Western and Eastern partners had set out to do in common was to defeat Germany and this goal they had successfully accomplished. By May 8, 1945, Germany surrendered. But in the eyes of the West, Germany was only half liberated and Poland and eastern Europe were already in the Soviet dictator's grip. Out of the wartime comradeship-in-arms a new rivalry for power was to emerge, with a firm peace still to be won.
最终，可以说战争的进程超越了战略家和政治家的预期。从随后的岁月来看，第二次世界大战显然标志着国际力量平衡的根本性转变，而旨在取得胜利的联盟战略并未提供任何真正或宏大的解决方案。全面战争既没有带来全面和平，也没有带来全面国家安全。归根结底，第二次世界大战可以被视为第一次世界大战未竟之业的一部分，而1945年后的动荡时期则是战争未竟之业的延续——对和平与安全的追求，是军事胜利未能实现的。第二次世界大战是全面战争，但并未彻底结束。
In the end, it may be argued, the war outran the strategists and the statesmen. In the perspective of the intervening years, it is apparent that the Second World War represented a fundamental shift in the international balance of power, for which a coalition strategy fashioned for victory provided no real or grand solutions. Total war brought neither total peace nor total national security. In the final analysis, the Second World War may be viewed as part of the unfinished business of the first and the uneasy era after 1945 a carryover of the unfinished business of the war—a quest for the peace and security that had eluded military victory. The Second World War was total but incomplete.
1本文在很大程度上是作者对二战盟军战略的研究和写作的成果，这些研究和写作体现在《1941-1942 年联合战争战略规划》（与 Edwin M. Snell 合著，华盛顿特区，1953 年）和《1943-1944 年联合战争战略规划》（华盛顿特区，1959 年）中，这两部著作是美国陆军二战系列丛书中的官方卷册，以及脚注和参考书目中列出的各种已发表的论文和文章中。
1 This essay is in large measure an outgrowth of the author's research and writing on Allied strategy in World War II incorporated in Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, with Edwin M. Snell (Washington, D.C., 1953), and Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944 (Washington, D.C., 1959), volumes in the official U.S. Army in World War II series, and in various published essays and articles indicated in the footnotes and the bibliographical note.
2温斯顿·S·丘吉尔，《第二次世界大战：合围》（波士顿，1951 年），第 426 页。
2 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring (Boston, 1951), 426.
3 JFC Fuller，《第二次世界大战，1939-1945》（纽约，1949 年），第 250、266、385 页。
3 J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War, 1939–1945 (New York, 1949), 250, 266, 385.
4切斯特·威尔莫特，《欧洲之争》（纽约，1952 年），尤其是第 11、12、109、128、138、338、448 页。有关威尔莫特论点的分析，请参阅莫里斯·马特洛夫的《重访威尔莫特：英美第二战场战略中的神话与现实》，该文由艾森豪威尔基金会发表在《D 日：诺曼底登陆回顾》 （堪萨斯州劳伦斯，1971 年）一书中。
4 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York, 1952), esp. pp. 11, 12, 109, 128, 138, 338, 448. For an analysis of Wilmot's thesis see Maurice Matloff, “Wilmot Revisited: Myth and Reality in Anglo-American Strategy for the Second Front,” an essay published by the Eisenhower Foundation in D-Day: The Normandy Invasion in Retrospect (Lawrence, Kans., 1971).
5 1949 年 7 月 25 日，西德尼·马修斯博士、罗伊·拉姆森少校和大卫·汉密尔顿少校与马歇尔将军的访谈，军事历史档案办公室主任的记录，引自马特洛夫，《联盟战争战略规划，1943-1944》，第 5 页。
5 Interview, Dr. Sidney Mathews, Major Roy Lamson, and Major David Hamilton with General Marshall, 25 July 1949, Office Chief of Military History Files, quoted in Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, 5.
6要了解二战期间莫斯科对苏联关系的第一手资料，请参阅约翰·R·迪恩的《奇怪的联盟》（纽约，1947 年）。
6 For a first-hand account of relations with the Soviet Union in World War II as seen from Moscow, consult John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York, 1947).
7有关 ABC 会议的记载，请参阅 Mark S. Watson 的《参谋长：战前计划和准备》（华盛顿特区，1950 年），第 12 章；Matloff 和 Snell 的《联盟战争战略规划，1941-1942 年》，第 3 章；以及 Louis Morton 的《“德国优先：二战盟军战略的基本概念”，载于Kent R. Greenfield 编辑的《指挥决策》（华盛顿特区，1960 年）。
7 For accounts of the ABC Conference see Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C., 1950), ch. 12; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, ch. 3; and Louis Morton, “Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II” in Command Decisions, ed. Kent R. Greenfield (Washington, D.C., 1960).
8马特洛夫和斯内尔在《1941-1942 年联合战争战略规划》第 5 章中详细讨论了阿卡迪亚会议
8 The Arcadia Conference is discussed at length in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, ch. 5.
9有关斯塔克海军上将的“狗计划”备忘录的讨论，请参见同上，第 25-28 页；沃森，《参谋长：战前计划和准备》，第 4 章；以及塞缪尔·E·莫里森，《大西洋之战，1939 年 9 月至1943 年 5 月》（波士顿，1947 年），第 171-172 页。
9 For a discussion of Admiral Stark's Plan Dog Memorandum, see ibid., 25–28; Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, ch. 4; and Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (Boston, 1947), 171–72.
10引自 Matloff 和 Snell，《联盟战争战略规划，1941-1942》，第 61 页。
10 Quoted in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, 61.
11有关丘吉尔在 1943 年对巴尔干半岛的立场的官方英国系列研究，请参阅约翰·埃尔曼的《大战略》第 5 卷，1943 年 8 月至 1944 年 9 月（伦敦，1956 年），第 112-113 页和附录，第 554-556 页。
11 For an examination in the official British series of Churchill's position on the Balkans in 1943, see John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. 5, August 1943-September 1944 (London, 1956), 112–13 and appendix, 554–56.
12 Gordon A. Harrison，“霸王行动”，1951 年 11 月在陆军战争学院发表的演讲稿，军事历史档案主任办公室，引自 Matloff，“铁砧决策：战略的十字路口”，载于Greenfield 编辑的《指挥决策》。
12 Gordon A. Harrison, “Operation Overlord,” transcript of an address delivered at the Army War College, November 1951, Office Chief of Military History Files, quoted in Matloff, “The Anvil Decision: Crossroads of Strategy,” in Command Decisions, ed. Greenfield.
13莫里斯·马特洛夫在《指挥决策》一书中发表了题为《90师的赌博》的文章，对这一主题进行了阐述。
13 This theme is developed in an essay by Maurice Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” in Command Decisions, ed. Greenfield.
14福雷斯特·C·波格，《最高指挥部》（华盛顿特区，1954 年）第 23、24 章；福雷斯特·C·波格，《在易北河停止前进的决定》 ，载于格林菲尔德编，《指挥决策》 ；以及丘吉尔，《胜利与悲剧》（波士顿，1953 年）第 8、11 章。
14 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, D.C., 1954) chs. 23, 24; Forrest C. Pogue, “The Decision to Halt at the Elbe” in Command Decisions, ed. Greenfield; and Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston, 1953), chs. 8, 11.
15有关马歇尔将军对柏林和布拉格的立场，请参阅 Matloff 的《联盟战争战略规划，1943-1944》，第 534 页。
15 For General Marshall's position on Berlin and Prague, see Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, 534.
16丘吉尔，《胜利与悲剧》，455。
16 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 455.
17 Michael Howard，《第二次世界大战中的地中海战略》（纽约，1968 年），第 69-70 页。
17 Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (New York, 1968), 69–70.
18 Samuel I. Rosenman 编，《富兰克林·罗斯福的公共文件和演讲集》，1944-1945 年卷（纽约，1950 年），第 524 页。
18 Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944–1945 volume (New York, 1950), 524.
19有关马歇尔将军的建议，请参阅马歇尔致艾森豪威尔的信，1945 年 1 月 17 日，艾森豪威尔个人档案，引自波格，《最高指挥部》，第 407 页。
19 For Gen. Marshall's recommendation see Marshall to Eisenhower, January 17, 1945, Eisenhower personal file, quoted in Pogue, Supreme Command, 407.
24. 美国和日本在太平洋战争中的战略
24. American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War
T中国作为亚洲强国的衰落与复兴，是20世纪上半叶美日两国竞争乃至最终爆发武装冲突的核心因素。1941年，美日两国开战，是因为两国的国家战略已无法调和，尤其是在对华政策方面。在二战前后，两国都对中国抱有不切实际的幻想，并制定了不切实际的对华政策。日本奉行大陆军事战略，将其大部分作战力量投入中国；而美国则强调对日海上战略，优先考虑中太平洋战区，这两种战略共同塑造了远东战争的进程。战后，美日两国对共产主义在亚洲，尤其是在中国的扩张的共同担忧，对两国的和解至关重要。
THE DEMISE and rebirth of China as an Asian power were central to the rivalry and eventual armed conflict between America and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century. America and Japan went to war in 1941 because their national strategies had become irreconcilable, particularly regarding China. Both nourished illusions about China and developed unrealistic policies toward it before and during the Second World War. Japan's pursuit of a continental military strategy, with much of its combat power channeled to China, and America's emphasis on a maritime strategy against Japan, with priority given to Central Pacific operations, shaped the course of the Far Eastern war. Important to the postwar reconciliation of America and Japan was their common concern over the advance of communism in Asia, especially in China.
1941年至1945年的战争对交战双方以往的战略思维提出了挑战，迫使双方根据新的、不可预见的形势调整优先事项和计划。因此，本文不仅会考察日本和美国在战争时期的国家战略和军事战略，还会将其置于此前四十年的背景下进行分析。我们的讨论将区分国家战略和军事战略。前者指的是运用一切必要资源——包括政治、外交、军事、技术、经济、宣传等——来实现国家政策目标。而军事战略则指的是运用武装力量，以武力或武力威胁来确保国家政策目标的实现。
The war of 1941–1945 posed challenges to earlier strategic thinking on both sides, requiring each to adapt priorities and plans to new, unforeseen situations. Thus the national and military strategies of Japan and America will be considered not only for the war years but also in the context of the preceding four decades. Our discussion will distinguish between national and military strategy. By the former we mean the utilization of all necessary resources—political, diplomatic, military, technological, economic, propagandistic, and others—in achieving the objectives of national policy. By military strategy we refer to the employment of armed services to secure the ends of national policy by force or the threat of force.
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十九世纪末，日本民族主义和现代化进程中错综复杂的因素交织在一起，形成了对西方在亚洲利益构成首次强大挑战的局面。伴随着令人瞩目的工业和军事发展，日本走上了帝国扩张之路。在19世纪70年代夺取琉球群岛和千岛群岛之后，日本于1894年至1915年间重拾扩张主义，并取得了一系列胜利：在接连不断的战争中彻底击败中国和俄国，夺取了台湾、澎湖列岛、朝鲜以及满洲和库页岛的部分地区；与英国缔结了防御联盟；占领了德国在中国和中太平洋的殖民地；并在中国经济上取得了突破性进展，几乎将这个饱受革命蹂躏的国家变成了日本的保护国。第一次世界大战后，日本似乎注定要与西方殖民列强发生冲突，尤其是在凡尔赛会议拒绝将日本提出的种族平等宣言纳入《国际联盟盟约》之后，这不仅是对日本民族自尊心的侮辱，而且由于美国移民法将日本人排除在外，这种侮辱更是加剧了日本的民族自尊心。
The complex elements underlying Japanese nationalism and modernization in the late nineteenth century combined to produce the first powerful Asian challenge to Western interests in that region. Concomitant with its impressive industrial and military growth, Japan set out on the path to empire. After obtaining the Ryukyus and the Kuriles in the 1870s, it resumed expansionism with vigor in 1894–1915: soundly defeated China and Russia in successive wars, acquiring Formosa, the Pescadores, Korea, and portions of Manchuria and Sakhalin; negotiated a defensive alliance with Great Britain; seized Germany's colonies in China and the Central Pacific; and carved economic inroads into China, nearly making that revolution-torn land a Japanese protectorate. In the wake of the First World War, Japan appeared set on a collision course with Western colonial powers, especially after the Versailles Conference's refusal to include a Japanese-sponsored declaration on racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant, an insult to national pride exacerbated by the American immigration law excluding Japanese.
但出人意料的是，日本在20世纪20年代放弃了与西方的对抗，并为威尔逊国际和谐理念的实践做出了贡献。日本成为国际联盟理事会中唯一的非西方成员国，其法官在世界法院中表现出色，其在国际联盟各委员会和机构中的代表在改善东西方文化关系、促进自由国际贸易政策等问题上普遍持进步立场。日本的经济外交日益遵循与主要工业化国家在经济相互依存、一体化和互惠互利框架下开展合作的原则。日本摒弃了侵略扩张主义，将原德国殖民地山东归还中国；从苏联远东地区撤军；加入华盛顿会议条约的签署国行列，这些条约规定削减海军规模、尊重中国的政治完整，并通过外交手段解决太平洋列强之间的分歧；并成为《凯洛格-白里安条约》的缔约国，该条约旨在放弃战争。 20世纪20年代的日本国内事务呈现出自由民主的趋势，政党、工会运动兴起，选民群体大幅扩大，而军国主义和极端民族主义势力则似乎处于休眠状态。无论在对外还是对内，日本似乎都在朝着西方，特别是英美关于如何确保和平、实现国内稳定和繁荣发展的理念迈进。
But surprisingly, Japan retreated from confrontations with the West in the 1920s, and contributed to putting Wilsonian ideals of international harmony into practice. It became the only non-Western member of the League of Nations Council, Japanese judges served with distinction on the World Court, and its representatives on League committees and agencies were generally progressive in such matters as improving East-West cultural relations and promoting free international trade policies. Japanese economic diplomacy was governed increasingly by the principle of cooperation with the other major industrial nations in a framework of economic interdependence, integration, and mutual trade benefits. Turning away from aggressive expansionism, Japan returned the former German colony in Shantung to China; withdrew its troops from the Soviet Union's Far Eastern territory; joined the signatories of the Washington Conference treaties that provided for naval reductions, respect for China's political integrity, and settlement of differences between the Pacific powers by diplomacy; and became a party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact on the renunciation of war. Japanese domestic affairs in the 1920s were characterized by liberal, democratic trends, with the rise of political parties, trade unionism, and a much-broadened electorate, while militaristic, ultra-nationalistic interests appeared dormant. Externally and internally, Japan seemed to be moving in line with Western, especially Anglo-American, ideas of how to secure peace, attain domestic stability, and prosper.1
1929-1930年爆发的大萧条迅速席卷全球资本主义经济体，带来了重大变革。日本饱受内部经济困境、至关重要的对外贸易瘫痪以及20世纪20年代兴起的自由派和温和派政治力量缺乏强有力领导的双重打击。在国际合作尝试失败后，西方工业化国家转而各自为政，应对这场萧条。美国作为当时世界首屈一指的资本主义强国，也是与日本贸易和外交关系最为密切的西方国家，率先采取了孤立主义经济政策，损害了其贸易伙伴的利益。极端民族主义者再次利用这场经济危机抬头，日本由此陷入了反对与西方合作、转而寻求大陆扩张这一旧有“灵丹妙药”的新时代。而引领这场新侵略浪潮的正是军队。它无视东京的文职当局，挑起与中国在满洲的冲突，然后在 1932 年占领了该地区。
The onset of the Great Depression in 1929–1930, which soon struck capitalist economies all around the globe, brought a major change. Japan was beset by internal economic distress, by paralysis of its vital foreign trade, and by want of strong leadership among the liberal and moderate political elements that had emerged in the 1920s. After some futile efforts at international cooperation, the Western industrial nations turned to separate devices in coping with the depression. The United States, the world's foremost capitalist power and the Western country with whom Japan by then had its closest trade and diplomatic ties, led the way in adopting isolationist economic policies that worked to the detriment of its trading partners. Extreme nationalists again rose to the fore by exploiting the economic crisis, and Japan plunged into a new era of reaction against cooperation with the West and in favor of the old panacea of continental expansion. Spearheading the new aggressiveness was the army. Defying civilian authorities in Tokyo, it provoked a clash with China over Manchuria and then conquered the territory in 1932.
五年后，由军队主导的政府将国家拖入了一场决定命运的战争，目标是征服中国，这是迄今为止日本最大的战利品。日本领导人重拾并重新包装了之前的理由，声称控制中国对于维持日本疲弱的经济至关重要，它能提供原材料和市场，安置日本不断增长的人口，抵御苏联可能对中国发动的武装入侵，并有机会传播优越的日本文化和价值观。此外，在这场征服全中国的伟大行动中，日本人民将重拾民族团结和自豪感，从而消除经济大萧条造成的普遍不满。战争带来的行政集中化也确实有助于新政治领导人巩固权力，而工业精英则能从战争生产中攫取巨额利润——这两个目标都未公开。然而，所有这些目标都取决于能否在中国取得相对迅速的胜利。
Five years later the government, now dominated by the army, led the nation into a fateful war for the greatest prize yet—the conquest of China. Reviving and revamping earlier justifications, the Japanese leaders maintained that control of China was essential to provide raw materials and markets for the ailing Japanese economy, resettlement areas for Japan's burgeoning population, security against potential Soviet armed incursion in China, and opportunities for propagating the superior Japanese culture and values. Moreover, in this great effort to take all of China, the Japanese people would experience a resurgence of national unity and pride that would eradicate the widespread discontent bred by the depression. It was also true that administrative centralization made necessary by the war would enable the new political leaders to solidify their power, while the industrial elite would reap enormous profits from war production—two aims discreetly not publicized. All these gains depended, however, on a relatively quick triumph in China.
日军很快占领了中国北部和沿海地区，包括主要的人口和经济中心，但预期的中国抵抗崩溃并未发生。日本人被中国国民党、共产党和军阀势力之间长期而艰苦的斗争所蒙蔽，大大低估了中国人民的抵抗意志以及分裂的政治团体组织有效（尽管各自为政）的动员和防御的能力。到1938年末，日本发现自己陷入了一场消耗战，军事人力物力消耗惊人，而且看不到任何胜算。南京的傀儡政权在争取中国民众支持日本方面收效甚微，东京试图按照自己的条件与中国国民党和共产党政权谈判和平的努力也以失败告终。
Japanese armies soon captured the northern and coastal regions of China, including the principal population and economic centers, but the anticipated collapse of Chinese resistance did not occur. Deceived by the long, bitter struggles between the Chinese Nationalist, Communist, and warlord factions, the Japanese had greatly underestimated the Chinese people's will to resist and the ability of divided political groups to mount effective, if separate, mobilization and defense efforts. By late 1938, Japan found itself locked into a war of attrition with an alarmingly heavy drain on its military manpower and matériel and no decision in sight. A puppet regime in Nanking proved of little use in winning converts to Japan's cause among the Chinese, and Tokyo's attempts to negotiate peace on its own terms with the Chinese Nationalist and Communist regimes were unsuccessful.2
随着中国战事陷入僵局，日本战争后勤需求逼近临界点，东京开始筹划控制东南亚丰富的石油、橡胶、铝土矿、锡矿及其他战略物资和粮食资源。日本政府向朝鲜、满洲和中国发出呼吁，要求建立泛亚洲团结，反对西方干涉，并建立一体化的区域经济。日本政府宣称致力于构建一个涵盖东南亚的大东亚共荣圈。1939年初，日本首次进军南海，占领了海南岛和南沙群岛。次年夏天法国沦陷后，日军开始在法属印度支那北部建立基地，为未来可能向南推进的军事行动做准备。日本与东印度群岛的荷兰当局以及美国政府就获取维持中国战事所需的战略物资进行的谈判均以失败告终。为了在征服东南亚的过程中争取盟友并保护其侧翼（东京认为征服东南亚是不可避免的，但也极有可能引发与英国和美国的战争），日本于1940年9月加入了德国和意大利组成的轴心国条约，并在次年春天与苏联缔结了中立条约。1941年年中，日军占领了法属印度支那南部地区，同年12月，日军发动了夺取东京所谓的“南方资源区”的主要作战行动。为了重振其在中国的战争力量并决定这场冲突的走向，日本孤注一掷地与英美列强对抗。
As the logistical needs of the Japanese war effort neared critical levels with the stalemate in China, Tokyo began laying plans to gain control of the vast resources of Southeast Asia in oil, rubber, bauxite, tin, and other strategic materials and foodstuffs. Extending its appeal for pan-Asian unity against Western intervention and for an integrated regional economy to the Koreans, Manchurians, and Chinese, the Japanese government now proclaimed its commitment to creating a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was to encompass Southeast Asia. In early 1939, Japan made its first moves into the South China Sea, seizing Hainan and the Spratly Islands. With the fall of France the next summer, Japanese forces began establishing bases in northern French Indochina for possible future operations to the south. Japanese negotiations with Dutch authorities in the East Indies and with the American government to obtain the strategic materials needed to sustain operations in China were unavailing. To gain allies and protect its flanks during the conquest of Southeast Asia, which Tokyo saw as inevitably necessary but also likely to provoke war with both Britain and America, Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Axis Pact in September 1940 and concluded a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union the next spring. Japanese troops occupied the southern portion of French Indochina in mid-1941, and that December the main operations to take what Tokyo called the Southern Resources Area were launched. In trying to refurbish its war effort in China and decide that conflict, Japan risked all by taking on the Anglo-American powers.3
自19世纪80年代以来，日本军事战略不断演变，陆海军的优先事项和计划都围绕着大陆扩张这一国家政策的核心目标展开，20世纪20年代除外。尽管日本在地理位置上与英国相似，都位于传统上敌对的大陆国家附近，但自1868年明治维新以来，日本领导人设想的并非成为领先的海上强国，而是成为东亚大陆霸主。他们将陆军视为实现大陆霸权的主要工具。海军则负责运输、补给、支援和保护陆军，并保障其主要作战基地——本土的安全。尽管在世纪之交与中国和俄国的战争中，日本海军取得了一些海战胜利，尤其是在对马海峡击败俄国波罗的海舰队，但直到1941年，日本海军战略家们仍然将海军定位为服务于陆战的辅助力量。远离本土水域的大规模进攻性舰队行动并未得到充分研究。由于舰队的主要任务是支援地面部队，因此，在可以避免的情况下，日本并没有计划让舰艇冒险卷入大规模海战。两次世界大战期间，日本海军的设计总体上体现了当时对速度和射速的重视，而非装甲防护。在此期间，日本海军在水下和舰载航空的发展方面取得了领先地位，但潜艇和航空母舰仍然主要被视为陆军作战的支援武器，而非强大的进攻性火力武器。
In the evolution of Japanese military strategy since the 1880s, the army and navy had developed priorities and plans consonant with the objective of continental expansion that was implicit in national policy except during the 1920s. Although Japan bore a geopolitical similarity to Britain in its insular position near traditionally hostile continental nations, Japanese leaders from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 onward had envisioned their nation not as a leading maritime state but rather as the dominant continental power of East Asia. They saw the army as the primary instrument to achieve continental hegemony. The navy was to transport, supply, support, and protect the army and to provide security for its principal base of operations, the home islands. Although the navy won several victories at sea during the wars with China and Russia near the turn of the century, notably over the Russian Baltic Fleet at Tsushima Strait, Japanese naval strategists until 1941 planned in terms of the fleet's subordinate service role to ground operations. Large-scale offensive fleet actions far from home waters were not much studied. Since the fleet's primary mission was to assist the ground forces, there were no plans to risk the ships in major naval confrontations when that was avoidable. Japanese naval design between the world wars generally reflected the prevailing emphasis on speed and rapidity of fire rather than on armor. During this period the Japanese navy became a leader in undersea and naval air developments, but the submarine and the aircraft carrier were still viewed basically as supportive weapons for army actions, not as potent devices of offensive firepower.
山本五十六海军大将的偷袭珍珠港计划并非海军传统角色的偏离，因为这次袭击是一次风险最小的游击战，攻击部队随后立即被调往支援东南亚的地面作战。1941年，日本的战争计划不仅包括占领南方资源区，还包括在其东侧太平洋岛屿建立防御圈。人们或许会认为，在珍珠港事件的打击之后，美国海军恢复过来并试图切断日本通往南方的交通线时，日本海军领导人会预料到会发生类似马哈尼式的舰队交战。但日本人估计，美国需要一年或更长时间才能完成经济动员，而当新的舰艇增援部队被派往美国太平洋舰队时，日本在西太平洋的防御圈将足够强大，足以阻止或击退任何渗透企图。
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's plan to attack Pearl Harbor did not mark an aberration from the navy's traditional role, for the raid was to be a minimum-risk, hit-and-run mission with the attacking units immediately assigned thereafter to supporting ground operations in Southeast Asia. Japanese war plans in 1941 called for not only the capture of the Southern Resources Area but also the establishment of a defense perimeter through the Pacific islands on its eastern flank. One might have expected that Japanese naval leaders would anticipate Mahanian-style fleet engagements after the American navy recovered from the blow of Pearl Harbor and tried to interdict Japan's lines of communication to the south. But the Japanese calculated that a year or more would be needed for full American economic mobilization and that by the time new ship reinforcements were sent to the United States Pacific Fleet, the Japanese defense perimeter in the West Pacific would be strong enough to deter or repel any attempts at penetration.4
尽管日本在珍珠港事件后的六个月里取得了辉煌的战术胜利，但其早期的战略失误远不止是严重低估了美国的工业动员能力。首先，如果日本绕过菲律宾——菲律宾本身经济资源匮乏，日本也无须臆断——它完全有可能在不激怒美国的情况下夺取南方资源区。此外，尽管日本的长期计划是在确保东南亚安全后与西方对手进行谈判解决，但珍珠港事件的背信弃义行径激起了美国民众的强烈愤慨，不仅使后续谈判陷入僵局，英国领导人也担心国内的民意和政治压力会迫使美国政府放弃对德战争这一战略优先事项。而且，日本的意图仅仅是打一场争夺东南亚的有限战争，东京方面也没有制定任何替代方案；一旦计划失败，日本根本无力对西方发动全面战争。到1941年末，日本的战略从征服中国转向夺取南方资源区，最终走向与美国及其盟国开战。造成这种困境的原因，正如1941年日本驻美大使野村吉三郎海军大将后来所称的“日本的主要毒瘤”，即军队脱离文官控制。到日本对西方开战时，其军事战略虽然占据主导地位，但却与其国家战略相悖。
Although Japan won spectacular tactical victories for six months after Pearl Harbor, its early strategic blunders amounted to more than badly miscalculating America's capability to mobilize its industry. In the first place, Japan might well have gained the Southern Resources Area without provoking America into war if it had bypassed the Philippines, which had few economic resources Japan needed anyway. Moreover, although the long-range Japanese plan provided for a negotiated settlement with the Western adversaries after Southeast Asia was secured, the treacherous nature of the opening move at Pearl Harbor so inflamed the American public that not only were later negotiations made impossible but British leaders feared that popular and political pressures at home might compel the United States government to abandon its commitment to the strategic priority of the war against Germany. Also, the Japanese intention was to fight only a limited war for Southeast Asia and Tokyo had prepared no alternative strategy; the nation lacked the resources to wage total war against the West if the plan went awry. By late 1941, Japanese strategy shifted from conquering China to seizing the Southern Resources Area and finally to engaging in combat the United States and its allies. This predicament was occasioned by what Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, ambassador to the United States in 1941, later called “the principal cancer of Japan,” namely, the independence of the military from civilian control. By the time Japan went to war against the West, its military strategy dominated but contradicted its national strategy.5
二
II
十九世纪末，日本崛起为现代强国，美国也成为太平洋地区最新的帝国主义竞争者。到1898年，美国国旗已飘扬在太平洋北端的阿拉斯加和阿留申群岛，以及关岛、威克岛、中途岛、夏威夷群岛，以及从夏威夷延伸至萨摩亚的众多中南太平洋小岛上。然而，正是菲律宾的沦陷，才使美国的领土和安全利益与日本帝国主义的势力范围拉开差距。美国政府拒绝在菲律宾群岛驻扎足够的防御力量，在1905年至1917年间，被迫通过一系列双边协议，对日本在北美大陆的扩张行径表示默许。作为交换，日本承诺尊重美国在菲律宾的立场。实际上，菲律宾沦为日本的“人质”，以此换取美国对日本扩张主义的默许。
The end of the nineteenth century marked both the emergence of Japan as a modern power and of America as the newest imperialist contender in the Pacific. By 1898 the American flag flew over Alaska and the Aleutians at the northern end of the Pacific and over Guam, Wake, Midway, the Hawaiian Islands, and a number of small islands extending from Hawaii to Samoa in the Central and South Pacific. But it was the acquisition of the Philippines that brought American territorial and security interests to the periphery of Japanese imperialism. Refusing to station adequate defensive forces in the archipelago, the American government reluctantly acceded to Japanese expansionist moves on the continent in several bilateral agreements of the 1905–1917 period that, in return, provided Japanese pledges to respect the American position in the Philippines. In effect, the Philippines became a virtual hostage of Japan to gain American acquiescence to Japanese expansionism.
美日外交关系的主要摩擦点在于门户开放政策，该政策由国务卿约翰·海于世纪之交首次提出。在随后的四十年里，其核心原则构成了美国远东政策的基石：维护中国的独立、主权、领土完整和行政完整；以及为所有与中国开展经贸关系的国家提供平等机会。华盛顿首次向东京发出强烈的外交抗议，源于日本在1915年企图将中国沦为保护国。门户开放政策在1922年的《九国同盟条约》中得到了多边认可，但美国仍然是西方维护中国领土完整的主要国家。尽管如此，直到1939年，美国对日本侵略中国的行动所采取的回应仅限于外交压力和道义劝说，而非军事或经济制裁。日本入侵满洲后，美国率先拒绝承认日本对该领土的占领。随后日本开始侵略中国，1939年至1941年间，美国对中国的援助形式包括贷款、救济、租借物资以及派遣美国志愿战斗机飞行员。美国还废除了与日本的贸易条约，并针对日本在中国的持续侵略及其在印度支那的扩张，逐步对日本实施了石油、钢铁和其他战略物资的禁运。1941年，华盛顿和东京之间的外交谈判因中国问题这一根本性问题而屡次破裂。国务卿科德尔·赫尔坚持要求所有日本军队撤出中国，以此作为进一步解决美日分歧的先决条件，他对此毫不妥协。
The main irritant in American-Japanese diplomatic relations was the Open Door policy, first enunciated by Secretary of State John Hay at the turn of the century. For the ensuing four decades its key principles constituted the linchpin of the Far Eastern policy of the United States: preservation of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial and administrative integrity of China; and establishment of equal opportunity for all nations engaged in commercial and industrial relations with China. The first strong diplomatic protest sent by Washington to Tokyo resulted from Japan's attempt in 1915 to reduce China to a protectorate. The Open Door policy received multilateral endorsement in the Nine-Power Pact of 1922, but America continued to be the principal Western nation concerned with guarding China's integrity, although diplomatic pressure and moral suasion, rather than military or economic sanctions, were the only responses of the United States to Japanese moves against China until 1939. Upon Japan's invasion of Manchuria, America took the lead in refusing to recognize the seizure of that territory. When Japan subsequently undertook the conquest of China, American assistance to China by 1939–1941 was in the form of loans, relief aid, lend-lease supplies, and volunteer American combat aviators. The United States also abrogated its trade treaty with Japan and, in response both to Japan's continuing aggression in China and its moves into Indochina, inaugurated a graduated series of embargoes on oil, iron, steel, and other strategic exports to Japan. The diplomatic negotiations between Washington and Tokyo in 1941 repeatedly broke down over the fundamental issue of China. Secretary of State Cordell Hull would not compromise on the withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China as a prerequisite to the further resolution of American-Japanese differences.
1941年以前，美国在远东的国家战略有四大基本目标：为菲律宾独立做好准备；保持中国市场对美国商人开放；维持东南亚原材料的供应，确保美国工业所需原材料的流通；以及通过非武力手段遏制日本在这些地区的扩张。尽管菲律宾的行政管理比亚洲其他殖民政权更为进步，但自1935年获得自治领地位以来，该群岛严重缺乏政治稳定、经济自给自足和足够的防御能力。美国对中国市场的执着与现实脱节，因为美中贸易额微乎其微，而美国与亚洲唯一发达资本主义国家——日本——之间的进出口贸易却稳步增长。如同自18世纪70年代以来美国人对与法国人民友好关系的错觉一样，美国人也错误地认为与中国有着特殊的友谊——这种奇怪的观念既缺乏实证支持，也渗透到了华盛顿的官方体系中。 1939年至1941年间，罗斯福总统开始抱有另一种幻想，而这种幻想将极大地影响其政策：他认为在亲美的蒋介石领导下，中国正在重回强国地位。在东南亚，土著民族主义者将美国等同于他们的欧洲殖民统治者，因为为了保住对该地区资源的获取权，美国继续默许殖民者对自然财富和土著人民的剥削。20世纪30年代，美国倾向于单方面应对日本的侵略行径，而非采取集体行动，并依赖道德外交，这种做法显得越来越无效。直到炸弹开始落在瓦胡岛和吕宋岛的美国基地，罗斯福及其顾问们才确信美国公众是否会支持以武力阻止日本的侵略。
The four basic aims of America's pre-1941 national strategy in the Far East were to prepare the Philippines for independence, to keep the China market open to American traders, to maintain the flow of raw materials from Southeast Asia important to American industry, and by means short of force to deter Japanese expansion in those areas. Although the administration of the Philippines had been more progressive than other colonial regimes in Asia, the archipelago sorely lacked political stability, economic self-sufficiency, and adequate defenses after gaining commonwealth status in 1935. The American obsession with the China market was at odds with reality, for the trade between the two countries was negligible, while export-import business between the United States and Asia's one developed capitalist nation, Japan, had grown steadily. Like the illusion of amity with the French people since the 1770s, Americans cultivated a misperception of special friendship with the Chinese nation—a strange idea that was not buttressed by empirical evidence but pervaded official Washington, too. During 1939–1941, President Roosevelt began entertaining another illusion which would greatly affect policy: that China was en route to big-power status again under the pro-American leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. In Southeast Asia native nationalists identified America with their European colonial overlords because, in order to preserve its access to the region's resources, the United States continued to acquiesce in the colonial exploitation of the natural wealth and native peoples. America's tendency to respond to aggressive moves by Japan unilaterally rather than through collective action and to rely upon moralistic diplomacy appeared increasingly ineffective in the 1930s. Until bombs began falling on American bases on Oahu and Luzon, Roosevelt and his advisors were uncertain whether the American public would support an armed commitment to stop Japanese aggression.6
1941年以前的美国军事战略形成于20世纪20年代初。当时，华盛顿陆军部和海军部的战争计划部门开始修订1914年以前的“颜色系列”战争计划。这些计划涵盖了一些假想情景，每种颜色都是对应战略计划的代号，例如，红色代表英国，绿色代表墨西哥，黑色代表德国，橙色代表日本。这些计划范围有限，对后勤方面着墨不多，也没有考虑到联盟或全面战争/全球战争的情况。它们对当时或未来的国际格局判断不切实际；其中，被认为最有可能被采用的“橙色战争计划”仅仅设想了美国和日本之间的冲突。
America's pre-1941 military strategy developed in the early 1920s, when the war plans divisions of the War and Navy departments in Washington began revising the Color series of pre-1914 war plans covering certain hypothetical scenarios, in which a color was the code name for the strategic plan to be used if America were attacked by a particular nation, for example, red for Britain, green for Mexico, black for Germany, and orange for Japan. The plans were limited in scope, with only superficial attention to logistical aspects and with no provisions for coalitions or for conditions of total or global warfare. They were unrealistic about contemporary or future international alignments; War Plan Orange, which was viewed as the most likely to be used, was conceived in terms of a clash solely between the United States and Japan.
从1924年到1938年，华盛顿的规划者们在对《橙色计划》进行多次修订的过程中，始终假定这将是一场以海战为主的冲突。到了20世纪30年代，他们预见到太平洋战争将会旷日持久且代价惨重，菲律宾很可能会早早沦陷。在联合规划会议上，海军发言人希望优先考虑由海军和海军陆战队在中太平洋发起的一次进攻，以夺取日本托管的马绍尔群岛、加罗林群岛和马里亚纳群岛，并确保珍珠港和马尼拉之间的交通线畅通。而陆军规划者则认为，当时美国在菲律宾的兵力，仅由少量陆军和陆军航空兵部队以及实力薄弱的亚洲舰队组成，无法抵御日军的大规模进攻；在战争初期加强或夺回该群岛的努力将代价高昂且徒劳无功；因此，美军应该撤退到阿拉斯加、夏威夷和巴拿马等更易防御的基地。但海军战略家们考虑到太平洋舰队在夏威夷以西地区的重要性，拒绝同意从菲律宾撤军。
In their numerous revisions of Orange from 1924 to 1938, the Washington planners always assumed that it would be mainly a naval conflict. By the 1930s they envisaged a long, costly war in the Pacific with the early loss of the Philippines. In the joint planning sessions navy spokesmen wanted priority given to an advance spearheaded by navy and marine forces across the Central Pacific to capture the Japanese-mandated Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas islands, and to secure the line of communication between Pearl Harbor and Manila. Army planners argued that the current American strength in the Philippines, comprised of small army and army air units and the weak Asiatic Fleet, could not hold the islands against a sizable Japanese assault, that efforts to reinforce or retake the archipelago in the war's early stages would be costly and futile, and that therefore the American forces should be withdrawn to more defensible bases in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. But naval strategists, contemplating a preeminent role for the Pacific Fleet west of Hawaii, refused to concur in a military withdrawal from the Philippines.
经过三年的僵持，陆军和海军的计划人员最终妥协，于1938年完成了战争计划的最终主要版本。为了顾及陆军计划人员的意见，计划中删除了有关进攻行动和海军早期进驻西太平洋的内容；而陆军部代表长期以来坚持要求的、授权在夏威夷以西进行进攻行动的条款，也因海军的满意而被删除。修订后的奥兰治计划要求美菲联军尽可能长时间地守住马尼拉湾入口，但几乎没有给出立即解围的希望，也没有规定海军需要多长时间才能抵达菲律宾。与既不愿放弃菲律宾群岛也不愿为其提供充足防御资金的美国国会一样，陆军部和海军部的计划人员也无法解决菲律宾战略安全的难题。
After three years of stalemate, the army and navy planners compromised and produced the final major edition of the war plan in 1938. References to offensive operations and the early advance of the navy into the West Pacific were omitted in deference to the army planners, and presidential authorization for offensive missions west of Hawaii, long insisted upon by the War Department representatives, was deleted to the satisfaction of the navy. The revised Orange plan called for American-Filipino forces to hold the entrance to Manila Bay as long as possible but offered little hope of their immediate relief, with no stipulation on how long it would take the navy to reach the Philippines. Like the United States Congress, which wanted neither to abandon the archipelago nor to provide funds for its adequate defense, the planners of the War and Navy departments could not solve the dilemma of Philippine strategic security.7
1939年第二次世界大战在欧洲爆发时，华盛顿的规划者们正在制定新构想的“彩虹”系列五项作战计划。这些计划旨在应对涉及多个交战国联盟在多个战区作战的各种战争局面。与之前的“彩色”系列计划相比，新计划在更现实地预测美国在友好和敌对国家联盟以及美国孤军作战情况下的战时角色方面有所改进。“彩虹5”计划最接近战争中实际演变的联盟和战区；在太平洋战场上，该计划设想美国将迅速失去菲律宾，并对日本采取战略防御行动，直到德国和意大利战败后，英美主力才能从优先级更高的欧洲战场抽调出来。 1940年末，海军作战部长哈罗德·R·斯塔克海军上将的“狗计划备忘录”（Plan Dog Memorandum）——一份战略研究报告——也呼吁将重点放在对轴心国欧洲成员国的战争上。次年春天，在华盛顿举行的数月英美军事参谋秘密会议后形成的ABC-1报告也提出了类似的观点。ABC-1报告的起草者假定德国是轴心国中最危险的，因此强调在计划和作战方面加强英美之间的密切协调，并呼吁优先将英美军事资源投入到对德战争中。1941年5月，华盛顿的陆海军联合委员会批准了“彩虹5号”（Rainbow 5）和ABC-1报告。尽管在罗斯福总统正式签署美国参战之前并未正式认可这些计划，但它们却成为未来四年盟军战略主要方向的制定基础。
When the Second World War erupted in Europe in 1939, the Washington planners were preparing five plans in the newly conceived Rainbow series, which provided for war situations involving various coalitions of belligerents engaged in several theaters of combat. The new plans were an improvement over the Color series in realistically projecting America's wartime role in the context of friendly and hostile coalitions of nations as well as in situations where the United States would be fighting without allies. Rainbow 5 most nearly approximated the coalitions and operational theaters as they actually evolved in the war; in the Pacific, it envisaged the quick loss of the Philippines and strategic defensive operations against Japan until major Anglo-American forces could be released from the higher-priority European theater following the defeat of Germany and Italy. In late 1940 Admiral Harold R. Stark's Plan Dog Memorandum, a strategic study by the chief of naval operations, also called for focusing on the war against the European members of the Axis Pact, as did the ABC-1 Report the next spring that resulted from several months of secret Anglo-American military staff sessions in Washington. Assuming that Germany was the most dangerous of the Axis powers, the ABC-1 drafters stressed the development of close Anglo-American coordination in planning and operations and called for priority commitment of Anglo-American military resources to the war against Germany. In May 1941 the Joint Army-Navy Board in Washington gave its approval to Rainbow 5 and ABC-1 and, though not formally endorsed by President Roosevelt prior to America's entry into the war, those plans became the basis for determining the main directions of Allied strategy for the next four years.8
因此，尽管日本一直专注于大陆军事战略，美日外交分歧也主要源于对华政策，但自20世纪20年代以来，美国战争策划者基本达成共识，即一旦与日本开战，美国将采取海上战略，海军将在决定性的中太平洋攻势中发挥主导作用。策划者之间的分歧主要在于菲律宾的战略地位。尽管在珍珠港事件之前，他们对太平洋海战的总体构想已经相当清晰且前后一致，但战争爆发后，其他因素的出现使得先对德后太平洋的海上战略的实施比预想的更加困难。
Thus, although Japan had concentrated on a continental military strategy and American-Japanese diplomatic differences had originated primarily over China, American war planners had been in basic agreement from the 1920s on that the United States would pursue a maritime strategy in case of war with Japan, with the navy playing the principal role in a decisive Central Pacific offensive. The planners had differed mostly over the strategic place of the Philippines. Although their general concept of a Pacific naval war was clear enough and rather consistently held before Pearl Harbor, other factors would come into play once the war began that made the implementation of the Germany-first and Pacific-maritime strategies more difficult than envisaged.
三
III
尽管二战期间美国人普遍将日本视为与其轴心国伙伴一样的法西斯极权国家，但实际上，日本的意识形态和政治制度与德国和意大利之间的差异远远大于相似之处。日本之所以被轴心国联盟所吸引，部分原因是其成员国有着共同的遭遇：早期民主政治经历令人失望；人口压力持续存在，促使它们渴望“生存空间”；大萧条期间，日本经济遭受的冲击比大多数其他国家更为深远；强烈的贫困感和被更成熟的工业强国平等接纳的感受；以及对共产主义的强烈恐惧。到了20世纪30年代末，日本深陷极端民族主义和军国主义的泥潭，但这两者与纳粹主义或意大利法西斯主义下的类似现象并无太大相似之处；而且，即使是东条英机这样的日本首相，也未曾拥有希特勒或墨索里尼那样的独裁权力。在与轴心国的关系中，日本领导人发现，他们在柏林和罗马的同僚始终未能理解日本帝国体制的本质、日本文化的独特价值和传统，以及他们的泛亚洲主义理念。种族主义也加剧了轴心国欧洲和亚洲成员国在战时沟通不畅的问题。
Although Americans during the Second World War generally viewed Japan as a fascist, totalitarian state like its Axis partners, actually the differences between Japan's ideology and political system and those of Germany and Italy far exceeded the similarities. Japan was attracted to the Axis coalition, in part, because its members had in common disappointing earlier experiences with democratic politics, population pressures that kept alive the urge for Lebensraum, shocks to their economies during the Great Depression that were more far-reaching than those felt in most other nations, an acute sense of being have-not societies and of not being accepted on an equal level by the more mature industrial powers, and a strong fear of communism. By the end of the 1930s, Japan was in the grips of ultra-nationalism and militarism, but neither bore much resemblance to those phenomena under Nazism or Italian fascism; and no Japanese premier, even Hideki Tojo, possessed the dictatorial powers of Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini. In Axis relations, Japanese leaders found that their Berlin and Rome colleagues never grasped the nature of their imperial system, the unique values and heritage of Japanese culture, and their concept of pan-Asianism. Racism also contributed to the inability of the European and Asian members of the Axis Pact to establish close wartime communications.
在柏林和罗马，日本的利益几乎被完全忽视，中国和太平洋地区的战事似乎对欧洲和地中海的战略影响甚微。与英美领导人之间密切的军事计划协调不同，日本战争策划者与欧洲轴心国的战争策划者在制定联盟战略方面几乎没有合作。因此，轴心国早期战略中的两个关键决策都是单方面做出的，令其他盟国措手不及：德国入侵苏联和日本偷袭珍珠港。如果德日两国进行协调的战略规划，或许能够凸显双方在共同集中力量首先击败苏联方面所拥有的长期优势，但两国政府都不愿为了共同的战略目标而牺牲国家利益。如果希特勒的军队突破苏联欧洲边界时，日本也进攻苏联远东地区，战争的进程可能会截然不同。轴心国在联盟层面，尤其是在对苏战略规划方面，未能制定出有效的战略规划，其对二战最终结果的影响几乎与美英成功制定联盟战略同等重要。9
Japanese interests were virtually ignored in Berlin and Rome where actions in China and the Pacific seemed to have little bearing on strategies for European and Mediterranean operations. In contrast to the close coordination of military planning between the Anglo-American leaders, there was little cooperation toward coalition strategy making between the Japanese war planners and those of the European Axis powers. Thus two of the early pivotal decisions of Axis strategy were made unilaterally and surprised the other pact members: the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Coordinated strategic planning by Germany and Japan probably would have pointed up the mutual long-range assets in joint concentration on defeating the Soviet Union first, but neither government was willing to subordinate national interests in order to work toward common strategic objectives. The course of the war might have been quite different had Japan struck the Soviet Far East when Hitler's armies penetrated the European border of the USSR. The Axis failure to develop strategic planning at the alliance level, especially against the Soviets, was almost as important to the final outcome of World War II as the success of America and Britain in molding their coalition strategy.9
由于无法在对西方开战前打破大陆的军事僵局，日本急于在中国达成和解，而此时美国正横扫西南太平洋和中太平洋。1943年，日本当局直接或通过其傀儡政权向重庆的国民党和延安的共产党发出停战信号。提出的条件包括日军撤出、终止日本在中国的经济势力范围、援助中国重建，以及提议中日两国签署相互尊重领土和政治完整、合作发展区域经济、共同维护和平稳定的协议。中国方面则要求停止敌对行动并断绝与英美同盟的关系。此前日本的目标是征服中国，但如今战争的紧迫性迫使日本采取绥靖政策，甚至基于泛亚主义，提议中国加入对抗英美列强的战争。日本战争目标的剧变令中国人难以接受；蒋介石的国民党政权继续寻求西方军事援助，而中国共产党则坚信最终会战胜日本和国民党。除了1944年日军在华南地区攻占了一些美军B-29轰炸机基地外，中国境内的战争断断续续、毫无结果，牵制了大量日军兵力，而这些兵力在太平洋战场上至关重要。
Unable to break the military deadlock on the mainland before going to war against the West, Japan became anxious to negotiate a settlement in China as the Americans mounted dual offensives across the Southwest and Central Pacific. In 1943, armistice overtures were made directly by Japanese authorities and indirectly through their puppet regime to the Nationalists in Chungking and the Communists in Yenan. Concessions proffered included withdrawal of Japanese troops, termination of Japanese economic spheres of influence, and assistance for rehabilitation programs in China, as well as proposed Sino-Japanese agreements on mutual respect for each other's territorial and political integrity, collaboration in regional economic development, and cooperation in maintaining peace and stability. The Chinese were to cease hostilities and sever their ties with the Anglo-American alliance. After its earlier objective of conquering China, combat exigencies now forced Japan to try appeasement and, in an appeal based on pan-Asianism, even to propose that China join the war against the Anglo-American powers. The drastic change in Japanese war aims was too much for the Chinese to accept on good faith; Chiang's Nationalist regime continued to solicit Western military assistance, while the Chinese Communists remained convinced of their eventual triumph over both the Japanese and the Kuomintang. Except for a Japanese offensive in South China that overran some American B-29 bases in 1944, the war in China dragged on in a desultory, inconclusive fashion, tying down large Japanese forces that were badly needed in the Pacific.10
同样，在东南亚，日本人也未能让当地居民相信他们真心实意地奉行“亚洲人的亚洲”这一口号。日本早期的军事胜利极大地打破了东南亚人对白人优越性的幻想，而日本在占领区的宣传也不断提醒民众，日本已将他们从白人统治者的奴役中解放出来，强调亚洲人与其前殖民统治者之间的价值体系差异，并着重宣传加入日本“大东亚共荣圈”的种种好处。然而，随着占领的持续，越来越多的印尼人、马来人、泰国人、缅甸人、越南人和菲律宾人对日本人压迫和剥削的手段感到反感。日本人对当地劳工的残酷剥削、对原材料和粮食的掠夺以及对异议的镇压，丝毫不亚于最残暴的白人殖民者。
Similarly, in Southeast Asia the Japanese largely failed to persuade the natives that they were sincerely dedicated to their slogan of “Asia for the Asiatics.” The early Japanese military successes did much to dispel illusions among Southeast Asians regarding the white man's superiority, and Japanese propaganda in occupied areas continually reminded the people that Japan had liberated them from their white overlords, pointed out differences between the value systems of the Asians and their former colonial masters, and emphasized the blessings of belonging to Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. But as the occupation wore on, growing numbers of Indonesians, Malays, Thais, Burmese, Vietnamese, and Filipinos were repelled by the oppressive, exploitative methods of the Japanese, who worked native laborers as brutally, seized raw materials and foodstuffs as rapaciously, and stifled dissent as ruthlessly as the worst of the white colonialists.
太平洋战局发生决定性逆转后，日本姗姗来迟地试图重新定义其战争目标，以期获得被占领国的更好合作。1943年秋，在东京举行的大东亚会议上，来自被占领的中国和被征服的东南亚国家的代表出席了会议。日本官员发起了一项区域政治、经济和社会合作以及相互尊重和友好的宣言，其主张与1941年的《英美大西洋宪章》相媲美，都体现了威尔逊式的理想主义原则，即民族自决和公平开放的国际关系。然而，尽管日本迫切需要东南亚人民的支持来对抗盟军在该地区即将到来的进攻，但占领区的日本官员和军队却不断暴露出东京会议上阐述的理想与其实际行动之间的巨大矛盾，其后果是东南亚各地游击队的数量和活动都在增加。日本成功地刺激了新兴的民族主义运动，但其占领政策却鲜少获得支持。早在1944年6月盟军海空军严重切断日本从东南亚的补给线、游击活动日益猖獗之前，南方资源区对日本而言已弊大于利。<sup> 11</sup>
Belatedly, with the tide of battle having turned decisively in the Pacific, Japan tried to redefine its war aims in terms designed to elicit better cooperation from the occupied countries. At the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo in the autumn of 1943, attended by delegates from occupied China and the conquered Southeast Asian countries, Japanese officials sponsored a declaration of regional political, economic, and social cooperation and of mutual respect and amity that rivaled the Anglo-American Atlantic Charter of 1941 in espousing idealistic Wilsonian principles of national self-determination and fair, open international relations. Nevertheless, although desperately needing the Southeast Asian peoples' support against impending Allied assaults in the region, Japanese officials and troops in the occupied areas continued to reveal glaring discrepancies between the ideals enunciated at the Tokyo assembly and their conduct, the consequence being an increase in guerrilla forces and operations in all the Southeast Asian lands. Japan had succeeded in stimulating nascent nationalist movements but had gained little support for its occupation policies. Even before June of 1944, when Allied naval and air forces seriously interdicted Japan's supply lines from Southeast Asia and guerrilla activities were mounting, the Southern Resources Area had become more of a liability than an asset to Japan.11
到1944年中期，东条英机在战时国家战略目标上已全部失败：轴心国条约几乎毫无价值；中国问题无论通过武力还是外交手段都无法解决；获取东南亚战略资源的途径受阻，而驻扎在那里的日军又面临着民众普遍不满和盟军即将入侵的威胁。同年7月，日军在马里亚纳群岛战败，该地首次成为B-29轰炸机空袭本州岛的基地。东条英机内阁垮台，由小矶邦昭将军领导的新内阁接任。一些日本高级政治家私下里希望承认战争的无望，并与美国及其盟国展开和平谈判，但由于仍然惧怕军国主义者而不敢这样做。然而，小矶内阁以及1945年4月继任的铃木贯太郎海军大将领导的内阁，却设定了不切实际的目标：离间苏联与西方的联盟，并利用苏联的斡旋，从英美列强那里获得满意的和平条款。这些徒劳的外交努力在1945年8月结束，当时苏联军队发动了大规模攻势，迅速击溃了驻扎在满洲和朝鲜北部的日军。利用莫斯科从战争中挽回一些颜面的计划，是军国主义者在下台前最后也是最愚蠢的阴谋。
By mid-1944 the Tojo ministry had failed in all its wartime objectives of national strategy: the Axis Pact had proved of little worth; a solution to the China problem had been obtainable neither by force nor by diplomacy; and access to the strategic resources of Southeast Asia had been interrupted, while Japanese forces there faced widespread popular discontent and threats of imminent Allied invasion. With the Japanese defeat that July in the Marianas, which provided base sites for B-29 raids on Honshu for the first time, the Tojo ministry collapsed and was succeeded by one headed by General Kuniaki Koiso. Instead of acknowledging the hopelessness of the war and initiating peace negotiations with America and its allies, as some senior Japanese statesmen secretly wanted but did not dare urge because they still feared the militarists, the Koiso cabinet, as well as the ministry of Admiral Kantaro Suzuki that followed in April 1945, set up quixotic goals of separating the Soviet Union from its alliance with the West and using Soviet intercession to obtain satisfactory peace terms with the Anglo-American powers. These exercises in diplomatic futility ended in August 1945 when the Soviet army launched a massive drive that swiftly routed Japanese forces in Manchuria and northern Korea. The scheme to use Moscow to salvage something from the war was the final and most foolish machination of the militarists before their ouster.12
在整个战争期间，日本最高指挥部在应对不断变化的战局时表现出缺乏灵活性。他们几乎无视卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨一个多世纪前提出的原则：“政治家和指挥官必须做出的首要、最高、影响最深远的判断，是确定……他们即将发动的战争的性质；既不要将其误认为是，也不要试图将其变成与其本质相悖的东西。”<sup> 13</sup>由于长期以来一直按照大陆战略进行规划，日本迟迟未能意识到，这场与西方的新战争将主要由其最强大的敌人——美国——所采用的海上战略所主导。尽管到1942年中期，日本已被迫在太平洋战场转入防御，但他们从未将大部分军事力量投入到对抗美军的进攻中。尽管驻扎在满洲的强大广东军因调往太平洋防御而损失了一些精锐地面部队，但到1945年8月初，部署在本土以外地区的320万日军中，仍有180万人（占56%）驻扎在中国和满洲。1942年至1945年间，除1944年的华南攻势外，日军在中国前线的陆空军力量与其所参与的实质是守势作战相比，显得过于强大。当东京决定将大量兵力从中国和满洲调往太平洋时，美军海空部队已经控制了西太平洋的制空权，重创了日军南下的部队运输，并最终彻底挫败了日军的增援行动。<sup> 14</sup>
Throughout the war the Japanese High Command manifested a lack of flexibility in adjusting to the changing circumstances of combat. Little heed was paid to the principle formulated by Carl von Clausewitz over a century earlier: “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”13 Having long planned within the framework of a continental strategy, the Japanese were slow to realize that this new war with the West would be shaped by the primarily maritime strategy employed by their most powerful enemy, the United States. Despite being forced on the defensive in the Pacific by mid-1942, Japan never committed the bulk of its military strength against the American offensives. Although the strong Kwangtung Army in Manchuria lost some of its best ground units by transfer to Pacific defenses, 1.8 million, or 56 percent, of the 3.2 million troops deployed outside the home islands were still stationed in China and Manchuria by early August 1945. During 1942–1945, Japanese ground and air forces on the China front were unnecessarily strong for the essentially holding operations in which they were engaged, except for the South China offensive in 1944. By the time Tokyo decided to transfer forces from China and Manchuria to the Pacific in substantial numbers, American naval and air units had gained control of the skies and seas of the West Pacific, exacting a heavy toll of Japanese troop shipments southward and eventually thwarting such reinforcements altogether.14
日本军事战略家不仅迟迟未能将太平洋战事列为优先考虑事项，而且还误判了美军主导的哪场攻势更具威胁性。道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟将军的自我宣传使他成为战争中首位重要的美国英雄，但他的宣传攻势和他在战场上的初步胜利也导致东京方面将更多精力放在防御其在西南太平洋的推进上，而不是应对切斯特·W·尼米兹海军上将在中太平洋的行动。日本之所以将注意力集中在麦克阿瑟的攻势上，部分原因是其靠近南方资源区的核心地带，尽管中太平洋的战事实际上对切断从东南亚到日本的所有补给线构成了更为直接的威胁。此外，日本若采取内线作战策略保卫南方资源区，本可获得诸多优势，例如缩短作战基地与前线之间的距离，以及在不暴露主要交通线的情况下快速调动部队。然而，这些优势却被美国人引入的新型远程潜艇、第三舰队巧妙的海上补给系统（使其能够长期在西太平洋进行补给）以及马克·A·米切尔海军上将麾下可搭载超过九百架飞机的快速航母舰队所抵消——而所有这些都由尼米兹而非麦克阿瑟指挥。除了1942年6月的中途岛海战和1944年6月的马里亚纳群岛海战（这两场战役均以惨败告终）之外，日本联合舰队并未在中太平洋地区与尼米兹的部队正面交锋，而是为日军地面部队提供后勤保障，以对抗麦克阿瑟在新几内亚-菲律宾的推进轴线以及威廉·F·哈尔西海军上将在所罗门群岛的部队。 1944年10月发生的四场大规模海战统称为莱特湾海战，这场海战是历史上规模最大的海战，日美两国舰队在其中兵戎相见。而这场海战的起因，实际上是日本海军试图履行其支援陆军的传统职责，这次是为了对抗麦克阿瑟入侵菲律宾中部。15
Not only were Japanese military strategists late in setting a higher priority on the Pacific, but they also misjudged which of the American-led advances was the more menacing. General Douglas MacArthur's self-promotion helped to make him the first major American hero of the war, but his publicity campaign and his first successes in the field also led Tokyo to focus more on defensive measures against his Southwest Pacific advance than on countering the moves of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's forces in the Central Pacific. Japanese attention on MacArthur's offensive was justified in part because of its proximity to the heart of the Southern Resources Area, though the Central Pacific operations actually posed the more direct threat to interdicting all supply lines from Southeast Asia to Japan. Moreover, the advantages that might have accrued to Japan from operating on interior lines in defense of the Southern Resources Area, such as a shorter distance from bases of operations to front sectors and superior mobility in shifting units to different areas without exposing the main lines of communication, were negated by the Americans' introduction of new long-range submarines, the ingenious at-sea resupply system of the Third Fleet that enabled it to range the West Pacific for long periods, and Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's fast carrier force that could launch over nine hundred aircraft—all of which operated under Nimitz, not MacArthur. Except off Midway in June 1942 and the Marianas in June 1944, both of which were severe defeats, the Japanese Combined Fleet did not venture forth into the path of Nimitz's forces in the Central Pacific, but instead serviced and supported Japanese ground operations against MacArthur's New Guinea-Philippines axis of advance and against Admiral William F. Halsey's forces in the Solomons. The four large engagements in October 1944 collectively called the battle for Leyte Gulf, which pitted the Japanese and American fleets against each other in the greatest naval action in history, actually resulted from the Japanese navy's attempt to function in its traditional role of supporting the army, this time against MacArthur's invasion of the central Philippines.15
正如美国在20世纪30年代和19世纪80年代制定战争计划时并未充分考虑后勤需求一样，日本在1941年至1945年战争前后也未将后勤放在优先位置。事实上，如果他们重视后勤，他们很可能会意识到，日本在东南亚和太平洋地区的扩张已经过度，其现有和未来的能力不足以生产和分发装备及物资到大陆和岛屿战线。与欧洲战场相比，太平洋战争的确是一场距离之战。从爪哇岛巴达维亚到东京的海上航线长达4100英里。日本帝国鼎盛时期南部疆域的宽度达6400英里。帝国南北两端相距5300英里。日军推进的海洋战线在其鼎盛时期长达14200英里——相当于地球周长的一半以上。如此巨大的距离使得航运和远程飞机至关重要，但到1943年，日本舰船的沉没速度已经超过了新船的建造速度，而且日本从未拥有过质量或数量可与美国相媲美的远程飞机。在太平洋战争中，日本由于无法维持长距离的后勤补给线而处于严重劣势。在地面作战中，由于其陆军部队的机械化程度和生活水平通常不如同等规模的美军部队，因此在某些方面的后勤需求较低，这在一定程度上弥补了日本的这一劣势。
Just as American strategic planning did not fully consider logistical requirements in devising war plans in the 19x0s and 1930s, so neither before nor during the war of 1941–1945 did the Japanese give a high priority to logistics. Indeed, had they done so, they would probably have realized that in its Southeast Asian and Pacific conquests Japan had overextended itself and that its current and future capabilities were inadequate for producing and distributing equipment and supplies to forces on the continental and island fronts. Compared to the European theater, the conflict in the Pacific was, indeed, a war of distances. The sea route from Batavia, Java, to Tokyo was 4,100 miles. The width of the southern reaches of the Japanese Empire at its greatest extent was 6,400 miles. The empire's north-south extremities were 5,300 miles apart. The oceanic perimeter of the Japanese advance at its zenith was 14,200 miles in length—equivalent to well over half the earth's circumference. Such enormous distances placed premiums on shipping and long-range aircraft, but by 1943 Japanese ships were being sunk at a faster rate than new ones could be built, and Japan never possessed long-range planes comparable in quality or quantity to those of the United States. In the Pacific war, Japan was severely handicapped by its inability to maintain long logistical lines. In ground operations, this was offset somewhat by the lower logistical needs in some categories for its army units, whose degree of mechanization and standard of living were generally not as high as similar American units.
当日军向西推进至缅甸，向南进军至新几内亚和所罗门群岛时，他们遭遇了后勤方面的重重困境：补给中心距离遥远，地形恶劣，恶劣的天气持续不断地对物资和人员造成不利影响。物资和装备迅速损耗，修建机场、港口和其他军事设施需要极其高超的工程技术。在克服这些挑战所需的技术和工程能力方面，日本远远落后于其西方对手。东京在策划进军东南亚和西南太平洋的战略时，并未考虑到后勤方面的这一难题。
When Japanese forces pushed westward into Burma and southward into New Guinea and the Solomons, they encountered logistical nightmares: great distances from supply centers, inhospitable terrain and weather that exerted constant, adverse influences on matériel and men. Supplies and equipment rapidly deteriorated, and prodigious engineering feats were required to develop air fields, harbors, and other military installations. In technology and engineering skills needed to overcome these challenges, the Japanese were far behind their Western adversaries. Tokyo had not considered this aspect of logistics in plotting advances into Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.
或许更重要的是，日军忽视了医疗后勤作为军事战略重要组成部分的重要性。结果，南方资源区及其防御圈内恶劣的生活条件导致大量部队因疾病而伤亡惨重。疟疾、登革热、细菌性痢疾和阿米巴痢疾、恙虫病、黄热病等等，都给交战双方带来了严峻的挑战。然而，日本的医学和公共卫生水平远不及西方列强，而且在战争的第一年后，日军的交通线屡遭阻断，导致前线日军部队医疗设施和物资匮乏甚至完全缺失。
Perhaps more important, the Japanese had overlooked medical logistics as a vital adjunct of military strategy. As a consequence, the rugged living conditions found in much of the Southern Resources Area and its defense perimeter produced appalling troop losses to disease. Awaiting both sides were a host of diseases—malaria, dengue fever, bacillary and amoebic dysentery, scrub typhus, and yellow fever, to name a few. But Japanese medicine and public health were not nearly as advanced as those of the Western powers, and because Japanese lines of communication were interdicted with increasing frequency after the first year of combat, Japanese units at the front suffered from the scarcity or absence of medical facilities and supplies.
在太平洋岛屿战中，日军在某些方面优于美军和盟军：他们在夜间陆地和海上作战方面都更加娴熟，将更多兵力投入战斗而非后勤支援，并且在兵力规模和火力相近的情况下，通常比对手展现出更强的战斗意志。他们也逐渐认识到，面对拥有压倒性海空火力支援的登陆作战，更有效的防御策略是构筑环环相扣的防御阵地，而不是将兵力全部投入海滩。到冲绳战役时，他们已经掌握了这种防御技巧，但为时已晚，无法改变战争的走向。岛屿防御战略中另一个后来才受到重视的方面是特攻（即陆海空联合的自杀式攻击）的价值。神风特攻队是唯一规模较大的特攻部队，于1944年末首次投入使用，展现出毁灭性的威力。美英海军始终未能找到有效的防御手段，吕宋岛和冲绳岛的战果便是最好的证明。如果特攻部队（实际上是载人导弹）能在1942年末战争形势对日本不利时更早发展起来，或许就能给盟军造成惨重的损失，从而促成和平谈判。
In the island warfare in the Pacific, the Japanese were superior to their American and Allied opponents in some categories: they proved more adept at night fighting both on the ground and at sea, utilized a higher proportion of their personnel in combat rather than in service and support roles, and generally demonstrated a stronger will to fight than did their adversaries when forces of similar size and firepower engaged each other. They also gradually learned that a more effective defense against landing assaults backed by overwhelming naval and air firepower was to develop interlocking positions rather than to expend their forces at the beaches. By the time of the Okinawa campaign they had mastered this defensive technique, but it was too late to affect the course of the war. Another aspect of island defensive strategy that belatedly received attention was the value of Tokko, or special-attack suicide operations by land, sea, and air. The Kamikazes, the only sizable Tokko forces used, first went into action in late 1944 and showed devastating potential, with American and British naval units never able to devise a sound defense against them, as was apparent off Luzon and Okinawa. If developed earlier, as the fortunes of war shifted against Japan in late 1942., the Tokko, in effect manned missiles, might conceivably have proven so costly to the Allies that a negotiated peace would have been possible.
另一方面，日军陆海空防御作战中反复出现的零散性，暴露出陆军和海军（空军是这两个军种不可分割的一部分）指挥部之间严重缺乏协调与合作，相比之下，美军内部的军种间竞争都显得微不足道。在一次最为关键的指挥失误中，山下奉文将军卓越的领导才能和审慎的菲律宾防御战略，最终却因东京帝国本部对他及其计划的不满、西贡南方军司令坚持全力攻打莱特岛而非集中兵力保卫战略更为重要的吕宋岛，以及马尼拉海军将领的阻挠而功亏一篑。这些阻挠最终导致了失败。马尼拉海军将领没有服从山下奉文的撤退命令，反而将海军部队投入到自杀式的城市防御战中。在无数次陆海空交战中，日军在战前未能完成集结，导致进攻时机不当，通常收效甚微，这种零散的作战方式反映出日军在远超直接作战区域之外的联合作战计划方面存在严重不足。
On the other hand, the recurring piecemeal nature of Japanese ground, sea, and air defensive operations demonstrated a serious lack of coordination and cooperation between the army and navy commands (air units were integral parts of those two services) that made American interservice rivalries appear mild in contrast. In one of the most crucial command breakdowns, General Tomoyuki Yamashita's able leadership and judicious strategy for defending the Philippines were undone by Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo, which disliked him and his plans, by the Southern Army commander in Saigon who insisted on an all-out battle for Leyte instead of concentrating forces to defend the strategically more valuable island of Luzon, and by the admiral in Manila who instead of obeying Yamashita's orders to evacuate committed his naval troops to a suicidal defense of the city. In numerous ground, naval, and air engagements, Japanese forces failed to achieve concentration before battle, resulting in poorly timed, usually ineffective attacks in piecemeal fashion that reflected lack of joint planning far beyond the immediate combat area.
此外，日军不切实际地决定将岛屿视为孤立的堡垒进行防御，而不是将其视为纵深防御体系中相互交织的火力优势点。日军指挥官没有在其太平洋周边建立相互支援的岛屿基地群，而是奉命在相距遥远、交通线脆弱的单个岛屿上构筑集中防御工事。两栖防御与两栖进攻一样，都需要陆海空三军的密切协调，但到了入侵之时，日军守备部队往往与海空支援和补给线隔绝。简而言之，日本没有有效的两栖防御战略来对抗美军的两栖进攻。<sup> 16</sup>
The Japanese, moreover, unrealistically decided to defend an island as though it were an isolated citadel, instead of a strongpoint in a defense-in-depth system of interlocking firepower. Instead of developing clusters of mutually supportive island bases around their Pacific perimeter, Japanese commanders were ordered to prepare concentrated defenses on single islands separated by large distances and with vulnerable lines of communication. Amphibious defense, like amphibious assault, demanded close coordination of ground, sea, and air units, but by the time of invasion the defending Japanese army garrison frequently was isolated from its naval and air support and supply. In short, Japan had no viable strategy of amphibious defensive warfare to counter American amphibious offensives.16
战争初期，宣传主要作为日本国家战略的工具，其效果褒贬不一。战争后期，宣传也被应用于军事领域，但产生了一些明显的负面后果。起初，日本宣传的目的是激励日本民众更加积极地投入战争，并让亚洲各国接受“共荣圈”的益处。到1943年秋季，当尼米兹开始在中太平洋推进时，南方资源区的守军已经遭受了一系列持续的失败，这些失败始于1942年5月至6月在珊瑚海和中途岛海战中的海军挫败。按照惯例，军官们向士兵们宣讲对天皇和武士道精神的忠诚，但帝国总参谋部也决定通过宣传和审查来鼓舞士气，审查内容包括修改传达给前线部队的战争新闻。东京方面报告称，日军在最终击败敌人方面取得了稳步进展，而各前线司令部也越来越多地修改战后报告，向上级汇报乐观的战果。1944年6月马里亚纳群岛战役爆发后，东京向一线部队传达作战进展信息，以及一线部队向东京传达作战进展信息，这种信息扭曲现象显著加剧，营造出一种怪诞的虚假氛围，有时甚至影响到战略和后勤方面的考量，因为人们难以区分神话与现实。日本投降时，许多在前线作战的士兵以及本土的大多数民众都处于震惊和难以置信的状态，尽管主要城市遭受了毁灭性的空袭，他们仍然相信自1943年以来日本取得的辉煌胜利。<sup> 17</sup>
During the early part of the war, propaganda was primarily an instrument of Japanese national strategy. It proved of mixed value. In the later stage of the conflict propaganda was also used in the military realm with some decidedly negative results. At first Japanese propaganda had the purpose of inspiring the Japanese people to greater war efforts and of converting Asians to the benefits of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. By the fall of 1943, when Nimitz began to advance in the Central Pacific, the defenders of the Southern Resources Area had suffered a steady succession of defeats, starting with the naval setbacks in the Coral Sea and off Midway in May-June 1942. As customary, officers delivered exhortations to their men about loyalty to the Emperor and to Bushido, the hallowed samurai code, but Imperial General Headquarters also decided to boost morale through the use of propaganda and censorship in revising general war news relayed to field commands. Tokyo reported steady progress toward the final defeat of Japan's enemies, and field headquarters increasingly amended their after-action reports to present optimistic results to superior echelons. With the invasion of the Marianas in June 1944, there was a marked rise in the distortions of operational developments from Tokyo to the field forces and vice versa, creating a bizarre atmosphere of unreality that sometimes affected strategic and logistical considerations because it became difficult to separate myth from reality. When Japan surrendered, many of its fighting men in the field as well as most citizens of the home islands were in a state of shock and disbelief, having accepted the stories of glorious victories since 1943 despite the destructive air raids on their major cities.17
第四
IV
美国在太平洋战争中的国家战略的主要目标是：在优先度更高的欧洲战场的限制下，尽快击败日本；让中国继续参战，同时帮助中国在蒋介石的领导下重返强国地位，并重新打开美国对华贸易的大门；恢复美国获取东南亚丰富资源的途径，同时敦促英国在欧洲殖民列强中率先制定殖民地自决计划，正如美国对菲律宾所承诺的那样；维持与澳大利亚和新西兰宝贵的战时关系；鼓励苏联加入对日战争；以及通过在战时军事战略规划以及战后对被占领的日本和西太平洋地区的行政和安全安排中占据主导地位，来维护美国在太平洋事务中日益增强的作用。
The chief aims of America's national strategy in the Pacific war were to defeat Japan as soon as possible within the constraints imposed by the higher-priority European theater; to keep China in the war, while assisting its return to big-power status under the aegis of Chiang Kai-shek and reopening the door to American trade there; to restore American access to the rich resources of Southeast Asia, while prodding the British to set the pace among the European colonial powers in planning toward self-determination for their colonies, as the United States had pledged to the Philippines; to maintain the valuable wartime relationships with Australia and New Zealand; to encourage the Soviet Union to enter the conflict against Japan; and to preserve America's augmented role in Pacific affairs through dominance of planning in wartime military strategy and in arrangements for postwar administration and security in occupied Japan and the West Pacific.
尽管美国与英国在其宏大战略中致力于首先击败德国，并在1945年初将其陆军和空军的大部分兵力调往欧洲，但直到1943年秋季，美国海外部署的兵力重心仍然倾向于太平洋战场。在战争的第一年，美国的资源主要用于对付日本，但到1943年中期，其大部分海外物资开始运往大西洋彼岸。然而，截至1943年12月31日，美国在欧洲和太平洋战场的军事资源大致相当：对德作战的美军人数为180万（包括陆军、陆军航空兵、海军和海军陆战队），编制为17个陆军师，拥有8800架陆军和海军飞机以及515艘作战舰艇；而投入太平洋作战的美军人数为190万，编制为16.5个陆军和海军陆战队师，拥有7900架陆军、海军和海军陆战队飞机以及713艘作战舰艇。英美两国就全力攻打德国达成的协议之所以出现妥协，首先是由于一些始料未及的因素，例如盟军在缺乏更强大火力的情况下无法阻止日军的攻势；美国民众对击败日本的持续高涨的热情；以及或许最为重要的，英美领导人迟迟未能就大规模跨海峡入侵法国的具体计划和日期达成一致。正如战前计划所预期的那样，二战期间美国海军和海军陆战队的主要力量都部署在太平洋战场，但战争初期两年内大量陆军和空军部队被调往对日作战，这却是始料未及的。对击败德国的战略规划影响更为显著的是，大量船只、登陆艇和后勤部队被投入太平洋战场所造成的后勤危机。<sup> 18</sup>
Although the United States was committed to defeating Germany first in its grand strategy with Britain and by early 1945 had sent the preponderance of its strength in army ground and air forces to Europe, the balance in America's overseas deployment up to the autumn of 1943 was in favor of the Pacific theater. Through the first year of fighting American resources had been channeled mainly against Japan, though by mid-1943 the bulk of its overseas shipments began to go across the Atlantic. Nevertheless, as of December 31, 1943, American military resources remained about equally divided between the European and Pacific theaters: 1.8 million personnel (army, army air forces, navy, and marine), 17 army divisions, 8,800 army and navy aircraft, and 515 combat ships involved in the war against Germany compared to 1.9 million personnel, 16.5 army and marine divisions, 7,900 army, navy, and marine planes, and 713 warships committed to Pacific operations. The compromising of the Anglo-American agreement on a maximum effort against Germany first resulted from such unforeseen developments as the Allies' inability to stop Japanese offensives without greater firepower, the sustained intensity of the American public's interest in defeating Japan, and perhaps most important, the long delay of Anglo-American leaders in reaching an agreement on a specific plan and date for the massive cross-Channel invasion of France. As anticipated in prewar planning, the main American naval and marine strength was in the Pacific throughout the Second World War, but the drain of army ground and air units to the war with Japan during the first two years had not been expected. More significant in affecting strategic planning for the defeat of Germany was the logistical crisis created by the heavy absorption of shipping, landing craft, and service troops in Pacific operations.18
罗斯福总统对中国在东亚战时和战后潜在作用的执着，导致美国在1942年后加深了对中国政治和军事事务的介入。讽刺的是，当时日本正竭力摆脱其在东亚的纠葛。尽管斯大林和丘吉尔贬低中国对盟军事业的价值，美国参谋长联席会议也常常与他们的三军统帅在对中国军事价值的看法上存在分歧，罗斯福仍努力用美国的武器和顾问支持中国的防御行动，特别是蒋介石的部队。然而，由于该战区在英美战略规划中的优先级较低，以及通过喜马拉雅空路或穿越北缅甸的陆路向中国提供补给的困难，美国的援助不足以显著改变中国战线的战局。一项从中国基地对日本发动B-29轰炸的宏伟计划最终令人失望。约瑟夫·W·史迪威将军和其他驻扎在战时中国的美国指挥官和外交官普遍未能理解中国政治的复杂性，也未能促成国民党和共产党在决定性进攻行动中的协调。罗斯福坚持将中国视为盟军的主要力量，但美国在中国的努力对中国军事和政治局势的影响并不比日本更大。中国似乎决心按照自己的方式掌握命运，仿佛日本或美国从未在那里存在过。19
The fixation of President Roosevelt on the potential of China's wartime and postwar roles in East Asia led to deepening American involvement in Chinese political and military affairs after 1942 when, ironically, Japan was desperately trying to lessen its entanglements there. Although Stalin and Churchill disparaged China's worth to the Allied cause and the American Joint Chiefs often disagreed with their commander in chief's views on China's military value, Roosevelt endeavored to support Chinese defensive efforts, especially Chiang's forces, with American arms and advisors. But American assistance, because of the theater's low priority in Anglo-American strategic planning and the difficulty in supplying China via the Himalayan air route or the overland route across North Burma, was inadequate to alter the combat situation on the China front appreciably. A grandiose scheme to stage the main B-29 raids on Japan from Chinese bases proved disappointing. General Joseph W. Stilwell and other American commanders and diplomats stationed in wartime China generally failed to comprehend the intricacies of Chinese politics and to bring about Nationalist-Communist coordination for decisive offensive operations. Roosevelt persisted in viewing China as a major Allied power, but American efforts in that country were no more influential than those of Japan in their impact on Chinese military and political conditions. China seemed bent on working out its own destiny almost as if there had never been a Japanese or American presence there.19
美国能够获取其他资源和合成材料，因此无需立即依赖东南亚的战略原材料。唯一一次深入南方资源区腹地的行动——入侵婆罗洲——直到1945年战争的最后几个月才发生。除此之外，盟军的主要军事行动都绕过了该地区，从东部和北部进行包围，先是阻碍，然后切断了其通往日本的交通线。在整个战争期间，罗斯福和其他美国领导人发表了反殖民主义言论，并发表了关于菲律宾独立的虔诚声明，这激怒了流亡在外的英国、法国和荷兰政府。但是，尽管美国自身起源于革命，但在日本投降后，美国却默许并协助恢复了英国、荷兰和法国在东南亚的殖民统治，主要目的是为了恢复美国在该地区的自然资源供应，并确保西欧支持美国对抗苏联可能在战后采取的扩张行动。战后东南亚的民族主义动荡使美国陷入了与战时类似的困境：一方面，美国在道德上拥护反殖民主义；另一方面，美国又因经济和安全关系而与欧洲殖民列强紧密相连。有人认为，如果美国在日本投降后的最初几个月内暂时占领南方资源区，或许能够缓和当时正在形成的独立运动中极端的反殖民倾向。但正如中国的情况一样，无论美国如何努力，东南亚各国很可能都会走上各自的道路，尤其考虑到美国对反殖民主义的承诺在很大程度上只是停留在理论层面。在战争年代，美国政治和军事领导人普遍认为，英国在对日战争中的所有战略立场都受到其恢复甚至扩大战后亚洲帝国领土的野心所影响，这种观点极大地加剧了英美同盟内部的紧张关系。20
America's access to other sources and to synthetics obviated its immediate need for Southeast Asia's strategic raw materials, and the only thrust into the heart of the Southern Resources Area, the invasion of Borneo, did not come until the final months of the war in 1945. Otherwise, major Allied operations bypassed the region on eastern and northern envelopments, first hindering and then cutting its lines of communication to Japan. All through the war years Roosevelt and other American leaders voiced anticolonial rhetoric together with pious statements about Philippine independence that irritated the British and the French and Dutch governments in exile. But, despite its own revolutionary origins, the United States condoned and assisted in the restoration of the British, Dutch, and French colonial regimes in Southeast Asia upon Japan's capitulation, primarily to get American supplies of the area's natural resources flowing again and to ensure Western European support against possible postwar expansionist moves by the Soviet Union. The postwar nationalist upheavals in Southeast Asia found the United States basically in the same dilemma as during the war period, moralistically espousing anticolonialism but bound to the European colonial powers by economic and security ties. It has been suggested that temporary American occupation of the lands of the Southern Resources Area during the months of the immediate aftermath of Japan's surrender would have ameliorated the extreme anticolonial tendencies of the formative independence movements. But as China had, the Southeast Asian nations likely would have gone their ways regardless of American efforts, particularly since the United States' commitment to anticolonialism was largely theoretical. During the war years the American political and military leaders' assumption that in general all British positions on strategy in the war against Japan were colored by their desire to restore or even expand their imperial holdings in postwar Asia did much to exacerbate tensions in the Anglo-American alliance.20
在对德意战争中，妥协是英美战略制定的关键要素，而太平洋战争的战略方向则被美国牢牢掌控。1942年初，美国迫使英国做出这一让步，美英联合参谋长联席会议将太平洋战区的作战指挥权委托给了美国参谋长联席会议。在与太平洋战区指挥官打交道时，各军种司令充当了参谋长联席会议的执行代理人；因此，指挥太平洋战区的尼米兹将军的指令和命令来自海军作战部长欧内斯特·J·金海军上将，而麦克阿瑟将军的指令和命令则来自陆军参谋长乔治·C·马歇尔将军。<sup> 21</sup>
Whereas compromise was the key ingredient in Anglo-American strategy making in the war against Germany and Italy, the strategic direction of the Allied war in the Pacific was carefully monopolized by the United States. Early in 1942 this concession was wrung from the British, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff delegated to the American Joint Chiefs the responsibility for conducting operations in the Pacific. In dealing with the Pacific theater commanders, the respective American service chiefs acted as the executive agents of the Joint Chiefs; thus Nimitz, commanding the Pacific Ocean Areas, received his directives and orders from Admiral Ernest J. King, chief of naval operations, and MacArthur got his from General George C. Marshall, army chief of staff.21
在太平洋战争中，美国对日作战的战略和政策掌控力极强，很少放松，这使得其他十二个盟国很少有机会参与其中，也因此导致与英国、中国、荷兰和法国流亡政府、新西兰以及澳大利亚等国的联盟关系时常出现严重紧张。尼米兹的作战基地是夏威夷，而麦克阿瑟的作战基地则是澳大利亚——一个在战争初期就试图削弱与英国联系的国家。澳大利亚在向西南太平洋战区提供部队、战争物资和反向租借援助方面发挥了不可或缺的作用。鉴于其慷慨而重要的贡献，澳大利亚认为自己理应在决定对日战争的走向方面拥有发言权。然而，除了设立一个无关紧要的太平洋战争委员会作为小盟国的咨询平台之外，罗斯福及其军事首脑始终阻挠澳大利亚在太平洋战争和战后规划中发挥更重要作用的努力。围绕协商机制的性质、指挥安排、后勤和战略优先事项以及麦克阿瑟作为战区司令的权力等问题，美澳两国之间的分歧最终都不可避免地按照美国的目标得以解决。美国与新西兰之间也发展出了类似的关系，尽管新西兰领导人在抗议时不如堪培拉那样激烈。在整个战争期间，美国始终将其他对日作战的国家视为地位不平等的盟友。鉴于其在战争时期的联盟经验，澳大利亚在1945年春季的旧金山会议上成为联合国小国权利和权力的主要倡导者之一也就不足为奇了。在战争的最后半年，英国在太平洋的地位也变得如此弱势，以至于皇家海军部队只有在经过漫长的谈判后才被允许在太平洋海域支援美国海军作战；直到战争结束，金上将仍然不愿允许英国参与“美国战区”的行动。<sup> 22</sup>
The American grip on strategy and policy in the war with Japan in the Pacific was seldom relaxed to permit contributions by the twelve other allied nations in that conflict, thereby provoking sometimes serious stresses in alliance relations not only with Britain but also with China, the Dutch and French exile governments, New Zealand, and Australia. While Nimitz's base of operations was Hawaii, MacArthur's was Australia—a country that was trying to lessen its ties with Britain as the war began. Australia became invaluable in supplying troops, war matériel, and reverse lend-lease assistance for the Southwest Pacific theater. Because of its generous and important contributions, Australia felt it deserved a voice in deciding the direction of the war with Japan. But except for setting up an innocuous Pacific War Council as a sounding board for the lesser allies, Roosevelt and his military chiefs consistently thwarted Australia's attempts to play a more prominent part in Pacific war and postwar planning. Bilateral differences over the nature of consultative machinery, command arrangements, logistical and strategic priorities, and MacArthur's authority as theater commander all were inevitably resolved in accordance with American objectives. A similar relationship evolved between the United States and New Zealand, although its leaders were less vociferous than Canberra in their protests. Throughout the conflict the United States treated the other nations at war against Japan as unequal allies. In view of its wartime coalition experience, it is not surprising that at the San Francisco Conference in the spring of 1945 Australia emerged as one of the chief advocates on behalf of the smaller nations' rights and powers in the United Nations organization. During the final half year of the war even Britain's position in the Pacific had become so weak that Royal Navy units were permitted to operate in those waters in support of the United States Navy only after lengthy negotiations; to the end, Admiral King was reluctant to allow British participation in the “American theater.”22
如果说日本在战争后期与苏联的暧昧关系是异想天开，那么美国寻求苏联援助以击败日本的想法至少可以说是不切实际的。到1944年初秋，尼米兹、麦克阿瑟及其参谋人员，以及参谋长联席会议及其策划人员普遍认为，仅靠空中轰炸和海上封锁不足以迫使日本投降，必须对九州和本州进行大规模入侵。五角大楼和前线指挥官暂定第一次行动于1945年11月进行，第二次行动于1946年初进行，他们预估这两次进攻将十分艰难，并可能造成美军重大伤亡。双方都倾向于由苏联进攻满洲，以阻止驻扎在满洲和华北的大量日军增援本土守军。
If Japan's flirtation with the Soviet Union during the later stage of the war was quixotic, American interest in obtaining the help of the USSR in defeating Japan was unrealistic to say the least. By the early autumn of 1944, Nimitz, MacArthur, and their planning staffs, together with the Joint Chiefs and their planners, were generally agreed that aerial bombing and naval blockade would not suffice to force Japan's surrender and that immense invasions of Kyushu and Honshu would be needed. Tentatively setting the first operation for November 1945 and the second for early 1946, the Pentagon and the field commanders envisaged those assaults as difficult and likely to produce high American casualties. Both groups favored a Soviet attack on Manchuria to prevent the sizable Japanese forces there and in North China from reinforcing the defenders of the home islands.
1945年2月，在雅尔塔会议上，罗斯福在其军事顾问的支持下，同意了斯大林提出的苏联干预条件：千岛群岛、南萨哈林岛、外蒙古、大连、旅顺港以及满洲的主要铁路。这项协议与1943年末在开罗向蒋介石作出的领土承诺相悖，损害了国民党政权的威望，并导致其与西方盟国的关系进一步恶化。到了7月，随着原子弹试验的成功以及日本经济迅速崩溃的迹象，五角大楼的策划者开始重新评估苏联援助的必要性。然而，此时九州岛的进攻准备工作已步入正轨，作战计划正在进行最后的修订，大量兵力在从冲绳、吕宋岛到瓦胡岛的各个集结地集结。入侵计划并未被取消，因此苏联援助仍有一定的理由。事态急转直下，进一步的重新考虑被抛诸脑后；美国迅速将日本置于原子弹战争的恐怖之下，苏联军队也迅速进军满洲、外蒙古、朝鲜北部、千岛群岛和南萨哈林岛。事后看来，一旦九州攻势计划制定完成，军事战略便基本占据主导地位，美国国家战略也因此无法灵活地接受苏联的干预。23
At Yalta in February 1945, Roosevelt, with his military advisors' backing, agreed to Stalin's price for Soviet intervention: the Kuriles, South Sakhalin, Outer Mongolia, Dairen, Port Arthur, and Manchuria's main railways. The deal, which contradicted territorial pledges to Chiang at Cairo in late 1943, hurt the prestige of the Nationalist regime and caused further deterioration in its relations with the Western Allies. By July, with the success of the atomic-bomb test and evidence that Japan's economy was collapsing fast, Pentagon planners began reevaluating the need for Soviet assistance. By then, however, the Kyushu assault preparations were developing their own momentum, with the operational plan undergoing final revision and huge forces assembling at staging bases from Okinawa and Luzon to Oahu. The invasion plan was not rescinded, so some rationale for Soviet help remained. The rush of events overcame further reconsiderations; in quick order America subjected Japan to the horror of atomic warfare and Soviet forces rapidly moved into Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, northern Korea, the Kuriles, and South Sakhalin. In retrospect, it seems that once the Kyushu assault plan was drafted, military strategy essentially became dominant, with American national strategy bound inflexibly to it in its acceptance of Soviet intervention.23
早在1943年，华盛顿的国务院、陆军部和海军部就开始研究占领日本的行政管理以及美国战后在太平洋地区的安全需求。到1944年末，当国务院、陆军部和海军部成立协调委员会，负责制定三部门共同关注的政策，特别是未来对德国和日本的占领时，美国对战后日本和西太平洋地区治理的研究已经远远领先于其盟国。早在旧金山联合国宪章获得通过之前，华盛顿就已着手通过托管琉球群岛、小笠原群岛、马里亚纳群岛、马绍尔群岛和加罗林群岛，以及在菲律宾即将独立后就美国在菲律宾的军事基地达成协议，来确保其在西太平洋的战略地位。
As early as 1943, the State, War, and Navy departments in Washington undertook studies on the administration of occupied Japan and on America's postwar security needs in the Pacific. By late 1944, when the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was established to formulate policy on matters common to all three departments, especially future occupations of Germany and Japan, American research on the postwar governance of Japan and the West Pacific was far in advance of that done by its allies. Well before the United Nations Charter was approved at San Francisco, Washington was preparing to secure strategic positions in the West Pacific through trusteeships over the Ryukyus, Bonins, Marianas, Marshalls, and Carolines, as well as through agreements on American bases in the Philippines after that nation's impending independence.
休·博顿和约瑟夫·C·格鲁等日本问题专家，协助国务院-陆军-海军协调委员会制定了一套开明温和的日本占领政策。由美国控制的占领机构将通过天皇和现有的政府架构，推动日本的非军事化和民主化，并使其重新融入国际关系和贸易框架。协调委员会起草的占领指令主要基于自由民主理念，仅在审判战犯和清洗军国主义者及极端民族主义者方面较为严厉。令人遗憾的是，东条英机下台后的日本政府并不知晓这项仁慈的占领计划，因为交战双方的温和派都已准备好结束战争，并使日本重新回到20世纪20年代与西方建立合作外交和商业关系的轨道上来。24
Specialists on Japan, such as Hugh Borton and Joseph C. Grew, helped to mold an enlightened, moderate approach by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to policy for the occupation of Japan. The American-controlled occupation machinery would work through the emperor and existing governmental structure to demilitarize and democratize Japan and to prepare it for readmittance into the framework of international relations and trade. The occupation directives drafted by the Coordinating Committee were based largely on liberal, democratic concepts and were harsh only regarding trials of war criminals and purges of militarists and ultra-nationalists. It was unfortunate that the Japanese government after Tojo's downfall did not know of the benevolent occupation planned, for moderates on both sides were ready to terminate the war and to reorient Japan toward its position in the 1920s of cooperative diplomatic and commercial ties with the West.24
罗斯福总统于1943年初在卡萨布兰卡宣布的无条件投降政策，在大多数参与制定占领政策的华盛顿规划者看来，远比日本人想象的要灵活得多。日本人对这一政策的解读五花八门，从种族灭绝到废除皇室制度、将天皇作为战犯惩处，无所不包。然而，对日本人来说不幸的是，国务院、陆军部和海军部的规划者们是在不公开的环境下制定战后政策的，而美国政府和媒体公开传达的信息普遍对日本战败后的前景持悲观态度。美国公众舆论，主要反映在媒体上，深受种族主义、民族中心主义和战争情绪的影响，对日本人几乎没有同情心。华盛顿官员们，部分原因是不愿招致绥靖日本军国主义领导人的指责，因此没有采取任何行动来否认或修改不投降政策。杜鲁门总统错失了向日本发出有利信号的良机。1945年7月，他听从亲信顾问的错误建议，在《波茨坦公告》中遗漏了美国政府在占领期间保留并利用天皇的意图。自1943年初以来，美国宣传一直将美国描绘成不可逆转地与日本无条件投降挂钩，而事实上，协调委员会的讨论并未预料到这种情况，最终也没有发生。但美国高级官员和宣传人员对这一政策的持续口头支持，有效地阻止了双方进行直接的双边沟通，而这些沟通本可能在1945年8月中旬之前就结束战争。<sup> 25 </sup>
The policy of unconditional surrender, proclaimed by Roosevelt at Casablanca in early 1943, was viewed by most Washington planners working on occupation guidelines as far more flexible than the Japanese imagined. The latter interpretations ranged from annihilation of their people to abolition of the imperial system and punishment of the emperor as a war criminal. Unfortunately for Japanese perceptions, the State-War-Navy planners were shaping postwar policies in an environment closed to public notice, while what was communicated openly by the American government and press was generally negative about Japan's prospects after its defeat. American public opinion, as reflected mainly in the press, was strongly influenced by racist, ethnocentric, and war-bred feelings that displayed little sympathy for the Japanese, and Washington officials, in part because they did not want to invite charges of appeasement toward the Japanese militarist leadership, made no move to disavow or revise the no-surrender policy. President Truman missed an opportunity to send a favorable signal to Japan when, on poor counsel from his close advisors, he omitted from the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945 any reference to the American government's intention to retain and use the emperor during the occupation. Since early 1943 American propaganda had portrayed the United States as irrevocably bound to the unconditional surrender of Japan, a development that, in fact, was not anticipated in the Coordinating Committee's deliberations and did not take place. But the continuing lip service paid to the policy by top American officials and propagandists was influential in keeping both sides from direct bilateral communications that might have terminated the war well before mid-August 1945.25
V
V
1942年3月，参谋长联席会议的一项指令将太平洋战区划分为两个区域，对美国在太平洋的军事战略产生了长达三年的影响：西南太平洋战区由麦克阿瑟将军指挥；太平洋战区由尼米兹海军上将指挥，他同时兼任太平洋舰队司令及中太平洋次战区司令。参谋长联席会议此举违背了统一指挥原则，主要原因是海军反对选择该地区资历最深的军官麦克阿瑟担任太平洋战区总司令。理想情况下，参谋长联席会议宣称，他们将作为一个整体，作为太平洋战区规划和作战的最高指挥机构。然而，参谋长联席会议主席缺乏集中权力，主要扮演协调者的角色，其工作委员会体系也逐渐演变成复杂而繁琐的安排。其结果是，位于华盛顿的太平洋战区指挥中心权力分散，深陷军种间摩擦，并且由于在修改战区方案和自身建议时反复辩论和妥协，导致决策效率低下。太平洋战场上没有任何一个权威机构有权在相互冲突的计划和各战区的需求之间做出抉择，也没有任何机构能够协调各战区的行动。<sup> 26</sup>大多数太平洋战区的高级军官都对这一体制持批评态度。麦克阿瑟指责道：“在战争的所有错误决策中，或许最令人费解的就是未能统一太平洋战区的指挥权……这导致了分散的兵力、浪费、分散和重复部署，最终导致战争延长，伤亡和成本增加。”<sup> 27</sup>然而，他并没有补充说，他只有在自己担任最高统帅的情况下才希望实行统一指挥，也没有说海军将领不愿将太平洋舰队委托给他和由美国陆军控制的司令部有什么正当理由。
American military strategy in the Pacific was affected for three years by a Joint Chiefs' directive of March 1942 establishing two theaters of operations: the Southwest Pacific Area, to be headed by General MacArthur, and the Pacific Ocean Areas, to be commanded by Admiral Nimitz, who also was to head the Pacific Fleet and the Central Pacific subtheater. The Joint Chiefs violated the principle of unity of command primarily because of navy objections to selecting the senior officer in the region, MacArthur, as overall Pacific commander. Idealistically, the Joint Chiefs declared that as a body they would serve as the Supreme Command for Pacific planning and operations as a whole. But the Joint Chiefs had a chairman who lacked centralizing authority and functioned mainly as a moderator, and their system of working committees evolved into a complex and cumbersome arrangement. The consequences were that the Washington command post for the Pacific became diffused in its authority, entangled in interservice friction, and handicapped in quick decision making by debates and compromises on revising theater proposals and its own recommendations. No single authority in the Pacific was empowered to decide between conflicting plans and needs of the theaters or to coordinate their operations.26 Most senior Pacific officers were critical of the system. MacArthur charged that “of all the faulty decisions of the war perhaps the most unexplainable one was the failure to unify the command in the Pacific…. It resulted in divided effort, the waste, diffusion, and duplication of force, and the consequent extension of the war with added casualties and cost.”27 He did not add, however, that he wanted unity of command only if he were the supreme commander or that naval leaders had some justification for not entrusting the Pacific Fleet to him and his American army-controlled headquarters.
“橙色作战计划”要求美军沿中太平洋单一轴线推进，但1942年3月参谋长联席会议的指令为西南太平洋和中太平洋的双线进攻奠定了基础。如果日军从中国调集大量兵力到太平洋，那么将美军打击力量分散在相距甚远的两条轴线上的战略就显得不明智。但到了1943年秋季，凭借麦克阿瑟和尼米兹指挥部压倒性的实力，中太平洋和南太平洋的攻势有效地扰乱了日军在太平洋的漫长防线。例如，1943年中期至1944年中期的美军作战行动表明，尽管存在缺陷，但这种分权指挥的安排也有一些优势，尽管各指挥部之间的合作往往更多是偶然而非计划好的。在1943年夏季至1944年春季的“车轮行动”期间，美军在西南太平洋和南太平洋对新几内亚、新不列颠、阿德默勒尔蒂群岛和所罗门群岛发动攻势，吸引了来自中太平洋基地的敌军空军力量，使得尼米兹的部队得以在几乎没有空中抵抗的情况下占领吉尔伯特群岛和马绍尔群岛。另一方面，太平洋舰队从特鲁克到帕劳群岛的毁灭性空袭迫使日本海军撤出新几内亚以北海域，使得麦克阿瑟的陆军得以在缺乏强大海军保护的情况下沿荷属新几内亚海岸推进。他对比亚克岛的进攻反过来又牵制了原本用于保卫马里亚纳群岛的日本空军力量。1944年6月，就在日军第一机动舰队准备护送运兵船从摩鹿加群岛前往新几内亚西北部，并攻击麦克阿瑟在比亚克岛的滩头阵地以及美国第七舰队的小型支援部队之际，中太平洋舰队入侵了塞班岛。得知尼米兹进攻塞班岛的消息后，日本海军迅速向东北方向疾驰，随后在菲律宾海海战中遭遇惨败，而麦克阿瑟的部队则完成了对荷属新几内亚的征服。28
War Plan Orange had called for a single American axis of advance by way of the Central Pacific, but the Joint Chiefs' directive of March 1942 set the stage for dual offensives through the Southwest and Central Pacific. If large Japanese forces had been redeployed from China to the Pacific, the strategy of dividing the American striking power on widely separated axes would have been unwise. But with the overwhelming strength of MacArthur's and Nimitz's commands by autumn 1943, the offensives in the Central and South Pacific were effective in keeping the Japanese off balance along their extensive cordon in the Pacific. The American operations from mid-1943 to mid-1944, for example, demonstrate that, despite its flaws, the divided-command arrangement had some assets, although often the commands' teamwork was more inadvertent than planned. During Operation Cartwheel, from summer 1943 to spring 1944, Southwest and South Pacific offensives on New Guinea, New Britain, the Admiralties, and the Solomons attracted enemy air power from Central Pacific bases, allowing Nimitz's units to seize the Gilberts and the Marshalls without serious air opposition. On the other hand, the Pacific Fleet's destructive raids from Truk to the Palaus forced the Japanese navy out of the waters north of New Guinea and permitted MacArthur's army to advance along the coast of Dutch New Guinea without strong naval protection. His assault on Biak, in turn, siphoned off Japanese air strength intended for the defense of the Marianas. The Central Pacific forces invaded Saipan in June 1944 just as the Japanese First Mobile Fleet was preparing to escort troopships from the Moluccas to northwestern New Guinea and to attack MacArthur's beachhead on Biak and the small supporting force of the American Seventh Fleet. Upon getting news of Nimitz's move against Saipan, the Japanese navy rushed northeastward, subsequently meeting disaster in the battle of the Philippine Sea while MacArthur's troops completed their conquest of Dutch New Guinea.28
到1944年春季，太平洋战场上最令参谋长联席会议关注的问题是：在对日作战之前，吕宋岛和台湾哪个才是更合适的入侵目标？金将军长期以来一直反对在菲律宾登陆，到1944年5月，马歇尔将军和陆军航空兵司令亨利·H·阿诺德将军认为，任何经由吕宋岛的推进都将比从马里亚纳群岛向台湾推进的路线更加缓慢且代价更高。麦克阿瑟将军则坚称，出于人道主义、政治和战略方面的考虑，必须攻占吕宋岛。同年7月，罗斯福总统和威廉·D·莱希海军上将似乎也赞同他在珍珠港的论点。参谋长联席会议持续讨论各种方案，直到10月初，金将军、尼米兹将军及其策划人员最终得出结论：在短期内，进攻台湾在后勤方面不可行。随后，参谋长联席会议发布指令，授权入侵吕宋岛。正如该计划的反对者所担心的那样，吕宋岛战役成为太平洋战争中美军阵亡人数最多的战役。征服吕宋岛是否必要仍是一个悬而未决的问题，但其他军事行动，特别是入侵帕劳群岛，其必要性也同样会受到质疑。事实上，唯一没有受到质疑的岛屿进攻行动是马里亚纳群岛战役。
The Pacific issue that absorbed the Joint Chiefs' attention by spring 1944 was whether Luzon or Formosa was the better invasion target prior to direct operations against Japan. King had long objected to any landings in the Philippines, and by May 1944 Marshall and General Henry H. Arnold, the army air chief, thought any advance by way of Luzon would be slower and more costly than one from the Marianas to Formosa. MacArthur asserted that humanitarian, political, and strategic considerations required Luzon's capture, and both President Roosevelt and Admiral William D. Leahy seemed favorable to his argument at Pearl Harbor that July. The Joint Chiefs continued to debate the alternatives until early October when King, Nimitz, and their planners concluded that a Formosa assault would not be logistically feasible in the near future. Thereupon the Joint Chiefs issued a directive authorizing the Luzon invasion. As feared by the plan's opponents, the Luzon campaign became the costliest of the Pacific war in American troops killed in action. Whether the conquest of Luzon was necessary would remain moot, but the question of necessity would be raised about other operations also, especially the invasion of the Palaus. In fact, the only island assaults whose necessity has not been questioned are the Marianas operations29
在1943年至1944年间，麦克阿瑟从新几内亚东北部一路推进至莫罗泰岛，巧妙地利用了相对匮乏且不均衡的后勤支援，最大限度地发挥了作用，并通过精明的包围战术瓦解了日军的据点。然而，从1945年初开始，当他拥有强大的兵力和充足的补给时，他却下令在吕宋岛以南开展一些看似无关紧要的行动。尽管美军第六集团军在吕宋岛与山下奉文麾下强大的日军作战时急需增援，麦克阿瑟却派遣美军第八集团军进攻菲律宾南部被日军绕过的驻军。他不顾华盛顿策划者的建议，派遣澳大利亚第一军前往婆罗洲，并在攻占塔拉坎、文莱湾和巴厘巴板的战斗中遭受了惨重损失。他还命令澳大利亚第一集团军歼灭布干维尔岛、新不列颠岛和新几内亚东北部孤立的日军部队，结果导致双方伤亡惨重。如果参谋长联席会议预料到麦克阿瑟会在吕宋岛以南作战，他们很可能会同意金的要求，在征服荷属新几内亚后结束西南太平洋攻势。30
In his 1943–1944 campaigns from Northeast New Guinea through Morotai, MacArthur brilliantly exploited relatively meager and unbalanced logistical support to the maximum and neutralized Japanese strongholds by shrewd envelopments. But from early 1945 onward, when he had strong forces and adequate supplies, he ordered operations south of Luzon that appear tangential. Although the U.S. Sixth Army needed reinforcements in its fight against Yamashita's formidable army on Luzon, MacArthur sent the American Eighth Army to assault bypassed enemy garrisons in the southern Philippines. Against the advice of Washington planners, he dispatched the Australian I Corps to Borneo where it sustained heavy losses in taking Tarakan, Brunei Bay, and Balikpapan. He also ordered the Australian First Army to annihilate the isolated enemy units on Bougainville, New Britain, and Northeast New Guinea with resultant high casualties. Had the Joint Chiefs expected MacArthur's operations south of Luzon, they probably would have concurred with King's demand to terminate the Southwest Pacific offensive after the conquest of Dutch New Guinea.30
尽管参谋长联席会议为美军在被划定为中缅印战区的地区建立了指挥体系，但美国对该地区的军事战略贡献甚微。该地区的后勤保障优先级一直很低，太平洋两大司令部与史迪威将军的中缅印司令部之间也缺乏规划协调。1944年初，参谋长联席会议曾考虑一项由尼米兹的部队入侵中国南海岸的计划，该计划本应与中缅印司令部合作，但由于当年夏天日军在该地区发动攻势，该计划被搁置。蒙巴顿勋爵领导的英国东南亚司令部与史迪威及其参谋人员关系不睦，双方也都未能与蒋介石的司令部建立良好的沟通。英美中三国高级指挥官之间的关系常常充斥着民族偏见、互不信任和怨恨。
In spite of the Joint Chiefs' establishment of a command structure for American forces in what was designated the China-Burma-India theater, the American contribution to military strategy for that region was minimal. Its logistical priority was always low, and there was no planning coordination between the two Pacific headquarters and General Stilwell's China-Burma-India Command. In early 1944 the Joint Chiefs considered a plan for an invasion of the South China coast by Nimitz's forces that would have involved collaboration with the China-Burma-India Command, but it was shelved when the Japanese mounted an offensive in the region that summer. The British Southeast Asia Command under Admiral Lord Mountbatten seldom enjoyed harmonious relations with Stilwell and his staff, and neither group achieved good communications with Chiang's headquarters. All too often national prejudice and mutual distrust and resentment characterized relations between senior British, American, and Chinese commanders.
1945年夏天，英美联合参谋长将东印度群岛的作战管辖权从麦克阿瑟移交给蒙巴顿。战争在东南亚司令部启动收复马来亚和新加坡的计划行动之前就结束了。在日本投降后，荷兰军队返回之前，英军进入爪哇岛和苏门答腊岛，监督部队投降并恢复社会秩序，但却首当其冲地遭受了印尼民族主义运动早期暴力冲突的冲击。一些历史学家对英、美、中三军指挥部之间缺乏更有效的合作感到遗憾，但没有人指出，如果他们能够将有限的军事资源集中起来，用于优先任务之外的其他用途，将会如何显著影响该地区的军事局势。每个国家集团都对其他集团的动机抱有过多的怀疑，以至于无法协调一致地开展决定性的联合行动。他们最引人注目的一次合作——1944-1945年收复缅甸——也充满了摩擦和敷衍了事的合作。<sup> 31</sup>
In the summer of 1945 the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs transferred the East Indies' operational jurisdiction from MacArthur to Mountbatten. The war ended before the Southeast Asia Command could launch its planned operations to retake Malaya and Singapore. Before the Dutch returned after Japan's capitulation, British forces moved into Java and Sumatra to oversee troop surrenders and to restore civil order, but caught the brunt of the early violence of the rising Indonesian nationalist movement. Some historians have lamented the lack of better cooperation among the British, American, and Chinese commands, but none has shown how a pooling of their few available military resources beyond higher-priority commitments could have significantly affected the military situation in the region. Each national group was too suspicious of the others' motives to coordinate efforts for a decisive joint venture. Their most notable endeavor together, the recapture of Burma in 1944–1945, was characterized by friction and half-hearted cooperation.31
1943年至1945年间，美军在火力、机动性和物资资源方面拥有绝对优势，因此在战略和指挥安排上存在一些缺陷是可以容忍的，尤其因为他们掌握了许多日军的计划、行动、部队兵力和作战序列。早在珍珠港事件之前，美国的密码破译专家就已经破解了日本“紫色”密码机加密的外交信号。这套用于收集情报的解密系统被称为“魔法”（Magic）。在整个战争期间，“魔法”都是盟军重要的情报来源，尽管其主要关注的是非军事领域，因为截获的信号是日本外务省与其外交官之间的信息。虽然“魔法”的存在早已为人所知，但直到近几年，非官方研究人员才得以接触到美国密码分析专家从日本战时海军和陆军密码中获取的大量信息。当时，这些数据被正式称为“超级情报”（Ultra intelligence），但它不应与通过破解德国恩尼格玛密码机加密的更为人熟知的“超级情报”（Ultra material）混淆。通过“魔术”（Magic）行动，尤其是“超级”（Ultra）截获的情报，对美国舰队在中途岛海战和其他战役中的作用至关重要；对美国潜艇在对日本商船队进行毁灭性打击的行动中发挥了关键作用；对中太平洋和西南太平洋陆军陆空军在众多作战行动中也至关重要。“超级”行动还造成了日本战略领导层无法估量的损失：1943年4月，联合舰队司令、杰出的海军战略家山本五十六在布干维尔岛上空遭到伏击身亡。毫无疑问，太平洋战争中许多尚未被揭示的真相将从此前封闭的美国信号情报档案中浮出水面，就像1973年后关于欧洲战争中“超级”行动的著述一样，这些档案将迫使人们重新审视此前对双方战略、战术和指挥的评估。<sup> 32</sup>
Possessing great superiority in firepower, mobility, and material resources in 1943–1945, the Americans could afford some flaws in their strategy and command arrangements, particularly since they were privy to many of the Japanese plans, moves, unit strengths, and orders of battle. Long before the Pearl Harbor raid American code and cipher experts had penetrated diplomatic signals enciphered on Japan's Purple machine. This decrypting system of gathering intelligence data was known as Magic. Throughout the war Magic was a valuable Allied source of intelligence, though largely on nonmilitary matters because the signal intercepts were messages between the Japanese Foreign Office and its diplomats. Although Magic's existence has long been known, only in recent years have nonofficial researchers gained access to the large body of information derived by American cryptanalysts from Japan's wartime navy and army codes. At the time this data was officially termed Ultra intelligence, though it should not be confused with the better-known Ultra material acquired by breaking German messages enciphered on the Enigma device. The information obtained through Magic and especially Ultra intercepts was vital to the American fleet at Midway and other battles, to its submarines in their devastating campaign against Japan's merchant marine, and to Central and Southwest Pacific army ground and air forces in numerous operations. Ultra was responsible also for an incalculable loss to Japanese strategic leadership: the fatal aerial ambush of Admiral Yamamoto, Combined Fleet commander and a brilliant naval strategist, over Bougainville in April 1943. Undoubtedly much of what remains to be learned about the Pacific conflict will emerge from the formerly closed American signal intelligence records and, like post-1973 writings about the Ultra of the European war, will compel revisions of earlier evaluations of strategy, tactics, and command on both sides.32
尽管《太平洋机密》一书的影响多种多样，但未来的学者很可能会得出这样的结论：太平洋战争对军事战略史最重要的贡献是美国的两栖作战体系。如果不是当时已经发展出针对敌占岛屿（尤其是防御严密的岛屿）的进攻战略和战术理论，美国最高指挥部所采取的海上战略恐怕只会沦为不切实际的“彩色”系列作战计划。20世纪30年代初，在弗吉尼亚州匡蒂科，海军陆战队指挥官开始着手研究如何进行两栖进攻。他们发现，这需要新的作战技巧、高度的诸兵种协同作战能力，以及特殊的登陆艇和武器装备。1943年11月的塔拉瓦岛登陆战表明，尼米兹的海军和海军陆战队仍有许多需要学习的地方，但到了次年夏天进攻马里亚纳群岛时，他们已经掌握了两栖作战的精髓。与此同时，在西南太平洋部队进行的八十多次两栖登陆作战中，陆军部队凭借强大的陆基空军和相对有限的海军支援，成功地展现了多种两栖攻击战术。33
In spite of the varied implications of the Pacific Ultra, scholars in the future may well conclude that the most important contribution of the Pacific war to the history of military strategy was the American system of amphibious warfare. The maritime strategy adopted by the American High Command would have amounted to little more than the unrealistic Color series of war plans had strategic and tactical doctrine not already been developed for assaulting enemy-held islands, especially strongly defended ones. In the early 1930s at Quantico, Virginia, Fleet Marine Force leaders began to work on the problems of conducting amphibious offensives, which they found required new combat techniques and a high degree of combined-arms coordination, as well as special landing craft and weapons. The Tarawa invasion of November 1943 showed that Nimitz's navy and marine forces still had much to learn, but by the time of their assaults on the Marianas the next summer they had mastered the intricacies of amphibious warfare. Meanwhile, in the more than eighty amphibious landings by Southwest Pacific units, army troops with strong land-based air and only moderate naval support demonstrated successful variations of amphibious attack.33
太平洋战争将永远因原子弹的引入而载入史册，而原子弹的出现又引发了战后军事战略的革命。杜鲁门总统和战争部长史汀生确立了使用原子弹的官方理由，声称原子弹能够迅速结束战争，并挽救远超广岛和长崎原子弹爆炸所造成伤亡人数的生命，尤其是在必须进行九州和本州入侵的情况下。然而，自1945年8月以来，越来越多的证据表明，在空中打击、海上封锁以及苏联参战的压力下，日本可能很快就会投降，而无需诉诸原子战争。此外，修正主义学者认为，华盛顿决定使用原子武器可能受到了对苏联态度转变的影响，而这一转变后来被证明是冷战形成阶段的一部分。<sup> 34</sup>
The Pacific war will always remain distinctive for the introduction of the atomic bomb, which, in turn, precipitated a postwar revolution in military strategy. President Truman and Secretary of War Stimson established the official rationale for its use, maintaining that it would end the war quickly and save many times the number of lives lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, particularly if the Kyushu and Honshu invasions had to be staged. Growing evidence since August 1945, however, has indicated that Japan, under the pressures of aerial destruction, naval blockade, and the Soviet Union's entry into the war, may have surrendered shortly without the need for resorting to atomic warfare. Revisionist scholars, moreover, have argued that Washington's decision to use the atomic weapons may have been influenced by changing attitudes toward the Soviet Union in what later proved to be the formative stage of the Cold War.34
六年级
VI
本文并未将交战双方的任何一人描绘成在太平洋战争战略中扮演举足轻重的角色。总体而言，美日两国采取的战略早在1940年之前就已酝酿多年，凝聚了众多平民和士兵的心血。事实上，要厘清1941年至1945年间美国军事战略领域中个人的贡献，不仅困难重重，而且也找不到真正杰出的人物。参谋长联席会议的体制倾向于通过妥协和委员会讨论，或者说集体思考来制定战略。尽管一些对麦克阿瑟的赞誉之作称他是这场战争中最伟大的战略家之一，但实际上，他的作用通常仅限于执行参谋长联席会议的战略指令，而且主要集中在太平洋战区这一次要战场。例如，一些传记作家声称绕过拉包尔要塞的决定是麦克阿瑟做出的，但实际上，是参谋长联席会议否决了他提出的进攻方案后，下令对拉包尔进行包围。或许可以有力地论证金和山本五十六是海军战略的主要制定者。但金在回顾历史时认为，美国在战争中的整体军事战略的制定是一系列妥协的结果，他在这些妥协中败下阵来。另一方面，山本五十六在战争中期阵亡，使得所有关于他如何调整战略以适应战争后期发展的问题都只能是推测。35
This essay has portrayed no one on either side as playing a paramount role in the strategies of the war in the Pacific. On the whole, the strategies adopted by America and Japan had developed over many years before 1940 and involved the efforts of scores of civilians and soldiers. Indeed, the delineation of individual contributions in the realm of American military strategy from 1941 to 1945 not only is difficult but reveals no persons who truly stand out. The Joint Chiefs system favored strategy making by compromise and by committee, or group thinking. Although adulatory works on MacArthur claim he was one of the great strategists of the war, in truth his role usually was confined to implementing strategic directives from the Joint Chiefs—and in the subordinate theater of Pacific operations. Some biographers have declared, for example, that the decision to bypass the stronghold of Rabaul was made by MacArthur, but actually the Joint Chiefs ordered its envelopment after overruling his proposal for an assault on it. Conceivably, strong cases could be made for Admirals King and Yamamoto as the principal shapers of naval strategy. But King, in looking back, saw the formulation of the overall American military strategy of the war as a series of compromises in which he lost more arguments than he won. On the other hand, Yamamoto's death at the midpoint of the war relegates to conjecture all questions of how he might have adapted his strategy to the later developments of the conflict.35
尽管太平洋战争给日本和美国的国家战略造成了巨大的人力物力损失，但其后果对两国而言远比对那些失去殖民地和对远东地区经济主导地位的前欧洲帝国主义列强更为有利。日本扩张主义者控制中国的旧目标在1937年至1945年的中日战争泥潭中破灭，并随着战后中国共产党政权的建立和苏联在东北亚的扩张而彻底埋葬。然而，日本20世纪20年代温和派和国际主义领导人所追求的国家目标在战后基本得以实现。在1945年至1952年美国控制下的日本之后，日本开始了惊人的经济繁荣，其国民生产总值跃居世界第三，并使其在东南亚地区获得了丰厚的经济利益，同时与西方建立了极具竞争力的贸易关系。与 1902 年的英日同盟相比，1951 年与西方最强大的国家签订的安全条约对日本更有利，使日本能够主要依靠美国军队进行防御，从而将大部分国家预算用于非军事需求。
The consequences of the Pacific war for the national strategies of Japan and the United States, despite considerable losses in human and material resources, were more favorable than for the former European imperialist powers in the Far East, who lost both their colonies and their lucrative economic dominance of much of that region. The Japanese expansionists' old aim of controlling China died in the morass of the Sino-Japanese war of 1937–1945 and was buried by the postwar emergence of the Chinese Communist state and the expanded Soviet presence in Northeast Asia. But the national objectives pursued by Japan's moderate and internationalist leaders of the 1920s were largely realized in the war's aftermath. Following the American-controlled occupation of 1945–1952, Japan began a phenomenal economic boom that propelled its gross national product to the third highest in the world and that gave it profitable economic penetrations into Southeast Asia and strongly competitive trade relations with the West. Far more beneficial than the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, its 1951 security pact with the West's most powerful nation enabled Japan to rely primarily on American forces for its defense and thereby to devote most of its national budget to nonmilitary needs.
二战结束后，美国牢牢确立了对中西太平洋大部分地区的战略控制。更重要的是，罗斯福幻想中强大的亲美中国落空，美国转而与日本结盟，日本是一个坚定的盟友，致力于资本主义、反共产主义以及独具日本特色的民主模式。英国作为美国对抗轴心国的关键伙伴，战后其政治和经济影响力持续下降。而美国历史上首次与一个非西方强国结盟，这个国家或许是其在持续对抗共产主义国家的战略博弈中最宝贵的盟友，也是其如何获取贸易利润的良师益友。日本和美国似乎都重新构建了始于20世纪20年代、但因1931年至1945年间的大萧条和军国主义而中断的国际合作框架。
In the wake of the Second World War the United States firmly established its strategic control over much of the Central and West Pacific. More important, in lieu of Roosevelt's illusion of a strong pro-American China, the United States gained in Japan a strong ally that was committed to capitalism, anticommunism, and a uniquely Japanese version of democracy. While Britain, America's key partner against the Axis, declined steadily after the war in political and economic influence, the United States, for the first time in its history, found itself allied with a non-Western power that was perhaps its most valuable friend in the ongoing strategic maneuvering against the communist states and its virtual tutor in how to turn trade profits. Both Japan and America seemed to have returned to building the framework of international cooperation that was begun in the 1920s but interrupted by the Great Depression and militarism between 1931 and 1945.
1 Ryusaku Tsunoda 等人编，《日本传统的来源》（纽约，1958 年），第 718-758 页；Akira Iriye，《后帝国主义时代：远东新秩序的探索，1921-1933 年》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1965 年），第 17-22 页、第 222-23 页、第 300-303 页；Roger Dingman，《太平洋的权力：海军武器限制的起源，1914-1922 年》（芝加哥，1976 年），第 63 页、第 194-195 页、第 218 页。
1 Ryusaku Tsunoda et al., comps., Sources of the Japanese Tradition (New York, 1958), 718–58; Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 17–22, 222–23, 300–303; Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: the Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922 (Chicago, 1976), 63, 194–95, 218.
2 Akira Iriye，《权力与文化：日美战争，1941–1945》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1981 年），第 2–16、28、34–39、49 页；Saburo Ienaga，《太平洋战争：第二次世界大战与日本人，1931–1945》（纽约，1978 年），第 57–96 页。
2 Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 2–16, 28, 34–39, 49; Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945 (New York, 1978), 57–96.
3 Robert JC Butow，《东条英机与战争的到来》（普林斯顿，1961 年），第 133-163 页；Hilary Conroy，“野村吉三郎：戏剧与欺骗的外交”，载于Richard D. Burns 和 Edward M. Bennett 编，《危机中的外交官：美中日关系，1919-1941 年》（加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉，1974 年），第 297-316 页；Basil Collier，《远东战争，1941-1945 年：军事史》（纽约，1969 年），第 94-97 页。
3 Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, 1961), 133–63; Hilary Conroy, “Nomura Kichisaburo: The Diplomacy of Drama and Deception,” in Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941, ed. Richard D. Burns and Edward M. Bennett (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1974), 297–316; Basil Collier, The War in the Far East, 1941–1945: A Military History (New York, 1969), 94–97.
4 Alexander Kiralfy，“日本海军战略”，载于Edward Mead Earle 编，《现代战略的缔造者》（普林斯顿，1943 年），第 457–58、462–64、478、480–84 页；Clark G. Reynolds，“日本帝国的大陆战略”， 《美国海军学会会刊》 109（1983 年 8 月），第 65–70 页；Stephen E. Pelz，《珍珠港之争：第二次伦敦海军会议的失败与第二次世界大战的爆发》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1974 年），第 25–40 页；浅田贞夫，“日本海军与美国”，载于Dorothy Borg 和 Shumpei Okamoto 编， 《珍珠港事件史： 1931–1941 年日美关系》（纽约，1973 年），第 225–59 页。
4 Alexander Kiralfy, “Japanese Naval Strategy,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943), 457–58, 462–64, 478, 480–84; Clark G. Reynolds, “The Continental Strategy of Imperial Japan” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 109 (August 1983), 65–70; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 25–40; Asada Sadao, “The Japanese Navy and the United States,” in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York, 1973), 225–59
5 Gordon W. Prange 等人，《黎明时分我们入睡：珍珠港不为人知的故事》（纽约，1981 年），第 547-50 页，第 582-83 页；Pelz，《奔向珍珠港》，第 212-28 页；Louis Morton，“日本的战争决定”，《美国海军学会会刊》 80（1954 年 12 月），第 1325-35 页。
5 Gordon W. Prange et al., At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York, 1981), 547–50, 582–83; Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, 212–28; Louis Morton, “The Japanese Decision for War,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80 (December 1954), 1325–35.
6克里斯托弗·索恩，《同类型的盟友：美国、英国与对日战争，1941-1945》（纽约，1978 年），第 22-24 页、第 40-45 页；弗雷德·格林，“1904-1940 年美国国家政策的军事视角”，《美国历史评论》第 67 卷（1961 年 1 月），第 354-377 页；塞缪尔·E·莫里森，《两洋战争：美国海军在第二次世界大战中的简史》（波士顿，1963 年），第 3-45 页。另见多萝西·博格，《美国与1933-1938 年远东危机》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1964 年）。
6 Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945 (New York, 1978), 22–24, 40–45; Fred Greene, “The Military View of American National Policy, 1904–1940,” American Historical Review 67 (January 1961), 354–77; Samuel E. Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston, 1963), 3–45. See also Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938 (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).
7 Louis Morton，《战略与指挥：前两年。美国陆军在第二次世界大战中的历史[以下简称USAWW2]：太平洋战争》（华盛顿特区，1962年），第21-44页；Grace P. Hayes，《二战参谋长联席会议史：对日战争》（安纳波利斯，1982年），第4-8页；Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr.，“美国海军的作用”，载于《珍珠港事件史》，Borg和Okamoto编，第197-223页。
7 Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. United States Army in World War II [USAWW2 hereafter]: The War in the Pacific (Washington, D.C., 1962), 21–44; Grace P. Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War against Japan (Annapolis, 1982), 4–8; Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., “The Role of the United States Navy,” in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 197–223.
8 Morton，《战略与指挥》，67-91；Hayes，《参谋长联席会议史》，8-15；Forrest C. Pogue，《乔治·C·马歇尔》，3卷（纽约，1963-），2:122-27；TB Kittredge，“美国国防政策与战略，1941”，《美国新闻与世界报道》，1954年12月3日，53-63，110-39。
8 Morton, Strategy and Command, 67–91; Hayes, History of the Joint Chiefs, 8–15; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, 3 vols. to date (New York, 1963- ), 2:122–27; T. B. Kittredge, “United States Defense Policy and Strategy, 1941,” U.S. News and World Report, December 3, 1954, 53–63, 110–39.
9丸山正雄，《现代日本政治中的思想与行为》，伊万·莫里斯编（伦敦，1963 年），第 90-95 页；卡尔·博伊德，《非常使节：大岛弘将军与第三帝国的外交，1934-1939 年》（华盛顿特区，1980 年），全文；弗兰克·W·伊克莱，《德日关系，1936-1941 年》（纽约，1956 年），第 111-118 页；保罗·W·施罗德，《轴心国同盟与日美关系，1941 年》（伊萨卡，1958 年），第 126-153 页。
9 Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, ed. Ivan Morris (London, 1963), 90–95; Carl Boyd, The Extraordinary Envoy: General Hiroshi Oshima and Diplomacy in the Third Reich, 1934–1939 (Washington, D.C., 1980), passim; Frank W. Iklé, German-Japanese Relations, 1936–1941 (New York, 1956), 111–18; Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941 (Ithaca, 1958), 126–53.
10 Iriye，《权力与文化》，47、63、90-97、110-112、223-225；Ienaga，《太平洋战争》，72-96、130-142、165-171。最新的研究是迪克·威尔逊的《当老虎战斗时：中日战争的故事，1937-1945》（纽约，1982年）。
10 Iriye, Power and Culture, 47, 63, 90–97, 110–12, 223–25; Ienaga, Pacific War, 72–96, 130–42, 165–71. The most recent study is Dick Wilson, When Tigers Fight: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945 (New York, 1982).
11入江，《权力与文化》，64–66、72、118–21、153–54；家永，《太平洋战争》，153–80。另见 Joyce C. Lebra 编，《二战期间日本的大东亚共荣圈：精选读物与文献》（纽约，1975 年）；Harry J. Benda，《新月与旭日：日本占领下的印度尼西亚伊斯兰教，1942–1945》（海牙，1958 年）。
11 Iriye, Power and Culture, 64–66, 72, 118–21, 153–54; Ienaga, Pacific War, 153–80. See also Joyce C. Lebra, ed., Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents (New York, 1975); Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945 (The Hague, 1958).
12 Robert JC Butow，《日本投降的决定》（斯坦福，加利福尼亚州，1954 年），112-41；Iriye，《权力与文化》，86-89、182-83、235-36、242-48。
12 Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, Calif., 1954), 112–41; Iriye, Power and Culture, 86–89, 182–83, 235–36, 242–48.
13卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特编辑和翻译，修订版（普林斯顿，1984 年），第 88 页。
13 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1984), 88.
14 Charles A. Willoughby 编，《麦克阿瑟将军报告》，4 卷（华盛顿特区，1966 年），1:458–60、464，2:64–65，3:665。
14 Charles A. Willoughby, ed., Reports of General MacArthur, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1966), 1:458–60, 464, 2:64–65, 3:665.
15约翰·B·伦德斯特罗姆，《第一次南太平洋战役：太平洋舰队战略，1941年12月至1942年6月》（安纳波利斯，1976年），第195-205页；莫顿， 《战略与指挥》，第444-453页、第534-547页、第584-591页；雷诺兹，《大陆战略》，第14-16页；C·范恩·伍德沃德，《莱特湾海战》（纽约，1965年），第7-12页、第40-41页、第232-235页。克拉克·G·雷诺兹，《快速航母：航空海军的锻造》（纽约，1968年）；以及克莱·布莱尔，《无声的胜利：美国对日潜艇战》（费城，1975年），对战略和作战都有深刻的见解。另见 HP Willmott，《帝国的平衡：日本和盟军太平洋战略至1942 年 4 月》（安纳波利斯，1982 年）；HP Willmott，《屏障与标枪：日本和盟军太平洋战略， 1942 年 2 月至 6 月》（安纳波利斯，1983 年）。
15 John B. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941–June 1942 (Annapolis, 1976),195–205; Morton, Strategy and Command, 444–53, 534–47, 584–91; Reynolds, “Continental Strategy,” 14–16; C. Vann Woodward, The Battle for Leyte Gulf (New York 1965), 7–12, 40–41, 232–35. Perceptive on strategy as well as operations are Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy (New York 1968); and Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan (Philadelphia, 1975). See also H. P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 (Annapolis, 1982); H. P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942 (Annapolis, 1983).
16 Willoughby，《麦克阿瑟将军报告》，第1卷，第40-43页，第2卷，第54-58页，第3卷，第561-574页；Morton，《战略与指挥》，第235-236页；Masatake Okumiya和Jiro Horikoshi，《零式！》（纽约，1957年），第239-254页；美国战略轰炸调查，《对日本官员的审讯》，2卷（华盛顿特区，1946年），全文。另见Saburo Hayashi和Alvin D. Coox，《甲军：太平洋战争中的日本陆军》（弗吉尼亚州匡蒂科，1959年）；Raymond J. O'Connor编，《二战中的日本海军》（安纳波利斯，1970年）。
16 Willoughby, Reports of General MacArthur, 1:40–43, 2:54–58, 3:561–74; Morton, Strategy and Command, 235–36; Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi, Zero! (New York, 1957), 239–54; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1946), passim. See also Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, Va., 1959); Raymond J. O'Connor, ed., The Japanese Navy in World War II (Annapolis, 1970).
17 LD Meo，《日本对澳大利亚的无线电战争，1941-1945 年》（墨尔本，1968 年），26-32；伍德沃德，《莱特湾之战》，18-20；东条布图，411-16；家永，太平洋战争，98-106。
17 L. D. Meo, Japan's Radio War on Australia, 1941–1945 (Melbourne, 1968), 26–32; Woodward, Battle for Leyte Gulf, 18–20; Butow, Tojo, 411–16; Ienaga, Pacific War, 98–106.
18 Kent R. Greenfield，《第二次世界大战中的美国战略：重新思考》（巴尔的摩，1963 年），第 4-5 页、第 7 页；Samuel E. Morison，《战略与妥协》（波士顿，1958 年），第 17-22 页；Maurice Matloff，《1943-1944 年联盟战争战略规划》，载于《美国二战史：战争部》（华盛顿特区，1959 年），第 395-401 页；Richard M. Leighton 和 Robert W. Coakley，《 1940-1943 年全球后勤与战略》，载于《美国二战史：战争部》（华盛顿特区，1955 年），第 13-17 页、第 662-68 页、第 709-721 页、第 732-35 页；Hayes，《参谋长联席会议史》，第 104-120 页。
18 Kent R. Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore, 1963), 4–5, 7; Samuel E. Morison, Strategy and Compromise (Boston, 1958), 17–22; Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944. USAWW2: The War Department (Washington, D.C., 1959), 395–401; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943. USAWW2: The War Department (Washington, D.C., 1955), 13–17, 662–68, 709–721, 732–35; Hayes, History of the joint Chiefs, 104–120.
19 Thorne， 《同类型的盟友》，第 170-83 页、第 322-27 页、第 424-39 页、第 563-80 页；Michael Schaller，《美国在中国的十字军东征，1938-1945 年》（纽约，1979 年），第 90-99 页、第 122-23 页、第 171-78 页；Herbert Feis，《中国纠葛：从珍珠港到马歇尔使团的美国在中国的努力》（纽约，1965 年），第 3-13 页、第 55-62 页、第 290-303 页；Barbara W. Tuchman，《史迪威与美国在中国的经验，1911-45 年》（纽约，1970 年），第 237-38 页、第 491-502 页。
19 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 170–83, 322–27, 424–39, 563–80; Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945 (New York, 1979), 90–99, 122–23, 171–78; Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (New York, 1965), 3–13, 55–62, 290–303; Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45 (New York, 1970), 237–38, 491–502.
20 Iriye，《权力与文化》，第 247-48 页；Thorne，《同一种盟友》，第 224-28 页、699-730 页。
20 Iriye, Power and Culture, 247–48; Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 224–28, 699–730.
21 Hayes，《参谋长联席会议史》，第 88-90 页；Morton，《战略与指挥》，第 240-44 页。
21 Hayes, History of the Joint Chiefs, 88–90; Morton, Strategy and Command, 240–44.
22 Roger J. Bell，《不平等的盟友：澳大利亚与美国的关系和太平洋战争》（墨尔本，1977 年），第 226-32 页；Hayes，《同类盟友》，第 630-38 页；Thorne，《参谋长联席会议史》，第 252-67 页、第 364-69 页、第 479-87 页、第 645-51 页；Morison，《两洋战争》，第 423-24 页。
22 Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War (Melbourne, 1977), 226–32; Hayes, Allies of a Kind, 630–38; Thorne, History of the joint Chiefs, 252–67, 364–69, 479–87, 645–51; Morison, Two-Ocean War, 423–24.
23 Louis Morton，“苏联对日战争的干预”，《外交事务》 40（1962 年 7 月），652–66；Schaller，《美国十字军东征》，209–212；Iriye，《权力与文化》，181–82、220、230–33、241–47、252；Peter W. Vigor 和 Christopher Donnelly，“满洲战役及其对现代战略的意义”，《比较战略》 2（1980 年），163–65。
23 Louis Morton, “The Soviet Intervention in the War with Japan,” Foreign Affairs 40 (July 1962), 652–66; Schaller, U.S. Crusade, 209–212; Iriye, Power and Culture, 181–82, 220, 230–33, 241–47, 252; Peter W. Vigor and Christopher Donnelly, “The Manchurian Campaign and Its Relevance to Modern Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 2 (1980), 163–65.
24 Hugh Borton，《美国战后日本投降前计划》（纽约，1967 年），第 3-37 页；Iriye，《权力与文化》，第 201-202 页、第 208-213 页、第 225-227 页。
24 Hugh Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York, 1967), 3–37; Iriye, Power and Culture, 201–202, 208–213, 225–27.
25 Kazuo Kawai，“Mokusatsu：日本对波茨坦公告的回应”，《太平洋历史评论》 19（1950 年 11 月），409–414；Butow，《日本的决定》，189–209；Hanson W. Baldwin，《战争中的重大错误》（纽约，1949 年），14–25；Brian L. Villa，“美国陆军、无条件投降和波茨坦公告”，《美国历史杂志》 63（1976 年 6 月），66–92。
25 Kazuo Kawai, “Mokusatsu: Japan's Response to the Potsdam Declaration,” Pacific Historical Review 19 (November 1950), 409–414; Butow, Japan's Decision, 189–209; Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York, 1949), 14–25; Brian L. Villa, “The U.S. Army, Unconditional Surrender, and the Potsdam Declaration,” Journal of American History 63 (June 1976), 66–92.
26 Hayes，《参谋长联席会议史》，第 93-103 页、第 265-272 页；Willoughby，《麦克阿瑟将军报告》，第 1 卷，第 30-31 页；Morton，《战略与指挥》，第 244-263 页；Louis Morton，“太平洋司令部：军种间关系研究”（哈蒙纪念讲座，美国空军学院，1961 年），第 6-29 页。
26 Hayes, History of the Joint Chiefs, 93–103, 265–72; Willoughby, Reports of General MacArthur, 1:30–31; Morton, Strategy and Command, 244–63; Louis Morton, “Pacific Command: A Study in Interservice Relations,” (Harmon Memorial Lecture, U.S. Air Force Academy, 1961), 6–29.
27道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟，《回忆录》（纽约，1964 年），172-73 页。
27 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1964), 172–73.
28 EB Potter 和 Chester W. Nimitz，《太平洋的胜利：海军与日本的斗争》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯，1963 年），第 101-103 页。
28 E. B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, Triumph in the Pacific: The Navy' Struggle against Japan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), 101–103.
29 Robert R. Smith，“吕宋岛对台湾” ，载于 Kent R. Greenfield 编辑的《指挥决策》（华盛顿特区，1960 年），第 461-77 页；Pogue，《乔治·C·马歇尔》，第 3 卷，第 451-54 页；Hayes，《同类盟友》，第 603-624 页；Clark G. Reynolds，“麦克阿瑟作为海上战略家”，《海军战争学院评论》第 32 卷（1980 年 3 月-4 月），第 81-82 页；D. Clayton James，《麦克阿瑟的岁月》，3 卷（波士顿，1970-85 年），第 2 卷，第 521-42 页。
29 Robert R. Smith, “Luzon Versus Formosa,” in Command Decisions, ed. Kent R. Greenfield (Washington, D.C., 1960), 461–77; Pogue, George C. Marshall, 3:451–54; Hayes, Allies of a Kind, 603–624; Clark G. Reynolds, “MacArthur as Maritime Strategist,” Naval War College Review 32 (March-April 1980), 81–82; D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 3 vols. (Boston, 1970–85), 2:521–42.
30 Robert R. Smith，《菲律宾的胜利》。《美国二战：太平洋战争》（华盛顿特区，1963 年），第 363-364、389、539、584-585 页；Gavin Long，《最后的战役》。《澳大利亚在 1939-1945 年战争中的表现》，第一辑（堪培拉，1963 年），第 43-44、389、547、609 页；Samuel E. Morison，《菲律宾的解放：吕宋岛、棉兰老岛、维萨亚斯群岛，1944-1945 年》。《美国海军在第二次世界大战中的作战史》，第 13 卷（波士顿，1959 年），第 214 页； D. Clayton James，“麦克阿瑟在 1945 年的包围战略失误”，《参数》 10（1980 年 6 月），26-32。
30 Robert R. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines. USAWW2: The War in the Pacific (Washington, D.C., 1963), 363–64, 389, 539, 584–85; Gavin Long, The Final Campaigns. Australia in the War of 1939–1945, series 1 (Canberra, 1963), 43–44, 389, 547, 609; Samuel E. Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945. History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 13 (Boston, 1959), 214; D. Clayton James, “MacArthur's Lapses from an Envelopment Strategy in 1945,” Parameters 10 (June 1980), 26–32.
31 Hayes， 《同类型的盟友》，437–38、569–79、588–90；Schaller，《美国十字军东征》，52–53、102–110、138、144、151–55、164–75；Thorne，《参谋长联席会议史》，333–39、450–55、586–92。
31 Hayes, Allies of a kind, 437–38, 569–79, 588–90; Schaller, U.S. Crusade, 52–53, 102–110, 138, 144, 151–55, 164–75; Thorne, History of the Joint Chiefs, 333–39, 450–55, 586–92.
32 Ronald Lewin，《美国魔法：密码、密文和日本战败》（纽约，1982 年），第 14-16、106、223-225、246-247、293-295 页；WJ Holmes，《双刃剑：二战期间美国海军在太平洋的情报行动》（安纳波利斯，1979 年），第 125-126 页。
32 Ronald Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan (New York, 1982), 14–16, 106, 223–25, 246–47, 293–95; W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II (Annapolis, 1979), 125–26.
33 Jeter A. Isley 和 Philip A. Crowl，《美国海军陆战队与两栖战争：太平洋战争的理论与实践》（普林斯顿，1951 年），第 45-71 页，第 580-90 页；Daniel E. Barbey，《麦克阿瑟的两栖海军：第七两栖部队作战，1943-1945 年》（安纳波利斯，1969 年），第 11-20 页，第 43-49 页，第 357-58 页。另见 George C. Dyer，《两栖人征服世界：里士满·凯利·特纳海军上将的故事》，2 卷（华盛顿特区，1972 年）。
33 Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, 1951), 45–71, 580–90; Daniel E. Barbey, MacArthur's Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–1945 (Annapolis, 1969), 11–20, 43–49, 357–58. See also George C. Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1972).
34 Gregg Herken，《制胜武器：冷战中的原子弹，1945-1950》（纽约，1982 年），第 4-42 页；Martin J. Sherwin，《被摧毁的世界：原子弹与大联盟》（纽约，1975 年），第 61-63 页；Butow，《日本的决定》，第 142-209 页；美国战略轰炸调查， 《日本结束战争的斗争》（华盛顿特区，1946 年），第 3-13 页；Louis Morton，“使用原子弹的决定”，《外交事务》 25（1957 年 1 月），第 334-353 页。
34 Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York, 1982), 4–42; Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1975), 61–63; Butow, Japan's Decision, 142–209; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (Washington, D.C., 1946), 3–13; Louis Morton, “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 25 (January 1957), 334–53.
35关于金和山下，参见欧内斯特·J·金和沃尔特·M·怀特希尔，《海军元帅欧内斯特·J·金》（波士顿，1980 年）；阿川博之，《不情愿的海军上将：山本五十六和帝国海军》（纽约，1980 年）。
35 On King and Yamashita, see Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston, 1980); Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy (New York, 1980).
25. 前两代核战略家
25. The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists
我1945年7月，第一颗原子弹在新墨西哥州进行试验。次月，生产线下线的第二颗和第三颗原子弹在日本投下。自那以后，尽管主要强国已积累了数万颗原子弹，且其破坏性和复杂性大幅提升，但原子弹却从未被用于实战。因此，核战略的研究本质上就是对这些武器不使用的研究。关于原子弹在实战中实际运用方式的假设可能会影响其在和平时期的作用，但历史经验提供的指导意义甚微。
IN JULY 1945, the first atomic bomb was tested in New Mexico. The next month the second and third weapons off the production line were dropped on Japan. Since then no atomic weapons have been used in anger, although tens of thousands have been accumulated by the major powers and their destructiveness and sophistication increased immensely. The study of nuclear strategy is therefore the study of the nonuse of these weapons. Suppositions about their actual employment in combat may influence their peacetime role, but historical experience provides minimal guidance.
尽管缺乏实际的核武器作战行动，而且试图理解未来此类行动的发展走向也存在诸多固有难题，但这并未阻碍核战略的发展。事实上，寻求一种既能服务于明确的政治目标又不引发浩劫的核战略，一直是当今一些最杰出思想家关注的焦点。总的来说，这一领域的领导者大多是文职人员而非军方人士，因为相关问题更多地关乎国际政治的本质以及极端危机时期高层决策的性质，而非按照传统方式为传统目的使用武力。
The lack of actual campaigns involving nuclear weapons and the problems inherent in any attempt to make sense of how such a campaign might develop in the future has not inhibited the development of nuclear strategy. Indeed, the quest for a nuclear strategy that can serve definite political objectives without triggering a holocaust has occupied some of the best minds of our time. By and large the leaders in this field have been civilians rather than the military, because the issues involved relate more to the character of international politics and the nature of higher decision making in times of extreme crisis than to the employment of force along traditional lines for traditional purposes.
本文仅从战略角度探讨核武器问题，即从军事手段与政治目标的关联角度出发，而非从伦理、文化或裁军等角度进行探讨——尽管在这些领域已有丰富的文献资料。其次，本文将聚焦西方核战略的核心问题，即北大西洋公约组织（北约）依赖于首先动用核武器来遏制苏联的常规入侵，尽管苏联的核反击风险显而易见。本文考察的战略家和战略主要来自美国，因为在过去四十年中，美国的战略最为重要且最具创新性。要在一篇文章中全面阐述这一核心战略辩论已属不易；更遑论涵盖苏联、法国、英国和中国的相关辩论，以及核武器在东西方冲突之外的安全辩论中的相关性。
This essay will only consider nuclear weapons as a problem in strategy, that is, in terms of military means to be related to political ends, rather than as a problem in ethics or culture or disarmament although of course a rich literature exists in all of these areas. Second, it will focus on the dominant issue in Western nuclear strategy, which revolves around the dependence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the threat to use nuclear weapons first in an effort to contain a Soviet conventional invasion, despite the evident risk of a Soviet nuclear counterattack. The strategists and strategies examined are largely those of the United States, as these have been the most important and innovative over the past four decades. It is difficult enough in one essay to do justice to this central strategic debate; it would be impossible to cover the parallel debates in the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and China, let alone the relevance of nuclear weapons to security debates beyond the East-West conflict.1
我
I
核战略的起源可以追溯到1945年8月6日核时代正式到来之前。摧毁广岛和长崎的原子弹显然代表了大规模杀伤能力的巨大飞跃，但其影响仍然可以用当时盛行的战略空军理论来理解。
The origins of nuclear strategy go back to well before the formal arrival of the nuclear age on August 6, 1945. The bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki clearly represented a dramatic leap in capabilities for mass destruction, but their implications could still be understood in terms of the prevailing theories of strategic air power.
20世纪二三十年代的战略轰炸理论家们确立了一些基本原则，二战的经验修正了这些原则，但并未完全推翻它们：在空中作战中，进攻比防御更有优势；空袭的目标既可以是敌方的政治和经济中心，也可以是其军事力量；对这些目标的攻击能够为胜利做出独立而独特的贡献。空军力量的拥护者们过分强调了这些原则，这是他们的错误。轰炸机并非总能突破防线，平民百姓在面对轰炸时也比职业军人想象的更具韧性。空军力量是一种毁灭性的消耗战工具，但未必能造成决定性的打击，因此它本身无法带来胜利。
The theorists of strategic bombardment of the 1920s and 1930s had established certain precepts that the experience of World War II qualified but did not completely overturn: in the air the advantages lay with the offense rather than the defense; relevant targets for an air offense could be the enemy's political and economic centers as much as his military forces; attacks on these targets could provide an independent and distinctive contribution to victory. It had been in overstating these precepts that the air power enthusiasts had been in error. The bomber could not always get through and civil populations were more resilient in the face of bombardment than the professional warriors had supposed. Air power was a devastating instrument of attrition, but not necessarily of decisive shock, and thus was incapable of bringing about victory on its own accord.
随着原子弹的问世，有人认为那些拥护者并非错误，只是为时过早。核武器仍然需要飞机投放，而且在抵达目标之前可能仍然会有一场战斗，但破坏力的飞跃意味着一架飞机就能达到两百架飞机的威力。<sup> 2</sup>广岛和长崎被摧毁后被迫投降的日本的经历，残酷地提醒人们这种新型炸弹的威力和战略影响。核裂变最终与德国V- 2S火箭所展现的那种火箭技术相结合，预示着一种无法阻挡的武器即将问世。即将到来的灾难性打击，即使是最团结、最强大的社会也无法承受。在原子弹面前，所有其他形式的军事力量都将黯然失色。
With the arrival of the atomic bomb it was argued that the enthusiasts had not been in error—merely premature. Nuclear weapons would still depend on aircraft for delivery and there might still be a battle before they reached their targets, but the leap in destructive power meant that one aircraft could now achieve the same impact as two hundred.2 The experience of Japan, which had been forced to surrender after Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been destroyed, provided a grim reminder of the new bomb's power and strategic impact. The eventual marriage of nuclear fission with the sort of rocket technology exhibited in the German V-2S promised an unstoppable weapon. In prospect was a battering that not even the most cohesive and substantial society could withstand. In the face of the atomic bomb all other forms of military power would fade into the background.
认为原子弹的出现标志着空军力量的成熟，这种假设未免过于仓促；广岛的教训远比当时人们所承认的要复杂得多。到1945年8月，日本已接近投降，苏联参战以及广岛两座城市的陷落都令其措手不及。此外，攻击一个防空能力薄弱且没有任何反击能力的敌人，很难说是对这种新型武器效能的一次真正考验。3美国的原子弹储备仍然相对较少，尽管外界几乎无人能准确估算其规模，但稀缺性的局限性是显而易见的。4 当时人们认为有效的洲际导弹至少还需要二十年才能问世，而空军不愿面对飞行员过时的局面，竭尽全力使这一预测比实际需要的更加准确。5
The presumption that with the atomic bomb air power had come of age was somewhat premature; the lessons of Hiroshima were much more ambiguous than acknowledged at the time. By August 1945 the Japanese were already close to surrender and they were knocked off balance as much by the Soviet entry into the war as by the loss of the two cities. Moreover, an attack on an enemy that had minimal air defense and no ability to retaliate in any form was hardly a critical test of the new weapon's effectiveness.3 The American stockpile was still relatively small, and although few outsiders could guess just how small it was the limitations of scarcity were recognized.4 Effective intercontinental missiles were believed to be at least two decades away, and the air force, unwilling to contemplate the obsolescence of its pilots, was doing its best to make this prediction more accurate than it need have been.5
由于这些武器数量稀少，且只有在大量护航飞机的掩护下才能将运载飞机送达目标，因此其成本效益实际上受到了严重限制。<sup> 6</sup>此外，即使在经历了前一次战争的残酷教训之后，这些武器巨大的破坏力仍然令人难以接受。在这些武器被正式纳入军事战略之前，曾有人认真尝试通过联合国来控制它们，但最终因冷战时期日益加剧的猜忌而失败。<sup> 7 </sup>
Because the weapons were scarce and could only be delivered to their targets if the planes carrying them were protected against enemy defenses by a large number of accompanying aircraft, their cost effectiveness was in practice severely qualified.6 Furthermore, the enormity of their destructive power was still found distasteful, even after the hardening experience of the previous war. Before the weapons had been properly incorporated into military strategy, there was a serious but ultimately futile attempt to control them through the United Nations that floundered on the developing suspicions of the Cold War.7
正是冷战，特别是1948年夏季的柏林封锁，最终导致美国将原子弹纳入战争计划。<sup> 8</sup>尽管哈里·S·杜鲁门总统对在战争中使用原子弹的前景明显感到不安，但这一进程还是发生了。<sup> 9</sup> 1950年朝鲜战争爆发时，并未使用原子弹。此外，在1949年苏联首次原子弹试验之后，美国重新评估了其战略，并认为西方依靠核武器获取战略优势的日子屈指可数了。
It was the Cold War, and in particular the Berlin blockade of the summer of 1948, that eventually led to the incorporation of atomic bombs into American war plans.8 This occurred despite clear unease on the part of President Harry S. Truman at the prospect of using them in combat.9 When the Korean War broke out in 1950 no bombs were used. Furthermore, in the reappraisal of American strategy that followed the test of the first Soviet atomic device in 1949, it was presumed that the days in which the West could rely on nuclear weapons for its strategic advantage were numbered.
诚然，首要决策之一便是授权研发氢弹（热核弹），以进一步提升核领域的赌注，从而保持领先地位。尽管最终落后的前景开始变得与维持优势的愿望一样重要。<sup> 10</sup>这一时期的关键文件——国家安全委员会第68号文件（NSC-68）认为，氢弹将使美国的核优势在20世纪50年代的大部分时间里得以维持，但也认识到，随着苏联在核领域迎头赶上（就像苏联在裂变弹领域已经做到的那样），这种优势将会减弱。因此，这种优势最好被用作一种掩护，为启动常规武器重整进程提供掩护。<sup>11</sup> 1950年朝鲜入侵韩国为重整军备进程提供了刺激，否则，如果这一呼吁主要局限于NSC-68，那么重整军备进程可能早已胎死腹中。
To be sure, one of the first decisions was to raise the nuclear stakes even higher by authorizing development of the hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb in order to stay in the lead, although the prospect of eventual inferiority was starting to become as influential as the desire to maintain superiority.10 The key document of the period, NSC-68, believed the hydrogen bomb would preserve the American nuclear advantage for much of the 1950s, but recognized that this advantage would diminish as the Soviet Union caught up in this area as it had already done with fission bombs. The advantage was therefore best used as a shield, providing cover while a process of conventional rearmament was set in motion.11 The North Korean invasion of the South in 1950 provided the stimulus for the rearmament process, which might otherwise have been stillborn had the call been confined largely to NSC-68.
因此，杜鲁门政府留给艾森豪威尔总统的遗产在1953年1月可谓喜忧参半。一方面，美国推进氢弹计划，实际上是将“灭绝平民的政策推向了比原子弹本身更为极端的地步”。<sup> 12</sup>另一方面，由于这种灭绝威胁最终将波及西方国家，因此西方国家已经开始着手准备一种对核武器依赖性更低的防御方式，以捍卫自身利益。<sup> 13</sup>
The legacy of the Truman administration to President Dwight D. Eisenhower in January 1953 was therefore mixed. On the one hand, by proceeding with the hydrogen bomb, the United States was carrying “much further than the atomic bomb itself the policy of exterminating civilian populations.”12 On the other hand, largely because this threat of extermination would eventually face the people of the West, moves had already been made to prepare for a defense of Western interests far less dependent on nuclear weapons.13
二
II
总的来说，这一历史遗产暗示核武器的唯一长期作用是威慑敌方使用核武器。然而，在实践中，核武器从未真正退出历史舞台中心。这部分是因为短期发展掩盖了杜鲁门政府政策的深远影响，部分是因为新上任的艾森豪威尔政府迅速而有力地扭转了这一政策。但此后几十年的核战略发展历程，展现的是一种逐渐回归到简单观点的过程：在核僵局的情况下，这些威力巨大的武器库往往会相互抵消。
Taken together this legacy implied that the sole long-term role of nuclear weapons was to deter their use by the enemy. However, in practice the weapons never left center stage. This was in part because short-term developments obscured the implications of the Truman administration's policy, and in part because the incoming Eisenhower administration reversed the policy with alacrity and vigor. But the story of the decades of nuclear strategy that followed is of a gradual return to the simple view that, in conditions of nuclear stalemate, arsenals of these tremendously powerful weapons tend to cancel each other out.
20世纪50年代初期，事态发展太过迅速，以至于这样的评估难以令人信服。冷战的激烈程度赋予了原子弹一种紧迫的现实意义，如果国际关系更为缓和，这种现实意义或许不会如此凸显。此外，最显著的长期趋势是，武器供应量日益丰富，且破坏力不断增强。武器的大规模生产已经开始。氢弹的出现，使得破坏力没有了上限。此前，这种威力可以用数万吨TNT当量（千吨或KT）来衡量，例如广岛原子弹的16千吨TNT当量。而现在，衡量标准变成了数百万吨TNT当量（兆吨或MT）。人们可以设想，单个“城市毁灭者”的核弹就能摧毁一切。最后，苏联核能力的出现意味着，决定这些武器用途的不再仅仅是美国的特权。面对这些深刻的发展，那些被视为权宜之计的、试探性的常规重新武装举措，无法产生重大影响。
In the early 1950s events were moving too fast for such an assessment to be sustained with confidence. The intensity of the Cold War had endowed the atomic bomb with an immediate relevance that it might not have developed had international relations been more relaxed. Furthermore, the most pronounced long-term trend was toward a plentiful supply of weapons of ever-increasing destructiveness. Mass production of the weapons was under way. With the hydrogen bomb, there were no limits on destructive power. Before, this power could be measured in the tens of thousands of tons of TNT equivalent (kilotons or KT) as with the 16KT of Hiroshima. Now the measure was of millions of tons of TNT equivalent (megatons or MT). It was possible to envisage individual “city-busters.” Lastly, the arrival of a Soviet nuclear capability meant that decisions on the role of these weapons was no longer solely the prerogative of the United States. Against these profound developments, the tentative moves toward conventional rearmament, which were all presented as no more than temporary expedients, could not make a great impact.
在核武器泛滥的时代，美国核优势已被视为制衡苏联在动员人力和地理优势方面的重要手段，因此，任何一届美国政府要想将核武器置于战略边缘，都需要非凡的克制。尽管艾森豪威尔政府承认核优势不可能永远持续下去，但它远不如其前任政府那样愿意放弃暂时优势可能带来的任何直接利益。这一立场源于其对苏联的强硬态度、当时特殊的政治问题以及对过度依赖常规力量所带来的显而易见的困难的担忧。
In an age of nuclear plenty and from a starting point in which American nuclear superiority was already seen as a vital counter to Soviet advantages in mobilized manpower and geography, it was going to take an act of unusual self-restraint for any American administration to keep nuclear weapons on the strategic sidelines. Thus, although the Eisenhower administration accepted that nuclear superiority could not last forever, it was far less willing than its predecessor to forgo any immediate benefits that temporary superiority might afford. This position was determined by its extremely tough attitude toward the Soviet Union, the nature of the particular diplomatic problems of the time, and concern over the evident difficulties connected with a greater reliance on conventional forces.
朝鲜战争使这些困难凸显出来。战争本身旷日持久、令人不快、胜负难分，因此在政治上不得人心。联合国军在美国指挥下取得有限胜利的一个解释是，他们被迫在政治约束下行动——特别是对使用核武器的否决权以及对苏联和中国领土作为安全区的尊重。为了在1953年打破僵局，美国政府暗示这些约束很可能会被取消。随后在停战谈判中取得的进展似乎使美国政府相信，美国的核优势至少在当时是一个强大的外交杠杆。<sup> 14</sup>
The Korean War brought these difficulties into focus. The fighting itself was prolonged, disagreeable, inconclusive, and in consequence politically unpopular. One explanation for the limited success achieved by the United Nations' forces under American command was the political constraints under which they had been forced to operate—in particular the veto on the use of nuclear weapons and the respect for Soviet and Chinese territory as sanctuaries. In seeking to break the deadlock in 1953, the administration dropped hints that these constraints might well be removed. The consequent progress at the armistice talks appears to have convinced the administration that America's nuclear superiority was, at least for the time being, a powerful diplomatic lever.14
常规部队的第二个问题是其成本。对于英国和美国的保守派政府而言，他们继承的重整军备计划带来了巨大的经济压力。在不违背承诺的前提下降低成本的唯一途径是放宽对核武器使用的限制，并以核武器替代常规火力。1952年，英国政府已经得出结论：西方在与东方对抗中的最佳选择是依靠核威慑。<sup> 15</sup>与这一转变密切相关的空军元帅约翰·斯莱瑟爵士成为了“大威慑”的主要宣传者。<sup> 16</sup>
A second problem with conventional forces was their cost. To the conservative governments of both Britain and the United States the rearmament programs that they had inherited involved enormous economic strain. The only way to reduce costs without reneging on commitments was to relax the inhibitions surrounding nuclear use and to substitute nuclear for conventional firepower. In 1952. the British government had already concluded that the best bet for the West in its confrontation with the East was to rely on nuclear deterrence.15 Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, who was closely associated with this shift, became a major publicist for the “Great Deterrent.”16
1954年1月，在核时代最具开创性的演讲之一中，美国国务卿约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯宣布，美国未来将主要依靠“强大的反击能力，能够立即以我们选择的方式和地点进行反击”来遏制侵略。<sup> 17</sup>这项政策被称为“大规模报复”，并被普遍解读为，无论侵略行为多么有限，美国都将威胁摧毁苏联和中国的经济和政治中心。这种解读并不完全公正，但美国政府却未能消除这种误解。
In January 1954, in one of the seminal speeches of the nuclear age, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that the United States intended in the future to deter aggression by depending “primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing.”17 The policy became known as “massive retaliation,” and was generally interpreted as a threat to devastate Soviet and Chinese economic and political centers in response to any aggression, no matter how limited. It was an interpretation that was not wholly fair but one that the administration failed to dispel.
解释这项政策的难点之一在于它体现了两个不同的目标。第一个目标是提高资金利用效率（正如一位国防部长所说，“花小钱办大事”）。但军方并不确定是否会被授权常规使用核武器。这意味着，维持的常规部队规模远大于在确信可以释放核武器的情况下所需的规模。如果确信可以释放核武器，就可以削减常规部队规模，从而节省大量开支。这不仅包括为战场使用而设计的新型短程战术核武器，也包括为攻击敌方本土而设计的更为常见的战略核武器。因此，这项政策的基础是通过改变一般战争的交战规则来减少兵力需求。该政策于1953年10月获得批准，编号为NSC-162/2。正如艾森豪威尔当时指出的那样，核优势不太可能持续超过几年，不足以支撑这项政策的实施。苏联当时已经对美国的盟友构成了相当大的威胁。美国本土很快就会面临危险；苏联飞机已经能够对东海岸造成严重破坏。总统在原文件中补充道，如果“强调大规模报复性打击能力”最终“对美国不利”，则有必要重新考虑这一做法。<sup> 18</sup>因此，这是启动美国政策根本性调整的短期契机。
One of the difficulties in explaining the policy was that it reflected two different objectives. The first was to produce more value for money (or a “bigger bang for a buck” as one secretary of defense put it). But the military did not know whether or not they would be authorized to use nuclear weapons as a matter of course. This means that far larger conventional forces were maintained than would have been necessary had there been confidence that nuclear release would be permitted. Given such confidence, the conventional forces could be cut, which would lead to substantial savings. This involved the new short-range tactical nuclear weapons, designed for battlefield use, as much as the more familiar strategic weapons designed for use against the enemy homeland. The basis of this aspect of the policy, therefore, was to reduce force requirements by changing the rules of engagement for general war. It was approved as NSC-162/2 in October 1953. As Eisenhower noted at the time, nuclear superiority was unlikely to be available to support this policy for more than a few years. The Soviet Union was already mounting a substantial threat against America's allies. It would not be long before the continental United States would be at risk; already Soviet aircraft were capable of inflicting serious damage on the Eastern seaboard. The President added to the original paper that it would be necessary to reconsider the “emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage” if this came to “work to the disadvantage of the United States.”18 This was therefore a short-term set of circumstances in which to set in motion a fundamental reorientation of American policy.
这种长远后果与短期考量之间的对比，在考虑到杜勒斯凭借当前优势政策所带来的直接外交机遇时，就显得更加突出。1954年1月，杜勒斯发表讲话时，他想到的是前一年利用核威胁打破朝鲜僵局的成功，以及当时印度支那的危机——美国政府正在讨论是否以及如何援助处境艰难的法国。杜勒斯的言论反映了共和党对杜鲁门政府外交政策的批评，即该政策过于克制，任由苏联主导冷战的规则。共产党会利用其在西方薄弱地区的人力优势来扩张势力范围。他们必须认识到，在这种情况下，西方国家会采取对自身有利的应对措施，这很可能包括对苏联权力中心进行大规模核报复。杜勒斯主要关注的是如何趁现在还能利用这种威胁来获取政治筹码，而不是为美国战略制定长远基础。但这种做法只有在美国能够自信地发出此类威胁时才有效。
This contrast between long-term consequences and short-term rationales becomes even more pronounced when one considers the sense of immediate diplomatic opportunities arising out of the current superiority that Dulles brought to the policy. When he spoke in January 1954 he had in mind the previous year's success in using nuclear threats to unlock the Korean stalemate and the current crisis in Indochina, where the administration was debating if and how to aid the beleaguered French. Dulles was reflecting the Republican critique of the Truman administration's foreign policy, which was deemed to have been too restrained in allowing the Soviet Union to set the rules of engagement for the Cold War. Communists would try to expand their dominion by taking advantage of superior manpower in areas where the West was weak. They had to recognize that in such circumstances the Western nations would respond in a manner that suited them, and that could well include massive nuclear retaliation against the centers of Soviet power. Dulles was mainly interested in extracting political leverage from this threat while he could, rather than developing a long-term basis for American strategy. But this approach was valid only as long as the United States could make such threats with confidence.
詹姆斯·雷斯顿对“大规模报复”演讲做出了必然的解读：“如果朝鲜、印度支那、伊朗或其他任何地方再次爆发代理人战争或小规模冲突，美国可能会立即对苏联或红色中国使用原子武器进行报复。”<sup> 19</sup>认为美国正朝着这个方向发展的想法十分普遍。例如，美国的盟友非但没有支持政府的印度支那政策，反而可能出于怀疑而选择与美国保持距离。<sup> 20</sup>这种解读虽然颇具吸引力，但在某种程度上并不公平。其基本理念是，应对方式的选择不应受到限制，但从未设想过美国会立即将任何小规模对抗演变为全面核战争。然而，即便断言西方施加的惩罚总是与罪行相符，也需要确信西方不会因反击的威胁而退缩。由于苏联已经展现出追赶美国的决心和能力，因此无需太多的远见就能认识到这项政策的基础并不牢固。
The inevitable interpretation of the “massive retaliation” speech was provided by James Reston: “In the event of another proxy or bushfire war in Korea, Indochina, Iran or anywhere else, the United States might retaliate instantly with atomic weapons against the USSR or Red China.”19 The thought that the United States was tending in this direction was widespread. For example, rather than leading America's allies to support the administration's Indochina policy, their suspicions probably encouraged them to keep their distance.20 This interpretation was inviting though to some extent unfair. The basic idea was that the choice of response was not to be restricted, but it was never envisaged that the United States would immediately turn any small-scale confrontation into an all-out nuclear war. Nevertheless, even the assertion that the punishment meted out by the West would always fit the crime required confidence that the West would not be deterred by the threat of counterpunishment. Because the Soviet Union had already demonstrated its determination and ability to catch up with the United States it did not take great foresight to recognize that this policy was resting on shaky foundations.
约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯关于报复的大规模演讲激发了美国学者对战略问题的关注。在20世纪50年代后半期，一系列书籍和文章探讨了政府政策中的矛盾之处。总的来说，最初的研究——尤其是那些公开发表的研究——更多地侧重于政治而非军事。尽管正如我们将看到的，其中也探讨了诸如报复部队的生存能力或战术核武器的效用等问题，但批判的核心在于，既然美国自身也面临核毁灭的风险，其外交政策就不能再像拥有有效垄断地位时那样不受约束了。
The massive retaliation speech of John Foster Dulles served as a stimulus for American scholars to interest themselves in strategic matters. During the second half of the 1950s a series of books and articles explored the contradictions in the administration's policy. By and large the initial studies—certainly those that reached the public domain—were more political than military in nature. Although, as we shall see, there was consideration of such questions as the survivability of retaliatory forces or the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, the essential thrust of the critiques was that now that the United States itself faced a risk of nuclear destruction, its foreign policy could no longer be as uninhibited as it might have been with an effective monopoly.
有三点基本要点被反复强调：现在既不可能将与共产主义世界的对抗进行到决定性的结束，也不可能以无限的手段发动目标无限的战争，因为对美国而言，其后果也可能是无限的。因此，除非西方能够以适当有限的手段做出回应，否则一旦苏联在“自由世界”边缘地带发起适度的挑战，西方就可能陷入可怕的困境。正如威廉·考夫曼在最早对大规模报复进行学术批判的文章之一中所解释的那样：“如果共产党人挑战我们的安全——他们有充分的理由这样做——我们要么迎战，要么保持沉默。如果我们迎战，我们将陷入原子战争难以估量的恐怖之中。如果我们保持沉默，我们将遭受严重的威望损失，并削弱我们阻止共产主义进一步扩张的能力。” 21学者们认为，除非政府准备采取极其鲁莽的行动，否则它不太可能发现其核优势在 20 世纪 50 年代中期以后还能成为强大的政治力量的来源。
Three basic points were hammered home: it would not now be possible either to pursue the confrontation with the Communist world to a decisive conclusion or to conduct wars with unlimited objectives using unlimited means, when the consequences for the United States were also likely to be unlimited. Therefore, unless the West could respond with appropriately limited means it could find itself in an awful dilemma in the event of a modest Soviet challenge somewhere on the periphery of the “free world.” As William Kaufmann explained in one of the first academic critiques of massive retaliation: “If the Communists should challenge our security and they would have good reasons for daring to do so, we would either have to put up or shut up. If we put up, we would plunge into all the immeasurable horrors of atomic war. If we shut up, we would suffer a serious loss of prestige and damage our capacity to establish deterrents against further Communist expansion.”21 According to the academics, unless the administration was prepared to be extremely reckless, it was unlikely to find that its nuclear superiority would serve as a source of great political muscle beyond the mid-1950s.
一旦实施，大规模报复政策就难以回避。核威慑的政治优势或许难以捉摸，但其经济效益却是实实在在的。任何试图回归常规战略的尝试都将面临资源短缺的问题，而只要无法筹集到额外的资金，大规模报复的逻辑就会被制度化。北约的情况尤其如此，当时北约正经历着深刻的反思，因为它未能就建立欧洲防务共同体达成一致，也未能实现1952年里斯本部队目标，却仍然打算重新武装西德。美国政府的核政策严重影响了盟国对美国承诺的理解和重视程度。
Once implemented, it was not going to be easy to retreat from a policy of massive retaliation. The political advantages of nuclear deterrence might turn out to be elusive, but the financial benefits were real enough. Any attempt to revert to a more conventional strategy would face the question of resources, and as long as the extra money could not be found, the logic of massive retaliation was being institutionalized. This was particularly true in NATO, which was then going through a profound reappraisal following its failure to agree on a European Defense Community and to meet the Lisbon Force Goals of 1952 while still intending to rearm West Germany. The administration's nuclear policy had a serious effect on the way in which American commitments to its allies were understood and appreciated.
NSC-162/2号文件中已明确指出，可能需要在盟国领土上维持驻军，以确保盟国相信美国将继续致力于其安全，即便审慎的做法表明美国应采取不那么慷慨的政策。1949年《北大西洋公约》签订之时，美国最初对西欧的承诺与其说是关注美国承诺代表盟国进行干预的方式，不如说是关注干预本身的存在。当时的假设是，如果1914年或1939年美国就做出这样的承诺，德皇或希特勒就不会希望同时与所有西方民主国家开战，战争也就得以避免。
It had been recognized in NSC-162/2 that garrisons might have to be maintained on allied territory to reassure them that the United States would remain committed to their security, even if prudence suggested a less generous policy. The original American commitment to Western Europe at the time of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty was concerned less with the manner of America's promised intervention on behalf of its allies than with the fact of its existence. The presumption was that if there had been such a commitment in 1914 or 1939 the Kaiser or Hitler would not have wished to take on all the Western democracies at once and war would have been prevented.
朝鲜战争的冲击促使北约开始发展和协调其军事能力。尽管这导致常规部队规模大幅增长，但仍未达到预期的必要水平，因此，人们对北约应对苏联在欧洲的军事挑战的能力已普遍持悲观态度。因此，北约成员国乐于接受任何可能以更可控的成本遏制苏联侵略的美国提议。
It was only with the shock of the Korean War that NATO began to develop and coordinate its military capabilities. Although this led to a substantial increase in conventional forces it was not to the level that had been deemed necessary, so pessimism already existed about the alliance's ability to cope with the Soviet military challenge in Europe. Alliance members were therefore receptive to any American ideas that might make it possible to deter Soviet aggression at a more manageable cost.
随着1954年“新面貌”战略的实施，美国不仅更加依赖美国核力量的威慑作用，而且还迫使其盟友与美国的核战略结盟。具有长远意义的是，美国政策的转变恰逢德国重新武装。根据1954年被法国否决的欧洲防务共同体计划，德国的重新武装本应作为欧洲常规部队的一部分。而同年签署的《巴黎协定》明确规定，德国重新武装的前提是放弃“德国原子弹”。但德国方面坚持认为，其领土不应成为未来的欧洲战场，这意味着德国必须在其边界进行防御——即前沿防御。由于常规手段已难以实现这一目标，因此必须尽早启用核威慑。此外，德国也拒绝成为北约的二等国。由于北约计划将核武器整合到其陆军和空军中，德国军队也将使用这些武器（尽管根据双钥匙安排，核弹头由美国控制）。因此，“新面貌”计划的时机选择，不仅使其成为美国力量重心从常规力量转向核武器的手段，而且还使其成为在北约部队基本结构中植入核武器倾向的手段，而这种倾向此后变得极其难以改变。
With the adoption of the 1954 New Look, the United States was not only increasing the reliance on the deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear power, but was also forcing its allies to associate themselves with U.S. nuclear strategy. It was of long-term significance that the switch in American policy was taking place at the same time as German rearmament. Under the plan for a European Defense Community, which was rejected by the French in 1954, German rearmament would have taken place as part of a European conventional force. And under the Paris Agreements of that year it was made plain the rearmament required a rejection of a “German bomb.” But for its part, Germany insisted that its territory should not constitute a future European battleground, which meant that it had to be defended at its borders—forward defense. Because conventional means were now unlikely to achieve this, the early invocation of nuclear deterrence was required. Moreover, Germany also refused to be a second-class NATO power. As NATO planned to integrate nuclear weapons into its ground and air forces, so German forces were to operate with these weapons (albeit with the warheads controlled by the United States under a dual-key arrangement). So the timing of the New Look meant that it turned into a means not only for shifting the balance of American forces from the conventional to the nuclear but also for instituting a nuclear bias into the basic structure of NATO forces that thereafter became extremely difficult to dislodge.
杜勒斯将这项承诺与核武器紧密联系起来，以至于其可信度被认为取决于美国是否有能力代表其盟友承担核风险，而这又取决于西方在恐怖力量方面占据绝对优势。恐怖力量平衡的发展必然会限制美国对欧洲的核承诺，尽管它也可能强化人们对战争风险的普遍认知。此外，即便从未有过对西欧遭受常规攻击时使用核武器的保证，美国向西欧扩展核威慑的危机也可能出现。苏联的核能力对西欧构成了威胁，而这种威胁只能由美国的能力来应对。恐怖力量平衡使得任何可能使其卷入核战争的美国行动都充满疑问。然而，正是威慑常规攻击的需求，被认为给美国核力量带来了远超其承受能力的负担，除非是在极短期内。
Dulles had tied the commitment so closely to nuclear weapons that its credibility was seen to depend on the ability of the United States to take nuclear risks on its allies' behalf, which in turn depended on a substantial imbalance of terror in the West's favor. The development of a balance of terror would inevitably qualify the American nuclear commitment to Europe, even though it might also serve to reinforce the general sense of the risks of war. It should be added that this crisis in the extension of the American nuclear deterrent to Western Europe might have developed even had there never been a guarantee to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack on Western Europe. Soviet nuclear capabilities posed a threat to Western Europe that could only be countered by American capabilities. A balance of terror put a question mark against any American move that could involve it in nuclear war. Nevertheless, it was the need to deter a conventional attack that was seen to be imposing a far larger burden on American nuclear forces than they could conceivably carry, apart from over the very short term.
在接下来的几年里，政府官员逐渐意识到依赖可信度日益下降的核威胁所带来的问题。这种限制几乎立即开始出现。在1954年1月的演讲引发轩然大波后，杜勒斯在一篇文章中承认，无论美国目前的“空中打击力量”多么强大，“这种力量的意义可能不会永远不变”。从长远来看，与其依赖基于绝对优势的威胁，不如让侵略者摸不透我们的意图。尽管如此，杜勒斯仍然自信地重申，应对措施的选择权“在我们手中，而不是在他手中”。<sup> 22</sup>
Over the next few years administration officials recognized the problems posed by reliance on nuclear threats of diminishing credibility. The qualifications began almost at once. Following the furor caused by his January 1954 speech, Dulles acknowledged in an article that whatever the current dominance of the United States' “air striking power,” this “may not have the same significance forever.” In the long term, rather than rely on certain threats based on a confident superiority, it would be necessary to keep an aggressor guessing, although Dulles still was confident enough to reaffirm that the choice of response would be “ours and not his.”22
到1956年，美国政府已被迫重新审视其战略。各方达成共识，采取“全新面貌”，即既不试图维持核优势，也不试图弥补常规力量的失衡。相反，他们希望潜在的侵略者能够对核战争的前景保持足够的敬畏，从而避免试探美国的决心而自取灭亡。到1956年，政府的关键成员已准备好用“平衡的恐怖”来描述当时的局势，并对能否获得有效的核优势表示怀疑。<sup>23</sup>正如学者们所警告的那样，这种“恐怖平衡”对美国外交的影响在于，从核优势中获取政治筹码将变得越来越困难。1956年，杜勒斯在一次不经意的评论中透露，他已经发现，即便在灾难性战争的边缘，他也必须依靠展现决心的能力，而不是核优势。24杜勒斯的继任者在另一次不经意间，首次正式承认美国的盟友不能指望美国代表他们动用核威慑。1959年4月，国务卿克里斯蒂安·赫特尔向参议院委员会表示：“除非我们自身面临全面毁灭的危险，否则我无法想象任何一位总统会发动全面核战争。” 25
By 1956 the administration was already forced to review its strategy. A “new new look” was agreed on, in which there was to be no attempt either to maintain nuclear superiority or to redress the conventional imbalance. Instead it was hoped that potential aggressors would remain sufficiently in awe of the prospect of nuclear war not to court disaster by testing American resolve. Certainly by 1956 key members of the administration were prepared to describe the situation in terms of a “balanced terror” and to cast doubt on the possibility of a useful nuclear superiority.23 The implication of this balance of terror for American diplomacy was, as the academics were warning, that it was going to be increasingly difficult to extract political leverage from nuclear superiority. In an unguarded comment in 1956, Dulles revealed that he had already found it necessary to rely on his capacity to demonstrate resolve—even when on the brink of a catastrophic war—rather than on nuclear superiority.24 Dulles's successor, in another unguarded moment, acknowledged officially for the first time that America's allies could not rely on the United States to invoke nuclear deterrence on their behalf. In April 1959 Secretary of State Christian Herter informed a Senate committee: “I cannot conceive of any President engaging in all-out nuclear war unless we were in danger of all-out devastation ourselves.”25
三
III
当时的形势似乎是，苏联核能力的提升正在逐步削弱艾森豪威尔政府政策的根本前提，然而政策本身却基本未变。部队结构方面当然也未见任何变化。自然而然的回应是恢复到1954年以前的政策，即通过扩充常规部队来弥补核威慑力的削弱。正如我们所见，无论这种转变背后的逻辑是什么，都有强大的经济和制度因素会反对它。肯尼迪政府后来试图做出类似改变时，这一点就显露无疑了。相反，从20世纪50年代中期到60年代初期，政府内外都在努力制定战略方案，以支持美国的外交政策，特别是其对盟友的承诺，而这些方案的核心在于利用当时西方在核武器方面仍然被视为的优势。这些方案成为随后几十年解决核战略基本困境的基础。
The position seemed to be one in which the development of Soviet nuclear capability was progressively undermining the fundamental premise underlying the Eisenhower administration's policy, yet the policy itself remained essentially unchanged. Certainly no change was evident in the force structure. The natural response was to revert to the pre-1954 policy of building up conventional forces to compensate for the diminution in nuclear deterrence. As we have seen, whatever the logic behind such a shift, there were powerful economic and institutional reasons why it would be opposed. This became perfectly clear when the Kennedy administration later attempted to make a similar change. Instead, from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s attempts were made both inside and outside government to develop strategic formulations that would support American foreign policy and in particular its alliance commitments by drawing on what was still seen to be the West's advantage in nuclear weapons. These formulations became the foundation for efforts in subsequent decades to solve the basic dilemmas of nuclear strategy.
第一种方法基于20世纪50年代初发现的相对小当量、短程战术核武器的可能性。这源于空军被划分为战略和战术两大翼，前者负责攻击敌方腹地的重要目标，后者则支援地面作战。那些倡导战术核武器的人希望，这能促使人们放弃大规模杀伤性战略，并如罗伯特·奥本海默所言，“将战斗带回战场”。<sup> 26</sup>出于同样的原因，仍然秉持战略轰炸理念的美国空军战略空军司令部反对这一发展。随着北约不太可能将其常规部队提升到足以应对苏联挑战的水平，人们自然而然地对利用战术核武器来弥补常规力量不足的可能性产生了兴趣。这不再被视为战略轰炸的替代方案，而是补充方案。在核武器资源丰富的时代，两者都可以发展。
The first approach was based on the possibilities identified in the early 1950s for relatively small-yield and short-range tactical nuclear weapons. This followed the division of air forces into strategic and tactical wings, the former to attack vital targets in the enemy's heartland and the latter to support ground combat. Those promoting tactical nuclear weapons hoped that they could encourage a shift from strategies of mass destruction and bring, to quote Robert Oppenheimer, “battle back to the battlefield.”26 For the same reasons the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air Force, still imbued with the philosophy of strategic bombardment, opposed this development. As it became clear that NATO was unlikely to raise its conventional forces to the level deemed necessary to meet any Soviet challenge on its own terms, there was natural interest in the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons to redress conventional deficiencies. This became seen not as an alternative line of development to strategic bombardment but as a supplement. In an age of nuclear plenty both could be developed.
支持战术核武器的论点基于三个前提：这些武器在未来一段时间内仍将是西方的优势领域；使用战术核武器有利于防御；以及使用战术核武器不会对周边平民社区造成特别严重的损害。<sup> 27</sup>第一个前提必然是短暂的；苏联在20世纪50年代就研制出了自己的战术核武器。如果其他前提成立，这一点或许无关紧要。认为战术核武器有利于防御的观点假设进攻方必须集结兵力以备入侵，而这样做会为核打击提供有利的目标。然而，进攻方也可能像使用传统火炮一样，利用这些武器在防御体系中炸出一个缺口，以便地面部队能够由此涌入。有证据表明，苏联确实在考虑以这种方式使用其武器。<sup> 28</sup>
The argument in favor of tactical nuclear weapons rested on three propositions: that these weapons would remain an area of Western advantage for some time to come; that their use would favor the defense; and that they could be used without exceptional damage to the surrounding civil communities.27 The first of these propositions was inevitably short-lived; the Soviet Union developed its own tactical nuclear weapons during the 1950s. This would not have mattered so much had the other propositions been valid. The suggestion that tactical nuclear weapons would favor the defense assumed that the offense would have to mass its forces preparatory to an invasion and in doing so would provide lucrative targets for a nuclear attack. However, it was arguable that the offense might also use these weapons—in the manner of traditional artillery—to knock a hole in the defenses through which their ground forces might pour. There was evidence that the Soviet Union was indeed considering using its weapons in this manner.28
主要问题出在第三个提议上。1953年12月，参谋长联席会议主席指出，“如今，原子武器实际上已在我国军队中达到常规武器的地位”，而总统在1955年3月评论道，“如果这些武器仅用于军事目标和军事目的，我认为它们完全可以像子弹或其他任何武器一样使用。”然而，很快人们就意识到，核武器不能像常规武器那样使用。它们的杀伤半径太大，后续影响也太广泛，无法以如此精确和有针对性的方式使用。一旦军方开始使用战术核武器进行演习，对平民可能造成的严重后果就显而易见了。29支持者曾设想，有限的核战争将类似于海战，双方的机动部队可以相互调动，但大规模核部队在德国人口稠密地区作战的现实情况则截然不同。正如伯纳德·布罗迪所观察到的，“一个因我们在其领土上自由使用核武器而被拯救的民族，很可能是最后一个会向我们寻求帮助的民族。”<sup> 31 </sup>
The main problems came with the third proposition. In December 1953 the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that “today atomic weapons have virtually achieved a conventional status within our armed forces,” and his President commented in March 1955 that “where these things are used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would a bullet or anything else.” It soon became clear, however, that nuclear weapons could not be used just as if they were conventional weapons. Their radius of destruction was too large and their aftereffects too pervasive to employ them in such a precise and discriminating fashion. Once the military began exercising with tactical nuclear weapons, the potentially dire consequences for the civilian population became clear.29 Advocates had envisaged that somehow limited nuclear warfare would be akin to naval warfare with mobile and self-sufficient units maneuvering around each other, but the reality of large units operating in highly populated areas of Germany would be quite different.30 As Bernard Brodie observed, “a people saved by us through our free use of nuclear weapons over their territories would probably be the last that would ever ask us to help them.”31
如果核武器不能像常规武器那样使用，或者使用核武器需要做出与这些武器战术定位相悖的战略决策，那么围绕其使用的军事考量将变得更加复杂。战术核武器或许在敌方集中兵力在其边境一侧发动进攻时具有一定价值，但如果它们不能作为首选武器，那么等到授权使用时，敌军可能已经分散在需要防御的领土上。在这种情况下，平民的处境将更加危急，军事胜利的可能性也将更加渺茫。陆军一直辩称，将核武器纳入其装备库将增加而非减少其兵力需求（理由是有限的核战争将演变为一场消耗战，拥有最多后备力量的一方最有可能获胜），但陆军却发现发展核战术变得越来越困难。一位批评人士指出，地面部队“根本无法在我们的战略所设定的核环境中生存，更不用说作战了。”<sup> 32</sup>
If nuclear weapons could not be used as if they were conventional ones, or if such action would involve strategic decisions that would belie the tactical description allotted these weapons, then the military calculations surrounding their use became even more complicated. Tactical nuclear weapons might be of some value while an enemy was concentrating his forces for an offensive on his side of the border, but if they could not be weapons of first resort then by the time authorization came through for their release the enemy forces would be dispersed over the territory being defended. In these circumstances the consequences for the civilian population would be even more dire and the likelihood of military success even more remote. The army, which had argued all along that the integration of nuclear weapons into its inventory would increase rather than decrease its troop requirements (on the grounds that limited nuclear warfare would turn into a campaign of attrition in which the side with the largest reserves was the most likely to prevail, found it increasingly difficult to develop nuclear tactics. Ground troops, noted one critic, “are not capable of existing, let alone operating, in the very nuclear environment to which our strategy has consigned them.”32
不久之后，大多数学院派和独立战略家便对有限核战争的概念失去了热情。为了防止未来的战争演变为无限制暴力，最佳方案是完全不使用核武器。战术核武器和战术战略核武器之间的区别在实践中很可能无法维持，而早期在战场上使用核武器所取得的成果，只会使冲突更早地演变成比原本更加恐怖、更难以控制的局面。到1960年，就连亨利·基辛格也承认有限核战略是不明智的。<sup> 33</sup>他再次反映了当时的普遍情绪，主张转向常规部队。然而，尽管基于战场核武器的战略<sup> 34</sup>在理论上的支持昙花一现，但其影响却十分深远，因为核武器本身已被生产、运输并装备到一些北约国家的地面部队以及驻扎在欧洲的美军中。现在撤走这些武器在政治上会很尴尬。此外，由于苏联也在研发这类武器，总会有人辩称，即使没有其他原因，西方也需要这些武器来阻止苏联使用。
It was not long before most academic and independent strategists lost their enthusiasm for concepts of limited nuclear warfare. To prevent a future war from leading to unrestricted violence, the best course was not to use nuclear weapons at all. The distinction between tactical and tactical strategic nuclear weapons was likely to prove impossible to sustain in practice, and all that would be achieved by their early employment on the battlefield would be an earlier transformation of the conflict into something more horrific and less controllable than would otherwise have been the case. By 1960 even Henry Kissinger was acknowledging that a limited nuclear strategy would be ill-advised.33 Again reflecting the prevailing mood, he now argued for a shift toward conventional forces. However, even though the intellectual support for a strategy based on battlefield nuclear weapons34 had been short-lived, the effects were long lasting because the weapons themselves had been produced, shipped, and introduced into the ground forces of a number of NATO countries as well as to the U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Taking them away would now be politically awkward. Furthermore, as the Soviet Union was also introducing weapons of this nature, there would always be the argument that they were now needed on the Western side if for no other reason than to deter Soviet use.
由于这些武器一直留在欧洲，并被整合到地面部队中，因此人们一直致力于对其进行现代化改造，使其成为足够精确的武器，以兑现其早期作为有效防御苏联推进的潜力。例如，正是这种想法促成了“中子弹”（或北约更倾向于称之为“增强型辐射武器”）的研发，而这种武器在20世纪70年代末引发了巨大争议。<sup> 35</sup>此类武器的支持者或许能够令人信服地论证，既然核武器要保留在战场上使用，那么它们就应该具有选择性，减少附带损害，但他们却无法为基于早期战场使用核武器的战略辩护。北约的研究始终对广泛使用核武器的潜在军事价值得出否定结论。<sup>36</sup>正如我们将看到的，如果战术核武器有任何价值，那就是作为美国在和平时期对欧洲承诺的象征，以及在战争爆发时可能用来表明决心的一种手段。
Because the weapons remained in Europe, integrated into ground forces, there was continual interest in modernizing them into instruments of sufficient precision to fulfill their early promise as effective defense against Soviet advances. Such thinking, for example, was behind the development of the “neutron bomb” or (as NATO preferred it to be called) the “enhanced radiation weapon” that became a source of great controversy in the late 1970s.35 Supporters of such weapons might be persuasive in arguing that if nuclear weapons were to be kept available for battlefield use then they might as well be discriminating and threaten less collateral damage, but not in making a case for a strategy based on their early battlefield use. NATO studies consistently reached negative conclusions on the likely military value of widespread nuclear use.36 As we shall see, if tactical nuclear weapons had any value it was as a peacetime symbol of the American commitment to Europe, and as a possible means of signaling resolve in the event of war.
第四
IV
战场上使用核武器的难点在于，一旦第一批核武器被使用，行动的成败以及破坏程度能否得到控制，完全取决于敌方的反应。只要敌方具备强大的反击能力，西方首先使用核武器就必然会带来极其可怕的风险。摆脱核困境的另一种途径，在于能否消除敌方有效的反击能力。
The difficulty with the battlefield use of nuclear weapons was that once the first weapons had been unleashed, the success of the operation and the extent to which destruction could be contained were wholly dependent upon the character of the enemy's response. As long as the enemy had a capacity for a substantial riposte, first use by the West would involve terrible risks. A second way out of the nuclear dilemma depended on the possibility of removing the enemy's capacity for effective retaliation.
这种想法的早期版本——在苏联建立起核能力之前发动预防性战争——无需赘述，因为它只是20世纪50年代初的一个选项，而且当时似乎并未被认真考虑。<sup> 37</sup>更为严肃的是先发制人攻击的概念。其思路是通过摧毁地面上的核设施来解除敌方的核能力。这种方法完全符合空军的传统。然而，尽管在最初对新型原子弹的反应中，人们普遍认为这些武器将被用于突袭，但也认为攻击目标将是平民。<sup> 38</sup>一旦人们意识到，在对方拥有反击能力之后发动核战争是愚蠢的，那么认为下一场战争必然以突袭核战争开始的假设就消失了。39 20世纪40年代末期的普遍观点是，由于预计寻找相关目标存在困难，报复部队本身并不适合成为突袭的目标。40
An early version of this—to indulge in a preventive war before the Soviet Union had built up its nuclear capability—need not detain us because it was only an option early in the 1950s and does not seem to have been seriously considered at that time.37 More serious was the concept of a preemptive attack. The idea here would be to disarm the enemy of his nuclear capability by destroying it on the ground. This sort of approach was well within the traditions of air power. However, although it was very much assumed in the first set of reactions to the new atomic bombs that these weapons would be used in a surprise attack, it was also assumed that the targets would be civilians.38 As soon as realization dawned that after the other side had a retaliatory capability it would be foolhardy to initiate nuclear hostilities, the presumption that the next war would inevitably start with a surprise nuclear onslaught faded.39 The consensus view in the late 1940s was that the retaliatory forces would not themselves be suitable targets for a surprise attack because of the difficulties that were anticipated in finding the relevant targets.40
然而，随着与苏联陷入核僵局的前景，以及监视和目标定位技术的重大进步，人们对这种方法的兴趣显著增长，尤其是在空军内部。<sup> 41 </sup> 事实上，此时的核战争计划已经投入大量精力研究如何搜寻并摧毁日益增长的苏联核能力。<sup> 42</sup>鉴于20世纪50年代美国战略声明中强烈的核倾向以及对盟友的承诺，很难想象如何才能避免先发制人的逻辑。随着20世纪50年代的推进，这种逻辑的影响力日益增强，尽管在政府内部，反击力量目标定位也受到了批评，批评者（包括陆军和海军）认为，战略空军司令部在计划中纳入大量军事目标，使得难以限制最终的破坏规模或美国所需的兵力。空军仍然坚持，正如其参谋长在1959年所说，“美国政策必须包含对足够兵力的需求，以确保美国在任何战争情况下都能掌握主动权。” 43
With the prospect of a nuclear stalemate with the Soviet Union, however, and also with major improvements in surveillance and targeting technologies, interest in this sort of approach grew notably, particularly in air force circles.41 Indeed nuclear war plans by this time were already putting a great deal of effort into methods for seeking out and destroying the growing Soviet nuclear capability.42 Given the strong nuclear bias in the U.S. strategic pronouncements of the 1950s and the commitments that had been made to allies, it was very hard to see how the logic of preemption could be avoided. As the 1950s progressed the influence of this logic grew, although in the administration itself counterforce targeting was criticized by those (including the army and navy) who felt that Strategic Air Command's inclusion of large numbers of military targets in the plans made it difficult to set limits on either the eventual scale of destruction or U.S. force requirements. The air force still maintained, to quote its chief of staff in 1959, that “U.S. policy must encompass the requirement for forces adequate to permit the U.S. to have initiative under all circumstances of war.”43
在20世纪50年代，一方是否有可能通过突袭解除另一方的武装这一问题，从另一个角度深深地影响了美国决策者。兰德公司由阿尔伯特·沃尔斯特特领导的一个团队开展了一系列研究，从完全不同的角度探讨了这个问题。如果苏联试图对美国战略空军司令部的基地发动此类突袭，将会发生什么？战略空军司令部一心想主动出击，因此绝不允许其部队陷入此类袭击，所以并没有要求兰德团队研究这个问题。该团队当时正在研究可能影响空军基地选择的因素——这看似是一个相当普通的问题——但他们很快得出结论：易受突袭性攻击是其中最重要的因素之一。进一步的调查表明，现有基地在这一标准下表现非常糟糕，沃尔斯特特为此付出了巨大的努力，力图让空军和所有决策者认识到，如果苏联发展出必要的能力，将会面临怎样的风险。<sup> 44</sup>
Over the 1950s the question of whether one side might be able to disarm the other in a surprise attack impressed itself on U.S. policy makers from a different direction. A series of studies undertaken by a team at the Rand Corporation led by Albert Wohlstetter addressed the problem from a completely different angle. What would happen if the Soviet Union tried such a sneak attack on the bases of the U.S. Strategic Air Command? SAC, which had every intention of taking the initiative itself and therefore none at all of allowing its forces to be caught in such an attack, had not asked the Rand team to address this issue. The team was looking at the factors that might govern the choice of air bases—apparently a rather mundane matter—but it soon concluded that vulnerability to surprise attack was one of the most vital factors. Further investigation suggested that existing bases came out very badly when judged against this criterion, and Wohlstetter made a major effort to convince the air force and policy makers in general of the risks involved should the Soviet Union develop the requisite capabilities.44
这种担忧在20世纪50年代中期的其他研究中也有所体现，到50年代末，它已成为普遍共识，并得到了苏联在洲际弹道导弹研发方面遥遥领先的普遍信念的支持。<sup> 45</sup>苏联领导人尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫相当鲁莽地助长了这种信念，他过早地假定苏联在洲际弹道导弹研发方面的领先优势将转化为部署武器方面的优势。<sup> 46</sup> 1957年10月，苏联成功发射人造地球卫星——斯普特尼克1号——之后，许多人认为美国在军备竞赛中确实落后了。那些担忧美国军事基地脆弱性的人当然可以指出，自斯大林去世以来，苏联的战略思维发生了巨大变化；它从贬低转向赞扬技术军事革命（核武器加远程导弹）以及突袭在取得决定性胜利中可能发挥的作用。<sup> 47</sup>
This concern was picked up in other studies in the mid-1950s and by the end of the decade was very much part of the conventional wisdom, supported by the widespread belief that the Soviet Union was firmly in the lead in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.45 This belief was rather recklessly encouraged by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who had assumed prematurely that his country's head start in the development of ICBMs would be translated into a lead in deployed weapons.46 After the Soviet Union succeeded in being the first to launch an artificial earth satellite—Sputnik I—in October 1957, there were many who felt that the United States was indeed falling behind in the arms race. Those concerned about the vulnerability of American bases could certainly point to dramatic changes in Soviet strategic thinking since the death of Stalin; it had moved from disparagement to celebration of the technical-military revolution (nuclear weapons plus long-range rockets) and the possible role of surprise in achieving a decisive victory.47
沃尔斯特特在1959年初发表的一篇开创性文章中公开表达了自己的担忧。他对维持反击能力所涉及的各种问题进行了技术评估，包括如何在敌方攻击下幸存、如何传达反击决定、如何突破主动防空系统以及如何克服被动民防。他的结论是：“认为精心策划的突袭可以几乎毫不费力地被挫败，简而言之，认为我们可以回到人造卫星发射前的沉睡状态，这种想法是错误的，而这种想法几乎被普遍接受是极其危险的。”<sup> 48</sup>事实上，到那时，这种观点远未被普遍接受——至少在政府之外——部分原因在于沃尔斯特特的努力。大多数民间专家都表达了类似的观点。<sup> 49</sup> 1961年肯尼迪政府上台后，最高层开始认真对待这一脆弱性问题。<sup> 50</sup>
Wohlstetter made his own concerns public in a seminal article published early in 1959. He provided a technical assessment of the various problems connected with maintaining a retaliatory capability, including surviving an enemy attack, communicating a decision to retaliate, penetrating active air defenses, and overcoming passive civil defense. He concluded: “The notion that a carefully planned surprise attack can be checkmated almost effortlessly, that, in short, we may resume our deep pre-Sputnik sleep, is wrong and its nearly universal acceptance is terribly dangerous.”48 In fact by that time this particular notion was by no means universally accepted—at least outside of government—partly due to Wohlstetter's efforts. Most civilian specialists were expressing similar sentiments.49 When the Kennedy administration took over in 1961 the vulnerability problem was taken seriously at the highest levels. 50
沃尔斯特特的文章风格和方法独树一帜。20世纪50年代，一些政治学或历史学背景的学者开始受到公众关注，但经济学、工程学和自然科学背景的学者的工作却鲜为人知——这主要是因为这些工作大多是在秘密进行的。<sup>51</sup>沃尔斯特特揭示的这种新型战略分析方法比以往的分析方法更加系统化，对技术发展也更加敏感，并且拥有自己的一套术语和概念。例如，沃尔斯特特引入了“先发制人”和“二次打击”这两个关键概念。自此以后，这些概念一直是战略辩论的核心，尤其与先发制人和脆弱性问题密切相关。
What was distinctive was the style and method of Wohlstetter's article. A number of academics with backgrounds in political science or history had begun to command public attention during the 1950s, but less attention had been paid to the work of those with backgrounds in economics, engineering, and the natural sciences—largely because much of this work had been conducted in secret.51 The new style of strategic analysis revealed by Wohlstetter was much more systematic and sensitive to technological developments than previous analyses and had its own terminology and concepts. For example, Wohlstetter introduced the critical concepts of first strike and second strike. These concepts have been at the center of strategic debate ever since and are particularly relevant to the questions of preemption and vulnerability.
先发制人打击并非仅仅指核战争中的首轮攻击，而是指针对敌方反击手段的打击。成功的先发制人打击要么摧毁敌方所有地面核力量，要么在它们抵达目标之前将其拦截。二次打击能力则是指能够承受先发制人的打击，并仍然对敌方进行毁灭性反击。用于先发制人打击的部队必须能够攻击敌方的军事资产，但自身生存能力并非必要条件。其目的并非坐等对方先发制人。当然，这些关键力量越脆弱，就越需要在敌方发动攻击之前使用它们，无论相关部门多么倾向于保持克制。二次打击力量的关键要求是自身必须具备生存能力。
A first strike refers not simply to the first shots in a nuclear war but to an attack directed against the enemy's means of retaliation. A successful first strike would be one that either destroyed all the enemy's nuclear forces on the ground or else intercepted them en route before they could reach their targets. A second-strike capability represented the ability to absorb a first strike and still inflict a devastating retaliation on the enemy. Forces designed for a first strike had to be able to attack the military assets of the enemy, but it was not essential that they should be survivable themselves. The intention was not to wait for the other side to get its blow in first. Of course the more vulnerable these key forces were, the greater the pressures were to use them before the enemy could attack, however much responsible authorities might prefer to exercise restraint. The key requirement for a second-strike force was that it should be survivable.
对美军脆弱性的担忧，使得问题的根本焦点从维持某种有意义的战略优势以遏制苏联集团的扩张倾向，转移到担心在发生类似珍珠港事件的核袭击后，美国会战败。由此产生了第三个担忧：双方都力求获得先发制人的能力，又都害怕对方抢先一步，这使得危机可能比原本更加紧张和危险。双方或许都希望避免战争——尤其是核战争——但最终还是会因为害怕对方的意图而陷入可怕的对抗。基辛格警告说，双方战略力量的结构“无论双方的意图如何，都可能加剧不稳定”。<sup> 52</sup>托马斯·谢林提出了“相互恐惧突袭”的概念，即“双方都可能略微想要偷袭先发制人的冲动”，这种冲动会“通过相互预期的相互作用而加剧”。会出现这样的循环：“他以为我们认为他认为我们认为我们认为……他以为我们认为他认为他会进攻；所以他认为我们会进攻；所以他会进攻；所以我们必须进攻。” 53
The concern with the vulnerability of U.S. forces pushed the fundamental issue back from one of sustaining some form of meaningful strategic superiority to keep the expansive tendencies of the Soviet bloc in check to a worry that after some nuclear Pearl Harbor the United States would find itself defeated. Out of this developed a third concern that with both sides striving for a first-strike capability and fearful lest the other side get there first, crises could be even more tense and dangerous than would otherwise be the case. Both sides might wish to avoid war—especially nuclear war—yet still find themselves drawn into a terrible confrontation out of fear of what the other side was up to. Kissinger warned that the structure of the two sides' strategic forces might “contribute to instability regardless of the intentions of the two sides.”52 Thomas Schelling developed the concept of the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack,” by which “a modest temptation on each side to sneak in a first blow” would become “compounded through a process of interacting expectations.” There would be successive cycles of “he thinks we think he thinks we think…he thinks we think he'll attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we must.”53
到20世纪80年代初，因不可抗拒的军事逻辑而滑入一场类似1914年8月那样的意外核战争的风险，已成为一个主导性议题。当时人们追求的是“稳定”，即双方都不会因为渴望利用自身的先发制人能力或阻止对方利用其能力，而在危机中主动采取军事行动。能否实现稳定取决于双方各自军事力量的发展。“为了在核资源充裕的情况下制造核僵局，双方都必须拥有不可战胜的反击力量。” <sup>54</sup>因此，不仅要确保美军不会遭受苏联的突袭，还要让苏联相信其军队不会遭受美国的突袭。这种试图说服潜在敌人相信其最宝贵的战略资产并未受到严重威胁的新颖想法，并非军方自然而然想到的（除非他们正计划实施某种惊天骗局），因此当这批新型文职战略家提出这一想法时，军方并未表现出太大的热情。然而，核战争的恐惧、围绕西柏林地位等问题的持续危机、苏联发射人造卫星“斯普特尼克”所展现的令人瞩目的技术实力，以及普遍存在的军备竞赛意识，都意味着人们确实担心局势会迅速失控。肯尼迪政府再次回应了文职战略家的担忧，承认有必要鼓励建立稳定的核平衡，而不是美国明显占优势的核平衡，尽管其早期的行动和声明似乎更倾向于追求优势。<sup> 55</sup>
By the turn of the decade the risk of sliding into an inadvertent nuclear war through an irresistible military logic, à la August 1914, was becoming a dominant theme. The quest was for “stability,” meaning a situation in which neither side would feel compelled to take the military initiative in a crisis out of a desire either to exploit its own first-strike capability or to prevent the other side from exploiting its. Whether or not stability could be achieved would depend on the development of the respective force structures. “In order to create a nuclear stalemate under conditions of nuclear plenty it is necessary for both sides to possess invulnerable retaliatory forces.”54 Thus it was necessary not only to ensure that American forces would not be vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack, but also to reassure the Soviet Union that its forces were not vulnerable to an American surprise attack. This novel idea of seeking to convince a potential enemy that there was no serious threat to his most precious strategic assets was not one that occurred naturally to the military (unless they were planning some grand deception) and they were not overly impressed when the idea was put forward by this new breed of civilian strategists. Nevertheless, a combination of a fear of nuclear war, the persistent crises over such questions as the status of West Berlin, the demonstration by the Soviet Union of impressive technical prowess with the launch of Sputnik, and the prevailing sensation of engaging in a technological arms race meant that there was a real concern that the situation could rapidly get out of control. Again responding to the concerns of the civilian strategists, the Kennedy administration accepted a need to encourage the development of a stable nuclear balance rather than one in which the United States was palpably superior, although its early actions and pronouncements appeared to be more consistent with a drive for superiority.55
对于核辩论的各方——那些认为美国必须拥有战略优势的人、那些担忧苏联即将获得这种优势的人，以及那些坚信最佳局面是明确的僵局的人——关键问题在于，双方力量会倾向于发展先发制人还是后发制人的能力。早在1954年，伯纳德·布罗迪就以他一贯的清晰思路阐述了这个问题。
For all sides of the nuclear debate—those who believed that the United States must enjoy strategic superiority, those concerned that the Soviet Union was on the verge of achieving such a superiority, and those convinced that the best situation would be one of unambiguous stalemate—the key question was whether or not forces would tend toward first- or second-strike capabilities. Bernard Brodie had stated the issue with his customary lucidity as early as 1954.
如果……我们生活在一个任何一方都能对另一方发动突袭，从而摧毁后者进行有效反击能力的世界（这几乎是衡量“成功”的最低标准），那么动用战略空军力量就显得合情合理。在这种情况下，谁又能承受得起让战略空军放弃其至关重要的削弱任务，转而等待测试其他压力和战略呢？这就好比美国西部边疆式的枪战决斗。先拔枪并瞄准的一方就能干净利落地获胜，另一方必死无疑。但如果情况是双方都无法指望消除对方的反击能力，那么在一种情况下是自杀式的克制，现在就变成了谨慎，而动辄开火才是自杀式的行为。56
If…we are living in a world where either side can make a surprise attack upon the other which destroys the latter's capability to make a meaningful retaliation (which is almost a minimum definition of “success” for the enterprise), then it makes sense to be trigger-happy with one's strategic air power. How could one afford under those circumstances to withhold one's SAC from its critical blunting mission while waiting to test other pressures and strategies? This would be the situation of the American gunfighter duel, Western frontier style. The one who leads on the draw and the aim achieves a good clean win. The other is dead. But if, on the other hand, the situation is such that neither side can hope to eliminate the retaliatory power of the other, that restraint which was suicidal in one situation now becomes prudence, and it is trigger-happiness that is suicidal.56
V
V
在20世纪50年代后半期，人们似乎有理由认为，技术的飞速发展必然会带来不稳定。突破性进展似乎成了常态而非例外。远程轰炸机之后是雷达，然后是原子弹、氢弹、地球卫星、洲际弹道导弹等等。只要研发投入巨资，似乎就没有理由相信这种速度会放缓。此外，技术发展背后似乎存在着攻防博弈的模式。随着新的进攻手段的出现，双方也投入大量精力研发反制措施，而这反过来又刺激了进攻手段的创新。因此，尽管双方在20世纪50年代都大力加强了对远程轰炸机的防御，但远程导弹的研发也已进入最后阶段。为了应对这一新的挑战，反弹道导弹的研发工作早已如火如荼地展开。57
In the second half of the 1950s it seemed reasonable to suppose that the rapid pace of technological advance would be inherently destabilizing. Dramatic breakthroughs seemed the norm rather than the exception. The long-range bomber had been followed by the radar, and then the atom bomb, hydrogen bomb, earth satellite, ICBM, and so on. So long as massive resources were expended on research and development there seemed no reason to believe that the pace would slacken. Furthermore, there seemed to be a pattern behind the technological developments of an offense-defense duel. As new offensive means were found, prodigious efforts were made to develop countermeasures, which in turn stimulated innovations in the offense. Thus although both sides made major efforts to build up their defenses against long-range bombers during the 1950s, long-range missiles were proceeding through their final stages of development. In anticipation of this new challenge, work was already well under way on antiballistic missiles.57
极具影响力的盖瑟报告在苏联成功发射人造卫星“斯普特尼克”的消息传来后不久便呈递给了艾森豪威尔总统，该报告总结了这些预期。报告展望未来，预见到的只有“攻防之间持续不断的竞赛。双方都不能落后，也不能让对方的努力得不到跟上。这种攻防博弈将永无止境。”局势并非趋向稳定，而是走向一种“极其不稳定的平衡”，在这种平衡中，任何一方都可能即将取得决定性优势，但另一方却可能扭转乾坤。目前来看，如果不采取补救措施，“一次突袭就可能决定两大强国冲突的最终结果。”<sup> 58</sup>
The extremely influential Gaither Report, which was presented to President Eisenhower just after the news had come through of the Soviet success with Sputnik, summed up these expectations. The report looked into the future and saw nothing but “a continuing race between the offense and the defense. Neither side can afford to lag or fail to match the other's efforts. There will be no end to the moves and countermoves.” The situation was not tending towards stability but to an “extremely unstable equilibrium” in which either nation might come close to a decisive capability only for the other to turn the tables. For the moment, certainly without remedial action, “a surprise attack could determine the outcome of a clash between [the] two major powers.”58
1959年，伯纳德·布罗迪略带悲观地回答了他五年前提出的问题：“如今，发动无限制热核战争的先发优势几乎无可争议，因为掌握先发优势的一方在某些情况下完全有可能彻底摧毁对手的反击能力。” <sup>59</sup>他做出这一评估的依据是，航空时代显现的趋势在导弹时代也将同样具有影响力。詹姆斯·金在评论布罗迪的著作时指出，这反映了从航空时代向导弹时代过渡过程中存在的真正危险，当时人们对远程导弹的“评估主要着眼于它们对驻守基地的轰炸机构成的前所未有的威胁”。然而，一旦两支导弹部队对峙，突袭的吸引力可能就会大大降低，因为导弹本身更容易得到保护。<sup> 60</sup>事实上，早在1954年，一些参与洲际弹道导弹研发项目的科学家就提出了这一点。导弹之间很难相互交战。它们可以被隐藏、保护或转移，从而避免被地面拦截；而且它们飞行速度太快，在空中也难以被拦截。“我们完全可以预见，洲际导弹的出现之后不久，就会出现以威慑为根本的战略。”<sup> 61</sup>
In 1959 Bernard Brodie, somewhat gloomily, answered his own question of five years before: “Today the supreme advantage of the initiative in launching an unrestricted thermonuclear war can hardly be contested, for the side possessing it can hope, reasonably under some circumstances, to obliterate the opponent's power to retaliate.”59 He based this assessment on the assumption that the tendencies evident in the air age were going to be as influential in the missile age. James King noted in a review of Brodie's book that this reflected the real dangers involved in the transition from the air to the missile age, while long-range missiles were being “appraised mainly in terms of the unprecedented threat they offer to bombers sitting on their bases.” However, once two missile forces were facing each other, a surprise attack might well seem far less attractive because the missiles themselves could be more easily protected.60 This point had in fact been made as early as 1954 by some scientists associated with the ICBM development program. Missiles would not be very good at fighting each other. They could be hidden, protected, or moved around to prevent them being caught on the ground, and they moved too fast to be caught in the air. “We may well expect that the conversion to intercontinental missiles will be followed shortly by strategies which are fundamentally deterrent.”61
事实恰恰相反，这与那些鼓吹技术军备竞赛的预言家们的设想截然相反。导弹部队的建立充分考虑到了其脆弱性问题。到20世纪60年代初，一些导弹被部署在钢筋混凝土地下发射井中。更重要的是，另一些导弹被部署在核动力潜艇上。潜射弹道导弹（SLBM）被誉为具有积极的稳定作用。反潜作战技术当时（现在仍然）发展不足，不足以严重威胁中等规模潜艇部队的生存能力，而导弹本身精度也不够高，因此无法通过威胁敌方的反击手段来震慑敌人。到1964年，两位曾在政府担任要职的顶尖科学家指出，军事技术实际上已经达到瓶颈，任何更具决定性的突破都不太可能。民众无法免受攻击，但武器可以。他们指出，当前核僵局中唯一一个可能造成严重“不稳定因素”的因素是“成功研发反导防御系统”，这代表着真正先发制人能力的最后机会。然而，作者认为这种研发不太可能实现：防御系统必须绝对万无一失，自身能够承受集中攻击，而且只能根据已知的进攻手段进行规划，而这些手段很可能在防御系统投入使用时就已经得到改进。<sup> 63</sup>因此，基于不可战胜的反击力量的稳定状态似乎已经到来。
This is exactly what happened, contrary to the prophets of the technological arms race. Missile forces were introduced with full awareness of the problems of vulnerability. By the early 1960s some were being placed in reinforced-concrete underground silos. More critically still, others were being placed on nuclear-powered submarines. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) were celebrated as being positively stabilizing. Techniques of antisubmarine warfare had not (and still have not) progressed sufficiently to threaten seriously the survivability of a moderately sized submarine force, while the missiles themselves were somewhat inaccurate and therefore incapable of alarming the enemy by threatening his means of retaliation.62 By 1964 two leading scientists, who had both recently held critical positions in government, could suggest that military technology had effectively reached a plateau in that any more decisive breakthroughs were unlikely. Populations could not be protected against attack but weapons could. They pointed to only one serious “potential destabilizing element in the present nuclear standoff,” the development of “a successful antimissile defense,” which represented the last opportunity for a true first-strike capability. The authors, however, did not think such a development was likely: the defenses would have to be absolutely watertight, able themselves to survive a concentrated attack, and could only be planned against the known qualities of the offense, which were likely to have been improved by the time that the defense came into service.63 Thus the condition of stability based on invulnerable retaliatory forces appeared to have arrived.
国防部长罗伯特·麦克纳马拉上任之初，认同如果核战争爆发，必须尽一切努力减少对平民的伤害。然而，在分析了一系列大型民防计划提案后，他逐渐确信，进攻方仍将占据绝对优势，而试图建立有效的防御体系很可能失败，甚至会引发挑衅。于是，他将精力转向加强稳定。<sup> 64</sup>这一概念被重新定义为“相互确保摧毁”，这体现了他倾向于系统化和量化的思维方式。“确保摧毁”一词于1964年正式进入军事术语，其定义为“即使在遭受突袭之后，仍能始终保持清晰明确的打击能力，对任何侵略者或侵略者联盟造成不可接受的破坏，从而威慑针对美国或其盟国的蓄意核攻击”。65苏联认为，不可接受的损失是指损失20%至25%的人口和50%的工业产能。这种损失的计算，既参考了核破坏力边际收益递减规律，也参考了苏联对核战争容忍度的认知。毫无疑问，到20世纪60年代中期，美国完全有能力造成远超这一水平的破坏。
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had come to office sympathetic to the idea that if nuclear war was to be fought every effort must be taken to limit the damage to civilians. As he became convinced, however, through the analysis of proposals for a large civil defense program, that all the advantages would still lie with the offense and that the attempt to develop effective defenses would most likely both fail and be provocative at the same time, he put his efforts into reinforcing stability.64 The concept was recast as mutual assured destruction, which reflected his predisposition toward systematization and quantification. Assured destruction, entering the jargon in 1964, was defined as “the ability to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies by maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or combination of aggressors—even after absorbing a surprise first attack.”65 Unacceptable damage, calculated as much by reference to the law of diminishing marginal returns when applied to nuclear destructiveness as by any sense of the Soviet threshold of tolerance, was put at the loss of 20 to 25 percent of population and 50 percent of industrial capacity. There was little doubt that by the mid-1960s the United States could ensure destruction at levels much higher than this.
相互确保摧毁理论不幸地被简称为MAD<sup> 66 </sup>，后来又受到严厉批评，被指责倾向于攻击平民目标而非军事目标，以及威胁他国人民而非保卫本国人民。这种批评并不公平。麦克纳马拉只不过是在描述一种既有的状况。在他看来，这似乎是当时所能达到的最佳核状态，而试图达到任何其他状态都只会导致不稳定。相互确保摧毁与其说是一种核战争理论，不如说是一种部队规划的辅助工具，一种评估新发展的标准。如果它是核战争理论，那就意味着攻击目标将完全集中在城市上。但事实并非如此<sup> 67</sup> 。它根本算不上是一种战略，其关键缺陷（我们稍后会谈到）在于，它没有包含任何在威慑失败时如何运用战略力量的指导方针。其假设是，由于双方都有能力确保摧毁对方，因此侵略行动的风险将如此巨大，以至于威慑根本不会失效。68
Mutual assured destruction enjoyed the unfortunate acronym MAD66 and later was severely criticized as stating a preference for attacking civilian as opposed to military targets, and for threatening another's population rather than defending one's own. Such criticisms are unfair. McNamara was doing little more than describing an existing state of affairs. It seemed the best nuclear state available and the attempt to achieve any other would, McNamara believed, merely lead to instability. Assured destruction was more of an aid to force planning, a criterion against which new developments could be assessed, than a doctrine for nuclear war. If it was the latter then it implied that targeting would be wholly concentrated on cities. This was not actually the case.67 It was not really a strategy at all and its critical weakness (to which we shall return) was that it contained no guidelines for the employment of strategic forces should deterrence fail. The presumption was that with both sides able to ensure destruction, the risks connected with aggressive action would be so great that deterrence simply would not fail.68
对确保摧毁的主要威胁来自反弹道导弹（ABM）。如果不想让攻防博弈再添新刺激，就必须抵制美国国内日益高涨的研发反弹道导弹系统的呼声。最终，苏联推进了自己的反弹道导弹研发，这削弱了麦克纳马拉的决心。就确保摧毁理论而言，应对苏联此类研发的措施并非美国在同一领域投入同等力量，而是采取进一步的进攻行动。1966年末，麦克纳马拉采取了这样的行动，他授权研发多弹头独立重返大气层载具（MIRV）。MIRV将导弹前端分割成多个独立弹头，从而成倍增加了防御系统需要应对的弹头数量。苏联推进反弹道导弹研发，加上雷达技术的进步，使得美国部署反弹道导弹的压力几乎无法抗拒。 1967年9月，麦克纳马拉不得不接受现实，试图挽回局面，他勉强地将美国的反导计划从反苏转向反华，并对军备竞赛背后持续存在的动态进行了有力批判。在一篇对美国国防部长而言非同寻常的演讲中（不出所料，这篇演讲最终成为了他的告别演说），他指出了一种正在发挥作用的“行动-反应”现象：“无论他们的意图如何，或者我们的意图如何，任何一方在核力量建设方面采取的行动——甚至是切实可行的行动——都必然会引发另一方的反应。”几年前似乎有所缓和的攻防博弈，如今又濒临卷土重来：“如果我们通过美国部署一套重型反导系统，苏联显然会极力提升其进攻能力，以抵消我们的防御优势。” 70麦克纳马拉对这场决斗的分析与十年前的分析的区别在于，他从政府工作中吸取了教训，认识到规划所依据的战略评估涉及不完善的信息，特别是关于对方未来能力的信息，因此，战略评估可能更多地受到制度化的不信任而非理性分析的影响。
The main threat to assured destruction came from antiballistic missiles (ABMs). If the offense-defense duel was not to be given a new stimulus, then the powerful pressures building up in the United States behind development of such a system had to be resisted. In the event, the Soviet Union pushed ahead with its own ABMs and this undermined McNamara. In terms of the assured destruction theory the response to such a development would not be a comparable American effort in the same area but another move forward with the offense. McNamara took such a move in late 1966 when he authorized the development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). This involved splitting the front end of missiles into a number of individual warheads, thus multiplying the number of warheads with which the defense had to cope.69 The fact that the Soviet Union was pushing ahead with ABMs, coupled with advances in radar technology, made the pressure for an American ABM deployment almost irresistible. McNamara bowed to the inevitable in September 1967, attempting to salvage what he could from the situation by somewhat unconvincingly diverting the American ABM program from being anti-Soviet to anti-Chinese, and by providing a powerful critique of the persistent dynamic behind the arms race. In an extraordinary speech for an American secretary of defense, which not surprisingly turned out to be a valedictory, he identified an action-reaction phenomenon at work: “Whatever their intentions or our intentions, actions—or even realistically potential actions—on either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces necessarily trigger reactions on the other side.” The offense-defense duel, apparently in check a few years ago, was on the verge of reasserting itself: “Were we to deploy a heavy ABM system through the United States, the Soviets would clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their offensive capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage.”70 The difference between McNamara's analysis of the duel to those of a decade earlier is that, sobered by his experience in government, he had come to recognize that the strategic assessments on which planning had to be based involved imperfect information, particularly with regard to the future capabilities of the other side, and so could be driven by institutionalized mistrust as much as rational analysis.
“行动-反应”现象以及对军备竞赛背后制度性压力的担忧，在接下来的几年里成为战略辩论的主要议题。71 人们担心的是，一种“疯狂的势头”（麦克纳马拉的另一个说法）会将军备竞赛推向更加危险的程度，而此时局势可能刚刚趋于稳定，进入相互确保摧毁的局面。许多分析都与阻止美国部署反导系统的运动密切相关。1969年上台的尼克松政府重新调整了麦克纳马拉留下的反华计划，将其转变为旨在保护美国洲际弹道导弹发射井（而非城市）免受苏联攻击的计划。尼克松政府在证明这套名为“卫士”（Safeguard）的特定系统能够胜任这项任务方面遇到了一些困难，但另一方面，这项任务本身并不能被视为对苏联确保摧毁能力的挑战。72
The “action-reaction” phenomenon and the concern with the institutional pressures behind the arms race became part of the staple fare of the strategic debate for the next few years.71 The fear was of a “mad momentum” (another of McNamara's phrases) pushing an arms race to more dangerous levels just when things might have settled down into a stable condition of mutual assured destruction. Much of the analysis was bound up with the campaign to prevent deployment of an American ABM system. The Nixon administration, coming into power in 1969, recast the anti-China program bequeathed by McNamara and turned it into one designed to protect American ICBM silos (but not cities) from a Soviet attack. The administration had some difficulty in demonstrating that this particular system, known as Safeguard, was suited to the task, but on the other hand the task itself could not be seen as a challenge to the Soviet assured-destruction capability.72
事实证明，攻防博弈并未进入一个更加危险的新阶段。苏联似乎对美国提出的突破其第一代反导系统（包括多弹头分导式导弹）的方案印象深刻，以至于在1968年实际上放弃了该项目，转而探索下一代导弹系统。尼克松政府发现难以就“卫士”导弹系统本身的优劣进行论证，因此辩称有必要继续支持该项目，将其作为新一轮战略武器限制谈判（SALT）的筹码。1972年5月，双方在莫斯科签署了第一份SALT协议。协议中，双方同意严格限制反导系统的部署，从而确认了进攻性武器的优势地位。73
As things turned out, the offense-defense duel was not entering a new and more dangerous phase. The Soviet Union appears to have been sufficiently impressed by the revelation of the means by which the Americans proposed to penetrate its first generation ABMs, including MIRVs, that it virtually abandoned the project in 1968 and began to explore the next generation. The Nixon administration, finding it difficult to make a case for Safeguard on its merits, argued that it was necessary to continue to support the program as a bargaining chip for the new Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In May 1972 the first SALT agreement was signed in Moscow. In this the two sides agreed to tight limitations on ABM deployments, thereby confirming the supremacy of the offense.73
实际上，这场对决始终呈现一边倒的局面。20世纪60年代，美国对防御挑战的重视程度超过了其应有的水平，由此催生了多弹头分导式导弹（MIRV）计划，而该计划在70年代却一直困扰着美国。当时，可行性方面不存在任何问题。到70年代中期，美国洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）和潜射弹道导弹（SLBM）的可用弹头数量已经实现了惊人的增长。自1967年以来，美国的导弹数量一直保持在1750枚。十年后，这些导弹的弹头数量就超过了7000枚。苏联的多弹头分导式导弹计划起步较晚，其海基导弹力量也相对落后。但苏联庞大的洲际弹道导弹部队规模意味着其能够更快地增加弹头数量，而且单个弹头的当量也远高于美国。
The duel in practice was always one-sided. Taking the challenge of the defense more seriously than it deserved in the 1960s left a legacy in the form of the MIRV program which was to haunt the 1970s. Here there were no problems with feasibility. By the mid-1970s the United States had multiplied the numbers of available warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs by a startling amount. The number of U.S. missiles was held constant at 1,750 from 1967. A decade later these missiles could carry well over 7,000 warheads. The Soviet Union's MIRV program began later and it lagged behind with its sea-based force. But the larger size of its ICBM force meant that it was able to multiply its numbers more rapidly, and that the yield of the individual warheads was much greater.
20世纪70年代，进攻性核弹头的扩散及其精度的相应提高，主导了战略辩论。我们将在下文探讨这场辩论。目前只需指出，这一发展的主要后果是增强了反击能力，尤其是对对方陆基部队构成了威胁。尽管有人试图证明潜艇也变得越来越脆弱，但普遍认为，目前几乎没有迹象表明，配备远程导弹的相对安静的战略潜艇会受到任何即将实施的进攻措施的威胁。即使反潜作战取得重大突破，使用未经检验的系统对如此广泛的平台进行协同攻击，且一旦出现轻微失误就会付出如此惨重的代价，其难度也令人望而却步，不确定性之大，也使得任何冷酷无情的先发制人行动都显得不切实际。尽管洲际弹道导弹和轰炸机的脆弱性已被公认为不堪一击，但它们仍然远未达到真正的先发制人能力，也远未达到人们所寻求的决定性战略优势，或者说，远未达到自 20 世纪 50 年代以来人们所担心的根本不稳定因素。
The implications of this proliferation of offensive warheads and the associated improvements in the accuracy of these warheads dominated strategic debate in the 1970s. We will consider this debate below. For the moment suffice it to note that the main consequence of this development was to improve counterforce options, and in particular to threaten the land-based forces of the other side. Although there have been attempts to demonstrate that submarines are also becoming increasingly vulnerable,74 the consensus is that there are few signs of the relatively quiet strategic submarines with their long-range missiles being put at risk by any offensive measures currently in the offing.75 Even if there were major breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare, the problems in executing a coordinated attack with unproven systems against such a wide range of platforms, and with such a high penalty for a marginal failure, would be daunting and the uncertainties too great to warrant any cold-blooded preemption. The acknowledged vulnerability of ICBMs and bombers still fell far short of a true first-strike capability and the decisive strategic advantage that had been sought or the fundamental source of instability that had been feared since the 1950s.
20世纪80年代，人们对国防领域取得突破的可能性重新燃起了兴趣。1983年3月，里根总统要求全国科学家研发应对“苏联可怕的导弹威胁”的防御措施。他着眼于利用定向能进行拦截的天基系统的新可能性。总统声称，他并非寻求通过该项目获得“军事优势”（尽管如果成功，他很可能会认为自己拥有这种优势）。他也承认，成功还需要数十年时间。<sup> 76</sup>其他人则怀疑，由于一系列技术、政治和资源问题，这是否真的能够实现。<sup>77</sup>当然，没有任何证据表明，国防战略正在发生从进攻到防御的决定性转变。事实上，总统的计划似乎依赖于通过谈判对进攻性导弹进行某种限制，以将威胁控制在可控范围内。目前最稳妥的假设是，寻求真正的先发制人能力在未来很可能像过去一样徒劳无功。
The 1980s saw renewed interest in the possibility of a breakthrough on behalf of the defense. President Reagan enjoined the nation's scientists to develop a counter to “the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive” in March 1983. He was looking to new possibilities of space-based systems employing directed energy for intercepts. The President claimed that he was not seeking “military superiority” through this project (although he might well feel that he had such superiority, should it succeed). He also admitted that success would be decades away.76 Others doubted that it would ever be possible because of a series of technical, political, and resource problems.77 There was certainly no evidence that there was a decisive shift from the offense to the defense under way. Indeed, the President's plan appeared to depend on some sort of negotiated restraints in offensive missiles to keep the threat down to manageable proportions. For the moment the safest assumption is that the search for a true first-strike capability is likely to prove as futile in the future as it has in the past.
六年级
VI
试图发展像使用常规武器一样使用核武器的方法，或者发展有效的先发制人打击能力，可以从核战争之前的战略和战术空军理论来理解。如果这两条途径都行不通，那么就必须进行一场与技术革命相匹配的思维革命。
The attempts to develop ways to use nuclear weapons as if they were conventional or to develop an effective first-strike capability could be understood in terms of prenuclear theories of strategic and tactical air power. If neither of these avenues appeared promising then there would have to be a virtual revolution in thinking to match the revolution in technology.
升级是许多旨在制定强有力的核战略的尝试所围绕的基本概念。如今，人们普遍认为，升级指的是冲突性质的质变，即冲突的范围和强度不断增加。这一概念的形成历经时间，并被赋予了多种不同的含义。78现在人们普遍认为，升级不仅仅指冲突的扩大，更是指双方突破先前共同认可的界限。此类界限的例子包括军事目标与民用目标之间的界限、攻击盟国领土与攻击超级大国自身之间的界限，以及使用常规弹药与核武器之间的界限。尽管在许多核战争前的冲突中都能观察到这一过程，79但缺乏可供借鉴的经验来指导核时代的冲突。幸运的是，迄今为止，没有任何超级大国对抗的程度超过1962年10月苏联试图在古巴部署导弹引发的摊牌。
Escalation was the basic concept around which many of the attempts to develop a compelling nuclear strategic revolved. The term is now understood to refer to a qualitative transformation in the character of a conflict in the direction of increasing scope and intensity. The concept took time to develop and has been used in a number of different ways.78 There is now general agreement that it refers to something more than just an expansion of a conflict, to a movement across a limit that had been previously accepted by both sides. Examples of the sort of limits involved are those between military and civilian targets, between attacks on allied territory and on the superpowers themselves, and between the use of conventional and nuclear munitions. Although the process can be detected at work in many prenuclear conflicts,79 there is a lack of experience available to serve as a guide to conflicts in the nuclear age. Fortunately, no superpower confrontation has progressed to a level beyond the showdown in October 1962 over the Soviet attempt to place missiles in Cuba.
这意味着，预测未来战争走向的尝试始终包含高度的猜测。核门槛——即放弃核武器使用限制的临界点——可以明确界定，但许多最引人关注的问题都围绕着核武器首次使用之后是否存在并持续存在其他门槛。赫尔曼·卡恩对这一概念的发展做出了卓越贡献，他构建了一个包含44个“升级阶梯”的体系，核武器首次使用发生在第15级，尽管核门槛直到第22级才真正被突破。卡恩并未声称他的阶梯具有预测性，他也意识到苏联可能基于一套完全不同的阶梯。他试图传达的观点——贯穿其所有著作的一个核心主题——是决策者可以一直控制局势，直至最终爆发世界末日般的“痉挛战争”。80第一个问题是，最显著的阈值能否轻易被识别；第二个问题是，跨越这些阈值是出于主动还是被动。过去二十年来，关于核战略的大部分辩论都围绕着这样一个问题：冲突双方是否有可能控制核冲突，从而在不遭受不可接受的损失的情况下，实现战略目标。
This means that attempts to predict the course of a future war have always involved a high degree of guesswork. The nuclear threshold—the point at which restraints on nuclear employment are abandoned—could be clearly identified, but many of the most interesting questions revolved around the existence and sustainability of thresholds beyond these weapons' initial use. Herman Kahn, who did as much as anyone to develop the concept, was able to identify forty-four rungs on an “escalation ladder” with nuclear weapons first used on rung fifteen, although the nuclear threshold was not truly passed until rung twenty-two. Kahn did not claim that his ladder was predictive and he also recognized that the Soviet Union might be working on the basis of a completely different ladder. The point he was trying to get across, a consistent theme in all his work, was that control could be exercised by policy makers all the way to the final apocalyptic “spasm war.”80 How easily the most salient thresholds could be recognized was the first question, and the second was whether passage through these thresholds would be deliberate or involuntary. Much of the debate on nuclear strategy over the past two decades has revolved around the possibility of one side or the other being able to control a nuclear conflict to the extent of not being forced to suffer an unacceptable level of damage while still meeting strategic objectives.
我们已经注意到，无论是通过先发制人还是使用战术核武器来实现这一目标都存在诸多问题。讨论有限核战争的可能性与冲突升级问题密切相关，因为它表明人们对控制核冲突进程的能力，即使在冲突初期，也越来越缺乏信心。
We have already noted the problems of achieving this through either a first strike or the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The discussion of the possibilities of limited nuclear war is relevant to the question of escalation because it indicates declining confidence in the capacity to control the course of a nuclear conflict even at its earliest stages.
如果核武器无法用于取得直接的军事胜利，那么其运用就必须服务于政治目标。卡恩指出，“几乎所有分析人士现在都一致认为，首次使用核武器——即便针对军事目标——其目的与其说是为了摧毁对方的军事力量或削弱其行动，不如说是为了进行补救、警告、谈判、惩罚、罚款或威慑。”<sup> 81</sup>大多数旨在制定更具“政治性”的核战略的尝试，最终都停留在粗糙的谈判过程或“决心竞争”的阶段。<sup> 82</sup>许多方案的难点在于，实施起来相当复杂，而且成功与否取决于双方在核战争中难以达成的相互理解。
If nuclear weapons could not be used to achieve a straightforward military victory, then employment would have to be geared to political objectives. According to Kahn, “almost every analyst is now agreed that the first use of nuclear weapons—even if against military targets—is likely to be less for the purpose of destroying the other's military forces or handicapping its operations, than for redress, warning, bargaining, punitive, fining or deterrence purposes.”81 Most of the attempts to develop a more “political” nuclear strategy did not progress much beyond the idea of a crude bargaining process or a “competition in resolve.”82 The difficulty with many of the proposed schemes was that implementation would be quite complicated and success would depend on a degree of mutual comprehension that was unlikely to be available in the presence of nuclear exchanges.
阐明双方为何会采取较为谨慎的早期核交换策略是一回事，而解释这些交换最终如何能促成双方以令人满意的条件解决冲突则是另一回事。如果双方都遵循某些既定规则，那么这些规则又如何允许任何一方通过单次打击来改善自身整体处境呢？如果只有在常规手段失效的情况下才能考虑使用核武器，那么将首次打击用于政治目的而非夺回地面军事优势是否合理？核交换结束后达成的协议是否会与之前可能达成的协议截然不同？除了核交换之外，其他因素，特别是欧洲陆战的进程，在最终解决冲突方面究竟有多重要？如果核打击确实取得了一些成果，这究竟是因为双方承受惩罚的能力不同，还是因为引发冲突的根本原因不同？
It was one thing to demonstrate the sort of reasons that might lie behind a rather tentative move toward early nuclear exchanges, and quite another to explain how these exchanges could eventually lead to a resolution of the conflict on satisfactory terms. If it was the case that the two sides were both operating according to some agreed rules, how could these rules allow for either to improve its overall position through individual strikes? If nuclear use could only be contemplated because of a failure at the conventional level, would it make sense to use the initial strike to make a political point rather than to retrieve the military position on the ground? Would it be the case that the bargain achieved at the end of the nuclear exchanges would be strikingly different from that which might have been achieved beforehand? How important would be factors other than nuclear exchanges, in particular the course of a land battle in Europe, in influencing the final settlement? To the extent that the nuclear strikes did achieve results, would this be because of the relative capacities to withstand punishment or because of the different stakes in the issue that had prompted the conflict in the first place?
最终，关于冲突升级问题出现了两种基本方法。第一种方法试图通过在冲突升级的任何特定阶段占据主导地位来取得胜利，并迫使对方将冲突升级到更高、更危险的阶段。第二种方法是利用升级过程中固有的不确定性，通过警告对方事态可能失控来达到威慑目的。要更好地理解这两种方法，可以考察两位杰出理论家——赫尔曼·卡恩和托马斯·谢林的观点。
Two basic approaches to the question of escalation eventually emerged. The first involved an attempt to prevail in a conflict by dominating at any particular level of escalation and putting the onus on the other side to move to a higher and more dangerous level. The second involved drawing on the uncertainties inherent in the escalation process to achieve deterrence by warning the other side that things could get out of control. They can best be understood by considering the views of two outstanding theorists—Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling.
正如我们之前提到的，卡恩的基本假设是，即使是核冲突也可以以一种可控且有针对性的方式进行。冲突中固然存在非理性因素，但即使是这些因素也可以被利用来实现某种理性目的。如果用一个比较常见的比喻来说，两个超级大国之间的对抗就像一场幼稚的“胆小鬼游戏”，两辆老旧的汽车高速驶向彼此，胆小鬼率先转向，那么假装不负责任或鲁莽就具有优势。然而，只有当双方能力完全对称时，事态才会演变成一场纯粹的意志力较量，而这种情况很可能不会发生。在冲突升级的每一个阶段，双方都会有一方感觉自己更有能力应对。当敌人占据优势时，必须做出决定，是寻求以极具破坏性的条件达成和解，还是通过进入下一阶段来提高赌注。下一阶段会更加暴力和危险，或许也更难以控制，但优势可能会开始朝着更有利的方向发展。
As we have already noted, Kahn's basic assumption was that even a nuclear conflict could be conducted in a controlled, discriminating manner. There would be elements of irrationality present, but even these could be exploited for some rational purpose. If, to use one of the more familiar metaphors, a confrontation between the two superpowers represented the juvenile game of “chicken” in which two old cars speed toward each other with the chicken being the first to swerve, then there were advantages in feigning irresponsibility or recklessness. However, matters would only degenerate into a pure contest of resolve if there was a complete symmetry of capabilities, and most likely this would not be the case. At each stage of movement up the escalation ladder, one of the two sides would feel better equipped to fight. At a stage in which the enemy enjoyed the advantage a decision would have to be made whether to seek settlement on extremely damaging terms or to raise the stakes by moving to the next stage, which would be more violent and dangerous and perhaps less controllable but where the advantages might begin to flow in a more favorable direction.
要想在升级过程中获得合理的成功几率，升级的阶梯越高，做出这样的决定就越困难。因此，即使最终的逻辑指向一场双方都将损失殆尽的“痉挛性战争”，但较低层级上的能力不对称足以确保迫使升级的一方承受难以承受的负担。卡恩将这种情况描述为“升级优势”：“在其他条件相同的情况下，这种能力使拥有它的一方能够在升级阶梯的特定区域享有显著优势……它取决于当前层级上竞争能力的协同效应、双方对冲突升级到其他层级后果的预估，以及双方将冲突升级到其他层级的手段。”<sup> 83</sup>
This decision would be harder the farther up the escalation ladder it was necessary to go in order to have a reasonable chance of success. Thus even though the ultimate logic pointed towards a “spasm war” in which both sides would lose all, a sufficient asymmetry of capabilities at lower levels would ensure that an intolerable burden would be put on the side forced to raise the stakes. Kahn described such a condition as escalation dominance: “This is a capacity, other things being equal, to enable the side possessing it to enjoy marked advantages in a given region of the escalation ladder…. It depends on the jet effect of the competing capabilities on the rung being occupied, the estimate by each side of what would happen if the confrontation moved to these other rungs, and the means each side has to shift the confrontation to these other rungs.”83
这种方法在操作层面上的主要困难在于，升级阶梯在实践中不太可能像理论上那样清晰。某些阈值在常规层面或许不言而喻，但一旦越过核阈值，这些阈值可能更具争议性，也更难识别。尤其值得关注的是，能否轻易区分针对军事目标的有限打击和针对城市的大规模打击（考虑到即使是小当量核武器引爆也可能造成附带损害），或者能否区分对盟友的攻击和对超级大国领土的攻击（考虑到苏联领土与欧洲战场的接近程度），这些都是悬而未决的问题。如果一方采取的行动被另一方视为不有序的升级进程，或者如果沟通失误导致对对方行动规模的严重高估，将会发生什么？如果无法保证局势能够得到控制，则可能出现非自愿的升级过程，双方可能会违背自身意愿卷入大规模的核武器交换。在实践中，关键的阈值很可能就是核阈值。这就是早期有限核战争理论家得出的结论。在这种情况下，最有效的升级优势在于常规层面。如果无法保护自身社会免受误判后果的影响，仅仅依靠某种核能力的假想优势，就无法有效地起到威慑作用，也无法在冲突早期阶段增强自身实力。
The major difficulty with this approach in operational terms was that the escalation ladder was unlikely to appear as clear in practice as in theory. Certain thresholds might be self-evident at the conventional level but they might be both more controversial and harder to recognize once the nuclear threshold had been passed. In particular it was an open question whether distinctions could be readily made between limited strikes against military targets and large strikes against cities (given the collateral damage likely to result from detonating even the smaller-yield weapons) or between attacks on allies and attacks on superpower territory (given the proximity of Soviet territory to a European battleground). What would happen if one side tried a move that the other did not recognize as an orderly progression up the ladder or if a communications failure led to a substantial overestimation of the scale of the other side's activities? If there was no guarantee that the situation could be kept under control, an involuntary escalatory process could take over and the two sides could find themselves involved in massive exchanges of nuclear weapons against their better judgment. In practice, the critical threshold was likely to be the nuclear threshold. This was the conclusion to which the first theorists of limited nuclear war had been driven. In this case the most useful escalation dominance would be at the conventional level. To rely on a putative dominance in a certain type of nuclear capability when there was no way of protecting one's own society from the consequences of a miscalculation offered a thin reed on which to rely for deterrence purposes or as a means of strengthening one's hand at earlier stages of a conflict.
另一种利用局势升级的方法试图利用这一过程中固有的不确定性。谢林认为，即使威慑未能完成阻止战争爆发这一首要任务，局势仍有可能逆转。关键在于要记住，核武器的威慑作用并非源于其纠正军事力量失衡的能力，而是源于其杀伤力。这种杀伤力在敌对行动开始后仍能影响对手。只有当核武器全部耗尽时，它才会停止影响对手的行为，因此，它只有在作为一种潜在威胁存在时才能发挥威慑作用。如果（a）没有相应的反制威胁（这已不可能），或者（b）对手的不当行为会自动触发威胁，那么这种威胁就最具可信度。尽管如果（a）不成立，双方都不太可能让自己陷入这种境地。因此，这种威胁有可能被揭穿为虚张声势，尤其是在敌方侵略之后，如果威胁尚未被实施的话。
An alternative method of exploiting escalation sought to draw on the uncertainties inherent in the process. Schelling argued that even after deterrence had failed in its primary task to stop the outbreak of war there would still be a possibility of retrieving the situation. The important point was to remember that nuclear weapons gained their deterrent effect not through a capacity to redress a military imbalance but because of their capacity to hurt. This could still influence an adversary after hostilities had begun. It would only cease to influence adversary behavior once it had all been used up, and therefore it could only serve a deterrent purpose while it existed as a potential, as a threat. The threat would be most credible if either (a) it was not matched by a counterthreat, which was no longer possible, or (b) it would be implemented automatically by the adversary's misbehavior, although neither side was unlikely to put itself in such a position if (a) did not obtain. The threat thus risked being exposed as a bluff, especially if it had already not been implemented following enemy aggression.
但假设存在一种不可避免的风险因素，即无论双方是否认为在当时情况下采取这一步骤是理性的，伤害都不可避免地会发生。谢林并不认为局势升级是由于那些深谙其行为后果的精于算计的政府采取的蓄意行动造成的：“暴力，尤其是在战争中，是一种混乱且充满不确定性的活动，高度不可预测，它取决于易犯错的人类在不完善的政府中做出的决策，而这些政府又依赖于不完善的通信和预警系统，以及未经检验的人员和装备的性能。此外，它还是一种冲动的活动，其中承诺和声誉会形成自身的动力。”<sup> 84</sup>从有限战争发展到全面战争，尤其是在核武器投入使用后，局势失控的风险是不可避免的。关键在于通过巧妙的战术来利用这种风险。通过允许局势开始恶化，可以迫使对手面对事态完全失控的可能性，这或许会使他更容易妥协。如果只要威胁者完全掌控局面，无论在战争内外，威慑威胁都无法令人信服，那么为了获得可信度，就必须放弃部分控制权。谢林称之为“留有余地的威胁”。他解释说：“这类威胁的关键在于，尽管威胁者可能执行也可能不执行，但最终决定并非完全由其掌控。”<sup> 85</sup>
But suppose there was an unavoidable element of risk that the hurt would be imposed whether or not either side thought this to be a particular rational step in the circumstances. Schelling did not expect escalation to develop as a result of deliberate steps taken by calculating governments fully aware of the consequences of their actions: “Violence, especially in war, is a confused and uncertain activity, highly unpredictable depending on decisions taken by fallible human beings organized into imperfect governments depending on fallible communications and warning systems and on the untested performance of people and equipment. It is furthermore a hot-headed activity, in which commitments and reputations can develop a momentum of their own.”84 There was an unavoidable risk of things getting out of hand in the move from limited to general war, particularly once nuclear weapons were in use. The point was to exploit this risk through skillful tactics. By allowing the situation to begin to deteriorate, one would force the adversary to confront the possibility of matters getting completely out of hand and this might make him more accommodating. If deterrent threats in or out of war could not be credible so long as the threatener was in full control, then it would be necessary to relinquish some control in order to achieve credibility. Schelling called this “the threat that leaves something to chance.” “The key to these threats,” he explained, “is that, though one may or may not carry them out, the final decision is not altogether under the threatener's control.”85
这种方法旨在创造一种局面，在这种局面下，只有对方的服从才能减轻共同的痛苦，消除共同的风险。<sup> 86</sup>当然，这假设对手有足够的控制力，能够服从。将如此关键冲突的走向交由对手掌控的危险显然是巨大的。这相当于在一个国家历史上最关键的时刻放弃责任。然而，谢林显然比卡恩或其他一些人对未来战争的性质有着更为现实的认识，后者认为核战争可以采取程式化信号的形式，而对信号接收方的遭遇漠不关心。如果说准备打一场性质如此不确定的战争实际上也是一种带有偶然性的威胁，那么谢林就深刻地揭示了威慑在和平时期如何运作——它源于对未知的恐惧，而非潜在敌人的具体威胁。作为战时威慑的方案，谢林的理论说服力不足：它未能解释如何通过迫使敌方升级暴力冲突，从而迫使其放弃已取得的成果，而不是安于现状。谢林对实际军事形势的漠视是其理论的一大缺陷。
The approach was to create a situation in which only the other's compliance could relieve the shared pain and remove the shared risk.86 This, of course, assumed that the adversary was sufficiently in control to be able to comply. The dangers of handing over responsibility for the course of such a crucial conflict to the adversary were clearly enormous. It would involve the abdication of responsibility at the most critical time in a nation's history. Nevertheless, Schelling was clearly working with a much more realistic sense of the character of a future war than Kahn or others who believed that nuclear war could take the form of rather stylized signals, with slight regard for what would happen to those at the receiving end of the signals. To the extent that even preparing to fight a war of such an uncertain nature was in effect making a threat that left something to chance, Schelling was offering a real insight into how deterrence might operate in peacetime—as a function of the fear of the unknown rather than of the specific threats of the potential enemy. As a prescription for intrawar deterrence Schelling's work was less persuasive: it failed to explain the mechanisms by which putting the onus on the enemy to escalate to higher levels of violence would compel him not to settle for the status quo but to relinquish the gains he had already made. Here Schelling's indifference to the military situation on the ground was a substantial weakness.
第七章
VII
对于大多数战略家而言，升级优势的概念远比留有余地的威胁更具吸引力。20世纪50年代末，兰德公司开展了一项研究，旨在发展包含反击力量的核战术，并具备攻击城市工业目标的储备能力。其假设是，只要苏联城市不遭受攻击，苏联的动机就只会对美国对其军事力量的攻击进行对等回应，即便苏联在这方面的实力并不雄厚。1961年1月，罗伯特·麦克纳马拉从兰德公司招募了许多人才到五角大楼为他效力，他们带来了关于灵活核战略的理念。到1962年中期，这些理念已体现在官方政策中。87
The concept of escalation dominance was much more appealing to most strategists than the threat that left something to chance. A certain amount of work was undertaken at Rand in the late 1950s to develop nuclear tactics involving counterforce attacks with a capacity for attacks on urban-industrial targets held in reserve. The presumption was that as long as Soviet cities were not being attacked, the Soviet incentive would be to respond only in kind to American attacks on its military forces, even if it was not particularly well endowed at this level. Robert McNamara recruited many from Rand to work for him at the Pentagon in January 1961, and they brought with them their ideas for a flexible nuclear strategy. By the middle of 1962 these had been reflected in official policy.87
麦克纳马拉本人倾向于认为，即使在核战争爆发后，中央当局也应尽可能长时间地掌控局势。他早年向国会委员会解释说，他希望拥有一支战略部队，“这种部队的性质使我们能够在遭受攻击时冷静、审慎地使用它，并且始终完全处于既定当局的控制之下。”<sup> 88</sup> 1962年7月，在一次公开宣读此前已提交给北约的机密演讲时，他说道：
McNamara himself was drawn to the view that the central authorities should remain in control of the situation for as long as possible even after the outbreak of nuclear war. Early on he explained to a congressional committee that he wanted a strategic force “to be of a character which will permit us its use, in event of attack, in a cool and deliberate fashion and always under the complete control of the constituted authority.”88 In July 1962, in a public presentation of a classified speech that had already been given to NATO, he said:
美国已得出结论，在可能发生的全面核战争中，基本军事战略应尽可能与以往应对常规军事选项的方式保持一致。也就是说，一旦因联盟遭受重大攻击而引发核战争，其主要军事目标应该是摧毁敌方军事力量，而非其平民。
The U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military options have been approached in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.
联盟军队的强大实力和性质决定了，即使面对大规模的突袭，我们也能保留足够的后备打击力量，在被逼到绝境时摧毁敌方社会。换句话说，我们给了潜在的对手最大的威慑力，使其不敢攻击我们的城市。89
The very strength and nature of the Alliance forces makes it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to it. In other words we are giving a possible opponent the strongest possible incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.89
鉴于麦克纳马拉继承的全面核战争战略涉及对苏联、中国和东欧人民发动大规模、无差别攻击，这种更为可控和灵活的方法可谓革命性的。然而，问题在于它容易被解读成多种不同的含义。部分原因是由于相关概念的新颖性，部分原因也是由于目标不够清晰，以及未能将该战略与20世纪60年代初的国际形势联系起来。必须牢记，美国对欧洲的核保证对美国战略理论的发展产生了至关重要的影响。当时普遍认为，基本难题在于，如果不诉诸核威胁，就无法阻止苏联对西欧的常规攻击；但由于苏联反制力量的强大，核威胁本身又缺乏可信度。
Given that the strategy inherited by McNamara for general nuclear war involved a massive and undiscriminating attack on the peoples of the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe, this more controlled and flexible approach was truly revolutionary. The difficulty was that it was subject to a variety of interpretations. In part this was because of the novelty of the concepts involved, but in part it was also a result of a lack of clarity over objectives and a failure to relate the doctrine to the state of international affairs in the early 1960s. The influence of the United States nuclear guarantee to Europe has to be remembered as a critical influence on the development of American strategic doctrine. The basic conundrum was generally recognized to be that a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe could not be thwarted without resorting to nuclear threats but that the nuclear threats themselves lacked credibility because of the extent of the Soviet counterthreat.
麦克纳马拉的本能是否认常规战争的绝望局面，他在任期间竭力说服盟国接受这一观点。如果这一观点成立，那么逻辑上就指向北约摆脱对核武器威胁的依赖。1961年，肯尼迪总统也曾被这一想法所吸引。然而，当年最大的危机是西柏林冲突，这是北约唯一一个无法用常规手段防御的地区，因此他最终作罢。在冲突过程中，肯尼迪不得不重申北约首先使用核武器的原则。
McNamara's instinct was to deny the hopelessness of the conventional situation, and he tried hard during his tenure to persuade the allies of this view. Should it be valid, then logic led to removing NATO's dependence on the threat to use nuclear weapons. This idea tempted President Kennedy in 1961. He was held back by the fact that the major crisis of that year was over West Berlin, which was the only part of the alliance indefensible by conventional means. In the course of the conflict Kennedy was obliged to reaffirm the commitment to the first-use threat.
如果西方被迫升级冲突，美国政府承诺将攻击军事目标，并避开城市。许多人心目中的目标并非苏联的战略核资产，而是与欧洲地面战争相关的目标，尽管这些核资产最终也会成为攻击目标。然而，苏联很难不将麦克纳马拉的讲话——以及美国导弹能力的相应提升——解读为准备发动先发制人的打击。由于新战略的理念是在人们普遍认为苏联在核军备竞赛中领先的时期制定的，这种解读问题更加突出。等到美国政府开始公开阐述该战略时，很明显，苏联不仅远远落后，而且由于侦察卫星的到来，克里姆林宫也意识到美国人已经了解了它的弱点。90
If the West was forced to escalate then the administration was promising to attack military targets and to avoid cities. The sort of targets many had in mind were not the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear assets but targets related to a land war in Europe, although the nuclear assets would eventually become targets. It would be very hard, however, for the Soviet Union not to interpret McNamara's speech—and the associated surge in America's missile capacity—as preparations for a first strike. This problem of interpretation was accentuated by the fact that the concepts informing the new strategy had been developed during a period when it was assumed that the Soviet Union was winning the nuclear arms race. By the time the administration began to outline the strategy publicly it was clear that the Soviet Union was not only well behind but, because of the arrival of reconnaissance satellites, the Kremlin knew that the Americans were aware of its weaknesses.90
苏联领导人对美国的新战略和武器扩充无疑感到震惊。赫鲁晓夫总理此前一直在宣称苏联导弹实力日益增强，并以此为基础调整了苏联战略。他采取了一系列权宜之计，包括强调西欧国家的脆弱性，以此作为美国行为的筹码。1962年秋，他孤注一掷，试图通过在古巴秘密部署导弹来扭转局势，从而引发了核时代最严重的危机之一。然而，他并没有让任何人相信苏联有意像麦克纳马拉所建议的那样进行可控的战争。即便苏联想这样做，在20世纪60年代初期，它也根本不可能做到。相反，重点放在了苏联核武库的恐怖主义特性上，包括1961年9月进行的56兆吨大气层核试验。值得注意的是，在古巴导弹危机期间，肯尼迪总统的行动完全没有按照新战略执行：他将美国军用飞机分散到民用机场，并威胁要进行“全面报复”，从而剥夺了苏联的反击选项。
Certainly the Soviet leaders reacted with alarm to the new American doctrine and weapons buildup. Premier Khrushchev had recently been proclaiming his country's growing strength in missilery and had made this the basis for a reorientation of Soviet strategy. He reacted with a number of expedients, including stressing the vulnerability of the Western Europeans and so making them hostages for American good behavior. In the fall of 1962 he took the greatest gamble of all and sought to redress the balance by surreptitiously placing missiles in Cuba, thereby triggering one of the most serious crises of the nuclear age. What he did not do was give any encouragement to the idea that the Soviet Union was interested in fighting the sort of controlled affair that McNamara had proposed. The Soviet Union could not have fought that way in the early 1960s even if it had wanted to. Instead there was a stress on the terroristic properties of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, including a massive 5 6-megaton atmospheric test in September 1961. It is also of note that during the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy did not act at all according to the new strategy: he denied the Soviet Union a counterforce option by dispersing U.S. military aircraft to civilian airfields and threatening a “full retaliatory stroke.”
麦克纳马拉开始担忧苏联对新战略的解读，更令他担忧的是，美国空军似乎有意证实苏联最糟糕的预感，准备发动全面先发制人的核打击。柏林危机和古巴导弹危机期间，政府内部的讨论使参与者确信，对美国而言，任何规模的核武器使用都不太可能是一个可行的选择。麦克纳马拉更加关注的是如何确保核门槛不被突破，而不是突破门槛之后该如何应对。新战略公布后不久，麦克纳马拉就开始偏离这一战略，起初他仍然保留了其中的一些内容，例如强调需要限制损失，但后来他决定将重点放在确保摧毁上，强调核战争不可避免的悲剧性。
McNamara became concerned at the construction being put on the new strategy by the Soviet Union, and even more concerned at the apparent desire by the United States Air Force to confirm the Soviet Union's worst fears by preparing for a full first strike. The discussions within the administration during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises convinced those who participated that the use of nuclear weapons on any scale was unlikely to appear as a feasible option for the United States.91 McNamara became far more concerned with ensuring that the nuclear threshold was not passed than with what could be done after the passage of this threshold. Almost as soon as the new strategy had been announced McNamara began to drift away from it, at first still maintaining some of its aspects by talking of the need to limit damage before deciding to stress the inescapable tragedy of nuclear war in the concentration on assured destruction.
在理论层面，麦克纳马拉仍然奉行“升级优势”的原则，尤其是在保留二次打击力量以警告苏联升级到该级别危险性方面。但他对核武器之上存在可识别的阈值这一概念感到失望。这种不应跨越核门槛的决心使他与西欧国家产生了冲突。西欧国家当然不急于跨越核门槛，但他们担心美国论点的威慑作用。
In terms of the theory, McNamara was still operating within an “escalation dominance” framework, especially in terms of maintaining second-strike forces in reserve to warn the Soviet Union of the dangers of escalation to that level, but he had become disenchanted with the notion of recognizable thresholds above the nuclear. This determination that the nuclear threshold should not be passed brought him into conflict with the Western Europeans. They of course were not anxious to pass the threshold, but were worried about the implications for deterrence of the American arguments.
欧洲人依赖美国的核保护，但他们非常清楚苏联的反击能力给美国的核保证带来了不合理因素。美国人越是强调避免“动用核武器”，欧洲人就越怀疑这项保证正在被逐步取消。美国人降低了自身在欧洲爆发战争的风险，但通过确认升级到核战争的可能性极低，他们也降低了苏联发动侵略的风险。北约更强大的常规部队或许能阻止苏联取得胜利，但克里姆林宫的失败代价微乎其微；苏联领土本身也不会受到波及。一旦无需担忧核灾难，苏联的风险评估就会被危险地简化。对欧洲人来说，所有战争，而不仅仅是核战争，都必须受到威慑，而威慑至少需要存在诉诸核武器的可能性。
The Europeans depended on the United States for their nuclear protection, but they understood only too well the element of irrationality that the Soviet retaliatory capability had introduced into the American nuclear guarantee. The more the Americans talked about the need to avoid “going nuclear” the more the Europeans suspected that the guarantee was in the process of being removed. The Americans were reducing the risks to themselves of a war in Europe but, by confirming the unlikelihood of escalation to the nuclear level, they were also reducing the risks of aggression for the Soviet Union. More robust conventional forces for NATO might deny the Soviet Union a victory but the cost of failure to the Kremlin would be slight; Soviet territory itself would remain unscathed. Once there was no need to worry about nuclear catastrophe, Soviet risk calculations would be dangerously simplified. To the Europeans all war and not just nuclear war had to be deterred and deterrence required at least some prospect of a resort to nuclear weapons.
还有一个次要问题，那就是麦克纳马拉急于阻止盟国违背美国自身判断，迫使美国卷入核冲突，因此他尤其关注欧洲国家发展小型核武库。在1962年7月的演讲中，他概述了新的战略，并严厉批评这些小型核力量“危险、易过时且缺乏威慑力”。法国尤其强烈反对他们所认为的试图迫使他们退出核武领域的企图。他们不像美国那样确信常规防御的可行性，因此认为威慑现在取决于未来战争的巨大不确定性。额外的决策中心加剧了这种不确定性，从而强化了威慑。92
There was a subsidiary issue in that McNamara was anxious to prevent the allies from forcing the United States into a nuclear conflict against its better judgment and so was especially concerned at the development of smaller nuclear arsenals among the Europeans. In the July 1962 speech in which he outlined the new strategy he castigated these small forces as being “dangerous, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.” The French in particular took grave exception to what they correctly saw as an attempt to force them out of the nuclear business. They did not share the American confidence that a conventional defense was feasible and therefore argued that deterrence now depended on the sheer uncertainty of a future war. Extra centers of decision making contributed to this uncertainty and so reinforced deterrence.92
法国对北约的批评部分基于对美国担保可信度的怀疑以及对国家威慑手段的偏好，部分则基于联盟关系正在松动的假设。后一种假设是错误的，即使法国在1966年退出北约联合军事司令部，欧洲的联盟结构依然稳固。其他国家也没有急于效仿法国发展独立核武库。在这方面，最重要的国家是西德。德国人知道，如果他们决定朝这个方向发展，整个欧洲都会拉响警报，因此他们更倾向于利用这种可能性来影响美国。93既想掌控所有核决策，又想满足欧洲参与核决策的愿望，这种愿望催生了一些极其牵强的方案，其中最臭名昭著的就是组建多边部队的方案。94
The French critique of NATO was based partly on doubts about the credibility of the American guarantee and a preference for national means of deterrence, and partly on an assumption that alliance ties were loosening. This latter presumption was incorrect, and the alliance structure in Europe held together even when France left NATO's Integrated Military Command in 1966. Nor did other countries rush to follow France's example in developing independent nuclear arsenals. Here the most important country was West Germany. The Germans knew that alarm bells would be set ringing throughout Europe should they decide to move in this direction, and they preferred to use the slight possibility that they might as a source of influence over the United States.93 The desire to maintain control over all nuclear decision making while at the same time attempting to satisfy European desires to participate in nuclear decision making led to some extremely contrived schemes, of which the most notorious was for a multilateral force.94
欧洲方面的主要抱怨在于，美国不断强调必须远离核门槛，实际上是在试图撤回其核保证。最终，各方达成妥协。1967年，随着立场强硬的法国退出北约，北约采纳了灵活反应战略。95这项新战略与其说是精心制定的行动计划，不如说更像是一种措辞，因此难免存在各种解读，但这在所难免，因为它旨在调和对立的观点。
The main thrust of the European complaint was that the United States was attempting to withdraw its nuclear guarantee by its continual stress on the need to stay well clear of the nuclear threshold. In the end a compromise was reached. In 1967—with the uncompromising French now departed—NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response.95 The new strategy was more a form of words than a carefully worked-out plan of action and was thus subject to a variety of interpretations, but this was inevitable because it was an attempt to reconcile opposing views.
对美国立场的认可，在于接受了对常规侵略缺乏自动核反击机制的现状。北约试图以常规手段遏制侵略。如果常规手段失败，则会诉诸战术核武器。如果战术核武器仍无法以令人满意的方式结束冲突，则会动用美国的战略核武库。这不过是对既定的、简化的升级阶梯图的重申。问题在于，这种升级是出于有意还是无意，北约的目标是在升级中占据主导地位，还是仅仅依赖于威胁，而将一些不确定因素留给了对方。
The nod toward the American position was the acceptance of a lack of an automatic nuclear response to conventional aggression. The attempt was made to hold back the aggression with conventional means. Should that fail there would be a move to tactical nuclear weapons. If this did not terminate the conflict on satisfactory terms, there would be recourse to the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. This was no more than a restatement of the accepted and simplified view of the escalation ladder. The question was whether progression up this ladder would be deliberate or inadvertent, whether NATO was aiming for escalation dominance or merely relying on the threat that left something to chance.
由于种种原因，很明显，即便只是出于无奈，最终也会采用这两种方案中的第二种。欧洲人对美国施加的压力表现出极大的抵触情绪，美国一直试图说服他们，切实可行的常规方案唾手可得。96欧洲采纳新战略的条件之一是，他们无需再增加地面部队的开支。而此时，美国陆军已深陷越南战争泥潭，美国方面对增加欧洲的军事投入兴趣寥寥。因此，北约几乎不可能在常规层面占据主导地位。
For a number of reasons it was clear that it would be the second of these two approaches that would be adopted, if only by default. The Europeans were proving to be extremely resistant to the American pressures to convince them that a feasible conventional option was readily available.96 One of the European conditions for adopting the new strategy was that they were not to be expected to spend any more on ground forces, and by this time the United States Army was bogged down in Vietnam and there was less interest on the American side in adding to the European commitment. There was thus little chance that NATO was going to feel able to dominate at the conventional level.
如果当时人们确信战术（战场）核武器能够扭转欧洲地面战争的局势，使之有利于西方，那么西方或许就能在那个层面上取得优势。但正如我们所见，到那时，人们对进行有限核战争的可能性几乎毫无信心。对欧洲人而言，这些武器的重要性在于它们是核武器，而不是它们可以像常规武器一样使用。它们的价值不在于阻止战事升级到战略层面，而在于制造升级到战略层面的风险。根据当时的理论，这些武器会将美国的战略核武库与欧洲的地面战争联系起来，从而使苏联一旦考虑局部常规侵略，就无法避免全面核战争的风险。在北约核计划小组开展的关于灵活反应实施的首批研究中（由欧洲人主导），重点在于最初使用核武器向苏联领导层发出政治决心信号，而不是为了获取军事优势。97
If there had been confidence that the tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons could turn a land war in Europe in favor of the West, then dominance might be achieved at that level. But as we have seen, by this time there was only a slight belief in the possibility of fighting a limited nuclear war. To the Europeans the importance of these weapons was that they were nuclear and not that they might be used as if they were conventional. Their value was not as a means of preventing escalation to the strategic level but as a means of creating a risk of exactly that. According to the doctrine, these would couple the U.S. strategic arsenal to a land war in Europe so that the Soviet Union could not avoid the risk of all-out nuclear war should it contemplate localized conventional aggression. In the first studies to be undertaken within NATO's Nuclear Planning Group on the implementation of flexible response (exceptionally led by the Europeans), the emphasis was on initial use to signal political resolve to the Soviet leadership rather than to gain a military advantage.97
到了20世纪70年代初，灵活反应和确保摧毁原则的共同采纳，表明人们对一旦核武器投入使用，能否建立并维持明确的威慑门槛缺乏信心。只要核武器存在，并且以某种方式与美国及其盟友的防御挂钩，侵略者面临的风险就是不可接受的。没有必要深入探讨威慑失败后的应对措施这一棘手问题，因为似乎没有理由相信威慑会失败。20世纪70年代初是美苏缓和时期，两个超级大国似乎正在努力解决彼此间的分歧。即使在仍然存在冲突和危机的地区，核武器似乎也无关紧要。双方都没有进行核外交。上一次明确涉及核武器的危机是1962年的古巴导弹危机。 1973年10月阿以战争接近尾声时，美国战略部队提升了警戒级别，警告苏联不要直接介入埃及一方的战争。值得注意的是，美国试图传达的威胁是事态失控的风险——这种威胁带有偶然性。98
By the early 1970s the adoption of flexible response and assured destruction together demonstrated a lack of confidence in the possibility of establishing and sustaining distinctive thresholds once nuclear weapons were in use. As long as nuclear weapons were available and linked in some way to the defense of the United States and its allies, the risks facing an aggressor would be unacceptable. There was no need to delve too deeply into the awkward question of what would be done if deterrence failed, because there seemed to be little reason to believe that deterrence would fail. The early 1970s was a period of détente when the two superpowers appeared to be sorting out their differences. Even in those areas of conflict and crisis that remained, nuclear weapons seemed largely irrelevant. Neither side was practicing a nuclear diplomacy. The last crisis in which nuclear weapons had been clearly involved was the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Toward the end of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the alert status of American strategic forces was raised to warn the Soviet Union against intervening directly on behalf of Egypt. What is noteworthy about this incident is that the threat that the United States sought to convey was the risk of things getting out of hand—a threat that left something to chance.98
第七章
VII
20世纪70年代，人们开始质疑这种对模糊威胁的依赖。尽管从政治领导人的实际恐惧和认知以及局势升级一旦开始就难以控制的程度来看，将一切交由运气来决定似乎合情合理，但这无异于放弃战略。它既没有为部队部署提供指导，也没有为目标选择方案的制定提供任何依据。
During the 1970s a challenge began to be mounted to this dependence on such an unspecific threat. To rely on leaving things to chance, however realistic in terms of the actual fears and perceptions of political leaders and the difficulty of controlling the process of escalation once it was under way, seemed like the abandonment of strategy. It provided no guidelines for the design of forces or the preparation of targeting options.
最初，人们对这一立场的不满主要集中在相互确保摧毁的问题上。尽管美国决策者并未将全面攻击城市视为唯一选择，但对确保摧毁的强调却被广泛解读为暗示了这一点。例如，尼克松总统在1970年提交给国会的对外政策报告中问道：“如果发生核攻击，总统是否应该只能选择下令大规模屠杀敌方平民，而无法确定随后美国人也会遭到大规模屠杀？” 99官僚机构内部并没有采取太多行动来响应总统的挑战，制定更具吸引力的方案，但一些外部人士却对现状感到失望。例如，弗雷德·伊克勒谴责了“目前对相互威慑的健全性和稳定性沾沾自喜的态度”，认为这种态度“建立在一种自中世纪以来就受到普遍谴责的战争形式——大规模屠杀人质”之上。回应是，尽管依靠相互毁灭的威胁来维系和平令人不快，但这种方法似乎奏效了，而且无论如何，这种情况是现实，几乎超出了政策的范畴。100
Dissatisfaction with this position at first focused on the question of mutual assured destruction. Although American planners did not envisage an all-out attack on cities as the one and only option, the stress on assured destruction was widely taken to imply as much. For example, in his 1970 foreign policy report to Congress, President Nixon asked: “Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?”99 Not a lot was done within the bureaucracy to take up the President's challenge to develop more attractive options, but a number of outsiders picked up the theme of frustration with the existing state of affairs. Fred Iklé, for example, condemned the “current smug complacency regarding the soundness and stability of mutual deterrence” resting as it did “on a form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages—the mass killing of hostages.” The response was that however unpleasant it might be to rely on the threat of mutual destruction as a source of peace, it had seemed to work, and that in any case this state of affairs was a fact of life and almost beyond policy.100
变革的呼声逐渐高涨，其影响也体现在官方声明中。诸多因素解释了这一转变。首先，国际关系的恶化使得威慑失效后的应对策略问题显得尤为重要。其次，有人认为，尽管美国可能依赖于大规模杀伤性武器的威慑，但苏联的行动却更为复杂，并正在制定一套真正应对核战争的战略。这包括对苏联军事力量发动攻击，以限制其破坏苏联及其战略资产的能力，甚至可能为传统的军事胜利铺平道路。苏联决心获取决定性的战略优势，而苏联自20世纪60年代中期开始大规模扩充军备，涵盖所有类型的军事能力，这进一步加剧了人们的担忧。苏联军事理论中令人担忧的部分由来已久，而理论与能力之间明显的趋同，则使这些问题更加严重。
Gradually the desire for change gathered pace and the effects were seen in official pronouncements. A number of factors explain this change. First, the deterioration in international relations made the question of what to do should deterrence fail seem more pertinent. Second, it was argued that although the United States might be relying on the overbearing threat of mass destruction, the Soviet Union was moving forward in a much more sophisticated manner and developing a strategy for actually fighting a nuclear war. This would involve attacks on military forces to limit their ability to damage the Soviet Union and its strategic assets and perhaps even to prepare the ground for a traditional military victory. The fears that the Soviet Union was bent on obtaining a decisive strategic advantage were given added force by the Soviet military buildup, covering all types of military capabilities, that began in earnest in the mid-1960s. The worrisome parts of Soviet doctrine had been present for some time. What made them more serious was the apparent convergence between doctrine and capability.101
武器技术的发展也助长了这样一种观点：更复杂的核战术正在成为可能。单枚导弹搭载多枚弹头、当量重量比降低、可定制核效应、通信、指挥、控制和监视系统能力的提升，以及最重要的，以惊人的精度打击小型且防护严密的目标的能力，所有这些都促使人们认为，核武器正日益成为一种可以精确打击和区分目标的工具。
Developments in weapons technology also encouraged the view that more sophisticated nuclear tactics were becoming possible. The arrival of multiple warheads atop single missiles, the reduction of yield-to-weight ratios, the ability to tailor nuclear effects, the growing capacity of communications, command, control, and surveillance systems, and, most of all, the ability to hit quite small and protected targets with astonishing accuracy all contributed to a sense that nuclear weapons were increasingly becoming instruments that could be used with precision and discrimination.
20世纪70年代影响人们对核战略认知的最后一个值得一提的因素是军备控制。从形式上看，70年代的大部分谈判活动都围绕着在两个超级大国之间建立均势展开。考虑到双方都拥有数量庞大的进攻性核力量，均势，或者说双方力量结构中存在的某种不对称性，究竟是否具有任何意义，都值得商榷。然而，围绕这一问题的谈判不可避免地引发了关于特定差异意义的辩论。<sup> 102</sup>这也促成了人们对核武器不同类别的认知——“战略核”、“中程核”、“短程核”。造成这种情况的原因之一是将谈判划分为易于管理的领域，但一个重要的后果是强化了一种分级升级的概念。<sup> 103</sup>
A final factor in shaping perceptions of nuclear strategy in the 1970s that deserves mention is that of arms control. In formal terms much of the negotiating activity of the 1970s was bound up with establishing parity between the two superpowers. It was a moot point whether parity or the sort of asymmetries that did exist between the force structures of the two sides was of any relevance at all, given the enormous quantities of offensive nuclear power available to both sides. However, negotiations on this matter inevitably encouraged debate on the meaning of particular disparities.102 It also encouraged a perception of distinct categories of nuclear weapons—the “strategic,” the “intermediate,” the “short-range.” One reason for this was the simple problem of dividing up the negotiations into manageable areas, but an important consequence was to reinforce a concept of a graded ladder of escalation.103
20世纪70年代，所有这些因素共同促成了以升级优势为核心战略的回归。这一进程始于1974年，当时国防部长詹姆斯·施莱辛格宣布将发展一系列选择性核选项，以减少对确保摧毁威胁的依赖。施莱辛格明确表示，发展真正的先发制人打击能力既不可行也不可取，但在发生重大冲突时，必须尽可能有效地使用核武器来阻止敌人的推进，并警告其停止侵略。<sup> 104</sup>
All these factors worked together during the 1970s to encourage a return to strategies based on the concept of escalation dominance. The process began in 1974 when Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced that a range of selective nuclear options would be developed to reduce dependence on threats of assured destruction. Schlesinger made it clear that it was neither feasible nor desirable to develop a true first-strike capability but that in the event of a major conflict, it would be necessary to use nuclear weapons as effectively as possible to impede the enemy's advance and to warn him against continuing with his aggression.104
这一趋势在卡特政府时期得以延续。1980年，国防部长哈罗德·布朗公布了一项应对战略，即更为人熟知的总统指令——PD59，该指令使其生效。这项指令进一步拓展了应对方案，包括研究打持久核战争的可能性以及打击苏联关键政治和经济资产。然而，正如其名称所示，其基本理念是，如果苏联将冲突升级到更高层级，美国将能够在各个层面做出有效回应。105
The trend continued under the Carter administration. In 1980 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown unveiled a countervailing strategy, better known by the presidential directive—PD59—that brought it into force. This took the development of options further, including an investigation of the possibilities for fighting a protracted nuclear war and targeting key political and economic assets of the Soviet Union. However, as the name implied, the basic concept was that should the Soviet Union move up the escalation ladder the United States would be able to respond effectively at each level.105
1981年，里根政府将这一进程推进到了一个新的阶段。它声称自己所做的仅仅是发展必要的力量，以落实前任政府的战略。然而，语气发生了明显的变化。尽管仍然有人认为，如果苏联加速升级，保持灵活性是必要的，但同时也有人提出，如果美国认为自己有能力加快升级步伐，西方安全将得到极大的加强。<sup>106</sup>一些文职战略家也提出了类似的论点，他们指出，由于美国已经承诺为了支持盟友而发动核战争，因此需要对这些战争的走向有所了解。<sup> 107</sup>
In 1981 the Reagan administration took the process a stage further. It claimed to be doing no more than developing the forces necessary to implement the doctrine of the previous administration. There was a definite change of tone, however. It was still argued that flexibility was necessary should the Soviet Union force the pace of escalation, but joined with it was the suggestion that Western security would be immeasurably strengthened should the United States feel able to force the pace.106 This line of argument had been developed by a number of civilian strategists who had pointed out that because the United States had committed itself to initiating nuclear hostilities in support of its allies, it needed to have some idea of where these hostilities might lead.107
在20世纪70年代和80年代，人们就如何在升级阶梯的不同层级上实际行使主导权的可能性进行了详尽的讨论。我们已经提到过，有人提议使用改进型战场核武器来扭转欧洲地面战争的局势。这些提议并未得到欧洲人的认可。下一个阶段被称为中间层级。这一层级涉及部署在西欧、能够打击苏联的美国武器，以及旨在威胁西欧国家的苏联武器。这些武器引发了一场异常激烈的关于核武器问题的公开辩论。欧洲批评人士指责北约在1979年达成的一项计划，即向西欧部署新型远程导弹，称这是美国在欧洲发动有限核战争计划的一部分。讽刺的是，这些武器根本不适合这种战略。它们将战略核交换与欧洲地面战争联系起来，用行话来说，它们起到了耦合作用。如果美国想要遏制未来的核战争，那么就必须避免威胁苏联领土。因此，对该计划的批评反映了人们普遍认识到升级优势概念的影响（以及对里根政府外交政策同样普遍的不信任），但实际上，该计划破坏了两个超级大国将核战争限制在盟国领土内的任何计划。108
During the 1970s and 1980s, the possibilities for actually exercising dominance at different levels of the escalation ladder were discussed exhaustively. We have already noted the proposals for using improved battlefield nuclear weapons to turn the course of a land war in Europe. These found little favor with the Europeans. The next stage up became known as the intermediate level. Involved here were those American weapons based in Western Europe that could hit the Soviet Union or those Soviet weapons designed to threaten Western European countries. These weapons provided the focal point for an unusually intense public debate on the whole subject of nuclear weapons. The European critics of a NATO program agreed upon in 1979 to bring in new long-range missiles to Western Europe charged that this was part of an American plan to wage a limited nuclear war in Europe. The irony of this charge was that these weapons were wholly unsuited to such a strategy. They provided a link between strategic nuclear exchanges and a land war in Europe and in this way, to use the jargon, they were coupling. If the United States had desired to contain a future nuclear war then the need was to refrain from threatening Soviet territory. The criticisms of the program thus reflected a widespread recognition of the influence of concepts of escalation dominance (and an equally widespread distrust of the foreign policies of the Reagan administration), but in practice the program undermined any plans by either superpower to limit nuclear war to allied territory.108
美国国内引发最多争论的升级问题，在于美国陆基导弹可能遭受洲际攻击。争论的焦点在于，摧毁美国洲际弹道导弹将使美国丧失对等反击的能力（因为美国剩余的导弹系统精度不足），从而迫使局势升级到不可接受的反城市交战的程度。一位作家甚至提出，陆基固定导弹的这种脆弱性“意义重大，其预见性足以促使我们对战略理论进行根本性反思”。<sup> 109</sup>
The level of escalation that led to most debate within the United States concerned the possibility of an intercontinental attack against the land-based missiles of the United States. The argument was that the destruction of American ICBMs would leave the United States without the ability to respond in kind (the residual American systems being insufficiently accurate) and so would force escalation to the unacceptable level of counter-city exchanges. One writer was moved to suggest that this vulnerability of fixed land-based missiles was “an event so momentous that its anticipation should be the occasion for a fundamental review of strategic doctrine.”109
很难解释为什么这种弱点如此重要。对于苏联策划者来说，发动此类攻击的风险数不胜数：无论其导弹的理论性能如何，他都无法确定它们是否能如宣传的那样发挥作用；始终存在着美国人在预警后发动攻击的风险；而且也无法保证美国的反应会很克制，尤其是在人们逐渐意识到这次“有限”打击将导致数千万人伤亡的情况下。<sup> 110</sup>关于此事的争论往往围绕着一种新型导弹——MX或导弹实验型——展开，这种导弹既要具备足够的进攻能力以提供强大的反击选项，又要相对不易受到苏联的攻击。事实证明，除非付出巨大的代价和努力，否则几乎不可能满足这两个要求中的第二个要求。<sup> 111</sup>最终，一个由两党组成的总统委员会结束了这项探索，该委员会对洲际弹道导弹的弱点进行了全面评估。<sup> 112</sup>
It was difficult to explain why this vulnerability was so significant. For a Soviet planner the risks involved with mounting such an attack were legion: whatever the theoretical capabilities of his missiles, he could not be sure that they would perform as advertised; there was always the risk of the Americans launching on warning; and there could be no guarantee of a subdued American response, particularly as it became clear that this “limited” strike would lead to American casualties in the tens of millions.110 The debate on this matter tended to revolve around a new missile—the MX or Missile Experimental—that was to have sufficient offensive capability to provide imposing counterforce options but also to be relatively invulnerable to a Soviet attack. The second of these two requirements proved to be virtually impossible to meet except at enormous expense and effort.111 The search was eventually brought to a close by a bipartisan presidential commission that put the ICBM vulnerability into perspective.112
在这些例子中，两个超级大国在试图获得并利用升级优势时所面临的种种困难，都削弱了将其作为有效核战略基础的说法。其他关于开展各种形式的长期核行动可行性的研究也印证了这一观点。<sup>113</sup>里根政府越是坚持认为此类行动可以有效进行，怀疑论者就越是重申，西方最终仍然依赖于一种带有偶然性的威胁来保障自身安全。<sup> 114</sup>
In each of these instances, the difficulties facing either superpower in any attempt to achieve and exploit escalation dominance tended to undermine suggestions that it might serve as the basis for an effective nuclear strategy. Other studies of the practicalities of conducting protracted nuclear operations of whatever sort tended to confirm this view.113 The more the Reagan administration persisted with the suggestion that such operations could be conducted effectively, the more skeptics reaffirmed that in the end the West was still relying for its security on the threat that leaves something to chance.114
因此，到了20世纪80年代中期，也就是广岛和长崎遭受毁灭性打击四十年后，核战略家们仍然未能提出任何令人信服的核武器使用方法，以应对威慑失效的情况，这些方法既不能完全违背常理，也不能让各方达成共识：如果要维持威慑，是否必须找到这样的方法？核战略的根本困境依然棘手。如果说有什么共识的话，那就是：如果能够拥有更强大的常规力量，从而减少对核武器的依赖，西方的安全问题就能得到极大缓解！
By the mid-1980s, therefore, four decades after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the nuclear strategists had still failed to come up with any convincing methods of employing nuclear weapons should deterrence fail that did not wholly offend common sense, nor had they even reached a consensus on whether or not the discovery of such methods was essential if deterrence was to endure. The fundamental dilemma of nuclear strategy remained as intractable as ever. If there was any consensus, it was that the West's security problems would be eased substantially if only it were possible to have stronger conventional forces and so be less reliant on nuclear weapons!
1在撰写本章时，我不可避免地借鉴了我的《核战略的演变》 （伦敦，1981 年）。
1 I have inevitably drawn on my Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London, 1981) in writing this chapter.
2 HH Arnold，“原子时代的空军”，载于《一个世界或没有世界》，Dexter Masters 和 Katherine Way 编辑（纽约，1946 年），第 26-27 页。
2 H. H. Arnold, “Air Force in the Atomic Age” in One World or None, ed. Dexter Masters and Katherine Way (New York, 1946), 26–27.
3保罗·凯奇凯梅蒂，《战略投降：胜利与失败的政治》（纽约，1964年），第202-204页。另见L·乔瓦尼蒂和F·弗里德合著的《投掷原子弹的决定》（伦敦，1967年）附录中的访谈。这是一部关于广岛原子弹袭击决定的极其有用的历史著作。关于此次袭击引发的更普遍的战略问题的讨论，参见劳伦斯·弗里德曼的《广岛研究》，载《战略研究杂志》第1卷第1期（1978年5月）。
3 Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat (New York, 1964), 202–204. See also interviews in the appendix of L. Giovannitti and F. Freed, The Decision to Drop the Bomb (London, 1967). This is an extremely useful history of the decision to attack Hiroshima. For a discussion of the more general strategic issues raised by the attack see Lawrence Freedman, “The Study of Hiroshima,” Journal of Strategic Studies 1, no. 1 (May 1978).
4大卫·艾伦·罗森伯格，《美国核武库，1945年至1950年》，《原子科学家公报》38（1982年5月）。1946年，伯纳德·布罗迪估计美国核武库拥有20枚原子弹，但他同时也意识到实际数量可能更少；而实际数量只有9枚（《绝对武器》 [纽约，1946年]，第41页）。到1947年7月，美国核武库的原子弹数量仅达到13枚。
4 David Alan Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 38 (May 1982). In 1946 Bernard Brodie guessed a figure of twenty bombs while recognizing that it might be smaller; it was actually nine (The Absolute Weapon [New York, 1946], 41). By July 1947 the stockpile had only reached thirteen.
5 Edmund Beard，《洲际弹道导弹的研发：官僚政治研究》（纽约，1976 年）。
5 Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York, 1976).
6 Vannevar Bush，《现代武器与自由人》（伦敦，1950 年），第 96-97 页。
6 Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (London, 1950), 96–97.
7 Barton J. Bernstein，“寻求安全：1942-1946 年美国外交政策和原子弹的国际控制”，《美国历史杂志》 60（1974 年 3 月）。
7 Barton J. Bernstein, “The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of the Atomic Bomb, 1942–1946,” Journal of American History 60 (March 1974).
8 David Alan Rosenberg，“过度杀戮的起源：核武器与美国战略，1945-1960 年”，《国际安全》 7，第 4 期（1983 年春季），12-13 页。
8 David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983), 12–13.
9杜鲁门在 1947 年告诉大卫·李林塔尔：“我认为除非绝对必要，否则我们不应该使用这东西。下令使用如此可怕的、破坏性远超我们以往所拥有的任何东西，是一件非常可怕的事情。”（《大卫·E·李林塔尔日记》，第 2 卷，《原子能年代，1945-1950 年》[纽约，1964 年]，第 391 页）
9 Truman told David Lilienthal in 1947: “I don't think we ought to use this thing unless we absolutely have to. It is a terrible thing to order the use of something that is so terribly destructive beyond anything we have ever had” (The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, vol. 2, The Atomic Energy Years, 1945–1950 [New York, 1964], 391)
10关于氢弹决策，参见 Herbert York，《顾问：奥本海默、特勒和超级炸弹》（旧金山，1976 年）；Warner R. Schilling，“氢弹决策：如何在不做出实际选择的情况下做出决定”，《政治学季刊》 76（1961 年 3 月）；David Alan Rosenberg，“美国原子战略与氢弹决策”，《美国历史杂志》66（1979 年 6 月）。
10 On the H-bomb decision see Herbert York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb (San Francisco, 1976); Warner R. Schilling, “The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide without Actually Choosing,” Political Science Quarterly 76 (March 1961); David Alan Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,” Journal of American History 66 (June 1979).
11国家安全委员会，NSC-68，执行秘书向国家安全委员会提交的关于美国国家安全目标和计划的报告，1950 年 4 月 14 日。主要作者是保罗·尼采。
11 National Security Council, NSC-68, A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950. The main author was Paul Nitze.
12 1949 年10 月 30 日原子能委员会总咨询委员会的报告，转载于《约克，顾问》。
12 Report of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission of October 30, 1949, repr. in York, The Advisors.
13这一转变最重要的结果是美国向欧洲派遣地面部队，以及北约于 1952 年 2 月在里斯本通过的雄心勃勃的部队目标。
13 The most important results of this shift were the assignment of American ground troops to Europe and the ambitious Force Goals adopted by NATO at Lisbon in February 1952.
14 Barry Blechman 和 Robert Powell，“战略优势究竟是什么？”《政治学季刊》 97，第 4 期（1982-83 年冬季）认为，核暗示在确保进步方面的作用被夸大了。
14 Barry Blechman and Robert Powell, “What in the Name of God is Strategic Superiority?” Political Science Quarterly 97, no. 4 (Winter 1982–83) suggest that the role of the nuclear hints in securing progress was exaggerated.
15玛格丽特·戈温，《独立与威慑：英国与原子能 1945-1952》，第 1 卷，政策制定（伦敦，1974 年），第 441 页。
15 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 19451952, vol. 1, Policy Making (London, 1974), 441.
16斯莱索对“大威慑”的描述与杜勒斯后来使用的措辞非常相似。他写道，这是“对我们潜在敌人的庞大陆军和战术空军的反制措施。此外，它还赋予我们在冷战中一定程度的主动权，而且这种主动权还在不断增强，而不是总是受制于敌人”（约翰·斯莱索，《轰炸机在英国战略中的地位》，《国际事务》 23卷3期[1953年7月]，302-303页）。另见他的《西方战略》（伦敦，1954年）。
16 Slessor described the “Great Deterrent” in terms very similar to those later used by Dulles. It was, he wrote, “the counter-threat to the vast armies and tactical air forces of our potential enemy. Moreover it gives us some degree, and an increasing degree, of initiative in the cold war, instead of always dancing to the enemy's tune” (John Slessor, “The Place of the Bomber in British Strategy,” International Affairs 23, no. 3 [July 1953], 302–303). See also his Strategy for the West (London, 1954).
17约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯，《外交政策的演变》，国务院公报，第 30 卷，1954 年 1 月 25 日。
17 John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” Department of State Bulletin, vol. 30, January 25, 1954.
18国家安全委员会 NSC-162/2，《基本国家安全政策审查》，1953 年 10 月 30 日。背景资料参见 John Lewis Gaddis，《遏制战略：对战后美国国家安全政策的批判性评估》（纽约，1982 年），第 127-163 页；Glenn Snyder，《1953 年的新面貌》 ，载于 Warner R. Schilling 等人编，《政治与国防预算》（纽约，1962 年）；以及 Samuel Wells, Jr.，《大规模报复的起源》，《政治学季刊》 96（1981 年春季）。
18 National Security Council NSC-162/2, Review of Basic National Security Policy, October 30, 1953. For background see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127–163; Glenn Snyder, “The New Look of 1953” in Politics and Defense Budgets, ed. Warner R. Schilling et al. (New York, 1962); and Samuel Wells, Jr., “The Origins of Massive Retaliation,” Political Science Quarterly 96 (Spring 1981).
19 纽约时报，1954 年 1 月 16 日。
19 New York Times, January 16, 1954.
20关于核威慑无法应对印度支那危机的讨论，请参阅Alexander L. George 和 Richard Smoke 合著的《美国外交政策中的威慑：理论与实践》（纽约，1974 年）第 8 章。
20 For a discussion of the inability of nuclear deterrence to cope with the Indochina crisis, see chapter 8 of Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974).
21威廉·W·考夫曼编，《军事政策与国家安全》（普林斯顿，1956年），第24-25页。考夫曼的观点最初发表于1954年11月普林斯顿国际研究中心出版的一份题为《威慑的要求》的备忘录中。许多其他人也提出了同样的观点，这既是受到对新型氢弹破坏力增强的认识的推动，也是受到大规模报复性言论的影响。例如，英国的利德尔·哈特在1954年4月警告说，“氢弹在降低全面战争可能性的程度上，增加了以广泛的局部侵略为手段的有限战争的可能性”（文章转载于B·H·利德尔·哈特，《威慑还是防御》 （伦敦，1960年），第23页）。关于有限战争的其他重要文章和书籍有：罗伯特·恩迪科特·奥斯古德，《有限战争：对美国战略的挑战》（芝加哥，1957 年）；亨利·基辛格， 《核武器与外交政策》（纽约，1957 年）；以及伯纳德·布罗迪，《无限武器与有限战争》，《记者报》，1954 年 11 月 11 日。
21 William W. Kaufmann, ed., Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, 1956), 24–25. Kaufmann's views were initially circulated in a November 1954 memorandum entitled The Requirements of Deterrence, published by the Princeton Center of International Studies. The same point was made by many others, encouraged as much by awareness of the increases in destructive power of the new hydrogen bombs as by the massive retaliation speech. In Britain, for example, Liddell Hart warned in April 1954 that “to the extent that the H-bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibilities of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression” (article reprinted in B. H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defence [London, 1960], 23). Other important articles and books on limited war were: Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, 1957); Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957); and Bernard Brodie, “Unlimited Weapons and Limited War,” The Reporter, November 11, 1954.
22约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯，《安全与和平政策》，《外交事务》 30（1954 年 4 月）。杜勒斯还驳斥了美国“打算完全依靠大规模战略轰炸作为威慑和反击侵略的唯一手段”的观点。
22 John Foster Dulles, “Policy for Security and Peace,” Foreign Affairs 30 (April 1954). Dulles also repudiated the notion that the United States “intended to rely wholly on large-scale strategic bombing as the sole means to deter and counter aggression.”
1956 年 8 月，空军部长唐纳德·夸尔斯 (Donald Quarles) 表示：“任何一方都不能仅仅依靠飞机或其他原子武器投送手段的优势来避免此类战争的灾难。超过一定程度后，这种前景并非取决于双方力量的相对强弱，而是取决于双方各自掌握的绝对优势以及对拦截的实质性免疫力。”（引自塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿，《共同防御》 （纽约，1961 年），第 101 页）
23 Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles in August 1956: “Neither side can hope by a mere margin of superiority in airplanes or other means of delivery of atomic weapons to escape the catastrophe of such a war. Beyond a certain point, this prospect is not the result of relative strength of the two opposed forces. It is the absolute in the hands of each, and in the substantial invulnerability to interdiction” (quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense [New York, 1961], 101).
24杜勒斯观察到：“能够走到战争边缘而不卷入战争是必要的艺术。如果你不能掌握它，你必然会卷入战争。如果你试图逃避它，如果你害怕走到战争边缘，你就迷失了方向”（1 月16 日，詹姆斯·谢普利采访《生活》杂志）。
24 Dulles observed: “The ability to get to the verge without getting into war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost” (interview with James Shepley, Life Magazine, January 16, 1956).
25引自 Alfred Grosser，《西方联盟：1941 年以来的欧美关系》（伦敦，1980 年），第 173 页。
25 Quoted in Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 194J (London, 1980), 173.
26这是原子能委员会总顾问委员会中反对研制氢弹的成员的观点。参见约克，《顾问们》。
26 This was the view of those members of the general advisory committee of the Atomic Energy Commission who opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb. See York, The Advisors.
27基辛格的《核武器与外交政策》一书便是这种做法的一个显著例证另见安东尼·巴扎德的《大规模报复与渐进式威慑》，载《世界政治》第8卷第2期（1956年1月）。杜勒斯本人也曾沿着这条思路进行论述，试图在不重新转向常规武力的情况下维持政府政策（约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯，《美国外交政策中的挑战与回应》，载《外交事务》第36卷第1期[1957年10月]）。
27 One of the more notable examples of this approach is found in Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. See also Anthony Buzzard, “Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence,” World Politics 8, no. 2 (January 1956). Dulles himself came to argue along these lines in an effort to sustain administration policy without a shift back to conventional forces (John Foster Dulles, “Challenge and Response in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 36, no. 1 [October 1957]).
28参见雷蒙德·加索夫所著《核时代的苏联战略》（纽约，1958 年）第 7 章。
28 See chapter 7 of Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1958).
29其中最臭名昭著的演习是1955年在西德举行的“空白授权”演习。在这次演习中，只有北约一方“使用”了战术核武器。两天内，355枚核装置被“引爆”，大部分在西德境内。即使不考虑残留辐射的影响，这次演习也会造成多达170万德国人死亡，350万人受伤。
29 The most notorious such exercise was Carte Blanche, which took place in West Germany in 1955. In it tactical nuclear weapons were only “used” by the NATO side. Over two days 355 devices were “exploded,” mostly over West German territory. Even without the effects of residual radiation, this would have left up to 1.7 million Germans dead and 3.5 million wounded.
30参见威廉·考夫曼对基辛格著作的评论，《军事事务危机》，《世界政治》第 10 卷第 4 期（1958 年 7 月），以及詹姆斯·金对基辛格著作的评论， 《新共和》杂志，1957 年 7 月 8 日和 15 日。
30 See the reviews of Kissinger's book by William Kaufmann, “The Crisis in Military Affairs,” World Politics 10, no. 4 (July 1958) and by James King, The New Republic, July 8 and 15, 1957.
31伯纳德·布罗迪，“关于有限战争的更多内容”，《世界政治》 10，第 1 期（1957 年 10 月），117。
31 Bernard Brodie, “More about Limited War,” World Politics 10, no. 1 (October 1957), 117.
32 TN Dupuy，“美国能否打一场有限的核战争”，《奥比斯》 5，第 1 期（1961 年春季）。
32 T. N. Dupuy, “Can America Fight a Limited Nuclear War,” Orbis 5, no. 1 (Spring 1961).
33 Henry A. Kissinger，“有限战争：常规战争还是核战争？”《代达罗斯》 89，第 4 期（1960 年）。转载于Donald Brennan 编辑的《军备控制、裁军和国家安全》（纽约，1961 年）。
33 Henry A. Kissinger, “Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear?” Daedalus 89, no. 4 (1960). Reprinted in Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, ed. Donald Brennan (New York, 1961).
34该领域的术语历来晦涩难懂。随着“战术核武器”概念在理论上的局限性日益凸显，人们开始采用“战区核力量”这一术语，并根据部署地点而非用途对武器进行分类。这样一来，就必须区分用于打击战场后方目标的远程战区系统和用于战场的近程系统。然而，许多欧洲人指出，在所有这些情况下，人们仍然将此类武器与洲际战略武器进行比较，这意味着对两个大国的盟友使用类似当量的武器，其严重程度将低于“战略”级别。为了回应这些反对意见，美国于1981年引入了“中程核力量”这一术语。尽管许多评论员乐于用这个术语取代此前基于射程的“远程战区核力量”，但北约却将最初被称为“战术”的武器称为“短程中程”武器，从而使问题变得更加复杂。与此同时，外界评论员越来越多地使用更具启发性的“战场”一词来指代这些武器。这种繁琐的术语混乱之所以重要，仅仅是因为它揭示了更大的理论混乱。
34 Terminology in this area is notoriously difficult. As it became clear that the notion of a tactical nuclear weapon was intellectually suspect, the term theater nuclear force was adopted, which classified the weapons by location rather than by role. It was then necessary to distinguish between the longer-range theater systems that would be used against targets well to the rear of the battlefield and the shorter-range intended for battlefield use. However, many Europeans noted that in all these cases, the comparisons were still being made with intercontinental strategic weapons, which implied that the use of weapons of similar yield against any allies of the two larger powers would be something less serious than “strategic.” In an attempt to meet such objections the United States introduced the term intermediate nuclear forces in 1981. Although many commentators would have been happy to use that instead of what had hitherto been known as long-range theater forces as part of a classification based on range, NATO complicated matters by referring to the weapons originally known as tactical as short-range intermediate. Meanwhile, outside commentators were increasingly using the more revealing term battlefield to label these weapons. This tedious terminological confusion is relevant only because of the larger doctrinal confusion that it reveals.
35关于基于新技术应用的提案，参见 WS Bennett 等人的《北约可信的核重点防御》，载《奥比斯》 （1973 年夏季刊）。关于“中子弹”发明者的观点，参见 Sam Cohen 的《关于中子弹的真相》 （纽约，1983 年）。Sherri L. Wasserman 的《中子弹争议：联盟政治研究》（纽约，1983 年）描述了这场争议
35 For a proposal based on the exploitation of new technologies see W.S. Bennett et al., “A Credible Nuclear-Emphasis Defense for NATO,” Orbis (Summer 1973). For the views of the inventor of the “neutron bomb” see Sam Cohen, The Truth about the Neutron Bomb (New York, 1983). The controversy is described in Sherri L. Wasserman, The Neutron Bomb Controversy: A Study in Alliance Politics, (New York, 1983).
36例如，迈克尔·莱格记录了 20 世纪 70 年代初北约核计划小组对战区核武器后续使用情况的研究，所有研究都表明，尽管“以选择性打击的形式使用核武器可能会在相关地区带来短期优势，并很可能暂停冲突；……但如果华沙条约组织以类似（或更大）规模的核攻击作为回应，双方都不会因使用核武器而获得显著的军事优势”，而且大规模使用“还会造成完全不可接受的附带损害，其中大部分发生在北约领土上”（J. Michael Legge，《战区核武器与北约灵活反应战略》 [加利福尼亚州圣莫尼卡，1983 年]，第 26-27 页）。
36 For example, Michael Legge records how in studies of follow-on use of theater nuclear weapons for NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in the early 1970s, all suggested that although use “in the form of selective strikes could result in a short-term advantage in the area concerned, and quite possibly a pause in the conflict;…if the Warsaw Pact responded with a nuclear attack on a similar (or greater) scale, neither side would gain a significant military advantage as a direct consequence of using nuclear weapons” and that large-scale use “would also result in totally unacceptable levels of collateral damage, much of it on NATO territory” (J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response [Santa Monica, Calif., 1983], 26–27).
37参见伯纳德·布罗迪，《导弹时代的战略》（普林斯顿，1959 年），2.28-2.9。1954 年秋季，《基本国家安全政策》文件在对该问题进行了一些讨论后指出，“美国及其盟友必须拒绝预防性战争的概念或旨在挑起战争的行为”（参见罗森伯格，《过度杀戮的起源》，34）。
37 See Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959), 2.28–2.9. In the fall of 1954, the Basic National Security Policy paper stated, following some discussion of the problem, that “the United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war” (see Rosenberg, “Origins of Overkill,” 34).
38例如，爱德华·米德·厄尔写道，原子弹和火箭的结合将“极大地重视秘密策划、公开进行的突袭”（《空军对历史的影响》，《耶鲁评论》 35，第4期[1946年6月]）。
38 For example, Edward Mead Earle wrote that the combination of atom bombs and rockets would “put an enormous premium on the surprise attack, planned in secrecy and waged à outrance” (“The Influence of Airpower upon History,” Yale Review 35, no. 4 [June 1946]).
39最早注意到这一点的人之一是雅各布·维纳，他在 1945 年 11 月的演讲中发表了题为《原子弹对国际关系的影响》的演讲（《美国哲学学会会刊》 90，第 1 期 [1946 年 1 月]）。
39 One of the first to draw attention to this was Jacob Viner in a speech of November 1945 (“The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 90, no. 1 [January 1946]).
40威廉·博登的《没有时间》（纽约，1946 年）是个例外
40 One exception was William Borden, There Will Be No Time (New York, 1946).
41有关早期示例，请参阅 TF Walkowicz，“反击战略：我们如何利用美国的原子优势”，《空军杂志》 （1951 年 2 月）；Richard Leghorn，“无需轰炸城市即可赢得战争”，《美国新闻与世界报道》，1955 年 1 月 28 日。
41 For early examples see T. F. Walkowicz, “Counter-force Strategy: How We Can Exploit America's Atomic Advantage,” Air Force Magazine (February 1951); Richard Leghorn, “No Need to Bomb Cities to Win War,” U.S. News & World Report, January 28, 1955.
42攻击苏联核能力的计划要求可以追溯到杜鲁门政府时期（罗森伯格，《过度杀戮的起源》，25）。
42 The requirement in the plans for an attack on Soviet nuclear capability went back to the Truman administration (Rosenberg, “Origins of Overkill,” 25).
43同上，第 58 页。
43 Ibid., 58.
44原报告发表于1954 年 4 月 1 日，作者为 AJ Wohlstetter、FS Hoffman、RJ Lutz 和 HS Rowen，标题为《战略空军基地的选择和使用》 ，RAND R-266。有关背景信息，请参阅 Bruce LR Smith 的《兰德公司：非营利咨询公司案例研究》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1966 年），以及 Kaplan的《末日巫师：核时代的战略家》（纽约，1983 年）。
44 The original report was published as A. J. Wohlstetter, F.S. Hoffman, R. J. Lutz, and H.S. Rowen Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, RAND R-266, April 1, 1954. For background see Bruce L.R. Smith, The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation (Cambridge, Mass., 1966) and at a more anecdotal level, Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon: Strategists of the Nuclear Age (New York, 1983).
45劳伦斯·弗里德曼，《美国情报与苏联战略威胁》（伦敦，1977 年），第 40 章。
45 Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (London, 1977), ch. 40.
46阿诺德·霍雷利克和迈伦·拉什，《战略力量与苏联外交政策》（芝加哥，1966 年）。
46 Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1966).
47有一篇文章将苏联思想的发展与这些担忧联系起来，那就是赫伯特·S·迪纳斯坦的《苏联战略思想的革命》，载于《外交事务》第36卷第2期（1958年1月）。
47 One article that related developments in Soviet thinking to these concerns was Herbert S. Dinerstein, “The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking,” Foreign Affairs 36, no. 2 (January 1958).
48 Albert Wohlstetter，“恐怖的微妙平衡”，《外交事务》 37，第 2 期（1959 年 1 月）。
48 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959).
例如，伯纳德·布罗迪在同年出版的一本书中写道：“几乎所有人都认为，包括我们最高国家决策者在内，我们有能力对苏联的直接攻击进行强有力的报复。”（《导弹时代的战略》 ，第282页）两年后，亨利·基辛格写道：“威慑的前提条件是拥有不可战胜的报复力量。”（《选择的必要性》 （纽约，1961年），第22页）
49 For example, Bernard Brodie said, in a book published in the same year, “Our ability to retaliate in great force to a direct Soviet attack is taken far too much for granted by almost everybody, including our highest national policy-makers” Strategy in the Missile Age, 282, and Henry Kissinger wrote, two years later, “A precondition of deterrence is an invulnerable retaliatory force” (Necessity for Choice [New York, 1961], 22).
50参见 Alain C. Enthoven 和 K. Wayne Smith 合著的《多少才算足够？1961-1969 年国防计划的制定》（纽约，1971 年）。他们还指出，“脆弱性问题并未得到广泛或充分的理解”。尽管人们已经认识到保护美国进攻性武器的必要性，但对于与高层指挥结构和通信网络相关的问题却认识不足（同上，第 166 页）。
50 See Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961–1969 (New York, 1971). They also comment that the “vulnerability problem was not widely or well understood.” Although the need to protect U.S. offensive weapons had been recognized, there was less awareness of the problems connected with the high-level command structure and communications networks (ibid., 166)
51这一论断的主要例外是战后原子科学家所享有的影响力。他们创办了《原子科学家公报》，该刊多年来一直是讨论核武器相关问题的主要非政府出版物，他们还为国际社会控制核武器发展发挥了重要的游说作用。然而，在包括罗伯特·奥本海默在内的领导人在氢弹研发问题上受挫后，他们的内部影响力逐渐减弱。1954年，曾力主研发氢弹的爱德华·泰勒参与了阻止奥本海默获得安全许可的行动，这进一步加剧了科学家群体的分裂。苏联发射人造卫星“斯普特尼克”之后，科学家们重返高级顾问职位，但在政府之外的影响力有所下降。参见罗伯特·吉尔平著，《美国科学家与核武器政策》 （普林斯顿，1962年）。关于战略问题的各种处理方法，参见罗伯特·吉尔平与克里斯托弗·赖特主编的《科学家与国家政策制定》（纽约，1964年）中的相关论文
51 The major exception to this statement is the influence enjoyed by the atomic scientists immediately after the war. They founded the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which for many years was the main nongovernmental publication for the discussion of the issues raised by nuclear weapons, and they provided an important lobby for international controls on nuclear developments. Their internal influence waned after their leaders, including Robert Oppenheimer, were defeated on the question of hydrogen bomb development. The community was split further when Edward Teller, who had promoted the hydrogen bomb, associated himself with the effort in 1954 to deny Oppenheimer a security clearance. After Sputnik, scientists returned to higher advisory positions but were less visible outside of government. See Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton, 1962). For a discussion of the various approaches to strategic issues see the essays in Scientists and National Policy-Making, ed. Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (New York, 1964).
52亨利·基辛格，“军备控制、检查和突袭”，《外交事务》 38，第3期（1960年4月）。
52 Henry Kissinger, “Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack,” Foreign Affairs 38, no. 3 (April 1960).
53 Thomas B. Schelling，《冲突的战略》（纽约，1960 年），第 207 页。关于这一概念的批判，参见 Glenn Snyder，《威慑与防御》（普林斯顿，1961 年），第 108 页。
53 Thomas B. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York, 1960), 207. For a critique of this concept see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961), 108.
54奥斯卡·摩根斯坦，《国防问题》（纽约，1959 年），第 74 页。
54 Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense (New York, 1959), 74.
1962年12月，国防部助理部长约翰·麦克诺顿在密歇根大学发表讲话时，引用了谢林的“相互惧怕突袭”这一说法，并指出：“我们所做的每一个决定，都必须考虑稳定性因素以及对军备竞赛的动态影响。”关于肯尼迪执政时期的理论和武器决策的完整描述，请参阅德斯蒙德·鲍尔的《政策与兵力水平：肯尼迪政府的战略导弹计划》（伯克利，1980年）。
55 Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, speaking in December 1962 at the University of Michigan, used Schelling's phrase “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack” and stated, “We must, in every decision we make, concern ourselves with the factors of stability and of the dynamic effect on the arms race.” For a full account of the doctrinal and weapons decision of the Kennedy years see Desmond Ball, Policies and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, 1980).
56伯纳德·布罗迪，《无限武器与有限战争》。文中提到的“钝化任务”相当于后来被描述为反击的行动。
56 Bernard Brodie, “Unlimited Weapons and Limited War.” The “blunting mission” referred to is equivalent to what would later be described as a counterforce attack.
57关于对常规技术进步的预期所产生的影响，可参见赫尔曼·卡恩的《论热核战争》（普林斯顿，1960 年）。卡恩预测到 20 世纪 70 年代中期将出现八次技术革命。关于对当时人们热情的怀疑性论述，可参见赫伯特·约克的《走向遗忘的竞赛：军备竞赛参与者的视角》（纽约，1971 年）。
57 For an example of the influence of expectations of regular technological advance see Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, 1960). Kahn predicted eight technological revolutions by the mid-1970s. For a skeptical account of the period's enthusiasms see Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York, 1971).
58科学咨询委员会安全资源小组，《核时代的威慑与生存》（华盛顿特区，1957 年 11 月）。背景资料参见 Morton Halperin，“盖瑟委员会与政策过程”，《世界政治》 13，第 3 期（1961 年 4 月）。
58 Security Resources Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee, Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C., November 1957). For background see Morton Halperin, “The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process,” World Politics 13, no. 3 (April 1961).
59 Brodie，《导弹时代的战略》，第 176 页。
59 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 176.
60 James E. King，“导弹差距中的空中力量”，《世界政治》 12，第 4 期（1960 年 7 月）。
60 James E. King, “Airpower in the Missile Gap,” World Politics 12, no. 4 (July 1960).
61 Warren Amster，“威慑设计”，《原子科学家公报》（1956 年 5 月），第 165 页。在同一期中，另见 CW Sherwin，“通过军事技术保障和平”。
61 Warren Amster, “Design for Deterrence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 1956), 165. In the same issue, see also C.W. Sherwin, “Securing Peace through Military Technology.”
62谢林，《冲突的战略》，第 288 页。
62 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 288.
63 Herbert York 和 Jerome Wiesner，“国家安全与核试验禁令”，《科学美国人》，1964 年 10 月。
63 Herbert York and Jerome Wiesner, “National Security and the Nuclear Test Ban,” Scientific American, October 1964.
64此前曾有多项关于建立完善的民防网络的提案（包括盖瑟报告中的一项）。1961年7月，肯尼迪总统提交了一份大型方案，但到20世纪60年代中期，该方案实际上已被放弃。计算表明，在每种损失程度下，防御方的支出都是进攻方的三倍。
64 There had been a number of proposals for an elaborate civil defense network (including one in the Gaither Report). In July 1961 President Kennedy submitted a major program but by the mid-1960s it had been virtually abandoned. Calculations suggested that at each level of damage the defense had to spend three times as much as the offense.
65 Enthoven 和 Smith，《多少才算足够？》，174。
65 Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?, 174.
66该缩写词最早由唐纳德·布伦南在《生存》（1972 年 9 月/10 月）的“关于 SALT 协议的研讨会”中提出。
66 The acronym was first exploited by Donald Brennan in “Symposium on the SALT Agreements,” Survival (September/October 1972.).
67 Desmond Ball，《战略威慑的目标设定》，Adelphi Paper 185（伦敦，1983 年），14-15 页。
67 Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, Adelphi Paper 185 (London, 1983), 14–15.
68 “在第三次无限制的世界大战中，任何有意义的胜利都是不可能实现的，因为没有任何国家能够赢得全面热核战争。现在已经具备相互确保摧毁能力的两个世界强国充分认识到了这一点”（罗伯特·S·麦克纳马拉，《安全的本质：执政反思》 [伦敦，1968]，159-60）。
68 “No meaningful victory is even conceivable in a third unlimited world war, for no nation can possibly win a full-scale thermo-nuclear exchange. The two world powers that have now achieved a mutual assured-destruction capability fully realize that” (Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office [London, 1968], 159–60).
69 Ted Greenwood，《制造 MIRV：国防决策研究》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1975 年）。
69 Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study in Defense Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass., 1975).
70 Robert S. McNamara，“核战略的动态”，美国国务院公报，第 57 卷，1967 年 10 月 9 日。
70 Robert S. McNamara, “The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,” Department of State Bulletin, vol. 57, October 9, 1967.
71例如，乔治·拉斯延斯（George Rathjens）的《军备竞赛的动态》（“The Dynamics of the Arms Race”），载于1969年4月《科学美国人》 （Scientific American） 。 《科学美国人》在20世纪60年代末和70年代初发表了多篇关于这一主题的文章，主要关注反导系统（ABM）和分导式多弹头（MIRV）。这些文章收录于赫伯特·约克（Herbert York）主编的《军备控制》 （Arms Control）一书中（旧金山，1973年）。在《代达罗斯》 （Daedalus ）第104卷第3期（1975年夏季）的军备控制特刊中，对国内军备竞赛根源的关注也十分明显。
71 For example George Rathjens, “The Dynamics of the Arms Race,” Scientific American, April 1969. Scientific American published a number of articles on this general theme in the late 1960s and early 1970s, largely concerned with ABMs and MIRVs. They are collected in Arms Control, ed. Herbert York (San Francisco, 1973). The interest in the domestic sources of the arms race is very evident in the essays on arms control contained in a special issue of Daedalus 104, no. 3 (Summer 1975).
72参见弗里德曼，《美国情报与苏联战略威胁》，第 8 章。
72 See Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, ch. 8.
73约翰·纽豪斯，《寒冷的黎明：SALT 的故事》（纽约，1973 年）。
73 John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York, 1973).
74例如 Roger Speed，《20 世纪 80 年代的战略威慑》（斯坦福，1979 年），第 56-64 页。
74 For example Roger Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s (Stanford, 1979), 56–64.
75 Richard L. Garwin，“战略潜艇会很脆弱吗？”国际安全8，第 2 期（1983 年秋季）。
75 Richard L. Garwin, “Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable?” International Security 8, no. 2 (Fall 1983).
76 纽约时报，1983 年 3 月 2 日、4 日。
76 New York Times, March 2.4, 1983.
77关于 20 世纪 80 年代反导辩论的状况，请参阅 Ashton B. Carter 和 David Schwartz 编辑的《弹道导弹防御》（华盛顿特区，1984 年）。
77 On the state of the ABM debate in the 1980s, see Ashton B. Carter and David Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C., 1984).
78参见 Freedman，《核战略的演变》，第 210-211 页。
78 See Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 210–211.
79理查德·斯莫克，《战争：控制升级》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1977 年）。
79 Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).
80 Herman Kahn，《论升级：隐喻与场景》（纽约，1965 年）。
80 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York, 1965).
81同上，第 138 页。
81 Ibid., 138.
82利奥·西拉德在《原子科学家公报》第11卷第8期（1955年10月）发表的《裁军与和平问题》一文中，提出了一种在不使事态完全失控的情况下进行核交换的早期方案。莫顿·卡普兰首先在一篇文章中采用了这种方法，他主张美国对欧洲持续攻击的回应应包括“一系列分阶段的报复，最终达到欧洲两倍价值的报复”（《核威慑的计算》，《世界政治》第10卷第4期[1958年7月]）。后来，他参与撰写了多位著名文职战略家的论文集，探讨了这种方法（克劳斯·诺尔和桑顿·里德主编，《有限战略战争》[纽约，1962年]）。
82 An early scheme for conducting nuclear exchanges without things getting completely out of hand was developed by Leo Szilard in “Disarmament and the Problem of Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 11, no. 8 (October 1955). Morton Kaplan pursued this approach first in an article in which he advocated an American response to a sustained attack on Europe involving a “series of installment reprisals that eventually progress to reprisals double the value of Europe” (“The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence,” World Politics 10, no. 4 [July 1958]). Later he contributed to a collection of essays by a number of leading civilian strategists that sought to explore this approach (Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, eds., Limited Strategic War [New York, 1962]).
83 Kahn，《论升级》，2.90。
83 Kahn, On Escalation, 2.90.
84 Thomas Schelling，《武器与影响》（纽黑文，1966 年），第 93 页。
84 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. (New Haven, 1966), 93.
85谢林，《冲突的战略》，188。原文强调。
85 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 188. Emphasis in the original.
86同上，194。“最好通过不可逆转的行动或承诺来制造共同风险，这样只有敌人的撤退才能平息局势；否则，这可能会演变成一场心理战。”
86 Ibid., 194. “Preferably one creates the shared risk by irreversible manoeuvres or commitments, so that only the enemy's withdrawal can tranquilize the situation; otherwise it may turn out to be a contest of nerves.”
87背景资料参见卡普兰的《末日巫师》（Wizards of Armageddon）第18章。兰德公司理念发展及其转化为官方政策过程中最具影响力的人物之一是威廉·考夫曼。麦克纳马拉时期五角大楼的各种主题当时还历历在目，尚未被世人遗忘，考夫曼在《麦克纳马拉战略》（纽约，1964年）一书中对这些主题进行了有效的公开阐述。
87 For background see Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, ch. 18. One of the most influential figures in the development of the concepts at Rand and their translation into official policy was William Kaufmann. While the various themes of the McNamara period at the Pentagon were still fresh and untarnished, Kaufmann provided an effective public exposition of them in The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1964).
88致众议院军事委员会， 1961 年2 月。引自考夫曼，《麦克纳马拉战略》，第 53 页。
88 To the House Armed Services Committee, February 1961. Quoted in Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, 53.
89罗伯特·S·麦克纳马拉，《北大西洋共同体的防御安排》，美国国务院公报，第 47 号，1962 年 7 月 9 日。麦克纳马拉于 1962 年 5 月 5 日向北约部长们所作的原始简报现已解密。
89 Robert S. McNamara, “Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community,” Department of State Bulletin, no. 47, July 9,1962. McNamara's original briefing to NATO ministers on May 5, 1962, has now been declassified.
90参见弗里德曼，《核战略的演变》，第 15 章；另见鲍尔，《政策和兵力水平》，其中对新战略背后的动机有略微不同的解释。
90 See Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, ch. 15; see also Ball, Policies and Force Levels for a slightly different interpretation of the motivations behind the new strategy.
91这一点在麦克乔治·邦迪（McGeorge Bundy）的一篇著名文章中体现得最为明显。邦迪曾是肯尼迪总统的国家安全事务特别助理。他写道：“政治领导人对核武器的真实想法与模拟战略战争中对相对‘优势’的复杂计算中所假设的之间存在着巨大的鸿沟。智库分析人士可以将‘可接受的’损失水平设定在数千万人的生命之上。他们可以假设，对某些人来说，失去数十座大城市在某种程度上是一种真正的选择。但在真实的政治领导人的世界里——无论是在美国还是在苏联——一个哪怕只在本国一座城市投放一枚氢弹的决定，都会被事先认定为灾难性的错误；十颗炸弹袭击十座城市将是史无前例的灾难；而一百颗炸弹袭击一百座城市则是不可想象的”（《控制火山》，《外交事务》 48卷1期[1969年10月]，9-10页）。
91 This came over most clearly in a celebrated article by McGeorge Bundy, who was Kennedy's special assistant for national security affairs. He wrote: “There is an enormous gulf between what political leaders really think about nuclear weapons and what is assumed in complex calculations of relative ‘advantage’ in simulated strategic warfare. Think Tank analysts can set levels of ‘acceptable’ damage well up in the tens of millions of lives. They can assume that the loss of dozens of great cities is somehow a real choice for some men. In the real world of real political leaders—whether here or in the Soviet Union—a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable” (“To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs 48, no. 1 [October 1969], 9–10).
92法国理论的发展超出了本文的讨论范围。就北约的需求而言，最重要的理论家是安德烈·博弗雷，其著作《威慑与战略》（伦敦，1965年）最初以《劝阻与战略》（巴黎，1964年）为名出版。皮埃尔·加洛瓦质疑在核时代是否还能建立真正的联盟，并在《恐怖平衡：核时代的战略》 （理查德·霍华德译，波士顿，1961年）中提出了国家核力量的概念，该书最初以《核时代战略》 （巴黎，1960年）为名出版。英国对这场辩论的反应比法国更为谨慎，因为英国既是成熟的核大国，又在一定程度上依赖美国的慷慨资助来维持一支可信的核力量。参见安德鲁·皮埃尔，《核政治：英国拥有独立战略力量的经验，1939-1970》（伦敦，1972年）。
92 The development of the French theory is beyond the scope of this essay. The most important theorist arguing in terms of the needs of NATO was André Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy (London, 1965), originally published as Dissuasion et Stratégie (Paris, 1964). Pierre Gallois questioned whether true alliances were possible in the nuclear age and developed a concept for a national nuclear force in The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age, trans. Richard Howard (Boston, 1961), originally published as Stratégie de l'âge nucléaire (Paris, 1960). The British response to this debate was somewhat more inhibited than the French in that Britain was both an established nuclear power and already somewhat dependent on American largesse for maintaining a credible force. See Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939–1970 (London, 1972).
93 Catherine McArdle Kelleher，《德国与核武器政治》（纽约，1975 年）。
93 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1975).
94这场争论的背景可以在约翰·斯坦布鲁纳的《决策的控制论》（普林斯顿，1974 年）中找到。关于核共享问题给美国战略带来的挑战，请参阅阿尔伯特·沃尔斯特特的《核共享：北约与 N+1 国家》，载于《外交事务》第 39 卷第 3 期（1961 年 4 月）。
94 The background to this dispute is found in John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, 1974). For a discussion of the problems the nuclear sharing issue posed to U.S. doctrine see Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country,” Foreign Affairs 39, no. 3 (April 1961).
95 “这一概念……基于对各种程度的侵略或侵略威胁采取灵活、平衡的适当应对措施，包括常规和核应对措施。这些应对措施在适当的政治控制下，其设计目的首先是威慑侵略，从而维护和平；但如果不幸发生侵略，则在前沿防御概念范围内维护北大西洋公约组织区域的安全”（公报，北大西洋理事会部长级会议，1967 年 12 月 14 日）。
95 “This concept…is based upon a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. These responses, subject to appropriate political control, are designed, first to deter aggression and thus preserve peace; but, should aggression unhappily occur, to maintain the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area within the concept of forward defense” (communiqué, ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, December 14, 1967).
96恩托芬和史密斯在《多少才够？》第 4 章中从美国的角度描述了这场辩论
96 The debate is described from an American perspective in Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough? ch. 4.
97 Legge，《战区核武器与北约灵活反应战略》。
97 Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response.
98根据两位研究此事件的学生的说法，美国行动旨在传达的信息是：“如果你继续你目前的行动，如果你真的继续向埃及派遣军队，你将在我们两军之间引发一场互动，其最终结果尚不清楚，但可能会造成毁灭性后果”（Barry M. Blechman 和 Douglas M. Hart，“核武器的政治效用：1973 年中东危机”，《国际安全》 7，第 1 期 [1982 年夏季]，146-47 页）。
98 According to two students of the episode, the message U.S. actions were designed to convey was: “If you persist in your current activity, if you actually go ahead and land forces in Egypt, you will initiate an interactive process between our armed forces whose end results are not clear, but which could be devastating” (Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, “The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis,” International Security 7, no. 1 [Summer 1982], 146–47).
99理查德·M·尼克松，《1970 年代的美国外交政策》（华盛顿特区，1970 年 2 月 18 日），第 54-55 页。
99 Richard M. Nixon, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s (Washington, D.C., February 18, 1970), 54–55.
100 Fred Iklé，“核威慑能否持续一个世纪”，《外交事务》 51，第 2 期（1973 年 1 月）；Wolfgang Panofsky，“美国和俄罗斯之间的相互人质关系”，《外交事务》 52，第 1 期（1973 年 10 月）。
100 Fred Iklé, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century,” Foreign Affairs 51, no. 2. (January 1973); Wolfgang Panofsky, “The Mutual Hostage Relationship between America and Russia,” Foreign Affairs 52., no. 1 (October 1973).
101遗憾的是，关于苏联的争论超出了本文的讨论范围。美国国内关于苏联战略的争论可以从两部论文集中窥见一斑：德里克·利伯特主编的《苏联军事思想》（马萨诸塞州剑桥和伦敦，1981年）以及约翰·贝利斯和杰拉尔德·西格尔主编的《苏联战略》（伦敦，1981年）。这场争论可以分为两个问题。第一个问题是，苏联是否制定了一套基于打击军事目标并包含先发制人要素的核战争战略。现有证据似乎表明，这的确是苏联的策略。第二个问题是，这一战略是否赋予了苏联足够的信心去发动并赢得核战争，以至于西方的威慑力量受到了严重的损害。在这方面，现有证据表明，苏联领导人始终高度意识到核战争的风险。
101 The Soviet debate is unfortunately outside of the scope of this essay. The debate within the United States on Soviet strategy can be gleaned from two collections of essays: Derek Leebaert, ed., Soviet Military Thinking (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1981) and John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds., Soviet Strategy (London, 1981). The debate can be divided into two questions. The first was whether or not the Soviet Union had worked out a strategy for the conduct of nuclear war based on attacks on military targets and containing some elements of preemption. The evidence seemed to suggest that this was indeed the Soviet approach. The second question was whether this strategy gave them sufficient confidence to fight and win a nuclear war so that the integrity of Western deterrence had been dangerously compromised. Here the evidence suggested that Soviet leaders remained extremely aware of the risks of nuclear war.
102这引发了国务卿亨利·基辛格一段著名的激烈言论：“作为一个国家，我们必须扪心自问的一个问题是，战略优势究竟是什么？在政治、军事和作战层面，在这样的兵力规模下，它的意义何在？我们该如何利用它？”（1974年7月3日新闻发布会，转载于《生存》杂志[1974年9/10月]）。
102 This prompted one of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's more celebrated outbursts: “And one of the questions which we have to ask ourselves as a country is what in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers. What do you do with it?” (press conference of July 3, 1974, reprinted in Survival [September/October 1974]).
103军备控制的进程也超出了本文的讨论范围，尽管战略问题与军备控制问题日益紧密地联系在一起，对各种提案的讨论也引发了关于国防和外交政策的更广泛辩论。我曾在《武器、理论与军备控制》（载于《华盛顿季刊》 ，1984年春季刊）一文中探讨过宏观战略概念与军备控制之间的关系。关于主要战略武器谈判的历史，可参阅约翰·纽豪斯的《冷酷黎明：SALT的故事》（纽约，1973年）；斯特罗布·塔尔博特的《终局：SALT II的内幕》（纽约，1979年）以及《致命的博弈：里根政府与核军备控制僵局》（纽约，1984年）。
103 The course of arms control is also outside the scope of this essay, although questions of strategy increasingly became bound up with those of arms control, and discussion of the various proposals became an occasion for a broader debate about defense and foreign policy in general. I have discussed the relationship between broad strategic concepts and arms control in “Weapons, Doctrines and Arms Control,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 1984). For histories of the main strategic arms talks see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York, 1973); Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New York, 1979) and Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York, 1984).
104 国防部长詹姆斯·施莱辛格向国会提交的关于 1975 财年国防预算和1975-79财年国防计划的报告（华盛顿特区，1974 年 3 月 4 日）。林恩·埃瑟里奇·戴维斯，《有限的核选项：威慑与新美国主义》（伦敦，1976 年）。
104 Report of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975–79 Defense Program, (Washington, D.C., March 4, 1974). Lynn Etheridge Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine (London, 1976).
105其中一位负责此案的官员明确阐述了与升级优势概念的联系：“该政策要求美国必须拥有制衡的战略选择，以便在各种程度的冲突中，侵略行为要么被击败，要么导致不可接受的代价超过收益……总的来说，为大规模但非全面冲突做好准备的必要性，最适用于大规模战争已经爆发的情况——而且很可能是战术核武器已经使用的情况。在这种情况下，至关重要的是，苏联必须继续相信，不存在任何中间升级阶段，其使用核武器能够成功”（沃尔特·斯洛科姆，《制衡战略》，《国际安全》第5卷第4期[1981年春季]，第21-22页）。
105 One of the officials responsible made clear the connection with the concept of escalation dominance: “the policy dictated that the United States must have countervailing strategic options such that at a variety of levels of exchange, aggression would either be defeated or would result in unacceptable costs that exceeded gains…. In general, the need to be prepared for large-scale but less than all-out exchanges, is most applicable to a situation in which a ma)or war has already begun—and probably one in which tactical nuclear weapons have already been used. In such a context, it would be critical that the Soviet Union continue to believe that there is no intermediate level of escalation at which their use could be successful” (Walter Slocombe, “The Countervailing Strategy,” International Security 5, no. 4 [Spring 1981], 21–22).
106 “战时战略若让敌人面临我方反攻其弱点的风险，便能加强威慑，并服务于和平时期的防御战略”（国防部副部长弗雷德·伊克勒，《里根国防计划：聚焦战略要务》，《战略评论》 [1982年春季]，第15页）。关于卡特和里根计划之间关系的讨论，参见杰弗里·里切尔森，《PD-59、NSDD-13和里根战略现代化计划》，《战略研究杂志》第6卷第2期（1983年6月）。
106 “A wartime strategy that confronts the enemy, were he to attack, with the risk of our counter-offensive against his vulnerable points strengthens deterrence and serves the defensive peacetime strategy” (Under Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé, “The Reagan Defense Program: A Focus on the Strategic Imperative,” Strategic Review [Spring 1982], 15). For a discussion of the relationship between the Carter and Reagan programs see Jeffrey Richelson, “PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 6, no. 2. (June 1983).
107 Colin Gray 和 Keith Payne，“胜利是可能的”，《外交政策》，第 39 期（1980 年夏季）。
107 Colin Gray and Keith Payne, “Victory is Possible,” Foreign Policy, no. 39 (Summer 1980).
108 Andrew Pierre 编。《欧洲核武器》（纽约，1984 年）。
108 Andrew Pierre, ed. Nuclear Weapons in Europe (New York, 1984).
109科林·格雷，《陆基导弹部队的未来》（伦敦，1978 年）。另见保罗·尼采，《威慑我们的威慑力》，《外交政策》，第 25 期（1976-77 年冬季）。
109 Colin Gray, The Future of Land-Based Missile Force (London, 1978). See also Paul Nitze, “Deterring Our Deterrent,” Foreign Policy, no. 25 (Winter 1976–77).
110美国国会技术评估办公室，《核战争的影响》（华盛顿特区，1979 年）；约翰·斯坦布鲁纳和托马斯·加温，《战略脆弱性：谨慎与偏执之间的平衡》，《国际安全》 50，第 1 期（1976 年夏季）。
110 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effect of Nuclear War (Washington, D.C., 1979); John Steinbruner and Thomas Garwin, “Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance between Prudence and Paranoia,” International Security 50, no. 1 (Summer 1976).
111约翰·爱德华兹，《超级武器：MX 的制作》（纽约，1982 年）。
111 John Edwards, Super Weapon: The Making of MX (New York, 1982).
112 “尽管我们洲际弹道导弹的生存能力如今令人担忧（尤其是在单独看待这个问题时），但如果我们没有一支海上弹道导弹潜艇部队和一支轰炸机部队，情况会严重得多”（总统战略部队委员会报告[华盛顿特区，1983 年 4 月]，第 7 页）。
112 “Although the survivability of our ICBMs is today a matter of concern (especially when that problem is viewed in isolation) it would be far more serious if we did not have a force of ballistic missile submarines at sea and a bomber force” (Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces [Washington, D.C., April 1983], 7).
113德斯蒙德·鲍尔，《核战争可以控制吗？》（伦敦，1981 年）；保罗·布雷肯，《核力量的指挥与控制》（纽黑文，1984 年）。
113 Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled? (London, 1981); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven, 1984).
114例如，参见西奥多·德雷珀与国防部长卡斯帕·温伯格在《纽约书评》上的交流，该交流后被收录于德雷珀的著作《现今的历史：论核战争、缓和及其他争议》（纽约，1983年）。罗伯特·杰维斯在其著作《美国核战略的非逻辑性》（伊萨卡，1984年）中反对升级主导，并明确支持留有余地的威胁策略。
114 See for example Theodore Draper's exchanges with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the New York Review of Books, reprinted in Draper's book Present History: On Nuclear War, Detente and Other Controversies (New York, 1983). Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, 1984), opposes escalation dominance and explicitly favors the threat that leaves something to chance.
26. 核时代的常规战争
26. Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age
W当两颗原子弹在日本城市爆炸，第二次世界大战戛然而止时，人们对这些武器将如何影响战争方式的看法不一。一些曾致力于战略轰炸的飞行员，虽然对战略轰炸未能像预期那样使其他战争形式过时感到失望，但他们相信原子弹使他们的预测成为现实。另一些人则持较为温和的观点，他们相信战略轰炸对胜利至关重要，如今他们认为原子弹的作用比之前认为的更加决定性。还有一些人，包括许多水兵和士兵，则持怀疑态度。他们认为，制造两颗原子弹需要耗费巨大的人力物力，即使是最强大的国家也只能负担得起少量原子弹。他们所欢迎的主要结果是，战略轰炸机群的规模可以大幅缩减，从而不会像战争期间那样消耗大量的国防人力和财力。在1952年氢弹或聚变弹出现之前，二战战胜国在计划和训练军队时，仿佛一切都未发生根本性改变，他们设想在陆地、海洋和空中进行旷日持久的大规模战役，其方式与1941年至1945年间的战争如出一辙。尽管除苏联外，各国的常备军都大幅削减，但动员人力和物力储备被认为是此类战争的必要手段。英国和法国还面临着维持或恢复其在非洲和亚洲的帝国权威的问题，这项任务要求军队的组织和装备方式更类似于英国在1944年和1945年缅甸战争中使用的军队，而不是部署在欧洲的军队。他们需要大量的步兵，并辅以充足的空运支援。步兵的补充一部分来自征兵，一部分来自招募非洲和亚洲士兵；后者进展缓慢，因为空军更倾向于集中精力发展战斗机和轰炸机。
WHEN THE Second World War was abruptly brought to an end by the explosion of two atom bombs on Japanese cities, views varied about the effect these weapons would have on the conduct of war. Some of those airmen who had been dedicated to strategic bombing, but disappointed that it had not made other forms of warfare obsolete as had been predicted, believed that the atom bomb made their predictions possible. Others, who took a less extreme view but believed in strategic bombing as a major contribution to victory, now saw it as even more decisive than they had earlier claimed it to be. Others still, including many sailors and soldiers, were more skeptical. The huge effort involved in the production of two bombs meant, they believed, that even the most powerful nation would only be able to afford a few. The principal result, which they welcomed, would be that strategic bombing fleets could be significantly smaller and therefore would not absorb as much of defense manpower and money as they had during the war. Until the appearance of the hydrogen or fusion bomb in 1952, the victors of the Second World War planned and trained their forces as if nothing had fundamentally changed, envisaging lengthy major campaigns on land, at sea, and in the air, conducted on the same lines as those they had experienced between 1941 and 1945. Although standing forces, except in the case of the Soviet Union, were sharply reduced, mobilization of reserves, both of manpower and matériel, was expected to provide the means by which such wars would be fought. Britain and France also faced the problem of maintaining or restoring their imperial authority in Africa and Asia, a task that required armies organized and equipped on lines more akin to those the British had employed in Burma in 1944 and 1945 than to those deployed in Europe. The need was for large numbers of infantry, plentifully supported by air transport. The former was supplied partly by conscription and partly by recruitment of African and Asian soldiers; the latter was slow in coming, as air forces preferred to concentrate on fighters and bombers.
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1950年6月朝鲜入侵韩国，是对这些理念的首次考验。首批被打破的观念之一是原子弹使陆战过时；另一个被打破的观念是拥有原子弹就能免遭攻击或拥有超凡的实力。道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟将军运用二战时期的作战方法，包括在仁川进行大胆的两栖登陆，成功解救了李承晚领导的大韩民国，并在10月底将朝鲜军队击退至鸭绿江。在此之前，他无需过多担心朝鲜的空袭，但中国军队的参战改变了战争的性质。他们的作战方式与日军在1942年马来亚和缅甸战役中战胜英军时所采用的战术类似，避开美军及其盟军所依赖的道路，派遣大量步兵自行携带补给，穿越崎岖不平的山地。与此同时，麦克阿瑟被剥夺了将美国空军和海军航空兵的潜在力量扩展到鸭绿江以东攻击中国军队和基地的能力，而朝鲜空军从鸭绿江出发，装备了更现代化的苏联飞机，现在构成了更大的威胁。
The North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950 posed the first test of these ideas. One of the first casualties was the concept that the atom bomb had made land warfare obsolete; another was that possession of the bomb conferred either immunity from attack or exceptional power. Using World War II methods, including a bold amphibious landing at Inchon, General Douglas MacArthur came to the rescue of Syngman Rhee's Republic of Korea and drove the North Koreans back to the Yalu River by the end of October. Up to that time, he had not had to worry much about North Korean air attacks, but the entry of the Chinese into the war then changed its nature. Their methods resembled those that the Japanese had used in their victories over the British in Malaya and Burma in 1942, avoiding the roads to which the American army and its allies were tied and moving large numbers of infantry, carrying their own supplies, across the roadless hills. At the same time MacArthur was denied the ability to extend the potential power of the U.S. Air Force's and Navy's air fleets to attack Chinese forces and bases beyond the Yalu, operating from which the North Korean air force, reequipped with more modern Soviet aircraft, now posed more of a threat.
这场战争出于重大的战略原因被限制在一定范围内：既要避免与苏联发生直接冲突，又要避免与中国陷入旷日持久的战争。令麦克阿瑟极为恼火的是，他的行动自由因他认为的政治原因而受到限制，这种情况与美国陆军的战争理念背道而驰。1951年上半年的战斗，在马修·B·里奇韦将军接替麦克阿瑟时，三八线附近的战线已经稳定下来，这场战斗更像是第一次世界大战而非第二次世界大战。在1953年7月停战协定签署前的两年僵局中，这一点更加明显。在战线确定之前，双方都发动了一系列大规模的步兵进攻，并辅以猛烈的炮火轰击和有限的坦克支援。中国和朝鲜的步兵在密集阵型进攻中伤亡惨重。局势稳定后，所有静态堑壕战的旧技巧都得重新学习，反坦克地雷和反步兵地雷的出现更增加了危险性。1953年，德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔接替哈里·S·杜鲁门就任总统时，他决心不让这个世界上最强大的国家再次陷入这种过时的战争模式，在这种模式下，其装备精良、火力强大的现代化军队却无法取得决定性的胜利。
The war was to be limited for major strategic reasons: in order to avoid either direct conflict with the Soviet Union or a drawn-out war with China. To his intense annoyance, MacArthur found his freedom of action restrained for what he saw as political reasons, a situation that ran counter to the U.S. Army's concept of how wars should be conducted. The fighting in the first half of 1951, which by the time General Matthew B. Ridgway had replaced MacArthur had stabilized the line around the 38th Parallel, was more reminiscent of the First World War than the second. This was even truer of the two years of stalemate that followed before the armistice was signed in July 1953. Before the front became fixed, both sides employed a series of major infantry attacks, supported by intense artillery bombardments and limited tank support. The Chinese and North Korean infantry suffered heavy casualties as they attacked in close formation. After stabilization, all the old tricks of static trench warfare had to be learned afresh, the mine, both antitank and antipersonnel, adding to the hazards. When Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded Harry S. Truman as President in 1953, he was determined that the most powerful nation in the world should not again find itself suffering casualties in such an outdated form of warfare, in which its modern armed forces, liberally equipped with firepower, were unable to force a decision.
当时还有其他几个因素促使所有主要强国重新考虑其武装力量的备战方式。其中最突出的包括：苏联在欧洲的顽固不化及其庞大的军队（该军队占领了东欧）构成的威胁；毛泽东将权力扩展到整个中国；核武器领域的发展，特别是苏联的首次核试验，以及聚变炸弹和小型战术核武器的研制，都预示着不久之后，意识形态对立双方都将拥有大量的核武器；以及英国和法国在维护其帝国权威方面面临的日益严峻的挑战。
Several other factors caused all the major powers at this time to reconsider how their armed forces should be prepared to fight. Prominent among these were the threat posed by Soviet intransigence in Europe, backed by its still large army, which occupied Eastern Europe; Mao Tsetung's extension of his power over all of China; developments in the field of nuclear weapons, particularly the Soviet Union's first test, and the development both of the fusion bomb and of smaller, so-called tactical, weapons, with the prospect that it would not be long before nuclear weapons became plentiful on both sides of the ideological divide; and the increasing difficulties faced by Britain and France in maintaining their imperial authority.
在欧洲，旨在解决德国未来问题的和平条约谈判破裂、捷克斯洛伐克被苏联集团吞并以及苏联对柏林的封锁，导致了北大西洋公约组织的成立，以及驻扎在西德的英美法军队从占领军转变为作战部队。为了抵御苏联企图将其势力范围扩展到其占领区与其他地区分界线之外的威胁，西欧的防御计划以莱茵河为主要防线。按照二战的标准，这需要近百个师，与艾森豪威尔领导的盟军在二战结束时部署在德国的兵力大致相当。要将其中超过一小部分的兵力作为常备军几乎是不可能的，但人们寄希望于（尽管并不十分乐观）在危机时刻动员大部分兵力。许多被动员的人员都是参加过战争且仍有预备役义务的士兵，而一些所需的装备也可以从二战遗留的物资中找到。即使能够依靠动员起来的部队，仍然会存在巨大的兵力缺口。德国重新武装是一种部分解决方案；而利用核武器则是另一种方案。直到1955年，西德才加入北大西洋公约组织，并开始重建其武装力量。到那时，人们已经清楚地认识到，核武器不会像五年前包括B·H·利德尔·哈特在内的许多人所认为的那样稀有。
In Europe the breakdown of talks on a peace treaty to settle the future of Germany, the absorption of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet bloc, and the Soviet blockade of Berlin had led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and the conversion of British, American, and French forces in West Germany from occupation to operational armies. The plan to defend Western Europe from the threat of an attempt by the Soviet Union to extend its power beyond the demarcation line dividing its zone from those of the others was based on making the Rhine River the main line of resistance. Based on World War II standards, this would require nearly one hundred divisions, about the same number as the Allied forces under Eisenhower had deployed in Germany at the end of the war. To raise more than a fraction of these as standing forces was out of the question, but hope (though not much trust) was placed on mobilizing the majority in time of crisis. Many of those mobilized would be men who had served in the war and still had a reserve liability, and some of the equipment needed could be found from that left over from that conflict. But even if reliance could be placed on mobilized divisions, there would still be a large shortfall. German rearmament was a partial solution; exploitation of the nuclear weapon another. It was not until 1955 that West Germany was received into the North Atlantic Alliance and the revival of its armed forces was begun. By that time it had become clear that nuclear weapons were not going to be the rarity that many people, including B. H. Liddell Hart, had assumed five years earlier.
在1950年出版的文集《捍卫西方》中，利德尔·哈特既反对核武器会使其他武器过时的假设，也反对过度依赖核武器。他认为，苏联及其军队比西欧国家更不易受到原子弹攻击，而且如果双方都拥有核武器，反而可能起到威慑作用，避免使用核武器。他反对像二战时期那样动员大规模军队，因为这种军队需要进军东欧，占领苏联飞机可以起降的基地。当时，尽管他设想使用弹道导弹或巡航导弹投掷化学弹头，但他似乎认为这些导弹无法投掷核弹头。他力主组建由全装甲履带式机动师组成的正规军，并将其与空降步兵师相结合，充分利用现代化学战技术的发展成果。他认识到，动用核武器和大规模征兵制的全面战争将是灾难性的。他对旨在防止战争的方案缺乏信心，并强调限制战争的重要性。他认为，他所提议的那种部队在实现这一目标方面会更加有效。他不屑于谈论胜利，并对时任北约欧洲副最高司令的蒙哥马利元帅在1954年10月于伦敦皇家联合军种研究所发表的重要演讲中描绘的“第三次世界大战”景象提出了严厉批评。蒙哥马利说：“我要明确指出，我们欧洲盟军最高司令部的所有作战计划都基于在防御中使用原子弹和热核武器。对我们来说，不再是‘它们可能被使用’，而是非常肯定地说：‘如果我们遭到攻击，它们必将被使用’。”采取这一行动的原因在于，除非使用核武器，否则我们无法对抗可能出现的敌方力量……有人说，即使开战，也不会使用核武器；我对此持不同意见。我认为，对原子弹和热核武器的恐惧本身就是一种强大的战争威慑；但一旦世界大战爆发，交战双方都可能使用核武器。如果我们遭到攻击，我们自己也肯定会使用核武器。
In his collection of essays entitled Defence of the West, published in 1950, Liddell Hart had argued both against assuming that nuclear weapons made other forms of weapons obsolete and against placing too great reliance on them. He suggested that the Soviet Union and its armed forces were less vulnerable to atomic attack than the countries of Western Europe and also that when both sides possessed nuclear weapons, this might deter them from their use. He argued against reliance on mobilizing large armies of the Second World War pattern, which would be expected to advance into Eastern Europe and occupy the bases from which Soviet aircraft could operate. At that time, although he envisaged the use of ballistic or cruise missiles to deliver chemical warheads, he seems to have assumed that they would not be capable of delivering nuclear ones. He pressed for regular armies consisting of fully armored and tracked mobile divisions, the action of which would be combined with airborne infantry divisions, both exploiting the possibilities of modern developments in chemical warfare. He recognized that total warfare, employing nuclear weapons and large conscript armies, would be disastrous. He had little faith in schemes designed to prevent war, and urged the importance of trying to limit it. Forces of the kind that he proposed would, he believed, be more effective for that purpose. He deprecated talk of victory and was highly critical of the picture of “World War III” painted by Field Marshal Montgomery, then NATO's deputy supreme commander for Europe, in a significant lecture at the Royal United Services Institute in London, in October 1954. “I want to make it absolutely clear,” Montgomery said, “that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational plans on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defence. With us it is no longer: ‘They may possibly be used.’ It is very definitely: ‘They will be used, if we are attacked.’ The reason for this action is that we cannot match the strength that could be brought against us unless we use nuclear weapons…. There are some who say that if war is joined, nuclear weapons will not be used; I would disagree with that. My opinion is that the fear of atomic and thermonuclear weapons is a powerful deterrent to war; but once a world hot war has started, both sides are likely to use them. We would certainly use them ourselves if we are attacked.”
同年，艾森豪威尔总统告诉美国参谋长联席会议主席团，未来他们可以计划在任何有利于美国的地方使用各种类型和规模的核武器。¹ 自核武器的制造技术日趋成熟，不再像最初那样庞大以来，美国陆军就一直在敦促盟国接受这一概念。关于如何将核武器的使用与其他部队的行动结合起来，出现了不同的设想。其中最被广泛接受的方案是利用河流沿线区域来发挥核武器的破坏力。一支机动掩护部队将延缓敌军的推进，一支能够抵御原子弹攻击的观察部队将部署在河岸边，一支机动装甲打击部队则集结在更靠后的河岸。核武器将用于打击集结准备渡河的敌军、他们的渡河点以及他们即便如此可能在近岸建立的任何桥头堡。随后，装甲打击部队将攻击并消灭残余部队。
In that same year President Eisenhower told the U.S. chiefs of staff that they could plan to use nuclear armaments of all shapes and sizes in the future, wherever this would work to the advantage of the United States.1 The U.S. Army had been pressing its allies to accept this concept since it had become clear that nuclear weapons could be produced that were not of the huge size of the original. Different ideas developed on how to combine their use with the action of other forces. The most widely accepted concept was to use a river line as the area in which to exploit their destructive effect. A mobile covering force would delay the enemy's advance, while an observation force, well protected against atomic attack, would be deployed overlooking the river, with a mobile armored striking force assembled further in the rear. Nuclear weapons would be used to strike at the concentration of enemy troops as they assembled to cross, on their crossing places and on any bridgeheads that, in spite of this, they might have established on the near side. The armored striking forces would then attack and eliminate the remnants.
另一种方案更注重北约部队易受敌方核打击的脆弱性，即把防御部队分散部署在纵深的多个防御严密的固定阵地中，每个阵地都配备独立的战术核武器投放系统，用于打击渗透到阵地间空地的敌军，最后由空降部队对残余部队进行致命一击。这种方案的战场控制以及所谓“杀戮区”居民的命运都面临着诸多难题。人们希望他们能够事先被疏散。
An alternative concept, more sensitive to the vulnerability of NATO's forces to enemy nuclear attack, was to disperse the defending forces in a series of well-protected static positions in depth, each equipped with its own tactical nuclear delivery system, with which it would strike the enemy forces that had penetrated into the empty areas between the positions, the coup de grâce against remnants being delivered by airborne forces. Control of the battle in this concept posed difficult problems, as did the fate of inhabitants in the so-called killing areas. It was hoped that they could be evacuated beforehand.
这两种设想都纯粹是防御性的。一个更为雄心勃勃的设想是，先向苏联的城市和军事基地投放核武器，然后进行空降作战，占领该地区，并希望借此推翻声名狼藉、摇摇欲坠的共产主义政权。与这种不切实际的设想不同的是“断背式”战争。这种设想假设，最初的核武器交锋会耗尽双方的核武库，之后，双方将在废墟中恢复到核时代之前的战争模式。这种设想在海军和预备役部队中颇受欢迎，否则这些部队的存在就几乎没有任何意义。随着双方核武库的不断扩充，就北约而言，这种设想逐渐式微。
Both these were purely defensive concepts. A more ambitious one was to drop nuclear weapons on the cities and military bases of the Soviet Union itself, followed up by airborne landings that would occupy the area and, it was hoped, overthrow the discredited and ruined communist regime. The alternative to this unrealistic concept was that of “broken-backed” war. This assumed that the initial exchange of nuclear weapons would have exhausted the stocks of both sides, after which, among the ruins, they would both revert to a campaign characteristic of the pre-nuclear age. It was a concept popular with navies and reserve forces, which otherwise would have little justification for their existence. As the nuclear arsenals of both sides increased, the concept withered as far as NATO was concerned.
20世纪50年代末，北约开始对在战场上使用核武器来弥补其成员国不愿提供常规部队来制衡苏联（当时苏联的实力已因其华沙条约卫星国的军事力量而大幅增强）的实力而有所保留。造成这种保留的两个主要原因是：德意志联邦共和国加入北约，以及苏联发展出使用携带聚变弹头的洲际弹道导弹对美国城市进行核打击的能力。西德和美国都不愿假定一旦铁幕被突破，核武器就会立即被使用。此外，德国人也不愿接受在阻止敌人推进之前就放弃其狭小国土大片领土的防御计划。基于立即进行核报复的战略的可信度在世界其他地区已经受到损害，而就欧洲防御而言，这种战略的可信度似乎也大大降低了。
In the late 1950s NATO began to have reservations about relying on the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield to compensate for its members’ unwillingness to provide conventional forces to balance those of the Soviet Union, by then significantly augmented by those of its satellites in the Warsaw pact. The two principal reasons for these reservations were the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into the alliance, and the development of the Soviet Union's capability to deliver nuclear attacks on American cities with intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with fusion warheads. Both the West Germans and the Americans were reluctant to assume that nuclear weapons would be used at the first breach of the iron curtain. In addition, the Germans were not prepared to accept defensive plans that surrendered a large area of their narrow country before attempts were made to stop the enemy's advance. The credibility of a strategy based on immediate nuclear retaliation had already been undermined elsewhere in the world, and now appeared to have been considerably weakened as far as European defense was concerned.
朝鲜战争并非唯一一场核武器拥有与战争结果无关的冲突。1954年5月，法国在奠边府战役中惨败于武元甲将军之手，正是基于杜鲁门拒绝在朝鲜使用核武器的考量，艾森豪威尔在支持法国参与印度支那战争时也保持了同样的克制。国际和国内政治因素不仅制约了英国考虑使用核武器，也制约了英国在1956年英法苏伊士运河战争中对除机场以外的目标发动常规空袭。即使是小规模的空袭，例如1957年法国对突尼斯萨基特的空袭，也引发了国际社会的强烈抗议。
The Korean War had not been the only conflict in which possession of nuclear weapons had proved irrelevant to the issue. When the French faced humiliating defeat at the hands of General Vo Nguyen Giap at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the considerations that had led Truman to refuse to employ nuclear weapons in Korea persuaded Eisenhower to observe the same restraint in support of the French in Indochina. Both international and domestic political factors had restrained Britain not only from considering the use of its nuclear weapons, but also from employing conventional air attack on targets other than airfields in the Anglo-French Suez operation in 1956. Even air attacks on a small scale, such as those of the French against Sakiet in Tunisia in 1957, aroused international outcry.
因此，20世纪50年代末，西方世界对“以其他手段延续既有政策”的武装力量运用进行了普遍的重新审视。其结论主要有两种形式。英国哈罗德·麦克米伦领导的保守党政府认为，以征兵制为基础、在紧急情况下可以动员起来的庞大军队，以及为应对二战时期威胁而保留的海外基地，已经过时了。1957年，麦克米伦在欢迎劳里斯·诺斯塔德将军就任欧洲盟军最高统帅的讲话中说道：“我们不要抱有任何幻想；今天的军队并非为发动战争而建；其目的是防止战争。不会再有像过去那样的战役，不会再有通过漫长而势均力敌的斗争最终取得胜利；全面战争只能意味着彻底的毁灭。” 与当时的许多人一样，他也在寻求限制战争的途径。对亨利·基辛格和安德烈·博弗雷等人而言，这意味着要找到利用本国军事力量支持政策的方法。对利德尔·哈特等人而言，这意味着要努力确保，如果无法通过威慑阻止战争，也要尽可能控制战争规模，以免造成全面毁灭。美国和法国在远东的经验，以及英国和法国在中东和近东的经验，都令这些大国深感挫败。尽管三国都投入了大量人力物力用于国防，但它们在印度支那、中东和北非试图捍卫的阵地，却被那些军事资源（除了人力之外）远逊于它们的国家或政治运动的行动所削弱。国际和国内对除“解放运动”之外的任何军事行动的反对，以及对军事行动可能导致核战争的担忧，使得人们认为，几乎任何类型的军事行动都不能再由一个大国发起。在苏联和中国的鼓励和支持下，一些小国和颠覆运动通过武器供应和训练团队，正在破坏西方资本主义民主世界，而西方世界似乎对此无能为力。
The end of the 1950s therefore saw a general reexamination in the Western world of the employment of armed forces “as a continuation of policy by other means.” The conclusions took two forms. Harold Macmillan's Conservative administration in Britain adopted the view that ponderous forces, based on conscription in peacetime, which could be mobilized in an emergency, with their deployment supported by overseas bases retained to meet World War II types of threat, were obsolete. In a speech welcoming General Lauris Norstad as the new supreme commander of Allied powers in Europe in 1957, Macmillan said: “Let us be under no illusion; military forces today are not designed to wage war; their purpose is to prevent it. There will be no campaigns like the old ones, with victory at the end of a long and balanced struggle; total war can only mean total destruction.” In common with many others at that time, he sought means of limiting war. To some, like Henry Kissinger and André Beaufre, that meant finding ways by which their nation's military strength could be employed in support of policy. To others, like Liddell Hart, it meant trying to ensure that a war, if it could not be prevented by deterrence, could be kept limited, so that it did not result in total destruction. American and French experience in the Far East and British and French experience in the Middle and Near East had left these powers intensely frustrated. In spite of the large commitment of manpower and finance to defense by all three, the positions they had tried to defend in Indochina, the Middle East, and North Africa had been eroded by the action of nations or political movements whose military resources, except in manpower, were much inferior. International and domestic disapproval of any military action, other than that of “liberation movements,” and the fear that it could lead to a nuclear war combined to make it appear that military operations of almost any kind could no longer be embarked upon by a major power. Minor powers and subversive movements, encouraged and supported with arms supplies and training teams by the Soviet Union and China, were undermining the Western capitalist-democratic world, which appeared helpless to prevent this process.
在西方国家，专家们呼吁停止集中精力研究如何用核武器打仗，尽管基辛格和其他美国人最初寻求有限使用核武器的方法。但美国陆军参谋长麦克斯韦·泰勒将军和美国作家罗伯特·奥斯古德率先呼吁不再依赖核武器。法国的安德烈·博弗尔和雷蒙·阿隆不愿完全否定核武器，而是寻求“非常有限地使用核武器”的解决方案。在英国，利德尔·哈特几乎也想加入法国的行列，但他意识到政治和军事领导人往往会被战争激起的强烈情绪所左右，这让他最终采纳了基辛格后来经过深思熟虑后采取的立场：避免战争同归于尽的唯一可能方法是限制战争发生的地理区域（这在欧洲几乎不可能），或者避免使用核武器——或许两者兼而有之。2在1960年出版的另一部文章和演讲集《威慑还是防御》中，利德尔·哈特在题为“小型原子武器是答案吗？”的章节结尾写道：
In the Western countries experts called a halt to concentrating attention and effort on how to fight wars with nuclear weapons, although Kissinger and others in the United States initially sought ways of employing limited nuclear wars. But General Maxwell Taylor, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, and the American writer Robert Osgood took the lead in demanding that reliance should no longer be placed on nuclear weapons. André Beaufre and Raymond Aron in France, unwilling to reject them entirely, sought a solution in terms of “very limited nuclear use.” In Britain Liddell Hart was almost tempted to join the French, but his sense of how political and military leaders tended to be carried away by the strong emotions aroused in war persuaded him to take the line that Kissinger, on second thought, had taken: that the only possible forms of limiting war to avoid mutual suicide were either to limit the geographical area in which operations took place, which was hardly possible in Europe, or to refrain from using nuclear weapons—perhaps both.2 In another collection of articles and lectures published in 1960, Deterrent or Defence, Liddell Hart concluded the chapter entitled “Are Small Atomic Weapons the Answer?” with the words:
理论上，这些小当量核武器更有可能将核行动限制在战区内，从而限制其规模和破坏范围——这有利于人类和文明的延续。但是，一旦任何类型的核武器被实际使用，其影响都可能迅速扩散，最终导致全面核战争。战争中人类情感冲动的经验教训远不如理论——尤其是那些促成这些武器研发的战术理论——那样令人安心。
In theory, these small-yield weapons offer a better chance of confining nuclear action to the battle-zone, and thus limiting its scale and scope of destructiveness—to the benefit of humanity and the preservation of civilisation. But once any kind of nuclear weapon is actually used, it could all too easily spread by rapid degrees, and lead to all-out nuclear war. The lessons of experience about the emotional impulses of men at war are much less comforting than the theory—the tactical theory which has led to the development of these weapons.
他认为，为保卫阿尔卑斯山和波罗的海之间的地区提供充足的常规部队并非像人们普遍认为的那样遥不可及。所需兵力应与防御区域的大小相关，而不是以华沙条约组织能够调动的全部兵力为基准。他主张，北约在中部地区的常备部队中，至少一半的师不应部署在防御阵地上，而应作为机动预备队；常备部队应由民兵提供后援，其中一部分民兵将在前线地区构筑纵深防御网，另一部分民兵则在后方地区负责守卫关键据点，以抵御空袭。常备部队应由26个师组成，部分师为装甲师，全部师为履带式部队，坦克比例较高，并辅以部分轻步兵。他用以下这段话总结了他的提议：“当今最迫切的需求是加强氢弹威慑，因为氢弹威慑已经变成了一种双刃剑式的威胁，我们需要开发一种非核的防火和灭火手段——这种手段要部署在地面上，随时可以毫不犹豫、毫不拖延地使用。”
He took the line that the provision of adequate conventional forces to defend the area between the Alps and the Baltic was not as hopeless a task as was commonly supposed. The forces needed should be related to the area to be defended rather than to the maximum strength that the Warsaw Pact could deploy if all the forces it could mobilize were taken into account. He advocated that at least half of the divisions of NATO's standing forces in the Central Region should not be committed to defensive positions, but should be held as a mobile reserve, and that the standing forces should be backed by a citizen militia, some of whom would man a deep network of defense posts in the forward zone while others, in the rear areas, would guard key points against airborne attack. The standing forces should consist of twenty-six divisions, part armored and fully tracked, with a high proportion of tanks, and part light infantry. He summed up his proposals in these words: “The prime need to-day is to reinforce the H-bomb deterrent, which has turned into a two-edged threat, by developing a non-nuclear fireguard and fire-extinguisher—on the ground and ready for use without hesitation or delay.”
美国人的思路虽然朝着同一个方向发展，但原因却截然不同。他们不愿接受这样的现实：由于欧洲缺乏足够的常规防御，他们就必须立即诉诸核武器，而这意味着要冒着苏联核反击的风险。他们对欧洲盟友，特别是已经放弃核武器的德意志联邦共和国，所作出的核“保护伞”或“保证”无法撤回；但至少可以推迟，希望在敌对行动升级为相互自杀之前能够以某种方式阻止其发生。20世纪60年代初，时任总统约翰·F·肯尼迪的国防部长罗伯特·S·麦克纳马拉敦促欧洲盟友增强常规部队实力，以实现这一目标。但他遇到了相当大的阻力。欧洲各国政府发现，在他们试图朝着相反的方向发展（例如英国彻底废除征兵制）时，很难接受增加国防开支和延长义务兵役期限。人们还怀疑麦克纳马拉的提议意味着美国核保证的削弱，并可能促使其削弱在欧洲的常规部队。麦克纳马拉引发的长期讨论最终促成了被称为“灵活反应”政策的采纳。根据这一概念（其中也包含了前沿防御的理念），北约部队将尽可能仅使用常规部队来遏制和阻止苏联的入侵，希望核战争的可怕前景能够促使双方媾和。如果媾和未能实现，北约将实施更准确地说是“渐进式核反应”的措施，博弗雷将其描述为“有限核战争”。届时，北约将使用少量核武器——或许只是一次“演示性试射”——目的是让苏联相信北约已做好使用核武器的准备，因此双方都应该按兵不动。如果再次失败，北约就会一步步升级冲突，直到双方走向自杀式的境地，最终迫使其中一方停止行动。但为什么应该是另一方停止行动，这一点尚不清楚。
American minds had been turning in the same direction for rather different reasons. They did not relish the idea that, for lack of an adequate conventional defense in Europe, they should be expected to resort immediately to the use of nuclear weapons, which now meant risking Soviet nuclear counter-attack. Their nuclear “umbrella” or “guarantee” to their European allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, which had forsworn possession of them, could not be withdrawn; but at least it could be postponed in the hope that hostilities could somehow be arrested before they escalated into mutual suicide. In the early 1960s Robert S. McNamara, President John F. Kennedy's secretary of defense, pressed his European allies to increase the strength of their conventional forces in order to bring this about. He met considerable resistance. European governments found it politically difficult to accept higher defense expenditures and an increase in the length of conscript service, when they were trying to move in the opposite direction (the British abolishing conscription altogether). It was also suspected that McNamara's proposals implied a weakening of the American nuclear guarantee and could encourage a weakening also of its conventional forces in Europe. The prolonged discussion that McNamara provoked eventually resulted in the adoption of the policy known as flexible response. Under this concept, which also incorporated that of forward defense, NATO's forces would attempt to contain and bring to a halt a Soviet invasion by the use of conventional forces alone if possible, in the hope that the awful prospect of a nuclear exchange would persuade both sides to make peace. If it did not, NATO would then implement what would more correctly be defined as graduated nuclear response, described by Beaufre as “sublimited nuclear war.” A small number of nuclear weapons—perhaps only one “demonstration shot”—would be used with the intention of persuading the Soviet Union that NATO was prepared to take the nuclear decision, and that therefore both should hang back. If that again failed, NATO would climb the ladder of escalation rung by rung until, one had to assume, the approach of mutual suicide persuaded one side or the other to call a halt. It was not clear why it should be the other side.
北约无核部队在这一概念下的作战行动，除了前沿防御所规定的“以空间换时间”的限制外，还带来了诸多难题。他们必须时刻做好应对核武器攻击的准备，并让外界感受到这一点；同时，他们还必须尽可能延长常规作战阶段，且不能轻易放弃任何阵地。实际上，这需要庞大的常规部队，而北约的政治家们原本打算避免这种情况。1966年法国退出北约以及美国将精力和注意力转移到越南战争，进一步加剧了这些困难。
The conduct of operations by NATO's non-nuclear forces under this concept raised many difficult problems, apart from that imposed by forward defense, which forbade trading space for time. They had to be prepared for nuclear weapons to be used both by them and against them at any time, and had to convey that impression; but they had to try and prolong the conventional phase of fighting for as long as possible without giving much ground. In practical terms this required large conventional forces, which NATO's politicians had intended to avoid. The difficulties were aggravated by France's withdrawal from the military organization in 1966 and America's diversion of effort and attention to Vietnam.
尽管这被称为“灵活反应”，但这并非麦克斯韦·泰勒在其1955年发表的论文《国家军事计划》中提出该术语时的本意。他认为，交战双方的核武库相互抵消。正如利德尔·哈特所描述的那样，在这种“核零度”的掩护下，共产主义势力正鼓励颠覆运动挑战西方。西方在海军、空军及其核武器方面投入了大量精力，却缺乏有效的力量与之对抗。灵活反应政策意味着美国，以及人们希望整个西方，都能够根据威胁采取任何适当的手段，从外交、政治或经济行动，到秘密或“特种”部队，再到在世界任何地方发动全面常规战争。那种认为常规军事行动不应作为政策支持手段的观点应该被摒弃，同样应该摒弃的还有美国参与的任何战争都必须是全面且无限制的战争的观点。
Although this was called flexible response, that was not what had been meant by the term when it was coined by Maxwell Taylor in his paper “A National Military Program,” written in 1955. He believed that the nuclear arsenals of both sides cancelled each other out. Under cover of this “nuclear nullity,” as Liddell Hart described it, the communist powers were encouraging subversive movements to challenge the West, which, having put so much effort into navies and air forces and their nuclear armaments, had no effective forces to oppose them. A policy of flexible response would mean that the United States, and it was to be hoped the West as a whole, would have the capability to employ whatever means was appropriate to the threat, from diplomatic, political, or economic action, through clandestine or “special” forces, to full-scale conventional campaigns anywhere in the world. The idea that conventional military action should be ruled out as a support of policy should be discarded, as should the idea that any war in which the United States engaged must be total and unlimited.
肯尼迪于1961年就任总统后，热情地接受了泰勒的理念，并于1962年10月将其从退休状态召回，任命其为参谋长联席会议主席。然而，泰勒很快就经历了理论在实践中失效的痛苦体验。越南战争，如同阿尔及利亚战争一样，表明能否将战争控制在己方希望的范围内，取决于对手是否愿意接受这些限制。中国和苏联都不愿直接卷入战争，美国也不愿将它们牵扯进来；但胡志明和武元甲领导下的北越准备不惜一切代价——牺牲、人力、空间和时间——而美国却不愿如此。由于被迫投入远超最初设想的资源，以取代法国对南越吴廷琰政权的支持，美国政府最终认为，继续战争的政治弊端大于放弃战争、拱手将胜利让给对方的代价，即便这种胜利可能被掩盖。十一年前，戴高乐在阿尔及利亚也面临过同样的局面，并采取了同样的策略。那些认为有限战争可以像下棋一样进行的理论家们，他们的理论已被驳斥，不得不重新思考。有限战争的先驱罗伯特·奥斯古德的答案是，美国在选择哪些地区需要动用武力来遏制苏联的影响力时，应该更加谨慎。“这些地区，”他写道，“应该与具有实质性内在价值的特定环境目标相关，这些目标要从美国军事和经济安全的角度出发。” ³基于此，他会赞同国会拒绝美国介入安哥拉事务。然而，将他的政策应用于干预中美洲或波斯湾地区则并非如此简单明了。
When Kennedy became President in 1961, he accepted Taylor's ideas with enthusiasm, recalling him from retirement and appointing him chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1962. Taylor was to have the unpleasant experience of seeing his theory turn sour in practice. The Vietnam War, like the Algerian, showed that keeping a war limited to the extent one desires depends on the willingness of the opponent to accept the limitations. Neither China nor the Soviet Union wanted to become directly involved, and the United States did not wish to involve them; but the North Vietnamese, under Ho Chi Minh and Giap, were prepared to go to any limits—of sacrifice, of manpower, of space and of time—which the United States was not. Forced to expend an effort far beyond what was envisaged when it first intervened to replace the French support of Ngo Dinh Diem's regime in South Vietnam, the American government eventually decided that the political disadvantages of continuing outweighed those of giving up and ceding victory to the other side, however masked that might be. Eleven years previously, Charles de Gaulle had faced the same situation and taken the same road in Algeria. The theorists who had assumed that limited war could be conducted like a game of chess, had been discredited, and had to think again. The answer of the prophet of limited war, Robert Osgood, was that the United States should be more selective in designating the areas of the world that it considered to merit the use of force to contain Soviet influence. “They should relate,” he wrote, “to specific milieu goals of substantial intrinsic value from the standpoint of U.S. military and economic security.”3 On that basis, he would have approved of the refusal by Congress to see the United States involved in Angola. The application of his policy to intervention in Central America or the Persian Gulf would be less clear cut.
博弗雷将西方在印度支那、中东和北非战略的崩溃归咎于未能制定真正的战略——即过于注重装备而非理念。在他的著作《战略导论》中，他主张西方奉行他所谓的“全面”战略，涵盖政治、经济和外交活动的各个领域，并以武力威胁（必要时甚至实际使用武力）为后盾，类似于苏联的战略。⁴ 他忽略了在一个由独立、民主和主权国家组成的联盟中，就战略及其执行达成一致，更遑论真正落实战略的难度。他提出的最有价值的观点是，没有一种战略适用于所有情况：应根据具体情况选择不同的战略。他区分了总体战略（他更倾向于使用“总体战略”而非“大战略”）和统筹战略。前者指导政府层面的战争行为，后者则适用于特定领域——军事、政治、经济或外交，每个领域都有其自身的统筹战略，而这些战略又是总体战略的一部分。在军事领域，这便转化为作战战略，而作战战略必须基于可用资源、战区地理环境以及己方和敌方的军事能力。
Beaufre attributed the disarray of the West, with the collapse of its strategies in Indochina, the Middle East, and North Africa, to a failure to develop a real strategy—to having been mesmerized by concentrating on equipment rather than on ideas. In his book Introduction to Strategy, he advocated that the West pursue what he called a “total” strategy, embracing every field of political, economic, and diplomatic activity, backed by the threat and, if necessary, the actual use of military force, similar to the strategy pursued by the Soviet Union.4 He glossed over the difficulty, in a group of independent democratic and sovereign nations, of agreeing on both a strategy and its implementation, let alone actually putting it into effect. The most valuable point he made was that no one strategy is applicable to all situations: alternative strategies should be chosen according to the circumstances of the case. He distinguished between total strategy, a term he preferred to grand strategy, and overall strategy, the former governing the conduct of war at the governmental level, the latter applying to the particular field—military, political, economic, or diplomatic, each of which has its own overall strategy as part of the total strategy. In the military field this is converted into operational strategy, which must be based on the resources available, the geography of the theater, and the military capability of both one's own forces and those of the enemy.
博弗雷列出了五种总体战略选择。首先，当一方拥有充足的资源且目标并非至关重要时，可以采用直接威胁。理论上，这适用于拥有强大核能的大国面对实力较弱的非核国家的情况。但实际上，由于动用武力可能引发国际乃至国内政治动荡，这种策略难以实施。博弗雷认为，威慑的基础正是直接威胁——将所有资源直接用于敌方领土——尽管在这种情况下，目标至关重要。他称之为间接施压的第二种选择，适用于目标重要性适中，但资源不足以施加决定性威胁的情况。希特勒曾长期采用这种战略，苏联目前也仍在使用。它包括持续的政治、外交和经济压力，并以武力威胁作为后盾。博弗雷认为，当一方的行动自由受到限制时，这是一种合适的战略。他的第三种选择是一系列循序渐进的行动，一种蚕食式的策略，适用于资源有限但又乐于缓慢迈向最终目标的情况。这种策略的一种变体是既成事实（fait accompli），或称“一刀切香肠”，其执行方式与一系列行动类似，但希望一举达成目标。1956年和1967年的以色列战争就是很好的例子，埃及也曾希望1973年的十月战争也能如此。他的第四种选择是一场持久战，以较低的强度进行。这显然适用于军事资源有限（但人力充足），且准备花费大量时间来实现目标的情况。包括毛泽东击败蒋介石在内的解放战争，大多都是以这种方式取得胜利的。旷日持久的斗争并不适合西方工业化民主国家，它们通常缺乏耐心提供必要的资源，尤其是人力，来按照敌方的条件作战。最后，当己方军事资源明显优于敌方，且不存在任何限制（例如政治阻挠或对升级为核战争的担忧）时，以军事胜利为目标的经典暴力冲突才适用。这种冲突包括摧毁敌方武装力量、占领敌方领土或两者兼而有之。
Beaufre listed five choices for total strategy. First, the direct threat may be employed when one has ample resources and the objective is not of overwhelming importance. In theory this should be applicable to a major nuclear power facing a lesser non-nuclear one. In practice it cannot be used because of the international, and possibly also domestic, political implications of threatening to use that power. Beaufre maintained that this is the strategy on which deterrence is based—the threat that all one's resources would be applied directly to the enemy's territory—although in that case the objective would be of overriding importance. The second choice he called indirect pressure, applicable where the objective is of moderate importance, but the resources are not available to exert a decisive threat. This was the strategy used by Hitler much of the time and currently used by the Soviet Union. It consists of sustained political, diplomatic and economic pressure, backed by the threat of force. Beaufre suggested that this is a suitable strategy when there are limitations on one's freedom of action. His third choice was a series of successive actions, a nibbling process, suitable when one's resources are limited, but one is content to move slowly toward the ultimate goal. A variant of this is the fait accompli, or “single slice of salami,” similar in execution to a series, but with the hope of achieving one's aim with one blow. The Israeli wars of 1956 and 1967 are good examples, and Egypt hoped that the 1973 October war would be as well. His fourth choice was a protracted struggle, waged at a low level of intensity. This is clearly suitable when military, but not manpower, resources are limited, and one is prepared to take a long time to achieve one's aim. Wars of liberation, including Mao Tsetung's defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, were mostly won in this way. The protracted struggle is not suitable to Western industrial democracies, which do not as a rule have the patience to provide the resources, especially the manpower, required to fight on the enemy's terms. Finally the classic violent conflict aiming at military victory, involving either the destruction of the enemy's armed forces or the occupation of his territory or both, is applicable when one's military resources are clearly superior to those of the enemy and there are no limitations, such as political inhibitions or fear of escalation to nuclear war, which would restrict the application of one's military strength.
在上述五大选择类别中，人们可以制定总体和作战层面的军事战略。博弗尔追随福煦的观点，认为这两个层面的战略目标都是获取并维持己方的行动自由，并尽可能限制敌方的行动自由。要想将己方的意志强加于敌方，保持主动权至关重要，因为这正是战争的本质。博弗尔将战争定义为“两种对立意志运用武力解决争端的辩证过程”，而将战略定义为这种辩证过程的艺术。他总结道，未来在于间接战略领域。他写道：“随着核战略的进一步发展，以及它越来越接近于建立一种平衡——无论这种平衡多么脆弱——整体威慑，间接战略的使用就会越来越多。和平将变得越来越不和平，越来越接近我在1939年所说的‘和平时期的战争’，也就是我们所知的冷战……间接战略的关键阶段发生在最初的征兆出现之时。任何晚于此的行动都为时已晚……心理因素……在间接战略中占据主导地位，但武力的可用性和使用与直接战略同样必要……需要武力来利用（或威胁利用）心理战所创造的局面。”他的最后总结道：“我们必须掌握间接战略的艺术。” ⁵
Within these five categories of choice, one would design one's overall and operational military strategy. Beaufre followed Foch in suggesting that the object of strategy at both these levels is to achieve and maintain one's freedom of action and to try and limit that of the enemy. Retaining the initiative is essential if one is to impose one's will on the other side, for that is what war is all about. Beaufre defined war as “the dialectic of two opposing wills, using force to resolve their dispute” and strategy as the art of that dialectic. He concluded that the future lay in the field of indirect strategy. “The further nuclear strategy develops,” he wrote, “and the nearer it gets to establishing a balance, however precarious, of overall deterrence, the more will indirect strategy be used. Peace will become less and less peaceful and will get nearer and nearer to what in 1939 I called ‘war in peacetime’ and which we know as the Cold War…. The vital phase in indirect strategy takes place when the first symptoms appear. Anything later is too late…. The psychological factor…in indirect strategy becomes dominant [but] the availability and the use of force are just as necessary as in direct strategy…. force is required to exploit (or threaten to exploit) the situations created by psychological manoeuvre.” His final words were: “We must master the art of indirect strategy.”5
二
II
抛开理论不谈，自核时代开始以来，战争的实际进行情况如何？历史上并未发生过核战争，也没有任何战争是在核武器可能使用的阴影下进行的，尽管核武器的存在可能影响了美国和苏联，促使它们限制了在朝鲜、越南和中东的军事行动。因此，从某种意义上说，核时代的战争都是常规战争，但其中绝大多数是内战，在某些情况下，外部势力和支持发挥了作用。约翰·谢伊和托马斯·科利尔在下文的文章中探讨了这些叛乱和反叛乱行动。自前文讨论过的朝鲜战争以来，常规战争寥寥无几，其中大部分是阿拉伯国家与以色列之间以及印度与巴基斯坦之间的冲突。英法苏伊士运河行动是前者之一的延伸，印度也曾卷入一场与中国的短暂战争。伊朗和伊拉克目前正处于一场非常传统的战争之中，而阿根廷1982年入侵福克兰群岛以及英国随后发动的夺回行动，则如同昙花一现的常规战争。1962年至1966年英国和马来西亚与印度尼西亚在婆罗洲的“对抗”也是一种非常有限的常规战争，其许多特征都类似于反叛乱行动。所有这些战争（下文将对此进行讨论）都在某种程度上受到限制。它们共同的限制在于，尽可能避免轰炸对方的城市，这既是出于对报复的恐惧，也是出于对造成非战斗人员伤亡而引发国内外敌对反应的担忧。
Theory aside, how have wars actually been conducted since the beginning of the nuclear age? There have been no nuclear wars, and none fought under the shadow of the possible use of nuclear weapons, although their existence may have influenced both the United States and the Soviet Union to limit their involvement in Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East. Nuclear-age wars have therefore all been conventional in a sense, but the majority have been civil wars in which, in some cases, external influence and support have played a part. These insurgency and counterinsurgency operations are dealt with in the essay by John Shy and Thomas Collier below. Since the Korean War, which has been discussed, conventional wars have been few, the majority having been conflicts between the Arab nations and Israel and between India and Pakistan. The Anglo-French Suez operation was an appendage of one of the former, and India was also involved in a short war with China. Iran and Iraq are now engaged in a very conventional war, and a flash in the conventional pan was provided by Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 and Britain's expedition to recapture them. Britain and Malaysia's “confrontation” with Indonesia in Borneo from 1962 to 1966 was a very limited form of conventional war, which had many of the characteristics of a counterinsurgency campaign. All these wars, which will be discussed below, have been limited in one way or another. One limitation common to them all has been to avoid bombing each other's cities when at all possible, both from fear of reprisal and from fear of a hostile domestic and international reaction to inflicting casualties on noncombatants.
阿以战争。阿以战争与其他战争的不同之处在于，以色列是在为生存而战。对以色列而言，其行动的局限性在于其人力和物力资源，以及对主要盟友美国支持能力的有限性认识。阿拉伯国家的行动局限性则取决于它们彼此合作的意愿、为共同事业投入的努力程度，以及它们能否有效利用其在不同时期（1973年为巅峰时期）集结的大量军事资源。
Arab-Israeli Wars. The Arab-Israeli wars have differed from all the others in that Israel has been fighting for its very existence. The limits have been set, in Israel's case, by its resources, both human and material, and by the recognition that there are limits to the extent to which it can rely on the support of its principal ally, the United States. The limits on Arab action have been set by the degree to which they have been prepared to cooperate with each other, the effort they have been prepared to devote to the cause, and their ability to make good practical use of the considerable military resources that they have assembled at various times, 1973 representing the peak.
1948年，以色列建国，而这场战争是第一场战争，其军事手段相对简单。以色列军队由巴勒斯坦犹太人在英国统治下建立的非官方军事组织提供，而阿拉伯方面则由约旦领导的、由英国主导的阿拉伯军团承担作战重任。这场战争主要是一场步兵战争，使用步兵武器作战。以色列人凭借着古老的军事美德——决心、毅力、智慧、胆识和勇气——阻止了他们新生的国家被摧毁，或被分割成联合国大会提议的三个无法生存的地区。正如日后阿以冲突一样，这场战争发生在国际社会要求停火的压力之下。因此，这场战役往往既包括巩固已有的成果，也包括迅速攫取更多筹码，以便在达成或强制停火协议时作为谈判筹码。
The first of the wars, which established Israel's existence in 1948, was an unsophisticated affair. The Israeli troops were provided by the unofficial military organizations that the Jews of Palestine had established under British rule, and on the Arab side the burden of the fighting was borne by Jordan's British-led Arab Legion. It was primarily an infantry war, fought with infantry weapons, in which the age-old military virtues of determination, endurance, ingenuity, boldness, and courage enabled the Israelis to prevent their infant state from being crushed or reduced to the three unviable segments into which the General Assembly of the United Nations had proposed to divide it. As was to be the case in future Arab-Israeli conflicts, the fighting took place against the background of international pressure for a cease-fire. The campaign therefore tended to consist of attempts both to secure what one already had and to seize rapidly something more to use as a bargaining chip when the cease-fire was agreed on or imposed.
从1949年5月以色列和约旦根据一个月前结束的战争所划定的边界被联合国承认为独立国家，到1956年苏伊士运河战争爆发，以色列武装部队迅速发展成为一支高度专业化、训练有素且装备精良的军队，其中包括一支强大的空军。在此期间，以色列的阿拉伯邻国和巴勒斯坦难民持续不断地对以色列定居点和个人实施恐怖主义和破坏活动，以色列则以越境报复性袭击作为回应。1953年摩西·达扬就任以色列总参谋长后，这些袭击的规模和强度进一步加剧。这反而增强了以色列的抵抗力量，导致袭击成本不断攀升，其价值也因此受到质疑。1955年，英国撤离苏伊士运河基地，埃及准备对以色列采取军事行动的意图也随之显露。达扬希望先发制人，而英国和法国与加麦尔·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔之间的争执（起因是纳赛尔将苏伊士运河国有化）为以色列提供了机会，使其能够在一些国际支持下实现这一目标，从而分散了埃及的注意力，并转移了其兵力。
Between May 1949, when Israel and Jordan were recognized by the United Nations as independent states on the basis of the frontiers resulting from the fighting that had ended a month before, and the outbreak of the Suez War in 1956, Israel's armed forces became highly professional, well trained and equipped, including a formidable air force. During these years its Arab neighbors and Palestinian refugees had carried out a continuous series of acts of terrorism and sabotage against Israeli settlements and individuals, to which Israel responded with retaliatory raids across its borders. When Moshe Dayan became Israel's chief of staff in 1953, the scale and ferocity of these raids intensified. The result was to strengthen the resistance, so that the raids became more expensive, and this cast doubt on their value. With the departure of the British from their Suez Canal base in 1955, it became clear that Egypt was preparing for military operations against Israel. Dayan wished to preempt them, and Britain and France's quarrel with Gamel Abdel Nasser, sparked by his nationalization of the Suez Canal, provided the opportunity for Israel to do this with some international support, which distracted Egypt's attention and diverted its forces.
1956年达扬的战役堪称利德尔·哈特所倡导的空降部队与装甲部队协同作战的典范。尽管在最初的计划中，达扬将装甲部队置于次要地位，理由是其行动缓慢笨重，且需要过多的后勤保障。装甲部队原本计划用于支援步兵对西奈半岛东部埃及防御工事的进攻，而无装甲的轮式机动部队则将与空降部队在西奈半岛西部的山口会合。然而，达扬却无法抑制以色列坦克指挥官们的热情。他们的战术策略并非耗费时间采取“迂回战术”，而是直接猛攻埃及的关键防御工事，并取得了成功。相比之下，阿里埃勒·沙龙的伞兵在米特拉山口以东成功空降后，对米特拉山口的进攻则显得不那么顺利。他们未能夺取隘口，伤亡150人，超过整个战役总伤亡人数的一半。而这场战役仅用了六天就占领了整个西奈半岛，自身阵亡人数仅为200人。这原本是既成事实战略的一次非常成功的案例，但以美国为首的国际社会对紧随其后且与之密切相关的英法远征的反对，使以色列未能享受到胜利的果实。到1957年3月，以色列军队又退回了他们最初出发的边境线后方，放弃了自去年12月英法撤离塞得港以来一直坚守的加沙地带和沙姆沙伊赫。
Dayan's campaign in 1956 was a model of the cooperation between airborne and armored forces that Liddell Hart had advocated, although in his initial plan Dayan had relegated the armor to a secondary role on the grounds that it was too slow and cumbersome and required too much logistic support. It was to be used to support the infantry attacks on the Egyptian defenses in eastern Sinai, while unarmored, wheeled mobile troops would be used to join up with the airborne drops on the passes in western Sinai. But Dayan was unable to restrain the enthusiasm of the Israeli tank commanders. In their tactical methods they did not waste time on “indirect approaches,” but hit hard at the key Egyptian defenses and were successful. Ariel Sharon's paratroopers were less successful in their attack on the Mitla Pass after their unopposed airdrop east of it. They failed to secure the pass and suffered 150 casualties, more than half the total in the campaign, which captured the whole of Sinai in six days at a cost of only 200 dead. It had been a highly successful example of fait accompli strategy, but the international opposition, led by the United States, to the Franco-British expedition that followed immediately and was linked to it, deprived Israel of the fruits of victory. By March 1957 its forces were back behind the frontier from which they had started, surrendering the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh, which Israel had hung onto since December, when the British and French had left Port Said.
十年后，纳赛尔及其由苏联训练和装备的部队自认为实力强大，足以挑起与以色列的冲突。他认为自己能够取胜，从而提升其作为阿拉伯世界领袖略显低俗的形象，尽管他可能并未预料到这会演变成一场全面战争。1967年5月，他要求联合国部队撤出曾协助维护以色列西奈半岛边境和平的部队，并宣布封锁通往以色列红海港口埃拉特的蒂朗海峡。约旦国王侯赛因不情愿地与埃及和叙利亚结盟，同意在其领土上驻扎一个伊拉克师。以色列总理列维·艾希科尔面临采取果断行动的压力，最终导致摩西·达扬被召回国防部长一职。达扬告诉他的同事，他相信即使付出大约一千人死亡的代价，也能击败驻扎在西奈半岛的埃及军队，而对阿拉伯空军发动先发制人的打击将使其丧失战斗力，并确保以色列免受空袭。阿拉伯国家的挑衅程度如此之高，以至于以色列先发制人不会激怒美国，而且他确信苏联也不会直接干预。在当时以色列所处的有限范围内——阿拉伯国家占领了如今的整个西岸地区，埃及则占领了整个西奈半岛——以色列不能让敌人先发制人。达扬的论点被采纳。6月5日清晨，埃及空军的晨间巡逻结束，尼罗河三角洲的晨雾散去，以色列空军发动了持续近三个小时的连续空袭，之后又将攻击目标转向其他阿拉伯国家的空军。到第二天结束时，其250架作战飞机（其中约150架为现代化战斗机）出动超过一千架次，击落309架埃及作战飞机（埃及340架可用飞机，总计450架），包括所有远程轰炸机；此外还击落60架叙利亚飞机、29架约旦飞机、17架伊拉克飞机和1架黎巴嫩飞机，其中大部分是在地面被击落的。自身损失26架飞机，部分是在攻击埃及军队目标时损失的。他们还摧毁了23座埃及雷达站和数个地对空导弹阵地，其中16个位于西奈半岛。
Ten years later Nasser, his forces trained and equipped by the Soviets, felt strong enough to provoke a clash with Israel. He thought he could win and thereby enhance his somewhat tawdry image as leader of the Arab world, although he probably did not expect this to lead to a full-scale war. In May 1967 he demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations force that had helped to preserve peace on Israel's Sinai frontier, and declared a blockade of the Straits of Tiran, leading to Israel's Red Sea port of Eilat. Jordan's King Hussein reluctantly allied himself with Egypt and Syria, agreeing to the presence of an Iraqi division in his territory. Pressure on the Israeli prime minister, Levi Eshkol, to take decisive action led to the recall of Moshe Dayan as defense minister. He told his colleagues that he believed that Egyptian forces in Sinai could be defeated at a probable cost of a thousand dead and that a preemptive strike against the Arab air forces would knock them out and guarantee Israel against air attack. Arab provocation had been such that striking the first blow would not antagonize the United States, and he was confident that the Soviet Union would not intervene directly. Within the frontiers to which it was limited at that time, the Arabs occupying all of what is now known as the West Bank and Egypt all of Sinai, Israel could not afford to let its enemies strike first. Dayan's argument was accepted, and on the morning of June 5, at the time when the Egyptian air force's dawn patrols had stood down and the early morning mist in the Nile Delta had cleared, the Israeli air force struck in successive attacks lasting for nearly three hours, and thereafter switched its effort to attacks on other Arab air forces. By the end of the second day, its 250 combat aircraft, of which about 150 were modern fighters, in more than a thousand sorties had destroyed 309 (out of 340 serviceable and 450 total) Egyptian combat aircraft, including all their long-range bombers, and 60 Syrian, 29 Jordanian, 17 Iraqi, and 1 Lebanese aircraft, most of them on the ground, against a loss of 26 aircraft of their own, some of them in attacking army targets. They had also knocked out 23 Egyptian radar stations and several surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, 16 of them in Sinai.
这场决定性的胜利极大地减轻了加夫里什南方司令部的任务，该司令部的部队被分为三个集团军。塔尔指挥的北部集团军，下辖两个装甲旅，共计三百辆坦克，以及一个伞兵旅，负责对付地中海沿岸附近的埃及防御工事。沙龙指挥的中部集团军，下辖一个装甲旅，共计两百辆坦克，以及一个步兵旅，负责对付阿布阿盖拉周围的防御工事；约夫指挥的集团军，下辖两个装甲旅，每个旅一百辆坦克，负责在中部和中部集团军之间作战。此外，还有一个步兵旅和两个装甲旅作为预备队。达扬的战略是集中兵力快速推进至西奈半岛西部的吉迪山口和米特拉山口。他反对向苏伊士运河推进，认为此举可能引发国际社会的反对，并使纳赛尔更难达成和解。在确保西奈半岛安全之前，他也不打算将攻势转向耶路撒冷和约旦河西岸。他估计这场战役可以在三周内完成。但实际上，在以色列空军取得压倒性胜利的极大帮助下，战役进展得比预期更加顺利迅速。
This crushing victory greatly eased the task of Gavrish's Southern Command, whose forces were formed into three groups. The northern group under Tal, with two armored brigades totalling three hundred tanks, and a parachute brigade, was to deal with the Egyptian defenses near the Mediterranean coast. In the center Sharon's group had one armored brigade of two hundred tanks and one infantry brigade to deal with the defensive complex around Abu Agheila; and Yoffe's group, of two armored brigades, each of one hundred tanks, was to operate between the two. One infantry and two armored brigades were in reserve. Dayan's strategy was to concentrate on a rapid advance as far as the Gidi and Mitla passes in western Sinai. He opposed an advance to the Suez Canal as likely to arouse international opposition and make it more difficult for Nasser to come to terms, and he was not prepared to consider switching efforts to Jerusalem and the West Bank until Sinai had been secured. He estimated that the campaign could be completed in three weeks. In the event, greatly helped by the overwhelming victory of the Israeli air force, things turned out more successfully and moved more rapidly than expected.
驻扎在西奈半岛的埃及七个师——五个步兵师、一个装甲师和一个轻装甲师——在穆尔塔吉将军的指挥下，兵力远超加夫里什的部队，但其中很大一部分被部署在固定的防御阵地上。塔尔迅速成功地对加沙地带的防御工事发动了直接进攻。沙龙在乌姆卡特夫尝试了同样的战术，但遭到了挫败。他迅速调整计划，用直升机空投了一个伞兵营，从阵地后方发动夜袭。约夫设法从两军之间穿过。塔尔的持续胜利使整个阵地的防御体系松动，穆尔塔吉决定将所有部队撤退到苏伊士运河以东五十英里的山口。
The seven Egyptian divisions in Sinai—five infantry, one armored and one light armored—under General Murtagi, greatly exceeded Gavrish's forces in numbers, but a high proportion was tied to static defensive positions. Tal was quickly successful in a direct assault on the defenses of the Gaza Strip. Sharon tried the same tactic at Um Katef and met with a rebuff, but rapidly readjusted his plan, flying in a parachute battalion by helicopter for a night attack from the rear of the position. Yoffe managed to slip between the two. Tal's continued success loosened up the entire position, and Murtagi decided to withdraw all his forces to the passes fifty miles east of the Suez Canal.
达扬和总参谋长伊扎克·拉宾对立即利用这一机会持谨慎态度，因为他们担忧耶路撒冷及其北部地区的局势。他们原本希望说服约旦置身事外，但被任命为约旦河谷前线约旦、叙利亚和伊拉克三国部队总司令的埃及将军里亚德成功说服侯赛因，必须帮助埃及摆脱以色列空袭造成的绝境。然而，里亚德的无能、以色列空军对伊拉克旅的重创，以及叙利亚人担心如果入侵加利利也会遭受同样的命运，都让达扬和拉宾对该前线的担忧烟消云散。加夫里什的行动获得批准，西奈半岛陷入混乱的战斗之中，塔尔和约夫率领坦克从穆尔塔吉的部队后方发起进攻，沙龙也从其部队陷入的混乱中恢复过来。
Dayan and Itzhak Rabin, the chief of staff, were cautious about immediately exploiting this opportunity because they were concerned about the situation around Jerusalem and to the north of it. They had hoped to persuade Jordan to keep out of the war, but the Egyptian general Riad, who had been accepted as overall commander of the Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi forces on the Jordan Valley front, succeeded in persuading Hussein that he must help Egypt in the desperate straits to which the Israeli air attacks had reduced it. However, Riad's incompetence, the blow that the Israeli air force delivered against the Iraqi brigade, and the fear of the Syrians that they would suffer the same fate if they invaded Galilee relieved Dayan and Rabin of their anxiety about the situation on that front. Gavrish was given the go-ahead, and Sinai became the scene of confused battles as Tal and Yoffe thrust their tanks through and behind Murtagi's forces and Sharon recovered from the muddle into which his force had gotten itself.
6月8日晚7点，纳赛尔请求联合国安排停火时，塔尔的部队已经抵达运河。这促使以色列在停火生效前尽可能多地占领领土。6月9日清晨，约菲率领坦克穿过米特拉山口抵达运河，比联合国停火生效时间提前了三个小时。此时，以色列军队也已占领了约旦军队撤出的犹太和撒玛利亚地区，即所谓的西岸地区。达扬决心在停火生效前将叙利亚军队逐出戈兰高地，于是在未与埃什科尔或拉宾商议的情况下，命令埃拉扎尔于当天上午向叙利亚军队发起进攻。尽管遭到猛烈的空袭，叙利亚军队仍进行了顽强抵抗，但在经过24小时的激战后最终撤退。
Tal's troops had reached the Canal when Nasser asked the United Nations at 7:00 P.M. on June 8 to arrange a cease-fire. This spurred the Israelis on to occupy all the territory they could before it was implemented. Yoffee pushed his tanks through the Mitla Pass to reach the Canal early in the morning of June 9, three hours before the UN ceasefire was supposed to come into effect. By that time Israeli forces had also occupied the areas of Judaea and Samaria, known as the West Bank, from which the Jordanian forces had withdrawn. Dayan, determined that the Syrians should be evicted from the Golan Heights before a cease-fire became effective, ordered Elazar to attack them that morning, without consulting either Eshkol or Rabin. The Syrians put up a stiff resistance in spite of intense air attacks, but withdrew after twenty-four hours of fierce fighting.
以色列的胜利付出了778名军人和26名平民的死亡代价，不到埃及方面伤亡人数的十分之一。正如我们所见，空军做出了极其重要的贡献。在取得初步胜利后，空军能够迅速将支援陆军的火力从一个目标和一个战线转移到另一个目标和战线，实现了惊人的出动率。然而，胜利也带来了问题，主要是受辱的对手渴望复仇，以及以色列占领的领土——西奈半岛、加沙地带、约旦河西岸和戈兰高地——的未来问题。如果失去后两个地区，以色列的安全将永远无法得到保障。在联合国内外各方努力寻求政治解决方案之际，埃及采取了两种应对措施：一方面，埃及发动突袭和炮击，干扰以色列修建巴列夫防线以保卫苏伊士运河东岸；另一方面，在苏联的帮助下，埃及建立了一套有效的防空系统，并计划最终以此为掩护收复西奈半岛。1970年纳赛尔去世后，安瓦尔·萨达特全身心投入到这项工作中。以色列则以空袭埃及纵深目标和突袭行动进行报复，试图夺取并摧毁埃及日益强大的防空系统。以色列的行动逐渐削弱了埃及的防空力量，最终迫使以色列停止了空袭，这场战争被称为消耗战。
Israel's victory was achieved at a cost of 778 military and 26 civilian dead, less than a tenth of the casualties suffered by the Egyptians alone. As we have seen, the air force made a very significant contribution. After its initial victory, it was able to switch its effort in support of the army rapidly from one target and one front to another, achieving an astonishingly high sortie rate. Victory, however, brought its problems, primarily the desire of humiliated opponents for revenge and the problem of the future of the territories Israel had occupied—Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Without at least the last two, Israel's security could never be assured. While international efforts both inside and outside the United Nations were under way to find a political solution, Egypt reacted in two ways: by commando raids and artillery bombardment to interfere with Israel's construction of the Bar-Lev line to defend the east bank of the Suez Canal and, with Soviet help, by building up an effective antiaircraft defense, under cover of which it could eventually regain Sinai. When Nasser died in 1970, Anwar Sadat devoted himself to this task. Israel retaliated with air attacks on targets deep inside Egypt and with commando raids to capture and destroy elements of the increasingly effective Egyptian air defense system, which progressively reduced and eventually put an end to these attacks in what was known as the War of Attrition.
到1973年9月，以色列情报部门已经意识到埃及和叙利亚都在前线地区集结兵力，但他们认为埃及只有在空军能够压制以色列空军后才会开战，而叙利亚也不会在埃及不发动攻击的情况下发动进攻。他们认为阿拉伯恐怖主义在国际舞台上的威胁更为紧迫。直到10月3日，也就是埃及在运河以西展开大规模军事演习两天后，时任国防部长的达扬和现任总参谋长的埃拉扎尔才真正感到担忧。到10月5日，毫无疑问，袭击迫在眉睫，陆军和空军都倾向于像1967年那样进行先发制人的打击。但总理戈尔达·梅厄和达扬拒绝了这一提议。他们担心以色列会被指责挑起战争，从而失去美国的支持。由于以色列的边界现在远离其人口中心，因此它更有能力承担遭受先发制人打击的风险。而且，随着埃及防空能力的提升，以色列的首次打击不会像1967年那样产生决定性的影响。10月6日清晨，情报显示埃及和叙利亚将于当晚6点开始交战，而两国空军实际上提前四个小时发动了袭击，当时第一批埃及军队开始渡过运河。
By September 1973, Israeli intelligence was aware that both Egypt and Syria were building up their forces in the forward areas, but assumed that Egypt would not go to war until its air force could neutralize that of Israel, and that Syria would not attack unless Egypt did. The threat of Arab terrorism on the international scene was considered to be more immediate. It was not until October 3, two days after Egypt had started large-scale maneuvers west of the Canal, that Dayan, still defense minister, and Elazar, now chief of staff, became seriously alarmed. By October 5 there could be no doubt that an attack was imminent, and both army and air force favored a preemptive strike as in 1967. But Golda Meir, the prime minister, and Dayan refused. Israel would be accused of starting the war, prejudicing American support. Israel's frontiers now being further from its centers of population, it was in a better position to accept the risk of facing a first strike, and, with the improvement in Egypt's air defenses, Israel's own first strike would not have the decisive effect that it had had in 1967. Intelligence became available early on October 6 that Egypt and Syria were going to start hostilities at 6:00 P.M. that evening, and their air forces actually struck four hours earlier, as the first Egyptian troops began to cross the Canal.
以色列军队对此次打击准备不足，当时最直接、最危险的威胁来自叙利亚军队部署在戈兰高地的1500辆坦克。以色列军队依靠密集的空袭（以色列空军在此次战役中伤亡最为惨重）、驻扎在那里的两个以色列坦克营的英勇顽强作战以及迅速调动预备役部队，最终守住了戈兰高地。这些部队投入战斗，展现了以色列军队一贯的决心和创造力。在某个阶段，叙利亚坦克甚至俯瞰到了加利利海。
Israel's army was ill prepared to meet this blow, and the most immediate and dangerous threat was that of the Syrian army's 1,500 tanks to the Golan Heights. It was held by a combination of intensive air attack, in which the Israeli air force suffered most of its casualties in the campaign, skillful and courageous fighting by the two Israeli tank battalions stationed there, and the rapid deployment of mobilized reserves, fed into the battle with the determination and ingenuity that is a hallmark of the Israeli armed forces. At one stage Syrian tanks overlooked the Sea of Galilee.
在西奈半岛，埃及军队有条不紊地跨越苏伊士运河发起进攻，仅由一支正在进行年度训练的预备步兵旅负责防守。埃及军队拥有两支集团军：第二集团军位于大苦湖中心以北，下辖三个师；第三集团军位于其南部，下辖两个师。此外，埃及军队还拥有三个机动师和两个装甲师作为预备队。埃及军队共拥有2200辆坦克、2300门火炮和150个地对空导弹连，并有550架一线战机提供支援。以色列南方司令部司令戈南面临的问题是：是否应该动用他麾下三个师（每个师配备一百辆坦克）来加强岌岌可危的巴尔莱夫防线，还是应该将最初的防御阵地进一步向东推进；如果选择后者，又该考虑将防线设在哈特米亚山口、吉迪山口和米特拉山口的西侧还是东侧。他无法指望获得空中支援，因为空中力量都集中在戈兰高地。试图用坦克支援巴尔列夫防线的行动遭到埃及反坦克导弹的猛烈攻击，伤亡惨重。10月7日，达扬访问戈南，建议撤退到山口以东的山脉西缘。戈南和埃拉扎尔对此持不同意见。他们主张在山口以西建立临时防御阵地，以便于10月8日发起反击。他们的意见最终占了上风。反击行动组织不力，以失败告终，但却挫败了埃及将桥头堡推进至已扩展的15英里以外的计划。
In Sinai the Egyptians launched a methodical assault across the Suez Canal, defended by one reserve infantry brigade on its annual training. They had two armies, the Second, north of the center of the Great Bitter Lake, with three divisions, and the Third, south of it, with two. In reserve were three mobile and two armored divisions. Altogether the Egyptian army had 2,200 tanks, 2,300 pieces of artillery, and 150 surface-to-air missile batteries, backed by 550 first-line aircraft. The problem facing Gonen of Israel's Southern Command was whether to use his three divisions, each with one hundred tanks, to reinforce the threatened Bar-Lev line, or to base his initial defense further east and, if the latter, whether west or east of the Khatmia, Gidi, and Mitla passes. He could not count on air support, which was concentrated on the Golan Heights. Attempts to support the Bar-Lev line with tanks led to heavy casualties from Egyptian antitank missiles, and Dayan, visiting Gonen on October 7, advised withdrawing to the western edge of the mountains, east of the passes. Gonen and Elazar disagreed. They argued for a temporary defense west of the passes, from which counterattacks could be launched on October 8, and their view prevailed. The counterattacks were not well coordinated and failed, but had the effect of frustrating Egyptian plans to advance their bridgeheads beyond the fifteen miles to which they had been extended.
埃及和叙利亚的进攻都被遏制住后，以色列现在可以转而发起反攻。戈南和他的顾问巴尔·莱夫反对沙龙雄心勃勃的计划，即从德韦尔苏瓦大苦湖与运河的交汇处渡河，试图扭转战局。他们希望保存实力，以便在埃及再次进攻时发动决定性的反击。与此同时，埃拉扎尔主张立即对已被击退至原先防线的叙利亚军队发动决定性的空袭和地面进攻。他希望在约旦按兵不动、伊拉克援军（已在途中）抵达之前击溃叙利亚军队，以便之后集中力量对付埃及。达扬犹豫不决，担心叙利亚的战败和耻辱会迫使苏联出兵干预，以拯救其盟友。戈尔达·梅厄并非第一次否决了他的谨慎意见。袭击于 10 月 11 日发起，尽管有约旦和伊拉克的帮助，叙利亚还是在 10 月 20 日放弃了抵抗。
With both Egyptian and Syrian attacks held, Israel could now turn to the counteroffensive. Gonen and Bar Lev, who was attached to him as an advisor, resisted Sharon's ambitious proposal for an attempt to turn the tables by crossing the Canal at its junction with the Great Bitter Lake at Deversoir. They wished to preserve their strength for a decisive counterstroke when the Egyptians attacked again. Meanwhile Elazar argued for an immediate and decisive air force and army attack on the Syrian forces, which had been driven back to their start-line. He wanted to knock them out while Jordan remained inactive and before Iraqi reinforcements, already on their way, could arrive, so that he could thereafter concentrate all his effort against Egypt. Dayan hesitated, fearing that the defeat and humiliation of Syria would force the Soviet Union to intervene to save its protégé. Not for the first time Golda Meir overruled his caution. The attack was launched on October 11 and, in spite of Jordanian and Iraqi help, Syria gave up the struggle on October 20.
在西奈半岛，戈南已被沙龙的计划说服，但直到埃及试图突破其桥头堡（当时美军装甲师正准备部署到桥头堡）的大规模进攻被挫败后，他才能开始实施该计划。10月13日和14日，双方展开了为期两天的激烈战斗，投入了两千辆坦克——这是自1943年库尔斯克坦克战以来单次战斗中投入坦克数量最多的一次——最终埃及第二集团军战败，其指挥官马蒙将军突发心脏病。沙龙趁机命令部队于10月15日夜间渡过运河。然而，这次渡河尝试遇到了相当大的困难，并在接下来的两天里，在东岸的“中国农场”附近爆发了异常激烈的战斗。在10月18日和19日夜间桥梁建成之前，渡河部队的处境十分危险。到那时，布伦和曼德勒的师已与沙龙的部队在对岸会合，并继续推进，直到布伦的部队抵达苏伊士郊区，曼德勒的部队则切断了从那里通往开罗的道路，包围了埃及第三集团军。在阿列克谢·柯西金访问开罗、亨利·基辛格飞往莫斯科与列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫就决议条款达成一致后，联合国安理会呼吁停火。以色列再次掌握了谈判筹码，经过漫长的谈判，这些筹码间接促成了其南部边境的稳定安全局面。在总结这场战争及其之前的冲突时，我只能重复我在其他文章中已经写过的内容：
In Sinai Gonen had been won over to Sharon's plan, but could not begin to implement it until a major Egyptian attempt to break out of their bridgeheads, into which the armored divisions were on the point of being deployed, had been halted. Two days of fierce fighting, on October 13 and 14, in which two thousand tanks were involved—the largest number in a single engagement since the tank battle of Kursk in 1943—ended in defeat of the Egyptian Second Army, whose commander, General Mamoun, suffered a heart attack. Exploiting this, Sharon was ordered to cross the Canal on the night of October 15. This attempt ran into considerable difficulties, and exceptionally fierce fighting took place around “Chinese Farm” on the east bank during the next two days. The position of the troops who had crossed was precarious until bridges were completed on the nights of October 18 and 19, by the end of which Bren's and Mandler's divisions had joined Sharon's on the far side, pushing on until Bren was on the outskirts of Suez and Mandler had cut the road from there to Cairo, encircling the Egyptian Third Army. A ceasefire was called for by the UN Security Council, after Aleksei Kosygin had visited Cairo and Henry Kissinger had flown to Moscow to agree on the terms of a resolution with Leonid Brezhnev. Once more Israel held the bargaining chips, which were indirectly to lead, after prolonged negotiation, to a stable condition of security on its southern border. In summing up that war and the conflicts that had preceded it, I can only repeat what I have already written elsewhere:
“这是战争史上最激烈、最残酷的战斗之一。双方都配备了最先进的武器，尽管他们的库存中也包含相当数量的老旧武器。埃及和叙利亚分别拥有约2200辆和2000辆坦克。其中约有2000辆被击毁，尽管反坦克导弹得到了广泛宣传，但大部分还是被以色列的1700辆坦克击毁，而以色列自身也损失了大约一半的坦克。埃及和叙利亚共拥有约800架飞机，其中大部分在空战中损失了约250架；而以色列拥有500架飞机，仅损失了115架，几乎全部被地对空武器或导弹击毁，其中很大一部分是在地面支援任务中损失的。埃及和叙利亚各自阵亡约8000人，以色列阵亡2500人。就人口而言，即使对于以色列来说……当时以色列的人口已达300万……[这]也无法……”或许称不上高，但平均每天有115人阵亡，确实如此。双方装备和弹药消耗速度之快，令双方都措手不及，这令他们感到震惊。结果，双方都紧急向各自的赞助国请求立即补给，而双方也都做出了回应，从10月15日起，俄美运输机在东地中海航线上进行大规模空运，运送物资。如此高的消耗速度迫使铁幕两侧的后勤人员重新评估自身的需求。如果不到三周就能损失一半的库存，如何才能维持一场持久战？这场战争的教训被双方认真研究，因为这是西方列强和苏联首次将各自生产的众多最先进武器投入实战。这尤其适用于坦克和反坦克武器以及飞机和防空武器领域，尽管后者在越南战争中已经过检验，当时美军空军曾与苏联的地对空导弹交战。除了SAM6导弹之外，其他导弹都参与了战争。这场战争的一个有趣特点是坦克对坦克和空战仍然非常重要。
“It had been one of the fiercest and most intense struggles in the history of warfare. Both sides had been equipped with the most modern weapons, although their inventory also included a considerable number of older ones. Egypt and Syria started with some 2,200 and 2,000 tanks respectively. Of these they lost about 2,000, most of them, in spite of the publicity given to anti-tank guided missiles, to the gunfire of Israel's 1,700 tanks, of which she lost about half. Egypt and Syria each lost about 250 aircraft out of their combined total of about 800, mostly in air-to-air combat, while Israel lost only 115 out of her 500, almost all from surface-to-air guns or missiles, a large proportion incurred on ground support missions. Egypt and Syria each lost about 8,000 men killed, Israel 2,500. In terms of population, even in the case of Israel,…which now reached three million,…[this] could not be called high; but an average of 115 men killed a day, it seemed so. It was the very high rate of expenditure of equipment and munitions on both sides, for which neither was prepared, that caused alarm to them both. The result was an urgent plea to their respective sponsors for immediate supply, to which both responded with massive airlifts, Russian and American transport aircraft carrying them, crossing each other's routes in the Eastern Mediterranean from 15 October onwards. The rate of expenditure made logisticians on both sides of the Iron Curtain revise their estimates of their own requirements. If half one's inventory could be lost in less than three weeks, how was a long war to be sustained? The lessons of the war were studied with great care and interest as the first example of the use of many of the most sophisticated and modern weapons produced both by the Western powers and by Soviet Russia in action against each other. This applied particularly to the tank and anti-tank and the aircraft and anti-aircraft fields, although the latter had been tested in the Vietnam war, where the US Air Force had encountered the Russian Surface-to-Air Missiles, except the SAM6. An interesting feature of the war was the continuing importance of tank versus tank and air-to-air combat.
以色列在三场战争中的胜利似乎印证了富勒和利德尔·哈特这两位机动战术倡导者的理论。利德尔·哈特本人甚至将六日战争视为“迄今为止对间接战术理论的最佳诠释”。他们证明，一支规模虽小但训练有素、技能精湛的军队，装备精良，具备机动作战能力，并由思维敏捷、智慧过人的指挥官在前线指挥，能够击败规模更大、行动更迟缓的敌军。他们还证明，速度与奇袭相结合能够产生强大的推进力，旨在扰乱敌军心理和物理平衡的作战行动，比直接进攻更为有效。然而，与富勒和利德尔·哈特不同的是，以色列人从不犹豫地发动此类进攻，即便他们本可以避免。他们不认为避免行动是通往胜利的捷径，也承受不起拖延时间的代价。出于政治和军事的双重原因，他们始终感受到时间紧迫的压力。一辆带翼战车在附近盘旋。与他们的对手不同，他们深知自己是在为生存而战，这激励着他们奋勇作战。尽管他们对伤亡极其敏感，远胜于他们的对手，但他们却敢于承担其他士兵鲜少敢冒的风险。虽然这种大胆并非总能带来回报，但往往是成功的。
“Israeli victories in all three wars seemed to be a vindication of the theories of those apostles of mobility, Fuller and Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart himself regarded the Six-Day War as ‘the best demonstration yet of the theory of the indirect approach’. They had shown that a small, highly trained and skilled army, equipped for mobile operations and commanded from the front by men of high intelligence and speed of thought, could defeat much larger armies, more ponderous in thought and action. They had also shown that the combination of speed and surprise produced its own momentum and that operations aimed to upset the enemy's equilibrium, psychologically as well as physically, were more fruitful than direct assaults. But, unlike Fuller and Liddell Hart, the Israelis never hesitated to engage in such assaults if they thought them necessary, often when they could have avoided them. They did not recognize any short cuts to victory by avoiding action, nor could they afford to play for time. At their backs, for both political and military reasons, they always heard time's winged chariot hovering near. Unlike their opponents, they knew that they were fighting for their very existence, and this spurred them on. Although very sensitive about casualties, much more so than their opponents, they took risks which few other soldiers would have been prepared to face, and, although boldness did not always pay, more often than not it did.
他们的对手，约旦、埃及、叙利亚和巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人，在防御中往往展现出顽强的决心和勇气，进攻时亦是如此；但他们的整体指挥系统反应迟缓、犹豫不决，而且内部也存在分裂。叙利亚和埃及投入巨资及其俄罗斯支持者发展军队，却收效甚微。迄今为止，他们诉诸战争毫无建树。以色列凭借自身的防御努力，并在美国和其他一些国家的鼎力相助下幸存了下来。对以色列而言，安全至上，这一点毋庸置疑。6
“Their opponents, Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian Arab, often fought with dogged determination and courage in defence, as they did also in advancing to attack; but their overall command was ponderous and hesitant in its reaction, as well as being disunited. Syria and Egypt received a poor return for the vast resources devoted by them and by their Russian supporters to their armed forces. Their resort to war has so far achieved nothing. Israel, by her own defence effort, with significant help from the United States and some others, has survived. To her there is no doubt that security comes first.”6
以色列最近一次战争，即1982年入侵黎巴嫩，很难称之为常规战争，因为当时并没有常规意义上的对手，尽管以色列空军和陆军动用了所有可用的武器装备。这场战争带有既成事实战略的某些特征，但短期军事胜利是否能像以往的冲突一样，确保长期安全，仍有待观察。
Israel's latest war, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, can hardly be called conventional warfare, as there was no conventional opponent, although all the armament at the disposal of both the Israeli air force and army has been used. This had elements about it of the fait accompli strategy, but it remains to be seen whether, as in previous conflicts, short-term military success establishes security in the long term.
印度的战争。印度的战争远不如后来的阿以冲突那样复杂；首先，空军在战争中并未扮演如此重要的角色。从根本上讲，这些战争围绕着巴基斯坦的担忧展开：巴基斯坦认为印度从未真正接受在次大陆上存在一个独立的穆斯林国家；而印度则担心巴基斯坦会瓦解留在印度境内的大量穆斯林的忠诚。英国最初的提议是，各邦在独立后可以选择加入哪个国家，而克什米尔——其统治者是印度教的，人口也存在分歧（77%是穆斯林）——成为了这一提议对印度统一构成威胁的象征。克什米尔土邦王公在加入哪个国家的问题上摇摆不定，希望能够保持独立于两国之外。印度和巴基斯坦军队曾同属英国控制下的印度军队，但不久后，双方爆发了战争。1947年10月，一个印度营被空运至斯利那加，支援当地统治者镇压穆斯林叛乱。巴基斯坦介入支持叛军，双方都扩充兵力，最终各自拥有相当于两个步兵师的兵力。印度军队控制了该邦东部的大部分地区后，双方在山区展开了旷日持久且胜负难分的战斗，直到1949年1月达成停火协议，并由一个联合国小组监督执行。此后，这条停火线一直作为事实上的国际边界存在。
India's Wars. India's wars have been less sophisticated than the later Arab-Israeli conflicts; for one thing, air forces have not played such a prominent part. Fundamentally, these wars revolved around the fears of Pakistan that India had never genuinely accepted that a separate Muslim state should exist on the subcontinent, and the fears of India that Pakistan would subvert the allegiance of the considerable number of Muslims remaining within Indian borders. The original British proposal had been that, on independence, states could choose to which nation they should adhere, and Kashmir, with its Hindu ruler and divided population (77 percent Muslim) became the symbol of the dangers this posed to Indian unity. The Maharajah had vacillated over which nation he wished to join, hoping to be able to remain independent of both. Fighting between the Indian and Pakistani armies, so recently members of the same British-controlled Indian army, began soon after an Indian battalion had been flown to Srinagar in October 1947 to support the ruler in suppressing a Muslim rebellion against him. Pakistan intervened on the side of the rebels, and both sides built up their forces until they amounted to the equivalent of two infantry divisions on each side. After the Indians had secured most of the eastern half of the state, the two sides engaged in some inconclusive mountain warfare against each other until a cease-fire line was agreed to in January 1949, observed by a small United Nations team. It has remained the de facto international frontier ever since.
印度的下一场战争是与中国的战争，部分原因是克什米尔问题的敏感性。这场冲突源于印度与西藏（尼泊尔以西和以东）的边界争端，而西藏本身的地位长期以来也令这一争端更加复杂。印度总理贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁因默许毛泽东将中国管辖权扩大到西藏而受到右翼人士的批评，并且他拒绝了周恩来提出的一系列关于此问题的讨论。直到1957年，印度发现中国修建了一条从新疆到西藏拉萨的公路，途经克什米尔以北的阿克赛钦地区。双方都声称该地区是自己的领土，但印度从未实际占领过。此后，印度坚持要求中国从该地区撤军，并拒绝就争议地区进行谈判。中国的回应是，同意接受自1913年以来尼泊尔以东的实际边界——麦克马洪线，前提是印度接受尼泊尔以西的边界沿着喀喇昆仑山脉，即阿克赛钦南部边缘的边界线，而英国在1899年至1927年间一直接受这一边界线。如果印度拒绝，中国将坚持以阿萨姆山麓作为东部边界的主张。
India's next war was with China, caused in part by sensitivity over Kashmir. The conflict arose from a dispute about India's frontier with Tibet, west and east of Nepal, which had long been complicated by doubt about the status of Tibet itself. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had come under criticism from right-wing elements for accepting without protest Mao Tse-tung's extension of China's authority over Tibet, and he rejected a series of approaches by Chou En-lai to discuss the issue. Nothing happened until India discovered in 1957 that the Chinese had built a road from Sinkiang to Lhasa in Tibet through the area known as the Aksai Chin, north of Kashmir, which both sides claimed as their territory, but which India had never occupied. India then insisted that China withdraw from the area, and refused to negotiate the disputed areas. China's response was to offer to agree to the McMahon line, which had been the de facto frontier east of Nepal since 1913, provided that India accepted that west of Nepal the border followed the line of the Karakoram Mountains, on the southern edge of the Aksai Chin, which the British had accepted from 1899 to 1927. If India refused, China would maintain its claim to the foothills of Assam as the frontier in the east.
尼赫鲁过于自信地认为，美国和苏联的政治支持足以阻止中国采取任何行动。由于未能大力支持西藏反抗中国的起义，他饱受批评，因此拒绝谈判，推行“前进政策”，派遣一系列军事巡逻队支持印度在这些偏远山区的主张。这是一个愚蠢的举动，但那些指出军事现实的将领却被唯唯诺诺的将领所取代。周恩来曾多次警告尼赫鲁，他的政策存在危险，被解读为旨在将西藏从中国分离出去，但他的警告被置若罔闻，1961年，印军在西藏的驻军数量和兵力反而增加。1962年初，中国开始采取反制措施，以优势兵力包围印度哨所。9月，他们在靠近麦克马洪线与不丹边境交汇处的塔格拉山口使用了这一策略，并再次提出谈判。尼赫鲁拒绝了谈判，并命令军队击退中国军队。
Nehru, over-confident that the political support of both the United States and the Soviet Union would deter China from taking any action, and under criticism for not having done more to support the Tibetan rebellion against the Chinese, refused discussions and instituted a forward policy, sending a series of military patrols to support India's claims in these remote mountains. It was a foolish step, but generals who pointed out the military realities were replaced by subservient ones. Chou En-lai repeatedly warned Nehru of the dangers of his policy, which was interpreted as designed to detach Tibet from China, but his warnings were ignored, and the number and strength of military posts increased in 1961. Early in 1962 the Chinese began to take countermeasures, surrounding Indian posts with superior forces. In September they used this tactic at the Thag La Pass near the junction of the McMahon line with the frontier of Bhutan, and once more offered to negotiate. Nehru refused and ordered his army to drive the Chinese back.
这促使中国军队在10月发动反攻。中国军队在该地区拥有远胜于印度的兵力，正如他们在尼泊尔以西的拉达克地区一样，他们也同时在那里发动了进攻。驻扎在阿萨姆邦的印度军队虽然已经集结了两个师的兵力，但分散在各处，彼此无法支援，很容易被包抄。后勤准备不足也使得他们无法进行更合理的部署。高级指挥官大多是尼赫鲁的马屁精，他们无能地应对了这一棘手的局面。尽管许多部队英勇作战，但到11月20日，中国军队还是毫不费力地将他们赶出了山麓地带，退回了平原地区。在拉达克，能干的道拉特·辛格将军将他集结的一个师的兵力集中在喀喇昆仑山脉，并在11月中旬牢牢控制了局势。
This precipitated a counteroffensive in October by the Chinese, who could produce much superior forces in the area, as they could also in Ladakh, west of Nepal, where they attacked at the same time. The Indian forces in Assam, which had been built up to a strength of two divisions, were scattered about in positions that could not support each other and were easily outflanked. The lack of adequate logistic preparations ruled out more suitable dispositions. The higher commanders, drawn from Nehru's sycophants, handled an impossible situation with incompetence. Although many units fought gallantly, the Chinese had no difficulty in driving them out of the foothills and back to the plains by November 20. In Ladakh, General Daulat Singh, an able officer, concentrated his forces, which had been brought to the strength of one division, on the Karakoram range and by mid-November had the situation under firm control.
面对中国全面入侵印度的前景，尼赫鲁惊慌失措，放弃了不结盟政策，向美国、英国和苏联求助。前两者迅速回应，提供了武器和空中支援。然而，这些援助最终都未能派上用场。11月21日，周恩来宣布，中国边防部队将向后撤退20公里，撤退范围为“1959年11月7日中印实际控制线”，并要求印度军队遵守同样的距离，但民警哨所可以延伸至该距离。这样一来，双方便可交换战俘，并展开谈判。尼赫鲁虽然没有公开接受中方的条件，但实际上却顺从了，并让周恩来知道他会接受。
Panicking at the prospect of a wholesale Chinese invasion of India, Nehru abandoned his nonalignment and appealed to the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union for help. The first two responded rapidly, offering arms and air support. Neither was needed as, on November 21, Chou En-lai announced that Chinese “frontier guards” would withdraw twenty kilometers behind “the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959” and would expect Indian armed forces to observe the same distance, although civilian police posts could come up to it. Prisoners could then be exchanged and negotiations could proceed. Nehru did not publicly accept the Chinese terms, but in practice conformed and let Chou En-lai know that he would.
这是一场老式的步兵战争，现代重型武器几乎没有发挥作用，而能够翻越山地并从出其不意的方向调动优势兵力通常是取得胜利的关键。空军的行动几乎完全局限于后方运输。即使当时有一定数量的直升机，作战的高海拔也严重限制了现有机型的使用。对中国而言，这场战役是有限战争的完美典范，其目标和执行都十分有限，旨在实现明确的政治目的，并且手段也经过经济上的调整以适应最终目标。他们遵循了孙子的原则。孙子在公元前六世纪写道，应该以尽可能短的时间、尽可能少的努力、尽可能减少对敌人的伤亡来取得胜利，同时也要记住，战争结束后，双方还要继续和平共处。尼赫鲁忽视军事现实是愚蠢的，印度军队伤亡惨重也算是幸运——1383人阵亡，1696人失踪，3968人被俘。幸运的是，这场战争也导致一些无能的将领被撤职。
It had been an old-fashioned infantry war, in which modern heavy weapons had played little part, and the ability to move over mountainous country and bring a superior force to bear from an unexpected direction had usually carried the day. The actions of air forces had been almost entirely limited to transport in the rear areas. Even had helicopters been present in any number, the altitude at which operations took place would have seriously restricted the use of the types then available. On the part of the Chinese, the campaign had been the perfect example of a limited war, limited in aim and execution to effect a clear political purpose, the means being economically adapted to the end. They had followed the tenets of Sun Tzu, who had written in the sixth century B.C. that one should seek victory in the shortest possible time, with the least possible effort, and at the least cost in casualties to one's enemy, remembering that one had to continue to live next door to him when the fighting was over. Nehru was foolish to ignore the military realities, and the Indian army was lucky that its casualties were not greater—1,383 killed, 1,696 missing, and 3,968 captured. It was also fortunate in that it led to the dismissal of the incompetent among the generals.
印度与中国的战争对印巴关系产生了影响。巴基斯坦军队近期从美国获得了大量新装备，包括坦克和飞机，这是美国为加强中央条约组织（CENTO）以对抗苏联在中东的影响力而采取的政策的一部分。巴基斯坦与中国进行了友好谈判，并就共同边界线达成一致。面临国内政治困境的总统穆罕默德·阿尤布·汗看到了争取克什米尔其他地区支持的机会，该地区在1963年和1964年曾发生过严重的骚乱。尼赫鲁希望达成和解，但他于同年5月去世，他的继任者拉尔·巴哈杜尔·沙斯特里政治实力不足以做出让步。阿尤布·汗组织了一支由三万人组成的部队，其中大部分是非正规军，由巴基斯坦正规军军官指挥，由马利克将军率领，潜入克什米尔停火线。为了转移视线或将战争爆发的责任推卸给印度，他于1965年1月在库奇兰恩（位于印度河口以东，几乎无人居住，夏季季风时洪水泛滥）策划了一起边境事件。紧张局势不断升级，8月，马利克的部队分四次越过克什米尔防线，印度迅速做出反应。马利克的部队未能成功动员民众支持，很快被限制在距离防线十英里以内的区域，此后几乎没有参与战争。这场战争演变为印巴两国正规军之间的较量，双方各有约八个师，包括一个装甲师。最初的冲突发生在克什米尔防线的南端，随后逐渐向南蔓延至旁遮普地区，双方都试图通过突袭来转移对方对其境内目标的威胁。 9月6日，印度以三个师向拉合尔发起进攻，引发了为期四天的激烈战斗，巴基斯坦的装甲师也卷入其中。但战斗结果不分胜负。9月11日，印度再次向北推进，目标是锡亚尔科特，投入了包括装甲师在内的四个师。这引发了一场持续两周的大战，双方共投入了四百辆坦克；最终也以僵局告终。
India's war with China had repercussions on its relations with Pakistan. The latter's forces had recently received significant quantities of new equipment, including tanks and aircraft, from the United States, as part of America's policy of building up the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the Middle East. Pakistan had proceeded with friendly negotiations with China, agreeing on the line of their common frontier. President Mohammad Ayub Khan, who faced domestic political problems, saw an opportunity to win over the rest of Kashmir, where serious riots occurred in 1963 and 1964. Nehru wanted a settlement but died in May of that year, and his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was not strong enough politically to make concessions. Ayub Khan organized a force of thirty thousand men, mostly irregulars, commanded by regular Pakistan army officers, headed by General Malik, to infiltrate across the Kashmir cease-fire line. Either as a distraction or to try and pin the blame for the opening of hostilities on India, he engineered a frontier incident in January 1965 in the Rann of Kutch, an almost uninhabited region east of the mouth of the Indus River, flooded in the summer monsoon. Tension mounted, and in August Malik's force crossed the line in Kashmir in four thrusts, to which India reacted promptly. Malik's men failed in their plan to rouse the populace in support and were soon confined to an area within ten miles of the line, taking little further part in the war, which evolved into one between the two regular armies, each of about eight divisions, including one armored. The first clashes took place at the southern end of the Kashmir line and gradually extended southwards into the Punjab, as each side developed thrusts to draw off the other's threats to targets on its side. On September 6 India launched an attack with three divisions towards Lahore, which led to four days of fierce fighting, drawing in Pakistan's armored division. The results were inconclusive. On September 11 India launched another thrust further north, aimed at Sialkot, using four divisions including their armored one. This led to a major battle lasting two weeks, in which four hundred tanks were involved; it also ended in stalemate.
与此同时，国际社会持续施压，要求停火。其中最有效的措施是美国和英国决定切断对交战双方的武器供应。到9月22日，双方开始意识到，他们无法承受继续以如此快的速度损失主要装备。停火协议被接受，但直到1966年1月在塔什干举行的勃列日涅夫主持的会议上，才最终达成协议：双方撤回到1965年8月5日的阵地。沙斯特里在签署协议当天因心脏病去世，英迪拉·甘地继任。双方并未就克什米尔的未来达成一致。伤亡人数不可靠，但双方伤亡似乎大致相同——总计12000人，其中约3000人阵亡。双方似乎各自损失了约200辆坦克，另有150辆坦克无法使用但可以修复，不过巴基斯坦的损失可能略高一些。印度损失了约70架飞机，巴基斯坦损失了20架；两国海军几乎没有参战。就两国总人口而言，这些损失当然微不足道，对两国装甲部队以及弹药和零部件储备的影响最为显著。
Meanwhile, international pressure to bring about a cease-fire had continued, the most effective being the American and British decision to cut off arms supplies to both sides who, by September 22, had begun to realize that they could not afford to go on losing major equipment at the rate they had been experiencing. A cease-fire was accepted, although it was not until January 1966, at a meeting under the chairmanship of Brezhnev in Tashkent, that agreement was reached: they would both withdraw to the positions they had held on August 5, 1965. Shastri died of a heart attack on the day of signature, and was succeeded by Indira Gandhi. There was no agreement about the future of Kashmir. Casualty figures are unreliable, but appear to have been about the same on both sides—a total of twelve thousand, of whom about three thousand were killed. Both sides appear to have lost about 200 tanks each, with another 150 out of action but repairable, although Pakistan's losses may have been slightly higher. India lost about seventy aircraft and Pakistan twenty; their navies had hardly been engaged at all. In terms of their total populations, these losses were, of course, very small, the effect on their armored forces and on their stocks of ammunition and spare parts being the most significant.
尽管战争结果不明，但它削弱了巴基斯坦与印度的关系，也削弱了巴基斯坦的内部实力。东巴基斯坦对西方对克什米尔的执着感到不满，1969年接替阿尤布的叶海亚·汗在东西两方面都面临着严峻的挑战。这些挑战在1971年3月达到顶峰，当时叶海亚无限期推迟了新当选的国民议会的召开。在这次选举中，东巴基斯坦的人民联盟击败了西巴基斯坦佐勒菲卡尔·阿里·布托领导的人民党，赢得了多数席位。军方接管了东巴基斯坦，并对人民联盟以及受印度支持的受过教育的孟加拉阶层实施了镇压政策。这导致印度东孟加拉地区出现了严重的难民问题。由于未能说服叶海亚·汗改变其镇压政策，甘地夫人决定采取军事行动，彻底切断东西巴基斯坦之间的人为联系。
Although the war had been inconclusive, it weakened Pakistan in relation to India and also internally. East Pakistan resented the West's obsession with Kashmir, and Yahia Khan, who succeeded Ayub in 1969, faced severe difficulties in both West and East. These came to a head in March 1971 when Yahia indefinitely postponed the opening of a newly elected National Assembly in which East Pakistan's Awami League had won a majority over Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's People's Party in the West. The military assumed control over East Pakistan and pursued a policy of repression against the Awami League and the educated Bengali classes generally, who were supported by India. This led to a major refugee problem in India's East Bengal. Having failed to persuade Yahia Khan to change his policy of repression, Mrs. Gandhi decided to bring the artificial link between East and West Pakistan to an end by military action.
印度陆军约有82.5万人，编成一个装甲师、十三个步兵师、十个山地师和若干独立旅。自1965年以来，印度的坦克力量有所增强，这得益于其采购的450辆苏联T-55和T-56坦克，以及维克斯·维贾扬塔坦克的生产。维贾扬塔坦克的装甲较薄，但装备了与英国百夫长坦克相同的威力强大的105毫米火炮。空军的作战力量也增强到62.5架飞机，其中包括7个苏联米格-21战斗机中队，其余为苏联苏-7轰炸机、英国堪培拉轰炸机和猎人战斗机，以及印度国产的蚊蚋式战斗机。海军也得到了加强，以“维克兰特”号航空母舰为核心进行建设。巴基斯坦拥有两个装甲师、十二个步兵师和一个独立装甲旅，另有两个师正在组建中，以替换部署在东巴基斯坦的部队。巴基斯坦空军拥有十四个战斗机中队和三个轰炸机中队，但仅有一个佩刀式战斗轰炸机中队部署到东巴基斯坦，此外还有一个由五十辆坦克组成的轻型坦克团。巴基斯坦的镇压政策导致几乎所有在东巴基斯坦招募的士兵都叛逃，加入了支持人民联盟的颠覆性组织“解放军”（Mukti Bahini），结果不得不从西方招募士兵来填补空缺。该国的统治比以往任何时候都更加军事化，而得到印度支持的“解放军”的活动也日益猖獗。
The Indian army had about 825,000 men, organized into one armored, thirteen infantry, and ten mountain divisions and a number of independent brigades. Its tank strength had been increased since 1965 by the acquisition of 450 Soviet T-55 and T-56 tanks and the production of the Vickers Vijayanta tank, less thickly armored but mounting the same powerful 105-mm gun as their British Centurions. The air force had increased its combat strength to 62.5 aircraft, including seven squadrons of Soviet MIG-21s, the rest being Soviet Sukhoi-7s, British Canberras and Hunters, and Indian-produced Gnats. The navy had also been strengthened, built around the aircraft carrier Vikrant. Pakistan had two armored and twelve infantry divisions and one independent armored brigade, two other divisions being in the process of formation to replace those deployed in East Pakistan. Its air force had fourteen fighter and three bomber squadrons, but only one squadron of Sabre fighter-bombers was deployed to East Pakistan, as was one regiment of fifty tanks, all of them light. Pakistan's repressive policy led to the desertion of almost all its soldiers recruited in East Pakistan to the ranks of the subversive movement, the Mukti Bahini, which supported the Awami League, with the result that they had to be replaced by soldiers from the West. The administration of the country became more than ever a military regime imposed by the West, and the activity of the Mukti Bahini, supported from across the border by India, became more widespread.
印巴之间的敌对行动始于1971年12月3日，巴基斯坦空军对印度空军机场发动了一次无效的袭击，印度空军随即予以更有力的回击。与此同时，双方正规军和非正规军也越过克什米尔停火线发动了同样无效的袭击。这些袭击演变为克什米尔和旁遮普边境的一系列战斗，印度坦克在这些战斗中占据了上风。然而，这些战斗并未对加尔各答奥罗拉将军指挥的东巴基斯坦主要军事行动产生任何影响。他的计划颇具创意。他部署了三个军，一个军下辖两个师，驻扎在东孟加拉；另一个军下辖两个师，驻扎在东巴基斯坦北部边境的阿萨姆邦；第三个军下辖三个师，驻扎在东巴基斯坦东部的特里普拉邦。他克服了最大的难题——大大小小的水障碍——的方法，是尽可能地让部队摆脱对公路的依赖，同时调动所有可用的陆军工兵来修建桥梁和渡口。为后者运送物资是印度空军直升机的首要任务。这一同心圆式攻击计划利用了巴基斯坦将军尼亚齐·汗部署上的弱点。为了应对穆克提·巴希尼并控制国家，他的部队分散部署，尤其是在边境附近；他所能集中的力量主要用于确保首都达卡和位于东南部的主要港口吉大港之间的交通畅通。
Hostilities between India and Pakistan started on December 3, 1971, with an ineffective attack by the Pakistan air force on Indian air force airfields, to which the Indian air force replied to greater purpose. It was accompanied by equally ineffective attacks across the Kashmir cease-fire line by both regular and irregular forces. These developed into a series of battles on the borders of Kashmir and the Punjab, in which Indian tanks gained the upper hand. They had no effect on the major operation in East Pakistan under the command of General Aurora in Calcutta. His plan was an imaginative one. He had three corps, one of two divisions in East Bengal, another of the same strength on East Pakistan's northern border in Assam, and a third, with three divisions, in Tripura, east of the country. He overcame his principal problem, that of numerous water obstacles, large and small, by making his troops as independent of road movement as he could, while using all the army engineers that could be provided to construct bridges and ferries. Movement of matériel for the latter was the highest priority task for the Indian air force helicopters. This plan for a concentric attack exploited the weakness of the Pakistani general Niazi Khan's dispositions. In order to deal with the Mukti Bahini and keep the country under control, his forces were scattered, particularly near the frontiers; such strength as he could concentrate being held to secure communications between the capital, Dacca, and the main port of Chittagong in the extreme southeast.
印度的三次进攻都迅速取得了成功。在民众的热情支持和引导下，前线部队跨越国土，冒着在常规情况下会被视为愚蠢的风险。与此同时，印度空军已取得绝对制空权，能够提供不受限制的运输、打击和侦察支援。随着三个军的推进，12月11日，“曙光女神”空降了一个伞兵营，切断了从阿萨姆邦西部、主要河流以东方向进攻的巴基斯坦军队。这支由纳格拉将军指挥的北方部队正逼近达卡，此时尼亚齐请求停火。12月16日，尼亚齐在东巴基斯坦投降，此时他已抵达达卡郊外。十天前，甘地夫人承认了孟加拉国的独立，此后该国便以此名称命名。这场战役是一场名副其实的闪电战，遵循了利德尔·哈特的“扩张洪流”理论，该理论源于德军在1918年3月西线攻势中使用的战术。其核心在于利用敌军阵地的任何薄弱环节，通过渗透渗透、绕过抵抗，如同水流绕过河床障碍物一般。印度的目标较为有限，而它也完全按照孙子的兵法原则实现了这一目标。
All three Indian attacks met with rapid success. The forward troops, enthusiastically supported and guided by the populace, moved across country taking risks that would have been foolish in a more conventional setting, while the Indian air force, having established total air supremacy, was able to give unrestricted transport, strike, and reconnaissance support. As all three corps thrusts made progress, Aurora dropped a parachute battalion on December 11 to cut off the Pakistani force facing the attack from western Assam, east of the major river obstacles. This thrust from the north, under General Nagra, was approaching Dacca when Niazi asked for a cease-fire and was in the outskirts of the city when he surrendered all his forces in East Pakistan on December 16, ten days after Mrs. Gandhi had recognized the independence of Bangladesh, as the country was henceforth to be known. The campaign was a true blitzkrieg, following the lines of Liddell Hart's theory of “the expanding torrent,” derived from the tactics that the German army had used in its March 1918 offensive on the western front. It involved exploiting any weakness in the enemy's position by infiltrating troops, bypassing opposition, on the pattern by which water finds its way around obstacles in a streambed. India's aim had been a limited one, which it achieved in full conformity with the principles of Sun Tzu.
英国的战役。在核时代的整个时期，除了1968年之外，英国军队几乎一直在世界各地作战。其大部分战役都与英国政府在殖民地、前殖民地以及自1969年以来在英国本土（北爱尔兰）的权威所面临的内部挑战有关。除了这些战役以及前文已述的朝鲜战争之外，英国还参与了三场“常规”行动——英法苏伊士运河远征、1962年至1966年与马来西亚联合对抗印度尼西亚在婆罗洲的战役，以及1982年收复福克兰群岛的战役。海军陆战队和直升机以及空军的各种机型几乎参与了陆军参与的所有战役，尽管只有在福克兰群岛战役中，他们才需要与敌方舰船和飞机作战。
Britain's Battles. Throughout all the years of the nuclear age, except 1968, Britain's army has been in action somewhere in the world. Most of its campaigns have been concerned with internal challenges to its government's authority in colonies, former colonies, and, since 1969, within the United Kingdom itself in Northern Ireland. Apart from these and its contribution in the Korean War, which has been described, Britain has been involved in three “conventional” actions—the Franco-British Suez expedition, the campaign with Malaysia against Indonesia in Borneo from 1962 to 1966, and the recapture of the Falkland Islands in 1982. The navy's marines and helicopters and the air force's aircraft of all types participated in almost all of the campaigns in which the army was engaged, although it was only in the Falkland Islands operation that they had to fight against enemy ships and aircraft.
在苏伊士运河战争中，埃及空军在空降和两栖登陆作战开始前，就因机场遭到远程轰炸而丧失了地面作战能力，埃及海军也未能进行有效抵抗。苏伊士运河战争和福克兰群岛战争有一个共同点：事先都没有制定应急预案，因此只能临时应对。1956年，英国既缺乏两栖作战能力，也缺乏空运能力，无法通过海空大规模部署部队。英国在塞浦路斯和马耳他设有基地，但塞浦路斯的小型港口不适合集结或装载船只，其两个机场的容量也有限。马耳他距离塞得港1100英里，对于航速较慢的船只来说，这是一段漫长的海上航程。英法联合行动经历了多次计划变更，而且其目标也存在不确定性。此次行动的目的究竟仅限于确保苏伊士运河本身的安全，以便苏伊士运河公司能够继续代表苏伊士运河用户协会运营运河，还是旨在实现更为宏大的目标——推翻纳赛尔政权，并希望扶植一位更倾向于西方利益的领导人，这一点始终不甚明了。最初的计划是在亚历山大港登陆，然后派遣一支装甲纵队沿沙漠公路北上开罗，再从开罗分兵前往塞得港、伊斯梅利亚和苏伊士运河。当时乐观地认为，这一计划可以在八天内完成。但由于诸多原因，包括两栖舰艇数量不足的限制，计划改为对塞得港发起突袭，采用空降和两栖相结合的方式，并在突袭前对埃及空军基地进行夜间空袭。由于英法联合运输机的运力有限，空投伞兵人数最终只有668名英国伞兵和487名法国伞兵。
In the Suez action, the Egyptian air force was put out of action on the ground by long-range bombing of its airfields before the airborne and amphibious assaults took place, and the Egyptian navy put up no effective resistance. One factor was common to both the Suez and the Falklands operations: no previous contingency plan had been prepared for either of them; they had therefore to be improvised. In 1956 Britain had neither the amphibious nor the air transport resources to deploy troops in any numbers by sea or air. It had bases in Cyprus and Malta, but the small ports of Cyprus were unsuitable for assembling or loading shipping and its two airfields were of limited capacity. Malta is 1,100 miles from Port Said, a long sea journey for slow-sailing craft. The Franco-British operation suffered from many changes of plan, as well as uncertainty about its aim. It was never entirely clear whether the operation was limited to securing the Canal itself, in order that it might continue to be operated by the Suez Canal Company on behalf of a Suez Canal Users’ Association, or designed to achieve a more ambitious purpose, to topple Nasser from power in the hope, presumably, of replacing him with someone more favorably inclined toward Western interests. The original plan had been to land at Alexandria and thrust an armored column up the desert road to Cairo, from which columns would make for the Canal at Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez. It was optimistically assumed that this could be completed in eight days. For a number of reasons, including the limitations imposed by the paucity of amphibious craft, the plan was changed to an assault on Port Said, part airborne, part amphibious, preceded by a night-time air attack on the bases of the Egyptian air force. The limited capacity of Franco-British transport aircraft restricted the airdrop to 668 British and 487 French parachutists.
正如前文所述，此次行动最终公开宣称的目标是切断埃及和以色列军队在运河沿线的联系，尽管是否有人相信这一说法令人怀疑。在11月5日黎明时分，英法伞兵在塞得港后方降落时，以色列军队已经占领了西奈半岛。24小时后，两个英国海军陆战营乘坐履带式两栖车登陆，随后一个营乘坐直升机，其余英国伞兵旅则乘坐登陆艇。塞得港的战斗零星分散，指挥官是英国将军H·C·斯托克韦尔，副指挥官是博弗尔将军。斯托克韦尔计划由雅克·马苏将军指挥的法国伞兵对运河以南50英里处的伊斯梅利亚发动空降和运河登陆联合攻击，届时英国伞兵旅将沿陆路抵达与他们会合。但由于国际压力，尤其是来自美国的压力，在行动全面展开之前就达成了停火协议。尽管为此次行动集结了更多兵力，但实际参战的只有三个旅：一个英国伞兵旅、一个法国伞兵旅和一个英国海军陆战队旅。这三个旅中，11名英国士兵和10名法国士兵阵亡，92名英国士兵和33名法国士兵受伤。这是一次考虑不周的行动，虽然在军事上取得了成功，但几乎没有可能达成令人满意且可持续的政治解决方案。对于参战的军人来说，这次行动令人极其沮丧。
The eventual declared aim of the operation, carried out in collusion with Israel's attack, as has been described, was to separate the Egyptian and Israeli forces on the line of the Canal, although it is doubtful if anybody believed this. Israeli troops had already occupied Sinai by the time that the British and French parachutists landed at dawn on November 5 behind Port Said. Twenty-four hours later two British marine battalions landed from tracked amphibians, followed by one in helicopters and the rest of the British parachute brigade in landing craft. Fighting in Port Said was sporadic, and the commander, the British general H. C. Stockwell, to whom General Beaufre was deputy commander, planned that the French parachutists under General Jacques Massu should launch a combined air- and canal-borne attack on Ismailia, fifty miles south on the Canal, where the British parachute brigade, traveling by road, would join him. But international pressure, principally from the United States, brought about a cease-fire before this could be fully executed. Although larger forces were assembled for the operation, only three brigades actually took part, one of British and one of French parachutists, and one of British marines, of whom eleven British and ten French were killed, and ninety-two British and thirty-three French were wounded. It was an ill-conceived operation that, although it would have been militarily successful, had little if any chance of achieving a satisfactory and maintainable political solution. It was intensely frustrating for the members of the armed forces who took part.
另一方面，英国在婆罗洲的对抗行动在各方面都取得了成功。其目的是阻止印尼颠覆文莱政府，并阻止印尼吞并文莱及其邻国沙巴和砂拉越。这些行动始于1962年12月，当时印尼支持文莱苏丹国（英国的保护国）爆发叛乱，但这场叛乱很快被从新加坡空运来的三个英国营镇压。1963年4月，印尼开始向砂拉越（后又进入沙巴）渗透武装人员，表面上是协助当地叛军的志愿者。这些“志愿者”几乎找不到当地叛军可以帮忙；文莱可能存在的叛军都被拘留了，而砂拉越唯一潜在的叛军是当地华人少数族裔中的共产党人，其中较为活跃的成员也被关押了。英国增援部队（其中许多是廓尔喀营）被调入，马来亚部队也随之加入，因为在 8 月份主权和总指挥权移交给了新的马来西亚联邦。
British confrontation in Borneo, on the other hand, was successful in all respects. Its aim was to prevent Indonesia from subverting the government of Brunei, and from absorbing Brunei and its neighbors Sabah and Sarawak. These efforts began in December 1962 with an Indonesia-backed rebellion in the Sultanate of Brunei, a British protectorate, which was rapidly and effectively suppressed by three British battalions flown in from Singapore. In April 1963 Indonesia began to infiltrate armed men, ostensibly volunteers to assist the local rebels, into Sarawak and later into Sabah. These “volunteers” found few local rebels to help; those that may have existed in Brunei had all been detained, and the only potential rebels in Sarawak were part of the communist element in the population's Chinese minority, the more active of whom were also locked up. British reinforcements, many of whom were Gurkha battalions, were brought in, as were Malayan units when sovereignty and overall command was transferred to the new Federation of Malaysia in August.
1964年1月，在联合国主持下，马来西亚和印度尼西亚之间的谈判陷入僵局，短暂的停火协议随后生效。印尼方面放弃了之前的伪装，承认其军队在加里曼丹岛北部边境活动。这条边境线绵延八百英里，沿着山顶延伸，穿过茂密的丛林。印尼军队以百人左右为一组，恐吓当地土著居民，试图建立印尼事实上的统治延伸。起初，指挥英军的沃尔特·沃克将军依靠当地土著居民，并在特种部队的支持下，提供有关小股部队沿河进入耕地的情报。但他不能允许印尼军队在马来西亚一侧的边境建立基地，必须保护当地居民免受其侵扰。因此，他在边境附近建立了自己的连级基地，并通过空运补给，从这些基地派出排级巡逻队进行巡逻。如果遭遇大批印尼军队，增援部队可以通过直升机空投，通常是通过砍伐树木在丛林中挖出的洞口降落。伏击是英军部队（包括澳大利亚人、新西兰人和廓尔喀人）最有效的战术，能够给训练不足、情报匮乏的印尼士兵造成重大伤亡。到1964年底，沃克麾下拥有约14000名士兵，配备60架海军和空军运兵直升机以及40架陆军小型直升机，编成三个旅，1965年扩编至四个旅。同年，他获准秘密越境进入加里曼丹岛作战，并广泛利用截获的印尼无线电通讯信息来寻找伏击目标。这些策略取得了成功，1965 年 10 月针对苏加诺的政变引发了印尼亲共派和反共派之间长达数月的战斗，这场“对抗”实际上结束了，尽管直到 1966 年 8 月才最终结束，此时距离苏哈托将军取代苏加诺成为实际统治者已经过去了五个月。
A short cease-fire in January 1964, in which talks between Malaysia and Indonesia under UN chairmanship ended in deadlock, was followed by Indonesia's abandoning pretense and acknowledging that its troops were operating north of Kalimantan's frontier, which ran for eight hundred miles along mountain tops in thick jungle. They moved in companies of about one hundred men, intimidating the local natives and trying to establish a de facto extension of Indonesian authority. At first General Walter Walker, in command of the British forces, relied on the natives, supported by special forces, to provide information about the movement of the small groups that had made their way down rivers into the cultivated areas. But he could not let the Indonesians establish bases on the Malaysian side of the frontier and had to protect the natives from their incursions. He therefore set up company bases of his own near the frontier, supplied by air, from which patrols of platoon strength operated. If large bodies of Indonesian troops were encountered, reinforcements could be flown in by helicopter, often lowered through holes created in the jungle by felling trees. The ambush was the most effective tactic by which the British units, who included Australians and New Zealanders as well as Gurkhas, inflicted heavy casualties on the less-skilled and less well informed Indonesian soldiers. By the end of 1964 Walker had some fourteen thousand in his force, supported by sixty naval and air force troop-carrying helicopters and forty small army ones, organized in three brigades, increased in 1965 to four. In that year he obtained permission to operate secretly over the border into Kalimantan, making extensive use of intercepted Indonesian radio communications to provide targets for ambushes. These tactics paid off and, after a coup against Sukarno in October 1965 set off months of fighting between pro- and anticommunist factions in Indonesia, the “confrontation” virtually came to an end, although it was not finally concluded until August 1966, five months after General Suharto replaced Sukarno as the de facto ruler.
这场战争规模有限，对英国和马来西亚而言成本低廉，却取得了显著成果。战争高峰时期，曾有17000名英联邦军人部署在婆罗洲，另有10000名军人部署在马来亚和新加坡。伤亡方面，共有114人阵亡，181人受伤，其中廓尔喀士兵占很大比例。此外，还有36名平民丧生，53人受伤，4人被俘，几乎全部是当地居民。据估计，印尼方面有590人阵亡，222人受伤，771人被俘。这场战争持续了近四年，并明确而彻底地实现了其目标：阻止印尼或其他任何外部势力扼杀马来西亚的萌芽。尽管印尼在1964年8月曾对马来亚大陆发动了一次由100人组成的登陆作战和一次由200人组成的空降作战，但这两次行动均以失败告终，因此双方都无意将战火蔓延到婆罗洲以外。如果对军事基地或其他目标，或海上的海军舰艇或其他船只发动空袭，其弊端将远远大于可能产生的微弱军事效果。双方明智地将这场冲突称为“对抗”，并将其限制在严格的范围内，这些限制虽然从未正式达成一致，但双方都心照不宣地遵守着。英国人有时也曾试图试探局势，派遣军舰驶过分隔印尼主要岛屿的海峡，但最终还是谨慎地放弃了这一想法。
It had been a strictly limited war, and a cheap one for Britain and Malaysia, for which it achieved much. At its peak seventeen thousand servicemen of the British Commonwealth were deployed at one time in Borneo, with ten thousand more available in Malaya and Singapore. Casualties were 114 killed and 181 wounded, a high proportion Gurkha. There were also 36 civilians killed, 53 wounded, and 4 captured, almost all local inhabitants. It was estimated that 590 Indonesians were killed, 222 wounded, and 771 captured. The fighting lasted for nearly four years and clearly and decisively achieved its aim of preventing Indonesia, or any other outside influence from strangling Malaysia at birth. It had not been in the interests of either side to extend hostilities outside Borneo, although in August 1964 Indonesia had launched an amphibious raid of one hundred men and an airborne one of two hundred against the mainland of Malaya, both of which proved totally abortive. To have indulged in air attacks on military bases or other targets, or on naval or other ships at sea, would have incurred disadvantages greatly outweighing the marginal military effect that they might have produced. Both sides were wise to label the conflict a “confrontation” and to keep it within strict limits, which were never formally agreed to but were tacitly observed. At times the British were tempted to test the waters by sailing their warships through one of the straits separating the main Indonesian islands, but prudently refrained from doing so.
1982年的福克兰群岛行动则更为短暂而激烈。多年来，英国一直试图找到一个政治方案，以解决其对这些位于南美洲南端、人口稀少且大多荒凉的岛屿的主权问题。英国还管辖着完全由企鹅居住的南乔治亚岛。世界羊毛价格的实际下跌威胁到了当地经济，而福克兰群岛的经济实际上由福克兰群岛公司垄断，该公司对岛屿的投资却很少。人口也在不断减少，已降至约1800人，其中95%是英国后裔。为了改善社会和经济状况，并就阿根廷的主权声索达成妥协，历届英国政府都曾讨论过这些岛屿的未来地位，并最终说服阿根廷修建机场，开通飞往大陆的定期航班，以便岛民可以前往大陆接受教育、医疗服务以及进行其他活动，包括前往其他国家。然而，试图说服岛民接受与阿根廷建立某种形式的联盟的努力遭到了强烈抵制，这种抵制得到了东印度公司和英国两大主要政党的大多数成员的支持。因此，英国谈判代表无法向阿根廷人提供任何条件，阿根廷人对未能满足其诉求感到日益沮丧。
The Falkland Islands operation in 1982 was an altogether shorter and sharper affair. For many years Britain had been trying to find a political solution to the problem posed by its sovereignty over these sparsely inhabited and largely desolate islands off the tip of South America, from which the dependency of South Georgia, populated entirely by penguins, was administered. The fall in the world price of wool in real terms had threatened the economy, virtually a monopoly of the Falkland Islands Company, which invested little in the islands, and the population was dwindling, having fallen to about eighteen hundred, 95 percent of British origin. In an attempt both to improve social and economic conditions and to find a compromise over Argentina's claim to sovereignty, successive British governments had discussed the future status of the islands and persuaded Argentina to build an airfield and operate a scheduled air service to the mainland, to which the islanders could travel for education, medical treatment, and other purposes, including travel to other countries. Attempts to persuade the islanders to accept some form of association with Argentina, however, met with strong resistance, supported by the Company and the majority of both the main British political parties. Britain's negotiators had therefore nothing to offer the Argentines, who became increasingly frustrated at the lack of progress to meet their claim.
阿根廷入侵发生在1982年4月2日。自年初以来，一名阿根廷废品商一直在南乔治亚岛上拆除一座废弃的捕鲸站，这导致探险队未能遵守英国代表制定的程序，双方因此发生冲突，紧张局势在3月份不断升级。英国海军向福克兰群岛的调动也可能被阿根廷用作发动袭击的借口。由于正在进行换防，岛上的守军——68名海军陆战队员——兵力是平时的两倍，他们对在斯坦利港登陆的阿根廷海军陆战营进行了英勇但最终无力回天的抵抗。英国的反应迅速。4月5日，一支海军特遣舰队从英国启航，一些此前在直布罗陀附近海域进行演习的舰艇也加入了他们的行列。最终，这支特遣部队将包括44艘军舰、22艘海军后勤舰和45艘商船，共搭载28000名官兵。其中包括4个海军直升机中队、1个空军直升机中队、1个海军陆战队旅、2个伞兵营和3个步兵营及其支援部队。位于南大西洋英国属地阿森松岛的美国空军基地作为空中中转站发挥了至关重要的作用。为了利用该基地，许多老旧的英国V型轰炸机被迅速改装成加油机，其中一些飞机早在多年前就已经被改装过。
The Argentine invasion took place on April 2, 1982. Since the beginning of the year an Argentine scrap merchant had been dismantling an abandoned whaling station on South Georgia, which led to incidents over the expedition's failure to observe the procedures laid down by the British representative, and tension over this matter mounted in March. The movement of British naval forces toward the Falklands could also have been used by Argentina as a pretext for action by them. The garrison of the islands—sixty-eight marines—was double its normal strength because a relief was in progress, and it put up a gallant, if hopeless resistance to the Argentine marine battalion that landed at Port Stanley. Britain's reaction was swift. On April 5 a naval task force sailed from Britain, joined by some ships that had been exercising off Gibraltar. The task force was eventually to include forty-four warships, twenty-two naval logistic ships, and forty-five merchant ships, carrying a total of 28,000 men. They included four naval and one air force squadron of helicopters, one brigade of marines, and two parachute and three infantry battalions with their supporting arms. The U.S. Air Force base on the British-owned Ascension Island in the South Atlantic played an essential part as an air staging post. To make use of it, many of the aged British V-bombers were rapidly transformed into tanker aircraft, as some had been many years before.
在舰队启程进行八千英里航程之际，美国率先尝试建立谈判解决的基础。与此同时，英国向阿根廷发出警告，表明其决心。4月12日，英国宣布在岛屿海岸线外两百英里处设立海上禁区，后改为全面禁区，并表示任何阿根廷军舰或军用飞机接近特遣舰队的行为“都将受到相应处理”。据推测，正是基于此，一艘核动力潜艇于5月2日在禁区外击沉了阿根廷巡洋舰“贝尔格拉诺将军”号，彻底断绝了谈判解决的可能。此前，4月25日，特遣舰队的一个分遣队夺回了南乔治亚岛；5月1日，英国对阿根廷机场发动了首次空袭，特别是斯坦利港机场，该机场曾用于运送阿根廷军队及其补给。为报复贝尔格拉诺号沉没，阿根廷空军的两架法国超级军旗战斗机于 5 月 4 日用飞鱼导弹击中了英国驱逐舰谢菲尔德号，迫使其弃舰并最终沉没。
As the fleet set off on its eight-thousand-mile voyage, the United States led in trying to establish the basis of a negotiated settlement. This was accompanied by warnings to Argentina that Britain meant business. On April 12 it had declared a maritime exclusion zone two hundred miles from the coast of the islands, later to be enforced as a total exclusion zone, and had said that any approach by Argentine warships or military aircraft that amounted to a threat to the task force, “would be dealt with appropriately.” It was presumably on this basis that a nuclear-powered submarine sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano outside the exclusion zone on May 2, eliminating any chance of a negotiated settlement. Before that, on April 25, a detachment from the task force had recaptured South Georgia, and on May 1 the first air attacks had been made on airfields, notably that of Port Stanley, which had been used to fly in Argentine troops and their supplies. In response to the sinking of the Belgrano, two French Super-Etendards of the Argentine air force on May 4 hit the British destroyer Sheffield with an Exocet missile, forcing it to be abandoned and subsequently sunk.
特遣部队指挥官伍德沃德海军上将必须解决诸多相互矛盾的因素。时间紧迫：天气日益恶化；他不能让士兵和海军陆战队员在恶劣天气下长时间滞留在海上；而首相玛格丽特·撒切尔急于尽快取得战果。他不能在距离主要目标斯坦利港太远的地方建立基地，因为陆上人员和装备的运输受到道路缺失以及直升机和其他可降落车辆运载能力的限制。主要威胁来自阿根廷的陆基飞机，但这些飞机的作战半径已接近极限。伍德沃德可以让他的主力舰艇保持在阿根廷陆基飞机的作战半径之外，除非是在实际登陆或炮击期间。登陆之后，他数量有限的“鹞”式垂直/短距起降战斗机必须负责舰队、登陆区域以及推进部队的防空任务。它们还必须为数量少于敌军的部队提供直接打击支援。驻扎在岛上的阿根廷军队指挥官马里奥·B·梅嫩德斯将军并不知道英军会在哪里登陆，而且也面临着与英军类似的陆路运输难题。因此，他不得不将重心放在斯坦利港的防御上。五月初，随着英国舰队逼近，来自阿根廷大陆的增援和补给航班只能在夜间进行。
Admiral Woodward, the task force commander, had to resolve a number of conflicting factors. Time was not on his side: the weather was deteriorating; he could not keep his soldiers and marines at sea in foul weather for too long; and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was anxious for quick results. He could not afford to establish a base too far from his principal objective, Port Stanley, because the means of transport for men and equipment on land were limited by the absence of roads and by the restricted capacity of the helicopters and other vehicles that could be landed. The main threat came from Argentine land-based aircraft, which were operating, however, at the limit of their range. Woodward could keep his principal ships outside this, except when the actual landings or bombardments were taking place. After the landings, his limited number of Harrier VSTOL aircraft would have to cope with the air defense of the fleet, the landing area, and the troops as they moved forward. They also would have to provide direct strike support to the troops, who would be inferior in numbers to their opponents. General Mario B. Menendez, the commander of the Argentine forces on the islands, did not know where the British would land and faced problems of land transport similar to theirs. Inevitably he concentrated on the defense of Port Stanley. As the British fleet approached at the beginning of May, reinforcement and supply flights from the mainland were limited to the hours of darkness.
5月21日，英国海军陆战队旅在东福克兰群岛西海岸的圣卡洛斯湾顺利登陆，距离斯坦利港60英里。接下来的几天里，随着基地及其防空设施在岸上建立起来，阿根廷空军对舰船和登陆区发动了多次英勇的攻击。在此过程中，阿根廷空军损失了49架飞机，击沉了一艘驱逐舰和一艘护卫舰，重创了另一艘护卫舰，并击沉了一艘载有英国空军重型运输直升机中队的大型集装箱船。5月28日，随着伦敦方面要求陆上部队继续向斯坦利港推进的压力越来越大，一个伞兵营在圣卡洛斯以南20英里的鹅绿机场经过一场激烈的战斗后将其攻占。在战斗中，他们几乎没有得到来自炮兵、海军舰艇或飞机的火力支援。他们损失了17名阵亡者（包括他们的指挥官）和36名受伤者，击毙了250名敌军，俘虏了1400名敌军，并缴获了大量武器。
On May 21 the British marine brigade landed unopposed in San Carlos Bay on the west coast of East Falkland, sixty miles from Port Stanley. Over the next few days, as the base and its antiaircraft defense were established ashore, the Argentine air force carried out repeated and gallant attacks on the ships and the disembarkation area. In doing so, they lost forty-nine aircraft and sank one destroyer and one frigate, crippling another, and a large container ship that carried the British air force's heavy-lift helicopter squadron. On May 28, as pressure from London grew for the forces on land to press on toward Port Stanley, one of the parachute battalions captured the airfield at Goose Green, twenty miles south of San Carlos, after a fierce battle, in which they had little fire support either from artillery or from the navy's ships or aircraft. For the loss of 17 killed, including their commanding officer, and 36 wounded, they killed 250 of their opponents and took 1,400 prisoners with a large quantity of weapons.
重型运输直升机的损失如今已是切肤之痛。陆军司令杰里米·摩尔将军于6月1日得到一个步兵旅及其三个营的增援，使其登陆部队总兵力达到八人，总兵力达一万人；然而，在崎岖不平的丘陵地带向斯坦利港推进的交通工具几乎不存在。大部分士兵只能在寒冷、潮湿、大风的天气中徒步行军，直升机优先运送炮兵和弹药，以便在抵达后支援他们。出于军事和政治上的紧迫性，决定派遣步兵旅的三个营绕到东福克兰岛南侧，在斯坦利港西南16英里的菲茨罗伊定居点和布拉夫湾登陆。由于一系列误会，6月8日，两艘登陆舰在光天化日之下于阿根廷哨所的眼皮底下停留了数小时。它们遭到阿根廷飞机的攻击并被纵火焚毁。五十人阵亡，八十五人受伤，其中大部分来自同一个营。尽管遭遇了这一挫折，但对斯坦利附近山丘上阿根廷阵地的进攻于6月11日打响，除一个留守圣卡洛斯基地的营外，所有营都参与了战斗。
The loss of the heavy-lift helicopters was now keenly felt. General Jeremy Moore, the land-force commander, had been reinforced on June 1 by an infantry brigade with three more battalions, giving him eight in his total force of ten thousand men ashore; but the means of moving forward over the trackless hilly country toward Port Stanley were almost nonexistent. Most of the men marched the whole way in cold, wet, windy weather, priority for helicopter lift being given to artillery and ammunition to support them on arrival. The military and political need to hurry led to the decision to send the three battalions of the infantry brigade around the southern side of East Falkland to land at Fitzroy settlement and Bluff Cove, sixteen miles southwest of Port Stanley. As a result of a number of misunderstandings, two of the landing ships were off shore for several hours in daylight in full view of an Argentine post on June 8. They were attacked by Argentine aircraft and set on fire. Fifty men were killed and eighty-five wounded, most of them from one battalion. In spite of this setback, the attack on the Argentine positions in the hills around Stanley started on June 11, with all the battalions, except one that had been left behind to guard the San Carlos base, taking part.
6月14日，梅嫩德斯将军率领9000名士兵投降，至此，包括鹅绿地和西福克兰岛在内，阿根廷被俘总人数达到11400人。阿根廷方面公布的伤亡人数为672人，其中368人来自“贝尔格拉诺”号战列舰。英军方面，阵亡255人，受伤777人。英军损失6艘舰艇，10艘严重受损。英军5架“鹞”式战斗机被地面火力击落，4架因事故损失。英军声称击落阿根廷109架飞机，其中30架在地面被击落，31架被“鹞”式战斗机击落，19架被舰载导弹击落，9架被陆基导弹击落。
On June 14 General Menendez surrendered with 9,000 men, bringing the total captured, including those at Goose Green and in West Falkland, to 11,400. Argentina gave its losses of men killed and missing as 672, 368 from the Belgrano. British losses were 255 dead and 777 wounded. The British had lost 6 ships sunk and 10 seriously damaged. Five of their Harrier aircraft were shot down by ground fire and 4 lost in accidents. They claimed to have destroyed 109 Argentine aircraft, 30 on the ground, 31 by Harriers, 19 by ships’ missiles, and 9 by land-based missiles.
毫无疑问，英国人运气不错。几艘舰船被炸弹击中，但并未爆炸。梅嫩德斯投降时，时间已经所剩无几。英国炮兵的弹药供应日益减少，海军飞机的出动频率也因机械故障而不得不大幅降低，而且天气状况日益恶化。如果斯坦利的阿根廷守军能够进行更顽强的抵抗，结果或许会截然不同。英国在夜间作战方面的优势，加上现代视觉设备的辅助，是他们取得胜利的因素之一，但更重要的是他们重新掌握了主动权，以及他们远胜于阿根廷的训练水平和士气。在阿根廷方面，只有他们的空军飞行员在这场战役中获得了赞誉。
There is little doubt that the British had good luck. Several ships were hit by bombs that did not explode. Time was running out when Menendez surrendered. The British artillery ammunition supply was dwindling, the sortie rate of the navy's aircraft would have had to have been significantly reduced for mechanical reasons, and the weather was deteriorating. If the Argentine defenders of Stanley had put up a stouter resistance, the result might have been different. The British superiority in fighting at night, assisted by modern vision devices, was a factor in their success, but more significant was their recapture of the initiative and their greatly superior state of training and morale. On the Argentine side, only their air force pilots came out of the campaign with credit.
从总体战略角度来看，英国已经表明，部署和使用武力来保护其海外利益并非历史遗迹。此次行动的范围有限，除了袭击贝尔格拉诺号之外，英国并未对阿根廷领土或其在禁区外的船只和飞机采取任何敌对行动；阿根廷也未在禁区外攻击英国的船只或飞机，尽管它一直在监视。但英国似乎不遗余力地投入资源，只为解放这些偏远岛屿上寥寥无几的居民，而这些岛屿在经济和军事上几乎毫无价值。这关乎原则，也关乎荣誉和政治声誉。爱国主义在其中发挥了重要作用。
In general strategic terms, Britain had shown that the deployment and use of armed force to protect its interests overseas was not a thing of the past. The operation had been limited to the extent that no hostile action was taken against the territory of Argentina, or its shipping and aircraft outside the exclusion zone, apart from the attack on the Belgrano; nor did Argentina attack British ships or aircraft outside that zone, although it observed them. But there seemed no limits to the resources which Britain was prepared to devote to the liberation of the tiny population of these remote and, in economic and military terms, almost valueless islands. A principle was at stake, as well as honor and political reputations. Patriotism played a significant role.
如果没有阿森松岛，这次行动是否能够成功令人怀疑。如果英国在十多年前从苏伊士运河以东撤军时，没有保留其海军陆战队旅、两艘突击登陆舰和六艘后勤登陆舰所代表的两栖作战能力；没有保留一艘改装成突击舰的旧式航空母舰；没有建造一艘主要用于反潜直升机作战的新型航母；以及没有研发可从这两种舰艇上起降的“海鹞”战斗机，那么这次行动肯定无法成功。具有讽刺意味的是，撒切尔夫人领导的保守党政府曾决定逐步淘汰其中大部分力量，理由是它们在支持北约方面的作用微乎其微。一些分析人士将福克兰群岛行动解读为诉诸军事行动以维护自身利益和推进全球政策的趋势正在复苏；但也有人认为这只是一次特例，很难想象英国还会考虑在其他地方实施类似的行动。
It is doubtful whether the operation could have been mounted without Ascension Island. It certainly could not have been if, on withdrawal from east of Suez over a decade before, Britain had not retained the amphibious capability represented by its Marine Brigade and two assault and six logistic landing ships; had not retained an old aircraft carrier, converted into a commando ship; built a new type, intended primarily as an antisubmarine helicopter carrier; and developed the Sea Harrier that could operate from both. Ironically, Mrs. Thatcher's Conservative administration had decided to phase out most of these on the logical grounds that their role in support of NATO had little validity. Some analysts interpret the Falklands operation as a sign that resort to military action to protect one's interests and further one's policies worldwide is coming back into fashion; but there are also those who regard it as an anomalous occurrence, and find it difficult to imagine where else Britain might contemplate executing a similar operation.
伊朗和伊拉克。另一场自1980年以来持续不断的常规战争是伊朗和伊拉克之间的战争。这场战争更像第一次世界大战而非第二次世界大战，尽管战争初期双方都投入了大量坦克，这与第二次世界大战颇为相似。双方空军的行动都不算重要，海军也几乎没有参与。发动战争的伊拉克认为，伊朗在1979年成功推翻沙阿政权后陷入的混乱局面，为其提供了机会，使其能够宣称对阿拉伯河两岸的主权，而阿拉伯河是伊朗通往公海的唯一通道；起初，伊拉克的判断似乎是正确的。但尽管伊朗军队的大部分高级军官被撤职，伊朗仍然能够利用沙阿政权所获得的大量现代化军事装备。伊拉克军队节节败退，最终形成了与1914年后的法国极为相似的局面。在此过程中，阿巴丹重要的炼油厂和石油出口码头被夷为平地。据目前所知，双方伤亡惨重，伊朗被迫启用包括十几岁少年在内的“革命卫队”作为步兵，对伊拉克的防御阵地发起自杀式攻击。战争造成的损耗以及双方无力维护和修理原有的重型装备，使得这场战争演变为步兵、炮兵和工兵的混战。双方都没有足够的优势来迫使对方做出最终决定。如同第一次世界大战中的法国一样，双方都对部分战线发动攻势，以缓解其他战线的压力，而这些战线在取得初步胜利后便陷入停滞。截至本文撰写之时，外部各方为促成停战谈判所做的努力均告失败。尽管这对参战双方而言只是聊胜于无的安慰，但令世界各国感到欣慰的是，敌对的大国谨慎地避免支持任何一方。因此，虽然对伊拉克和伊朗而言，这并非一场有限战争，但从世界其他国家的角度来看，这却是一场有限战争。
Iran and Iraq. The other conventional war, in progress since 1980, has been that between Iran and Iraq. It has resembled the First World War more than the Second although the initial stage, when both sides maneuvered significant numbers of tanks, was reminiscent of the latter. On neither side has the operation of air forces been significant, and navies have hardly been involved. The initiator, Iraq, assumed that the disarray into which Iran had fallen after the successful coup against the Shah in 1979 provided an opportunity to assert its claim to both shores of the Shatt el Arab, its only channel to the open sea; and at first it looked as if that judgment was correct. But in spite of the removal of most of the senior officers of its armed forces, Iran was able to make use of the large arsenal of modern military equipment that the Shah had acquired. Iraqi forces were driven back, until a situation closely resembling that in France after 1914 was established. In the process the important refinery and oil-exporting terminal of Abadan was reduced to ruins. Casualties on both sides as far as can be ascertained have been heavy, Iran having been forced to employ “revolutionary guards,” including boys in their early teens, as infantry, thrown into suicidal assaults against Iraqi entrenched positions. Battle wastage and inability to maintain and repair the original stock of heavy equipment on both sides has converted the war into one of infantry, artillery, and engineers. Neither side has the margin of superiority to force a decision. As in France in the First World War, both sides have launched offensives on sectors of the front in order to relieve pressure on other sectors, which have stalled after an initial success. Outside attempts to find the basis of a negotiated armistice have, up to the time of writing, failed. Although it is cold comfort to the participants, the world at large has been relieved that the rival great powers have carefully refrained from supporting either side; thus, although it has not been a limited war for Iraq and Iran, it has been limited from the point of view of the rest of the world.
三
III
苏联和北约在核时代对常规战争的看法之间的本质区别在于，俄罗斯始终坚信进攻是最好的防御。为了尽可能先发制人，采取进攻行动的能力和意愿，一直是其军事思想、训练和组织的核心，这一理念同样适用于核战争和常规战争，并且在大部分时间里，他们拒绝将两者视为独立的战争形式。他们认为，在所有军事能力方面取得全面优势是这一战略的必要条件，也是获得行动自由的最佳途径——他们也认同博弗雷的观点，即行动自由是战略的根本目标。
The essential difference between the Soviet and the NATO view of conventional warfare in the nuclear age has been the Russian belief throughout that offense is the best form of defense. The ability and willingness to take the offensive, in order to preempt the enemy's offensive if possible, has been a consistent theme of their military thinking, training, and organization, applied equally to nuclear and conventional warfare, which, for most of the period, they have refused to regard as separate. They have seen overall superiority in all forms of military capability as essential to this strategy and as the best way of conferring freedom of action, which they would agree with Beaufre is the fundamental aim of strategy.
只要斯大林在世，伟大卫国战争的方法就不容挑战，核武器也像许多西方人一样，被认为无需进行根本性的变革。但1953年，也就是他去世的那一年，苏联研制出了聚变武器，并决定选择弹道导弹作为运载工具。次年，苏联总参谋部科学院启动了一项关于核武器对战争影响的重大研究。该研究报告于1957年提交给总参谋长瓦西里·索科洛夫斯基元帅，之后又花了两年时间讨论报告内容并修订军事理论。分析最终得出明确的结论：所有军事行动都必须建立在运用核武器的基础上，并假定核武器会被用来攻击己方。
As long as Stalin was alive, the methods of the Great Patriotic War could not be challenged, and the nuclear weapon was seen, as it was by many in the West, as calling for no fundamental change. But 1953, the year of his death, also saw the development of the fusion weapon and the decision by the Soviet Union to select the ballistic missile as the method of delivery. In the following year the Soviet General Staff Academy initiated a major study of the effect that nuclear weapons could have on war. Its report was submitted in 1957 to their chief, Marshal Vasili Sokolovskiy, and two more years were spent in discussing it and revising military doctrine. The analysis came to the firm conclusion that all operations must be based on exploitation of the use of nuclear weapons and on the assumption that they would be used against their forces.
核武器并非仅仅用作步兵和坦克的火力支援。所有其他兵种的行动都旨在配合核打击，而对特定目标使用核打击将是作战计划的核心。该计划将以纵深核打击为基础，同时打击敌方核武器运载工具的所有组成部分以及主要指挥部。空降部队、坦克和装甲运兵车上的步兵将在宽阔的战线上跟进这些打击，尽可能深入敌方防线，其主要目标是瓦解并扰乱敌方的整个军事结构。后者还将通过对敌方通信、预警和目标获取系统进行物理和电子攻击来实现。大量车辆和人员的集中部署使其极易受到敌方核打击。因此，集中兵力必须依靠核武器来实现。近年来，为推进此类行动，苏联组建了被称为“作战机动群”的特种部队，以机动部队在广阔战线上进行纵深渗透。这种渗透方式的目的和方法与卫国战争时期的钳形攻势截然不同。这与富勒和利德尔·哈特在20世纪二三十年代提出的构想非常相似，只是以核打击取代了空袭，并可能使用化学武器。这与当时美国陆军提出的、利德尔·哈特所推崇的构想也并无太大差异。在渗透过程中，苏军与敌军的混合作战能够为苏军提供一定程度的保护，使其免受那些幸免于难的敌方核打击系统的攻击。
Nuclear weapons were not to be used merely as fire support to infantry and tanks. The action of all other arms was to be designed to exploit nuclear strikes, the use of which against selected targets would be the main feature of the operational plan. That would be based on nuclear attack in depth, accompanied by strikes against all elements of the enemy's nuclear delivery means as well as major headquarters. Airborne forces, tanks, and infantry in armored personnel carriers would follow up these strikes on a wide front, penetrating as deeply as possible, with the principal aim of disorganizing and throwing into confusion the enemy's whole military structure. The latter would also be achieved by both physical and electronic attack on the enemy's communication, warning, and target acquisition systems. Concentration of large bodies of vehicles and men offered too vulnerable a target to enemy nuclear strikes. Concentration of effort was therefore to be achieved by the use of nuclear weapons. The deep penetration by mobile troops on a wide front, to head which special formations known as Operational Maneuver Groups have been organized in recent years, differed in purpose and method from the pincer-like envelopments of the Great Patriotic War. This was very similar to the concept proposed by Fuller and Liddell Hart in the 1920s and 1930s, but with nuclear strikes taking the place of air attacks, including the use of chemical weapons. It was also not very different from concepts developed by the U.S. Army and favored by Liddell Hart at that time. The intermingling of the Soviet forces with those of the enemy in the course of such penetrations would provide the former with a degree of protection against nuclear attack by those enemy delivery systems that had escaped destruction.
这种战争理念没有任何限制。由于这是两个对立政治制度之间的冲突，因此人们假定，如果战争爆发，它将不受任何约束。理想的策略是在意识到敌对行动计划后，先发制人地阻止敌方行动。一旦战争开始，摧毁敌军，特别是其核力量，将成为首要任务。除了作为准备进攻期间的临时措施外，防御策略被摒弃。苏联最具影响力的军事作家之一萨夫金曾说过：“只防守的一方注定失败。”为了实现这一理念，“兵力对比”必须恰当。换句话说，苏军必须在各个领域都拥有足够的优势，才能以最快的速度发起进攻。这就带来了一个不可避免的两难困境：既要做好充分的准备，又要追求出其不意，而苏联人也高度重视这一点。
There was nothing limited in this concept of war. Because it would be a conflict between two opposing political systems, it was assumed that, if it took place at all, it would be unrestrained. The ideal was to preempt the enemy's action, when it was realized that hostilities were planned. Once started, the destruction of the enemy's forces, particularly his nuclear forces, would take priority. Remaining on the defensive was dismissed, except as a temporary measure while preparing for an attack. One of the Soviet Union's most influential military writers, Savkin, said: “A side that only defends is inevitably doomed to defeat.” To make this concept possible, the “correlation of forces” had to be appropriate. In other words, the Soviet forces had to be assured of sufficient superiority in every field to be able to launch their offensive with the least possible delay. This posed an inevitable dilemma between adequate preparation and the need to achieve surprise, to which the Soviets also attached great importance.
尽管苏联战略拒绝任何形式的有限战争概念，但总参谋部已注意到北约的灵活反应概念，该概念假定战争初期阶段为非核战争。一些苏联军事著作承认这种情况可能发生，并在军事演习中有所体现；但相关讨论的重点在于苏联武装部队何时开始使用核武器至关重要。他们认为，可以利用这一非核阶段完成准备工作。然而，他们也承认“局部”战争可能发生——他们在阿富汗的军事行动就是一个例证——并且必须确保这些战争不会升级为核战争；但他们并不认为此类战争会在欧洲爆发。苏联大量的军事文献中贯穿着一个共同的主题——在“力量对比”中占据优势的重要性。优势不仅对于确保“社会主义阵营”和苏联免受“资本主义和帝国主义侵略”的威胁至关重要，这种侵略正不断试图削弱它们，而且优势也赋予苏联在必要时成功开展“低级别军事行动”的行动自由。苏联发展武装力量的目标，是使其在数量和质量上都优于“资本主义帝国主义侵略集团”可能部署的所有敌军，这与苏联总参谋部在其军事院校源源不断出版的文献中所阐述的军事理论和战略完全一致。那些寄希望于说服苏联接受无法维护其优势的军控措施的人，无论他们倾向于“实力谈判”还是单方面裁军，都注定要失败。
Although Soviet strategy rejects the concept of limited war in any form, the general staff has taken note of NATO's concept of flexible response, which assumes an initial phase of non-nuclear warfare. Some Soviet military writings accept that this may occur, and it has been reflected in military exercises; but discussion of it centers on the importance of choosing the correct moment for the Soviet armed forces to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. They see that such a non-nuclear phase could be exploited to complete their preparations. They do, however, accept that “local” wars can occur—their operations in Afghanistan are an example—and that it is important to ensure that they do not escalate into a nuclear exchange; but not that such wars could occur in Europe. One consistent theme permeates the great volume of Soviet military literature—the importance of superiority in the “correlation of forces.” Not only is superiority essential to ensure that “the Socialist Camp” and the Soviet Union are preserved against the threat of “capitalist and imperialist aggression” that is constantly trying to undermine them, but it gives the Soviet Union the freedom of action to engage successfully in “military actions at lower levels” if necessary. The Soviet Union's development of armed forces designed to be superior in quantity and quality to all those that “the aggressive circles of capitalist imperialism” could deploy against them is entirely consistent with the military doctrine and strategy that the Soviet general staff has outlined in all the literature that pours out in a constant stream from its military academies. It bodes ill for those who place their hopes on persuading them to accept measures of arms control that do not preserve their superiority, whether the approach preferred is that of “negotiation from strength” or unilateral disarmament.
第四
IV
幸运的是，自核时代到来以来，世界范围内的战争大多仍是常规战争，且规模有限。至今为止，还没有哪个国家面临过在核武器随时可能被使用的威胁下进行常规战争的严峻局面，也没有哪个拥有核武器的国家与另一个同样拥有核武器的国家交战。在核阴影下，像第一次和第二次世界大战那样，主要工业化国家集团之间为争夺资源而相互厮杀直至一方精疲力竭的战争，似乎难以想象。对于这些国家而言，发动战争绝非以其他方式延续理性政策的必然结果。
Fortunately for the world, so far wars since the coming of the nuclear age have remained conventional and limited. Nobody has yet faced the daunting prospect of fighting a conventional war under the threat that nuclear weapons might be used at any time, and no nation possessing nuclear weapons has fought another that also possessed them. Under the nuclear shadow, wars like the First and Second World Wars, in which groups of the major industrial nations struggled against each other until one side was exhausted, seem inconceivable. For such nations to embark upon war against each other could not possibly be regarded as continuing a rational policy by other means.
除了核武器的存在之外，还有其他原因使得这种全面战争似乎难以想象。其中之一是现代武器及其平台的成本和研发周期。这些武器相互消耗的速度很可能远远超过其补充速度，1973年的阿以战争就是最明显的例证。此类大国之间的常规战争必须在时间上受到严格限制，而且可能在空间上也受到限制，因此其目标也必须受到限制。其他国家和国际社会将施加巨大压力，以阻止战争的发生。像博弗雷提出的那些理论，将常规作战与“有限”使用或威胁使用核武器结合起来，似乎不如利德尔·哈特、亨利·基辛格（在他改变主意之后）、麦克斯韦·泰勒和罗伯特·奥斯古德的观点那样站得住脚。他们都认识到，任何类型的核武器的首次使用都是一个分水岭，它将战争变成了克劳塞维茨所描述的“毫无意义和毫无道理的事情”。
There are reasons, other than the existence of nuclear weapons, why such total wars seem inconceivable. One is the cost and the gestation time of modern weapons and their platforms. The rate of attrition of such weapons, when used against each other, is likely to be significantly more rapid than the rate at which they could be replaced, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War being the clearest indication of this. Conventional war between such powers would have to be severely limited in time and probably also in space, and therefore in aim. Considerable pressure from other powers and from the international community would be exerted to bring it to an end. Theories, like those propounded by Beaufre, which combine conventional operations with a “sublimited” use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons seem less soundly based than the views of Liddell Hart, of Henry Kissinger after his change of mind, and of Maxwell Taylor and Robert Osgood, all of whom recognized that the first use of any type of nuclear weapon was a watershed that converted war into what Clausewitz described as “something pointless and devoid of sense.”
因此，战争若要成为国家政策延续的合理“其他手段”，就必须是常规的、有限的。正如克劳塞维茨所认识到的，若要限制其影响，其目标也必须有所限制。无论多么强大的国家，都必须接受限制，并像孙子兵法所言，认识到战争结束后，双方仍需继续与对手比邻而居。正如苏联军事理论所强调的，正是“力量对比”上的优势赋予一个国家行动的自由——这是战略的本质——从而决定行动的界限。处于守势的弱势一方，或不愿与对手走得更远的一方，别无选择。
War therefore, if it is to be a rational “other means” of the continuation of state policy, will have to be conventional and limited. If it is to be limited in its effects, it must, as Clausewitz recognized, be limited in its aim. Nations, however powerful, will have to accept limits and recognize, as Sun Tzu did, that after the fighting is over, one has to continue to live next door to one's opponent. As the Soviet Union's military doctrine emphasizes, it is superiority in the “correlation of forces” that gives a nation the freedom of action—that essential of strategy—to determine the limits. The weaker party, on the defensive, or the one who is not prepared to go as far as his opponent, has no choice.
正是在这种氛围下，两个超级大国彼此对峙。它们不能指望彼此之间的战争会遵守界限。苏联当然也不指望战争会遵守界限。因此，我们衷心希望理性能够战胜铁幕两侧其他更强大的力量：希望理性能够继续说服美苏两大强国，无论付出多大代价，都必须避免直接冲突；并最终使双方都明白，永无休止地追求凌驾于对方之上并不能增进任何一方的安全，而应该寻求其他方式，在两个相互竞争的政治和经济体系之间实现稳定的平衡。
It is in this climate that the two superpowers face each other. They cannot expect a war between them to observe limits. The Soviet Union certainly does not expect it to. It is therefore devoutly to be hoped that reason will prevail over other, stronger influences on both sides of the iron curtain: that it will continue to persuade the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, that direct conflict between them must be avoided at all costs; and eventually convince both that the perpetual search for superiority over the other does not enhance the security of either, and that some other method of achieving a stable balance between the two rival political and economic systems is to be preferred.
1国家安全委员会文件 NSC-162/2，《基本国家安全政策》，1953 年 10 月 30 日。
1 National Security Council document NSC-162/2, Basic National Security Policy, 30.10.1953.
2参见亨利·基辛格，《选择的必要性》（伦敦，1960 年）。
2 See Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (London, 1960).
3 Robert Osgood，《有限战争再探》（博尔德，1979 年），第 106 页。
3 Robert Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, 1979), 106.
4安德烈·博弗雷，《战略导论》（伦敦，1965 年）。原版于 1963 年在巴黎出版。
4 André Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy (London, 1965). Originally published in Paris in 1963.
5同上，第 127 页。
5 Ibid., 127.
6 Michael Carver，《1945 年以来的战争》（伦敦，1980 年；纽约，1981 年），第 270-72 页。脚注省略。
6 Michael Carver, War since 1945 (London, 1980; New York, 1981), 270–72. Footnote omitted.
27. 美国独立战争
27. Revolutionary War
我1941年，普林斯顿军事研讨会开始着手编纂《现代战略的缔造者》一书时，本文的主题尚不存在。当然，近代史充满了革命，而大多数革命都伴随着某种形式的战争。至少自17世纪以来，革命现象就引起了广泛的学术兴趣，并且随着每一次革命的爆发——1776年、1789年、1848年、1917年——这种兴趣都在不断增长。在《现代战略的缔造者》第一卷的论文中，散布着人们对革命日益增长的兴趣，以及革命爆发与军事理论之间密切联系的证据。然而，在这部著作中，无论是关于马克思、托洛茨基，还是关于法国殖民战争战略家的论文，我们都找不到对运用武力实现激进政治和社会变革的思想的系统性论述。这一空白并非厄尔教授及其同事的过错；相反，这反映了这样一个事实：1941年根本不存在这样一套理论体系；或者更准确地说，当时人们认为不存在这样的理论，或者即便存在，也不认为它值得在一本涵盖从马基雅维利到希特勒军事思想的著作中占有一席之地。
IN 1941, when the Princeton seminar in military affairs began the work that led to the original Makers of Modern Strategy, the subject of this essay did not exist. Of course modern history was littered with revolutions, and most of those revolutions had involved some kind of warfare. At least since the seventeenth century, the phenomenon of revolution had aroused considerable intellectual interest, and that interest rose with each revolutionary epoch—1776, 1789, 1848, 1917. Evidence of the rising interest in revolution, and of the close connection between outbreaks of revolution and military theory, is scattered through the essays of the first Makers of Modern Strategy. But nowhere in that volume, not in the essays on Marx, Trotsky, or the strategists of French colonial warfare, do we find a systematic treatment of ideas for the use of armed force in effecting radical political and social change. The gap was not the fault of Professor Earle and his colleagues; rather, it reflects the fact that in 1941 no such body of theory existed; or, more correctly, that no such theory was seen to exist or, if it existed, to deserve space in a book surveying military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler.1
“革命战争”作为军事思想的重要分支，为何直到近半个世纪才出现，这是一个复杂的问题。与之相关的问题是——为何直到1941年，这一主题似乎既不重要也不明确——这警示我们不要轻易接受简单或显而易见的答案。第二次世界大战引发并催化了大量的革命爆发和动荡，其结果和后续影响至今仍在改变着世界。但同样重要的是，在回答我们的问题时，视角发生了迅速转变。革命战争作为一个需要单独分析的问题，以及一套衍生出一系列反制技术的理论体系，如今显得至关重要，甚至迫在眉睫，而对于富勒、施利芬或约米尼等人而言，情况并非如此。这是为什么呢？
Why “revolutionary war,” as an important branch of military thought, has emerged only in the last half century is a complex question. The correlative question—why the subject seemed neither important nor clearly defined as late as 1941—warns us against accepting easy or obvious answers. The Second World War triggered and catalyzed a large number of revolutionary outbreaks and upheavals, whose results and sequels continue to change the world. But equally important, in answering our questions, has been the rapid shift in perspective. Revolutionary warfare, as a problem for separate analysis and a set of techniques that have given rise to a set of countertechniques, now seems important, even urgent, in a way that it did not for, say, J. F. C. Fuller or Schlieffen or Jomini. Why?
要给出令人满意的答案，必须考虑军事理论在现代民族国家历史中的作用。17世纪在欧洲形成的民族国家体系，在革命压力的推动下，既不断受到威胁，也持续受到鼓舞。但该体系也确立了自身的优先事项。国家间的竞争和冲突（往往是暴力冲突）决定了国家自身的命运。瑞典和西班牙落后了，英国和普鲁士奋力拼搏，最终登上前线，而波兰和奥匈帝国则走向灭亡。为对抗法国大革命而结成的历次联盟的行为表明，无论革命意识形态和运动的威胁多么巨大，民族国家都难以将自身相互冲突的根本利益置于次要地位。为了击败拿破仑或希特勒，或在1815年或1918年后恢复秩序，民族国家曾在短暂时期内，为了有限的目标，抑制了自身的竞争本能。但国际竞争的首要地位，以及国家根本利益之间固有的冲突，很快又重新出现。成功的民族国家，归根结底，或许从定义上讲，就是一个好战的有机体。甚至连内部革命的危险似乎也取决于国际冲突的结果；失败会激起叛乱，而胜利则会用民族自豪感来平息不满。军事理论家和战略家对革命问题只是顺带提及，因为他们试图服务的民族国家，其首要关注点在于彼此之间的战争。
A satisfactory answer must consider the role of military theorizing in the history of the modern nation-state. The nation-state system as it took shape in Europe by the seventeenth century has been continually threatened as well as energized by revolutionary pressures. But the system has imposed its own priorities. Competition and conflict, often violent, between states has determined the fate of states themselves. Sweden and Spain fell behind, England and Prussia fought their way to the front, while Poland and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy disappeared. The behavior of successive coalitions formed to fight the French Revolution demonstrates how difficult nation-states found it, no matter how great the threat from revolutionary ideology and movements, to subordinate their own conflicting vital interests. For brief periods and for limited goals, nation-states have curbed their competitive instincts, to defeat Napoleon or Hitler, or to restore order after 1815 or 1918. But the primacy of international competition, the inherent conflict of vital national interests, soon reappeared. The successful nation-state, ultimately and perhaps by definition, is a war-fighting organism. Even the danger of internal revolution came to seem dependent on the outcome of international conflict; defeat excited rebellion, but victory submerged discontent in national pride. Military theorists and strategists treated revolution only incidentally because nation-states, whose interest they tried to serve, were overwhelmingly concerned by war with one another.
上世纪末，少数几个赢家几乎主宰了世界。欧洲一些较为成功的国家，加上美国和日本，似乎势不可挡。持续不断的竞争磨练了它们的技能，增强了它们的实力，激发了它们的野心，并让它们对扩张至亚洲、非洲以及（对美国而言）西半球的能力充满了信心。除了主要竞争对手的制衡力量之外，没有任何力量能够限制它们的帝国野心。然而，仅仅三十年后，这一体系便崩溃了。第一次世界大战动摇了它的信心和经济基础，第二次世界大战更是将其彻底摧毁，这个体系或许从未像表面看起来那样不可战胜。正如拿破仑战争的经验所表明的那样，其激烈的竞争本质是其衰落的根本原因。但显然，传统民族国家体系的实力和威望的骤然衰落，不仅解释了自1941年以来席卷全球的革命浪潮，也解释了革命战争作为一种独立的军事思想分支的出现。欧洲帝国在殖民甚至国内的攻击下崩溃，以及在帝国废墟中迅速出现新的继承国（通常很弱小），是我们看到军事理论这一新维度的主要原因，而这一维度在 1941 年是不存在的。
By the end of the last century, a handful of winners virtually dominated the world. The more successful European nations, joined by the United States and Japan, seemed irresistible. Constant competition had honed their skills, enhanced their power, whetted their appetites, and built enormous confidence in their capacity to expand through Asia, Africa, and (for the United States) the Western Hemisphere. Nothing except the countervailing power of their chief competitors could limit the scope of imperial ambitions. Then, in three decades, the system collapsed. Its confidence and economic base shaken by one world war and shattered by a second, the system may never have been as invincible as it looked. Its intensely competitive nature was the basic cause of its downfall, as the earlier Napoleonic experience might suggest. But clearly the sudden decline in power and prestige of the traditional nation-state system accounts not only for the global epidemic since 1941 of revolutionary attacks on the system, but also for the emergence of revolutionary war as a distinct branch of military thought. The crumbling of European empires under colonial and even domestic assault, and the rapid appearance amidst the imperial ruins of new successor states, often weak, are the main reasons why we see this new dimension of military theory where none was apparent in 1941.
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“革命战争”指的是通过武力夺取政权。并非所有人都认同这种简单的定义，事实上，这个词还有其他含义：它暗示着政权的夺取是由一场民众或广泛的政治运动所发起的；它意味着相当长的武装冲突时期；它意味着夺取政权是为了推行一项广为宣传的政治或社会纲领。此外，这个词还暗示着对目标和方法的高度自觉，以及对正在进行的“革命”战争的清醒认识。
“Revolutionary war” refers to the seizure of political power by the use of armed force. Not everyone would accept such a simple definition, and indeed the term has other connotations: that the seizure of power is by a popular or broad-based political movement, that the seizure entails a fairly long period of armed conflict, and that power is seized in order to carry out a well-advertised political or social program. The term also implies a high degree of consciousness about goals and methods, a consciousness that a “revolutionary” war is being fought.
人们常常将革命战争与游击战混淆。这种混淆不难理解，因为革命战争本身就包含游击战。然而，游击战的战术，例如打了就跑、避免代价高昂的正面交锋、藏身于山林或民众之中以躲避敌人追击，仅仅是进行革命战争的一种手段。其他手段还包括非暴力政治动员、合法的政治行动、罢工、鼓动和恐怖主义，以及大规模战斗和常规军事行动。反过来，游击战本身可能并没有革命目标，但其革命的政治潜力却从未消失。然而，对于任何革命战争的定义而言，革命目标的存在都至关重要；至于具体采用何种手段，则是次要的。
There is persistent confusion between revolutionary war and guerrilla warfare. The confusion is understandable, because revolutionary war includes guerrilla warfare. But the guerrilla tactics of hit and run, avoiding costly pitched battles, eluding enemy pursuit by hiding in the hills, in forests, or among the populace, are simply one means of carrying on revolutionary war. Others range from nonviolent political mobilization of people, legal political action, strikes, agitation, and terrorism, to large-scale battles and conventional military operations. Guerrilla operations, in turn, may have no revolutionary aim, though their revolutionary political potential is never absent. Vital to any definition of revolutionary war, however, is the existence of a revolutionary objective; the specific means to be employed are a secondary matter.
革命战争的独特之处还在于它并非什么。它并非通常意义上的“战争”，并非国际战争或国家间的战争，后者通常（尽管并非总是如此）期望交战各方最终能够通过谈判达成某种解决方案。实际上，这两种战争之间的明确界限可能会变得模糊不清。革命战争发生在国家内部，其目标是夺取国家政权。但是，一旦定义超越了国际“战争”和“革命战争”之间的这种简单区分，清晰便会转为模糊。通常情况下，一个或多个“外国”势力会介入革命战争，从而改变战争的进程，并往往改变战争的最终结果。例如，铁托领导的反对南斯拉夫独裁封建政权的军事共产主义运动，更广为人知的名称是抵抗德国入侵和占领；它同时也是克罗地亚反对塞尔维亚统治的斗争，并且深受当时英美苏三国对德“战争”的影响。然而，铁托发动的战争无疑是革命性的，正如1916年至1918年阿拉伯人反抗奥斯曼帝国统治的起义一样，这场起义与英国特工T·E·劳伦斯的名字紧密相连。劳伦斯受雇于英国，参与攻击土耳其——德国的盟友，而德国又是英国在一战中的主要敌人。在真实的史实面前，泾渭分明的定义很快就会失效。
Revolutionary war is also distinguished by what it is not. It is not “war” in the generally understood sense of the word, not international war or war between nations, with its usual (though not invariable) expectation that fighting will lead, sooner or later, to some negotiated settlement between the belligerent powers. In practice the sharp distinction between the two kinds of war may become hazy. Revolutionary wars occur within nations, and have as their aim the seizure of state power. But once the definition moves beyond this simple distinction between international “war” and “revolutionary war,” clarity gives way to murkiness. More often than not, one or several “foreign” powers will intervene in a revolutionary war, changing its course and often its outcome. To take one example, the military Communist movement led by Tito against a dictatorial and feudalistic regime in Yugoslavia was better known as resistance against German invasion and occupation; it was also a Croatian struggle against Serbian domination, and was strongly affected by the concurrent Anglo-American-Soviet “war” against Germany. Yet Tito's war was surely revolutionary, as was the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule in 1916–1918, so closely linked with the name of T. E. Lawrence, who was a British agent employed in attacking Turkey, an ally of Germany, the chief enemy of Britain in the First World War. Neat definitions break down quickly in the face of actual historical cases.
一种观点认为，革命战争在核时代蓬勃发展，恰恰是因为新型武器使得大国之间的战争变得不可能或过于危险。由此引申出的另一个观点是，大国为了应对大规模战争而过度武装，反而使自身容易受到革命战争战术的攻击；此外，国际战争（令人遗憾但合乎情理）与革命战争（一种不受国际法保护的国内现象）之间的传统区分本身就偏袒军事和工业强国。尽管这些论点具有一定的价值，我们仍然可以断言，无论从理论还是实践层面来看，革命战争都与本书其他文章中对“战争”一词的理解有着本质区别。
One school of thought argues that revolutionary war has flourished in the nuclear age precisely because new weapons have made war between great military powers impossible or too dangerous. Corollary arguments are that the great powers, ponderously armed for a big war, have left themselves vulnerable to the tactics of revolutionary war; and that the classic distinction between international war (regrettable but legitimate) and revolutionary war (a domestic phenomenon to which the safeguards of international law do not apply) is itself biased in favor of the great military and industrial powers. The value of these arguments recognized, we can still assert that in both theory and practice revolutionary war is fundamentally different from “war,” as that word is understood in the other essays of this volume.
除了术语定义上的难题之外，提出研究问题还存在另一个更为微妙的困难。这种困难源于历史学家天生倾向于在过去寻找连续性。历史学家假定研究对象——无论是个人、社群还是国家——都拥有某种类似记忆的东西，这赋予了历史连续性这一概念以意义。即使是“战略”这一概念，如果将其视为一种理念，也能在书籍出版和参谋部运作中拥有连续的历史；或者至少，发现历史的断裂本身就具有历史意义。然而，革命战争如果从历史角度被视为一套理念，则挑战了这种连续性的概念。革命战争本身只是历史事件，几乎没有什么能够有效地将其制度化为思想和经验体系，反而有很多因素导致其在记忆层面被压制或扭曲。如果胜利，胜利者会将战争神话化，以维护胜利革命事业的民族或社会认同，而失败者则想要遗忘这段痛苦的、往往是灾难性的、屈辱的经历。如果一场革命战争失败，它就变成了一场“叛乱”或“起义”，其意义主要在于为革命研究者提供“错误”的教训。无论如何，革命都是在秘密、背叛和欺骗的氛围中进行的。档案记录寥寥无几，幸存者撰写的回忆录也难以核实，更难以令人信服。1954年阿尔及利亚革命爆发三十年后，我们对起义军一方的了解仍然十分有限。即使革命战略家似乎受到了以往革命经验的影响，例如越南人效仿中国，这种联系也往往只是合情合理而非确凿无疑，而且必然会遭到一些最了解内情的人的质疑。撰写革命“战略”史的学者可能会将虚假的现实强加于其研究对象的时间发展之上，从而从根本上歪曲事实。
Beyond the problem of adequately defining terms, there is another, more subtle difficulty in posing the question for study. The difficulty lies in the historian's natural tendency to seek continuities in the past. The historian assumes that the subject, whether a person or a community or a state, has something like a memory, which gives meaning to the idea of historical continuity. Even “strategy,” treated as an idea, has a continuous history in the publication of books and the world of general staffs; or at least the discovery of discontinuities is itself historically interesting. But revolutionary warfare, treated historically as a set of ideas, challenges this notion of continuity. Revolutionary wars themselves are episodes, with little to institutionalize them effectively as bodies of thought and experience, and much to suppress or distort them in terms of memory. If successful, the victor mythologizes the war to sustain the national or social identity of the victorious revolutionary cause, while the loser wants to forget a painful, often disastrous and humiliating, experience. If a revolutionary war fails, it becomes a “revolt” or a “rebellion,” of interest largely as a lesson in “mistakes” for students of revolution. In any case, revolutions are carried on in an atmosphere of secrecy, betrayal, and deception. Archival records are few, and survivors who write memoirs can seldom be checked and are seldom trustworthy. Thirty years after its outbreak in 1954, we know little with confidence about the insurgent side of the Algerian revolution. Even where revolutionary strategists appear to have been influenced by previous revolutionary experience, as in the case of the Vietnamese following the Chinese example, the connection tends to be plausible rather than definitive, and is inevitably disputed by some of those best qualified to know. The scholar who writes the history of revolutionary “strategy” may impute a spurious reality to the temporal development of his subject, distorting it in a fundamental way.
与我们倾向于在可能并不存在历史联系的地方寻找联系密切相关的，还有另一个难题。“革命”自1776年和1789年以来，一直被赋予着一种强大而极具感染力的形象。它既能吸引又能恐吓民众，这种情感力量促成了近代史上革命冲突的频繁发生和激烈程度。如果从这种现象中抽象出某种更为局限、技术性更强、更偏重理性而非情感的“革命战争”战略，就可能忽略了这一主题最重要的部分——使革命成为可能的具体社会、政治和心理条件。没有这些条件，战略技巧就毫无意义；任何革命战略，如果不能反映和利用特定时空下存在的这些条件，几乎注定会失败，正如中国共产党在20世纪30年代初试图遵循马克思主义正统理论的失败一样。国际战争的战略思考和规划，如同1914年一样，屡屡受挫于如何将军事技术与根本条件相衔接这一难题。但至少现代国家已经发展出将变幻莫测、形形色色的社会力量转化为或多或少可预测、可控的军事工具的能力。然而，革命战争却并非如此；革命，顾名思义，并非由国家及其官僚机构发起，而是由原始的社会能量驱动，由那些必须随机应变、迅速调整、甚至在来不及思考之前就采取行动的领导人引领，才能赢得胜利，甚至得以生存。正如毛泽东所说，革命战争不是宴请宾客，也不是参谋部研究，更不是学术期刊上的文章。每一场革命战争都具有其独特的性质，这种性质对于非革命的作者和读者来说难以理解，这使得研究其“战略”的学者难以找到合理的视角，更遑论向读者揭示真相。
Closely related to our tendency to seek historical connections where none may exist is a further difficulty. “Revolution” since 1776 and 1789 has projected a powerful, highly emotive image. Its emotional power to attract and to frighten has contributed to the frequency and intensity of revolutionary conflicts in modern history. To abstract from this phenomenon some more limited and technical, more intellectual and less emotional, “strategy” of “revolutionary warfare” may be to miss the most important part of the subject—the specific social, political, and psychological conditions that make a revolution possible. Without those conditions, strategic technique is meaningless; and any strategy of revolution that does not reflect and exploit them as they exist, in a specific time and place, will almost certainly fail, as the Chinese Communist attempts to conform to Marxist orthodoxy failed in the early 1930s. Strategic thinking and planning for international war have foundered, as in 1914, on the same problem of relating military technique to underlying conditions, but at least the modern state has developed a capacity to transform volatile and various social forces into more or less predictable and manageable military instruments. But not so revolutionary warfare; revolutions, by definition, are not made by states and their bureaucracies, but by raw social energies, directed by leaders who must improvise, adapt quickly, and often act before they have time to think, if they are to win or even survive. Revolutionary wars, as Mao said, are not dinner parties, nor are they general staff studies, nor essays in scholarly journals. There is, to a degree difficult for the nonrevolutionary writer and reader to grasp, a unique quality to each revolutionary war, leaving the student of its “strategy” struggling to find a reasonable perspective, much less to tell readers the truth.
尤其是在探讨当代革命战争的重要性时，存在着过分强调理论而忽视实际经验的危险。面对频繁、复杂且多样的武装斗争（无论从哪个角度来看，这些斗争都具有某种“革命性”或“反革命性”），理论允许一定程度的简化，这在面对这些斗争时显得颇具吸引力。然而，将革命形式化地简化为“阶段”，或将反革命简化为通过赢得“民心”将叛乱分子与“人民”隔离开来，都会扭曲现代经验的真实面貌。与此同时，我们也必须认识到，“理论”，即便简单化或不严谨，也在塑造这种经验以及关于如何准确解读这种经验的持续争论中发挥了核心作用。在谨慎避免陷入理论简化主义的诱惑的同时，我们也应该承认理论的力量和吸引力，将其视为革命/反革命战争现象的一个重要方面。
There is a danger, especially in dealing with the contemporary importance of revolutionary wars, of giving undue emphasis to theory at the expense of actual experience. Theory permits a degree of simplification that is attractive when confronted with the frequency, complexity, and variety of armed struggles that are in some sense “revolutionary” or “counterrevolutionary.” But the formalistic reduction of revolution to “stages,” for example, or of counterrevolution to isolating rebels from the “people” by winning their “hearts and minds,” distorts the real world of modern experience. At the same time, it needs to be recognized that “theory,” even if simplistic or unsound, has played a central role in shaping that experience, and in the continuing debate over how, exactly, this experience should be interpreted. While being careful not to succumb to the seduction of theoretical simplism, we should accept the power and appeal of theory as a major facet of the phenomenon of revolutionary/counterrevolutionary war.
在这些冲突中，每一方都面临着一个核心的理论问题，而这个问题对每一方来说都是另一方长期困扰的问题的反面。对革命者而言，这个问题在于何时以及如何采取军事行动；对此，各方的答案不一：有人认为军事行动只不过是漫长而密集的政治准备和行动的最后阶段，而另一些人，例如拉丁美洲“焦点主义”的倡导者，则认为暴力实际上可以取代并催化革命的政治进程。革命领导层一次又一次地在主张军事行动和希望推迟军事行动之间产生分歧。
Each side in these conflicts has struggled with a central doctrinal question, and the question for each side arises as the reciprocal of the question chronically troubling the other side. For revolutionaries, it has been the question of when and how to undertake military action; answers have ranged from those who see military action as little more than a final stage of intensive, protracted political preparation and action, to those like the exponents of “focoism” in Latin America who argue that violence can, in effect, replace and catalyze the political process of revolution. Again and again, revolutionary leadership has divided between those who advocate and those who want to postpone military action.
另一方面——在反革命势力看来——关键问题在于暴力与劝说孰轻孰重，实际上是在战争与政治之间做出选择。一场革命运动在多大程度上依赖于民众的政治支持？因此，它又在多大程度上容易受到旨在削弱民众支持的政治行动的影响？这是革命反对者反复提出的问题。正如在越南战争中一样，“鹰派”会反复强调敌人只依赖子弹和残酷的恐怖手段，而“鸽派”则认为，民众的强烈不满才是革命战争的关键——也是其最大的弱点。在这里，问题的核心同样在于政治行动和军事行动各自扮演的角色。
On the other side—the side of the counterrevolutionaries—the crucial question concerns the relative importance of violence and persuasion, in effect the choice between war and politics. How far is a revolutionary movement dependent on popular political support, and thus how vulnerable is it to political action designed to undermine popular support? This is the recurring question for the opponents of revolution. Repeatedly, as in the Vietnam Wars, “hawks” will insist that the enemy relies only on bullets and terror ruthlessly applied, while “doves” argue that deep popular discontent is the key—and the key weakness—of revolutionary war. Here, too, the question centers on the relative roles of political and military action.
双方几乎不可避免的争论在两个层面展开：一是具体情境和紧迫现实的层面；二是理论层面，后者很容易引出关于政治和社会结构以及人类生存本质的争论。人们为何如此行事？他们为何愿意战斗，为何甘愿受苦？无论革命战争双方的领导人多么务实和强硬，似乎都无法避免在理论层面探讨这些问题。而在理论辩论中，语言本身变得至关重要。
The virtually inevitable debate on both sides is carried on at two levels: at the level of specific circumstances and urgent, concrete necessities; and at the level of theory, which leads readily to arguments about the structure of politics and society, and to the nature of human existence. Why do people behave as they do? Why are they willing to fight, and to suffer? No matter how pragmatic and hard-headed leaders on both sides of a revolutionary war may be, there seems to be no escape from arguing these questions at the level of theory. And in the theoretical debate, language itself becomes critically important.
1983年10月23日，一辆装满高爆炸药的大型卡车高速冲过戒备森严的大门，径直撞向位于黎巴嫩贝鲁特机场的美国海军陆战队营部混凝土建筑。爆炸摧毁了营部，造成231名海军陆战队员丧生，并很快导致被派往黎巴嫩平息内战的美国“维和”部队撤离。两个月后，美国国防部的一个特别委员会列出了此次袭击成功的原因：对海军陆战队在黎巴嫩的任务缺乏了解；该海军陆战队营的部署存在缺陷；（二战期间建立的）军事指挥结构不适用于内战环境；美军各军种之间缺乏协调阻碍了快速行动；以及由于收到大量军事情报，人数较少的营部参谋人员未能从中找到关键情报——即其辖区内哪些卡车超停。报告强调了今后应避免的错误，但并未对新问题进行更广泛的分析，只是敦促五角大楼应对“新型”战争的挑战。报告——以及总统本人——将这种新型战争狭义地定义为“国家支持的恐怖主义”，而不是将其视为其本质——更为古老的革命战争——的具体实例。
On October 23, 1983, a large truck packed with high explosive was driven at high speed, through a guarded gate, directly into the concrete headquarters of a U.S. Marine battalion at Beirut airport, Lebanon. The explosion destroyed the headquarters, killed 231 Marines, and soon led to the withdrawal of the American “peacekeeping” force sent to stop the Lebanese civil war. Two months later, a special commission of the U.S. Department of Defense listed the reasons why the attack had succeeded: the Marine mission in Lebanon had been poorly understood, the Marine battalion had a faulty position, the military command structure (developed during the Second World War) was not suited to the conditions of a civil war, lack of unity between U.S. military services hampered quick action, and, from a mass of military intelligence dumped on it, the small battalion staff was unable to find the vital piece of intelligence—which trucks in its area were overparked. The report stressed mistakes that in future should be avoided, but offered no broader analysis of the new problem, except to urge the Pentagon to meet the challenge of a “new” kind of warfare. The report—as did the President—defined this new kind of warfare narrowly, as “state-supported terrorism,” and not as a specific instance of what it actually is—the much older phenomenon of revolutionary war.
在革命战争中，语言、思想和认知扮演着极其重要的角色，而革命战争的现代史始于拿破仑战争。以非常规军事手段推翻政府、夺取政权乃至改变社会的暴力行为，其本质就是政治上的破坏。在传统的国际战争理论中，政治团结和支持通常是默认的，而非明确提出的，但革命战争的语言却充满了政治上的夸张和敏感。革命士兵常常被称作“匪徒”，实际上剥夺了他们作为战斗人员的法律地位，而他们的支持者则被描述为“罪犯”或“叛徒”。政府军变成了“人民的敌人”或“雇佣兵”，政府本身则被贴上了“法西斯”、“腐败”或“傀儡政权”的标签。“恐怖主义”一词被用来指代攻击非军事目标，或像贝鲁特袭击那样，使用出其不意和非常规手段的袭击。在革命战争中，不存在中立的、非政治性的词汇；语言本身就是武器。
Words, ideas, and perceptions have played an exceptionally important role in revolutionary war, whose modern history began with the Napoleonic Wars. Violent efforts to overthrow governments, seize power, and even change society, using unorthodox military means, are by definition politically disruptive. Political unity and support are usually assumed rather than explicitly stated in classical theories of international war, but the language of revolutionary war is politically hyperbolic and hypersensitive. Revolutionary soldiers are often called “bandits,” in effect denying them the legal status of combatants, and their supporters described as “criminals” or “traitors.” Government forces become “enemies of the people” or “mercenaries,” the government itself being “fascist,” “corrupt,” or a “puppet regime.” “Terrorism” is the word for attacking nonmilitary targets, or for attacks—like that at Beirut—using surprise and unusual methods. In revolutionary war there can be no neutral, apolitical vocabulary; words themselves are weapons.
将革命战争的行为描述为“新颖的”，或称其残酷程度前所未有（或声称革命战略深深植根于古代哲学），进一步说明了语言本身如何成为革命战争的武器。语言被用来孤立和迷惑敌人，团结和激励盟友，并争取摇摆不定的旁观者的支持。但同样的语言也指导——或误导——军事行动；政治冲突的修辞变成了战略理论的现实。欧洲和美国的军队能够迅速适应技术变革。但要应对一种截然不同的战争——在这种战争中，语言更多地是掩盖或扭曲军事现实，而不是揭示现实——却困难得多。美国总统和五角大楼不愿承认贝鲁特灾难是革命战争的事件，这是可以理解的。使用更准确的术语就等于承认了袭击的合法性。但使用不太准确、带有道德说教意味的语言，可能给他们自己而非敌人带来了更大的麻烦。这一困境本身已成为现代革命战争的独特特征，也因此成为分析这一主题（作为一套思想体系）时的一个主要难题。因此，我们不能从任何关于理论客观性，甚至关于理论与实践关系的简单假设出发；这些都是需要探究的问题。
Describing acts of revolutionary war as “new,” or as unprecedented in their cruelty (or claiming that revolutionary strategy is deeply rooted in ancient philosophy) further illustrates how language itself becomes a weapon of revolutionary warfare. Language is used to isolate and confuse enemies, rally and motivate friends, and enlist the support of wavering bystanders. But the same language directs—or misdirects—military effort; the rhetoric of political conflict becomes the reality of strategic theory. Adapting quickly to technological change comes readily to European and American armed forces. But learning to cope with a very different kind of warfare, in which words do more to mask or distort military reality than to reveal it, has proved far more difficult. The unwillingness of the American President and the Pentagon to admit that the Beirut disaster was an incident of revolutionary warfare is understandable. To use the more accurate term would concede the legitimacy of the attack. But to use less accurate, moralistic language may have created more difficulty for their own side than for the enemy. This dilemma has itself become a unique feature of modern revolutionary war, and thus a major problem in analyzing the subject as a set of ideas. So we cannot begin with any simple assumptions about the objective nature of theory, or even about the relationship of theory to practice; these are matters for inquiry.
由于革命战争的语言充斥着论战和激烈的争论，纯粹的分析方法似乎注定会在持续不断的争论中，不自觉地、或许是无意地，选边站队。几乎所有关于这一主题的文献都关注如何进行革命战争或如何赢得革命战争。本文旨在尽可能客观地审视这一主题，找出尚未解决的关键问题，尤其不是为了提供又一份革命战争政策和作战指南。从历史角度研究这一主题并不能完全避免评判，但至少它提供了一个机会，让我们能够跳出争论的泥潭，客观地描述已经发生的事情，而不妄图断言革命战争在作战、政治和伦理方面的真理。撰写一个在当下仍然如此鲜活、未来甚至难以预测的主题的历史，始终充满风险；即使是历史研究方法也未必能够达到所需的客观性。但至少这种方法为我们提供了最佳机会，将分析性的“发生了什么？”与评判性的“应该发生什么？”区分开来。
Because so much of the language of revolutionary war is polemical and highly charged, a strictly analytical approach seems doomed to take a side, implicitly and perhaps inadvertently, in the continuing debate. Virtually all of the literature of the subject is concerned with either how to conduct or how to defeat revolutionary war. The purpose of this essay is to examine the subject with as much detachment as possible, identifying key questions and problems as yet unresolved, and especially not to offer yet another guide to policy and operations for revolutionary war. Approaching the subject historically is no escape from judgment, but at least it provides an opportunity to step back from the polemics, describing what has been said and done without pretending to state the operational, political, and ethical truth about revolutionary war. Writing the history of a subject still so alive in the present, and whose future defies even guesswork, is always perilous; even the historical approach may not achieve the requisite detachment. But at least that approach provides our best chance to separate the analytical “What happened?” from the judgmental “What should have happened?”
尽管存在诸多困难，但历史性的、分析中立的方法使我们能够全面地、有条不紊地看待这一主题。这种方法也表明，“革命战争”本身可能是一种历史现象，而非永恒现象，它有其可辨识的开端和可想象的期限。20世纪30年代，“革命战争”作为一套关于如何进行武装革命的独特理念而兴起，这些理念的广泛传播既得益于其表面上的成功，也得益于其内在的特质。然而，作为一种政治和军事胜利的模式，“革命战争”或许已经显露出衰落的迹象。诚然，这仅仅是一种猜测，甚至可能是错误的。但至少它让我们注意到，“革命战争”作为一套理念或理论，与使这种理论得以实践的具体历史条件之间存在着至关重要的联系。
The historical, analytically neutral approach, despite its various difficulties, allows us to see the subject whole and in context. This approach also suggests that “revolutionary war” may itself be a historical—not a timeless—phenomenon, with a discernible beginning and an imaginable term. Emerging in the 1930s as a set of unique ideas about how to carry on armed revolution, ideas widely promulgated as much by their apparent success as by their intrinsic quality, “revolutionary war” as a formula for political and military victory may already show signs of faltering. Admittedly, this is no more than a guess, perhaps a mistaken one. But at least it calls attention to the vital link between “revolutionary war” as a set of ideas, or theory, and the specific historical conditions that have made such a theory practical.
二
II
革命战争作为一个成熟的概念，出现时间相对较晚，这主要是因为它与现代性的两大特征——工业化和帝国主义——密切相关。马克思主义者和其他对现代工业、经济和社会秩序持激进批判态度的学者，是最早分析动员和运用武装力量击败资本家和统治阶级的警察和军队这一问题的群体之一。到了19世纪后期，激进革命者开始在欧洲和北美的工业背景下研究这一问题，而亚洲殖民地抵抗运动的激进倡导者也开始着手解决与此类似的难题：推翻帝国官僚和士兵及其在当地的合作者。当然，暴力民众抗议和起义在欧洲历史上屡见不鲜，正如反抗帝国主义侵略的历史与帝国主义本身一样悠久，但直到大约一个世纪前，革命战争的概念——被视为一系列具有具体战略解决方案的艰巨问题——才开始形成并获得发展动力。
Revolutionary warfare, as a fully developed concept, is a relatively recent phenomenon largely because it is so closely associated with two aspects of modernity—industrialism and imperialism. Marxists and other radical critics of the modern industrial, economic, and social order were among the first to analyze the problem of mobilizing and employing armed force to defeat the police and army of the capitalist and ruling classes. While radical revolutionaries by the later nineteenth century were studying the problem in its European and North American industrial context, radical advocates of colonial resistance in Asia were beginning to deal with the not dissimilar problems of overthrowing imperial bureaucrats and soldiers along with their native collaborators. Of course violent popular protests and uprisings have dotted European history, just as resistance to imperialist intrusion is as old as imperialism itself, but only a century or so ago did the idea of revolutionary warfare, considered as a set of formidable problems with specific strategic solutions, begin to take shape and acquire momentum.
对现代革命战争概念的思想先驱进行简要考察，也能解释其为何出现得如此之晚。亚洲文化研究者认为，早在两千多年前，中国军事哲学家孙子就提出了革命战争的战略原则——攻击弱点、规避强项、保持耐心。<sup> 2</sup>他们还强调，在中国和越南的历史上，民众普遍相信“天命”，政权的合法性既由此获得，也由此丧失，这种信念几个世纪以来一直是争取民众支持革命的关键因素。<sup> 3 </sup> 让人们加入革命事业，为之战斗甚至牺牲，并以战略性的方式有效利用民众的热情，一直是——并且仍然是——所有严肃的革命战争思考的核心。因此，孙子和“天命”不仅仅是令人好奇的思想产物；它们都涉及核心问题。但目前尚不清楚的是，孙子和“天命”在非西方对革命战争问题的持续研究中究竟发挥了多大的作用。相反，有证据表明，近代反帝国主义革命思想出现了明显的“西方化”趋势，回归古代文献则是一个非常晚期的现象，或许更多地体现了一种文化民族主义，而非革命行动的指导原则。4
A brief look at the intellectual precursors of the modern concept of revolutionary warfare also suggests why it appears so late. Students of Asian cultures have argued that more than two millennia ago Sun Tzu, the Chinese military philosopher, formulated the strategic principles of revolutionary warfare—attack weakness, avoid strength, be patient.2 They have also emphasized that in Chinese and Vietnamese history, the popular belief in the “mandate of heaven,” by which regimes both gain and lose legitimacy, has for centuries been a critical element in recruiting popular support for revolution.3 Getting people to join, fight, and even die for the revolutionary cause and using popular zeal in strategically effective ways have been—and still are—the key points in all serious thought on revolutionary warfare. Sun Tzu and the “mandate of heaven” are therefore more than curious intellectual artifacts; each deals with central issues. But what remains unclear is how important Sun Tzu and the “mandate of heaven” have been in any continuing non-Western approach to the problem of revolutionary warfare. On the contrary, there is evidence suggesting a marked “Westernization” of anti-imperialist revolutionary thinking in modern times, with a return to the ancient sources a very late phenomenon, perhaps more a form of cultural nationalism than a guide to revolutionary action.4
西方经典的革命时代也提供了一些有趣的先例。在美国独立战争期间，交战双方都竭力将战争限制在常规形式和范围内。美国地方领导人在战争爆发前就已经从英国官员手中夺取了大部分地区的权力，因此战争的“革命性”被降到了最低。只有在战争初期，在边境地区，以及在南方战争的最后几年，暴力才呈现出“革命战争”那种民众参与的、非正规的性质。如果说战争的革命性微乎其微，那么可以称之为革命战略理论的东西几乎不存在。然而，一位名叫查尔斯·李的美国将军，这位曾参与1769年波兰起义的前英国军官，却制定了一套“人民战争”战略，这套战略与华盛顿所采取的依靠长期服役士兵和常规军事行动的战略形成了鲜明的对比。李将军认为，美国的民主、人口数量和人民热情是美国采取持久消耗战战略的正确基础，这种战略依靠地方抵抗。尽管李将军很快失去了对战争的影响力，他的思想也从未被任何人采纳，但他关于将政治、社会和军事因素整合到战略中的论点只能在革命背景下产生，并且预示了后来革命战争思想的一个主要特征。5
The classic Age of Revolution in the West also offers some interesting precursions. During the American War of Independence both sides made a serious effort to keep warfare within conventional forms and limits. American provincial leaders had seized power from British officials in most areas even before the outbreak of fighting, so the “revolutionary” nature of warfare was minimized, and only at the very outset, along the frontier zones, and again during the last years in the South, did violence take on the popular, irregular character of “revolutionary warfare.” If the revolutionary character of the war was minimal, what may be described as a strategic theory of revolution was nearly nonexistent. And yet one American general, Charles Lee, a former British officer who had taken part in the Polish uprising of 1769, formulated a strategy for “people's war” that implicitly opposed the strategy adopted by Washington, who relied on long-service soldiers and campaigns of conventional maneuvers. Lee argued that American democracy, numbers, and enthusiasm were the correct basis for an American strategy of protracted, attritional warfare relying on local resistance. Although Lee soon lost any influence in the conduct of the war, and his ideas were never taken up by anyone, his argument in favor of integrating the political, social, and military aspects of strategy could only have arisen in a revolutionary situation, and it forecasts a principal feature of later ideas about revolutionary warfare.5
法国大革命催生了“人民武装”，将民族主义与兵役联系起来，迈出了建立大规模公民军队的第一步；但这场革命的发展方式并未导致现代意义上的“革命战争”。法国大革命时期的战争主要是对外战争，旨在保卫法国并削弱其外部敌人。法国的战略和作战行动展现出一种新的魄力，但其战略目标虽然往往更加雄心勃勃，却与1789年之前的战争目标并无太大差异。法国王室政府在战争爆发前实际上已经崩溃，因此，对巴黎新政府的武装抵抗从本质上来说就是反革命的。无论是在法国西部的旺代地区、意大利和奥地利的山区，还是在西班牙和俄罗斯，游击队和党卫军都致力于驱逐革命势力，并协助与法国结盟的保守势力恢复合法政府。
The French Revolution gave rise to “the people in arms,” linking nationalism with military service in the first great step toward mass citizen armies; but the Revolution unfolded in a way that never led to “revolutionary war” in the full modern sense. The Wars of the French Revolution were mainly foreign wars, fought to defend France and to weaken its external enemies. A new boldness characterized French strategy and operations, but strategic aims, while often more ambitious, were not unlike the goals of warfare before 1789. Royal government in France had effectively collapsed before war began, so that armed resistance to the new government in Paris was by definition counter-revolutionary. Whether in the Vendée region of western France, in the mountains of Italy and Austria, or in Spain and Russia, guerrillas and partisans fought to expel the forces of the Revolution and to aid in the restoration of legitimate government by the conservative powers allied against France.
法国大革命历史上只有一次，而且非常短暂，接近了现代革命战争的概念。1793年，在恐怖统治时期，极端派别要求组建革命军队。这些“革命军队”并非旨在抵御入侵的联盟，而是作为一支由“人民”组成的武装队伍，负责搜寻和攻击“叛徒”——贵族、顽固的教士、投机分子、反革命的法国人，无论他们身在何处，其中无疑不乏身居高位者。革命军队的构想最初由罗伯斯庇尔提出，但后来却被用来对付他和他在公共安全委员会的同僚，因为他们试图集中力量控制饱受战争蹂躏的法国。如果按照最初的设想，革命军队很可能从公共安全委员会和国民议会手中夺取政权，并将其交给法国大革命中最激进的势力。最终，1794年的保守派政变结束了恐怖统治，革命军也沦为法国历史上的一段噩梦。然而，普通民众武装起来在自己的社会内部，甚至可能对抗自己的革命政权，这种想法本身，无论最终如何，都为我们展现了遥远未来的一瞥。6
Only once, very briefly, did the Revolution approach something like the modern concept of revolutionary war. In 1793, during the Reign of Terror, extremist factions demanded the creation of armées révolutionnaires. These “revolutionary armies” were not intended to defend the frontiers against the invading coalition, but rather as armed bands of self-directed “people” to find and attack “traitors”—aristocrats, recalcitrant priests, profiteers, counterrevolutionary Frenchmen whoever and wherever they might be, some no doubt in high office. Originally proposed by Robespierre, the idea of les armées révolutionnaires was turned against him and his colleagues on the Committee of Public Safety as they tried to centralize and control the war-torn French state. Carried through as conceived, les armées révolutionnaires might have seized power from the Committee of Public Safety and the National Assembly, and given it to the most radical elements in the French Revolution. In the event, the conservative coup of 1794, ending the Reign of Terror, reduced the armées révolutionnaires to a nightmarish moment in French history. But the idea itself, however abortive, of ordinary people armed to wage war within their own society, perhaps even against their own revolutionary regime, offers a fascinating glimpse of the distant future.6
滑铁卢战役之后，随着欧洲各地镇压政权的兴起，民众对动乱的担忧与日俱增，一种类似革命战争的自觉理论也随之出现，但到19世纪中叶便销声匿迹。意大利和波兰的革命者基于对民族主义团结和动员作用的信念，认为即使训练不足、装备简陋，群众性强的军队也能凭借其民族主义热情和压倒性的人数优势击败任何规模的政府军。然而，他们对自身社会革命潜力的分析却未能充分揭示中产阶级的自由主义目标、日益壮大的无产阶级的激进希望以及工匠、店主和农民往往存在的保守恐惧之间的深刻分歧。这些分歧，加上政府军的忠诚和技能，屡次阻挠19世纪20年代和30年代的革命运动，最终在1848年至1849年间彻底粉碎了革命。新技术消除了人们对现有革命理论不足的任何疑虑：线膛枪、电力通讯和蒸汽动力——所有这些都使1850年后的各国政府拥有了更多动用武力镇压民众起义的手段。7
After Waterloo, with the advent of repressive regimes throughout a Europe obsessed by the dangers of popular unrest, something like a conscious theory of revolutionary war actually emerged, only to fade away by midcentury. Based on their faith in the unifying and mobilizing effect of nationalism, Italian and Polish revolutionists argued that mass armies, however ill-trained and ill-equipped, could by their nationalist enthusiasm and their overwhelming numbers defeat any imaginable body of governmental troops. Analysis of the revolutionary potential of their own societies did not go far enough to expose the deep divisions between the liberal goals of the middle classes, the radical hopes of a growing proletariat, and the often conservative fears of artisans, shopkeepers, and peasants. Those divisions, together with the loyalty and skill of government forces, repeatedly stopped the revolutionary movements of the 1820s and 1830s, finally smashing them in 1848–1849. Any lingering doubts about the inadequacy of existing revolutionary theory were resolved by new technology: rifled weapons, electrical communications, and steam power—all of which gave governments after 1850 vastly increased means to deploy force against popular insurrection.7
这些不断改进和发展的新型武器，也使欧洲国家得以在19世纪后期轻松地渗透亚洲和非洲。在欧洲，革命者在马克思、恩格斯等人的指导下，将革命思想的重心从战争转向政治。组织、教育和宣传成为这场不那么浪漫、更加务实的革命运动的主要任务。暴力行为或许仍会发生——例如罢工、小规模恐怖主义或政治暗杀——但仅仅是实现特定政治目标的手段。自发群众起义的延迟似乎已经结束。过度或过早的暴力被认为会适得其反，会惊动敌人，使革命组织——规模小、手无寸铁、极易受攻击——遭受武装镇压。但也有一些罕见的时刻，例如1871年的巴黎公社，革命者公开战斗，并作为英雄和烈士牺牲。这些英雄时刻的记忆激发了欧洲革命者和殖民地抵抗运动领导人的想象力，也让那些耐心工作、常常冒着巨大危险为革命千年做准备的人们的希望得以延续。
This new weaponry, steadily improved and developed, also gave European states the means to make their remarkable penetration of Asia and Africa in the later nineteenth century seem relatively easy. Within Europe, revolutionists now guided by Marx, Engels, and others shifted the focus of revolutionary thought from warfare to politics. Organization, education, and agitation became the chief tasks of a less romantic, more realistic revolutionary movement. Violence might still take place—in strikes, small-scale terrorism, or political assassination—but only as a means to some specific political end. The delays of the spontaneous mass uprising seemed over. Excessive or premature violence was seen to be counterproductive, alerting the enemy to its danger and bringing the full force of armed repression down on the revolutionary organization—small, unarmed, and highly vulnerable. But there were also rare moments, notably the Paris Commune of 1871, when revolutionaries fought openly and died as heroes and martyrs. The memory of these heroic moments fired the imagination of European revolutionaries, and of colonial resistance leaders as well, keeping alive the hopes of those who worked patiently and often in great danger to prepare the revolutionary millennium.
在卡尔·马克思那本杰出的小册子《法兰西内战》中，他完成于巴黎政府军镇压巴黎公社最后抵抗力量之际。马克思并未提出革命战争的战略理论，而是简明扼要地阐述了此类战争的发动条件及其必须为之奋斗的目标。正如人们所预料的那样，他的分析激进，语气尖锐。马克思指出，暴力并非人民的专长，人民总是暴力的受害者。战争是君主的发明，是贵族的消遣，是帝国主义的标志。在巴黎公社遭受政府全面镇压之前，公社所犯下的暴力罪行仅有两起处决和一次镇压暴乱。1871年春天，政府镇压公社时犯下的滔天罪行，其中许多惨无人道，有些甚至带有虐待狂的色彩，早在1848年6月政府的暴力镇压中就已初见端倪。
In his remarkable pamphlet The Civil War in France, completed just as the last Communard resistance was being crushed by government forces in Paris, Karl Marx presented no strategic theory for revolutionary war, but rather a concise account of the conditions under which such wars are waged, and the goals for which they must be fought. As might be expected, the analysis is radical, and the tone bitter. Violence is not, Marx says, the specialty of the people, who are invariably its victims. War is the invention of monarchs, the sport of aristocrats, and the hallmark of imperialism. Two executions and the suppression of a single riot were all the violence committed by the Commune before it came under external, all-out government attack. The sheer volume of killing, much of it atrocious and some of it sadistic, done by the government when it smashed the Commune during the spring of 1871 had been foreshadowed by the violent governmental repression of June 1848.8
教训显而易见。一旦受到武装人民的威胁，统治集团就会不择手段地解除人民的武装，并以恐怖手段迫使其屈服。除了短期策略之外，任何妥协都是不可能的。所谓“激进”的国防政府及其在巴黎的代表的虚伪，证明了温和的措施和目标不过是幌子，旨在诱捕并解除人民的武装。国家机器及其社会支持结构不能简单地被接管；它们必须被摧毁，并按照革命原则重建。
The lesson was clear. Once threatened by the people armed, ruling groups would stop at nothing to disarm them and to terrorize them into submission. No compromise was possible, except perhaps as a shortterm tactic. The duplicity of the “radical” Government of National Defense, and of its representatives in Paris, proved that moderate measures and goals were a sham, designed to entrap and disarm the people. The apparatus of the state, and of its supporting structures in society, could not simply be taken over; they had to be destroyed and rebuilt on revolutionary principles.
无需成为马克思主义者也能认识到这种分析的力量。尽管马克思在证据选择上可能有所偏颇，但1871年、1849年以及自1815年以来无数其他革命爆发和失败中，大量惨烈的近期经验足以让读者信服：历史已经给民众革命的战略家们上了一堂惨痛的课。温和是愚蠢的；恩格斯在1891年版《法兰西内战》的导言中，对巴黎公社“毕恭毕敬地站在法兰西银行大门外”的“神圣敬畏”表示痛惜。9严密的组织和计划至关重要；主导巴黎公社领导层的布朗基和普鲁东的追随者们，被“自由”人民自发集结和起义的幻想所蒙蔽。暴力是一种武器，但只是众多武器中的一种。暴力不容回避，但绝不能浪漫化，也不能将其潜力浪费在徒劳的姿态上。马克思的这本小册子融合了现实主义和激情，使其成为自觉发展革命战争理论的重要一步。
One need not be a Marxist to recognize the power of this analysis. However selective Marx may have been in his evidence, there was ample recent experience of the most brutal kind, in 1871, in 1849–1849, and in numerous other revolutionary outbreaks and failures since 1815 to persuade his readers that history had taught a few painful lessons to strategists of popular revolution. Moderation was foolish; Engels in his introduction to the 1891 edition of The Civil War in France deplored “the holy awe” with which the Commune “remained standing respectfully outside the gates of the Bank of France.”9 Disciplined organization and planning was essential; the followers of Blanqui and Proudhon who dominated Communard leadership had been deluded by fantasies of the spontaneous rallying and rising of “free” people. Violence was a weapon, but just one among many. There could be no flinching from violence, but it was not to be romanticized, or its potential wasted in futile gestures. Marx's pamphlet is characterized by a fusion of realism and passion that made it a major step in the development of a conscious theory of revolutionary war.
列宁在对巴黎公社和马克思的小册子的各种评论中，指出并强化了其中的教训。与1905年俄国革命中的普列汉诺夫不同，马克思预见到1870年的民众起义将是“愚蠢的”，但事后他并没有利用起义的失败来炫耀自己的智慧，而是以同情和现实的态度对其进行了分析。在这方面（以及其他方面），马克思能够不受希望、恐惧或其他情绪的影响，客观地评估暴力的前景和后果，这堪称革命领袖的典范。列宁在马克思和恩格斯的评论基础上进一步指出，巴黎公社最大的错误在于温和与宽宏大量。不接管银行，坚持旧的“公平交换”规则，是被“在统一的法国建立更高正义的梦想”所误导。不消灭所有敌人，指望以此对敌人施加“道德影响”，犯下了一个重大错误，那就是低估了“内战中直接军事行动的重要性”。最终，这些敌人加入了政府军，镇压了公社。但公社仅仅是一场失败的战斗，战败者的勇气不断激励着最终将赢得最终胜利的同志们。公社表明，即使没有有利条件和充分的组织，革命行动也能取得多么巨大的成就。未来，建设革命组织、耐心等待、创造适宜革命行动的条件，将是革命战略的恰当任务。列宁一再追随马克思，坚持认为必须“拆散”、“摧毁”或“粉碎”“资产阶级国家机器”，首先要从常备军开始，并用“人民武装”建立的组织取而代之。<sup> 10</sup>
Lenin, in various observations on the Commune and Marx's pamphlet, pointed and hardened the lessons. Unlike Plekhanov in the Russian Revolution of 1905, Marx had foreseen that a popular insurrection in 1870 would be “folly,” but after the event did not use its failure to advertise his own wisdom, but analyzed it sympathetically and realistically. In that respect (as in others), Marx's capacity to assess both the prospects and the consequences of violence without being swayed by hopes, fears, or other emotions was a model for revolutionary leadership. The great mistakes of the Commune, as Lenin saw them, expanding on the commentary of Marx and Engels, were moderation and magnanimity. Not to seize the banks, and to keep the old rules of “fair exchange,” was to be led astray by “dreams of establishing a higher justice” in a united France. Not to destroy all enemies, in the hope of exerting “moral influence” on them, was to make the major error of underestimating “the significance of direct military operations in civil war.” In the end, those enemies had joined government forces in crushing the Commune. But the Commune was simply a lost battle, the courage of the vanquished a constant inspiration to comrades who would, eventually, win the ultimate victory. The Commune demonstrated how much could be done by revolutionary action, even without favorable conditions and adequate organization. In the future, to build the revolutionary organization, to wait patiently, and to foster suitable conditions for revolutionary action would be the proper tasks of revolutionary strategy. Again and again, Lenin follows Marx in his insistence on the need to “break up,” “smash,” or “crush” the “bourgeois state machine,” beginning with its standing army, and to replace it with an organization created by the “people armed.”10
托洛茨基而非列宁，吸取了巴黎公社和1905年俄国革命的教训，寻求革命战争的战略。与政府军发生武装冲突的必然性显而易见。各国政府都吸取了1789年的教训：当时法国君主制犹豫不决，不愿动用军队，任由人民武装起来，组织起来，最终颠覆了巴黎和其他城市的军事驻军。正如1848年、1871年和1905年所表明的那样，即使是软弱无能的政权，也总能在革命运动做好武装斗争的准备之前发动猛烈的打击。如何应对这一问题？在1905年至1917年间，托洛茨基比任何其他俄国革命家都更努力地试图解答这个问题。
Trotsky, not Lenin, used the lessons of the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution of 1905 to seek a strategy for revolutionary war. The inevitability of an armed clash with government forces was obvious. Governments had learned the lesson of 1789, when the French monarchy had hesitated to use its army, allowing the people to arm and organize themselves and to subvert the military garrisons of Paris and other cities. As 1848, 1871, and 1905 had demonstrated, even a weak and inefficient regime could be counted on to strike hard before the revolutionary movement was ready for an armed clash. How to deal with this problem? Between 1905 and 1917 Trotsky, more than any other Russian revolutionary, attempted to answer this question.11
两种解决办法浮现在脑海：一是加强革命武装力量，二是削弱政府军。打击士气和纪律显然是削弱敌军的有效途径，但具体哪些战术才能奏效呢？被征召入伍的农民缺乏政治意识，因此不太容易接受革命的政治号召。在1905年莫斯科革命期间，游击战被用来最大限度地发挥有限的革命力量的军事效能，但这种打了就跑的战术也激怒了政府军，加剧了镇压。恐怖主义有其拥护者；但也有人，比如普列汉诺夫，认为恐怖主义永远无法获得群众支持。总罢工瘫痪了政府军赖以对抗革命的铁路和电报系统，看似很有希望，但可能并非决定性的。削弱军队的一个孤注一掷的替代方法是采取消极抵抗，说服人们像俄罗斯同胞一样对抗政府军，必要时为信仰献身，希望他们的殉难能够打破军人枪杀工人的纪律束缚。12但这些策略似乎没有哪一种比其他策略更可行或更有效，能够削弱政权压倒性的武装力量，而且在1917年之前，所有这些策略都缺乏实际经验的支持。1906年喀琅施塔得和帝国军队其他地方发生的兵变令人鼓舞，但革命理论家们对此却存在不同的解读。农村地区游击队与政府军之间的战斗仍在继续，但民众抵抗与单纯的匪盗之间的界限难以界定。1905年后的军事战略之争实际上是一场政治辩论，双方立场截然相反：一方以列宁为代表，支持直接军事行动（认为这将唤醒群众、训练革命战士并瓦解帝国军队的士气）；另一方则以普列汉诺夫为代表，强调群众支持的必要性（因此担心“过早”发动武装起义的后果）。在这场辩论中，托洛茨基发挥了创造性的调解作用。
Two answers suggested themselves: strengthen the armed force of revolution, and weaken the government army. Attacking morale and discipline were obvious ways of weakening enemy troops, but what specific tactics would be effective? Conscripted peasants lacked political consciousness, and so were less susceptible to revolutionary political appeals. In Moscow during the 1905 revolution, guerrilla warfare had been used to maximize the military effect of limited revolutionary forces, but such hit-and-run tactics had also infuriated government troops and increased the energy of repression. Terrorism had its advocates; but others, like Plekhanov, argued that terror would never attract mass support. A general strike, paralyzing the rail and telegraph systems that gave government forces so much of their power against revolution, seemed promising but would probably not be decisive. A desperate alternative method of weakening the army was to resist it passively, to persuade people to confront government troops as fellow Russians, if necessary dying for their beliefs in the hope that their martyrdom would break the bonds of discipline that made soldiers shoot workers.12 But none of these various tactics seemed more feasible or effective than any other in undermining the overwhelming armed force of the regime, and before 1917 all lacked much support in actual experience. Mutinies at Kronstadt and elsewhere within the imperial armed forces in 1906 were encouraging, but susceptible to conflicting interpretations by revolutionary theorists. Fighting between partisan bands and government forces in the countryside continued, but the line between popular resistance and simple banditry was not easily drawn. The debate after 1905 over military strategy was in effect a political debate, the sides polarized between those, like Lenin, who supported direct military action (which would arouse the masses, train revolutionary fighters, and break the morale of the imperial army), and those, like Plekhanov, who emphasized the need for mass support (and consequently feared the effects of “premature” armed insurrection). In this debate Trotsky played a creative, mediating role.
由于无法决定如何最好地削弱政权的武装力量，革命者自然而然地将重点放在加强自身的军事力量上。在这方面，分歧较小。因为许多人对农村游击队持怀疑态度，认为他们的行动往往会演变成匪患和不受控制的恐怖主义；而另一些人则同样对“群众”革命这种谨慎而又略带浪漫色彩的理念持怀疑态度，认为只有在条件“合适”时才会发动革命。因此，各方达成共识的焦点在于，需要组织、武装和训练无产阶级中最具积极性和政治觉悟的部分。这样一来，党就能像1871年的巴黎公社或1905年的革命者那样，为武装斗争做好充分的准备，无论何时何地，无论斗争以何种方式爆发。然而，这种共识的结果是，它强调了革命战争的城市化、工业化乃至技术官僚化的一面，将战斗设想为争夺现代社会神经中枢控制权的短暂而激烈的较量。从这个意义上讲，1905 年后在俄国出现的革命战争理论反映了西方军事思想更为古老的传统。
Unable to decide how best to weaken the armed forces of the regime, the revolutionaries naturally concentrated on strengthening their own military arm. Here there was less disagreement. Because many were skeptical of the rural partisans, whose operations tended to degenerate into banditry and uncontrolled terrorism, and many others were equally skeptical of the cautious, somewhat romantic concept of a “mass” revolution when conditions were “suitable,” agreement could center on the need to organize, arm, and train the most highly motivated, politically conscious parts of the proletariat. In this way, the Party, unlike the Commune of 1871 or the revolutionaries of 1905, would be as ready as possible for the armed struggle, whenever and however it came. But the result of such agreement was to emphasize the urban, industrial, even technocratic aspect of revolutionary warfare, with battles conceived as brief, climactic encounters fought for control of the nerve centers of a modern society. In this respect, the theory of revolutionary warfare emergent after 1905 in Russia reflected a much older tradition of Western military thought.
托洛茨基在巴尔干战争中作为记者的经历，更加坚定了他这样的信念：只有装备精良、训练有素、指挥得当的革命军队才能战胜政府军，而依靠人数和热情的民众力量已经过时了。像在马其顿山区活动的切特尼克游击队这样的武装力量，在革命战争中充其量只能起到辅助作用。
Trotsky's experience as a journalist in the Balkan Wars reinforced his belief that only a well-armed, trained, and well-led revolutionary army could hope to defeat the army of the government, and that popular forces, relying on numbers and enthusiasm, were obsolete. Guerrilla bands, like the Chetniks operating in the Macedonian mountains, could at most play an auxiliary role in revolutionary war.
最终，第一次世界大战带来的巨大压力，比革命理论和鼓动更能削弱作为革命主要障碍的俄国帝国军队，而这支军队中很大一部分人倒戈加入革命事业，确保了布尔什维克的胜利。托洛茨基在俄国革命军事领袖地位上建立起来的内战，并非采用独特的“革命”战略，而是运用了“现代”——即常规的——军事方法。因此，俄国革命对军事理论的直接影响在于，它否定了革命战争战略可以基于资本主义列强参谋学院所奉行的原则之外的任何原则的观点。从这个意义上讲，战争涉及一系列主要技术性的需求，使其无法通过对资产阶级意识形态的革命批判来解决。
In the event, the extreme pressures generated by World War I did more than revolutionary theorizing and agitation to weaken the Russian imperial army as the chief barrier to revolution, and the defection of large parts of that army to the revolutionary cause secured Bolshevik victory. The Civil War, in which Trotsky gained fame as military leader of the Russian Revolution, was fought not with a uniquely “revolutionary” strategy but with “modern”—that is, conventional—military methods. The direct legacy of the Russian Revolution to military theory was, then, to reject the idea that a strategy for revolutionary war could be based on any principles other than those prevailing in the staff colleges of the capitalist powers. Warfare, in that sense, involved a set of largely technical demands that placed it beyond the revolutionary critique of bourgeois ideology.
在本土之外，欧洲列强更多地将叛乱和起义视为帝国治安问题，而非民众不满的表达。为了维护和平与秩序，殖民政府往往将“土著”领袖视为麻烦制造者和土匪，而非爱国者或政治激进分子。殖民地军队也视敌人与欧洲军队截然不同；在他们眼中，敌人是躁动不安的部落、叛乱分子和土匪，而非武装起来的民众。这些态度不难理解；与精心布置的伏击战能让人深入了解对手的武器和战术，却难以洞悉其政治目标、正义观念或世界观。此外，帝国列强在殖民战争中通常采用组织而非教条的方式。他们组建专门的殖民地军队，通常由欧洲人领导，其中大部分是当地士兵，并让他们负责处理在遥远地区进行的小规模战争的日常实际问题。独立的组织将殖民地军事经验与欧洲战争问题区分开来，并有助于使国家军事学院的思想家们不必关心应对革命的战略。
Outside their own continent, the European powers looked on revolts and insurrections more as problems of imperial policing than as expressions of popular discontent. In their efforts to maintain peace and order, colonial governments tended to see “native” leaders not as patriots or political radicals, but as troublemakers and bandits. The military forces of the colonies also looked on their foes as different from the armies of Europe; they were restless tribes, insurrectos, dacoits rather than the people armed. These attitudes are easy enough to understand; fighting through a well-laid ambush teaches a lot about the weapons and tactics of an opponent, but very little about his political goals, sense of justice, or cosmology. Furthermore, the imperial powers commonly used an organizational rather than a doctrinal approach to colonial wars. They organized specialized colonial armies, usually a high proportion of local troops led by Europeans, and let them worry about the practical, day-to-day problems of fighting and winning the little wars in distant places. Separate organization divided the colonial military experience from problems of European warfare, and helped to keep the thinkers of the national war colleges unconcerned with strategies for dealing with revolutions.
殖民地军事观点在世纪之交由皇家炮兵少校查尔斯·E·卡尔韦尔（Charles E. Callwell）的著作中得到了很好的阐述。<sup> 13</sup>在《小规模战争》（Small Wars）一书中，卡尔韦尔明确区分了此类战争与正规军之间的战役。随后，他进一步解释了如何对“野蛮人和半文明种族”进行远征。他的论述详尽透彻，并未声称非正规军和游击队可以被轻易制服。但他同时也明确指出，他所谈论的军事行动仅在殖民地具有重要意义。因此，在二战之前，殖民地丰富的作战经验在很大程度上与本土军队的理论和实践相隔绝。
The colonial military view is well expressed by Major Charles E. Callwell, Royal Artillery, who wrote at the turn of the century.13 In Small Wars, Callwell clearly distinguishes such wars from regular campaigns between organized armies. He then goes on to explain how to conduct “expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races.” He does this thoroughly and well, and does not pretend that irregular warriors and guerrillas can be simply overawed. But he also makes it clear that he is talking about military operations that are of importance only in the colonies. And so the rich legacy of operational experience in the colonies was kept largely separated from the theory and practice of the home armies before World War II.
当然也有例外。英国动员了其整个帝国的军队参与布尔战争，并在爱尔兰与家门口的游击队展开了残酷的战争。在法国，利奥泰元帅发表了一篇关于殖民地军队的广为流传的文章。<sup> 14</sup>美国在菲律宾“起义”期间扩充了正规军，并组建了25个志愿兵团。但即使是这些例外，也都是与游击队作战而非合作，因此对国内的军事思想影响甚微。然而，还有一个例外却引起了广泛关注。那就是1916年至1918年的阿拉伯起义，这场起义涉及的是发动而非对抗游击战。
There were exceptions. Great Britain mobilized contingents from throughout its empire to fight the Boer War, and in Ireland fought a vicious war against guerrillas on its doorstep. In France, Marshal Lyautey published a widely read article on the colonial army.14 America expanded its regular army and raised twenty-five volunteer regiments during the Philippine “Insurrection.” But even these exceptions involved fighting guerrillas rather than working with them, and thus had little impact on military thinking at home. One further exception, however, was widely noticed. It involved waging, rather than countering, guerrilla warfare: the Arab Revolt of 1916–1918.
T·E·劳伦斯与谢里夫·侯赛因及其子嗣的阿拉伯军队的合作经历，既为战争树立了典范，也催生了一套流传后世的战争理论。劳伦斯只是英国的顾问，而非指挥官，他协助阿拉伯反抗奥斯曼帝国的起义军，协调他们的政治目标和军事行动，以配合英国截然不同的目标和作战行动。他还将当时最先进的技术与阿拉伯人的马匹和骆驼相结合：机枪、迫击炮、轻型火炮、装甲车、用于侦察和对地攻击的飞机，以及海军炮火和后勤支援。尽管他从未声称这场小规模战争仅仅是“一场无关紧要的插曲”，但他确实以极小的英国资源和阿拉伯人的生命代价，为英国主力部队提供了宝贵的援助。值得注意的是，他的众多批评者中，既没有与他并肩作战的战友，也没有他的英国和阿拉伯上级。<sup> 15</sup>
The experience of T. E. Lawrence with the Arab forces of Sherif Hussein and his sons produced both an example and a theory of warfare that became legendary. Lawrence was only a British advisor, never a commander, to the Arab rebels against Ottoman rule, but he coordinated their political goals and military operations to complement the far different goals and operations of the British. He also integrated the latest technology with the horses and camels of the Arabs: machine guns, mortars, light artillery, armored cars, aircraft for both reconnaissance and ground attack, and naval gunfire and logistical support. Although he never claimed that his little war was more than “a sideshow of a sideshow,” he did provide valuable assistance to the main British forces at very little cost in British resources and Arab lives. It is significant that his many detractors included neither those who fought with him nor his British and Arab superiors.15
在理论方面，劳伦斯对游击战的看法与卡尔韦尔的截然不同。他将自己深厚的军事史背景应用于阿拉伯起义的具体问题，构建了一个比他所宣称的更具普遍适用性的理论基础。他清晰地界定了战争的政治目标，仔细分析了交战双方的优势和劣势，认识到从安全基地出发的“分离”战略（“沙漠力量”）的重要性，认识到利用先发制人进行袭击和撤退战术的重要性，认识到情报和反情报、心理战和宣传的重要性。简而言之，他写道，“只要拥有机动性、安全保障……时间和战术指导”，起义者就能取得胜利。<sup> 16 </sup>或许劳伦斯最终未能使英国做好在欧洲大陆以外发动革命战争的准备，正是由于他本人极具戏剧性的个性。他引人注目的公众形象掩盖了他的思想以及他实际的成就。他是文坛的宠儿，却是军官餐厅的祸害。几乎没有人把他当成军事预言家，而他于 1935 年去世，当时法国和英国正开始面临另一场世界大战的前景——但这与劳伦斯曾经参与的那种战争截然不同。
On the theoretical side, Lawrence set out a very different view of guerrilla warfare from that sketched by Callwell. Applying his considerable background in military history to the specific problems of the Arab Revolt, Lawrence developed a theoretical base that had a more general application than he claimed for it. He clearly defined the political objectives of the war, carefully analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing forces, recognized the importance of a strategy of “detachment” operating from a secure base (“desert-power”), of using the initiative to attack with hit-and-run tactics, of intelligence and counterintelligence, and of psychological warfare and propaganda. In brief, he wrote that “granted mobility, security…time, and doctrine,” the insurgents would win.16 Perhaps Lawrence's ultimate failure to prepare Great Britain for waging revolutionary war outside the Continent was a result of his own dramatic personality. His distracting public image obscured his ideas as well as his actual accomplishments. The darling of the literary world and the bane of the officers' mess, he was taken seriously as a military prophet by almost no one, and he died in 1935 just as France and Britain were beginning to face the prospect of another world war—not at all the kind of war that Lawrence had fought.
平心而论，20世纪30年代末期，欧洲军事思想家和规划者们确实面临着诸多忧虑。意大利皇家空军和德国空军，再加上毒气战的威胁，使得民防成为首要关注的问题。西班牙内战的观察家们对坦克编队和轰炸袭击感到恐惧，而来自飞机、快艇和潜艇的鱼雷攻击则令海军参谋部忧心忡忡。此外，还有大萧条带来的经济危机，以及第一次世界大战引发的民众反战情绪，再加上人们普遍认为战争计划是为了赢得胜利，而不是为了弥补失败，因此，在20世纪30年代，如果有人准备开展游击战，那他无疑是极其明智的。
In fairness to European military thinkers and planners, there was more than enough to worry them in the late 1930s. The Italian Regia Aeronautica and the German Luftwaffe, plus the specter of gas warfare, made civil defense a dominant concern. Tank formations and bombing attacks had looked fearsome to observers of the Spanish Civil War, while torpedo attacks from aircraft, fast boats, and submarines worried the naval staffs. Add to these problems the economic crises of the Depression and the popular antiwar sentiments that the Great War had generated, then top them with the natural belief that war plans are made to win victories, not to compensate for defeats, and it would have been an exceptionally wise person who would have prepared during the 1930s for guerrilla operations.
除了毛泽东（他的战略尚待探讨）之外，无论是战胜国还是战败国，都没有预料到二战中抵抗轴心国的抵抗运动会如此重要且规模庞大。例如，在英国，没有任何个人或机构像劳伦斯那样深入研究游击战。温斯顿·丘吉尔曾在1921年至1922年间聘用劳伦斯在殖民地事务部工作，多年来一直与他保持通信，并在其著作《伟大的同时代人》中提及劳伦斯。然而，丘吉尔似乎并未考虑过，如果英国再次面对强大的欧洲大陆强权，劳伦斯的这种战争方式在未来是否仍然适用。同样，军事评论家B·H·利德尔·哈特在20世纪30年代也曾与劳伦斯通信、交换书籍，并在周末与他见面。但利德尔·哈特认为劳伦斯的游击战战略更多地是对其自身“间接战术”战略的验证，而非适用于近期战场。18因此，当英国在1938年慕尼黑危机后开始认真备战时，游击战“几乎已被遗忘；没有组织能够进行游击战，也没有现成的经验教训或训练有素的行动人员可供借鉴。T·E·劳伦斯在阿拉伯的英勇事迹——英国最后一次非正规武装进攻之一——已成为一段浪漫的传奇…… 19直到1940年夏天，在所有其他反击德国的手段都失败之后，英国才在丘吉尔的敦促下成立了特别行动执行处，“以协调所有针对海外敌人的颠覆和破坏行动”。出席创建仪式的有殖民地大臣乔治·C·L·劳埃德，他是劳伦斯在开罗阿拉伯事务局时的老朋友；还有陆军部下属军事情报研究处（MIR）的J·C·F·霍兰德，他曾因在阿拉伯为劳伦斯飞行而获得勋章。他们的出现几乎是偶然的，但这恰恰凸显了革命战争战略缺乏连贯性。
With the exception of Mao Tse-tung, whose strategy is yet to be discussed, neither victors nor victims anticipated the importance and scale of the resistance movements that opposed the Axis forces in the Second World War. In England, for example, no person or institution carried on the study of guerrilla warfare that Lawrence had personified. Winston Churchill had employed Lawrence in the Colonial Office from 1921 to 1922, had corresponded with him over the years, and had included him in his book, Great Contemporaries.17 Yet Churchill does not seem to have considered the future usefulness of Lawrence's type of warfare should Great Britain again face a strong Continental power. Similarly, the military critic B. H. Liddell Hart had corresponded with Lawrence, exchanged books with him, and saw him on weekends in the 1930s. But Liddell Hart regarded Lawrence's guerrilla strategy more as validation for his own strategy of the “indirect approach” than as applicable to the immediate future.18 Thus, when Great Britain began to prepare seriously for war after the Munich Crisis of 1938, guerrilla warfare was “half-forgotten; no organization for conducting it survived, and there was no readily available corpus of lessons learned or of trained operators in this field. T. E. Lawrence's exploits in Arabia, one of the last irregular British armed offensives, had become a romantic legend…, 19 It was not until the summer of 1940, after all other means of striking back at the Germans had failed, that the British, at Churchill's urging, created Special Operations Executive, “to coordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas.” Present at the creation were George C. L. Lloyd, the Colonial Secretary and an old friend of Lawrence's from the days of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, and J. C. F. Holland of the War Office's vestigial MIR (Military Intelligence Research), who had won a medal flying for Lawrence in Arabia. Their almost accidental presence merely highlighted the lack of continuity in strategy for revolutionary warfare.
一年后，德军入侵苏联不久，斯大林向全国发表广播讲话：“必须组建骑兵和步兵游击队；必须组织师级和集团级单位与敌军作战，在各地开展游击战……”<sup> 20</sup>事实上，苏联秘密制定的游击战计划从未实施，游击队组织也根本不存在。德军的装甲部队已经在明斯克以东包围了近25万苏军，南北两大集团军也步步紧逼，此时再进行有序的计划已经为时过晚；因此，斯大林直接向民众发出呼吁，要求他们立即采取任何行动。
A year later, soon after the German army invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin broadcast an appeal to his people: “Partisan units, mounted and on foot, must be formed; divisions and groups must be organized to combat enemy units, to foment partisan warfare everywhere…”20 The truth was that secret Soviet plans for partisan warfare had never been implemented and no organization for partisans existed. With a Panzer trap already encircling almost a quarter-million Soviet soldiers east of Minsk, and the German Army Groups North and South gaining momentum, it was too late for orderly planning; hence Stalin's direct appeal to the populace to get something, anything, started immediately.
在南斯拉夫，德军的整个入侵过程仅用了11天。在希腊，入侵持续了17天，在法国则长达42天。鉴于军队如此迅速地溃败，以及战前普遍缺乏规划，欧洲各地民族抵抗运动的兴起速度之快令人惊讶。德国人对此负有很大责任，因为在各地——尤其是在斯拉夫地区——纳粹的“生存空间”和“种族”理论对被征服民族而言，充其量意味着剥削，最坏的情况则是种族灭绝，这一点都已昭然若揭。在熟悉的政府崩溃和异己敌对政权建立的双重冲击下，许多战败国的公民被迫脱离了正常生活。一些人投身抵抗运动，以此表达他们新的迷茫、恐惧和希望，并运用在欧洲各地所能找到的各种策略。
In Yugoslavia, the entire German invasion required only eleven days. In Greece it lasted seventeen days, and in France forty-two. With such rapid collapses of the armies and the general absence of prewar planning, it is surprising how quickly national resistance movements sprang up across Europe. The Germans themselves deserve much of the credit for this, since it became clear everywhere—brutally and rapidly clear in the Slavic regions—that Nazi doctrines of Lebensraum and race meant exploitation at best and extermination at worst for conquered populations. Under the twin shocks of the collapse of familiar government and the installation of an alien and antagonistic regime, many citizens of the defeated nations were shaken loose from their normal lives. Some turned to resistance as a way of expressing their new uncertainties, fears, and hopes, using whatever specific strategies became available in their particular part of Europe.
实际上发展出了两种总体战略——一种是保守的，另一种是革命的。苏联是保守战略的最佳例证，其抵抗目标是恢复原政权。保守战略要求重建与政府（无论是在首都还是流亡地）的联系，接受政府官员下达的作战命令，接受一切可能的援助，并最终与国家军队建立联系，重建国家政治体系。相比之下，革命战略在南斯拉夫发展得最为明显，铁托的游击队在那里为从流亡政权手中夺取政权而战。入侵结束仅七个月后，铁托的游击队就与德拉亚·米哈伊洛维奇将军的切特尼克游击队以及德军作战。尽管米哈伊洛维奇被正式任命为陆军部长、军队总司令以及盟军的唯一支持者，但铁托仍然保持独立和敌对的态度。 1942年，他组织了人民解放反法西斯阵线。1943年，该阵线委员会宣布成立南斯拉夫政府，铁托担任总理兼总司令。尽管他与切特尼克武装的冲突持续不断，但铁托与德军的殊死搏斗最终赢得了盟军的支持；英国于1943年派遣了代表团，苏联和美国则在1944年初也派出了代表团。到1944年9月，苏联红军逼近贝尔格莱德，盟军地中海空军猛烈轰炸了巴尔干半岛的德军交通线；到10月底，铁托已抵达贝尔格莱德，领导他的人民解放政府。对于南斯拉夫而言，革命目标贯穿了抵抗运动始终。
Two general strategies actually developed—one conservative, the other revolutionary. The Soviet Union provides the best example of a conservative strategy, in which the objective of resistance was to restore the former regime. Conservative strategy called for reestablishing communications with the government whether in the capital or in exile, accepting operational missions ordered by government officials, receiving whatever help could be spared, and building toward the eventual linkup with a national army and the reinstitution of the national political system. Revolutionary strategy, by contrast, developed most clearly in Yugoslavia, where Tito's partisans fought to take power from the exiled regime. Tito's partisans were fighting General Draja Mihailovitch's Chetnik guerrillas, as well as the Germans, only seven months after the invasion ended. Although Mihailovitch was officially appointed minister of war, commander in chief of the army, and sole receiver of Allied support, Tito remained independent and hostile. He organized a People's Liberation Anti-Fascist Front in 1942, and in 1943 the Front's council declared itself the government of Yugoslavia, with Tito as premier and commander in chief. In spite of his continuing conflict with the Chetniks, Tito's desperate combat against the Germans eventually won Allied support; Britain sent a mission in 1943, and the Soviet Union and the United States did so in early 1944. By September 1944 the Soviet Red Army was approaching Belgrade and the Allied Mediterranean Air Force was pounding the German lines of communication throughout the Balkans; by the end of October, Tito was in Belgrade at the head of his People's Liberation government. For Yugoslavia, a revolutionary objective had focused the efforts of the resistance from beginning to end.21
在欧洲其他地区，抵抗运动的战略不如苏联和南斯拉夫那样清晰明确。尽管所有抵抗运动都寻求恢复本国政府，但这些政府的政治性质却存在争议。抵抗运动或多或少都是由相互竞争的政治团体组成的联盟，在许多被占领国家，共产党是其中最强大、战斗力最强的政党之一。为了获得盟军的支持并加速击败德国人，所有抵抗运动普遍接受流亡政府的协调，但他们也都密切关注着各自国家的战后政治。在某些情况下，例如南斯拉夫切特尼克，这促使他们避免与德国人交战，并将资源用于内部斗争。而在另一些情况下，例如法国共产党，这促使他们建立起对抗德国人的记录，从而在战后巩固自身地位。无论具体战略如何，显而易见的是，“抵抗运动”最重大的影响之一体现在战后各国的政治格局中。战后多年，那些与德国人合作的人往往境遇不佳，而抵抗运动的英雄们则境遇良好，这与抵抗运动本身在全国范围内的成效无关。正如劳伦斯可能预料到的那样，抵抗运动的政治和心理后果，其影响在更长的时间里，比其直接的军事成果更为深远。22
Elsewhere in Europe, resistance strategies where less clearly defined than in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Although all of them sought a restoration of their national government, the political complexions of those governments were a matter of contention. Resistance movements were to a greater or lesser degree a coalition of competing political groups, and in many occupied countries the Communist Party was among the strongest and hardest fighting. All generally accepted coordination by the exiled government in order to receive support from the Allies and to expedite the defeat of the Germans, but they all also kept an eye on the postwar politics of their nations. In some cases, such as the Yugoslavian Chetniks, this led them to avoid combat with the Germans and to conserve their resources for the internal struggle. In others, such as the French Communist Party, it caused them to establish a record against the Germans that would strengthen their position after the war. Regardless of specific strategies, it is clear that one of the greatest consequences of the “Resistance” was in postwar national politics. For years after the war, those who had collaborated with the Germans tended to fare poorly and Resistance heroes well, regardless of the national effectiveness of the Resistance itself. As Lawrence might have predicted, the political and psychological consequences of the Resistance turned out to weigh more heavily over a longer time than did its direct military results.22
东南亚的抵抗运动与欧洲的抵抗运动有一个显著的不同之处：日本侵略者是亚洲人，而战败的政府则是欧洲或美国的——他们是早期侵略的继承者。<sup> 23</sup>这给了日本人巨大的优势，他们也打算利用这一优势。“大东亚共荣圈”的概念是许多日本人热情而真诚地相信的，对许多其他亚洲人来说，它似乎是西方帝国主义之外的一个合理选择。自1905年日本击败俄国以来，日本一直是亚洲人的骄傲和秘密希望的来源，而他们在1942年突然而意外的胜利几乎在一夜之间使“亚洲人的亚洲！”的口号成为现实。然而，其根本的现实是，日本在一场绝望的战争中过度扩张，它赢得胜利的唯一希望是迅速掠夺新解放土地上的资源。日本不仅决心在 1942 年支付战争津贴，而且还将国家的未来押在了继续支付战争津贴上，以对抗世界上最富有的国家和帝国。
Southeast Asian resistance movements revealed one striking difference from those in Europe: the Japanese invaders were Asians, while the defeated governments were European or American—the legatees of earlier invasions.23 This gave the Japanese a great advantage, which they intended to exploit. The “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” was a concept that many Japanese believed in enthusiastically and sincerely, and to many other Asians it appeared to be a reasonable alternative to Western imperialism. The Japanese had been a source of pride and secret hope for Asians since their defeat of Russia in 1905, and their sudden and unexpected victories in 1942 made the slogan “Asia for the Asians!” a reality almost overnight. The underlying reality, however, was that Japan had overextended itself in a desperate war, and its sole hope of winning was the rapid exploitation of the resources of the newly liberated lands. Japan not only was determined to make war pay in 1942, but had staked its national future on continuing to make war pay in a struggle against the richest nations and empires of the world.
除了对资源的渴求之外，日本人还抱持着一种以自我为中心的民族中心主义世界观。日本引以为傲的记录是从未被征服或入侵，并且在之前的四十年里轻松击败了其邻国中国和俄罗斯这两个强大的国家。可以说，日本人，尤其是皇军士兵，并没有将他们解放的亚洲人民视为平等的一员。这种优越感使得日本人难以被爱戴和接纳，尽管他们令人畏惧，甚至令人尊敬。
Added to this need for resources was the ethnocentric Japanese view of the rest of the world. Japan had a singularly proud record of never having been conquered or invaded, and in the preceding forty years had handily defeated its giant neighbors, China and Russia. It is fair to say that the Japanese, particularly the soldiers of the imperial army, did not see the Asian people that they had liberated as their equals. This sense of superiority made the Japanese difficult to love and accept, although they could easily be feared and even respected.
前殖民列强也并不受民众爱戴，因此，民众理所当然地将选择建立在自身利益之上，并受到交战双方的表现和承诺的指引。一些重要的例外包括：支持苏联一方的地方共产党；支持中国一方的华人少数民族；以及许多被推翻的殖民政权的军政官员，他们仍然忠诚地支持着他们以前的雇主。在这种忠诚与自身利益交织的复杂局面下，到1942年初，反日抵抗运动的可能性已经出现，而且随着时间的推移，这种可能性越来越大，部分原因是日本人不断提高经济要求和侮辱，部分原因是盟军胜利的可信度也随之提高。
The former colonial powers were not well loved either, and so the populations properly based their choices on self-interest, guided by the performances and promises of the warring sides. Important exceptions were the local Communist parties, which supported the side that the Soviets were on; Chinese minorities, which supported the side that China was on; and many military and civil officials of the displaced colonial regimes, who continued to support their former employers loyally. In this complex mixture of loyalty and self-interest, there was by early 1942 a possibility of anti-Japanese resistance movements, and the likelihood increased with time, partly because the Japanese increased their economic demands and their insults, partly because of a concurrent increase in the credibility of Allied victory.
与欧洲相比，亚洲的抵抗策略目标更为多样。例如，在缅甸，大多数缅族人最初并不认为有必要抵抗。30名年轻的缅甸爱国者，即“三十英雄”，在英国统治时期离开缅甸，于1942年随日军返回。他们组建了缅甸独立军，在仰光建立了自治政府，并于1943年获得日本的独立。然而，他们最终对日本人感到失望，于1944年末组建了秘密反对党和游击队，并与1945年从日军手中夺回缅甸的英军合作。凭借与日军合作以及随后反抗日军所获得的政治和军事力量，缅甸人在战后争取到了独立。令人遗憾的是，但并非罕见的是，在抵抗运动的遗留问题上，一些曾武装起来对抗日军的山地部落以及两个不同的共产党组织，在战后多年继续对仰光政府进行游击战。24
More than in Europe, resistance strategies in Asia had a variety of objectives. In Burma, for example, most ethnic Burmans initially saw no need for resistance at all. Thirty young Burmese patriots, the “Thirty Heroes” who had left Burma when under British rule, returned with the Japanese army in 1942. They recruited a Burmese Independence Army, set up an autonomous government in Rangoon, and were granted independence by the Japanese in 1943. Eventually disillusioned with the Japanese, however, they formed a secret opposition party and a guerrilla resistance force in late 1944, and cooperated with the British army that retook Burma from the Japanese in 1945. Using the political and military power-base gained by collaboration with—and then resistance to—the Japanese, the Burmese negotiated independence in the postwar period. In an unfortunate but not uncommon legacy of the Resistance, the several hill tribes that had been armed against the Japanese, as well as two different Communist groups, continued guerrilla war against the Rangoon government for years afterward.24
菲律宾联邦的经历则截然不同。1941年，菲律宾新军开始接受训练，并计划在五年内独立。菲律宾人与美军并肩作战，直至1942年4月在巴丹半岛战败。此后，马尼拉许多政客同意加入日本扶植的菲律宾共和国，而成千上万的普通菲律宾民众则继续与菲裔美国人游击队并肩作战，并为其提供支持。1944年至1945年间，美军卷土重来，战火纷飞，破坏力极大。战争加剧了政治精英与民众之间的分裂，使得菲律宾在获得独立后，未来充满不确定性。25
The Philippine Commonwealth had a different experience. With a new Philippine army under training in 1941 and a date set for independence within five years, the Filipinos fought beside the Americans until their defeat on the Bataan Peninsula in April 1942. After that, many of the Manila politicians agreed to serve in the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic, while thousands of ordinary Filipinos continued to fight with and support the Filipino-American guerrillas. The very destructive fighting of 1944–1945, when American forces returned, and the split—exacerbated by the war—between the political elite and the masses, left the Philippines with an uncertain future when independence was granted.25
马来人和越南人都曾抵抗日本侵略，但方式截然不同。马来亚人民抗日军以华人为主，而非马来人，其核心是马来亚共产党，并愿意接受英国的援助。该军于1945年解散，但在战后不久以马来亚民族解放军的名义重新出现，与英国作战长达十二年，最终承认战败。<sup> 26</sup>越南领导人胡志明于1941年在中国的一次印度支那共同体党（流亡组织）会议上创立了越盟。三年多的时间里，胡志明逐步在越南北部建立起军队和政治组织。到1945年8月，当日本将权力移交给保大皇帝时，越盟已成为越南唯一仍在运作的政治组织，保大皇帝被迫退位，将权力移交给越盟。 1945年9月，越南民主共和国在河内宣告独立，但它还需要经过三十年的斗争才能实现统一和独立。27
Both Malayans and Vietnamese resisted the Japanese, but in very different ways. The Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army was ethnically Chinese—not Malay—and built around the Malayan Communist Party; it was willing to accept British aid. It disbanded in 1945, but reappeared as the Malayan Races Liberation Army soon after the war to fight the British for twelve years before acknowledging defeat.26 The Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh founded the Vietminh party in 1941 at a meeting in China of the exiled Indochina Community Party. More than three years passed as Ho gradually formed an army and a political organization in northern Vietnam. By August 1945, when the Japanese handed power to Emperor Bao Dai, the Vietminh was the only working political organization in the country, and Bao Dai abdicated, relinquishing his authority to it. In September 1945 the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed in Hanoi, but it would have to fight for thirty years before becoming unified and independent.27
在印度尼西亚和泰国，没有出现大规模的抵抗运动。泰国是独立的，选择与日本合作，同时与美国和英国保持秘密联系。印度尼西亚在战略和经济上都过于重要，无法获得独立，因此日本军队接管了荷兰的行政体系，并统治该国直至1945年8月。他们的统治十分强硬，但在苏加诺和穆罕默德·哈达的支持下，鼓励了亲日民族主义。他们还训练了一支约6.5万人的印尼军队。1945年8月日本突然投降两天后，苏加诺和哈达宣布印尼独立，但印尼又经历了五年的内战以及与英国和荷兰的战争，才最终实现统一和独立。28
In Indonesia and Thailand there were no significant resistance movements. Thailand was independent, and chose to collaborate with the Japanese while maintaining undercover contacts with the Americans and British. Indonesia was too important strategically and economically to be granted independence, so the Japanese army took over the Dutch administrative system and ran the country until August 1945. Their rule was firm, but encouraged pro-Japanese nationalism with support from Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta. They also trained an Indonesian army of about 65,000. Two days after the abrupt Japanese surrender in August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta announced the independence of Indonesia, but it took five more years of civil wars and wars against the British and Dutch before Indonesia was unified and independent.28
二战期间的抵抗运动千差万别，任何概括都可能存在风险；但有一个共同点却鲜为人知，那就是技术。人们常说，游击队对抗的是技术更先进的敌人，他们往往能够利用敌人对先进技术的依赖所带来的弱点。但现代技术也确实促进了游击战；二战期间，欧洲和亚洲的抵抗运动之所以能够取得胜利并得以生存，很大程度上要归功于两种新的战争工具——无线电和飞机。无线电使抵抗战士在战略上具有重要意义，在战术上也更有效，而飞机则为他们提供补给，并常常保护他们。如果没有无线电，来自伦敦、莫斯科或其他地方的控制将是不可能的。与此同时，许多游击行动都依赖于快速通信。如果没有无线电，情报传递将会非常缓慢，空投、营救被击落的飞行员以及协调地面行动都会变得更加困难。小型远程无线电的研发和无线电操作员的培训是特别行动执行处等总部的重要职能，与此同时，德日两国在打击抵抗运动这一关键环节的战争中，致力于研发测向设备、破译密码、干扰技术和欺骗手段。支援游击队的飞机需要足够的航程和有效载荷，并且能够空投人员和物资，或在简易跑道上起降，或两者兼备。老旧的轰炸机，例如英国的惠灵顿轰炸机，以及美国的C-46和C-47运输机，都能很好地胜任这些任务。对于较轻的任务，久经考验的苏联PO-2（或U-2）双座双翼飞机可以将一名政委降落在任何小型跑道上，然后载着两名受伤的游击队员从机翼上起飞。机组人员的训练对于执行这些任务至关重要，缺乏特殊夜间飞行和导航能力的机组人员很难取得成功。盟军空军组建了专门训练和装备的飞行中队来执行这些任务。尽管技术细节现在看来可能并不重要，但这段经历本身却造就了一系列技能，并在某种程度上积累了一套硬件设备，这些在战后时期成为一种新意识的一部分，即“革命战争”不再被视为无关紧要。29
Resistance movements during the Second World War were so diverse that all generalization is hazardous; but one common feature, seldom noted, was technological. It is commonplace to say that guerrillas fight against technologically more advanced enemies, and are often able to exploit weaknesses that dependence on advanced technology creates. But it is also true that modern technology has facilitated guerrilla warfare; the wartime Resistance in both Europe and Asia owed its victories as well as its survival in large measure to two new tools of war—the radio and the airplane. The radio made Resistance fighters strategically relevant and tactically effective, while aircraft supplied and often protected them. Without radios, control from London, Moscow, or elsewhere would have been impossible. At the same time, many of the guerrilla operations depended on rapid communications. Intelligence reporting would have been too slow without the radio, and airdrops, pickups of downed airmen, and coordinated ground action would have been much more difficult. The development of small, long-range radios and the training of radio operators were important functions of headquarters such as Special Operations Executive, while the Germans and Japanese worked on direction-finding equipment, code-breaking, jamming, and deceptive techniques in their war against this key link in the Resistance. Aircraft for support of guerrillas needed adequate ranges and payloads, and the ability either to drop people and bundles by parachute, or to take off and land from short fields, or both. Obsolescent bombers, such as the British Wellington, worked well, as did the American C-46 and C-47 transports. For lighter work, the venerable Soviet PO-2 (or U-2) two-seat biplane could land a commissar in any small field, and then take off with two wounded partisans strapped to its wings. Aircrew training for these missions was important, and crews without special night-flying and navigation abilities had little success. Allied air forces developed squadrons specifically trained and equipped for these missions. Although the technological details may now seem unimportant, the experience itself created a set of skills, and to some extent a collection of hardware, that in the postwar period would become part of a new consciousness that “revolutionary war” could no longer be regarded as of minor significance.29
三
III
回顾历史，我们或许会发现革命战争现象起源于十八世纪美国和法国的第一波现代革命浪潮。在拿破仑战争的催化下，十九世纪，对民族独立、民主权利和社会正义的诉求汇聚一堂，为武装革命提供了强大的推动力。到了本世纪初，革命军事斗争的具体问题已受到广泛关注，而1917年的俄国革命则被视为这一漫长历史进程的顶峰。然而，这种看似合理的视角是错误的；思想与现实、理论与实践的真正融合从未发生，即便在1917年的革命中也未能实现。直到20世纪40年代，革命战争的真实面貌始终是一次次失败的尝试，一次次走向死胡同，至多只是对未来的短暂憧憬——而非人们预期的那种目标和方法都与西方悠久战争传统截然不同的全新战争模式的出现。即使在1941年，这种新型战争——无论是作为一类军事事件还是一种战略思维——都难以被察觉。但自那时起，人们的认识急剧上升。1949年中国共产党的胜利，以及随之而来的对其领导人毛泽东革命战争著作的广泛宣传，再加上欧洲列强在亚非的或多或少带有暴力色彩的瓦解，以及冷战的爆发，所有这些因素共同作用，使得这一主题在当代西方军事思想中获得了前所未有的关注度。真正新颖的并非这一现象本身，而是我们对它的认知。
It is possible to look back and see the phenomenon of revolutionary war emerging in the eighteenth century from the first wave of modern revolutions in America and France. Catalyzed by the Napoleonic Wars, demands for national independence, for democratic rights, and for social justice fused in the nineteenth century to provide a powerful impetus to armed revolution. By the early years of the present century, the specific problem of revolutionary military struggle was receiving considerable attention, and the Russian Revolution of 1917 would see the culmination of a long historic process. But this plausible perspective is mistaken; the vital fusion of ideas and actual conditions, of theory and practice, never took place, not even in the 1917 revolution. The real story, until the 1940s, is one of false starts, dead ends, at most brief flashes of the future—not at all the anticipated emergence of a radically new kind of warfare, whose aim and methods diverged sharply from the long tradition of Western warfare. Not even in 1941 was this new kind of war, considered either as a class of military events or as a body of strategic thinking, perceptible. Since then, awareness has risen sharply. The victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, with the attendant publicity for the writings on revolutionary war of their leader, Mao Tse-tung, the more or less violent dismantling of the great European empires in Asia and Africa, and the Cold War have all combined to give the subject an unprecedented salience in contemporary Western military thought. What is new is not the phenomenon itself, but our perception of it.
无论我们如何从其他地方寻找，关于革命战争思想的基本文本都出自毛泽东的著作。当中国共产党革命运动意识到马克思主义的无产阶级革命模式并不适用于中国这个工业薄弱的农业社会时，它便放弃了城市和工人阶级，转而将农村和农民作为革命的主要力量。在与国民政府的残酷斗争中，尤其是在1937年后抗击日本侵略者的斗争中，毛泽东和中国人民围绕着以农民为基础的游击战的战术和技巧，构建了一套新的革命理论。游击队比敌人弱小，如果没有强大而组织严密的民众支持，就无法发挥作用，甚至无法生存。动员这种支持是一项政治任务，而非军事任务，而政治优先于军事的理念也成为毛泽东战争理论的一个显著特征。在这方面，他与传统的西方军事思想截然不同，后者对战争与和平、政治与军事事务的区分相当僵化。
However much we may seek it elsewhere, the basic text for ideas about revolutionary war is in the writings of Mao Tse-tung. When the Chinese Communist revolutionary movement realized that the Marxist model of proletarian revolution did not apply to China, an agrarian society with a weak industrial sector, it turned away from the cities and workers to the countryside and the peasantry as the main support for revolution. In their violent struggle with the Nationalist government, and still more in their fight against the Japanese after 1937, Mao and the Chinese built a new doctrine for revolution around the tactics and techniques of waging a peasant-based guerrilla war. Guerrillas, weaker than their enemy, could not be effective or even survive without strong, well-organized popular support. Mobilizing that support was a political rather than a military task, and the primacy of political over military concerns became a hallmark of Mao's theorizing about warfare. In this respect he diverged markedly from traditional Western military thought, with its fairly rigid distinctions between war and peace, and between political and military affairs.
毛泽东在其他重要方面也与西方传统有所不同，尤其是在时间和空间的价值观念上。以拿破仑为代表的西方传统认为，军事胜利必须迅速取得，夺取或保卫领土是战争的核心目的。而对于毛泽东来说，由于长期以来缺乏夺取和守住领土或速战速决的手段，时间和空间反而成为了武器而非目标。“持久战”旨在消耗敌人的精力，即便无法在军事上取得胜利，至少也能在政治上将其瓦解，因为敌人无法像西方传统那样迅速取胜。同样，对于游击队而言，试图守住领土无异于自杀，但通过在比敌人更熟悉的广袤或崎岖地形中作战，他们可以诱敌深入、误导敌人、消耗敌人的体力，从而创造发动致命突袭的机会。这些是毛泽东思想的核心，围绕着政治、时间和空间展开。他在1949年的伟大胜利确保了这些与欧洲世界军事霸权所依据的军事理念截然不同的思想得以广泛传播，从而吸引了革命者和反革命者的共同关注。30
Mao diverged in other important respects as well, especially in the values given to time and space. In the Western tradition, epitomized by Napoleon, military victory was to be achieved quickly, and the seizure or defense of territory was central to the very purpose of warfare. For Mao, long without the means either to seize and hold territory or to win quick victory, space and time became weapons rather than goals. “Protracted struggle” promised to exhaust the enemy, if not militarily then at least politically, as he failed to achieve the quick victory demanded by the Western tradition. Similarly, trying to hold territory could be suicidal for guerrilla forces, but by operating in vast or difficult terrain, better known to them than to their enemy, they could entice, mislead, and wear him down, creating chances for damaging surprise attacks. These were key Maoist ideas centering on politics, time, and space. His great victory in 1949 ensured that these ideas, so divergent from the military concepts that presumably underlay European military predominance in the world, would be widely publicized, attracting enormous attention from revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries alike.30
分析毛泽东革命战争思想的难点在于，如何区分他实际的言论和人们通常理解的言论。与其他一些有影响力的军事理论家，如若米尼、克劳塞维茨和马汉一样，毛泽东的拥护者和反对者都曾断章取义地解读他的思想，脱离了这些思想最初发展、表达和理解的语境。我们必须牢记，这些思想是在极其危险和艰苦的环境下形成的：既有与国民党的残酷内战，也有对日本侵略的殊死抵抗。
The problem in analyzing Mao's thought on revolutionary war lies in keeping what he said distinct from what he was generally understood to have said. As with other influential military theorists, like Jomini, Clausewitz, and Mahan, admirers as well as enemies have taken Mao's ideas out of the context in which they were developed, expressed, and meant to be understood. It is well to remember that the ideas themselves were worked out in the midst of great danger and hardship: the ferocious civil war against the Nationalists and the equally desperate resistance to Japanese invasion.
最初，采取游击战策略是务实地承认国民党军队和日本军队一样，在军事上更强大。早在1930年，毛泽东就写道：
Resorting to guerrilla warfare was, initially, a pragmatic recognition that the Nationalists, like the Japanese, were stronger militarily. As early as 1930, Mao wrote:
我们采用的是游击战术……分散兵力动员群众，集中兵力对付敌人。
Ours are guerrilla tactics…. Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy.
敌军进，我们撤；敌军扎营，我们骚扰；敌军疲乏，我们进攻；敌军撤退，我们追击……
The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue….
在最短的时间内，以最佳的方式唤醒尽可能多的群众。31
Arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time and by the best possible methods.31
大约在同一时期，他在一篇题为《论纠正党内错误思想》的文中，进一步阐述了他唤醒群众的命令：“红军战斗不只是为了战斗而战斗，而是为了在群众中开展宣传，组织群众，武装群众，帮助群众建立革命政权。没有这些目标，战斗就失去了意义，红军也失去了存在的理由。”<sup> 32 </sup> 显然，他是在反驳自己阵营中关于军事和政治分工的观点。他的观点更偏向务实而非意识形态，这一点可以从同一篇文章的前文中看出：“尤其是在当前形势下，红军当然不应该只顾战斗……”<sup> 33</sup>
At about the same time, in a message called “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party,” he expanded on his order to arouse the masses: “The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.”32 Here he was obviously refuting an opinion in his own camp that called for a division of labor between military and political tasks. That his own opinion was more pragmatic than ideological is indicated by an earlier passage in the same essay: “Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting…,”33
到了20世纪30年代后期，长征和日本侵略之后，实用主义逐渐成为党的正统观念。在1937年接受一位英国记者采访时，他谈到了指导八路军政治工作的“原则”。三项原则中的第二项是“军民统一”，这意味着“保持严明的纪律，禁止任何损害人民利益的行为；在群众中开展宣传，组织和武装群众；减轻群众的经济负担；镇压危害军民的叛徒和合作者——这样，军队就与人民紧密团结，受到各地人民的欢迎。”他在其他地方也写到了“革命战争的规律”。<sup> 34</sup>
By the later 1930s, after the Long March and the Japanese invasion, pragmatism was becoming party orthodoxy. In a 1937 interview with a British journalist, he spoke in terms of “principles” guiding the political work of the Eighth Route Army. The second of three principles was that of “unity between the army and the people, which means maintaining a discipline that forbids the slightest violation of the people's interests, conducting propaganda among the masses, organizing and arming them, lightening their economic burdens and suppressing the traitors and collaborators who do harm to the army and the people—as a result of which the army is closely united with the people and welcomed everywhere.” Elsewhere he wrote of the “laws of revolutionary war.”34
毛泽东的言论不仅从务实转向教条（毫无疑问，部分原因是用马克思列宁主义的术语来说，他宣扬的是异端邪说），而且重点也从军队在人民政治化中的作用转向军队对人民的依赖。革命无产阶级居住的城市被反动派和帝国主义者占领，因此革命必须“把落后的农村变成先进的、巩固的基地”。他又说：“没有这样的战略基地，我们在执行任何战略任务或实现战争目标时就没有任何依靠。”<sup> 35</sup>其他中国共产党领导人（周恩来）显然有不同的看法：“革命基地的长期革命斗争主要由中国共产党领导的农民游击战组成。因此，忽视利用农村地区作为革命基地的必要性，忽视在农民中开展的艰苦工作，忽视游击战，都是错误的。” 36毛泽东始终抨击那些试图从乡村转向城市、从地方力量转向主力军、从人的动机转向军事技术、从战争转向政治行动的人。他反复强调：“枪杆子里出政权。” 37
Not only did the emphasis in his pronouncements shift from the pragmatic to the dogmatic (in part, no doubt, because in Marxist-Leninist terms Mao was preaching heterodoxy), but emphasis also shifted from the army's role in politicizing people to the army's reliance on the people. The cities, where the revolutionary proletariat lived, were occupied by reactionaries and imperialists, so the revolution must “turn the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas.” And again: “Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the aim of the war.”35 That other Chinese Communist leaders (Chou En-lai) saw matters differently is apparent: “The protracted revolutionary struggle in the revolutionary base areas consists mainly in peasant guerrilla warfare led by the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore it is wrong to ignore the necessity of using rural districts as revolutionary base areas, to neglect painstaking work among the peasants, and to neglect guerrilla warfare.”36 Throughout, Mao attacks those who would shift away from the villages to the cities, from regional forces to the main army, from human motivation to military technique, and from warfare to political action. “Political power,” he repeats, “grows out of the barrel of a gun.”37
所有这些关于革命战争的论述都出自毛泽东的《毛泽东选集》，该选集已被翻译成多种语言并在世界各地流传。它们也出现在1967年林彪掌权时出版的《人民战争》小红书里。<sup> 38</sup> 《人民战争》小红书，除其他内容外，是一部精心编排的引文集，其中穿插了林彪本人的补充，旨在支持其将中国意识形态与美国技术对立起来的争议性政策，并为毛泽东在1966年发动的文化大革命辩护。尽管这些引文大致准确地描绘了毛泽东关于革命战争的思想，但所有的细微差别、限定条件和语境参考都被忽略了，时间顺序也被抛诸脑后；相反，毛泽东的思想被放任自由，被视为普遍适用，至少对于像中国这样“半殖民地半封建”的国家而言是如此。39正是以这种高度浓缩、抽象的形式，毛泽东关于革命战争的思想给那些身处类似斗争中的人们留下了深刻的印象。
All of these statements on revolutionary war are taken from Mao's Selected Works, translated into many languages and circulated throughout the world. They are also found in the little red book on “People's War,” published in 1967 when Lin Piao was ascendant.38 The little red book is, among other things, a carefully arranged set of quotations, with interpolation by Lin himself, to buttress the controversial policy of pitting Chinese ideology against American technology, and to defend Mao's unleashing of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Although the quotations add up to an essentially accurate picture of Mao's thinking on revolutionary war, all nuances, qualifications, and contextual references are lost, and chronology is ignored; instead, Mao's ideas are allowed to float free, as universally valid, at least for countries like China, “semi-colonial and semi-feudal.”39 It was in this highly condensed, abstract form that Mao's thought on revolutionary war impressed itself on those caught up in comparable struggles.
将毛泽东的著作从20世纪30年代的作战备忘录奉为革命战争的圣经，其造成的最严重的扭曲在于，毛泽东对正确战略评估必要性的强调被忽略或淡化。如果仅从一种角度解读，毛泽东关于革命战略的各种论著充斥着陈词滥调：军事行动和政治行动紧密相连；游击队依靠民众的支持，而民众的支持是通过让群众享受革命的成果来获得的；革命战士是鱼，人民是他们赖以生存的海洋。这些论著也充满了冗长的论战，对那些拒绝、质疑或误解毛泽东战略的人进行猛烈抨击；“逃亡主义”、“孤注一掷”、“机会主义”和“游击主义”只是毛泽东谴责的众多异端邪说之一，读者或许会倾向于将这些抨击仅仅视为毛泽东写作时期中国革命政治斗争的反映。
The most serious distortion caused by this elevation of Mao's writing from operational memoranda of the 1930s to the biblical text for revolutionary war is the loss or muting of his emphasis on the need to make correct strategic assessments. If read in one way, his various treatises on revolutionary strategy are filled with what have become clichés: military and political action are closely interdependent; guerrillas depend on popular support, which they get by bringing the benefits of revolution to the masses; revolutionary fighters are fish, the people are the sea in which they swim. These treatises are also filled with ponderous polemics, attacks left and right on those who reject, doubt, or misunderstand Mao's strategy; “flightism,” “desperadoism,” “opportunism,” and “guerillaism” are among the many heresies denounced by Mao, and readers may be tempted to regard these attacks as simply reflecting the political struggles of the Chinese Revolution at the time Mao wrote.
但如果换个角度解读，将其视为解决各种具体战略情境中战略问题的根本手段，那么这些论战性的章节，连同他其他看似与军事无关的著作，就变得非常有趣和重要了。尤其值得注意的是，许多将毛泽东视为革命战争理论奠基人的人都忽略了他理论的这一部分。毛泽东痴迷于知识问题，他对异端观点的论战，虽然针对的是个人和政治目标，但实际上却是在探讨系统学习和思考的失败。在充满压力和情绪化的革命行动中，领导人很容易被情绪左右——胜利让他们陶醉，失败让他们沮丧，意外让他们不知所措。革命的社会结构加剧了这种困境：知识分子只能从书本和谈话中获得知识，农民只能相信自己的五官和个人经验。即使是革命行动，也只不过是强化了人们的固有观念而已。激烈的派系斗争、严重的错误和革命的失败，都是这种根深蒂固的弊病——未能把握革命现实——的必然结果。
But if read in another way, as a fundamental means of addressing the problem of strategy manifesting itself in a variety of specific strategic situations, then these polemical sections, together with other parts of his writing ostensibly unrelated to military matters, become very interesting and important, the more so because many who have looked to Mao as the seminal theorist of revolutionary warfare have neglected this part of his theory. Mao was obsessed by the problem of knowledge, and his polemical attacks on heretical views, while directed against personal and political targets, deal with failures of systematic learning and thinking. In the stressful and emotional realm of revolutionary action, leaders were easily carried away by their feelings—intoxicated by victory, downcast by defeat, confused by the unexpected. The social structure of revolution compounded the difficulty: intellectuals knew only what they got from books and talk, peasants trusted only their five senses and personal experience. Even revolutionary action did little more than harden preconceptions. Bitter factionalism, gross blunders, and revolutionary failure were the predictable fruits of this deeply rooted ailment, this failure to grasp revolutionary reality.
毛泽东的写作仿佛只有他，凭借其强大的力量和远见卓识，才能认识到肤浅的知识和冲动的决策问题，并加以应对。在这些长篇论文中，许多都是在极其艰苦的条件下，食不果腹、睡眠不足的情况下写成的，他反复强调，在采取行动之前，必须对每一种情况进行彻底的理解和严谨的分析。这些段落的语言、篇幅和出现频率，都消除了人们对他仅仅是在进行某种例行公事的马克思列宁主义说教的任何怀疑；这些段落，即便是在冷冰冰的翻译文字中，也尽可能清晰地展现了这位革命布道者试图对抗懒惰、主观思维这种原罪的热情。在他看来，他如今闻名遐迩的战略理论中的那些陈词滥调，只不过是能够为革命战略指明正确方向、警示人们避免最严重战略失误的简单指导原则。但只有将这些战略公式转化为真正的胜利，而这需要付出极大的智力努力。在随后的许多讨论中，毛泽东战略的这一关键方面却被忽略了。40
Mao wrote as if only he, with his enormous strength and vision, had the capacity to recognize the problem of superficial knowledge and impulsive decision and to cope with it. In these long essays, many written under the most difficult physical circumstances, with little food or sleep, he reiterates that every situation must be totally understood and rigorously analyzed before action is taken. The language, length, and frequency of these passages remove all suspicion that he was merely indulging in some obligatory Marxist-Leninist incantation; these passages reveal, as clearly as is possible in cold translated print, the passion of the revolutionary evangelist trying to confront the original sin of lazy, subjective thinking. The clichés of his now-famous strategic doctrine were, for him, no more than simple guidelines that could set the right direction for revolutionary strategy and warn against the worst kinds of strategic blunders. But only realistic application, which required the utmost intellectual effort, could turn these strategic formulae into actual victory. It is this vital aspect of Maoist strategy that is lost from view in much of the subsequent discussion.40
西方古典战略理论家，尤其是若米尼和克劳塞维茨，都关注同一个问题——如何弥合理论与实践之间的鸿沟。对克劳塞维茨而言，关键在于使理论紧贴经验根基，不让理论论述的语言、逻辑和论辩脱离实际战争纷繁复杂、错综复杂的现实。他最担心的是——他的同代人比洛就是一个需要避免的反面例子——创造出一种在真实军事行动中毫无价值的军事理论，一种仅仅沦为枯燥乏味的智力游戏。与克劳塞维茨一样，若米尼也认同理论与实践的二元对立，但他毫不犹豫地将理论推向最抽象、最简化的形式。在若米尼看来，弥合理论与实践之间的鸿沟是指挥官的问题，他经常告诫读者，无论战略的科学准则多么正确，关键在于如何正确运用它们。
Classic Western theorists of strategy, notably Jomini and Clausewitz, addressed the same problem—how to close the gap between theory and its application. For Clausewitz, the key was to keep theory close to its empirical roots, not letting the language, logic, and polemics of theoretical discourse break away from the untidy, multifarious reality of actual warfare. His chief fear—his contemporary Bülow being the bad example to avoid—was to create a military theory that had no value in the real world of military action, a theory that was only a sterile intellectual exercise. Like Clausewitz, Jomini accepted the dichotomy between theory and practice, but Jomini had no hesitation in pushing theory toward its most abstract, simplified form. For Jomini, closing the gap between theory and practice was the commander's problem, and he regularly warned his readers that however true the scientific maxims of strategy might be, the key lay in their correct application.
在这方面，毛泽东似乎更接近于约米尼而非克劳塞维茨。毛泽东和约米尼一样，似乎并不为“理论”本身的问题所困扰；真正的战略理论的存在及其本质令克劳塞维茨忧心忡忡，但约米尼和毛泽东却不以为意。他们关注的，一旦理解了理论，便是如何运用它。约米尼认为，任何有智慧且善于接受的人都能掌握战略理论，但只有“天才”才能在真实的战争世界中始终如一地运用它。毛泽东至少在言外之意上给出了类似的答案：革命领袖必须将知识、智慧、激情和纪律融为一体，形成一个单一的、目标明确的行动；只有人性的弱点才造成了理论与实践、思考与行动之间的鸿沟。如果理解正确，理论与实践之间并不存在鸿沟；对革命战略的理论化本身就是革命的一部分，而不是像本文一样，是一种误入歧途的、脱离实际的观察。乔米尼和毛泽东在这一点上的主要区别在于，对于毛泽东来说，“天才”就是他自己，其他人所能做的最好的事情就是听从他的领导并跟随他。
Mao, in this respect, seems closer to Jomini than to Clausewitz. Mao, like Jomini, seems untroubled by the problem of “theory” as such; the existence and nature of a true theory of strategy worried Clausewitz, but not Jomini and Mao. Their concern, once theory was understood, was in applying it. For Jomini, strategic theory could be grasped by any intelligent and receptive person, but only “genius” could apply it consistently in the real world of warfare. Mao offered, at least by implication, a similar answer: the revolutionary leader must fuse knowledge, intellect, passion, and discipline into a single, directed purpose; only human frailty created the gap between theory and practice, between thinking and acting. Properly understood, no gap existed between theory and practice; theorizing about revolutionary strategy is itself part of revolution, not—like this essay—a misguided attempt at detached observation. The main difference between Jomini and Mao on this point was that, for Mao, “genius” was himself, and others could not do better than listen and follow where he led.
西方及其他地区的读者一直以来都非常重视毛泽东的革命战略格言，却很少关注他关于如何应用这些格言的思想。他反复强调，战略理论只有在具体政治、社会和国际环境下才能发挥作用，而这一观点似乎无人理会。20世纪30年代，毛泽东的主要著作正是在那时写成的，当时人们对中国缺乏了解，这在一定程度上解释了这种长期存在的认知选择性。但约米尼的理论范畴对西方战略思想的持久而广泛的影响也必然能解释很多问题。表面上看，毛泽东就像一位亚洲版的约米尼：我们发现他们有着相似的格言、重复和劝诫；他们都刻意地将分析和指导结合起来，同样具有说教的动力，同样都援引“天才”——约米尼的天才是浪漫化的拿破仑，而毛泽东的天才则是他自己——认为天才能够将战略理论转化为胜利。<sup> 41</sup>
Readers in the West and elsewhere have persistently given great weight to Mao's maxims of revolutionary strategy, but little to his ideas about how they should be applied. His reiterated message that strategic theory has meaning only in terms of the concrete political, social, and international circumstances at the moment in which theory is being elucidated seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Lack of expert knowledge about China in the 1930s, when all his major treatises were written, partly explains this chronic selectivity of perception. But the enduring, pervasive influence of Jominian categories on Western strategic thinking must also explain a good deal. Superficially, Mao looks like an Asian Jomini: we find similar maxims, repetitions, and exhortations; there is the same deliberate compounding of analysis and prescription, the same didactic drive, the same invocation of the “genius”—a romanticized Napoleon for Jomini, and himself for Mao—who can turn strategic theory into victory.41
当毛泽东试图解释胜利如何从理论中产生——这个问题曾令克劳塞维茨着迷，却并未引起约米尼的兴趣——西方读者似乎就停止了聆听。他们无法或不愿放弃那些将战略二元对立的固有观念；正如他们坚持将军事和政治割裂开来一样，他们也将理论和实践割裂开来。在他们看来，“理论”独立于实践而存在；更重要的是，“理论”（如果它没有缺陷的话）包含了所有可能指导其应用的知识要素，而应用则被视为一个次要过程，主要取决于理论本身的正确性。毛泽东并没有颠覆这种关系，而是从根本上改变了它：首先，他否定了理论与实践的二元对立；然后（对于那些顽固的非马克思主义西方人而言），他有效地整合了理论与实践，将二者视为一体，置于同一层面，这常常令那些目光短浅、受西方思想影响的同僚们感到震惊。后世读者的难点在于，他们往往忽略了毛泽东论证的具体语境，并且无法放弃自身对理论的理解。西方理论概念源于自然科学，约米尼将其简单地融入到自己影响深远的战略著作中。这种理论概念将主要的智力投入放在理论本身，而将诸如谨慎、勇气、直觉和运气等截然不同的品质留给了实践。与此相反，毛泽东认为理论的应用同样重要，甚至更为重要。学习、倾听、思考、评估和再评估——这些是毛泽东式胜利的关键。他那惊人的傲慢，部分源于他对自己在这方面比任何对手都做得更好的绝对自信。然而，不知何故，他的大多数忠实追随者却忽略了这一点。
It is at the point where Mao tries to explain exactly how victory grows out of theory—a question that fascinated Clausewitz but did not attract Jomini—that Western readers seem to stop listening. They are unable or unwilling to give up the comfortable assumptions that dichotomize strategy; just as they persist in separating military and political matters, they compartmentalize theory and practice. “Theory,” in this view, exists apart from practice; more important, “theory”—if it is not defective—contains all possible intellectual elements that can inform its application, which is seen as a secondary process, dependent mainly on the soundness of the informing theory. Mao does not reverse this relationship, but he changes it fundamentally, first by denying the dichotomy of theory and practice, and then (for the incorrigible non-Marxist Westerner) by effectively integrating theory and practice, treating the two things as one, on the same plane, often rapping the knuckles of his blinkered, Westernized colleagues. The difficulty for later readers lies in losing the specific context of his argument and in being unable to relinquish their own view of theory. The Western concept of theory, derived from natural science and simply incorporated by Jomini into his own influential work on strategy, assigns to theory the main intellectual effort, leaving to practice such quite different qualities as care, courage, intuition, and luck. Mao, by contrast, assigns equal or greater intellectual effort to the application of theory. Studying, listening, learning, thinking, evaluating, and reevaluating—these are the Maoist keys to victory. His monumental arrogance lay, partly, in his absolute confidence that he did these things better than any of his rivals. But the point, somehow, has been lost on most of his avowed disciples.
第四
IV
1949年，毛泽东领导的共产党推翻了中国国民党政权，这一事件比任何其他事件都更深刻地唤起了西方对持久武装冲突的认识：运用游击战术，并以非正统的马克思列宁主义为指导，或许能够取得决定性的革命胜利。其他一些事件为这种新认识的形成铺平了道路，而另一些事件则强化了它的影响。二战期间，抵抗德国和日本占领的武装斗争迅速成为那场斗争集体记忆的一部分。菲律宾游击队、南斯拉夫游击队和法国游击队等组织都曾在“解放”其“人民”、使其摆脱暴政的外国统治的过程中扮演了英雄角色——有时出于政治目的，他们的事迹被夸大了。在战争结束之前，其中一些抵抗运动的目标已经转变为革命性的——夺取政权，摧毁封建主义、资本主义或殖民主义，建立一个新社会。战后十年间，欧洲列强遭遇了一系列武装解放运动，这些运动在理论、战术乃至人员构成上，几乎与备受推崇的战时抵抗运动别无二致。毛泽东的思想，尤其是他取得的伟大胜利，对这些战时和战后事件产生了深远的影响，并以一种令人震惊的全新视角将它们联系起来：世界正被一种非正统的军事战术与激进的政治纲领相结合而发生改变。
The fall of the Chinese Nationalist regime in 1949 to the Communists led by Mao, more than any other event, created a new Western consciousness of how protracted armed conflict, using guerrilla tactics and guided by a heterodox version of Marxism-Leninism, might achieve decisive revolutionary victory. Other events prepared the way for this new consciousness, and still others strengthened its influence. The armed resistance to German and Japanese occupation during the Second World War had quickly become part of the collective memory of that struggle. Philippine guerrillas, Yugoslav partisans, and French maquis were among those groups who had played heroic roles—sometimes exaggerated for political purposes—in the “liberation” of their “people” from tyrannical, foreign rule. Before the war had ended, some of these Resistance movements became revolutionary in aim—to seize power, to destroy feudalism or capitalism or colonialism, to build a new society. During the postwar decade European empires confronted armed liberation movements that were almost indistinguishable in doctrine, tactics, and often in personnel from the admired wartime Resistance. Mao's ideas and, more important, Mao's great victory played into these wartime and postwar events, linking them all in a shocking new sense that the world was being changed by an unorthodox military technique coupled to a radical political program.
当中国进行内战时，在去殖民化的世界中，其他地方也爆发了革命战争——无论真实存在还是人们臆想的。巴勒斯坦的犹太组织通过一场大胆而巧妙的恐怖活动，迫使英国在1948年撤离，几年后，希腊族塞人再次采用了类似的策略。在希腊，一场革命内战的胜负很大程度上取决于外国的支持。由于南斯拉夫和希腊在马其顿问题上的争端，南斯拉夫对希腊共产党叛军的支持令人怀疑；这种支持在1949年突然停止，而此时，陆军元帅亚历山德罗斯·帕帕戈斯正率领其装备精良的美军全力进攻叛军的主要据点。<sup> 42</sup>
While the Chinese were fighting their civil war, revolutionary wars—real and imagined—were breaking out elsewhere in a decolonizing world. The Jewish organizations in Palestine levered the British out by 1948 in a bold and skillful campaign of terror, a strategy that would be used again by the Greek Cypriots a few years later. In Greece, a revolutionary civil war was decided largely on the basis of foreign support. Yugoslav support for the Greek Communist rebels was suspect because of the Yugoslav-Greek dispute over Macedonia; that support stopped abruptly in 1949, just as Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos was bringing the full weight of his American-equipped army to bear on the major base area of the rebels.42
然而，东南亚在1945年后成为革命战争的中心，这得益于日本侵略的破坏，以及毛泽东和中国人民解放军的理论和榜样的激励。缅甸北部山区爆发了一系列起义。在东印度群岛，英国、荷兰和印尼各派势力之间战火不断，战争时断时续。马来亚和菲律宾的共产党领导的人民阵线政党重新激活了战时游击队，威胁中央政府。最终，凭借多年来精心策划和协调的军民合作，马来亚的英国政权和美国支持的菲律宾政府才击败了叛乱分子。在许多此类战役中，毛泽东的思想在战略、组织和革命政治灌输的优先次序上显得零散不成体系。在所有这些例子中，他的胜利榜样都鼓舞了游击队的士气，同时也令当权政府及其国际支持者感到担忧。<sup> 43</sup>但毛泽东思想最充分的发展发生在印度支那，越南人民从1941年到1954年在那里进行了反对法国殖民统治的革命斗争。这场斗争值得仔细研究。
Southeast Asia, however, was the center of gravity for revolutionary wars after 1945, facilitated by the disruption of the Japanese conquest, and inspired by the theory and example of Mao and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. A rash of revolts broke out in Burma along the mountainous arc of its northern borders. In the East Indies, wars flared up, died, and flared up again as British, Dutch, and Indonesian factions fought among themselves. Communist-led popular-front parties in Malaya and the Philippines reactivated wartime guerrilla forces to threaten the central governments. Only by dint of well-conceived and coordinated civil and military programs carried out over many years did the British regime in Malaya and the American-backed Philippine government defeat the insurgents. In many of these campaigns, Mao's ideas appeared piecemeal in strategy, in organization, and in priority given to revolutionary political indoctrination; in all of them, his victorious example sustained guerrilla morale, just as it worried the incumbent governments and their international supporters.43 But the fullest development of what may be called Maoism took place in Indochina, where the Vietnamese waged a revolutionary struggle against the French from 1941 to 1954. That struggle deserves careful examination.
中国共产党游击队的功绩，甚至毛泽东本人的著作，都广为人知，尤其是在东亚和东南亚地区。<sup>44</sup>越南领导人胡志明不仅读过毛泽东的著作，还在1938年访问过延安，后来还指导中国国民党军队学习毛泽东的游击战术。<sup> 45 </sup> 越南革命未来的军事统帅武元甲于1940年在昆明首次与胡志明会面；他们在中国南方共同策划应对法国战败和日本占领越南北部东京湾地区的行动。武元甲招募了一支越南难民排，这是他指挥的第一个部队，并训练他们进行游击战术训练，为重新越过边境做准备。<sup> 46</sup> 1941年初，胡志明在边境越南一侧崎岖的山区宣布成立第一个“解放区”，并在那里成立了越南独立同盟（越盟），誓言推翻日本和法国的统治。在接下来的几个月里，胡志明撰写游击战宣传册并训练干部，而武元甲则组织宣传队并为党报撰稿。到1941年底，随着越盟反抗日本支持的法国政权的消息不断传开，招募人员增多，他们将总部迁至越南内陆，并扩大了训练规模。胡志明在中国监狱度过了接下来的两年，而武元甲则继续缓慢地向南扩张，遭遇了法军驻防部队日益顽强的抵抗，并以伏击法军、报复其越南合作者以及向村民进行宣传等方式予以回应。到1944年夏天，武元甲已准备好将他的游击战体系推广到整个越南。然而，当胡志明在1944年末返回越南后，他改变了这一计划，认为在进一步军事扩张之前需要进行更充分的政治准备。47胡志明的决定只是越南革命政策中几个关键点中的第一个，这些关键点证实了毛泽东强调在将革命理论付诸实践时需要谨慎小心。
The exploits of the Chinese Communist guerrillas and even Mao's own writings were well known, particularly in East and Southeast Asia.44 The Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, had not only read about Mao but had visited Yenan in 1938, and later instructed Chinese Nationalist troops in Mao's guerrilla tactics.45 Vo Nguyen Giap, future military chief of the Vietnamese Revolution, first met Ho in Kunming in 1940; together in southern China they planned a response to the fall of France and the Japanese occupation of Tonkin, the northern region of Vietnam. Giap recruited a platoon of Vietnamese refugees, his first command, and trained them in guerrilla tactics in preparation for recrossing the border.46 In early 1941 Ho proclaimed the first “liberated zone” in the rugged mountains on the Vietnamese side of the frontier, and there founded the League for Vietnamese Independence, or Vietminh, pledged to overthrow the Japanese and the French. For the rest of the year, Ho wrote pamphlets on the guerrilla war and trained cadres, while Giap organized propaganda teams and wrote articles for the party newspaper. By the end of 1941, they had moved their headquarters deeper into the country and expanded their training programs as the news of the Vietminh fight against the Japanese-sanctioned French regime generated recruits. Ho spent the next two years in Chinese jails, while Giap continued to expand operations slowly southward, meeting increasing resistance from the French garrisons, and responding to it with ambushes against French forces, reprisals against their Vietnamese collaborators, and propaganda for the villagers. By the summer of 1944 Giap was ready to extend his guerrilla system throughout Vietnam. When Ho returned in late 1944, however, he changed these plans on the ground that a more thorough political preparation was needed before further military expansion.47 Ho's decision was only the first of several critical points when Vietnamese revolutionary policy bore out Mao's stress on the need for care and caution in putting revolutionary theory into practice.
1945年3月，日本直接控制印度支那并解除法军武装后，越盟总部迁至北部首府河内附近，并在越南各地加强政治活动，以期日本即将投降。1945年8月日本投降后，胡志明迅速发动政变，日本支持的皇帝保大被迫退位，将权力移交给越盟。武元甲率军进入河内，占领公共建筑；横幅和传单宣告全面起义，胡志明宣誓就任越南民主共和国主席。这场从旷日持久的战争到革命政变的迅速转变表明，胡志明是毛泽东思想的践行者，而非奴隶。
After the Japanese seizure of direct control in Indochina, disarming French forces in March 1945, Vietminh headquarters moved closer to the northern capital city of Hanoi, and political operations increased throughout Vietnam in anticipation of an imminent Japanese surrender. When surrender came in August 1945, Ho quickly effected a coup d'état and the Japanese-supported emperor Bao Dai abdicated, giving up his authority to the Vietminh. Giap led his troops into Hanoi and took over the public buildings; banners and leaflets proclaimed a general uprising, and Ho Chi Minh was sworn in as president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This swift change from protracted war to revolutionary coup indicates that Ho was a master—not a slave—of Maoist doctrine.
在接下来的一年里，胡志明周旋于越南各方势力之间：南方强大的英国占领军和北方的国民党军队，装备精良、斗志昂扬的法国军队，以及越南民众——无论是农民还是领袖——对独立的渴望。胡志明以最终独立为目标，拒绝被谴责法国殖民者的快感或仓促开战的压力所动摇。尽管与法国的漫长而艰难的谈判未能取得预期结果，但他巩固了自己的政治基础，扩充了武元甲的军队，加快了日军、英军，尤其是中国军队的进军步伐，并试图让其他国家关注越南的困境，但最终徒劳无功。他面临的最大挑战是评估法国的政治和军事意图及能力，并做出有效的应对。关于这段动荡时期的史料记载甚少，但似乎武元甲力主对国内外敌人动武，而胡志明则力图凭借争取独立的目标，赢得尽可能广泛的政治支持。与法国谈判代表争论似乎比攻击法国军队要好。
For the next year Ho worked among the several forces at play in Vietnam: the powerful occupation armies of the British in the South and the Nationalist Chinese in the North, the edgy and well-armed returning French troops, and the aroused passion for independence of the Vietnamese, peasants and leaders alike. With ultimate independence as the objective, Ho refused to be diverted by the pleasures of denouncing French colonialists or the pressures for a premature war. While long and difficult negotiations with the French failed to produce the desired result, Ho consolidated his political base, expanded Giap's army, sped the Japanese, the British, and especially the Chinese armies on their way, and tried without success to interest other nations in the plight of Vietnam. His most difficult task was to gauge French political and military intentions and capacities, and to respond effectively to them. Little evidence on this troubled period is available, but it appears that Giap was pressing for the use of force against both domestic and foreign enemies, while Ho sought the broadest possible political appeal based simply on the goal of independence. Arguing with French negotiators seemed preferable to attacking the French army.
随着谈判的拖延，双方明显的缺乏诚意以及零星的暴力冲突，导致11月发生了一起严重事件，随后双方停火，法国发出最后通牒，最终在12月法国炮轰了海防港。法军在几天的战斗中清除了沿海城市的敌军，而武元甲则命令其部队撤回北部东京湾的旧基地。经过15个月的谈判，双方都做好了全面战争的准备。48
As talks dragged on, evident bad faith on both sides and sporadic violence led to a serious incident in November, a cease-fire, a French ultimatum, and finally the French bombardment in December of the port city of Haiphong. The French cleared the coastal cities of their enemies in a few days of fighting, while Giap ordered his forces back to the old bases in northern Tonkin. After fifteen months of negotiation, both sides prepared for all-out war.48
此时，胡志明和武元甲已经深刻认识到革命游击战的代价和潜力。他们的最大优势在于越南独立的政治号召力，这是法国无法匹敌的。战争旷日持久，艰苦卓绝；正确的政治立场并不能保证胜利。在毛泽东的革命战争理论中，反复出现的关键问题在于双方的相对实力以及在任何特定时刻的最佳战略。例如，1946年12月，越盟袭击法占城市，并非为了赢得军事胜利，而是为了象征谈判的结束和战争的开始，并向法国和越南表明其有战斗的意志和手段。经过一段时间的小规模但遍及全国的游击战后，越盟在1947年末以撤退、小规模反击以及在越南其他地区的局部游击战来应对法军对其基地的进攻。
Ho and Giap had a firm grasp by this time of the costs as well as the potential of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Their great strength lay in the political appeal of Vietnamese independence, a point on which the French could not compete. The war was long and hard fought; a correct political position did not guarantee victory. Within the Maoist doctrine of revolutionary war, the recurrent key questions, addressed continually, concerned the relative strength of the two sides, and the best strategy for any particular moment. For example, in December 1946 the Vietminh attacked French-held cities, not to win military victory, but to symbolize the end of negotiation and the onset of war, and to show both French and Vietnamese that it had the will and the means to fight. After a period of small-scale but nationwide guerrilla operations, the Vietminh met a French offensive in late 1947 against its base areas by withdrawal, minor counterattacks, and local guerrilla actions elsewhere in Vietnam.
1948年和1949年的战斗强度有所降低，但越盟部队在战斗中得到了训练，士气也得到提升，越盟抓住机会削弱了法军，并巩固了革命阵地。1949年，随着中国红军出现在北部边境，双方力量对比发生了变化。新式武器和安全的训练区域使武元甲得以组建规模更大的师级部队。1950年，越盟部队袭击了中越边境的法军哨所，缴获了大量装备，并巩固了越盟与中国的联系。
Fighting in 1948 and 1949 continued at low intensity, training Vietminh troops and building their morale, weakening the French as opportunity offered, and consolidating the revolutionary position. The balance of forces shifted in 1949 when the Chinese Red Army appeared on the northern frontier. New weapons and safe training areas allowed Giap to organize larger, division-sized units. Vietminh divisions in 1950 struck French posts on the Chinese border, capturing large amounts of equipment and securing Vietminh links with China.
1950年的胜利鼓舞了胡志明和武元甲，他们似乎在运用毛泽东思想时犯了错误。他们决定对红河三角洲的法军阵地发动进攻。在三场大战中，越盟损失惨重，胡志明和武元甲失去了战略主动权，疲惫不堪的部队撤退到北部基地。但毛泽东思想战略的威力以及越南人对其原则的理解在随后的行动中得到了体现。1951年，武元甲利用中国的物资、强大的政治基础和广泛的游击队组织重建了部队，并将下一步行动交给了法国指挥官德·拉特尔·德·塔西尼元帅。德·拉特尔面临着利用近期胜利的压力；当时法国议会和美国国会都在讨论印度支那战争的军费预算，而他本人以勇猛果敢著称，因此需要取得更多胜利，而不是重回防御战。
Encouraged by these successes in 1950, Ho and Giap appear to have erred in their application of Maoist theory. They decided to launch an offensive against French positions in the Red River Delta. In three major battles, the Vietminh suffered heavy losses, Ho and Giap lost the strategic initiative, and their battered forces withdrew to the northern bases. But the strength of Maoist strategy and the Vietnamese grasp of its principles were demonstrated in the sequel. Using Chinese supplies, a strong political base, and widespread guerrilla organization to rebuild his forces in 1951, Giap left the next move to the French commander, Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny. De Lattre was under pressure to exploit his recent success; both the French Assembly and the U.S. Congress were then debating military budgets for the Indochina War, and his own reputation for dash and élan demanded further victories, not a return to defensive warfare.
在距离三角洲防御工事25英里的和平镇，德·拉特尔于1951年11月建立了一支庞大的驻军，意图引诱越盟进行决战。在武元甲经过一个月的计划、侦察和精心部署后，越盟发动了攻击——但并非攻击和平镇，而是攻击其沿黑河的补给线。经过两个月双方都付出惨重代价的战斗，和平镇的法军驻军逐渐被蚕食殆尽。1952年2月，法军发动了一次大规模反击，最终重新打开了黑河防线，但仅仅维持了很短的时间，就迫使驻军撤回了四个月前他们发起进攻的三角洲地区。和平镇战役奠定了法军的先例：法军的机动性和火力几乎可以让他们占领越南的任何地方，但他们无法长期驻扎，最终只会浪费资源和时间。对法国人来说，时间是一种日益减少的资源，因为巴黎的耐心已经耗尽。对越南人而言，时间增强了他们的信心，并将民众对独立的拥护转化为更切实的力量：训练、物资和兵力。胡志明和武元甲的判断失误仍然可能付出惨痛的代价，就像1950年那样，但正确运用毛泽东思想使越南得以复苏。武元甲通过改变作战节奏和地点，调整战术和武器，充分利用各种机会，在接下来的几年里不断消耗法国及其美国支持者的实力，最终在1954年因法国的急躁和压力而导致奠边府战役的决定性胜利。同样的策略，在毛泽东思想的指导下，在接下来的二十年第二次印度支那战争中也同样发挥了作用。
At Hoa Binh, twenty-five miles beyond his delta defenses, de Lattre established in November 1951 a large garrison intended to draw the Vietminh into a decisive battle. After a month in which Giap planned, reconnoitered, and carefully deployed his forces, the Vietminh struck—not at Hoa Binh, but at its supply line along the Black River. In two months of fighting costly to both sides, the French garrison of Hoa Binh slowly strangled. A major French counterattack in February 1952. finally reopened the Black River line, but only long enough to withdraw the garrison to the delta from which it had advanced four months earlier. Hoa Binh set the pattern: French mobility and firepower could take them almost anywhere in Vietnam, but they could not stay, and could show only wasted resources and time for their efforts. Time, to the French, was a dwindling resource as patience ran out in Paris. To the Vietnamese, time built confidence, and allowed the transformation of popular support for independence into more tangible kinds of strength: training, supplies, and troop strength. Mistaken judgments by Ho and Giap could still be costly, as they had been in 1950, but a correct application of Maoist theory made recovery possible. Changing the tempo and locus of operations, shifting tactics and weapons, taking full advantage of opportunities, Giap wore down the French and their American supporters in the next years until impatience and pressure produced the decisive battle at Dienbienphu in 1954. The same methods, informed by Maoist theory, would serve equally well for the next twenty years, in the Second Indochina War.
如果说毛泽东和武元甲是革命战争理论的主要奠基人，那么埃内斯托·“切”·格瓦拉则是他们的杰出追随者。格瓦拉在古巴革命中担任菲德尔·卡斯特罗的副手，并很快成为这场革命战争的战略家，这场革命取得了巨大的成功。卡斯特罗在古巴巩固革命成果的同时，格瓦拉则在其他地方继续进行革命斗争。他加入了玻利维亚起义，但起义很快被镇压，他也在起义中牺牲。不过，在去世前，格瓦拉写了一本关于革命战争的小册子，他的思想后来被他在玻利维亚的同志雷吉斯·德布雷进一步发展。<sup> 49</sup>
If Mao and Giap are the chief theorists of revolutionary war, Ernesto “Che” Guevara ranks high among their disciples. Guevara served as lieutenant to Fidel Castro in the Cuban Revolution, and soon became known as the strategist of that remarkably successful revolutionary war. While Castro consolidated his revolution in Cuba, Guevara continued the revolutionary struggle elsewhere. He joined the Bolivian insurrection, which was quickly smashed and where he was killed. But before he died, Guevara wrote a short book on revolutionary war, and his ideas were further developed by his comrade in Bolivia, Régis Debray.49
格瓦拉-德布雷式的毛主义思想在拉丁美洲乃至其他第三世界国家都产生了重要影响。根据毛泽东和武元甲的观点，革命战争的第一阶段必须是政治动员——这是一个漫长而艰辛的过程，需要招募和组织民众支持，并在村一级建立一支忠诚且纪律严明的革命干部队伍。在第一阶段，暴力的使用必须极其有限且有选择性；最好完全避免公开的军事行动，因为这可能会使政府意识到自身的危险，并导致武装镇压降临到尚未做好准备的革命组织身上。
The Guevara-Debray variant of Maoism has had important consequences in Latin America, and perhaps elsewhere in the Third World. According to Mao and Giap, the first phase of revolutionary war must be political mobilization—the lengthy, painstaking process of recruiting and organizing popular support, building a dedicated and disciplined revolutionary cadre at the village level. During this first phase, only the most limited and selective use of violence is permissible; overt military action is better avoided altogether because it risks awakening the government to its peril and bringing armed repression down on an unready revolutionary organization.
但古巴并没有进行这样的“第一阶段”准备。相反，卡斯特罗的小股游击队在岛屿偏远的东部地区站稳了脚跟，并在向哈瓦那推进的过程中不断积累支持。巴蒂斯塔政权在古巴各阶层民众中极不受欢迎；随着卡斯特罗日益壮大的部队逼近古巴首都，该政权最终垮台。这一惊人的结果几乎可以肯定是特殊情况下的结果，但它却成为偏离毛泽东思想正统的根源，其程度堪比毛泽东本人对马克思列宁主义教条的背离。古巴的这种变体被称为“焦点主义” 。50
But no such “first-phase” preparation had taken place in Cuba. Instead, Castro's small guerrilla band had established itself in the remote eastern region of the island, and had gathered support as it moved toward Havana. The Batista regime was very unpopular with all classes of Cubans; it collapsed as Castro's growing force approached the Cuban capital. This spectacular result was almost certainly the result of unique conditions, but it became the basis for a deviation from Maoist orthodoxy as great as Mao's own departure from Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The Cuban variant is known as focoism.50
“Foco”指的是“流动起义点”；这一概念概括了古巴特有的经验，即毛泽东和武元甲所规定的漫长的村级政治准备并非必要。一支小规模的革命力量，通过暴力手段，可以更快地动员民众支持；与其说是政治动员最终导致暴力，不如说是暴力改变了政治局势。民众在流动起义的袭击中觉醒和振奋，在政府应对的残酷和无能中愤怒和鼓舞，在政府寻求外国势力援助时感到疏离，最终会在暴力本身成为催化剂的过程中被动员起来投身革命。
“Foco” refers to the “mobile point of insurrection”; the concept, generalizing the peculiar Cuban experience, is that lengthy political preparation at the village level, as prescribed by Mao and Giap, is not essential. A small revolutionary force, by using violence, can mobilize popular support much more quickly; instead of political mobilization leading eventually to violence, violence transforms the political situation. Awakened and excited by foco attacks, angered and encouraged by the brutality and ineptitude of governmental response, alienated if the government seeks help from a foreign power, people will be mobilized for revolution in a process in which violence itself is the catalyst.
迄今为止的经验表明，尽管局部主义看似合理，但实际上却收效甚微；从革命的角度来看，其结果可谓灾难性的。毛泽东和武元甲或许曾告诉格瓦拉和德布雷，局部暴力非但不会催化革命，反而会在革命运动最脆弱的时刻使其遭受毁灭性的反击，正如玻利维亚的惨剧所发生的那样。那些原本可能被招募参加革命战争的人们，反而因局部主义的失败而感到恐惧和沮丧。局部主义最严重的缺陷或许在于，它忽视了革命战争正统第一阶段的互惠性：漫长而艰苦的政治准备工作不仅组织了农民和无产阶级，而且还让革命活动家——通常是年轻的城市知识分子——了解人民、村庄、态度和不满，甚至了解革命战争必须建立的地理环境。对当地情况的彻底无知是玻利维亚惨败的主要原因之一。批评家认为，这种“焦点主义”异端邪说既反映了拉丁美洲文化特有的急躁（与汉化的东亚文化形成对比），也反映了年轻知识分子特有的傲慢。他们受阅读和谈话所启发，进入农村——与旧帝国主义者颇为相似——渴望改变被压迫群众的生活，却对那些谎言中可能与他们预设的抽象概念不符之处漠不关心。
Experience so far indicates that focoism, however plausible, is not effective; results have been, from the revolutionary point of view, disastrous.51 Mao and Giap might have told Guevara and Debray that foco violence, rather than catalyzing revolution, would instead expose the revolutionary movement at its weakest moment to a crushing counterattack, as happened in Bolivia. The people who might have been recruited for revolutionary war are instead frightened and discouraged by focoist failure. Perhaps the most serious flaw of focoism is that it ignores the reciprocal nature of the orthodox first phase of revolutionary war: the long hard work of political preparation not only organizes the peasantry and proletariat, but it also teaches the revolutionary activists—usually young urbanized intellectuals—about the people, the villages, the attitudes and grievances, even the physical terrain, on which revolutionary war must be based. Sheer ignorance of local conditions played a major part in the Bolivian fiasco. Critics have suggested that the focoist heresy reflects both the impatience characteristic of Latin American culture (in contrast to sinicized East Asia) and the characteristic arrogance of young intellectuals. Moved to action by what they have learned through reading and talking, they enter the countryside—not unlike the old imperialists—eager to change the lives of the oppressed masses but insensitive to whatever in those lies may not fit preconceived abstractions.
毛泽东本人在1930年就预见并驳斥了后来在其他地方被称为“焦点主义”的异端邪说：
Mao himself, writing in 1930, anticipated and rejected the heresy later—and elsewhere—known as focoism:
我们党内有些同志仍然不知道如何正确评估形势，也不知道该如何解决随之而来的行动问题。虽然他们认为革命的高潮不可避免，但并不认为它迫在眉睫……同时，由于他们对在游击区建立红色政权意味着什么缺乏深刻理解，也就没有真正理解通过巩固和扩大红色政权来加速全国革命高潮的理念。他们似乎认为，既然革命高潮还很遥远，那么通过艰苦努力建立政权就是徒劳。相反，他们想通过游击战这种更容易的方式来扩大我们的政治影响力，一旦全国群众被争取过来，或者说基本被争取过来，他们就想发动一场全国性的武装起义，并借助红军的力量，最终演变成一场全国性的革命。他们认为必须先在全国范围内、各个地区赢得群众，然后才能建立政权，这种理论不符合中国革命的实际情况……建立和壮大红军、游击队和红区的建设是农民斗争的最高形式……仅仅号召游击队四处奔走的政策，无法完成加速全国革命浪潮的任务……” 52
Some comrades in our Party still do not know how to appraise the situation correctly and how to settle the attendant question of what action to take. Though they believe that a revolutionary high tide is inevitable, they do not believe it to be imminent…. at the same time, as they do not have a deep understanding of what it means to establish Red political power in the guerrilla areas, they do not have a real understanding of the idea of accelerating the nation-wide revolutionary high tide through the consolidation and expansion of Red political power. They seem to think that, since the revolutionary high tide is still remote, it will be labour lost to attempt to establish political power by hard work. Instead, they want to extend our political influence through the easier method of roving guerrilla actions, and, once the masses throughout the country have been won over, or more or less won over, they want to launch a nation-wide armed insurrection which, with the participation of the Red Army, would become a nation-wide revolution. Their theory that we must first win over the masses on a country-wide scale and in all regions and then establish political power does not accord with the actual state of the Chinese revolution…. The establishment and expansion of the Red army the guerrilla forces and the Red areas is the highest form of peasant struggle…. The policy which merely calls for roving guerrilla actions cannot accomplish the task of accelerating this nation-wide revolutionary high tide….”52
他对后来演变为格瓦拉-德布雷式毛泽东战略的批评，直接源于他此前忽视了对战略形势的全面、准确把握，以及尽可能冷静地思考战略问题。毛泽东不仅以惊人的精力和力量领导中国革命，他还深知，在革命战略的理论问题上，他的思维比周围的人更加敏捷、更加透彻。
His criticism of what would become the Guevara-Debray variant of Maoist strategy leads directly back to his neglected emphasis on getting the fullest and most accurate picture of the strategic situation, and then thinking through, as dispassionately as possible, the strategic problem. Not only did Mao bring astonishing energy and force to his leadership of the Chinese Revolution, he also knew that his mind worked harder and better than those around him on the intellectual problems of revolutionary strategy.
西方对革命战争作为战略问题的认识始于冷战时期，并在法国军方内部最早得到清晰体现。在印度支那，法国军方决心为1940年的耻辱复仇，而越南人民也为革命战争提供了极其坚实的基础，这片土地成为了反革命理论“革命战争”（guerre révolutionnaire）滋生的熔炉。苏联（1949年后也包括中国）支持越南革命者，而美国则日益支持法国“遏制共产主义”的努力，战争持续了八年。尽管有美国的援助和劝说，法国政府在1954年还是认定这场战争无法取胜，放弃了对印度支那的统治权。然而，面对又一次的失败，法国军官团内部却产生了一种执念，即从印度支那战争中吸取教训，以便在法兰西帝国其他地区即将爆发的革命战争中取得胜利。<sup> 53</sup>
Western awareness of revolutionary war as a strategic problem began with the Cold War, reaching its earliest clear expression within the French military. Indochina, where the French military was determined to avenge its humiliation of 1940, and where the Vietnamese people provided an exceptionally strong basis for revolutionary war, became the caldron from which emerged the counterrevolutionary theory known as guerre révolutionnaire. With the Soviet Union and, after 1949, China supporting the Vietnamese revolutionaries, and the United States increasingly behind the French effort to “contain Communism,” war had lasted eight years. Despite American aid and exhortation, the French government in 1954 decided that the war could not be won, and gave up its claim to rule Indochina. But within the French officer corps, faced with yet another defeat, there arose an obsessive concern with learning the lessons of the Indochina war so that future revolutionary wars, already imminent elsewhere in the French Empire, might be won.53
“革命战争”（Guerre révolutionnaire）不仅仅是法语中“革命战争”一词；它还描述了一群颇具影响力的法国职业军官对现代世界主要病症的诊断和治疗方案——西方未能应对无神论共产主义颠覆的挑战。这些政治立场极其保守的军官们，凭借神秘的天主教信仰和对法国殖民主义文明使命的坚定信念，以笛卡尔式的逻辑论证第三次世界大战已经爆发。当美国及其盟国被核战争的前景所迷惑时，共产主义正从南方绕过西方的防御，如果不加以遏制，最终将摧毁西方文明。共产主义以苏联为基地，在中国取得了第一次胜利，在印度支那取得了第二次胜利，并在亚洲其他地区节节胜利。战争已经蔓延到北非，纳赛尔在埃及发动的政变被视为共产主义的又一次胜利，而1954年法属阿尔及利亚战争的爆发则被视为共产主义的又一次攻势。由于撒哈拉以南非洲和拉丁美洲显然是未来的目标，西欧和美国很快就会被孤立，它们强大的武器装备在一场已经失败的全球战争中从未派上用场。
Guerre révolutionnaire was more than the French phrase for revolutionary war; it described a diagnosis and a prescription for what an influential group of French career soldiers saw as the chief illness of the modern world—Western failure to meet the challenge of atheistic Communist subversion. Politically very conservative, they drew on a mystical Catholicism and an unshaken faith in the civilizing mission of French colonialism to argue, with Cartesian logic, that the Third World War had already begun. While the United States and its allies were mesmerized by the prospect of nuclear warfare, Communism was outflanking Western defenses from the South, and if not stopped would ultimately destroy Western civilization. Communism, from its base in the Soviet Union, had won its first victory in China, its second in Indochina, and was winning its other battles in Asia. The war had reached North Africa, where Nasser's coup in Egypt was seen as yet another Communist victory, and the outbreak of war in French Algeria in 1954 as another Communist offensive. With sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America obvious future targets, Western Europe and the United States would soon be isolated, their powerful armaments never employed in a global war already lost.
《革命战争》一书提出的方案与诊断相呼应；两者都体现了法国军方对当代世界共产主义的愿景。共产主义被视为一种世俗宗教，填补了传统宗教对民众影响力衰落所留下的空白。共产主义的信仰和纪律令人钦佩，即便它也被反对为完全致力于邪恶。民族主义、反殖民主义和社会正义诉求被视为有限而肤浅的态度，共产主义利用这些态度将所有非西方、欠发达地区拉入一个由共产党领导的全球联盟，以对抗基督教西方。共产党人向贫困无知的民众描绘了美好未来的希望，他们不择手段，无论多么残酷，都无所不用其极地实现目标；没有任何法律或道德障碍能够阻止他们。西方国家的宗教信仰早已衰落，两次世界大战动摇了他们的信心，其政府和军事行动的范围又因其自由民主体制而受到严重限制，因此，西方至今仍未找到应对共产主义革命战争的有效方法。实际上，以暴制暴是唯一的解决办法。在毛泽东和胡志明的崇拜者中，没有谁比法国革命战争理论家更热衷于将革命战争描绘成几乎不可战胜的。
The prescription offered by guerre révolutionnaire mirrored the diagnosis; both reflected this French military vision of Communism in the contemporary world. Communism was seen as a secular religion, filling the void left by the declining hold of traditional religion on the masses. The faith and discipline of Communism was admired, even while it was opposed as totally dedicated to Evil. Nationalism, anticolonialism, and demands for social justice were regarded as no more than limited, superficial attitudes that Communism was exploiting in order to bring all non-Western, underdeveloped areas into a global, Communist-led coalition against the Christian West. Offering hope for a better future to the poor and ignorant masses, Communists used all means, however cruel, to reach their goals; no legal or ethical barrier stopped them. The West, its religious faith long in decline, its confidence shaken by two world wars, its range of governmental—and military—action severely limited by its liberal democratic structure, had as yet found no effective response to Communist revolutionary war. In effect, fighting fire with fire was the only answer. No admirer of Mao and Ho did more to present revolutionary war as virtually invincible than did the French theorists of guerre révolutionnaire.
他们的详细方案在各个方面都体现了他们所理解的革命理论。首先，重拾对反共产主义（以及邪恶）十字军东征的信念至关重要；基督教复兴必然是这一信念的核心——自由人文主义，如同民族主义一样，在最需要团结和勇气的时候显得过于软弱和分裂。下一步是扩大心理战的规模，以传播重拾的信念并揭露共产主义的邪恶。与此同时，一项社会和经济行动方案也必须大力应对教育、公共卫生和贫困等问题，这些问题为共产主义的剥削创造了有利条件。重组和调整武装部队，一部分组建为机动反游击队，另一部分组建为准政府驻防部队，这是方案中的军事部分，实际上是将行政权力从文职部门转移到了军方手中。革命战争理论家们仅在一点上存在分歧——即使用恐怖和酷刑。一些人出于道德原因反对使用酷刑；另一些人则认为，政府恐吓自己的臣民是适得其反的；不少人准备将革命战争的逻辑贯彻到底——在善恶的最终对抗中，一切手段都是正当的。
Their detailed prescription mirrored what they took to be revolutionary doctrine at every point. First, renewed faith in the counter-Crusade against Communism (and Evil) was essential; Christian revival would necessarily be at the heart of this faith—liberal humanism, like nationalism, was too soft and divisive when unity and courage were needed above all. An expanded program of psychological warfare to promulgate the renewed faith and to expose the evil of Communism was the next step. A parallel program of social and economic action must also deal vigorously with problems like education, public health, and poverty that created conditions ripe for Communist exploitation. Reorganizing and reorienting armed forces, some into mobile antiguerrilla units and others into quasi-governmental garrison forces, was the military part of the prescription, which in effect shifted administrative power from civilian to military hands. Only on one point did the theorists of guerre révolutionnaire disagree—on the use of terror and torture. Some rejected it on moral grounds; others argued that it was counterproductive for a government to terrorize its own subjects; more than a few were ready to follow the logic of guerre révolutionnaire to its grisly end—in the final confrontation between Good and Evil, all means were justified.
革命战争最极端的版本很容易被归类为偏执、极权和法西斯主义。革命战争的手段在阿尔及利亚战争中得到了一定程度的应用，无论是在农村地区还是在臭名昭著的阿尔及尔战役中，都并非毫无成效。但这些手段也导致了法国内部的深刻分裂，最终导致了1958年5月的政变，以及秘密武装组织（Organisation Armée Secrète）的出现。该组织在数年间对戴高乐领导的第五共和国发动了恐怖袭击。最终，正是戴高乐在1958年政变后重掌政权，并决定通过给予这个法国前“省”独立来结束阿尔及利亚战争。即使在今天，革命战争的理论家们仍然坚持认为，当戴高乐赋予阿尔及利亚革命运动胜利时，这场战争实际上已经失败了。<sup> 54</sup>
The most extreme versions of guerre révolutionnaire readily lend themselves to being categorized as paranoid, totalitarian, and fascist. Applied to some extent in the Algerian war, the methods of guerre révolutionnaire were not ineffective, in the countryside as well as in the notorious battle of Algiers. But they also led to deep division in France itself, to the coup of May 1958, and to the Organisation Armée Secrète, which for several years waged a terrorist campaign against de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. In the end it was de Gaulle, brought back to power by the 1958 coup, who decided that the Algerian war should be ended by granting independence to this former “department” of France. Even now, the theorists of guerre révolutionnaire insist that the Algerian revolutionary movement had lost the war when de Gaulle gave it victory.54
与法国不同，英国只在马来亚遭遇过一次小规模的毛派革命战争，尽管在巴勒斯坦、塞浦路斯和肯尼亚，针对英国的战术与毛派革命战争在某些方面有相似之处。英国的应对措施没有革命战争的意识形态狂热，反而更符合其殖民传统的精髓：文武权力紧密结合，尽可能使用警察而非军队，依靠“特别部门”特工提供的可靠情报，在诸如将平民安置到适宜居住、卫生条件良好的营地等事务上保持行政上的井然有序，并且普遍愿意通过谈判达成非彻底胜利的局面。在军事方面，英国的殖民经验再次展现了其训练高效地方部队的能力，对取得胜利所需时间的耐心考量，以及倾向于在精心策划的行动中使用精干的小规模部队，而不是大规模使用大量兵力和重火力。英国人利用种族分歧动员马来人对抗华人叛军，但仍然花了十多年才镇压马来亚叛乱。他们灵活而耐心的策略是否能战胜更强大的革命运动，仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。55
The British, unlike the French, faced Maoist revolutionary warfare only once, on a small scale in Malaya, although the tactics used against them in Palestine, Cyprus, and Kenya bore certain similarities. The British response had none of the ideological fervor of guerre révolutionnaire, but was instead more like that of their colonial tradition at its best: tight integration of civil and military authority, minimum force with police instead of army used when possible, good intelligence of the kind produced by “Special Branch” operatives, administrative tidiness on such matters as the resettlement of civilians in habitable, sanitary camps, and a general readiness to negotiate for something less than total victory. On the military side, British colonial experience showed again its capacity to train effective local forces, a patient view of the time required for success, and a preference for the employment of small, highly skilled troops in well-planned operations rather than massive use of large numbers and heavy firepower. Exploiting ethnic divisions to mobilize Malays against Chinese rebels, the British still required more than a decade to put down the Malayan rebellion. Whether their flexible, patient methods would have succeeded against a more powerful revolutionary movement must remain a question.55
美国对独立战争的反应将永远与越南战争以及惨痛的失败经历联系在一起。此前，美国曾成功支持菲律宾政府镇压胡克叛乱，这使美国文职和军事领导人对这类战争的胜利抱有一定的信心，认为只要态度和战术得当，就能取得胜利。美国也曾向法国在印度支那提供大量物资援助，但法国的表现却遭到了广泛的鄙视，这在畅销小说和电影《丑陋的美国人》中体现得尤为明显。1954年法国同意瓜分越南后，美国继续支持南越的反共政府，对抗河内胡志明的新政权及其在南方的支持者。
The American response to revolutionary war will be forever linked to Vietnam, and to the experience of painful defeat. A fairly successful effort in support of the Philippine government against the Huk rebellion had created a measure of confidence among American civilian and military leaders that such wars could be won by the correct attitudes and tactics. Disdain for the French performance in Indochina, where the Americans had also provided considerable material assistance, was widely expressed, notably in the popular novel and film, The Ugly Americans56 After the French agreement to partition Vietnam in 1954, the United States continued to support an anti-Communist government of South Vietnam against the new regime of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi and against his supporters in the South.
事实证明，美国的自信是错付的。无论是美国国务院还是其他机构（美国驻越特派团、美军驻越和平局、越南对外关系委员会等），都未能展现出足够的能力来应对根本性的政治问题；美国人没有能与英法殖民地机构相提并论的文职组织，更遑论与纪律严明、锐意进取的越南共产党先锋队相提并论。美国文职人员收集情报并提交报告，但他们既缺乏直接对抗革命运动所需的训练，也缺乏相关的经验。从这个意义上讲，美国在越南的“反叛乱”行动与拉丁美洲的“焦点主义”颇为相似——热情、天真、急躁；无法满足毛泽东提出的行动必须基于严谨的政治和社会分析的要求；在残酷的革命战争中，他们注定是一群注定失败的浪漫主义者，这与当时另一部流行小说——格雷厄姆·格林的《安静的美国人》中的主人公颇为相似。57
In the event, American confidence proved to be misplaced. Neither the U.S. Department of State nor various agencies (USOM, JUSPAO, CORDS, and others) showed sufficient capacity to deal with fundamental political problems; the Americans had no civilian organization comparable to the British and French colonial services, much less comparable to the disciplined, vanguard Communist party of Vietnam. The American civilians gathered information and submitted reports, but had neither the training nor the tradition needed to operate directly against a revolutionary movement. In that sense, the American “counterinsurgency” effort in Vietnam was not unlike Latin American “focoism”—earnest, naive, and impatient; incapable of meeting the Maoist demand that operations be based on closely reasoned political and social analysis; doomed romantics in the brutal world of revolutionary war, not unlike the central figure in another popular novel of the period, Graham Greene's The Quiet American.57
在军事方面，美国人也暴露出类似的缺陷。1962年，肯尼迪总统曾鼓励短暂尝试“特种作战”，但陆军精锐特种部队的组织基础从未稳固，而快速扩张更是进一步削弱了其实力。美国陆军高层对这支接受过非常规作战训练的部队抱有不信任感，而当特种部队开始与美国中央情报局密切合作时，双方关系最终破裂。陆军当局逮捕并监禁驻越特种部队指挥官，表明即使是美军也无法统一其反革命战略。美国技术人员和军事顾问在南越军队中秉持良心接受了任务，但他们认为政治事务——革命战争的核心——并非他们的职责。尽管在美国的指导和支持下，南越军队的战斗力显著提升，但对于胡志明的民族声望所带来的政治吸引力、南越社会的种种问题以及政权对外国援助的依赖，美国却未采取任何措施。
On the military side, the Americans showed similar deficiencies. In 1962 President Kennedy encouraged a brief flirtation with “Special Warfare,” but the organizational base of the Army's elite Special Forces was never strong, and was further weakened by rapid expansion. The U.S. Army establishment mistrusted a group trained for irregular operations, and the final estrangement came when Special Forces units began to work closely with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The arrest and imprisonment by Army authorities of the officer commanding Special Forces in Vietnam indicates the degree to which even the American military could not unify its counterrevolutionary strategy. American technicians and military advisors with the South Vietnamese armed forces accepted their mission in good conscience, but assumed that political matters—the heart of revolutionary war—were not their responsibility. Although the fighting effectiveness of the South Vietnamese improved markedly with American tutelage and support, nothing was done to confront the political appeal of Ho's national stature, the problems of South Vietnamese society, and the taint of a regime dependent on foreign assistance.
1965年，对北越的持续空袭以及向南方派遣大量美军作战部队，都是美国战略破产的征兆。一场美国化的战争是否能在不摧毁越南及其人民的前提下取得胜利，至今仍是一个争论不休的问题。但可以肯定的是，美国的大规模军事干预加剧了越南乃至其他地区革命战争爆发的根本性政治、社会和经济问题。而战争的美国化使得至关重要的政治努力——必然是一项民事努力——几乎不可能解决导致众多越南人准备发动或支持革命战争的根本原因。相反，美军各师（通常情报匮乏，但机动性强、火力强大、决心坚定）试图寻找并摧毁与之匹敌的敌军部队。美国高级军事指挥官从未认真考虑过，在大型作战行动提供的安全掩护下进行的政治努力，应该享有同等甚至更高的优先级。
Sustained aerial attack on North Vietnam and the shipment of large American combat forces to the South were symptoms in 1965 of strategic bankruptcy. Whether an Americanized war could have been won, short of destroying the country and its population, continues to be a debated question. But surely massive American military intervention exacerbated the basic political, social, and economic conditions that gave revolutionary war, in Vietnam and elsewhere, its impetus. And Americanizing the war made it almost impossible for the vital political effort, necessarily a civilian effort, to deal with whatever made so many Vietnamese ready to wage or support a revolutionary war. Instead, U.S. Army divisions, usually with poor intelligence but with great mobility, firepower, and determination, sought to find and destroy comparable enemy formations. The senior American military commanders never took seriously the idea that the political effort, presumably going on behind the security screen provided by large-scale combat operations, should have equal or greater priority.
这场后来被称为美国“反叛乱”的行动代价极其惨重，越南和美国自身都付出了沉重的代价。<sup> 58</sup>从理论层面来看，它流于表面，既缺乏革命战争中神秘主义与理性主义的融合，也缺乏英国军民协调中冷静务实的精神。它几乎完全是一种军事手段，如同诺曼底登陆或1944年的吕宋岛解放，其目标被假定为与美国作战部队如出一辙的敌人——农民（如同另一部畅销小说《阿达诺的钟声》中感恩戴德的意大利人），被动地等待着美国解放带来的福祉。<sup> 59</sup>美国战略对胡志明和武元甲构成了严峻挑战，但最终未能击败他们，这在很大程度上是因为它从未真正理解这场战争的本质，也从未真正理解赋予这场战争革命性质的越南特殊国情。
American “counterinsurgency,” as it came to be known, was very costly, both to the Vietnamese and to the Americans themselves.58 Intellectually, it was shallow, lacking either the fusion of mysticism and rationalism of guerre révolutionnaire, or the phlegmatic pragmatism of British civil-military coordination. It was almost a purely military approach, like the Normandy landings or the liberation of Luzon in 1944, targeted on an enemy presumed to be the mirror image of American combat units, the peasants (like the grateful Italians of yet another popular novel, John Hersey's A Bell for Adano) waiting passively for the blessings attendant on American liberation.59 American strategy severely challenged Ho and Giap, but in the end it failed to defeat them, in large part because it never grasped the kind of war being fought nor the particular Vietnamese conditions that gave the war its revolutionary character.
V
V
革命战争理论经常被革命者和反革命者讨论，仿佛它是一种普遍适用的理论。当然，讨论中也经常提及需要灵活运用，根据具体的政治、社会、地理和国际条件调整理论。但直到最近，才有人提出，至少在其经典的毛泽东式表述中，该理论可能只在有限的范围内有效。杰拉德·沙利安德（Gerard Chaliand）在20世纪60年代和70年代经历了丰富的革命战争经验，并且他公开表示同情大多数革命运动，这使得他对这一主题的谨慎观点更具分量。他对该理论的全球适用性表示严重怀疑。<sup>60</sup>他指出，除了古巴（或许现在还有伊朗）这个特殊例外，革命战争的成功仅限于亚洲的汉化地区——中国和越南。在亚洲、非洲和拉丁美洲的其他地区，民族认同和社会凝聚力要弱得多，可能不足以承受革命战争带来的巨大而漫长的压力。在其他地方，革命战争要么在坚决镇压下失败，要么分裂成族裔、地域或部落派系，这些派系之间的敌意似乎超过了共同的革命目标。甚至阿尔及利亚也不能声称赢得了革命战争。沙利安的观点远非教条，但他提出了一个至关重要的问题。
The theory of revolutionary war is often discussed, by revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries alike, as if it were a doctrine of universal applicability. Of course the discussion routinely includes mention of the need for flexibility, adapting the doctrine to specific political, social, geographical, and international conditions. But only recently has the possibility been raised that the doctrine, at least in its classic Maoist formulation, is valid only in a limited range of circumstances. Gerard Chaliand, whose wide experience of revolutionary wars in the 1960s and 1970s, along with his professed sympathy for most revolutionary movements, gives weight to his cautionary views on the subject, has expressed serious doubts about the global validity of the doctrine.60 He notes that with the peculiar exception of Cuba (and perhaps now Iran), revolutionary war has been successful only in the Sinicized parts of Asia—China and Vietnam. National identity and social cohesion are much weaker in the rest of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, probably too weak to endure the terrific, prolonged strain of waging revolutionary war. Elsewhere, revolutionary wars have collapsed in the face of determined repression, or split into ethnic, regional, or tribal factions whose hostility to one another seems stronger than the common revolutionary goal. Not even Algeria can claim to have won its revolutionary war. Chaliand is far from dogmatic in his view, but he raises a vital question.
探究自1945年以来数十场革命战争的胜败之道，有助于我们更清晰地审视革命理论的有效性。起义军的胜利往往发生在对抗外国占领或殖民政权时，此时民族主义乃至种族情绪被激发出来，共同对抗外来政府及其帮凶。对抗不得人心、腐败无能的政权，例如古巴的巴蒂斯塔政权或伊朗的沙阿政权，也更有可能取得胜利，因为即使是政府军也会很快丧失斗志，加入起义军的行列。然而，除了这些较为明确的参照点之外，问题的答案就变得难以确定。革命战争理论发展于以种植水稻的农民社会，这些社会有着强大的家庭团结和集体合作传统。游击战作为革命战争的核心军事手段，必然建立在这些农民之上。但农民本质上是保守的，他们宁愿忍受苦难，也不愿冒失去一切的风险。他们对叛乱煽动者（通常是受过教育的城市外来者）的接受度，并不比对遥远且不被信任的中央政府特工的接受度更高。事实上，几乎所有后毛泽东时代关于革命战争的理论都出自这类知识分子之手，而他们对农民世界的无知是出了名的。从这个意义上讲，革命战争理论变成了神话，它给一小群革命先锋队带来了希望，而实际上胜利的希望可能微乎其微。
Asking what has led to victory or defeat in the dozens of revolutionary wars fought since 1945 is a way bringing the question of doctrinal validity into sharper focus. Rebel victory has been most likely against foreign occupation or a colonial regime, where national and sometimes racial feelings are mustered against a government of outsiders and their collaborators. The chances of victory are also good against a regime that is unpopular, corrupt, and weak, like Batista's in Cuba or the Shah's in Iran, where even government forces soon lose heart and join the rebellion. But beyond these fairly clear points of reference, the answer to the question becomes uncertain. The doctrine of revolutionary war developed in societies of rice-growing peasants, with their powerful tradition of family solidarity and communal cooperation. Guerrilla warfare, which has been the central military method of revolutionary war, is necessarily based on such peasants. But peasants are basically conservative, more disposed to suffer than risk their hard-earned all. They are no more receptive to rebel agitators, usually educated and urbanized outsiders, than they are to agents of a distant and mistrusted central government. In fact, almost all of the post-Mao theorizing about revolutionary war has come from just such intellectuals, whose inability to understand the peasant world is notorious. In that sense, the doctrine of revolutionary war becomes mythological, giving hope to a small revolutionary vanguard when actual chances for victory may be remote.
似乎只有当农民的生活急剧恶化到绝望的地步时，他们才能被动员起来参与革命战争。为了摆脱农民缺乏革命意识的困境，“城市游击战”受到了一定的关注，其主要武器是通常被称为“恐怖主义”的行动。但恐怖主义至今尚未在任何地方取得胜利，城市游击队员也发现，他们的生存正如毛泽东理论所预言的那样艰难。61
It appears that peasants can be mobilized for revolutionary war only when their lives have deteriorated so rapidly and radically that they feel desperate. In part to escape this dilemma of an unrevolutionary peasantry, “urban guerrilla warfare” has received a certain amount of attention, its chief weapon being acts usually called “terrorist.” But terrorism has yet to win a victory anywhere, and urban guerrillas have found physical survival as difficult as Maoist theory indicated they would.61
从理论探讨转向1945年以来的实际经验，国际形势往往似乎是解释革命战争结果的关键因素。1949年中国共产党取得的胜利，尽管民间流传着相反的说法，但这场胜利几乎或完全没有苏联的参与，这是一个巨大且具有误导性的例外。1983年，美国海军陆战队和其他“维和”部队未能阻止黎巴嫩内战，这则是一个截然相反的极端案例。黎巴嫩沦为以色列和叙利亚、巴勒斯坦人以及来自伊朗的“志愿者”之间的战场。也可以说，黎巴嫩内战是美国和苏联之间的一场“代理人战争”，两国分别向交战双方提供了支持。无论如何，巴勒斯坦人为从以色列人手中夺回家园而发动的革命战争，以及黎巴嫩穆斯林多数群体为从基督徒手中夺取政权而发动的革命战争，都完全依赖于强权之间的冲突。
Turning from the theoretical debate to the specifics of actual experience since 1945, the international situation often appears to be the crucial factor in explaining the outcome of revolutionary war. The victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, which owed little or nothing to the Soviet Union (popular legends to the contrary notwithstanding), is the great and misleading exception. The Lebanese civil war, which U.S. Marines and other “peace-keeping” forces failed to stop in 1983, is an extreme case in the opposite sense. Lebanon became a battleground between Israel and Syria, the Palestinians, and “volunteers” from Iran. It is also possible to argue that Lebanon was a “proxy war” between the United States and the Soviet Union, who supplied the respective sides. In any case, the intertwined revolutionary wars, of the Palestinians to recover their homeland from the Israelis, and of the Muslim majority of Lebanon to take power from the Christians, were utterly dependent on the clash between stronger powers.
从爱尔兰到斯里兰卡，其他一些内乱表明，革命运动更多地依赖外部支持而非广泛的内部动员，这表明叛乱的现实与革命战争的理论之间往往只有松散的、修辞上的联系。而且，在紧急情况迫使实际操作与经典的毛泽东理论大相径庭的地方，除非发生某种重大的“外部”事件，即革命中的“天灾”，否则革命胜利的几率似乎微乎其微。
Other civil upheavals, from Ireland to Sri Lanka, where revolutionary movements depend more heavily on support from outside than on a broad base of mobilized internal support, suggest that there is often no more than a loose, rhetorical relationship between the realities of rebellion and the theory of revolutionary war. And wherever urgent circumstances have forced the operational realities to diverge very far from classical Maoist theory, the chances for revolutionary victory—barring some major “external” event, the revolutionary equivalent of an act of God—appear to be slim.
中国领导人林彪在一篇著名的演讲中，将资本主义列强比作世界上的“城市”，而将亚洲、非洲和拉丁美洲比作“乡村”。他预言，由中国领导的全球乡村地区的革命游击运动，将像毛泽东那样，组织、动员并进行一场持久战，直到那些在革命世界中不过是孤立的反动堡垒的城市，因缺乏只有乡村才能提供的关键资源而崩溃。这一预言，其宏大的气势与法国革命战争倡导者的极端设想如出一辙，令世界各地的许多“城市居民”感到震惊，也成为西方对革命战争理论和学说迅速产生浓厚兴趣的重要因素。然而，林彪去世后不久，世界的发展却远未达到他这一惊世骇俗的预言。在每个东南亚国家，这些国家距离中国革命领导和支持的源头最近，都存在着试图推翻非共产主义、通常是保守派政府的游击运动。然而，这些运动最多只得到了中国象征性的支持。显然，对中国领导人而言，与东南亚相关国家（东盟）的关系比他们对全球化革命战争的投入更为重要，而受共产主义影响的东南亚游击运动对北京来说与其说是武器，不如说是尴尬。<sup> 63</sup>
In a famous speech, the Chinese leader Lin Piao described the capitalist powers as the “cities” of the world and Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the “countryside.”62 Revolutionary guerrilla movements in this global countryside, led by China, would organize, mobilize, and fight a protracted war, as Mao had done, until cities, no more than isolated bastions of reaction in a revolutionized world, would collapse, starved for vital resources that only the countryside could supply. This prophecy, in its grandiosity so like the extreme visions of the French proponents of guerre révolutionnaire, alarmed many “city-dwellers” throughout the world, and itself was an important factor in the rapid rise of Western interest in the theory and doctrine of revolutionary war. But not long after Lin Piao's death, the world hardly matched his alarming prophecy. In every Southeast Asian state, nearest to the font of revolutionary leadership and support in China, there were guerrilla movements attempting to overthrow non-Communist, often conservative governments. Yet these movements received at most token support from China. Chinese relations with the associated governments of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) were clearly more important to Chinese leaders than their commitment to globalized revolutionary war, and the Communist-influenced guerrilla movements in Southeast Asia more an embarrassment to Peking than a weapon in its armory.63
历史学家或许比任何人都更应该了解预言的风险。但要对革命战争这一概念进行历史性的探讨，就必须对未来做出预测，同时也要解释过去。1941年，爱德华·米德·厄尔和他的普林斯顿研讨班并未意识到革命战争的重要性。与两次世界大战的影响以及另一次世界大战的爆发相比，武装起义推翻政府似乎只是战略中一个无关紧要的方面。三十年后，一切都发生了改变；除了威力过大而无法使用的空投核弹之外，当代战略面临的最紧迫、最令人困惑的问题是革命战争的普遍性和成功率之高。
Historians, perhaps better than anyone, should understand the hazards of prophecy. But a concluding attempt to place the idea of revolutionary warfare historically entails an estimate of the future as well as an explanation of the past. In 1941 Edward Mead Earle and his Princeton seminar were not impressed by the importance of revolutionary war. Compared to the impact of one world war and the outbreak of another, armed uprisings to overthrow governments seemed a peripheral aspect of strategy. Three decades later all had changed; except for airborne nuclear explosives too destructive to consider using, the most urgent and puzzling problem for contemporary strategy was the remarkable ubiquity and success of revolutionary wars.
我们此前已对这种战略认知的迅速转变提出了一些解释。西欧帝国在世界大战后实力削弱，于1945年后迅速瓦解。如果某个殖民地的解体进程涉及暴力，那么自然而然地就会出现游击队和恐怖分子与政府军之间的对抗。非殖民化之后，继承政权往往难以治理，资源匮乏，人为划定的国界线也造成了内部分裂。针对这些后殖民政权，经常会爆发武装抵抗运动，类似于此前反抗欧洲殖民列强的运动。而包括拉丁美洲在内的世界前殖民地地区持续动荡的背后，是主要位于北方的工业化国家分裂成两个相互敌对的武装阵营。这两个阵营都害怕爆发核战争，但又都几乎随时准备在“第三世界”的战场上进行间接对抗。
We have already suggested some of the explanation for this rapid shift in strategic perception. The Western European empires, weakened by world war, crumbled rapidly after 1945. If the process in any particular colony involved violence, it naturally pitted guerrillas and terrorists against government forces. After decolonization, successor regimes often governed with difficulty, troubled by inadequate resources and by the internal divisions of artificially defined state boundaries. Against these postcolonial regimes, armed resistance movements, similar to those organized earlier against the European colonial powers, often formed. And behind the continuing turmoil in the former colonial regions of the world, including Latin America, was the division of the predominantly northern, industrialized nations into two mutually hostile armed camps, each afraid to risk nuclear war, but both almost too ready to confront one another indirectly, on the battlefields of the “Third World.”
如果对近期历史的这种描述基本准确，那么它就为革命战争的未来指明了一些可能性。旧欧洲帝国实际上已经不复存在，随之消失的还有那些曾为革命战争注入强大能量的强烈排外民族主义及其脆弱的目标。后殖民政权依然动荡不安，但或许在经历了一段暴力冲突之后，全面革命战争在这些地区将不再是常见的动荡表现形式。最后，超级大国并未从参与这些代价高昂、旷日持久且往往难以控制的斗争中获益良多。越南战争对美国来说是一场灾难，而苏联频繁干预反殖民和革命冲突也鲜有斩获。如果苏联目前在邻国阿富汗针对游击队抵抗的行动以及美国在中美洲和加勒比地区的类似行动仅仅如其表面所见——为确保公认势力范围敏感边界地区的安全而进行的有限的军事行动，或许笨拙但并不令人惊讶——那么即使是看似永无止境的冷战也不能保证革命战争将继续像 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代那样重要。
If this picture of the recent past is essentially accurate, then it points toward some possibilities for the future of revolutionary war. The old European empires are virtually gone, and with them the intense xenophobic nationalism and its vulnerable targets that gave revolutionary warfare so much of its energy. The post-colonial regimes continue to be troubled, but it may be that after a period of violent conflict, full-scale revolutionary war will become a less frequent manifestation of trouble in those parts of the world. And, finally, the superpowers have not gained much from their involvement in these expensive, protracted, often unmanageable struggles. The Vietnam War was a disaster for the United States, and the Soviet Union has little to show for its frequent intervention in anticolonial and revolutionary conflicts. If current Soviet operations against guerrilla resistance in neighboring Afghanistan and comparable American maneuvers in Central America and the Caribbean are no more than what they seem—limited military ventures to secure the sensitive border areas of acknowledged spheres of influence, clumsy perhaps but not surprising—then even the apparently endless Cold War does not promise that revolutionary warfare will continue to be as important as it was in the 1950s and 1960s.
一代人的惨痛经历或许对那些热衷于武元甲和毛泽东革命战略的人——无论是在华盛顿和莫斯科的军事中心，还是在第三世界的丛林和山区——产生了清醒的认识。仔细研究这两位人物的生平和著作就会发现，革命战争，除了针对最弱小的政权之外，几乎不可能带来军事和政治上的胜利。在中国和越南，革命战争意味着数百万人丧生，数百万人遭受一代人的苦难；革命所需的残酷纪律令人难以理解。正如毛泽东所说：“革命不是吃饭，不是写文章，不是画画，不是刺绣；它不可能那么精致，那么悠闲，那么温和，那么和蔼，那么有礼貌，那么克制，那么宽宏大量。革命是起义，是暴力行为……”<sup> 64</sup>不可避免地，革命战争在国际上声名鹊起的过程中，也存在着一种肤浅的、浪漫的因素。这种浪漫主义体现在对毛泽东本人的神化，体现在法国和美国“专家”对革命战争和反叛乱的极端言论，也体现在一些身处相对安全的伦敦、巴黎或纽约却支持革命事业的人的观点中。这种浪漫主义本身虽是历史事实，却也转瞬即逝，我们只需将其纳入更广阔的历史现象中，加以考察即可。
A generation of costly experiences may have had a sobering effect on enthusiasts—in the military centers of Washington and Moscow as well as in the jungles and mountains of the Third World—for the revolutionary strategy of Giap and Mao. The careers and writing of both men, studied closely, suggest that revolutionary warfare, waged against any but the most feeble regime, is hardly a magic prescription for military and political victory. In China and Vietnam, revolutionary war meant millions dead and a generation of suffering for millions more; the brutal discipline required for revolutionary endurance stretches the powers of comprehension. As Mao himself put it, “a revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence….”64 There has been, inevitably, a superficial, romantic element in the rise of revolutionary war to international prominence. This romanticism is visible in the deification of Mao himself, in the more extreme statements of French and American “experts” on guerre révolutionnaire and counterinsurgency, and in the views of some who support revolutionary causes from the relative security of London, Paris, or New York. This romanticism, itself a historical fact however transitory, may be simply noted and assigned a place in the larger phenomenon.
最后一个问题必然会让我们对我们关于革命战争作用逐渐减弱的估计产生一些疑问。所谓第三世界地区过去是，而且很可能将来仍将是革命战争的中心，无论这种军事行动在未来可能具有何种重要性。关于这些地区，一些基本事实和趋势值得注意：第三世界与工业化国家之间的经济差距持续扩大。与此同时，这些地区大多数的人口增长速度，即使是最乐观的估计也表明，在短短几十年内，本已稀缺的资源将无法养活数量庞大的人口。如果这些地区的政治体制普遍稳定有效，社会制度也相对公平，那么统治集团或许会齐心协力避免经济和人口灾难。但第三世界的政治和社会现实并不支持这种预期，最富裕国家的行为也让人难以抱有希望。
A last question must raise some doubt about our estimate of a declining role for revolutionary warfare. The regions known as the Third World have been, and in all likelihood will remain, the locus of revolutionary warfare, whatever importance this kind of military action may have in the future. A few basic facts and trends pertaining to those regions ought to be noted: the economic gap between the Third World and the industrialized nations continues to increase. At the same time, population in most of these regions has been growing at a rate that, even by the most optimistic estimates, will mean that within a few decades vastly larger numbers of people cannot possibly be supported by already scarce resources. If the political systems of these regions were generally stable and effective, and their social systems fairly equitable, a concerted effort by ruling groups to avert economic and demographic catastrophe might be expected. But the political and social realities in the Third World do not encourage any such expectation, nor does the behavior of the richest nations offer much hope for salvation from that quarter.
引用近期对拉丁美洲某些地区特有状况的描述：
To quote from a recent description of conditions characteristic of certain parts of Latin America:
绝大多数财富被缺乏社会意识的寡头垄断，法治的实际缺失或缺陷，军事独裁者对基本人权的嘲弄，某些权势官员的腐败，以及一些外国资本利益集团的野蛮行径，这些因素共同滋生了那些自认为在技术、金融、货币或经济秩序中遭受新殖民主义迫害的无力受害者的反抗热情。
The seizure of the vast majority of the wealth by an oligarchy of owners bereft of social consciousness, the practical absence or the shortcomings of a rule of law, military dictators making a mockery of elementary human rights, the corruption of certain powerful officials, the savage practices of some foreign capital interests constitute factors which nourish a passion for revolt among those who thus consider themselves the powerless victims of a new colonialism in the technological, financial, monetary or economic order.
这段文字并非出自革命檄文，也非自由主义对新殖民主义剥削的谴责，而是一份教皇的正式声明，警告天主教神职人员不要卷入第三世界的革命运动。<sup>65</sup>尽管教皇的声明带有保守色彩，但它承认所描述的状况普遍存在，而且经过适当修正后，这些状况也适用于拉丁美洲以外的大部分第三世界地区。目前的趋势表明，没有任何理由相信任何形式的渐进式变革能够改变这些状况。
This passage is not from a revolutionary tract, or a liberal denunciation of neocolonial exploitation, but an official papal statement, warning Catholic clergy against becoming involved in Third World revolutionary movements.65 The papal pronouncement, despite its conservative aim, concedes the widespread existence of the conditions described, which, suitably amended, apply to much of the Third World beyond Latin America as well. Present trends give no reason to believe that any form of gradual, evolutionary process will change these conditions.
1927年，毛泽东描述了湖南省贫苦农民的悲惨境遇。他反驳了农民革命潜力至多有限的正统观点，坚持认为湖南乃至中国其他农村地区的状况极其恶劣，革命可以建立在这些绝望的农民身上。与19世纪的欧洲农民不同，这些人已经没有什么可失去的了。十年后，经过中共内部的激烈斗争，毛泽东赢得了这场争论，成为革命运动无可争议的领袖。1937年，没有人，甚至毛泽东本人，相信中国革命战争会在十二年内取得胜利。当我们审视世界、世界前景、暴力在这些前景中可能扮演的角色，尤其是指导武力使用的战略思想时，毛泽东的经历具有启发意义。我们不禁要问，世界许多地方的大量民众是否会沦落到1927年湖南农民的境地，从而为革命战争创造巨大的爆发性潜力。
Mao, in 1927, described the appalling conditions of the poor Chinese peasants in Hunan province. Taking issue with the orthodox line that peasants had, at most, limited revolutionary potential, Mao insisted that conditions were so bad in Hunan, and elsewhere in rural China, that revolution could be based on the desperate Chinese peasantry. These people, unlike the European peasantry of the nineteenth century, had nothing left to lose. A decade later, after bitter battles within the Chinese Communist Party, Mao had won the argument, and was undisputed leader of the revolutionary movement. No one, not even Mao himself, believed in 1937 that within twelve years the Chinese revolutionary war would be won. As we survey the world, its prospects, the likely role of violence in those prospects, and especially the strategic ideas guiding the use of armed force, Mao's experience is suggestive. We can only ask whether large numbers of people, in large parts of the world, will sink to the level of Hunan peasantry in 1927, creating a vast explosive potential for revolutionary war.
1西格蒙德·诺伊曼的《恩格斯和马克思：社会革命者的军事概念》、让·戈特曼的《比若、加列尼、利奥泰：法国殖民战争的发展》和爱德华·米德·厄尔的《列宁、托洛茨基、斯大林：苏联的战争概念》是《现代战略的缔造者》原版中的相关文章，由爱德华·米德·厄尔编辑（普林斯顿，1943 年），第 155-71 页、第 234-59 页、第 322-64 页。
1 Sigmund Neumann, “Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolutionaries,” Jean Gottmann, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” and Edward Mead Earle, “Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin: Soviet Concepts of War,” are the relevant essays in the original edition of Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943), 155–71, 234–59, 322–64.
2孙子，《孙子兵法》，塞缪尔·B·格里菲斯译（牛津，1963年）
2 Sun Tzu, The Art of Wars, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, 1963)
3约翰·T·麦卡利斯特和保罗·穆斯合著的《越南人及其革命》（纽约，1970年），尤其是第55-69页，是穆斯著作中最易于理解的版本。穆斯的《越南：一场战争的社会学》（巴黎，1952年）强调了天命的核心地位。弗朗西丝·菲茨杰拉德的《湖中之火》（波士顿，1972年）使这一观点在西方读者中广为流传。
3 John T. McAlister, Jr., and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution (New York, 1970), particularly pp. 55–69, is the most accessible version of the work of Mus, whose Vietnam: Sociologie d'une guerre (Paris, 1952.), stresses the central importance of the mandate of heaven. Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake (Boston, 1972), gave the idea its widest currency among Western readers.
4例如，毛泽东经常使用“内部”和“外部”作战路线的概念，这显然借鉴了瑞士军事理论家和历史学家若米尼的理论。关于“天命”重要性的质疑，参见热拉尔·沙利安，《第三世界的革命》（纽约，1977 年；企鹅版，1978 年），第 89 页及之后。
4 For example, Mao Tse-tung frequently used the concept of “interior” and “exterior” lines of operation, obviously borrowed from the Swiss military theorist and historian Jomini. On doubts about the importance of the “mandate of heaven,” see Gérard Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World (New York, 1977; Penguin ed., 1978), 89ff.
5约翰·夏伊，《众多武装的人民》（纽约，1976 年），133-162 页。
5 John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed (New York, 1976), 133–62.
6理查德·科布，《革命武装》，第 2 卷。 （巴黎，1961-63）。
6 Richard Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires, 2. vols. (Paris, 1961–63).
7 Geoffrey Best，《革命时期欧洲的战争与社会，1770–1870》（伦敦，1982 年），第 257–95 页。
7 Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770–1870 (London, 1982), 257–95
8卡尔·马克思，《法兰西内战：放屁公社》（1891 年版，弗里德里希·恩格斯作序），列宁增补评注后重印（纽约，1940 年；1968 年）。
8 Karl Marx, The Civil War in France: The Farts Commune (1891 ed., intro. by Friedrich Engels), reprinted with added commentary by Lenin (New York, 1940; 1968).
9同上，第 18 页。
9 Ibid., 18.
10同上，91-106。
10 Ibid., 91–106.
11以下关于托洛茨基的内容摘自哈罗德·W·纳尔逊的《列昂·托洛茨基与起义的艺术，1905-1917》（安娜堡，1978 年）。
11 What follows on Trotsky is drawn from Harold W. Nelson, Leon Trotsky and the Art of Insurrection, 1905–1917 (Ann Arbor, 1978).
12同上，第 26 页及以下。
12 Ibid., 26ff.
13 Charles E. Callwell，《小规模战争——其原则和实践》（伦敦，1896 年），引自 Robert B. Asprey，《阴影中的战争：历史上的游击战》，2 卷（纽约州花园城，1975 年），第 1 卷，第 221 页。
13 Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars—Their Principles and Practice (London, 1896), as quoted in Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, 2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y., 1975), 1:221.
14 LHG Lyautey，“Du rôle colony de l'Armée”， Revue des Deux Mondes 157（1900 年 2 月 15 日），308-328，后来由巴黎阿曼德·科林图书馆以小册子形式再版。
14 L. H. G. Lyautey, “Du rôle colonial de l'Armée,” Revue des Deux Mondes 157 (February 15, 1900), 308–328, later republished as a booklet by Librairie Armand Colin, Paris.
15参见T.E.劳伦斯，《智慧七柱》（纽约，1935年）。尤其参见第33章和第59章。关于战略和战术的更简明论述，参见劳伦斯，《叛乱的演变》，该文最初发表于《陆军季刊》第1期（1920年10月），后重印于斯坦利·温特劳布和罗德尔·温特劳布编，《叛乱的演变：T.E.劳伦斯战后早期著作》（宾夕法尼亚州大学城，1968年），第100-119页。回顾性论述，参见康拉德·莫尔西，《T.E.劳伦斯：战略家》，载于斯蒂芬·E.塔巴奇尼克编，《T.E.劳伦斯之谜》（佐治亚州雅典，1984年），第185-203页。
15 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York, 1935). See especially chapters 33 and 59. For a more concise statement on strategy and tactics, see Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” originally published in Army Quarterly 1 (October 1920), and reprinted in Evolution of a Revolt: Early Postwar Writings of T. E. Lawrence, ed. Stanley Weintraub and Rodelle Weintraub (University Park, Penn., 1968), 100–119. For a retrospective view, see Konrad Morsey, “T. E. Lawrence: Strategist” in The T. E. Lawrence Puzzle, ed. Stephen E. Tabachnick (Athens, Ga., 1984), 185–203.
16 Weintraub 和 Weintraub，《叛乱的演变》，119。
16 Weintraub and Weintraub, Evolution of a Revolt, 119.
17温斯顿·S·丘吉尔，《伟大的同时代人》（伦敦，1937 年），第 129-140 页。
17 Winston S. Churchill, Great Contemporaries (London, 1937), 129–140.
18 Basil H. Liddell Hart，《战略：间接方法》，第 3 版（伦敦，1967 年），第 197-98 页，第 373-82 页。另见 Liddell Hart，《劳伦斯上校：传奇背后的男人》，第 2 版（纽约，1935 年），第 380-84 页，以及 Arnold W. Lawrence 编，《T.E. 劳伦斯及其朋友》（纽约州花园城，1937 年），第 157-58 页。
18 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, 3d ed. (London, 1967), 197–98, 373–82. See also Liddell Hart, Colonel Lawrence: The Man Behind the Legend, 2d ed. (New York, 1935), 380–84, and Arnold W. Lawrence, ed., T. E. Lawrence by His Friends (Garden City, N.Y., 1937), 157–58.
19 Michael RD Foot，《SOE在法国：英国特别行动执行处在法国的工作记录，1940-1944》（伦敦，1966年），第1页。第一章，第110页，描述了SOE的创建。另见Foot，《抵抗：欧洲对纳粹主义的抵抗，1940-1945》（纽约，1977年），第137-138页。
19 Michael R. D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940–1944 (London, 1966), 1. The first chapter, pp. 110, describes the creation of SOE. See also Foot, Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism, 1940–1945 (New York, 1977), 137–38.
20约瑟夫·斯大林，《苏联伟大的卫国战争》（纽约，1945 年），第 9 页。
20 Joseph Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (New York, 1945), 9.
21 DM Condit、Bert H. Cooper 等人编著的《内部冲突中的挑战与应对》第 2 卷（华盛顿特区，1967 年）简明扼要地描述了欧洲和中东的 18 起叛乱。关于南斯拉夫，参见 Earl Ziemke 的《南斯拉夫（1940-1944）》，载于同上，第 321-351 页。
21 D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper et al., eds., Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1967) concisely describes eighteen insurgencies in Europe and the Middle East. For Yugoslavia, see Earl Ziemke, “Yugoslavia (1940–1944),” in ibid., 321–51.
22 Condit 等人，《挑战与应对》，第 2 卷。
22 Condit et al., Challenge and Response, vol. 2.
23有关第二次世界大战期间及战后东南亚革命战争的概述，请参阅 David Joel Steinberg 编辑的《寻找东南亚》（纽约，1971 年），第 337-342 页，以及 Condit 等人的《挑战与回应》，第 1 卷。Joyce Lebra在《东南亚的日本训练军队：第二次世界大战中的独立与志愿军》 （纽约，1977 年）中详细介绍了日本的作用。
23 For a summary of revolutionary warfare in Southeast Asia during and immediately after World War II, see David Joel Steinberg, ed., In Search of Southeast Asia (New York, 1971), 337–342., and also Condit et al., Challenge and Response, vol. 1. Joyce Lebra details the Japanese role in Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Armies in World War II (New York, 1977).
24 Lebra，《日本训练的军队》，第 39-74 页，第 157-165 页。
24 Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies, 39–74, 157–65.
25斯坦伯格，《寻找东南亚》，第 372-377 页，以及阿斯普雷，《阴影中的战争》，第 1 卷，第 562-578 页。
25 Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, 372–377, and Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1:562–78.
26 F. Spencer Chapman，《丛林是中立的》（伦敦，1949 年）是一部关于二战期间马来亚的个人记述。另见 Steinberg，《探寻东南亚》，第 364-370 页。
26 F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (London, 1949) is a personal account of World War II in Malaya. See also Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, 364–70.
27参见Jean Lacouture，《胡志明：政治传记》（巴黎，1967 年）和 Vo Nguyen Giap，《难忘的岁月》（伊萨卡，纽约，1975 年）。另见 Steinberg，《探寻东南亚》，第 356-364 页。
27 Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography (Paris, 1967) and Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Months and Years (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975). See also Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, 356–64.
28 Lebra，《日本训练的军队》，第 75-112 页、第 146-156 页，以及 Steinberg，《寻找东南亚》，第 347-351 页、第 377-384 页。
28 Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies, 75–112, 146–56, and Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, 347–51, 377–84.
29航空航天研究所，《空中力量在游击战中的作用》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地，1962年）是对该主题的全面论述。哈里斯·沃伦，《对地下组织的空中支援》 ，载于韦斯利·F·克雷文和詹姆斯·L·凯特主编的《二战时期的陆军航空兵》 ，共7卷（芝加哥，1948-1958年），第3卷，第493-524页，描述了欧洲的作战行动。
29 Aerospace Studies Institute, The Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1962) is a comprehensive account of the subject. Harris Warren, “Air Support for the Underground” in The Army Air Forces in World War II, ed. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, 7 vols. (Chicago, 1948–58), 3:493–524 describes operations in Europe.
30毛泽东思想传入英语世界的主要形式是四卷本的《毛泽东选集》（伦敦和纽约，1954-1956）。《毛泽东军事文选》（北京，1963）收录了早期出版物中的相关文章。菲利普·德维勒主编的《毛泽东传》（伦敦，1969）也是一本有用的参考书。其中最著名的当属“小红书”——《毛主席论人民战争》（北京，1967），该书出版发行量达数百万册。以下引文尽可能出自这本“小红书”，并注明出处为《毛泽东选集》或其他来源。
30 The principal form in which Mao's ideas have been transmitted to the English-reading world is the four-volume Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (London and New York, 1954–56). Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1963) brings together relevant essays from the earlier publications. Mao, in the “What They Really Said” series, ed. Philippe Devillers (London, 1969), is also useful. Best known by far is the “little red book”—Chairman Mao Tse-tung on People's War (Peking, 1967)—millions of which were published and circulated. Quotations below are from this little “Red Book” wherever possible, with citation to the Selected Works or other source also given.
31《红皮书》，32；《星星之火可以燎原》，《精选作品集》 ，1:124。
31 “Red Book,” 32; “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire,” Selected Works, 1:124.
32 “红书”，25；精选集，1:106，其中的译文略有不同。
32 “Red Book,” 25; Selected Works, 1:106, where the translation differs slightly.
33《红皮书》，24；《精选集》，1:106，此处译文有所不同。着重号为后加。
33 “Red Book,” 24; Selected Works, 1:106, where the translation differs. Emphasis added.
34《红皮书》，26、38；《精选集》，2:96、175，译文略有不同。重点为后加。
34 “Red Book,” 26, 38; Selected Works, 2:96, 175, with slight difference in translation. Emphasis added.
35《红皮书》，19-20；《精选集》，3:85，2:135
35 “Red Book,” 19–20; Selected Works, 3:85, 2:135
36 “红皮书”，21；精选集，3:85–86，其中用“不正确的”而不是“错误的”来描述“错误”。重点为笔者所加。
36 “Red Book,” 21; Selected Works, 3:85–86, where “incorrect” was used instead of “wrong” to describe the “errors.” Emphasis added.
37《红皮书》，4；精选作品，2:272。
37 “Red Book,” 4; Selected Works, 2:272.
38姚明乐，《林彪的阴谋与死亡》，斯坦利·卡诺作序（纽约，1983 年），第十五页。
38 Yao Ming-le, The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao, with an introduction by Stanley Karnow (New York, 1983), xv.
39 “红皮书” 38；精选集，1:175
39 “Red Book” 38; Selected Works, 1:175
40德维勒斯，《毛泽东》，71-152，尤其有助于清晰地阐明毛泽东的军事理论及其应用思想。
40 Devillers, Mao, 71–152, is especially helpful in bringing Mao's ideas on military theory and its application into sharp focus.
41例如，1938 年发表的著名系列讲座“论持久战”（《精选作品集》2:157-243）中有许多约明式的段落，如下：“在这个阶段，我们的战争将不再是战略防御战争，而是战略反攻战争，我们将不再在战略内部战线上作战，而是转向战略外部战线”（第 188 页）。
41 For example, the famous series of lectures, “On Protracted War,” given in 1938 (Selected Works, 2:157–243), has a number of Jominian passages like the following: “In this stage, our war will be no longer one of strategic defensive, but one of strategic counter-offensive in the form of strategic offensive and we shall no longer operate on strategically interior lines, but shift to strategically exterior lines” (p. 188).
42 Condit 等人，《挑战与回应》第 2 卷描述了在巴勒斯坦、塞浦路斯和希腊的行动。
42 Condit et al., Challenge and Response, vol. 2 describes operations in Palestine, Cyprus, and Greece.
43同上，第 1 卷描述了亚洲的 19 起叛乱。
43 Ibid., vol. 1 describes nineteen insurgencies in Asia.
44毛泽东的《游击战》于 1937 年出版，随后在“自由中国”广泛销售，每本售价 10 美分。据塞缪尔·B·格里菲斯 (Samuel B. Griffith) 所著《毛泽东论游击战》 （纽约，1961 年）第 37 页记载。毛泽东的战略和战术在埃德加·斯诺 (Edgar Snow) 的《红星照耀中国》 （纽约，1938 年）和埃文斯·F·卡尔森 (Evans F. Carlson) 的（均为纽约，1940 年）中均有描述。
44 Mao's Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla warfare) was published in 1937 and was then widely sold throughout “Free China” for ten cents a copy, according to Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1961), 37. Mao's strategy and tactics are described by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1938) and Evans F. Carlson, Twin Stars Over China and The Chinese Army (both New York, 1940).
45拉库图尔，胡志明市，69-70。
45 Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, 69–70.
46 Robert J. O'Neill，《武元甲将军：政治家和战略家》（纽约，1969 年），20'23。
46 Robert J. O'Neill, General Giap: Politician and Strategist (New York, 1969), 20'23.
47武元甲，《人民军队的起源》，载于《人民战争的军事艺术：武元甲精选文集》，Russell Stetler 编辑（纽约，1970 年），第 66 页。
47 Vo Nguyen Giap, “Origins of the People's Army” in The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of Vo Nguyen Giap, ed. Russell Stetler (New York, 1970), p. 66.
48 O'Neill，《武元甲将军》，第 38-49 页，以及 Lacouture，《胡志明》，第 109-171 页。接下来对第一次印度支那战争的描述基于 Bernard B. Fall 的《没有欢乐的街道》（纽约，1957 年），第 21-55 页。
48 O'Neill, General Giap, 38–49, and Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, 109–171. The description of the First Indochina War that follows is based on Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (New York, 1957), 21–55.
49切·格瓦拉，《游击战》（纽约，1961 年）；雷吉斯·德布雷，《革命中的革命？》（纽约，1967 年）。
49 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1961); Régis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? (New York, 1967).
50沙利安，《第三世界的革命》，第 43 页及后续页。
50 Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World, 43ff.
51埃尔顿·肯沃西 (Eldon Kenworthy) 的文章《拉丁美洲革命理论：它是否回到了巴黎公社？》（“Latin American Revolutionary Theory: Is It Back to the Paris Commune?”）对焦点主义失败的原因进行了简明扼要但又深刻的阐述。该期刊的整期都致力于“革命战争：西方的回应”，其主要文章（但不包括肯沃西等人的短文）后来以同样的标题重新出版成书，由大卫·S·沙利文 (David S. Sullivan) 和马丁·J·萨特勒 (Martin J. Sattler) 编辑（纽约，1971 年）。
51 A brief but incisive account of why focoism has failed is Eldon Kenworthy, “Latin American Revolutionary Theory: Is It Back to the Paris Commune?” Journal of International Affairs 25 (1971), 164–70. The entire issue of this journal is devoted to “Revolutionary War: Western Response,” and its chief articles (though not the short essays by Kenworthy and others) were republished in book form under the same title, edited by David S. Sullivan and Martin J. Sattler (New York, 1971).
52德维勒斯，毛，85-86，摘自“星星之火可以燎原”，与《精选作品集》 1:116ff 的翻译有实质性差异。
52 Devillers, Mao, 85–86, from “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire,” with substantial differences in translation from Selected Works, 1:116ff.
53彼得·帕雷的《从印度支那到阿尔及利亚的法国革命战争》（纽约，1964年）是最佳分析。克劳德·德尔马的《革命战争》 （巴黎，1959年），是通俗丛书《何为权威》 （Que sais-jef）第826号，是一位拥护者对该理论所针对的革命威胁的简要描述，而该理论正是应对这一威胁的“正确”之举。
53 Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria (New York, 1964) is the best analysis. Claude Delmas, La guerre révolutionnaire (Paris, 1959), no. 826 in the popular series Que sais-jef, is an adherent's brief account of the revolutionary threat to which the doctrine was the “correct” response.
54典型的例子是革命战争的主要策划者之一罗杰·特兰基耶上校的回忆录《逝去的时光》（巴黎，1978 年），第 349 页：“戴高乐要求我们平定阿尔及利亚；他给了我们实现这一目标的手段。我们做到了。”
54 Typical is the memoir of a chief architect of guerre révolutionnaire, Colonel Roger Trinquier, Le temps perdu (Paris, 1978), 349: “De Gaulle asked us to pacify Algeria; he gave us the means to do it. We had done it.”
55朱利安·佩吉特，《反叛乱运动》（伦敦，1967 年），第 43-79 页，第 155-179 页。关于马来亚和越南的两部比较研究是理查德·L·克拉特巴克的《漫长的战争》 （纽约，1966 年）和罗伯特·汤普森的《击败共产主义叛乱》（伦敦，1966 年）。
55 Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London, 1967), 43–79, 155–79. Two comparative studies of Malaya and Vietnam are Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War (New York 1966) and Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London, 1966).
56尤金·伯迪克和威廉·J·莱德勒合著的《丑陋的美国人》（纽约，1958年）是当时最受关注的书籍之一，其书名也为政治话语增添了一句名言。1963年由马龙·白兰度主演的电影版严重歪曲了原著的论点，但并未改变其强烈的反共反革命基调。此处以及注释57和59引用了多部流行小说和电影，以表明美国公众舆论在塑造关于当代革命战争的性质和重要性的观念方面发挥了重要作用。
56 Eugene Burdick and William J. Lederer, The Ugly American (New York, 1958) was one of the most widely discussed books of the period, and its title added a phrase to political discourse. The film version of 1963, starring Marlon Brando, grossly distorted the argument of the novel without altering its strongly anti-Communist, counterrevolutionary tone. Here and in notes 57 and 59 popular novels and films have been cited to indicate the important role played by American public opinion in developing ideas about the nature and importance of contemporary revolutionary war.
57格雷厄姆·格林，《安静的美国人》（伦敦，1955）。美国评论界抨击了作者对美国的批判观点，并质疑他与共产党的关系。1958年的电影版将原著改编成一部谋杀悬疑片，削弱了其政治寓意。
57 Graham Greene, The Quiet American (London, 1955). American reviews attacked the author's critical view of the United States, and questioned his relationship to the Communist Party. The film version of 1958 blunted the political message of the book by transforming it into a murder mystery.
58道格拉斯·S·布劳法布的《反叛乱时代：美国理论与实战》（纽约，1977年）是基本论述，但争论仍在继续，许多人认为美国在越南战争中几乎取得了胜利，因此该文中表达的判断是无法接受的。哈里·G·萨默斯二世的《论战略》（加利福尼亚州诺瓦托，1982年）则表达了另一种观点。
58 Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance (New York, 1977) is the basic account, but debate has continued, and the judgment expressed in the text of this essay is unacceptable to many who argue that the United States came close to winning its war in Vietnam. Another view is expressed in Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy (Novato, Calif., 1982).
59约翰·赫西，《阿达诺的钟声》（纽约，1944 年）。这部讲述二战期间意大利一个村庄“解放”和民主化的轻描淡写、感伤的故事赢得了普利策奖，并在 1945 年——就像《丑陋的美国人》一样——被改编成了一部受欢迎的电影。
59 John Hersey, A Bell for Adano (New York, 1944). This slight, sentimental story of the “liberation” and democratization of an Italian village in World War II won the Pulitzer Prize, and in 1945—like The Ugly American—became a popular film.
60这些疑虑在他的《第三世界革命》 （纽约，1977 年）和他的文集《游击战略》（伯克利，1982 年）的引言中都有所表达
60 These doubts are expressed both in his Revolution in the Third World (New York, 1977) and in the introduction to his anthology, Guerrilla Strategies (Berkeley, 1982).
61埃里克·R·沃尔夫的《二十世纪农民战争》（纽约，1969年）一书对农民与革命的研究颇具价值。约翰·尼辛主编的《城市游击战》（鹿特丹，1974年）记录了人们对这一主题日益增长的兴趣。
61 Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York, 1969) is valuable on peasants and revolution. Johan Niezing, ed., Urban Guerilla (Rotterdam, 1974) documents the growing interest in its subject.
62《人民战争胜利万岁（北京，1965 年），摘自沃尔特·拉克尔，《游击队读本》（费城，1977 年），第 197-202 页。
62 Long Live the Victory of People's War (Peking, 1965), extracted in Walter Laquer, The Guerrilla Reader (Philadelphia, 1977), 197–202.
63这一发展历程可以从新加坡东南亚研究所自 1974 年以来出版的年度报告《东南亚事务》中追溯到
63 This development can be traced through the annual report, Southeast Asian Affairs, published since 1974 by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
64德维勒斯，毛泽东59，引用“湖南农民运动调查报告”；与《毛泽东选集》 1:27 的翻译略有不同。
64 Devillers, Mao 59, quoting “Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan”; with slight differences in translation from Selected Works, 1:27.
65摘自梵蒂冈关于“解放神学”的声明，《纽约时报》 ，1984 年 9 月 4 日。
65 Excerpts from the Vatican statement on “Liberation Theology,” New York Times, September 4, 1984.
28. 对当前和未来战略的思考
28. Reflections on Strategy in the Present and Future
一个在探讨了从马基雅维利时代到第二次世界大战和核时代军事思想与实践演变的著作即将结束之际，有必要回到开篇提出的问题，即相关性问题。过去的经验对我们在核时代面临的问题是否有任何真正的借鉴意义？或者，正如一些军事作家所言，我们是否生活在一个没有可借鉴先例的时代，这种情况在战略领域尤为突出？
AT THE END of a book that has dealt with the evolution of military thought and practice from Machiavelli's time to the Second World War and the nuclear age, it is necessary to return to the question raised in its first pages, namely, that of relevance. Has the experience of the past any real bearing upon the problems that confront us in the nuclear age, or are we living, as some military writers have claimed, in an age without useful precedents, a situation that is most pronounced in the field of strategy?
考虑到世界政治危险的两极格局、超级大国对核武器的痴迷以及它们之间激烈的军备竞赛，人们很容易倾向于后一种观点，并得出结论：当今时代并不适合古代先贤们所阐述的那种战略原则。例如，克劳塞维茨写下他那句名言“战争是政治的延续，只不过手段不同”时，虽然他强调了战争与和平之间的联系，但他当时可能认为二者之间的区别比我们今天所认为的要清晰得多。事实上，在今天，战争与和平是否真的能够完全分离，确实值得商榷。 1914年，维护19世纪大部分时间和平的国际体系崩溃，随后所有寻找有效替代方案的尝试均告失败；1917年以来，意识形态对国际关系产生了至高无上的影响；尽管法西斯主义和国家社会主义最终被超越其成员间意识形态分歧的联盟彻底击败，但1945年后意识形态的影响却日益加剧；二战后摆脱殖民统治的国家的极端民族主义；以及——尤其是在中东——好战宗教狂热的出现，使得1945年以来的岁月成为多层面冲突不断的时期。如果说大国之间避免了公开战争，那么它们为了扶植附庸国而卷入地区争端，有时却使它们濒临战争边缘。在危机之外，它们彼此之间的正常态度一直充满敌意，以至于历史书将1949年至1969年称为冷战时期，而1980年以来的局势在许多观察家看来似乎预示着冷战的回归。
It is easy enough, when one considers the dangerously bipolar nature of world politics, the preoccupation of the superpowers with nuclear weapons, and the intensity of the arms race between them, to incline to the latter view and to conclude that the present age is not congenial to the kind of strategical principles elaborated by the masters of the past. When Clausewitz, for instance, wrote his famous sentence “War is the continuation of politics by other means,” he was, while emphasizing the links between war and peace, probably assuming a clearer distinction between them than we can today, when it is, indeed, questionable whether the two conditions are separable in any real sense. The collapse in 1914 of the international system that had preserved peace during most of the nineteenth century and the subsequent failure of all attempts to find an effective substitute for it, the paramount influence of ideology upon international relations since 1917 and—despite the definitive defeat of Fascism and National Socialism by a coalition that transcended the ideological divisions among its members—its increased intensity after 1945, the hypernationalism of countries that freed themselves from colonial status in the wake of the second world conflict, and—particularly in the Middle East—the emergence of militant religious zealotry have made the years since 1945 a period of almost unremitting conflict on many levels. If the greatest of the Great Powers have avoided open war against each other, their involvement in regional disputes on behalf of client states has on occasion brought them dangerously close to it, and their normal attitude toward each other between such crises has been of such fixed hostility that the years from 1949 to 1969 are referred to in the history books as the years of the Cold War, and those since 1980 have seemed to many observers to betoken a return to that condition.
在这种情况下，民意调查显示，越来越多的欧美普通民众不再相信超级大国之间和平的持久性，一些专家——例如1981年4月在荷兰格罗宁根会面的科学家、军事专家和和平研究人员——倾向于认为和平无法维持到十年末，这或许并不令人惊讶。事实上，这些观点已经开始影响个人行为：一方面，人们的宿命论日益增长，对政治领导人的信任度下降，政治参与度降低，更加关注地区和环境问题，个人生活更加注重内在，而忽视了城邦（polis ）；另一方面，人们积极参与基层直接行动运动，要求对复杂的政治和军事问题寻求立即彻底的解决方案，而往往忽视了其中涉及的技术、外交和战略因素。
In these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that public opinion polls should report that an ever larger number of ordinary people in Europe and America no longer believe in the durability of peace between the superpowers and that some specialists—like the scientists, military experts, and peace researchers who met in Groningen in the Netherlands in April 1981—are inclined to believe that it cannot survive the end of the decade. Such views were, indeed, already having their effects upon personal behavior, on the one hand, in a growing fatalism, a frustrated distrust of political leaders and a withdrawal from political participation, a new focus on regional and environmental problems, and an internalization of life at the expense of the polis1 and, on the other hand, in participation in grass-roots, direct-action movements that demand immediate and total solutions for complicated political and military problems, often with scant regard for the technical, diplomatic, and strategical factors that are involved.
在一些国家，值得注意的是一种矛盾的情绪，这种情绪既允许对战争的恐惧与高涨的民族主义情绪并存，这种民族主义情绪可能表现为好战情绪，同时还允许人们高度参与战争准备并从中获利。理查德·巴内特曾就后一种活动写道：“战争经济为成千上万身着或不身着军装的官僚提供了舒适的生存空间，他们每天上班制造核武器或策划核战争；数百万工人的工作依赖于核恐怖主义体系；科学家和工程师受雇寻找能够提供全面安全的最终‘技术突破’；承包商不愿放弃唾手可得的利润；以及兜售威胁、鼓吹战争的武士知识分子。” ²
Notable also in some countries is an ambivalence of mood that permits fear of war to exist side by side both with an exalted state of national feeling that is capable of belligerent expression and with a high degree of profitable involvement in preparation for war. Richard Barnet has written of this last activity that “the war economy provides comfortable niches for tens of thousands of bureaucrats in and out of military uniform who go to the office every day to build nuclear weapons or to plan nuclear war; millions of workers whose jobs depend upon the system of nuclear terrorism; scientists and engineers hired to look for that final ‘technological breakthrough’ that can provide total security; contractors unwilling to give up easy profits; warrior intellectuals who sell threats and bless wars.”2
存在这种倾向的时代，若要称之为和平时期，未免牵强附会；悲观主义者或许会认为，它更类似于东德小说家克丽斯塔·沃尔夫所称的“战争前奏”（ der Vorkrieg ） 。3
An age in which such tendencies exist cannot be described as a time of peace without straining the meaning of the word, and a pessimist might be inclined to believe that it resembles more closely that transitional state that the East German novelist Christa Wolf calls der Vorkrieg, the prelude to war.3
现代科技或许需要对克劳塞维茨的另一项假设做出一些调整，即无论在和平时期还是战争时期，负责任的政治领导人通常都能做出所有重要的政策决定。未来危机中采取的行动确实有可能具有预先设定和自动执行的性质。我们可以合理地论证，一旦政治领导人授权将国家资源用于某种武器研发或某种轰炸机、导弹或潜艇的生产，其自主权便开始萎缩。由于此类项目需要一定的准备时间，今天的决策必然会决定或限制未来的政策走向，从而预先判断尚未预见的局面，并限制应对尚未发生的突发事件的能力。
Modern technology may require some adjustment to another assumption by Clausewitz, namely that in time of both peace and war the responsible political leadership will usually be able to make all significant policy decisions. The actions that will be taken in future crises promise, indeed, to be predetermined and automatic in nature. One can argue plausibly that the autonomy of the political leadership begins to shrink from the moment that it authorizes the expenditure of national resources on this or that kind of weapons research or the production of this or that kind of bomber, missile, or submarine. Because of the lead time required for the realization of such projects, the decision made today inevitably determines or circumscribes policy at a later date, thus prejudging situations that have not been foreseen and limiting one's capabilities for contingencies that have not yet arisen.
与这种依赖根据设计室中形成的效率理念订购和制造的武器的倾向相伴随的是，武器生产往往会形成自身的发展势头，并造成政治家们难以承受的压力和焦虑。军备在一个国家的经济中扮演着重要的角色——增加工业收入和降低失业率——这使得人们几乎无法抵制推动军备竞赛的力量，而潜在对手对自身努力的反应（或想象中的反应）所引发的担忧，进一步加剧了这种趋势。随着武器生产竞争日趋激烈，对武器使用的限制可能会放松甚至消失。 1914年，德国最高统帅部担心三年内军事优势将彻底倒向协约国一方，正是这种担忧促使其决定发动战争。在最终的危机中，政治领导人被技术性论据所左右，这些论据强调立即宣战能在动员时间内取得优势——简而言之，用现代术语来说，就是强调先发制人战略的优势。在核军备竞赛中，这一过程重演的危险性要大得多。超级大国竞相追求所谓的反制力量能力，导致它们更加关注时机，并鼓吹“先发制人打击”和“遭受攻击后发射”等理论，这便是最好的例证。美国军备控制和裁军署前署长弗雷德·C·伊克莱指出，此类系统将“难以置信的责任赋予了系统内部的一些技术军士。系统越快速、越自动化，就越是将决策权——国家历史上最关键的决策权——交给那些远离总统和参谋长联席会议的人。” ⁴
Concurrent with this inclination to rely on weapons ordered and manufactured according to notions of efficiency formed in drafting rooms, arms production tends to assume its own momentum and to create pressures and anxieties that statesmen find difficult to withstand. The general role that armament plays in the economy of a country—increasing industrial earnings and reducing unemployment—makes it almost impossible to resist forces driving toward an arms race, and this tendency is encouraged by the apprehensions engendered by the nature of the response (or the imagined response) of potential antagonists to one's own efforts. As the competition to produce weapons becomes more frenetic, the restraints upon their use may loosen or dissolve. In 1914, it was the German High Command's fear that military superiority would shift definitively to the side of the Entente powers within the next three years that determined its decision to push for war, and in the final crisis the political leaders were overborne by technical arguments about the advantages to be gained in mobilization time by immediate declaration of war—arguments in short, to use modern parlance, about the advantage of a first-strike strategy. The dangers of this process repeating itself are infinitely greater in the nuclear arms race, as is illustrated by the way in which the superpowers' competition to achieve what is called counter-force capability has led to a heightened preoccupation with timing and to advocacy of “preemptive strike” and “launch-under-attack” doctrines. Fred C. Iklé, former head of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has pointed out that such systems put “incredible responsibilities on some tech sergeant in the innards of the system. The more quick and automatic it is, the more you're turning over decisions—the most fateful decisions in the nation's history—to people far removed from the President and the Joint Chiefs.”4
当战略脱离有效的政治控制时，它便会变得盲目而鲁莽，战争也正是在这种时候呈现出克劳塞维茨所担忧的那种绝对形式。一个广为人知的故事是，在1914年8月危机最严重的时候，一份报告送达了德意志帝国司令部，指出只要德国不进攻法国，英国就不会卷入即将到来的战争。据说，皇帝告诉总参谋长赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇上将，如果情况属实，德国就应该将进攻重心转移到东方。毛奇回答说这不可能，因为军队只有一个作战计划，现在无法更改。“你叔叔会给我一个不同的答案，”威廉二世抱怨道，但这句虽有道理却略带恼怒的反驳并没有阻止德军纵队向西推进的致命行动。⁵不难想象，在当今时代，类似的场景也可能发生，只不过计算机扮演了那个难以更改的作战计划的角色。凡是曾因银行和公司电脑系统反复无常的运行而导致个人记录混乱不堪的人，都不会否认马克思主义者最近对超级大国依赖机械化预警系统的描述——“将安全依赖于机器而非对历史形势的分析，这是一种疯狂的错误。而只有具备历史认知（也意味着了解对方历史形势）的人才能做到这一点。”<sup> 6</sup>
When strategy is freed from effective political control, it becomes mindless and heedless, and it is then that war assumes that absolute form that Clausewitz dreaded. There is a well-known story of a report reaching the German Imperial Headquarters at the height of the August crisis of 1914, indicating that the British would not enter the pending war provided that the Germans refrained from attacking France. The Emperor is said to have told Generaloberst Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of the general staff, that if this were true Germany should shift the focus of its offensive to the East. Moltke answered that this was impossible, because the army had only one war plan, which could not now be changed. “Your uncle would have given me a different answer,” William II grumbled, but this peevish if reasonable retort did not stop the fateful westward movement of the German columns.5 It is not difficult to think of a similar scenario in our times, with the computer taking the role of the intractable war plan. No one who has suffered the irritation of having his personal records hopelessly tangled by the erratic behavior of bank and corporation computer systems will deny the justice of a recent Marxist description of superpower reliance upon mechanized warning systems as “the lunatic error of making security dependent upon a machine rather than upon the analysis of the historical situation, which only people with historical understanding (and that means also with an understanding of the historical situation of the other side) are capable of.”6
就此而言，值得指出的是，当代核战略除了以高度敏感的执行方式和对机械技术的依赖（这极大地削弱了政治控制）为特征外，其情报体系也难以称得上足以应对当今这个特殊危险时代的需要。欧内斯特·R·梅在近期一项关于两次世界大战前情报评估的研究中写道，在评估其他大国的能力时，当今各国政府的处境可能比第一次世界大战前的政府还要糟糕。“他们至少可以像1914年以前的政府能够统计大炮、马匹和无畏舰的数量一样精确地统计导弹、轰炸机、航母、潜艇和装甲师的数量；但现在，就像当时一样，没有人能够确定这些总数意味着什么。”此外，由于这些新型武器都没有在大国之间的战争中经过检验，“情报分析人员、参谋人员和决策者不得不依靠想象力而非经验来评估能力。”<sup> 7</sup>
In this connection, it is worth remarking that contemporary nuclear strategy, in addition to being characterized by a hair-trigger methodology of implementation and a reliance upon mechanical techniques that greatly weakens political control, is guided by an intelligence system that can hardly be described as being adequate to the needs of uniquely dangerous times. In a recent study of intelligence assessment before the two world wars, Ernest R. May has written that, in judging the capabilities of other powers, the governments of our time may be worse off than those before the First World War. “They can count missiles, bombers, carriers, submarines, and armored divisions at least as precisely as governments before 1914 could count guns, horses, and dreadnoughts; but now, as then, no one can be confident what the totals signify.” Moreover, since none of the new weapons has been tested in warfare between major powers, “intelligence analysts, staff officers, and decision-makers have to rely on imagination rather than experience to assess capabilities.”7
对于其他大国的倾向，它们或许和上世纪30年代一样一无所知——那个年代的预测能力并不强。近年来，各国政府的组织结构日益复杂，其行为也因此更加难以预测。如今，大国的外交政策有时难以展现出以往被视为外交成功先决条件的连贯性和一致性。在这种情况下，客观评估对方的意图总是困难重重，而且始终存在这样的风险：一些仅仅基于意识形态热情的论点，会与那些严格依据现有证据但因其矛盾性而显得谨慎和犹豫的论点一样，获得同等的重视。因此，在核竞争中，一些赢得战争的战略是基于对潜在对手倾向的评估而提出的，但这些评估在其历史、心理或近期行为中都找不到佐证，并且对双方的相对能力表现出鲁莽的乐观态度。
With respect to the proclivities of other powers, they are probably as much in the dark as they were in the 1930s, a time not blessed by the gifts of accurate prediction. Governments have in recent years become more and more complex and consequently less foreseeable in their behavior. It is now sometimes difficult to discover in the foreign policy of the Great Powers the coherence and continuity that in earlier times were considered to be the prerequisites of a successful conduct of foreign affairs. In these circumstances, an objective assessment of the intentions of the other side is always difficult, and the danger always exists that arguments based on little more than ideological zeal will be given as much weight as those that are based strictly on available evidence but are, because of its contradictory nature, cautious and tentative. Thus, in the nuclear competition, war-winning strategies have been advanced on the basis of assessments of the proclivities of the potential antagonist that find no corroboration in its history, psychology, or recent behavior and that show a reckless optimism with respect to the relative capabilities of the two sides.
然而，尽管如此，我们必须指出，我们讨论的这些趋势并非必然会像现在这样持续占据主导地位。我们生活在核时代，但尚未进入核战争时代。自1945年以来发生的所有国家间冲突中，没有一场动用了核武器，所有冲突都不同程度地遵循着从过去继承而来的战略理念。此外，现代科技——它制造了投掷在广岛和长崎的原子弹，以及自1945年以来引发人们对超级大国之间以相互毁灭告终的冲突的担忧的更先进的武器——如今正以其永不停歇的能量，制造出新型武器，这些武器或许最终会使核战争过时，并重新创造古典战略原则形成时的时代背景。
Having said all this, however, one must note that it is not inevitable that the tendencies we have discussed will continue to be as dominant as they now appear to be. If we live in a nuclear age, we do not yet live in any age of nuclear war. None of the interstate conflicts that have taken place since 1945 has seen the employment of nuclear weapons, and all have been waged, with varying degrees of efficiency, in accordance with strategical concepts inherited from the past. Moreover, modern technology, which created the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the more sophisticated ones that have in the years since 1945 aroused visions of a conflict between the superpowers that would end in mutual annihilation, is now, in its restless energy, creating new kinds of weapons that may in time make nuclear war obsolete and recreate the conditions in which the principles of classical strategy were formulated.
弗里曼·戴森在其引人入胜的著作《武器与希望》中，描述了一种名为精确制导导弹（PGM）的军事技术领域，该领域发展迅猛，前景广阔。精确制导导弹本质上是非核的，体积小巧，单兵或装甲车、直升机均可发射，并在1973年的战争中对以色列装甲部队进行了实战检验，取得了显著成效。自那时以来，精确制导导弹技术得到了进一步发展，戴森写道：
In his interesting study Weapons and Hope, Freeman Dyson has written of the vigorous and rapidly advancing area of military technology known as precision-guided missiles or PGM, non-nuclear in nature, small enough to be fired by individual soldiers or from armored cars or helicopters, and already tested with effect against Israeli armor in the 1973 war. Since that time, PGM technology has been pushed further, and Dyson writes:
微型计算机和传感器技术的飞速发展很可能导致精密非核武器的扩散，进而促使军队回归到更古老、更专业的战争模式。新型武器需要训练有素的精锐士兵才能有效使用，而不再需要像两次世界大战中那样庞大的军队作为炮灰。1982年的福克兰群岛战争进一步印证了这一趋势。阿根廷空军这支精锐小部队，凭借精准的武器装备和高超的作战技巧，给入侵的敌军造成了巨大损失；而阿根廷陆军这支由大量征召兵组成的军队，则惨败。现代科技似乎正在将我们带回十八世纪，带回那个小型职业军队进行小型职业战争的时代。
It seems likely that the rapid development of microcomputer and sensor technology will result in a growing proliferation of sophisticated non-nuclear weapons [that] will cause armies to take a step back into an older, more professional style of warfare. The new weapons need elite, highly trained soldiers to use them effectively. They do not need the mass armies that provided the cannon fodder of the two world wars. The Falklands campaign of 1982 provides some additional evidence that the winds of change are blowing in this direction. The Argentine air force, a small elite force using precise weapons with daring and skill, did great damage to the invading forces, while the Argentine army, a mass army of conscripts, was crushingly defeated. It seems that modern technology is taking us back toward the eighteenth century, toward the era when small professional armies fought small professional wars.8
人们日益怀疑北约战略的可信度，而这一战略一直基于在遭受来自东方的压倒性常规攻击时首先使用核武器的原则，这进一步强化了上述考量。近来，关于加强常规威慑的可能性展开了热烈的讨论，讨论的重点在于，能否通过对苏联侧翼和东欧腹地发起常规进攻来应对苏联的攻击。9
Such considerations are strengthened by growing doubts about the credibility of a NATO strategy that has been based upon the doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons in the event of an overwhelming conventional attack from the East. Of late there has been lively discussion of the possibility of strengthening conventional deterrence by adding to it a retaliatory capability that would not involve the use of nuclear weapons and thus would not risk escalation; and this has centered around the feasibility of countering a Soviet attack by means of a conventional offensive thrust against the Soviet flanks and deep into the heart of Eastern Europe.9
这种战略的支持者并不畏惧批评者指出北约在常规兵力上逊于华沙条约组织。相反，他们认为历史上不乏兵力占优却成功发动进攻的例子：格兰特将军的维克斯堡战役、1940年德军入侵法国、1944年美国第三集团军的迂回战术、1951年美国在朝鲜的攻势以及1967年以色列在西奈半岛的战役。此外，他们指出，北约对东欧发动常规进攻将威胁到苏联的政治弱点，因为这将为北约提供机会，利用其东欧盟友的政治不可靠性。这一论点与毛奇1879年的战争计划惊人地相似，该计划主张在俄罗斯西部省份发动进攻，并系统性地煽动波兰等被统治民族的起义。10此外，他们认为，这将“使苏联面临其理论和战略试图避免的局面：即他们无法控制事态发展，并且极有可能面临不确定性和突袭。” 11
Advocates of this kind of strategy are not deterred by critics who point to NATO's inferiority to the Warsaw Pact in conventional strength. On the contrary, they argue that history is filled with examples of successful offensive action by forces that were faced by superior numbers: Grant's Vicksburg campaign, the German drive into France in 1940, the United States Third Army's end run in 1944, the United States offensive in Korea in 1951, and the Israeli Sinai campaign in 1967. In addition, they point out that a conventional offensive into Eastern Europe by NATO would threaten the Soviet Union where it is politically weak by providing opportunities to exploit the political unreliability of its East European allies, an argument strikingly similar to that in Moltke's war plan of 1879, which called for an offensive in Russia's western provinces that would be combined with a systematic attempt to encourage insurrection among such subject peoples as the Poles.10 It would, in addition, they believe, “confront the Soviets with just exactly the situation their doctrine and strategy attempt to avoid: one in which they do not have control of developments and in which they face a high probability of uncertainty and surprise.”11
这些例子或许足以表明，过去的战略经验绝非与我们当前对战场问题的思考无关，而且，如果戴森的预言成真，其重要性将更加凸显。即使在当前形势下，对过往错误的了解也应表明，将军事计划和军备置于更强有力的政治控制之下是明智之举，并应明确指出，计划与经济和技术的交织需要一个整体组织，在这个组织中，军队的作用必须受到审慎的限制。
These examples are perhaps enough to show that the strategical experience of the past is by no means irrelevant to our current thinking about battlefield problems and that, if Dyson's predictions come true, it will become even more pertinent. Even in the present situation, knowledge of past mistakes should indicate the advisability of bringing military planning and armament under firmer political control and should make it evident that the entanglement of planning with economics and technology requires an overall organization in which the role of the military is subject to prudent limitation.
当然，这并非全部真相。战略不仅仅是为国家可能卷入的武装冲突做准备，以及规划如何运用资源和部署兵力以取得胜利的艺术。从更广义的角度来看，它也是十七、十八世纪所谓的“国家利益”（ragione di stato）或“国家理由”（raison d'état）的现代对应物。它是对一个国家核心利益、安全必需品、与其他国家关系中的根本目标以及各项目标的优先顺序的理性界定。这种更广义的战略应当激励和指导更狭义的战争计划和作战战略，克劳塞维茨在本文开头引用的那句名言中也暗示了这一点。
That, of course, is not the whole story. Strategy is not merely the art of preparing for the armed conflicts in which a nation may become involved and planning the use of its resources and the deployment of its forces in such a way as to bring a successful issue. It is also, in a broader sense, the modern equivalent of what was, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, called ragione di stato or raison d'état. It is the rational determination of a nation's vital interests, the things that are essential to its security, its fundamental purposes in its relations with other nations, and its priorities with respect to goals. This broader form of strategy should animate and guide the narrower strategy of war planning and war fighting, and Clausewitz implied as much in the famous statement cited at the outset of these observations.
从广义上讲，有效制定和执行战略的历史范例并不难寻。例如，在我国建国初期，《联邦党人文集》和乔治·华盛顿的告别演说等著作中，就对国家利益进行了系统性的分析。这些著作的显著特点在于，它们以简洁客观的方式阐述了在充满危险竞争的世界中，国家生存的基本前提，例如约翰·杰伊的《联邦党人文集》第三篇，其中对基本原则的陈述几乎是客观的：“在一个明智而自由的民族认为有必要关注的诸多事项中，保障自身安全似乎是首要的……但是，美国人民免受外国势力威胁的安全，不仅取决于他们是否不给其他国家提供正当的战争理由，还取决于他们是否能够使自身处于一种不招致敌意和侮辱的境地。”<sup> 12</sup>
Historical examples of the effective formulation and execution of strategy in the broader sense are not hard to find. One thinks of the series of methodical analyses of national interest made at the beginning of our nation's history in such works as The Federalist and George Washington's Farewell Address. The salient characteristic of these is their economical and objective presentation of the basic premises of national existence in a dangerously competitive world, as in John Jay's Federalist No. 3 with its almost matter-of-fact statement of first principles: “Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first…. But the safety of the people of America against dangers from foreign force depends not only upon their forbearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite hostility and insult.”12
这些国家文件实际上是开国元勋们的政治遗嘱，它们确立了共和国建国初期政策的指导原则，宣称其根本利益在于政治自由和经济实力，并认为安全的前提是国内团结（即免于内战和分裂）、适当的军事力量（即在保卫国家的名义下，既不威胁共和政体，也不损害经济健康），以及明智的外交政策——在特殊紧急情况下，可依靠与外国的临时联盟。这构成了美国军事战略的理论基础，该战略带领这个新生国家渡过了拿破仑战争的风暴，当然，并非一帆风顺，但最终美国的安全和主权没有受到重大损害。<sup> 13</sup>
The political testaments of the Founding Fathers—for that is what these state papers amounted to—formulated the guiding principles of the Republic's policy in its first years, declaring that its vital interests were its political freedom and its economic strength and arguing that the prerequisites of security were domestic union (that is, freedom from internecine brawls and divisions), an appropriate military establishment (meaning one that, under the guise of protecting the nation, would threaten neither its republican form of government nor its economic health), and a wise foreign policy, which, for extraordinary emergencies, would rely upon temporary alliances with foreign powers. This was the theoretical underpinning of the military strategy that carried the fledgling American nation through the storms of the Napoleonic Wars, not, to be sure, without mishap, but in the end without significant hurt to American security and sovereignty.13
第二个广义上的战略范例，这次的战略更具侵略性，是普鲁士王国在1862年至1866年间所采取的战略。该战略的基本构想源于奥托·冯·俾斯麦在19世纪50年代担任驻法兰克福议会大使期间撰写的一系列精辟报告。这些报告阐述了克里米亚战争后国际体系混乱无力的背景下普鲁士的利益和机遇，分析了其主要竞争对手奥地利的实力，并倡导了一项政策方针。在俾斯麦执掌普鲁士政务后，该方针最终促成了克尼格雷茨战役的胜利，并最终使普鲁士在北德意志地区占据了霸权——总而言之，这一战略被视为有效协调武力与治国之道以实现政治目标的经典范例。<sup> 14</sup>
A second example of strategy in the broader sense, and this time one that was aggressive in nature, was that followed by the Kingdom of Prussia in the years from 1862 to 1866, which had its basic formulation in a series of incisive dispatches written by Otto von Bismarck when he was ambassador to the Frankfurt Diet in the 1850s. These delineated Prussian interests and opportunities in the context of the confusion and ineffectiveness of the international system after the Crimean War, analyzed the capabilities of its chief rival Austria, and advocated a course of policy that found its implementation, after Bismarck had assumed direction of Prussian affairs, in the policy that led to Königgrätz and hegemony over northern Germany—all in all, a strategy that has been regarded as a classic illustration of the effective coordination of force and statecraft for the attainment of political aims.14
最后，我们可以从杜鲁门政府应对 1947 年至 1950 年挑战的方式中找到一个系统且精心协调的国家战略的近期例子。杜鲁门政府敏锐地确定了美国在战后世界中的利益性质，有效地动员公众支持其对欧洲的承诺，并巧妙地利用经济资源来实现其目标。最后，当朝鲜战争爆发时，杜鲁门政府根据政治考虑对其在朝鲜的军事行动施加了限制——总而言之，这是一项战略举措，几乎肯定会赢得克劳塞维茨的赞许。
Finally, a more recent example of a systematic and carefully coordinated national strategy can be found in the way in which the Truman administration responded to the challenge of the years 1947–1950 by a shrewd determination of the nature of American interests in the postwar world, by the effective mobilization of public support for its European commitments and the skillful use of economic resources to gain its objectives, and, finally, when hostilities broke out in Korea, by the imposition upon its military operations there of limitations determined by political considerations—all in all, an exercise in strategy that would almost certainly have won Clausewitz's approbation.
这些战略的共同之处在于，它们在制定和实施过程中都体现了完全的理性，对所要实施的国际环境进行了现实的评估，对潜在对手的能力和倾向进行了准确的认识，并基于一个基本假设，即军事力量的积累和运用必须以可证明的政治优势为依据，并且不能给国家资源造成过重的负担，以及决心在政治目标实现后停止使用武力。
Common to these strategies was their complete rationality in formulation and, in their implementation, a realistic appraisal of the international context in which they were to be pursued, an accurate view of the capabilities and proclivities of potential opponents, an underlying assumption that the accumulation and employment of military force must be justified by demonstrable political advantage and must not impose too heavy a burden upon national resources, and a determination that the use of force should end with the attainment of the political objective.
这些历史案例对我们当下的处境有多大意义？至少，它们为那些肩负国家安全决策重任的人们提供了研究和反思的案例，以及衡量当前实践的典范。在持续不断的军备竞赛似乎正形成一种新的强制模式，攫取国会和公众的注意力，并因此几乎不可能对我们当前形势的现实和需求进行逻辑和系统的思考之际，我们当然应该记住，例如，德国最杰出的政治战略家取得成功的关键在于，他拒绝屈服于瞬息万变的局势所带来的压力，并坚持不懈地在既定的情境中寻找那些符合国家利益的因素。
How relevant are such historical examples to our present situation? At the very least, they provide those who are charged with decisions affecting national security with cases for study and reflection and models against which to measure present practice. At a time when the ongoing arms race threatens to create its own pattern of compulsions, to engross both congressional and public attention, and, by doing so, to make logical and systematic thought about the realities and the requirements of our situation all but impossible,15 it is surely worthwhile to be reminded, for example, that the key to the successes won by Germany's most distinguished political strategist was his refusal to submit to the pressures created by the rush of events and his unremitting search for those elements in the rebus sic stantibus that were compatible with the interests of his country.
本书导言指出，历史总是难以直接为当下提供经验教训。历史永远无法告诉我们该如何行动，但它却蕴藏着丰富的案例研究，我们可以从中汲取灵感和警示。我们引用的案例既是典范，也是警示。它们提醒我们，无论时代背景如何，有效的战略始终是为实现政治目标而精心策划地运用武力和治国之道。事实上，战争史和外交史——构成历史的重要组成部分——只不过是各国是否愿意或拒绝将这一真理作为其政策依据的记录而已。
The introduction to this volume referred to the stubborn refusal of the past to yield direct lessons to the present. History can never tell us how to act, but is prolific in case studies from which we can draw ideas and cautionary prescriptions. The cases that we have cited are both models and admonitions. They remind us that, regardless of temporal context, effective strategy is always a calculated employment of force and statecraft for a political end. Indeed, the history of war and diplomacy, which makes up such a large part of history in general, is little more than the record of the readiness or refusal of nations to base their policies upon that truth.
1请参阅Fritz J. Raddatz，“Die Aufklärung entlässt ihre Kinder”和“Unser Verhängnis als unsere Verantwortung”， Die Zeit， 1984 年 7 月 13 日，6 日。
1 See, inter alia, Fritz J. Raddatz, “Die Aufklärung entlässt ihre Kinder,” and “Unser Verhängnis als unsere Verantwortung,” Die Zeit, 6, 13 July 1984.
2 Richard J. Barnet，《真正的安全》（纽约，1981 年），第 97 页。
2 Richard J. Barnet, Real Security (New York, 1981), 97.
3 Christa Wolf，卡珊德拉：Erzäblung（达姆施塔特，1984 年），76f。
3 Christa Wolf, Kassandra: Erzäblung (Darmstadt, 1984), 76f.
4引自 Barnet，《真正的安全》，第 30 页。
4 Cited in Barnet, Real Security, 30.
5 Gordon A. Craig，《普鲁士军队的政治，1640–1945》（纽约，1964 年），第 294 页。
5 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 (New York, 1964), 294.
6 Christa Wolf，《Voraussetzungen einer Erzählung：Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesungen》（达姆施塔特，1983 年），87。
6 Christa Wolf, Voraussetzungen einer Erzählung: Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesungen (Darmstadt, 1983), 87.
7 Ernest R. May，“能力和倾向”，载《了解敌人：两次世界大战前的情报评估》（普林斯顿，1984 年），第 530 页。关于当前战略的预定性质和情报的问题性质，另见 Paul Bracken，《核力量的指挥与控制》（纽黑文，1984 年）。
7 Ernest R. May, “Capabilities and Proclivities,” in Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars (Princeton, 1984), 530. On the predetermined nature of current strategy and the problematical character of intelligence, see also Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven, 1984).
8 Freeman Dyson，《武器与希望》（纽约，1984 年），55。关于 PGM，另见 Horst Afheldt， Verteidigung und Frieden（慕尼黑，1976 年）。
8 Freeman Dyson, Weapons and Hope (New York, 1984), 55. On PGM, see also Horst Afheldt, Verteidigung und Frieden (Munich, 1976).
9.对北约战略的批评可见于埃米尔·斯潘诺基和盖伊·布罗索莱合著的《不战而胜》（慕尼黑，1976年）以及卡尔·弗里德里希·冯·魏茨泽克的《危险之路》（慕尼黑，1976年）。关于其他方案，可参见伯纳德·W·罗杰斯将军的《增强北约灵活反应的灵活性》 （载于《战略评论》，1983年春季）以及《应对艰难十年的处方：80年代的大西洋联盟》（载于《外交事务》第60卷，1981-1982年，第1145-1156页）。此外，值得注意的是，过去新型侵略性武器似乎总是势不可挡，但随着时间的推移，防御性反制武器相继被发明和生产出来，战略考量才重新占据了其传统地位。
9 Criticisms of NATO strategy are to be found in Emil Spannocchi and Guy Brossolet, Verteidigung ohne Schlacht (Munich, 1976) and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Wege in der Gefahr (Munich, 1976). On alternatives, see, inter alia, General Bernard W. Rogers, “Greater Flexibility for NATO's Flexible Response,” Strategic Review (Spring 1983), and “Prescription for a Difficult Decade: The Atlantic Alliance in the 80's,” Foreign Affairs 60 (1981–82), 1145–56. It might also be noted that in the past frequently, almost regularly, new aggressive weapons would appear to be irresistible, but gradually, some time after their introduction, defensive counterweapons were invented and produced so that strategical considerations regained their traditional role.
10莫尔特克伯爵，《Die deutschen Aufmarschplane 1871–1890》，编辑。费迪南德·冯·施梅尔茨菲尔德（ Forschungen und Darstellungen aus dem Reichsarchw，Heft 7）（柏林，1929 年），80。
10 Graf Moltke, Die deutschen Aufmarschplane 1871–1890, ed. Ferdinand von Schmerzfeld (Forschungen und Darstellungen aus dem Reichsarchw, Heft 7) (Berlin, 1929), 80.
11 Samuel P. Huntington，“欧洲的常规威慑和常规报复”，《国际安全》（1983-84 年冬季刊），第 43 页。
11 Samuel P. Huntington, “Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe,” International Security (Winter 1983–84), 43.
12 《联邦党人文集》，爱德华·米德·厄尔编辑（纽约，1937 年），第 13、18 页。
12 The Federalist, ed. Edward Mead Earle (New York, 1937), 13, 18.
13费利克斯·吉尔伯特，《告别演说：早期美国外交政策思想》（普林斯顿，1961 年），第 4、5 章。
13 Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1961), chs. 4, 5.
14 Lothar Gall，《俾斯麦，白人革命家》（法兰克福，1980 年），第 127-173 页；Otto Pflanze，《俾斯麦与德国的发展：统一时期，1815-1871 年》（普林斯顿，1963 年），第 87 页及以下；Craig，《普鲁士军队的政治》，第 5 章。
14 Lothar Gall, Bismarck, der weisse Revolutionar (Frankfurt a.M., 1980), 127–173; Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815–1871 (Princeton, 1963), 87ff; Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army, ch. 5.
15参见乔治·F·凯南，《呼吁外交》，1983 年 11 月的演讲，部分内容转载于《哈珀斯》，1984 年 4 月，第 20 页。
15 See George F. Kennan, “A Plea for Diplomacy,” speech, November 1983, reprinted in part in Harper's, April 1984, p. 20.
贡献者
Contributors
南安普顿大学现代英国和欧洲历史讲师马丁·亚历山大撰写了题为“莫里斯·加梅林与法国保卫战”的论文。
MARTIN ALEXANDER, Lecturer in Modern British and European History at Southampton University, wrote his dissertation on “Maurice Gamelin and the Defence of France.”
布莱恩·邦德是伦敦大学国王学院战争研究高级讲师。他撰写了大量关于战争史的著作。他的著作包括《法国和比利时，1939-1940》、《利德尔·哈特：军事思想研究》、《两次世界大战之间的英国军事政策》以及《欧洲的战争与社会，1870-1970》。
BRIAN BOND IS Reader in War Studies, King's College, University of London. He has written extensively on the history of war. Among his books are France and Belgium, 1939–1940; Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought; British Military Policy between the Two World Wars; and War and Society in Europe, 1870–1970.
迈克尔·卡弗，英国陆军元帅，著有多部关于战争史和国防政策的著作，其中包括《1945 年以来的战争》、《机动性的使徒》、《和平政策》和《英国陆军的七个时代》。
MICHAEL CARVER, Field Marshal, British Army, is the author of many works on the history of war and defense policy, among them War since 1945, The Apostles of Mobility, A Policy for Peace, and The Seven Ages of the British Army.
托马斯· W·科利尔是美国陆军前军官，曾于 1962 年至 1967 年参加越南战争。他曾在西点军校教授军事史，目前正在密歇根大学攻读历史学研究生学位。
THOMAS W. COLLIER is a former U.S. Army officer who served in the Vietnam War during 1962–1967. He has taught military history at West Point, and currently is completing graduate study in history at the University of Michigan.
戈登· A·C·克雷格是斯坦福大学人文学院荣休教授，曾任J·E·华莱士·斯特林讲席教授。他的著作包括《普鲁士军队政治，1640-1945》、《科姆格雷茨战役》、《德国，1866-1945》和《德国人》。他与亚历山大·L·乔治合著了《武力与治国之道》，并与费利克斯·吉尔伯特共同编辑了《外交官，1919-1939》。
GORDON A. CRAIG is J. E. Wallace Sterling Professor of Humanities Emeritus at Stanford University. Among his books are The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945; The Battle of Kömggrätz; Germany, 1866–1945; and The Germans. With Alexander L. George he wrote Force and Statecraft, and with Felix Gilbert he edited The Diplomats, 1919–1939.
菲利普· A·克罗尔是美国海军战争学院的欧内斯特·J·金海事史荣誉教授。他的著作包括《革命期间及之后的马里兰》和《马里亚纳群岛战役》 。他与杰特·A·伊塞利合著了《美国海军陆战队与两栖战争》，并与E·G·洛夫合著了《吉尔伯特群岛和马绍尔群岛的占领》。
PHILIP A. CROWL IS Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History Emeritus at the Naval War College. Among his books are Maryland During and After the Revolution and Campaign in the Marianas. With Jeter A. Isely he wrote The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, and with E. G. Love he wrote Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls.
《现代战略的缔造者》原版编辑爱德华·米德·阿勒曾任普林斯顿高等研究院教授。他的其他著作包括《逆流而上》和《现代法国》。
EDWARD MEAD EARLE, the editor of the original Makers of Modern Strategy, was Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Among his other works are Against This Torrent and Modern France.
劳伦斯· F·里德曼是伦敦国王学院战争研究教授。他是《美国情报与苏联战略威胁》、《英国与核武器》和《核战略的演变》的作者，也是《动荡的联盟》的编辑。
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN is Professor of War Studies, King's College, London. He is the author of US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, and The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, and the editor of The Troubled Alliance.
迈克尔·盖尔( MICHAEL GEYER)是芝加哥大学历史学副教授。他是关于国防军的专着《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit》和《Deutsche Rüstungspolitik, 1860–1980》的作者。
MICHAEL GEYER is Associate Professor of History at the University of Chicago. He is the author of a monograph on the Reichswehr, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, and of Deutsche Rüstungspolitik, 1860–1980.
费利克斯·吉尔伯特是普林斯顿高等研究院历史研究学院的荣誉退休教授。他的著作涵盖欧洲史和世界史，包括《希特勒指挥战争》、《告别演说》、《马基雅维利与圭恰尔迪尼》、《教皇、他的银行家与威尼斯》以及论文集《历史：选择与承诺》。他还与戈登·A·克雷格合编了《外交官，1919-1939》。
FELIX GILBERT is Professor Emeritus in the School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. Among his books on European and world history are Hitler Directs His War; To the Farewell Address; Machiavelli and Guicciardini; The Pope, His Banker and Venice; and a collection of essays, History: Choice and Commitment. With Gordon A. Craig he edited The Diplomats, 1919–1939.
亨利·古埃拉克是康奈尔大学科学史教授。他著有《拉瓦锡：关键的一年》、《拉瓦锡：化学家和革命家》、《牛顿在欧洲大陆》以及《现代科学史论文集》。
HENRY GUERLAC was Professor of the History of Science, Cornell University. He wrote Lavoisier, The Crucial Year; Lavoisier, Chemist and Revolutionary; Newton on the Continent; and Essays and Papers in the History of Modern Science.
马克·冯·哈根是哥伦比亚大学历史系助理教授。他的博士论文题为《革命学校：1918-1928年红军中的布尔什维克和农民》。
MARK VON HAGEN is Assistant Professor of History at Columbia University. He wrote his dissertation on “School of the Revolution: Bolsheviks and Peasants in the Red Army, 1918–1928.”
H AJO H OLBORN曾任耶鲁大学斯特林历史学教授。他的著作包括三卷本的《现代德国史》 、美国军事政府、欧洲政治崩溃以及论文集《德国与欧洲》。
HAJO HOLBORN was Sterling Professor of History at Yale University. Among his works are A History of Modern Germany in three volumes, American Military Government, The Political Collapse of Europe, and a collection of essays, Germany and Europe.
迈克尔·霍华德是牛津大学钦定现代史教授。他著述颇丰，涵盖战争史和战争理论等领域，其中包括英国官方二战史“大战略”系列第四卷《普法战争》、《战争与自由主义良知》，以及两部论文集《战争与和平研究》和《战争的起因》。他还与彼得·帕雷特合译并编辑了克劳塞维茨的《战争论》。
MICHAEL HOWARD is Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Oxford. Among his many books on the history and theory of war are Volume IV of the Grand Strategy series of the United Kingdom official history of the Second World War, The Franco-Prussian War, War and the Liberal Conscience, and two collections of essays, Studies in War and Peace and The Causes of War. With Peter Paret he translated and edited Clausewitz's On War.
D. C. LAYTON J AMES，密西西比州立大学历史系杰出教授，著有三卷本《麦克阿瑟的岁月》 。他还编辑了《南下巴丹，北上奉天：W.E. Brougher准将的狱中日记》。
D. CLAYTON JAMES, Distinguished Professor of History, Mississippi State University, is the author of The Years of MacArthur in three volumes. He also edited South to Bataan, North to Mukden: The Prison Diary of Brigadier General W. E. Brougher.
大卫·麦克伊·萨克（David MacI Saac），美国空军中校（退役），在为本书撰写关于空军力量的文章时，曾任空军大学航空航天理论、研究与教育中心高级研究员。他著有《二战中的战略轰炸》一书。
DAVID MACISAAC, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Ret., was Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Air University, when he wrote the essay on air power for this volume. He is the author of Strategic Bombing in World War II.
莫里斯·马特洛夫（M AURICE M ATLOFF） ，曾任美国陆军军事历史中心首席历史学家，是《二战美国陆军官方史》中《1943-1944年联合战争战略规划》一书的作者，也是该系列前一卷《1941-1942年联合战争战略规划》的合著者。他还编辑过《美国军事史》。
MAURICE MATLOFF, formerly Chief Historian, Center of Military History, Department of the Army, is the author of Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944 in the official history of the United States Army in World War II, and coauthor of the preceding volume in the series, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942. He has also edited American Military History.
西格蒙德· N ·尤曼是卫斯理大学政府学教授。他著有《永久革命》和《德国：希望与危险》。
SIGMUND NEUMANN was Professor of Government at Wesleyan University. He wrote Permanent Revolution and Germany: Promise and Perils.
RR P ALMER是耶鲁大学历史系荣誉退休教授。他的著作颇丰，包括《十八世纪法国的天主教徒和非信徒》、《十二位统治者》和《民主革命时代》。
R. R. PALMER is Professor of History Emeritus, Yale University. Among his many books are Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France, Twelve Who Ruled, and The Age of the Democratic Revolution.
彼得·帕雷特是普林斯顿高等研究院安德鲁·W·梅隆人文讲席教授。他与约翰·夏伊合著了《20世纪60年代的游击队》。他的其他著作包括《从印度支那到阿尔及利亚的法国革命战争》、《约克与普鲁士改革时代》以及《克劳塞维茨与国家》。他还与迈克尔·霍华德合作翻译并编辑了克劳塞维茨的《战争论》。
PETER PARET is Andrew W. Mellon Professor in the Humanities, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. With John Shy he wrote Guerrillas in the 1960s. Among his other books are French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, and Clausewitz and the State. With Michael Howard he translated and edited Clausewitz's On War.
沃尔特·平特纳，康奈尔大学历史学教授，著有《尼古拉一世时期的俄罗斯经济政策》。他与唐·卡尔·罗尼合编了《俄罗斯官僚体制》。
WALTER PINTNER, Professor of History, Cornell University, is the author of Russian Economic Policy under Nicholas I. With Don Karl Rowney he has edited Russian Officialdom.
道格拉斯·波奇是西塔德尔学院的马克·W·克拉克历史学教授。他的法国军事史著作包括《军队与革命：1815-1848年的法国》、《进军马恩河》和《征服摩洛哥》。
DOUGLAS PORCH is Mark W. Clark Professor of History at the Citadel. Among his works on French military history are Army and Revolution: France 1815–1848, The March to the Marne, and The Conquest of Morocco.
康多莉扎·赖斯是斯坦福大学政治学助理教授，著有《苏联与捷克斯洛伐克军队》一书。
CONDOLEEZZA RICE is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford University. She is the author of The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army.
冈瑟· E·罗森伯格是普渡大学历史学教授。他的众多战争史著作中包括两部关于奥地利在克罗地亚军事边界的专著，以及《弗朗茨·约瑟夫的军队》和《以色列军队的剖析》。
GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG is Professor of History at Purdue University. Among his many works on the history of war are two monographs on the Austrian military border in Croatia, as well as The Army of Francis Joseph and The Anatomy of the Israeli Army.
约翰· S ·海伊是密歇根大学历史系教授。他与彼得·帕雷特合著了《20世纪60年代的游击队》，也是《走向列克星顿》和论文集《人数众多且武装起来的人民》的作者。
JOHN SHY is Professor of History at the University of Michigan. He wrote Guerrillas in the 1960s with Peter Paret and is also the author of Toward Lexington and of a collection of essays, A People Numerous and Armed.
R ·罗素· F·韦格利是坦普尔大学历史学教授。他在美国军事史方面著述颇丰，其中包括《走向美国军队》、《美国陆军史》、《游击战》、《美国战争方式》和《艾森豪威尔的副官们》。
RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY is Professor of History at Temple University. Among his numerous works on American military history are Towards an American Army; A History of the United States Army, The Partisan War, The American Way of War, and Eisenhower's Lieutenants.
参考文献*
Bibliographical Notes*
介绍
INTRODUCTION
关于战争的浩瀚文献中，并没有一部对战略思想进行全面分析的历史著作。或许，对欧洲从古代到拿破仑和克劳塞维茨时代战略发展的最佳概括性论述，可见于汉斯·德尔布吕克的《政治史框架下的战争艺术史》（Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte）的前四卷，该书由奥托·海因茨撰写重要导论后重印（柏林，1962年）。德尔布吕克将他的战略分析与诸多其他方面融为一体：战役史、战争史以及社会、技术和政治变革。沃尔特·J·伦弗罗二世正在翻译的英文版《政治史框架下的战争艺术史》（History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History，韦斯特波特，康涅狄格州，1975年至今）虽然内容尚可，但不够学术严谨。自 1900 年至 1920 年该著作首次出版以来，一直没有人尝试更新书目，也没有人尝试根据研究成果讨论德尔布吕克的解释。
The vast literature on war does not contain a comprehensive analytical history of strategic thought. Probably the best general account of the development of strategy in Europe from antiquity to the age of Napoleon and Clausewitz can be found in the first four volumes of Hans Delbrück's Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, reprinted with an important introduction by Otto Haintz (Berlin, 1962). Delbrück integrates his analysis of strategy with much else: the history of battles, campaigns, and social, technological, and political change. An English translation in progress by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History (Westport, Conn., 1975-) is adequate but unscholarly; no attempt has been made to update the bibliographies or to discuss Delbrück's interpretations in light of research since the work's original appearance between 1900 and 1920.
诸如欧仁·卡里亚斯的《德国军事思想》（巴黎，1948）及其著作《法国军事思想》（巴黎，1960）等论述特定社会战略史的著作，往往属于入门概述。而对个人或一代人的战略思想进行更为深入的分析，则可见于专著、传记或特定战争或战役的研究中，本书的脚注和参考文献中列举了部分此类著作。
Accounts of the history of strategy of a particular society such as Eugène Carrias, La pensée militaire allemande (Paris, 1948), and the same author's La pensée militaire française (Paris, 1960), tend to be introductory surveys. More sophisticated analyses of the strategic thought of an individual or a generation may be found in the monographic literature, in biographies, or in studies of particular wars or campaigns, some of which are listed in the footnotes and bibliographical notes of this volume.
最初的《现代战略的缔造者》（普林斯顿，1943）汇集了关于多位重要战略家的文章，至今仍值得一读。维尔纳·哈尔维格编辑了一部类似的德文著作《战争艺术经典》（达姆施塔特，1960），其中收录了所讨论人物的著作节选。关于西方世界战略发展的重要论述，可参阅两部近期出版的通论：迈克尔·霍华德的杰作《欧洲战争史》（牛津和纽约，1976）以及休·斯特拉坎同样优秀的《欧洲军队与战争行为》（伦敦和波士顿，1983）。斯特拉坎的著作虽然不如霍华德的著作涵盖范围广泛（从18世纪而非中世纪开始），但内容更为详尽。
The original Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1943) brought together essays on a number of important theorists, which are still worth reading. Werner Hahlweg edited a similar work in German, Klassiker der Kriegskunst (Darmstadt, 1960), which includes brief excerpts from the writings of the men discussed. Valuable comments on the development of strategy in the Western world may be found in two recent, general accounts: Michael Howard's excellent War in European History (Oxford and New York, 1976) and Hew Strachan's equally fine European Armies and the Conduct of War (London and Boston, 1983), which covers less ground than Howard does—beginning with the eighteenth century rather than with the Middle Ages—but goes into greater detail.
奥托·欣茨（Otto Hintze）1906年撰写的论文《国家宪法与军队宪法》（Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung）虽然本身对战略着墨不多，但对于军事制度和战争史的研究却至关重要。该文收录于费利克斯·吉尔伯特（Felix Gilbert）编辑的欣茨论文选集《奥托·欣茨历史论文集》（The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze，纽约，1975年）英文版中。关于战争史在当今历史研究中的地位，可参阅彼得·帕雷特（Peter Paret）的《战争史》（“The History of War”，载《代达罗斯》第100期，1971年春季）和沃尔特·埃米尔·凯吉（Walter Emil Kaegi, Jr.）的《军事史学的危机》（“The Crisis in Military Historiography”，载《武装部队与社会》第7卷第2期，1981年冬季）。后者也对战略思想史研究、思想史以及当代战略思想发展之间的关系提出了富有启发性的见解。
Containing little on strategy as such, but of fundamental importance to the historical study of military institutions and of war, is Otto Hintze's essay “Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung,” written in 1906, which is included in the English edition of Hintze's selected papers, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York, 1975). On the place of the history of war in historical studies today, see Peter Paret, “The History of War,” Daedalus 100 (Spring 1971), and Walter Emil Kaegi, Jr., “The Crisis in Military Historiography,” Armed Forces and Society 7, no. 2 (Winter 1981), which also offers stimulating observations on the relationship between the historical study of strategic thought, the history of ideas, and the development of current strategic thinking.
1.马基雅维利：战争艺术的复兴
1. MACHIAVELLI: THE RENAISSANCE OF THE ART OF WAR
由塞尔吉奥·贝尔泰利和弗朗切斯科·加埃塔编辑的马基雅维利著作批判版，收录于费尔特里内利出版社的意大利古典文库（Biblioteca di Classici Italiani）中，共八卷（米兰，1960-1964年），其中包含极具价值的导言，阐释了各部作品的创作缘起及其引发的学术讨论。此外，马里奥·马尔泰利为桑索尼出版社编辑的单卷本（1282页，佛罗伦萨，1971年）也便于使用。关于马基雅维利在佛罗伦萨政务部的活动，相关资料发表并分析于让-雅克·马尔尚的《尼科尔德·马基雅维利：早期政治著作（1499-1512）》（帕多瓦，1975年）一书中。
The critical edition of Machiavelli's works in the Biblioteca di Classici Italiani of the publishing house Feltrinelli, edited by Sergio Bertelli and Francesco Gaeta in eight volumes (Milan, 1960–64), contains valuable introductions explaining the origin of individual works and the scholarly discussion they aroused. Convenient to use also is the large (1,282 pages) one-volume edition edited by Mario Martelli for the Sansoni publishing house (Florence, 1971). The relevant material regarding Machiavelli's activities in the Florentine Chancellery is published and analyzed in Jean-Jacques Marchand, Niccold Machiavelli; I primi scritti politici (1499–1512) (Padua, 1975).
马基雅维利的主要著作由艾伦·吉尔伯特翻译成三卷本（达勒姆，1965年）。马基雅维利的《战争艺术》在十八世纪被译成英文，尼尔·伍德略作修改和现代化后的版本由鲍勃斯·梅里尔出版社在其文科丛书中出版（印第安纳波利斯，1965年）；伍德为该卷撰写的长篇导言对这部著作的重要性和影响进行了精彩的分析。查尔斯·卡尔弗特·贝利在其著作《文艺复兴时期佛罗伦萨的战争与社会：莱昂纳多·布伦特的《论军事》》（多伦多，1961年）中研究了马基雅维利军事思想的思想渊源。
Machiavelli's Chief Works have been translated in three volumes by Allan Gilbert (Durham, 1965). Machiavelli's Art of War was translated into English in the eighteenth century and a version of this translation, slightly modified and modernized by Neal Wood, has been published by Bobbs Merrill in its Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis, 1965); Wood's long introduction to this volume gives an excellent analysis of the importance and the influence of this work. The intellectual origins of Machiavelli's ideas on military affairs and war have been studied in Charles Calvert Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence: The De Militia of Leonardo Brunt (Toronto, 1961).
1984 年出版的《马基雅维利与圭恰尔迪尼》（纽约：WW Norton &c Co.）平装版中的书目论文可以作为近期马基雅维利研究的入门读物。
The bibliographical essay in the 1984 paperback edition of my Machiavelli and Guicciardini (New York: W. W. Norton &c Co.) can serve as an introduction to recent Machiavelli scholarship.
JR Hale 在其著作《文艺复兴时期欧洲的战争与社会（1450-1620）》（Fontana 欧洲战争与社会史，伦敦，1985 年）中概述了战争和军事事务在这一时期欧洲政策中的作用；Piero Pieri 在其著作《文艺复兴与意大利军事危机》 （都灵，1952 年）中详细阐述了马基雅维利时代意大利的军事事件；Fernand Braudel 在其著作《资本主义与物质生活（1400-1800 ） 》（译本）中概述了火药发展的早期阶段及其影响。M. Kochan（伦敦，1973 年），第 285-295 页，以及 ME Mallett 和 JR Hale 的《文艺复兴国家的军事组织：威尼斯，约 1400-1617 年》（剑桥，1984 年），虽然关注的是威尼斯而不是佛罗伦萨，但却揭示了当时的军事实践：雇佣雇佣兵和雇佣军的程序、军事开支对城市财政的影响以及军事指挥官与政府之间的关系。
The role of war and military affairs in the European policy of this period is outlined in J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450–1620, Fontana History of European War and Society (London, 1985), and details about the military events of Machiavelli's time in Italy can be found in Piero Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Torino, 1952). The early stages of the development and the influence of gunpowder are outlined in Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400–1800, trans. M. Kochan (London, 1973), pp. 285–95, and M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice circa 1400–1617 (Cambridge, 1984), although concerned with Venice and not with Florence, throws light on the military practice of the time: the procedures involved in hiring a condottiere and mercenaries, the impact of military expenses on the city finances, and the relation between military commanders and the governments.
2.拿骚的莫里斯、古斯塔夫·多尔弗斯、雷蒙多·蒙特库科利与十七世纪的“军事革命”
2. MAURICE OF NASSAU, GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, RAIMONDO MONTECUCCOLI, AND THE “MILITARY REVOLUTION” OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
本文分析的“军事革命”始于荷兰起义，历经三十年战争，终于路易十四时期的荷兰战争，跨越一个多世纪。与此同时，欧洲各国继续与土耳其作战，彼此之间也爆发了无数冲突，并且各地开始着手建立常备军。关于这些发展，已有大量的第一手和第二手文献。然而，当我们转向本文讨论的三位军事革命代表人物——莫里斯、古斯塔夫和蒙特库科利时，却发现相关的文献仅限于荷兰语、西班牙语、瑞典语、德语、法语和意大利语。
Beginning with the Revolt of the Netherlands, continuing through the Thirty Years' War, and ending with the Dutch War of Louis XIV, the “military revolution” analyzed in this essay spans over one century. At the same time, Europeans continued to wage war against the Turks, fought in numerous conflicts against each other, and everywhere began to lay the foundations for standing armies. An enormous primary and secondary literature exists on these developments. But when we turn to the three exponents of military revolution discussed in this essay, Maurice, Gustavus, and Montecuccoli, we find that the literature is abundant only in Dutch, Spanish, Swedish, German, French, and Italian.
若想了解这一时期的总体背景，可参阅奥利弗·L·斯波尔丁、霍夫曼·尼克尔森和约翰·W·赖特合著的《战争：从远古时代开始的军事方法研究》（华盛顿特区，1937年）。尽管书名如此，但该书主要集中于近代早期，并附有详尽的参考书目。汉斯·德尔布吕克的《政治史框架下的战争艺术史》（共4卷，新版，柏林，1962-1964年）的相关卷册也仍然很有价值。沃尔特·J·伦弗罗正在翻译该书的英文版，名为《政治史框架下的战争艺术史》 （康涅狄格州韦斯特波特，1975年至今）。尤金·冯·弗劳恩霍尔茨的《德国陆军发展史》（共5卷）也颇具参考价值，尽管其观点可能带有倾向性。（慕尼黑，1935–41）。乔治·利维特的《从马基雅维利到霍布斯的战争与和平》 （巴黎，1972）探讨了其哲学背景。皮耶罗·皮耶里、扬·W·维恩和维尔纳·根布鲁赫在维尔纳·哈尔韦格主编的《战争艺术经典》 （达姆施塔特，1960）中的章节以及维克多·G·基尔南在特雷弗·H·阿斯顿主编的《 1560–1660年欧洲危机》 （伦敦和纽约，1965）中发表的阐释性文章《外国雇佣兵与绝对君主制》都包含有趣的内容。
For a general background on this period, turn to Oliver L. Spaulding, Hoffman Nickerson, and John W. Wright, Warfare: A Study of Military Methods from the Earliest Times (Washington, D.C., 1937), which, despite its title, concentrates heavily on the early modern period and contains a useful bibliography. Also still valuable are the relevant volumes of Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, 4 vols., new ed. (Berlin, 1962–64). An English translation is now in progress by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History (Westport, Conn., 1975-). Useful, if tendentious, is Eugen von Frauenholz, Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens, 5 vols. (Munich, 1935–41). Georges Livet, Guerre et paix de Machiavel à Hobbes (Paris, 1972) addresses the philosophical background. There is interesting material in the chapters by Piero Pieri, Jan W. Wijn, and Werner Gembruch in Klassiker der Kriegskunst, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Darmstadt, 1960) and in the interpretive essay by Victor G. Kiernan, “Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy,” in Crisis in Europe 1560–1660, ed. Trevor H. Aston (London and New York, 1965).
关于低地国家战役漫长而曲折的历程，没有任何英文版本。 IL Uiterschout、Geknopt overzicht van de belangrijkste gebeurtenissen uit de nederlandsche krijgsgeschiedenis van 1568 tot heden（海牙，1937 年）提供了概述，补充了 FJG ten Raa 和 François de Bas 在Het Staatsche Leger 1568-1795中的工作（布雷达， 1913）。对于莫里斯的早期战役，标准叙述仍然是 T. Fruin, Tien jaren uit den 80 jarigen oorlog 1588–1598 (Leiden, 1857)。关于奥兰治派改革的详细资料来源是一位高级公务员的日记，Journaal van Anthonis Duyck, advokaat-fiskaal van den Raad van Staate编辑。洛德韦克·穆德，第 3 卷。 （海牙，1862-86）。莫里斯没有完整的军事传记，但他的表弟威廉·路易斯在吕岑·H·瓦格纳尔的《Het leven van Willem Lodewijk》（阿姆斯特丹，1904年）中讨论过，这是一部有点过于爱国的著作。关于弗里斯兰的战役，请参阅格里特·奥弗迪普 (Gerrit Overdiep) 的《德格罗宁根 schansenkrijg: De Strategie van graaf Willem Lodewijk》（格罗宁根，1970 年）。在政治行政方面，可参考 PFM Fontaine 的《国家议会：1588-1590 年的政策、组织和工作》（格罗宁根，1970 年）。关于战术改革和肩兵武器，JB Kist 为 Jacob de Gheyn 的《根据奥兰治亲王莫里茨阁下、拿骚伯爵的勋章进行的卡利弗斯、火枪和长矛武器训练》（海牙，1607 年；纽约，1971 年重印）影印版所作的导言中有精彩的论述。此外，还有两部重要的传记。第一部是 Jan den Tex 的《奥尔登巴内费尔特传》 ，共 5 卷。 （哈勒姆-格罗宁根，1960-72年），令人欣慰的是，该书有英文节略版（两卷，剑桥，1973年）。莱昂·范德埃森的《亚历山大·法尔内塞，帕尔马亲王，下荷兰总督，1545-1592年》（五卷，布鲁塞尔，1933-37年）探讨了西班牙的观点以及更多内容。最后，J·W·史密斯的论文《关于荷兰叛乱的研究现状》收录于约翰·S·布罗姆利和恩斯特·H·科斯曼主编的《英国与荷兰》（伦敦，1960年），第一卷，第11-28页，涵盖了近期的相关论述。
Nothing covering the long and tortuous course of the campaigns in the Low Countries is available in English. An overview is provided by I. L. Uiterschout, Geknopt overzicht van de belangrijkste gebeurtenissen uit de nederlandsche krijgsgeschiedenis van 1568 tot heden (The Hague, 1937), supplementing the work of F. J. G. ten Raa and François de Bas in Het Staatsche Leger 1568–1795 (Breda, 1913). For the early campaigns of Maurice, the standard account remains T. Fruin, Tien jaren uit den 80 jarigen oorlog 1588–1598 (Leiden, 1857). A detailed source on the Orangist reforms is the diary of a high civil servant, Journaal van Anthonis Duyck, advokaat-fiskaal van den Raad van Staate, ed. Lodewijk Mulder, 3 vols. (The Hague, 1862–86). No full-scale military biography exists for Maurice, but his cousin William Louis is discussed in Lützen H. Wagenaar, Het leven van Willem Lodewijk (Amsterdam, 1904), a somewhat too patriotic work. On the campaigns in Friesland see Gerrit Overdiep, De Groningen schansenkrijg: De Strategie van graaf Willem Lodewijk (Groningen, 1970). For the political-administrative side there is P. F. M. Fontaine, De Raad van Staat: Zijn taak, organisatie en werkzaamheden in de jaren 1588–1590 (Groningen, 1970). An excellent discussion of the tactical reforms and shoulder arms is contained in the introduction by J. B. Kist to the facsimile edition of Jacob de Gheyn, The exercise of armes for calivers, muskettes, and pikes after the Order of his Excellence Maurits Prince of Orange, Counte of Nassau (The Hague, 1607; repr. New York, 1971). In addition, there are two important biographies. The first is Jan den Tex, Oldenbarneveldt, 5 vols. (Haarlem-Groningen, 1960–72), happily available in an abridged English edition (2 vols., Cambridge, 1973). The Spanish view and much more is discussed in Léon van der Essen, Alexandre Farnèse, prince de Parme, gouverneur-général des Pays Bas, 1545–1592, 5 vols. (Brussels, 1933–37). Finally, recent writings are covered in the paper by J. W. Smit, “The Present Position of Studies regarding the Revolt of the Netherlands,” in Britain and the Netherlands, ed. John S. Bromley and Ernst H. Kossmann (London, 1960), 1:11–28.
古斯塔夫·阿道夫的传记由英国作家迈克尔·罗伯茨撰写，他不仅对古斯塔夫·阿道夫进行了深入研究，还翻译了尼尔斯·阿伦德的瑞典语著作《古斯塔夫·阿道夫大帝》（普林斯顿，1940）。关于古斯塔夫·阿道夫战争的标准参考书是斯塔本将军的《瑞典战争史1611–1632》，共5卷，另加2卷增补（斯德哥尔摩，1936–38）。克劳德·诺德曼的《17世纪瑞典军队》（载《北方评论》第54期，1972年，第133–47页）对瑞典军队进行了简要介绍。国王的主要对手也都有优秀的传记作家。关于蒂利，格奥尔格·吉拉尔多内在其著作《蒂利，圣徒哈尼施》 （慕尼黑，1932年）中有所论述。该书虽略显偏袒，但其研究基于巴伐利亚档案馆的资料。关于瓦伦斯坦，最新的传记是赫尔穆特·迪瓦尔德所著的《瓦伦斯坦》（慕尼黑-埃斯林根，1969年）。汉斯·施密特在其论文《瓦伦斯坦作为指挥官》（载于《上奥地利州档案馆通讯》第14卷，1984年，第241-260页）中对其作战能力进行了评估。关于德国战场的战事，可参阅G·贝内德克所著的《三十年战争中的德国》（伦敦，1978年）。关于瑞典作战方法对英国军队的影响，可参阅查尔斯·H·弗斯所著的《克伦威尔的军队》（第三版）。 （伦敦，1921 年），其中还包含有关瑞典军队的有用信息。对于法国军队的早期发展，最有用的著作仍然是《Louis André, Michel Le Tellier et l'organise de l'armée Monarchique》（巴黎，1906 年；日内瓦，1980 年）和 Léon Mention，《L'armée française de l'Ancien Régime》（巴黎，1900 年）。卡米尔·FA·鲁塞 (Camille FA Rousset)，《卢瓦的历史与行政管理与军事》，第 4 卷。 （巴黎，1862-64）也仍然是一个有价值的来源。
Gustavus Adolphus has been well served by his English biographer, Michael Roberts, who also translated Nils Ahlund, Gustav Adolf the Great (Princeton, 1940) from the Swedish. The standard reference for the wars of Gustavus Adolphus is Generalstaben, Sveriges Krig 1611–1632, 5 vols, and 2 supp. vols. (Stockholm, 1936–38). A short treatment of the Swedish army is found in Claude Nordmann, “L'armée suédoise au XVIIe siècle,” Revue du Nord 54 (1972), 133–47. The king's major adversaries also have had good biographers. Tilly is discussed in Georg Gilardone, Tilly, der Heilige tm Harnisch (Munich, 1932), a rather too favorable study, but based on the Bavarian archives. For Wallenstein the most recent biography is Hellmut Diwald, Wallenstein (Munich-Esslingen, 1969), and his operational skills are assessed in the essay by Hans Schmidt, “Wallenstein als Feldherr,” Mitteilungen des Oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs 14 (1984), 241–60. Material on the fighting in Germany can be found in G. Benedecke, Germany in the Thirty Years' War (London, 1978). On the influence of Swedish fighting methods on the British army, see Charles H. Firth, Cromwell's Army, 3rd. ed. (London, 1921), which also contains useful information on the Swedish army. For the early development of the French army the most useful works remain Louis André, Michel Le Tellier et l'organisation de l'armée monarchique (Paris, 1906; repr. Geneva, 1980) and Léon Mention, L'armée française de l'Ancien Régime (Paris, 1900). Camille F. A. Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire, 4 vols. (Paris, 1862–64) also remains a valuable source.
关于蒙特库科利，Cesare Campori、Raimondo Montecuccoli、la sua famiglia ei suoi tempi（佛罗伦萨，1876 年）仍然是最好的传记。托马索·桑多尼尼 (Tommaso Sandonnini) 的作品《Il Generale Raimondo Montecuccoli e la sua famtglia》，2 卷。 （摩德纳，1914）受到意大利沙文主义解释的损害。对于蒙特库科利的智力发展，除了注释中引用的研究之外，还有皮耶罗·皮耶里（Piero Pieri），“La formazione dottrinale di Raimondo Montecuccoli”，Revue Internationale d'histoire militaire，第 1 期。 10（1951），92-115。他最著名的战役在 Kurt Peball, Die Schlacht bei St. Gotthard-Mogersdorf 1664 , no.中得到了巧妙的讨论。 《军事历史史》第 1 期（维也纳，1964 年）。 Géza Perjés, “Army Provisioning, Logistics, and Strategy in the Late Half of the 17th Century,” Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarium Hungaricae 16 (1970), 1-51对他的后勤问题和战略系统进行了讨论。恩斯特·海施曼 (Ernst Heischmann) 的《 Osterrich 的 Die Anfänge des stehenden Heeres》 （维也纳，1925 年）的较早研究应由 Philipp Hoyos 的《Die kaiserliche Armee 1648–1650》、Schriftenreihe des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums (Militärwissenschaftliches Institut)中的详细数据进行补充。维也纳7（1976），169-232。有关针对土耳其人的边境防御的形成，请参阅 Gunther E. Rothenberg，克罗地亚的奥地利军事边界，1522-1747 年（乌尔巴纳，1960 年）；有关围困和防御技术的情况，请参阅 Walter Hummelberger，“Bemerkungen zur Taktik und Bewaffnung der Verteidiger Wiens 1683”，Studia Austro-Polonica 3 （1983），81-110。
On Montecuccoli, Cesare Campori, Raimondo Montecuccoli, la sua famiglia e i suoi tempi (Florence, 1876) is still the best biography. The work by Tommaso Sandonnini, Il Generale Raimondo Montecuccoli e la sua famtglia, 2 vols. (Modena, 1914) is marred by a chauvinistic Italian interpretation. For Montecuccoli's intellectual development, in addition to the studies cited to the notes, there is Piero Pieri, “La formazione dottrinale di Raimondo Montecuccoli,” Revue internationale d'histoire militaire, no. 10 (1951), 92–115. His most famous battle is ably discussed in Kurt Peball, Die Schlacht bei St. Gotthard-Mogersdorf 1664, no. 1 of Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe (Vienna, 1964). A discussion of his logistic problems and strategic system is presented by Géza Perjés, “Army Provisioning, Logistics, and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century,” Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarium Hungaricae 16 (1970), 1–51. The older study by Ernst Heischmann, Die Anfänge des stehenden Heeres in Osterrich (Vienna, 1925), should be supplemented by the detailed data in Philipp Hoyos, “Die kaiserliche Armee 1648–1650,” Schriftenreihe des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums (Militärwissenschaftliches Institut) in Wien 7 (1976), 169–232. For the formation of frontier defenses against the Turks see Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522–1747 (Urbana, 1960) and for the state of siege and defense technology consult Walter Hummelberger, “Bemerkungen zur Taktik und Bewaffnung der Verteidiger Wiens 1683,” Studia Austro-Polonica 3 (1983), 81–110.
博格丹·丘多巴在其著作《西班牙与帝国》（芝加哥，1952年）中探讨了哈布斯堡王朝各宫廷之间的互助。关于与哈布斯堡王朝相关的德意志军队的发展，可参阅库尔特·雅尼的《普鲁士皇家军队史》（柏林，1928-1933年，共4卷）第一卷和F.A.弗兰克的《萨克森军队史》 （莱比锡，1885年，共3卷）。戴维·G·钱德勒的《马尔伯勒时代的战争艺术》（伦敦，1976年）概述了军事革命末期军队的状况和战争艺术。
Mutual aid between the Hapsburg courts is discussed in Bogdan Chudoba, Spain and the Empire (Chicago, 1952). For the development of the German armies associated with the Hapsburgs see the first volume of Curt Jany, Geschichte der königlich-preussischen Armee, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1928–33) and F. A. Francke, Geschichte der sächsischen Armee, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1885). An overview of the state of the armies and the art of war at the close of the military revolution is provided by David G. Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (London, 1976).
3.沃邦：科学对战争的影响*
3. VAUBAN : THE IMPACT OF SCIENCEON WAR*
对 17 世纪法国军事机构仍然不可或缺的较早研究是 Louis André、Michel Le Tellier et l'organise de l'armée Monarchique（巴黎，1906 年；日内瓦报告，1980 年）。同一作者的姊妹篇是Michel Le Tellier et Louvois（巴黎，1942 年）。安德烈·柯维西耶 (André Corvisier) 的《欧洲的军队和社会，1494-1789》（布卢明顿，1979 年）是一份有用的介绍性调查，对法国的研究比对欧洲其他国家的研究更好。关于沃邦改革法国军事机构的努力的有趣讨论是 Werner Gembruch, “Zur Kritik an der Heeresreform und Wehrpolitik von Le Tellier und Louvois in der Spätzeit der Herrschaft Ludwig XIV,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 12 (1972)。另请参见 Gembruch 关于沃邦的早期著作：“Vauban, zu seinem 325. Geburtstag am 15 Mai 1958”，Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 8，no。 5（1958）； “Gedanken Vaubans über den Seekrieg”，Marine Rundschau 56，no。 2（1959）； “Vauban”，《Klassiker der Kriegskunst》，编辑。 Werner Hahlweg（达姆施塔特，1960 年）；和“Zwei Denkschriften Vaubans zur Kolonialpolitik und Aussenpolitik Frankreichs aus den Jahren 1699 und 1700”，Historische Zeitschrift 195，no。 2（1962）。
A still indispensable older study of French military institutions in the seventeenth century is Louis André, Michel Le Tellier et l'organisation de l'armée monarchique (Paris, 1906; repr. Geneva, 1980). A companion volume by the same author is Michel Le Tellier et Louvois (Paris, 1942). André Corvisier's Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494–1789 (Bloomington, 1979) is a useful introductory survey, better on France than on the rest of Europe. An interesting discussion of Vauban's efforts at reforming French military institutions is Werner Gembruch, “Zur Kritik an der Heeresreform und Wehrpolitik von Le Tellier und Louvois in der Spätzeit der Herrschaft Ludwig XIV,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 12 (1972). See also Gembruch's earlier writings on Vauban: “Vauban, zu seinem 325. Geburtstag am 15 Mai 1958,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 8, no. 5 (1958); “Gedanken Vaubans über den Seekrieg,” Marine Rundschau 56, no. 2 (1959); “Vauban,” in Klassiker der Kriegskunst, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Darmstadt, 1960); and “Zwei Denkschriften Vaubans zur Kolonialpolitik und Aussenpolitik Frankreichs aus den Jahren 1699 und 1700,” Historische Zeitschrift 195, no. 2 (1962).
克里斯托弗·达菲撰写了两部优秀的筑城史研究著作：《火与石：要塞战的科学，1660-1860》（牛顿艾伯特，1975年）和《围攻战：近代早期世界的要塞，1494-1660》（伦敦，1979年），这两部著作为理解沃邦的著作提供了历史背景。沃邦最著名的著作或许是他的《论攻防》（海牙，1737年），该书已多次再版。沃邦的《Mémoire pour servir d'instruction dans laducte des sièges et dans la défense des place》（莱顿，1740 年）由乔治·罗斯洛克翻译和编辑，并附有出色的介绍和有用的注释参考书目：Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban，《攻城技术和防御工事手册》（安娜堡，1968 年）。同样重要的是沃邦的回忆录（即所谓的《Oisivetés》），其中前四卷由安托万·奥戈亚出版，并由同一编辑出版了他的《沃邦元帅服役简章，1703 年，巴黎，1839 年》。
Christopher Duffy has written two good surveys of the history of fortification: Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660–1860 (Newton Abbot, 1975), and Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494–1660 (London, 1979), which provide the historical context of Vauban's work. Perhaps best known of Vauban's writings is his Traité de l'attaque et de la défense des places (The Hague, 1737), which has been reprinted several times. Vauban's Mémoire pour servir d'instruction dans la conduite des sièges et dans la défense des places (Leiden, 1740), has been translated and edited by George Rothrock with an excellent introduction and a useful annotated bibliography: Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, A Manual on Siegecraft and Fortification (Ann Arbor, 1968). Also important are Vauban's memoirs—the so-called Oisivetés— the first four volumes of which were published by Antoine Augoyat, and, brought out by the same editor, his Abrégé des services du maréchal de Vauban, fait par lui en 1703 (Paris, 1839).
如同他建造的防御工事一样，沃邦的著作也包罗万象，题材广泛，涵盖军事建筑、税收制度，乃至最有效的养猪方法。他的非军事著作鲜有英文译本。或许他最具政治争议的作品是《皇家十百万年计划》（Projet d'une dixme royale，出版地不详，出版日期不详）。该书的众多重印版本之一是《皇家十百万年计划，附沃邦两篇金融论文》（Projet d'une dixme royale, suivi de deux écrits financiers par Vauban），由E. Coornaert编辑（巴黎，1933年）。F.J. Hebbert和George Rothrock合著的两篇论文《沃邦元帅：作家与评论家》（“Marshal Vauban, Writer and Critic”，《今日历史》 24卷，第3、4期，1974年）对沃邦撰写其税收论著的背景及其出版后的政治影响进行了有趣的论述。
Like his fortifications, Vauban's writings were varied and numerous, their subjects ranging from military architecture to systems of taxation to the most efficient way of raising pigs. Few of his nonmilitary works have been translated into English. Perhaps his politically most controversial work was his Projet d'une dixme royale (n.p., n.d.). One of many reprints is Projet d'une dixme royale, suivi de deux écrits financiers par Vauban, ed. E. Coornaert (Paris, 1933). An interesting account of the circumstances in which Vauban wrote his treatise on taxation, and of the political effects of its publication, is contained in a two-part article by F. J. Hebbert and George Rothrock, “Marshal Vauban, Writer and Critic,” History Today 24, nos. 3, 4 (1974).
阿尔伯特·德·罗沙·德·艾格伦所著的《沃邦及其家族、著作、生活和通信》（巴黎，1910年）是一部非常优秀的沃邦传记，尽管在许多方面略显过时。该书收录了沃邦回忆录的节选以及他与卢瓦之间经常被引用的通信。皮埃尔·埃利齐耶·拉扎尔的博士论文《沃邦》 （巴黎，1934年）也颇具参考价值。建筑师雷金纳德·布隆菲尔德在其著作《塞巴斯蒂安·勒普雷斯特·德·沃邦，1633-1707》 （伦敦，1938年）中大量借鉴了拉扎尔的研究成果，该书重点介绍了沃邦的防御工事和工程项目。自二战以来，面向普通读者出版了多部沃邦传记：乔治·图多兹的《沃邦先生》（巴黎，1954年）；阿尔弗雷德·雷贝利奥的《沃邦》 （巴黎，1962年）；米歇尔·帕朗和雅克·韦鲁斯特的《沃邦》（巴黎，1971年）；以及米歇尔·帕朗的《沃邦：一位前百科全书式的学者》（巴黎，1982年）。在近期的英文研究中，可参见上文提及的赫伯特和罗斯罗克的文章，以及亨利·盖拉克的重要而简短的文章《塞巴斯蒂安·勒普雷斯特·德·沃邦》，该文章发表于《科学传记词典》（纽约，1976年），并附有详尽的参考书目。
A very good if in many respects outdated biography of Vauban is Albert de Rochas d'Aiglun, Vauban, sa famille et ses écrits, ses oisivetés, et sa correspondance, 2. vols. (Paris, 1910), which incorporates extracts from Vauban's memoirs and his frequently quoted correspondence with Louvois. Also useful is the published dissertation by Pierre Elizier Lazard, Vauban (Paris, 1934). Reginald Blomfield, an architect, drew heavily on Lazard's work for his Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 1633–1707 (London, 1938), which concentrates on Vauban's fortifications and engineering projects. Since the Second World War several biographies for the general reader have appeared: George Toudoze, Monsieur de Vauban (Paris, 1954); Alfred Rebelliau, Vauban (Paris, 1962); Michel Parent and Jacques Verroust, Vauban (Paris, 1971); and Michel Parent, Vauban, un encyclopédiste avant la lettre (Paris, 1982). Among recent studies in English, see the article by Hebbert and Rothrock mentioned above and Henry Guerlac's important, brief article, “Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban,” in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography (New York, 1976), with a useful, wide-ranging bibliography.
最后，关于沃邦生活特殊方面的两本专着是 Jacques Guttin, Vauban et le corps des ingénieurs militaires (巴黎，1957)； Walter Bräuer, Frankreichs Wirtschaftliche und Soziale Lage um 1700（马尔堡，1968 年），其中包含沃邦著作和有关他的著作的大量参考书目，重点是经济问题。
Finally, two monographs on special aspects of Vauban's life are Jacques Guttin, Vauban et le corps des ingénieurs militaires (Paris, 1957); and Walter Bräuer, Frankreichs Wirtschaftliche und Soziale Lage um 1700 (Marburg, 1968), which contains an extensive bibliography of Vauban's writings and works on him, with an emphasis on economic issues.
4.腓特烈大帝、吉伯特、比洛：从王朝战争到国家战争*
4. FREDERICK THE GREAT, GUIBERT, BÜLOW: FROM DYNASTIC TO NATIONAL WAR*
关于十八世纪战略的著作太多，却没有理解其基本组成部分——人力政策、军队组织、补给方法和战术理论。关于这些主题的作品特别具有启发性，因为它们广泛借鉴了当代资料，对法国来说是：Louis Bacquet，L'infanterie au XVIII e siècle：L'organization（巴黎，1907年），Jean Colin，L'infanterie au XVIII e siècle：La tactique（巴黎，1907年），Edouard Desbrière，La cavalerie de 1740 à 1789 年（巴黎，1906 年），Edouard Desbrière 和 Maurice Sautai，《革命骑士吊坠》，2 卷。 （巴黎，1907-1908），以及欧内斯特·皮卡德和路易斯·胡安，L'artillerie française au XVIII e siècle（巴黎，1906）；德国和奥地利：Eugen von Frauenholz，《Das Heerwesen in der Zeit des Absolutismus》，卷。他的《Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens》（慕尼黑，1940 年）第 4 篇，以及 Rainer Wohlfeil、 Vom Stehenden Heer des Absolutismus zur Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht（法兰克福，1964 年）和 Jürgen Zimmermann、Militärverwaltung und Heeresaufbringung in Osterreich bis 1806 年（法兰克福，1965 年），这是《Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte》的第 2 卷和第 3 卷，两卷都有很好的注释参考书目。对当代文学最广泛的分析仍然包含在 Max Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland的第二卷和第三卷中，第 3 卷。 （慕尼黑和莱比锡，1889-91 年），其中最后一卷对弗雷德里克、吉贝尔和比洛进行了精彩的论述。皮尔斯·麦克西的《明登的懦夫》（伦敦，1978 年）一书，基于对当时战争现实的深刻了解，对十八世纪的一场战役进行了精彩的重构。
Far too much has been written on eighteenth-century strategy without an understanding of its basic components—manpower policies, army organization, methods of supply, and tactical doctrine. Among works on these subjects that are especially enlightening because they draw extensively on contemporary sources, are, for France: Louis Bacquet, L'infanterie au XVIIIe siècle: L'organisation (Paris, 1907), Jean Colin, L'infanterie au XVIIIe siècle: La tactique (Paris, 1907), Edouard Desbrière, La cavalerie de 1740 à 1789 (Paris, 1906), Edouard Desbrière and Maurice Sautai, La cavalerie pendant la Révolution, 2 vols. (Paris, 1907–1908), and Ernest Picard and Louis Jouan, L'artillerie française au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1906); for Germany and Austria: Eugen von Frauenholz, Das Heerwesen in der Zeit des Absolutismus, vol. 4 of his Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens (Munich, 1940), and Rainer Wohlfeil, Vom Stehenden Heer des Absolutismus zur Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht (Frankfurt a.M., 1964) and Jürgen Zimmermann, Militärverwaltung und Heeresaufbringung in Osterreich bis 1806 (Frankfurt a.M., 1965), which are volumes 2 and 3 of Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte, both with good annotated bibliographies. The most extensive analysis of the contemporary literature is still contained in the second and third volumes of Max Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland, 3 vols. (Munich and Leipzig, 1889–91), the last volume of which includes good discussions of Frederick, Guibert, and Bülow. A brilliant reconstruction of an eighteenth-century campaign, derived from profound knowledge of the realities of war at the time, is Piers Mackesy, The Coward of Minden (London, 1978).
腓特烈大帝的大部分官方和非官方军事著作都收录于约翰·迪特里希·埃尔德曼·普鲁斯编辑的《腓特烈大帝著作集》（Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand）第28-30卷（共30卷，柏林，1846-1856年）以及古斯塔夫·贝特霍尔德·沃尔茨编辑的《腓特烈大帝著作集》（Die Werke Friedrichs des Grossen）第10卷（柏林，1912-1914年）。这些版本中的文本并非总是准确无误，其中一些作品的更佳版本已单独出版，例如理查德·费斯特编辑的《腓特烈大帝1747年将军训令》（Die Instruktion Friedrichs des Grossen für seine Generale von 1747，柏林，1936年）。杰伊·卢瓦斯编辑了腓特烈大帝的英文著作选集《腓特烈大帝论战争艺术》（Frederick the Great on the Art of War，纽约，1966年）。
Most of Frederick the Great's official and unofficial military writings are printed in volumes 28–30 of Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand, ed. Johann Dietrich Erdmann Preuss, 30 vols. (Berlin, 1846–56), and in Die Werke Friedrichs des Grossen, ed. Gustav Berthold Volz, 10 vols. (Berlin, 1912–14). The texts in these editions are not always accurate, and better versions of some of the pieces have been published separately, e.g., Die Instruktion Friedrichs des Grossen für seine Generale von 1747, ed. Richard Fester (Berlin, 1936). Jay Luvaas has edited a selection of Frederick's writings in English, Frederick the Great on the Art of War (New York, 1966).
腓特烈战役的基本历史是大总参谋部历史部出版的《Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen 》，第 24 卷。 （柏林，1890-1913）。这部带有精美地图的详细著作得到了历史部分对特殊主题的许多研究的补充，例如，《普鲁士军队战术部署》，第 10 号。《Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften》第 28-30 章（柏林，1900 年）。 Otto Hintze 的文章“Delbrück、Clausewitz und die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen” ，Forschungen zur Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Geschichte 33 (1920)分析了汉斯·德尔布吕克 (Hans Delbrück) 发起的有关腓特烈战略辩论的早期文献。近期的研究中值得关注的是埃伯哈德·凯塞尔的文章，例如《腓特烈大帝在战争史变迁中的作用》（载于《知识与战争》第17期，1936年）。彼得·帕雷特的《约克与普鲁士改革时代》（普林斯顿，1966年）和格哈德·里特的《腓特烈大帝》（修订版，彼得·帕雷特编辑并翻译，伯克利和洛杉矶，1974年）对腓特烈的战略和战术进行了简明扼要的分析。克里斯托弗·达菲的《腓特烈大帝的军队》 （纽约，1974年）是一部适合普通读者的优秀概述。西奥多·希德尔的《腓特烈大帝》（柏林，1983年）是腓特烈最新的传记，但它对腓特烈作为战略家和指挥官的才能并无新意。
The basic history of Frederick's campaigns is Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, published by the historical section of the Great General Staff, 24 vols. (Berlin, 1890–1913). This detailed work with excellent maps is supplemented by many studies on special subjects by the historical section, e.g., Die taktische Schulung der Preussischen Armee, nos. 28–30 of Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften (Berlin, 1900). The earlier literature on the debate of Frederician strategy that was initiated by Hans Delbrück is analyzed in Otto Hintze's article “Delbrück, Clausewitz und die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen,” Forschungen zur Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Geschichte 33 (1920). Notable among more recent studies are Eberhard Kessel's articles, for instance, “Friedrich der Grosse im Wandel der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Überlieferung,” Wissen und Wehr 17 (1936). Concise analyses of Frederician strategy and tactics are contained in Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform (Princeton, 1966), and Gerhard Ritter, Frederick the Great, rev. ed., ed. and trans. Peter Paret (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974). A good overview for the general reader is Christopher Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great (New York, 1974). The most recent biography of Frederick, Theodor Schieder, Friedrich der Grosse (Berlin, 1983) has nothing new to say about Frederick as strategist and commander.
吉贝尔的军事著作由其遗孀收集整理，汇编成五卷本的《吉贝尔伯爵军事著作集》（巴黎，1803年）。现代有两个版本：一是梅纳尔将军编辑的选集《雅克-安托万-伊波利特·吉贝尔伯爵军事著作集》（巴黎，1977年）；二是更为详尽的《吉贝尔军事著作集》，由让-保罗·沙尔奈和马丁·布尔戈斯编辑（巴黎，1977年）。吕西安·波瓦里埃的简短专著《吉贝尔（1743-1790）》（巴黎，1977年）引人入胜，发人深省，但对吉贝尔思想在启蒙运动晚期和法国君主制末期军事问题背景下的发展进行深入分析，仍有待进一步研究。
Guibert's military writings were collected by his widow in Oeuvres militaires du comte de Guibert, 5 vols. (Paris, 1803). Two modern editions are: a selection, edited by General Menard, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, comte de Guibert, Ecrits militaires (Paris, 1977), and the more substantial Oeuvres militaires, ed. JeanPaul Charnay and Martine Burgos (Paris, 1977). Lucien Poirier's brief monograph Guibert (1743–1790) (Paris, 1977) is interesting and thought-provoking, but a thorough analysis of the development of Guibert's thought in the context of the late Enlightenment and the military issues of the last years of the French monarchy remains to be written.
比洛的十六部著作至今尚未再版，学者们只能依赖原著，而这些原著在欧洲和美国的主要研究图书馆中相对容易获取。爱德华·比洛和威廉·吕斯托编辑的《海因里希·迪特里希·冯·比洛的军事与杂文集》（莱比锡，1853年）是一部颇具价值的选集，其中附有引人入胜的传记和分析性导言。莱因霍尔德·霍恩在其著作《革命—陆军—战争图景》 （达姆施塔特，1944年）中对比洛进行了详尽的论述。而以《沙恩霍斯特的军事》（法兰克福，1952年和1972年）为题出版的大幅删减修订版中，关于比洛的内容却寥寥无几。这两部著作都存在霍恩方法论原始且不可靠的问题。彼得·帕雷特在其著作《克劳塞维茨与国家》（纽约和伦敦，1976年；普林斯顿重印，1985年）以及帕雷特本人的《战争中的革命：早期诠释者》（载于伯纳德·布罗迪、迈克尔·因特里利加特和罗曼·科尔科维奇主编的《国家安全与国际稳定》，剑桥，马萨诸塞州，1983年）和《作为敌人的拿破仑》（载于克拉伦斯·B·戴维斯主编的《第十三届革命欧洲研讨会论文集》，雅典，佐治亚州，1985年）中探讨了比洛思想的某些方面，但仍亟需进一步研究。比洛如同吉贝尔一样，仍在等待一位现代诠释者。
None of Bülow's sixteen books has yet been reissued in a modern edition, and scholars are dependent on the originals, which are reasonably accessible in major research libraries in Europe and the United States. A valuable selection, Militärische und vermischte Schriften von Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow (Leipzig, 1853) was edited by Eduard Bülow and Wilhelm Rüstow, with interesting biographical and analytic introductions. Reinhold Höhn discusses Bülow extensively in his Revolution—Heer—Kriegsbild (Darmstadt, 1944). The much-abbreviated revised edition that appeared under the title Scharnhorsts Vermächtnis (Frankfurt a.M., 1952 and 1972.) contains little on Bülow. Both works suffer from Höhn's primitive and unreliable methodology. Some aspects of Bülow's thought are discussed in Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (New York and London, 1976; repr. Princeton, 1985), and in the same author's “Revolutions in Warfare: An Earlier Generation of Interpreters,” National Security and International Stability, ed. Bernard Brodie, Michael Intriligator, and Roman Kolkowicz (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), and “Napoleon as Enemy,” in Proceedings of the Thirteenth Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, ed. Clarence B. Davis (Athens, Ga., 1985), but there is great need for further research. Bülow, like Guibert, still awaits his modern interpreter.
5.拿破仑与战争革命
5. NAPOLEON AND THE REVOLUTION IN WAR
拿破仑战争思想及其作战实践的基本来源是其信件、命令及其他著作的汇编——《拿破仑一世书信集》（Correspondance de Napoléon I er），共32卷（巴黎，1857-1870年）。自该书出版以来，不断有新的出版物补充收录了更多信件和文件，并对原版中的错误和篡改之处进行了修正。另一大类资料来源，其数量之庞大几乎无法估量，则包括拿破仑的将领、士兵以及对手的信件、日记和回忆录。一个很好的例子是法国总参谋部历史部门编辑的达武在1806年战争中的官方文件——《第三军团作战，1806-1807：达武元帅报告》（Opérations du 3 e corps, 1806–1807: Rapport du Maréchal Davout，巴黎，1896年）。
The basic source for Napoleon's ideas on war and for his practice of warfare is the edition of his letters, orders, and other writings, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, 32. vols. (Paris, 1857–70). Since its appearance, the work has been supplemented by numerous publications of additional letters and documents, and of corrections of errors and falsifications in the original edition. A second body of sources, almost immeasurable in extent, is formed by the correspondence, diaries, and memoirs of Napoleon's generals and soldiers, as well as of his opponents. A good example is the edition by the historical section of the French general staff of Davout's official papers in the War of 1806, Opérations du 3e corps, 1806–1807: Rapport du Maréchal Davout (Paris, 1896).
遗憾的是，基于法国档案馆藏品的详尽全面的拿破仑战役文献记载寥寥无几。E. Buat 精心编纂的《从雷根斯堡到兹奈姆》（De Ratisbonne à Znaim ，1809 年，两卷本，巴黎，1909 年）是其中的例外。G. Fabry 的巨著《俄国战役（1812 年）》（Campagne de Russie (1812 )，五卷本，巴黎，1900-1903 年）及其后由同一编辑的两卷本《1812 年战役》（Campagne de 1812，巴黎，1912 年）至今仍未完成。然而，一些具体的作战行动和战役却得到了全面的记录和分析；例如，P.J. Foucart 的档案研究著作《包岑战役》 （ Bautzen ，巴黎，1897 年）和 Capitaine Alombert 的《迪伦斯坦战役》（Combat de Dürrenstein，巴黎，1897 年）。文森特·J·埃斯波西托和约翰·罗伯特·埃尔廷合著的《拿破仑战争军事史与地图集》 （纽约，1964年）的核心内容是一系列精美的地图，生动地展现了拿破仑从1796年到1815年的战役。该书还包含一份虽略显独特的注释书目，但颇具参考价值。J·C·奎内瓦特的《大军地图集》（巴黎和布鲁塞尔，1966年）虽然内容不如前者全面，但也值得一读。
Unfortunately few Napoleonic campaigns have been the subject of detailed and comprehensive documentary accounts based on the holdings of the French archives. An exception is the carefully prepared work by E. Buat, 1809: De Ratisbonne à Znaim, 2 vols. (Paris, 1909). The major project by G. Fabry, Campagne de Russie (1812), 5 vols. (Paris, 1900–1903), supplemented by the same editor's two-volume Campagne de 1812 (Paris, 1912), remains incomplete. Particular operations and battles have, however, been comprehensively documented and analyzed; see, for instance, the archival studies by P. J. Foucart, Bautzen (Paris, 1897) and Capitaine Alombert, Combat de Dürrenstein (Paris, 1897). A series of excellent maps, illustrating Napoleon's campaigns from 1796 to 1815, forms the core of Vincent J. Esposito and John Robert Elting, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars (New York, 1964), which also contains a useful if idiosyncratic annotated bibliography. Less comprehensive but worth consulting is the similar work by J. C. Quennevat, Atlas de la grande armée (Paris and Brussels, 1966).
若想全面了解拿破仑的战役，若米尼的著作仍然值得参考，尤其是他的《革命战争批判与军事史》（Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la révolution），共15卷（巴黎，1820-1824年），以及他的《拿破仑的政治与军事生平》（Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon），共4卷（巴黎，1827年）。亨利·W·哈勒克将其译为《拿破仑传》（Life of Napoleon），该译本于1864年在伦敦出版，并多次再版。克劳塞维茨并未撰写过类似规模的著作；但他在其十卷本《后方著作》（ Hinterlassene Werke，柏林，1832-1837年）的第4至8卷中对1796年、1799年、1812年、1813年、1814年和1815年的战役的研究涵盖了这一时期的大部分内容，并包含了他一些最重要的历史分析。《论战争》一书中当然充满了对拿破仑和拿破仑战争的引用。
For a general account of Napoleon's campaigns it is still useful to consult Jomini, in particular his Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la révolution, 15 vols. (Paris 1820–24), and his Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon, 4 vols. (Paris, 1827), a translation of which by Henry W. Halleck, Life of Napoleon, appeared in London in 1864 and has been reprinted several times. Clausewitz did not write a similarly comprehensive work; but his studies of the campaigns of 1796,1799,1812,1813,1814, and 1815 in volumes 4 to 8 of his Hinterlassene Werke, 10 vols. (Berlin, 1832–37) cover much of the period and contain some of his most important historical analyses. On War is, of course, full of references to Napoleon and Napoleonic war.
对拿破仑作为战略家和指挥官的现代解释很大程度上是由属于法国总参谋部历史部门或与之相关的军官塑造的。这里我们只需要注意休伯特·卡蒙的众多作品，其中包括《拿破仑战争》，第 3 卷。 （巴黎，1903-1910），1925 年重印第七扩大版；La fortification dans la guerre napoléonienne（巴黎，1914 年）；拿破仑战争系统（巴黎，1923 年）；和《拿破仑的天才与技艺》（巴黎，1930 年）。亨利·博纳尔将军同样坚信拿破仑是现代战争的伟大导师。他的诸多著作——包括《乌尔姆的罗斯巴赫》（巴黎，1903年）和《兰茨胡特演习》（巴黎，1905年）——最初都是为高等军事学院编写的教材。另一位军官，未来的将军让·科林，其著作在具体性和历史敏感性方面则更胜一筹。他对法国大革命时期战争的研究、更为全面的著作《战争的转型》（伦敦，1912年），尤其是他的《拿破仑的军事教育》（巴黎，1900年），树立了卓越的标杆，后世作者鲜有企及。
The modern interpretation of Napoleon as strategist and commander was largely shaped by officers belonging to, or associated with, the section historique of the French general staff. Here we need to note only the numerous works of Hubert Camon, among them La guerre napoléonienne, 3 vols. (Paris, 1903–1910), reprinted in a seventh enlarged edition in 1925; La fortification dans la guerre napoléonienne (Paris, 1914); Le système de guerre de Napoléon (Paris, 1923); and Génie et métier chez Napoléon (Paris, 1930). Equally convinced that Napoleon was the great teacher of modern war was General Henri Bonnal, whose many writings—among them De Rosbach à Ulm (Paris, 1903) and La manoeuvre de Landshut (Paris, 1905)—began as texts for the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre. Much better in their specificity and historical sensitivity are the books of another officer, the future general Jean Colin. His studies of war during the French Revolution, his more general work The Transformations of War (London, 1912), and especially his L'éducation militaire de Napoléon (Paris, 1900) set a standard of excellence that later authors have only rarely approached.
在非法国学者中，对拿破仑战略最具原创性的分析当属汉斯·德尔布吕克在其著作《战争艺术史》（Geschichte der Kriegskunst）第四卷（柏林，1962年新版）中所作的分析。德尔布吕克驳斥了雨果·冯·弗雷塔格-洛林霍芬、约克·冯·瓦滕堡伯爵等人的解读，这些解读如今仅具历史研究价值。另一方面，德国总参谋部在1806年战争和解放战争史中对法军作战方法的分析仍然具有很高的价值——尤其是在指挥结构、补给、作战和战术等方面。
The most original analysis of Napoleonic strategy by a scholar who is not French remains that of Hans Delbrück in the fourth volume of his Geschichte der Kriegskunst, new ed. (Berlin, 1962). The interpretations by Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, Count Yorck von Wartenburg, and others that Delbrück rejected are today only of antiquarian interest. On the other hand, the analyses of French methods in the German general staff histories of the War of 1806 and of the Wars of Liberation retain much of their value—especially in the areas of command structure, supply, operations, and tactics.
英文标准通论是戴维·G·钱德勒的《拿破仑战役》（纽约，1966），作者将其描述为“为如今更为详尽权威的军事研究‘拉开序幕’”。冈瑟·E·罗森伯格的《拿破仑时代的战争艺术》 （伦敦，1978）是一部颇具见地的入门概览。相比之下，亨利·拉舒克的《拿破仑：二十年战役》 （巴黎，1964）虽然内容全面，但缺乏分析，令人失望。拉舒克关于拿破仑战争的近二十部著作，是该领域浩瀚的现代文献的典型代表。它们以生动热情的笔触描绘了人物和事件，却从未提出，更遑论解答那些亟待解答的诸多难题。最后，在我看来，对拿破仑的军事才能进行的最佳现代分析是詹姆斯·马歇尔-康沃尔所著的《拿破仑作为军事指挥官》（伦敦，1967 年）。
The standard general account in English is David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, 1966), which the author characterizes as merely a “‘curtain raiser’ to the more detailed and authoritative military studies now available.” A knowledgeable introductory survey is Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (London, 1978). Far less satisfactory is the comprehensive but unanalytic work by Henri Lachouque, Napoléon: Vingt ans de campagnes (Paris, 1964). Lachouque's nearly two dozen books on Napoleonic war are characteristic of much of the vast modern literature in the field. They offer a colorful, enthusiastic treatment of personalities and events, without ever raising let alone answering the many hard questions that remain to be asked. Finally, the best modern analysis of Napoleon's generalship seems to me to be James Marshall-Cornwall, Napoleon as Military Commander (London, 1967).
6. J OMINI
6. JOMINI
约米尼最重要的著作是《军事大作战论》（ Traité des grandes opérations militaires），第二版，共四卷（巴黎，1811年），以及《战争艺术概要》（Précis de l'art de la guerre ），共两卷（巴黎，1838年）。《军事大作战论》第一版的第一部分和第二部分以《大型战术论》（Traité de grande tactique ）为名出版（巴黎，1805年），第五部分于1806年以相同标题出版；其余两部分，即第三部分和第四部分，分别于1807年和1809年出版。《军事大作战论》和《战争艺术概要》均有多个版本再版和译本。约翰·I·阿尔杰所著的《安托万-亨利·约米尼：书目概览》（纽约州西点，1975年）是研究约米尼著作目录复杂性的必备指南。英文版《战争艺术概要》的最新版本是JD Hittle 编辑的《约米尼及其战争艺术概要：简明版》 （宾夕法尼亚州哈里斯堡，1947 年），而 1855 年的权威版本已于 1973 年在奥斯纳布吕克重新出版，并由 HR Kurz 用德语作序。
Jomini's most important works are Traité des grandes opérations militaires, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Paris, 1811), and Précis de l'art de la guerre, 2 vols. (Paris, 1838). The first edition of the Traité, parts I and II, was published as Traité de grande tactique (Paris, 1805), and Part V in 1806 under the same title; the remaining two parts, III and IV, were published in 1807 and 1809 respectively. Both the Traite and Précis were republished and translated in various editions. The indispensable guide to the complexities of Jomini's bibliography is John I. Alger, Antoine-Henri Jomini: A Bibliographical Survey (West Point, N.Y., 1975). The most recent edition of the Précis in English is Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War: A Condensed Version, edited by J. D. Hittle (Harrisburg, Penn., 1947), and the definitive 1855 edition of the Précis has been republished in Osnabrück (1973), with an introduction in German by H. R. Kurz.
约米尼的其他重要作品包括《革命战争批判与军事史》，15 卷。 （巴黎，1820-24），作为 Traité 的延续于 1811 年首次出现；拿破仑的政治与军事生活，第 4 卷。 （巴黎，1827 年），最初匿名出版；《1815 年战役政治与军事概要》（巴黎，1839 年），约米尼声称这是他一生中拿破仑滑铁卢战役中“丢失”的部分；以及《Tableau analytique desprinciplescominaisonsdelaguerre》（巴黎，1830 年），这是他第一本对“战争原理”进行长篇阐述的书。所有这些作品都有后来的版本，并被翻译成英语和其他语言。
Other important works by Jomini include Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la révolution, 15 vols. (Paris, 1820–24), which had first begun to appear in 1811 as a continuation of the Traité; Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon, 4 vols. (Paris, 1827), originally published anonymously; Précis politique et militaire de la campagne de 1815 (Paris, 1839), which Jomini claimed was the “lost” section on the Waterloo campaign of his life of Napoleon; and Tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la guerre (Paris, 1830), which was his first book-length elaboration of the “principles of war.” All of these works have later editions and have been translated into English and other languages.
基本传记仍然是费迪南德·勒孔特 (Ferdinand Lecomte) 的《Le général Jomini, sa vie et ses écrits》（巴黎，1860 年；第 3 版，洛桑，1888 年）。勒孔特是一名瑞士军官，是若米尼的密友和弟子。他的传记是主要信息来源。乔治·吉尔伯特（Georges Gilbert）对勒孔特（Lecomte）的《约米尼》（Jomini）的重要评论发表在《新评论》（La nouvelle revue，1888 年 12 月 1 日），674-85。 CA Sainte-Beuve 在《Le général Jomini》（巴黎，1869 年）中没有添加新信息，却增加了 Jomini 的名气。约米尼的曾孙泽维尔·德库维尔 (Xavier de Courville) 在他拥有的文件上为《约米尼，ou le devin de Napoléon》（巴黎，1935 年）画了画，但令人失望的是，勒孔特几乎没有添加任何内容。约米尼未发表的回忆录中有两部篇幅较长的节选，分别是《西班牙战争》（巴黎，1892年）和《1812年至1814年战役的政治和军事概要》（巴黎，1886年），均由勒孔特在约米尼去世后出版。约米尼未发表手稿中最容易获取的部分收藏于大英图书馆（埃格顿手稿3166-3168、3198和3217），这些手稿是1940年从娜塔莉·奥努夫人处购得的一批藏品的一部分；这些手稿仅涉及他在巴黎的最后几年。丹尼尔·赖歇尔 (Daniel Reichel) 的主题及其对其他未发表材料的简要说明尤其有价值，“Laposition du général Jomini en tant qu'expert militaire à la cour de Russie”，Actes du symposium 1982，Service historique，Travaux d'histoire militaire et de polémologie，vol. 1982。 1 服务历史，（洛桑，1982 年），51-75。在约米尼逝世周年纪念日上，出现了一系列传记文章，《Le général Antoine-Henri Jomint (1779–1869): Contributions à sa biographie》，Bibliothèque Historique Vaudoise，第 1 期。 41（洛桑，1969），以及展览目录，Général Antoine-Henri Jomtnt，1779-1869（Payerne，1969），由 Jomini 将军委员会出版。两者都很有价值。
The basic biography remains that of Ferdinand Lecomte, Le général Jomini, sa vie et ses écrits (Paris, 1860; 3d ed., Lausanne, 1888). Lecomte was a Swiss officer, a close friend and disciple of Jomini; his biography is a primary source of information. An important review of Lecomte's Jomini by Georges Gilbert appeared in La nouvelle revue (December 1, 1888), 674–85. C. A. Sainte-Beuve added to Jomini's fame without adding new information in Le général Jomini (Paris, 1869). Xavier de Courville, Jomini's great-grandson, drew on papers in his possession for Jomini, ou le devin de Napoléon (Paris, 1935), but adds disappointingly little to Lecomte. Two large excerpts from Jomini's unpublished memoirs are Guerre d'Espagne (Paris, 1892) and Précis politiques et militaire des campagnes de 1812 à 1814 (Paris, 1886), both published by Lecomte after Jomini's death. The most accessible portion of Jomini's unpublished papers is in the British Library (Egerton Manuscripts 3166–3168, 3198, and 3217), part of a larger collection acquired in 1940 from Mme. Nathalie Onu; these deal only with his last years in Paris. Especially valuable, both for its subject and its brief account of other unpublished material, is Daniel Reichel, “La position du général Jomini en tant qu'expert militaire à la cour de Russie,” Actes du symposium 1982, Service historique, Travaux d'histoire militaire et de polémologie, vol. 1 Service historique, (Lausanne, 1982), 51–75. On the anniversary of Jomini's death appeared a series of biographical essays, Le général Antoine-Henri Jomint (1779–1869): Contributions à sa biographie, Bibliothèque Historique Vaudoise, no. 41 (Lausanne, 1969), as well as the catalogue of an exhibit, Général Antoine-Henri Jomtnt, 1779–1869 (Payerne, 1969), published by the Comité du Centenaire du Général Jomini. Both are valuable.
布林顿、克雷格和吉尔伯特在1943年版《现代战略的缔造者》中撰写的关于约米尼的文章，是所有其他相关著作的标杆。此前对约米尼理论的评价包括爱德华·吉永的《我们的军事作家》（两卷本，巴黎，1898-99年）和鲁道夫·冯·凯默勒的《十九世纪战略科学的发展》（伦敦，1905年）。迈克尔·霍华德的《约米尼与古典传统》（载于迈克尔·霍华德主编的《战争理论与实践》，伦敦和纽约，1965年，第5-20页）首次探讨了劳埃德的影响，并且对约米尼的论述明显带有同情色彩。伯纳德·布罗迪（Bernard Brodie）是当代战略作家中的一员，他对约米尼及其影响的评价更为严厉，尤其是在《导弹时代的战略》（Princeton，1959），3-39中。其他现代叙述包括 Gustav Däniker 在Klassiker der Kriegskunst编辑的《Klassiker der Kriegskunst》中。沃纳·哈尔韦格（达姆施塔特，1960），267–84； Jehuda L. Wallach，《Kriegstheorien：Ihre Entwicklung im 19. und 20》。Jahrhundert（美因河畔法兰克福，1972 年），11-27；和 Hew Strachan，《欧洲军队和战争行为》（伦敦和波士顿，1983 年），60-75。关于约米尼对美国内战战略的影响程度仍存在争议。 Thomas L. Connelly 和 Archer Jones 合著的《指挥政治：邦联战略中的派系和思想》（巴吞鲁日，1973 年）第 3-30 页、第 174-176 页和第 226-229 页是一部完整的导论，但并非最终定论。
The essay on Jomini by Brinton, Craig, and Gilbert in the 1943 edition of Makers of Modern Strategy is the benchmark for all other work. Earlier appraisals of Jomini's theories include Edouard Guillon, Nos écrivains militaires, 2 vols. (Paris, 1898–99), and Rudolph von Caemmerer, The Development of Strategical Science during the Nineteenth Century (London, 1905). Michael Howard, “Jomini and the Classical Tradition,” in The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (London and New York, 1965), 5–20, first explored the influence of Lloyd, and is a notably sympathetic account of Jomini. Bernard Brodie, among contemporary writers on strategy, dealt more harshly with Jomini and his influence, particularly in Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959), 3–39. Other modern accounts include Gustav Däniker in Klassiker der Kriegskunst, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Darmstadt, 1960), 267–84; Jehuda L. Wallach, Kriegstheorien: Ihre Entwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), 11–27; and Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London and Boston, 1983), 60–75. Controversy continues over the degree to which Jomini influenced strategy in the American Civil War; Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy (Baton Rouge, 1973), 3–30, 174–176, and 226–229, is a full introduction but not the last word.
7. C·劳塞维茨
7. CLAUSEWITZ
克劳塞维茨著作的完整版本并不存在。他去世后不久，他的大量手稿选集出版了：Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung，10 卷。 （柏林，1832-37）。此后又出版了更多手稿，其版本通常部分重复。最重要的是：“Über das Leben und den Charakter von Scharnhorst”，Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift 1 (1832)；普鲁士新闻大灾难，卷。Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften （柏林，1888 年）第 10 期并重印多次；政治文献和简报，编辑。 Hans Rothfels（慕尼黑，1922 年；新版波恩，1980 年）；1804 年的策略，由 Zusätzen von 1808 和 1809编辑。艾伯哈德·凯塞尔（Eberhard Kessel，汉堡，1937 年）；Zwei Briefe des Generals von Clausewitz: Gedanken zur Abwehr ， Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau 2 (1937)特刊，最近以英文出版，名为两封关于战略的信件，编辑。和反式。彼得·帕雷特和丹尼尔·莫兰（宾夕法尼亚州卡莱尔，1984 年）。尽管经常有荒谬的评论，克劳塞维茨的国家社会主义著作集《Geist und Tat》编辑。值得一提的是瓦尔特·马尔姆斯坦·舍林（斯图加特，1941年），因为它收录了克劳塞维茨一些此前未发表过、如今似乎已经遗失的短篇作品。克劳塞维茨对1806年战役的分析，最初于1807年以匿名形式发表，后经约阿希姆·尼迈耶撰写导言后重印，书名为《关于1806年10月大战的历史书信》（波恩，1977年）。
A complete edition of Clausewitz's writings does not exist. Soon after his death, an extensive selection of his manuscripts was published: Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung, 10 vols. (Berlin, 1832–37). Additional manuscripts have been published since then, often in editions that partly duplicate each other. The most important are: “Über das Leben und den Charakter von Scharnhorst,” Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift 1 (1832); Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner grossen Katastrophe, vol. 10 of Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften (Berlin, 1888) and reprinted several times; Politische Schriften und Briefe, ed. Hans Rothfels (Munich, 1922; new ed. Bonn, 1980); Strategie aus dem Jahr 1804, mit Zusätzen von 1808 und 1809, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Hamburg, 1937); Zwei Briefe des Generals von Clausewitz: Gedanken zur Abwehr, special issue of the Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau 2 (1937), recently published in English as Two Letters on Strategy, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Carlisle, Penn., 1984). Despite its frequently absurd commentary, a National-Socialist collection of Clausewitz's writings, Geist und Tat, ed. Walther Malmsten Schering (Stuttgart, 1941), should be noted because it includes some shorter pieces by Clausewitz that had not been previously published and now seem to be lost. Clausewitz's analysis of the campaign of 1806, which appeared anonymously in 1807, has been reprinted with a useful introduction by Joachim Niemeyer, Historische Briefe über die grossen Kriegsereignisse im Oktober 1806 (Bonn, 1977).
克劳塞维茨编辑和目录学家的泰斗维尔纳·哈尔维格 (Werner Hahlweg) 推出了克劳塞维茨的一些手稿和信件的详尽注释版本，其中许多是首次印刷：卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨 (Carl von Clausewitz)，Schriften-Aufsätze-Studien-Briefe，2 卷。 （哥廷根，1966 年，1986 年）。同一编辑卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨 (Carl von Clausewitz) 的合集《Verstreute kleine Schriften》（奥斯纳布吕克，1979 年）专为普通读者设计。 Hahlweg 教授还是最具学术性的著作《Vom Kriege》（波恩，1980 年）的编辑。克劳塞维茨的主要理论著作的最新英文译本是迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特的《论战争》（普林斯顿，1976 年；修订版，1984 年），其中收录了彼得·帕雷特、迈克尔·霍华德和伯纳德·布罗迪的文章和评论。
The dean of Clausewitz editors and bibliographers, Werner Hahlweg, has brought out an exhaustively annotated edition of some of Clausewitz's manuscripts and letters, many of which are printed for the first time: Carl von Clausewitz, Schriften-Aufsätze-Studien-Briefe, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1966, 1986). A collection by the same editor, Carl von Clausewitz, Verstreute kleine Schriften (Osnabrück, 1979), is designed for the general reader. Professor Hahlweg is also the editor of the most scholarly text of Vom Kriege (Bonn, 1980). The most recent English translation of Clausewitz's major theoretical work is by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton, 1976; rev. ed. 1984), with essays and commentary by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie.
克劳塞维茨和他妻子之间的通信是重要的传记和历史资料，由卡尔·林内巴赫编辑，题为《卡尔和玛丽·冯·克劳塞维茨》（柏林，1917 年）。
The correspondence between Clausewitz and his wife, a biographical and historical source of great importance, has been edited by Karl Linnebach, Karl u. Marie v. Clausewitz (Berlin, 1917).
对二手文献最好的调查可以在 Werner Hahlweg 的 1980 版Vom Kriege中找到，其中列出了数百本书和文章。这里值得注意的是两卷本卡尔·施瓦茨的生平和书信、《卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨将军的生活》和《玛丽·冯·克劳塞维茨夫人的生活》。格拉芬·冯·布鲁尔（Gräfin von Brühl，柏林，1878 年）；汉斯·罗斯菲尔斯 (Hans Rothfels) 和卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨 (Carl von Clausewitz )的重要但有些浪漫的研究：政治与克里格 (Politik und Krieg )（柏林，1920 年）；以及两项简短而有价值的研究：Rudolf von Caemmerer, Clausewitz（柏林，1905）和 Werner Hahlweg, Clausewitz（哥廷根，1957）。彼得·帕雷特的《克劳塞维茨与国家》（牛津和纽约，1976年；普林斯顿重印，1985年）结合了传记和思想史（参见雷蒙·阿隆在《年鉴》第30卷第6期[1977年]的评论）。雷蒙·阿隆的两卷本著作《思考战争：克劳塞维茨》（巴黎，1976年）是对克劳塞维茨理论的重要探讨，并结合了高度思辨性的尝试，试图将其扩展并应用于当代（参见彼得·帕雷特在《跨学科历史杂志》第8卷第2期[1977年]的评论）。阿隆著作的英文版《克劳塞维茨：战争哲学家》 （伦敦，1984年）并未包含原文全文，编辑糟糕，且错误百出（参见休·斯特拉坎在《泰晤士高等教育增刊》 1984年6月1日的评论）。 Michael Howard 撰写了一篇关于克劳塞维茨理论的简要讨论，书名为《克劳塞维茨》（牛津和纽约，1983 年）。
The best survey of the secondary literature is found in Werner Hahlweg's 1980 edition of Vom Kriege, which lists several hundred books and articles. To be noted here are the two-volume life and letters by Karl Schwartz, Leben des Generals Carl von Clausewitz und der Frau Marie von Clausewitz geb. Gräfin von Brühl (Berlin, 1878); the important though somewhat romantic study by Hans Rothfels, Carl von Clausewitz: Politik und Krieg (Berlin, 1920); and two brief, valuable studies: Rudolf von Caemmerer, Clausewitz (Berlin, 1905), and Werner Hahlweg, Clausewitz (Göttingen, 1957). Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Oxford and New York, 1976; repr. Princeton, 1985) combines biography and the history of ideas (see the review by Raymond Aron in Annales 3 z, no. 6 [1977]). Raymond Aron's two-volume study Penser la guerre: Clausewitz (Paris, 1976) is an important discussion of Clausewitz's theories linked with a highly speculative effort to expand and adapt them to the present (see the review by Peter Paret in the Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8, no. 2 [1977]). The English edition of Aron's work, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War (London, 1984), does not contain the full text of the original, is badly edited, and marred by numerous errors (see the review by Hew Strachan in The Times Higher Education Supplemerit, June 1, 1984). Michael Howard has written a brief discussion of Clausewitz's theories, Clausewitz (Oxford and New York, 1983).
大多数政治学家和战略分析家试图将克劳塞维茨的理论应用于当今战略和战争问题的努力都收效甚微。哈里·G·萨默斯（Harry G. Summers, Jr.）的《论战略》（ On Strategy，1982年，加利福尼亚州诺瓦托）一文则是一个例外，该文内容翔实且富有启发性。约翰·E·塔什吉恩（John E. Tashjean）也撰写了几篇关于克劳塞维茨理论在当今意义的简短而富有想象力的文章，例如《游泳池里的大炮：克劳塞维茨研究与战略民族中心主义》（“The Cannon in the Swimming Pool: Clausewitzian Studies and Strategic Ethnocentrism”，载于《皇家联合军种研究所期刊》，1983年6月）。两部德国学术论文集在将克劳塞维茨研究与当代战略分析联系起来方面取得了一定的成功，分别是乌尔里希·德·迈齐埃（Ulrich de Maizière）主编的《没有战争的自由》（Freiheit ohne Krieg，波恩，1980年）以及1980年国际克劳塞维茨会议论文集（载于《国防科学评论》第29卷第3期，1980年）。
Most efforts by political scientists and strategic analysts to bring Clausewitz to bear on current problems of strategy and war have been relatively unproductive. An exception is the responsible and stimulating essay by Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy (Novato, Calif., 1982). John E. Tashjean has written several brief, imaginative articles on the significance of Clausewitz today, for instance “The Cannon in the Swimming Pool: Clausewitzian Studies and Strategic Ethnocentrism,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (June 1983). Two German colloquia that have had some success in linking the study of Clausewitz with contemporary strategic analysis are Freiheit ohne Krieg, ed. Ulrich de Maizière (Bonn, 1980) and the proceedings of the International Clausewitz Conference, 1980, in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 29, no. 3 (1980).
8. A· D · S ·史密斯、A·亚历山大·汉密尔顿、 F·里德里希·利斯特：《军事力量的经济基础》*
8. ADAM SMITH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, FRIEDRICH LIST: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY POWER*
关于重商主义，请参阅 Eli F. Heckscher 的著作《重商主义》（斯德哥尔摩，1931 年），该书由 M. Shapiro 翻译成英文，为《重商主义》，共 2 卷（伦敦，1935 年）；Gustav Schmoller 的《重商体系及其历史意义》，由 WJ Ashley 翻译（伦敦，1896 年）；CW Cole 的《科尔伯特与一个世纪的法国重商主义》（纽约，1939 年）。
On mercantilism, see the still valuable work of Eli F. Heckscher, Merkantilismen (Stockholm, 1931), translated into English by M. Shapiro, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (London, 1935); Gustav Schmoller, The Mercantile System and Its Historical Significance, trans. W. J. Ashely (London, 1896); C. W. Cole, Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism (New York, 1939).
亚当·斯密的《国富论》最初出版于1776年，此后多次再版。其中，由R.H. Campbell、A.S. Skinner和W.B. Todd编辑的版本（牛津，1976年）尤为杰出，该版本是20世纪70年代出版的极具价值的多卷本《亚当·斯密著作与书信集》格拉斯哥版的一部分。约翰·雷的《亚当·斯密传》（纽约，1895年）经雅各布·维纳评注后再版（纽约，1965年）。关于斯密著作集两位编者所著的传记，可参阅R.H. Campbell和A.S. Skinner合著的《亚当·斯密传》（伦敦，1982年）。此外，值得一提的还有20世纪70年代出版的几卷纪念亚当·斯密的论文集：安德鲁·斯金纳和托马斯·威尔逊编，《亚当·斯密论文集》（牛津，1975年）； Fred Glahe 编，《亚当·斯密与国富论1776–1976：二百周年纪念论文集》（博尔德，1978 年）；Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. 编，《亚当·斯密与现代政治经济学：国富论二百周年纪念论文集》（艾姆斯，1979 年）。
Originally published in 1776. Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations has often been reprinted. Outstanding is the edition by R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd (Oxford, 1976), part of the invaluable multivolume Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith that appeared in the 1970s. John Rae, Life of Adam Smith (New York, 1895) has been republished with a commentary by Jacob Viner (New York, 1965). For a biography by two editors of Smith's collected works, see R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, Adam Smith (London, 1982). Also of note are several volumes of essays from the 1970s commemorating Adam Smith: Andrew Skinner and Thomas Wilson, eds., Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford, 1975); Fred Glahe, ed., Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations 1776–1976: Bicentennial Essays (Boulder, 1978); Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., ed., Adam Smith and Modern Political Economy: Bicentennial Essays on the Wealth of Nations (Ames, 1979).
关于亚历山大·汉密尔顿的最佳资料来源是哈罗德·C·西雷特和雅各布·E·库克编辑的《亚历山大·汉密尔顿文集》 ，共26卷（纽约，1961-1979年）。在众多汉密尔顿传记中，可参见布罗德斯·米切尔的《亚历山大·汉密尔顿》，共2卷（纽约，1957年、1962年；1976年重印），以及约翰·C·米勒的《亚历山大·汉密尔顿：悖论肖像》（纽约，1959年）。米切尔在20世纪70年代又出版了两部作品：《亚历山大·汉密尔顿：革命岁月》（纽约，1970年），其中包含对汉密尔顿军事生涯的记述；以及《亚历山大·汉密尔顿：简明传记》（纽约，1976年）。雅各布·欧内斯特·库克的《亚历山大·汉密尔顿》（纽约，1982年）是汉密尔顿文集的编辑撰写的传记。
The best source on Alexander Hamilton is The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, 26 vols. (New York, 1961–79). Among the many biographies of Hamilton, see Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton, 2 vols. (New York, 1957, 1962; repr. 1976), and John C. Miller, Alexander Hamilton: Portrait in Paradox (New York, 1959). Two more works by Mitchell appeared in the 1970s: Alexander Hamilton: The Revolutionary Years (New York, 1970), which includes an account of Hamilton's military career, and Alexander Hamilton: A Concise Biography (New York, 1976). Jacob Ernest Cooke, Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1982) is a biography written by an editor of Hamilton's papers.
弗里德里希·李斯特著作集（Friedrich List Gesellschaft, Schriften, Reden, Briefe，共10卷，柏林，1927-1935年）仍然不可或缺。《政治经济学的民族体系》（纽约，1966年）是桑普森·S·劳埃德 (Sampson S. Lloyd) 于1885年翻译的李斯特著作《政治经济学的民族体系》（斯图加特，1841年）的重印本。特别值得关注的是W.O.亨德森 (W.O. Henderson) 翻译并编辑的《政治经济学的自然体系》（伦敦，1983年）。关于李斯特的众多传记，可参见弗里德里希·伦茨 (Friedrich Lenz) 的《弗里德里希·李斯特：其人及其作品》（慕尼黑和柏林，1936年）。汉斯·伽里格 (Hans Gehrig)、弗里德里希·李斯特 (Friedrich List) 和 Deutschlands politsch ökonomische Einheit (莱比锡，1956)；保罗·格林，弗里德里希·李斯特：Jugend und Reifejahre，1789-1825（图宾根，1964）。 《List》上一本引人注目的插图卷是 Eugen Wendler, Friedrich List: Leben und Wirken in Dokumenten (Reutlingen, 1976)。 List 上的专门研究数量非常多。值得注意的是：Georg Weippert，Der Späte List：Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Wissenschaft von der Politik und zur politischen Ökonomie als Gestaltungslehre der Wirtschaft（埃尔兰根，1956）； Werner Strosslin，Friedrich 列出了 Lehre von der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung：Zur Geschichte von Entwicklungstheorie und -politik（巴塞尔，1968 年）； Harald Randak，Friedrich List und die wissenschaftliche Wirtschaftspolitik（图宾根，1972）。
Still indispensable is the collection of Friedrich List's works published by the Friedrich List Gesellschaft, Schriften, Reden, Briefe, 10 vols. (Berlin, 1927–35). The National System of Political Economy (New York, 1966) is a reprint of the 1885 translation by Sampson S. Lloyd of List's Das Nationale System der politischen Ökonomie (Stuttgart, 1841). Of special interest is The Natural System of Political Economy, trans, and ed. W. O. Henderson (London, 1983). Among the many biographies of List, see Friedrich Lenz, Friedrich List: Der Mann und das Werk (Munich and Berlin, 1936); Hans Gehrig, Friedrich List und Deutschlands politisch ökonomische Einheit (Leipzig, 1956); Paul Gehring, Friedrich List: Jugend und Reifejahre, 1789–1825 (Tübingen, 1964). An attractive illustrated volume on List is Eugen Wendler, Friedrich List: Leben und Wirken in Dokumenten (Reutlingen, 1976). The number of specialized studies on List is great. Of note are: Georg Weippert, Der Späte List: Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Wissenschaft von der Politik und zur politischen Ökonomie als Gestaltungslehre der Wirtschaft (Erlangen, 1956); Werner Strosslin, Friedrich Lists Lehre von der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: Zur Geschichte von Entwicklungstheorie und -politik (Basel, 1968); Harald Randak, Friedrich List und die wissenschaftliche Wirtschaftspolitik (Tübingen, 1972).
9.恩格尔斯和马克思论革命、战争与军队在社会中的作用*
9. ENGELS AND MARX ON REVOLUTION, WAR, AND THE ARMY IN SOCIETY*
1975年， 《马克思恩格斯全集》 （MEGA）第一卷在东柏林出版，这是苏联共产党中央委员会下属的马克思列宁主义研究所和德国统一社会党（SED）合作的成果。这部权威的全英文原版全集完成后，将取代所有先前的版本。同年，最好的英文版《马克思恩格斯全集》也开始出版，这是莫斯科进步出版社、苏联共产党马克思列宁主义研究所、美国共产党和英国共产党（伦敦）共同努力的成果。在这两个版本完成之前，学者们会发现最方便且最接近完整的版本是《马克思恩格斯全集》，共41卷，另加增补卷（东柏林，1960-1974年）。这三个版本均收录了已出版的作品、信件以及大量此前未出版的手稿资料。
In 1975 the first volume of the Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) appeared in East Berlin, the product of a collaboration between the Institutes of Marxism-Leninism affiliated with the Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the German Socialist Unity Party (SED). When complete, this authoritative all-original-language edition will supersede all previous editions. The best English Collected Works also began publication in 1975 and represents a joint effort between Progress Publishers in Moscow, the C.P.S.U.'s Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and the Communist Parties of the U.S.A. and Britain (London). Until these two editions are complete, scholars will find the handiest and most nearly complete edition to be the Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Werke, 41 vols, plus supp. vols. (East Berlin, 1960–74). All three editions include published works, correspondence, and a large number of hitherto unpublished manuscript materials.
W.H. Chaloner 和 W.O. Henderson 编辑了恩格斯的英文文章集，这些文章转载自19 世纪 60 年代的《志愿兵杂志》和《曼彻斯特卫报》 ，书名为《恩格斯作为军事评论家》（曼彻斯特，1959 年）。恩格斯的军事著作已被翻译成俄语和德语出版：F. Engels 的《军事著作选集》（莫斯科，1957 年）；F. Engels的《军事著作选集》，两卷本（柏林，1958-1964 年）；以及与列宁的军事著作合编的《军事政治著作》，Erich Wollenberg 编辑（奥芬巴赫，1952 年）。恩格斯的《新美国百科全书》中关于军队、步兵、进攻和战斗的条目已单独出版：《军队》（柏林，1956年）；《步兵、进攻、战斗》（柏林，1956年）。最早的合集之一，至今仍具有很高的价值，是1924年弗里德里希·恩格斯的俄文版《关于战争问题的论文集》（莫斯科）。
W. H. Chaloner and W. O. Henderson have edited a collection of Engels's articles in English, reprinted from the Volunteer Journal and the Manchester Guardian of the 1860s, entitled Engels as Military Critic (Manchester, 1959). Engels's military writings have been translated and published in both Russian and German: F. Engel's, Izbrannye voennye proizvedeniia (Moscow, 1957); F. Engels, Ausgewählte militärische Schriften, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1958–64); and with Lenin's military writings, in F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, Militärpolitische Schriften, ed. Erich Wollenberg (Offenbach a.M., 1952). Engels's New American Cyclopaedia entries on the army, infantry, attack, and battle have been published separately: Die Armee (Berlin, 1956); Die Infantrie, Der Angriff, Die Schlacht (Berlin, 1956). One of the earliest collections, and still a valuable one, is the Russian edition of 1924, Fridrikh Engel's, Stat'i i pis'ma po voennym voprosam (Moscow).
现代传记包括：Gerhard Zirke，《Der General: Friedrich Engels, der erste Militärtheoretiker der Arbeiterklasse》（莱比锡，1957 年）；格蕾丝·卡尔顿，《弗里德里希·恩格斯：影子先知》（伦敦，1965年）；W.O.亨德森，《弗里德里希·恩格斯传》，两卷本（伦敦，1976年）。在早期著作中，经典之作当属古斯塔夫·迈耶，《弗里德里希·恩格斯传》（海牙，1934年）。关于恩格斯在19世纪40年代末的军事活动，可参阅近期的一部德国研究著作：海因茨·赫尔默特，《弗里德里希·恩格斯：革命的副官，1848-49》（莱比锡，1973年）。尽管有些地方带有颂扬色彩，但现代最好的卡尔·马克思传记是戴维·麦克莱伦，《卡尔·马克思：生平与思想》（纽约，1973年）。其他有益的著作包括：杰罗尔德·西格尔，《马克思的命运：人生的轨迹》（普林斯顿，1978年）；弗里茨·J.拉达茨，《卡尔·马克思传》。马克思：政治传记，译。理查德·巴里（波士顿，1978 年）；阿诺德·库恩兹利，《卡尔·马克思：一部心理传记》（维也纳，1966 年）。还值得注意的是弗兰兹·梅林、卡尔·马克思的经典传记：Geschichte seines Lebens（莱比锡，1918）；以及 D. Ryazanov、卡尔·马克思和弗里德里希·恩格斯（纽约，1927 年）。
Modern biographies include: Gerhard Zirke, Der General: Friedrich Engels, der erste Militärtheoretiker der Arbeiterklasse (Leipzig, 1957); Grace Carlton, Friedrich Engels: The Shadow Prophet (London, 1965; W. O. Henderson, Life of Friedrich Engels, 2 vols. (London, 1976). Among earlier works, the classic remains Gustav Mayer, Friedrich Engels: Eine Biographie (The Hague, 1934). For Engels's military activities in the late 1840s, see a recent German study: Heinz Helmert, Friedrich Engels: Adjutant der Revolution, 1848–49 (Leipzig, 1973). The best modern biography of Karl Marx, albeit hagiographic in places, is David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (New York, 1973). Other helpful works include: Jerrold Seigel, Marx's Fate: The Shape of a Life (Princeton, 1978); Fritz J. Raddatz, Karl Marx: A Political Biography, trans. Richard Barry (Boston, 1978); Arnold Kuenzli, Karl Marx: Eine Psychobiographie (Vienna, 1966). Also to be noted are the classic biographies of Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: Geschichte seines Lebens (Leipzig, 1918); and D. Ryazanov, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (New York, 1927).
过去二十年来，德语、俄语和英语著作都显示出人们对恩格斯著作中军事方面内容的重新关注。在德语方面，耶胡达·L·瓦拉赫在其著作《弗里德里希·恩格斯的战争理论》（法兰克福，1968年）中概述了恩格斯关于战争和军队的主要思想。沃尔夫拉姆·韦特在其著作《德国社会主义者的战争理论》（斯图加特，1971年）中论证了马克思和恩格斯为社会主义对和平与裁军运动的贡献奠定了基础。汉斯·佩尔格编辑了1970年恩格斯研讨会的论文集《弗里德里希·恩格斯 1820–1970：报告—讨论—文献》 （汉诺威，1971年）。 《军事史杂志》上的几篇文章也探讨了恩格斯的军事著作。德文的开创性著作是 August Happich, Friedrich Engels als Soldat der Revolution (Hessische Beiträge zur Staat und Wirtschaftskunde, 1931) 和 Ernst Drahn, Friedrich Engels als Kriegswissenschaftler (Kultur und Fortschritt , nos. 524, 525) 的著作。苏联研究恩格斯军事思想的专家是艾·巴宾。参见他的Formirovanie i razvitie voenno-teoreticheskikh vzgliadov F. Engel'sa （莫斯科，1975 年）和F. Engel 的早期研究：Vydaiushchiisia voennyi teoretik rabochego klassa （莫斯科，1970 年）。巴宾的最新作品包括大量用俄语出版的文章和书籍的参考书目。苏联军事史研究所召开了两届纪念马克思和恩格斯诞辰150周年的研讨会。研讨会论文集出版了两个版本，均附有两位革命家军事著作的注释索引：分别是《马克思与军事史》（莫斯科，1969年）和《恩格斯与军事史》 （莫斯科，1972年）。此前，英语世界尚无关于马克思和恩格斯军事思想的重要专著。马丁·伯格的著作《恩格斯、军队与革命》 （康涅狄格州哈姆登，1977年）填补了这一空白。伯格在书中还附有德文和英文著作的参考书目。 W.B.加利在其著作《和平与战争哲学家》 （剑桥大学出版社，1978年）中收录了一篇关于马克思和恩格斯的精辟文章。然而，这篇文章也存在一个在许多关于马克思和恩格斯的著述中都存在的通病：加利在文章开头将马克思和恩格斯描述为严谨的教条主义理论家，但随后却用了大量篇幅来批评他们未能达到他所宣称的水平。最后，伯纳德·塞梅尔在其著作《马克思主义与战争科学》（牛津大学出版社，1981年）中也探讨了马克思和恩格斯。
In the past twenty years, works in German, Russian, and English have signaled a new interest in the military aspects of Engels's writings. In German, Jehuda L. Wallach offers an outline of Engels's major ideas on war and armies in Die Kriegslehre von Friedrich Engels (Frankfurt a.M., 1968). Wolfram Wette, in Kriegstheorien deutscher Sozialisten (Stuttgart, 1971), argues that Marx and Engels laid the foundations for a socialist contribution to the peace and disarmament movements. Hans Pelger has edited the proceedings of a 1970 conference on Engels, Friedrich Engels 1820–1970: Referate—Diskussionen—Dokumente (Hanover, 1971). Several articles in the Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte also discuss Engels's military writings. The pioneering works in German are those of August Happich, Friedrich Engels als Soldat der Revolution (Hessische Beiträge zur Staat und Wirtschaftskunde, 1931) and Ernst Drahn, Friedrich Engels als Kriegswissenschaftler (Kultur und Fortschritt, nos. 524, 525). The Soviet specialist on Engels's military thought is A. I. Babin. See his Formirovanie i razvitie voenno-teoreticheskikh vzgliadov F. Engel'sa (Moscow, 1975) and an earlier study F. Engel's: Vydaiushchiisia voennyi teoretik rabochego klassa (Moscow, 1970). Babin's latest work includes an extensive bibliography of articles and books published in Russian. The Soviet Institute of Military History convened two conferences dedicated to the 150th anniversaries of the births of Marx and Engels. The articles presented at the conferences were published in two editions, which include annotated indices to the military writings of the two revolutionaries: Karl Marks i voennaia istoriia (Moscow, 1969), and Fridrikh Engel's i voennaia istoriia (Moscow, 1972). Until recently no major monograph on the military thinking of Marx and Engels existed in English. This gap has been filled with an interesting book by Martin Berger, Engels, Armies, and Revolution (Hamden, Conn., 1977). Berger includes a useful bibliography of works in Ger-man and English. W. B. Gallie includes an insightful essay on Marx and Engels in his book, Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge, 1978), which, however, suffers from a tendency that can be noted in much of the writing about Marx and Engels; at the outset Gallie describes Marx and Engels as rigorously dogmatic theorists, only to devote most of his essay to faulting them for failing to live up to his claims on their behalf. Finally, Bernard Semmel discusses Marx and Engels in his collection, Marxism and the Science of War (Oxford, 1981).
10.普鲁士-德国学派：莫尔特克与总参谋部的崛起*
10. THE PRUSSO-GERMAN SCHOOL: MOLTKE AND THE RISE OF THE GENERAL STAFF*
关于十九世纪普鲁士军队通史的文献浩如烟海，无法在此一一列举。任何对普鲁士军事立法的历史研究都必须从1806年后的军事改革经典著作入手，例如：马克斯·莱曼的《沙恩霍斯特》（莱比锡，1886-87年）；汉斯·德尔布吕克的《格奈森瑙战役》（第三版，柏林，1908年）；弗里德里希·迈内克的《博伊恩战役》（斯图加特，1896-99年）。在较新的著作中，可参见彼得·帕雷特的《约克与普鲁士改革时代》（普林斯顿，1966年）；以及同一作者的《克劳塞维茨与国家》（纽约和伦敦，1976年；普林斯顿，1985年重印）。关于这一时期的军事通史，可参考科尔马·弗朗西斯·马格努斯（Colmar Frh. Margnus）的著作。 von der Goltz, Kriegsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. Jahrhundert (柏林，1914)，以及 Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst (柏林，1928)第 5 卷。虽然这本书由埃米尔·丹尼尔斯（Emil Daniels）撰写，没有达到德尔布吕克之前四卷的水平，但它构成了一本有用的汇编。对 19 世纪战略的专业研究最好的介绍仍然是鲁道夫·冯·凯默勒 (Rudolf von Caemmerer) 的《Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert》（柏林，1904 年）。英文译本于 1905 年在伦敦出版。一篇关于现代战略的最新文章可以在军事词典Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften (1936) 中 T. von Schaefer 的文章“Kriegskunst”中找到，1:180-227。
The literature on the general history of the Prussian army during the nineteenth century is too large to be enumerated here. Any historical study of Prussian military legislation still has to start with the classics on the military reforms after 1806: Max Lehmann, Scharnhorst (Leipzig, 1886–87); Hans Delbrück, Gneisenau, 3d ed. (Berlin, 1908); Friedrich Meinecke, Boyen (Stuttgart, 1896–99). Among more recent works, see Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform (Princeton, 1966); and the same author's Clausewitz and the State (New York and London, 1976; repr. Princeton, 1985). For the general military history of the period, Colmar Frh. von der Goltz, Kriegsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1914), should be consulted as well as volume 5 of Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst (Berlin, 1928). Although this volume, written by Emil Daniels, does not reach the level of Delbrück's earlier four volumes, it constitutes a useful compilation. The best introduction to the specialized study of nineteenth-century strategy continues to be Rudolf von Caemmerer, Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1904). An English translation appeared in London in 1905. A more recent essay on modern strategy may be found in the article “Kriegskunst” by T. von Schaefer in the military dictionary Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften (1936), 1:180–227.
毛奇的著作在他死后被收集成两个大版本：Helmuth von Moltke、Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten，8 卷。 （柏林，1891-93）；和Militärische Werke，德国总参谋部编辑，13 卷。 （柏林，1892-1912）。这些版本不包含他关于 1871 年至 1890 年两线战争问题的备忘录。它们由 Ferdinand von Schmerfeld 编辑：H. Graf von Moltke，Die deutschen Aufmarschpläne 1971–1890：Forschungen und Darstellungen aus dem Reichsarchiv，vol. 7（柏林，1928 年）。 （彼得·拉索 (Peter Rassow) 的《Der Plan des Feldmarschalls Grafen Moltke für den Zweifronten-Krieg, 1871–1890 [Breslau, 1936] 》中有简短的分析和描述。）关于毛奇关于两条战线战争的思想的其他材料可以在德国关于第一次世界大战起源的出版物《Diegrosse Politik der europäischen》的第 6 卷中找到。内阁，1871-1914。德国总参谋部历史部门毛奇 ( Moltke in der Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Operationsen)编写的研究报告具有一定的文献价值，第 1 期。《Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften》第 37 条（柏林，1905 年）。
The writings of Moltke were collected after his death in two large editions: Helmuth von Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten, 8 vols. (Berlin, 1891–93); and Militärische Werke, edited by the German general staff, 13 vols. (Berlin, 1892–1912). These editions do not contain his memoranda on the problems of a two-front war during 1871–1890. They were edited by Ferdinand von Schmerfeld: H. Graf von Moltke, Die deutschen Aufmarschpläne 1971–1890: Forschungen und Darstellungen aus dem Reichsarchiv, vol. 7 (Berlin, 1928). (A brief analysis and description will be found in Peter Rassow, Der Plan des Feldmarschalls Grafen Moltke für den Zweifronten-Krieg, 1871–1890 [Breslau, 1936].) Additional material on Moltke's thought about the two-front war is to be found in volume 6 of the German publication on the origins of the First World War, Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914. Of some documentary value is the study prepared by the historical section of the German general staff, Moltke in der Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Operationen, no. 37 of Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften (Berlin, 1905).
为了研究毛奇的战略，应该查阅 1866 年和 1870-1871 年战争的军事史。对于理解毛奇的战略最有用的一般历史著作有 Heinrich Friedjung, Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft Deutschlands (Ist ed., Stuttgart, 1896; ioth ed., 1916) 和 Oscar von Lettow-Vorbeck, Geschichte des Krieges von 1866 in Deutschland (柏林, 1896–1902）。
For the study of Moltke's strategy the military histories of the wars of 1866 and 1870–1871 should be consulted. Among the general historical works most useful for the understanding of Moltke's strategy are Heinrich Friedjung, Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft Deutschlands (Ist ed., Stuttgart, 1896; ioth ed., 1916), and Oscar von Lettow-Vorbeck, Geschichte des Krieges von 1866 in Deutschland (Berlin, 1896–1902).
对毛奇战略的专著研究更为重要。其中，西吉斯蒙德·冯·施利希廷将军的专著《毛奇与贝内德克》（1900年）堪称现代战略史经典之作，应位列首位。施利希廷的这部著作是对弗里德容历史著作中军事章节的批判，它通过对军事和战略问题的历史性理解，对1866年的战胜者和战败者都做出了更为公正的历史评价。由此引发了一场旷日持久的辩论，弗里德容的后续版本对此进行了总结。相关文献中值得一提的书籍和文章包括：阿尔弗雷德·克劳斯的《毛奇、贝内德克与拿破仑》（维也纳，1901年）；汉斯·德尔布吕克的《“毛奇”：回忆录、随笔与论述》 （柏林，1902年）。 A. von Boguslawski，战略研究(1901)；雨果·冯·弗雷塔格-洛林霍芬，《Die Heerführung Napoleons in ihrer Bedeutung für unsere Zeit》（柏林，1910 年）。当然，特别令人感兴趣的是施利芬在他的坎尼文章中对毛奇策略的处理。请参阅下面论文 11 的参考文献。
The monographic studies of Moltke's strategy are even more important. First place should be given to General Sigismund von Schlichting's monograph Moltke und Benedek (1900), one of the classics of the history of modern strategy. Schlichting's study was written as a critique of the military chapters of Friedjung's historical work and, through its historical understanding of the military and strategic problems, arrived at a fairer historical judgment of both victors and vanquished of 1866. A long debate developed, which is summed up in later editions of Friedjung. In the literature the following books and articles should be noted: Alfred Krauss, Moltke, Benedek und Napoleon (Vienna, 1901); Hans Delbrück, “Moltke,” Erinnerungen, Aufsätze und Reden (Berlin, 1902); A. von Boguslawski, Strategische Erörterungen (1901); Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, Die Heerführung Napoleons in ihrer Bedeutung für unsere Zeit (Berlin, 1910). Of particular interest is, of course, Schlieffen's treatment of Moltke's strategy in his Cannae articles. See bibliographical note for essay 11, below.
铁路建设对现代战略的影响在E.A. Pratt的《战争与征服中的铁路力量崛起，1833-1914》（伦敦，1915年）和Dennis Showalter的《铁路与步枪》（康涅狄格州哈姆登，1975年）中均有论述。关于德国铁路作为战争手段的历史，可参阅H. von Staabs的《以1871 -1914年作战计划为基础向两线推进》（1925年）。他的继任者，德国总参谋部铁路部门负责人威廉·格罗纳，在普鲁士公共工程部编辑的《当代德国铁路》 （1923年新版）一书中，撰写了一篇关于1914年铁路动员的文章。从那时起，这个主题在第一次世界大战的德国官方历史中得到了充分的处理：Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg: Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen , vol. 1、Die Eisenbahnen zu Kriegsbeginn（柏林，1928 年）。
The impact of railroad building on modern strategy is treated by E. A. Pratt, The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833–1914 (London, 1915) and Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles (Hamden, Conn., 1975). For the history of the German railroads as means of warfare see H. von Staabs, Aufmarsch nach zwei Fronten, auf Grund der Operationspläne von 1871–1914 (1925). His successor as chief of the railroad section of the German general staff, Wilhelm Groener, contributed an article on the railroad mobilization in 1914 to the work Die deutschen Eisenbahnen der Gegenwart, ed. Prussian Ministry of Public Works (new ed. 1923). Since then the subject has received a full treatment in the official German history of the First World War: Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg: Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, vol. 1, Die Eisenbahnen zu Kriegsbeginn (Berlin, 1928).
许多研究都涉及政治与战略之间的关系。可以提及以下内容：Wilhelm von Blume，“政治与战略：俾斯麦与毛奇”，Preussische Jahrbücher 111 (1903)；威廉·布施，《俾斯麦与毛奇》（1916）；汉斯·冯·哈夫滕 (Hans von Haeften)，《俾斯麦与毛奇》，Preussische Jahrbücher 177 (1919)；保罗·施密特纳（Paul Schmitthenner），《新历史中的政治与战争》（汉堡，1937 年）。
A good many studies deal with the relationship between politics and strategy. The following may be mentioned: Wilhelm von Blume, “Politik und Strategie: Bismarck und Moltke,” Preussische Jahrbücher 111 (1903); Wilhelm Busch, Bismarck und Moltke (1916); Hans von Haeften, “Bismarck und Moltke,” Preussische Jahrbücher 177 (1919); Paul Schmitthenner, Politik und Kriegsführung in der neuesten Geschichte (Hamburg, 1937).
11. M ·奥尔特克、施利芬与战略发展学说*
11. MOLTKE, SCHLIEFFEN, AND THE DOCTRINE OF STRATEGIC ENVELOPMENT*
哈约·霍尔本的书目注释概述了20世纪40年代初之前出版的关于普鲁士-德国陆战学派的大量文献。此后，又涌现出大量其他著作。虽然没有关于老毛奇的新文献资料，但施利芬著名的1905年12月备忘录的文本，连同早期草稿和后来的修订稿，都收录在格哈德·里特所著的《施利芬计划》（伦敦，1958年）中。此外，埃伯哈德·凯塞尔编辑了施利芬的信件集（哥廷根，1958年），并由编辑撰写了重要的导言。毛奇和施利芬的官方著作选段收录在格哈德·帕普克和汉斯·迈尔-韦尔克撰写的章节中，这些章节收录在维尔纳·哈尔韦格主编的《战争艺术经典》（达姆施塔特，1960年）中。
Hajo Holborn's bibliographical note surveyed the extensive literature on the Prusso-German school of land warfare published up to the early 1940s. Since then a considerable number of additional works have appeared. While there has been no new documentary material on Moltke the Elder, the text of Schlieffen's famous December 1905 memorandum, together with earlier drafts and later revisions, was published in Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan (London, 1958). In addition, Eberhard Kessel edited a collection of Schlieffen's Briefe (Göttingen, 1958) with an important introduction by the editor, and selections from Moltke's and Schlieffen's official writing can be found in the chapters by Gerhard Papke and Hans Meier-Welker in Klassiker der Kriegskunst, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Darmstadt, 1960).
施利芬去世后不久，他发表的文章和公开演讲被汇编成书，书名为《阿尔弗雷德·冯·施利芬伯爵文集》，共两卷（柏林，1913年）。1925年，该文集的节选版以《坎尼战役》为题出版。这两个版本的主要内容都是施利芬专门研究从坎尼到色当的包围战的系列文章。1931年，堪萨斯州莱文沃思堡出版了《坎尼战役》文章的英文节选译本。施利芬著作中最重要的补充收录于1937年由德国总参谋部开始编纂的豪华版官方文集：《陆军总参谋长施利芬元帅文集》。今天施利芬计划的最佳历史资料仍然是汉斯·冯·屈尔 (Hans von Kühl)，《德国总参谋部》，《Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Weltkrieges》，第 2版。 （柏林，1920）；沃尔夫冈·福斯特（Wolfgang Foerster），施利芬伯爵和世界战争（柏林，1921 年）；德国官方第一次世界大战历史：Reichsarchiv，Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918，14卷。 （柏林，1925–44）； Rüdt von Collenberg，“Graf Schlieffen und die deutsche Mobilmachung”，Wissen und Wehr (1927)；沃尔夫冈·福斯特 (Wolfgang Foerster)，《Aus der Gedankenwerkstatt des 德国将军》（柏林，1931 年）。
Shortly after Schlieffen's death his published articles and public speeches were collected under the title: Graf Alfred von Schlieffen, Gesammelte Schriften, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1913). An abbreviated edition of these collected writings appeared in 1925 under the title Cannae. The bulk of both editions is formed by the series of studies that Schlieffen devoted to the encirclement battles from Cannae to Sedan. An abbreviated English translation of the Cannae articles was published in 1931 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The most important addition to the writings of Schlieffen is contained in the luxurious edition of his official writings started by the German general staff in 1937: Dienstschriften des Chefs des Generalstabes der Armee, Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Schlieffen. The best historical sources for the Schlieffen plan today are still Hans von Kühl, Der deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Weltkrieges, 2d ed. (Berlin, 1920); Wolfgang Foerster, Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1921); the official German history of the First World War: Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918, 14 vols. (Berlin, 1925–44); Rüdt von Collenberg, “Graf Schlieffen und die deutsche Mobilmachung,” Wissen und Wehr (1927); Wolfgang Foerster, Aus der Gedankenwerkstatt des deutschen Generalstabes (Berlin, 1931).
对施利芬战略思想的探讨贯穿了所有现代德国战略著作，犹如一条主线。它在德国对第一次世界大战作战的批判中扮演着至关重要的角色。除了汉斯·冯·库尔和沃尔夫冈·福斯特的上述研究，以及主要由汉斯·冯·哈夫滕将军指导撰写的德国官方第一次世界大战史之外，威廉·格罗纳将军的著作也堪称杰作。格罗纳将军于1914年担任总参谋部铁路部门负责人，并于1918年秋季接替鲁登道夫。作为共和国时期的陆军部长，他成为现代德国军队及其战略的主要奠基人之一。他的《施利芬伯爵遗嘱》（柏林，1927年）是对施利芬研究最为杰出和深刻的著作。格罗纳后来又出版了《意志远大的元帅》（柏林，1931年），对年轻的毛奇的战略进行了研究。施利芬在德国军界几乎享有普遍的崇敬。1938年《军事科学评论》（Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau ）的一期特刊便很好地体现了这一点，该特刊题为《冯·佐尔纳中将：施利芬的功绩》（Lieutenant General von Zoellner, Schlieffens Vermächtnis）。 1914年以前施利芬的主要对手弗里德里希·冯·伯恩哈迪将军并未赢得多少追随者。然而，有一种军事思想流派认为老毛奇比施利芬更胜一筹，他们要么批评施利芬作战方案的僵化，要么推荐毛奇提出的东线进攻方案，认为这是解决两线作战困境的更佳方案。这一流派的代表人物可能是E·布赫芬克将军。参见他发表于《历史杂志》（Historische Zeitschrift ）158期（1938年）的文章《毛奇与施利芬》（Moltke und Schlieffen）。鲁登道夫本人在《德国国防军》 （1930 年）的一篇文章中为小毛奇修改施利芬计划辩护。
The discussion of Schlieffen's strategic ideas runs like a red thread through all modern German books on strategy. It plays the greatest part in the German critique of the operations of the First World War. In addition to the above-mentioned studies by Hans von Kuhl and Wolfgang Foerster and the official German history of the First World War, which was written chiefly under the direction of General Hans von Haeften, the outstanding work came from the pen of General Wilhelm Groener, who was chief of the railroad section of the general staff in 1914, and succeeded Ludendorff in the fall of 1918. As minister of war under the Republic he became one of the chief fathers of the modern German army and its strategy. His Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen (Berlin, 1927) is the most distinguished and profound study of Schlieffen. Groener supplemented it later with his Der Feldherr wider Willen (Berlin, 1931), a study of the strategy of the younger Moltke. The veneration enjoyed by Schlieffen in German military circles is almost general. A good expression of it is found in a special issue of the Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau in 1938: Lieutenant General von Zoellner, Schlieffens Vermächtnis. The chief opponent of Schlieffen before 1914, General Friedrich von Bernhardi, failed to attract many followers. However, there has been a school of military thought that placed Moltke the Elder above Schlieffen, criticizing either the rigidity of Schlieffen's operational schemes or recommending Moltke's idea of an offensive in the east as the better solution of the two-front war. The best representative of this school is probably General E. Buchfinck. See his article “Moltke und Schlieffen,” Historische Zeitschrift 158 (1938). Ludendorff himself defended the change of the Schlieffen plan by the younger Moltke in an article in Deutsche Wehr (1930).
JV 布雷特的《比利时中立国与施利芬战争计划》（Die belgische Neutralität und der Schlieffensche Feldzugplan，1919 年）是 1914 年之前德国军事和政治界处理比利时问题的主要资料来源。德国第一次世界大战官方历史的专卷显示了施利芬现代战争概念对德国经济和金融准备工作的影响：《国家档案》、《世界战争》、战争与战争，卷。 1 卷。 1、附件。
J. V. Bredt, Die belgische Neutralität und der Schlieffensche Feldzugplan (1919), is the chief source for the treatment of the Belgian question in German military and political circles before 1914. Special volumes of the official German history of the First World War show the influence of Schlieffen's concept of modern war upon the economic and financial preparations in Germany: Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, Kriegsrüstung und Kriegswirtschaft, vol. 1 and vol. 1, Annexes.
人们对士兵与国家的关系，特别是总参谋长与政治当局之间的关系，表现出浓厚的兴趣。主要著作包括鲁道夫·施塔德尔曼的《毛奇与国家》（克雷费尔德，1950年）；格哈德·里特的《剑与权杖》，共4卷（佛罗里达州科勒尔盖布尔斯，1969-1973年）；以及戈登·A·克雷格的《普鲁士军队政治，1640-194年》（纽约，1964年）。雅克·贝努瓦-梅钦的《德国军队史》 ，共10卷（巴黎，1938-1964年），也提供了一些有用的信息，但由于作者的极右翼观点，其整体分析存在缺陷。目前已有不少关于普鲁士总参谋部的专著。这些著作包括沃尔特·格尔利茨的《德国总参谋部史》（纽约，1953年），尽管该译本省略了原著《德意志总参谋部》（法兰克福，1951年）的部分内容。维根德·施密特-里希贝格的《1871-1945年德国总参谋部》（斯图加特，1962年）则更为专业，但涵盖范围有限。对施利芬著作的研究可参见赫伯特·罗辛斯基的《从沙恩霍斯特到施利芬：德国军事思想的兴衰》，载《美国海军战争学院评论》第29卷（1976年），第83-103页；赫尔穆特·奥托的《施利芬与总参谋部》（东柏林，1966年）；以及N·T·察列夫的《从施利芬到金登堡》（莫斯科，1946年）。后两部作品都带有强烈的意识形态倾向。关于瓦尔德塞的新出版物只有埃伯哈德·凯塞尔的重要文章《瓦尔德塞伯爵作为军需官和总参谋长的职责》（“Die Tätigkeit des Grafen Waldersee als Quartiermeister und Chef des Generalstabes der Armes”，载于《世界史》第15卷（1954年），第181-210页）。美国最新的相关研究是特雷弗·N·杜普伊的《战争天才：德国陆军与总参谋部，1807-1945》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德崖，1977年），该书既涉及人物也涉及作战理论。但该书并非基于新的研究，而是反映了美国陆军参谋院校多年来普遍存在的对德国方法和教条的不加批判的推崇。
Much interest has been shown in the relations between the soldiers and the state, especially between the chief of the general staff and the political authorities. Major works include Rudolf Stadelmann, Moltke und der Staat (Krefeld, 1950); Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, 4 vols. (Coral Gables, Fla., 1969–73), and Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–194; (New York, 1964). Some useful information can be found in Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Histoire de l'armée allemagne, 10 vols. (Paris, 1938–64), though the overall analysis is flawed by the author's extreme right-wing perceptions. There now exist a number of special studies of the Prussian general staff. These include Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (New York, 1953), though the translation omits sections of the original, Der deutsche Generalstab (Frankfurt a.M., 1951). Wiegand Schmidt-Richberg, Die Generalstäbe in Deutschland 1871–1945 (Stuttgart, 1962), is more specialized and limited in coverage. Examinations of Schlieffen's work are provided by Herbert Rosinski, “Scharnhorst to Schlieffen: The Rise and Decline of German Military Thought,” U.S. Naval War College Review 29 (1976), 83–103; Helmut Otto, Schlieffen und der Generalstab (E. Berlin, 1966), and N. T. Tsarev, Ot Schlieffen do Gindenburga (Moscow, 1946). The latter two works display a strong ideological bent. The only new publication on Waldersee is the important article by Eberhard Kessel, “Die Tätigkeit des Grafen Waldersee als Quartiermeister und Chef des Generalstabes der Armes,” Die Welt als Geschichte 15 (1954), 181–210. The most recent American study, dealing with personalities as well as operational doctrine, is Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977). It is not based on new research and reflects the somewhat uncritical admiration of German methods and dogma common in U.S. Army staff schools for many years.
在操作方面，《军事原理》，卷。 Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt 的第 9 条，Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte（慕尼黑，1979 年）是不可或缺的。歼灭战理论的持续影响可以在 Jehuda L. Wallach, Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht (Frankfurt aM, 1967) 和 Edgar Röhricht, Probleme der Kesselschlacht dargestellt durch Einkreisungsoperationen im zweiten Weltkrieg (Karlsruhe, 1958) 中进行研究。 Eberhard Kessel, “Zur Genesis der Modernen Kriegslehre,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3 (1952), 405–23讨论了专门的主题； E. v. Kiliani，“Die Operationslehre des Grafen Schlieffen und ihre deutschen Gegner”，Wehrkunde 2 (1961)，71-76；和 E. Kaulbach，“Schlieffen-Zur Frage der Bedeutung und Wirkung Seiner Arbeit”，Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 13 (1963)，137-49。 Larry H. Addington 在其著作《闪电战时代与德国总参谋部 1865–1941》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克，1971 年）以及 Martin Van Creveld 的著作《战争补给：从瓦伦斯坦到巴顿的后勤》（剑桥，1977 年）的相关章节中，探讨了经常被忽视的后勤方面。
On the operational side, the Grundzüge der militärischen Kriegsführung, Vol. 9 of Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte (Munich, 1979), is indispensable. The continuing influence of the battle of annihilation doctrine can be studied in Jehuda L. Wallach, Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht (Frankfurt a.M., 1967), and in Edgar Röhricht, Probleme der Kesselschlacht dargestellt durch Einkreisungsoperationen im zweiten Weltkrieg (Karlsruhe, 1958). Specialized topics are addressed by Eberhard Kessel, “Zur Genesis der modernen Kriegslehre,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3 (1952), 405–23; E. v. Kiliani, “Die Operationslehre des Grafen Schlieffen und ihre deutschen Gegner,” Wehrkunde 2 (1961), 71–76; and E. Kaulbach, “Schlieffen—Zur Frage der Bedeutung und Wirkung Seiner Arbeit,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 13 (1963), 137–49. Often-neglected logistical aspects are treated in Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff 1865–1941 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1971) and in the relevant chapers of Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge, 1977).
Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “'Absoluter' und 'totaler' Krieg von Clausewitz zu Ludendorff,” Politische Viertelfahreszeitschrift 10 (1969), 220–48 提出了战略政治问题。克劳斯·E·克诺尔（Klaus E. Knorr），“四次欧洲战争中的战略惊喜”，载于《战略军事惊喜》，编辑。克劳斯·E·克诺尔和帕特里克·摩根（新泽西州不伦瑞克，1983 年），41–75； Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr.，《短期战争幻觉》（圣巴巴拉，1973 年）；罗伯特·E·哈卡维 (Robert E. Harkavy) 的《两线常规战争中的先发制人：1967 年以色列战略与第一次世界大战前德国施利芬计划的比较》（耶路撒冷，1977 年）。在保罗·M·肯尼迪主编的《大国的战争计划，1880-1914》 （伦敦，1979 年）中的几篇著名文章中讨论了战前计划；丹尼斯·肖沃尔特的《东线与德国军事计划，1871-1914：一些观察》，载《东欧季刊》第 15 卷（1981 年），第 163-180 页；以及诺曼·斯通的《毛奇-康拉德：奥匈帝国和德国总参谋部之间的关系，1909-1914》，载《历史杂志》第 9 卷（1966 年），第 201-228 页。
Strategic-political issues are raised among others by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “‘Absoluter’ und ‘totaler’ Krieg von Clausewitz zu Ludendorff,” Politische Viertelfahreszeitschrift 10 (1969), 220–48; Klaus E. Knorr, “Strategie Surprise in Four European Wars,” in Strategie Military Surprise, ed. Klaus E. Knorr and Patrick Morgan (Brunswick, N.J., 1983), 41–75; Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr., The Short-War Illusion (Santa Barbara, 1973); and in Robert E. Harkavy, Preemption in a Two-Front Conventional War: A Comparison of the 1967 Israeli Strategy with the Pre-World War I German Schlieffen Plan (Jerusalem, 1977). Prewar planning is discussed in several notable essays in The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914, ed. Paul M. Kennedy (London, 1979); Dennis Showalter, “The Eastern Front and German Military Planning, 1871–1914: Some Observations,” East European Quarterly 15 (1981), 163–80; and Norman Stone, “Moltke-Conrad: Relations between the Austro-Hungarian and German General Staffs, 1909–1914,” The Historical Journal 9 (1966), 201–28.
尽管埃伯哈德·凯塞尔的《毛奇》（斯图加特，1957年）略带颂扬色彩，但它是一部非常精深的著作，如今已成为标准的传记。目前尚无关于施利芬的完整传记。弗里德里希·冯·博蒂歇尔的《施利芬》（哥廷根，1957年）篇幅虽短，但内容翔实。另见尤金·比尔歇尔和沃尔特·博德合著的《施利芬：人与思想》 （苏黎世，1937年）。小毛奇几乎完全被忽视。科雷利·巴内特的《持剑者》（纽约，1963年）中题为“悲剧的错觉：赫尔穆特·约翰内斯·路德维希·冯·毛奇上将”的长篇章节文笔流畅，但鲜有新意。戈登·A·克雷格的《柯尼格雷茨战役》（费城，1964 年）和迈克尔·霍华德的《普法战争》（纽约，1961 年）都是对老毛奇两大胜利的重新诠释。
Although somewhat hagiographic, Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart, 1957), is a work of great sophistication and now the standard biography. There still is no full biography of Schlieffen. Friedrich v. Boetticher, Schlieffen (Göttingen, 1957), is brief, but informative. See also Eugen Bircher and Walter Bode, Schlieffen: Mann und Idee (Zurich, 1937). Moltke the Younger remains almost completely neglected. The long chapter, “The Tragic Delusion: Colonel General Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke,” in Correlli Barnett, The Sword Bearers (New York, 1963), is well written but contains little that is new. Both Gordon A. Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz (Philadelphia, 1964) and Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (New York, 1961) are reinterpretations of the elder Moltke's two major triumphs.
12.德尔布吕克：军事史学家
12. DELBRÜCK: THE MILITARY HISTORIAN
德尔布吕克的第一部主要作品是《Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neidhardt von Gneisenau》（柏林，1882 年）。这部作品自首次出版以来已经经历了四个版本，仍然是普鲁士将军的标准传记。在《德国战争与勃艮第战争：两支联合作战研究》（Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege：Zwei kombinierte kriegsgeschichtliche Studien，柏林，1887）中，德尔布吕克首先明确概述了他研究军事历史的方法以及重建单一战役重要性的概念。他的战略理论的早期全面介绍可以在《Die Strategie des Perikles erläutert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen: Mit einem Anhang über Thucydides und Kleon》（柏林，1890）中找到；以及弗里德里希、拿破仑、毛奇（柏林，1892 年）。
Delbrück's first major work was Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neidhardt von Gneisenau (Berlin, 1882). This work, which has gone through four editions since its initial publication, remains the standard biography of the Prussian general. In Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege: Zwei kombinierte kriegsgeschichtliche Studien (Berlin, 1887), Delbrück first clearly outlined his method of approaching military history and his conception of the importance of reconstructing single battles. Early full-scale presentations of his strategical theories will be found in Die Strategie des Perikles erläutert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen: Mit einem Anhang über Thucydides und Kleon (Berlin, 1890); and Friedrich, Napoleon, Moltke (Berlin, 1892).
《战争艺术史及其政治框架》（Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte）第一卷出版于1900年；第二卷出版于1902年；第三卷和第四卷分别出版于1907年和1920年。前两卷的第二版（柏林，1908年）和第一卷的第三版（柏林，1920年）增加了注释和对批评者的回应，但除此之外内容未作改动。该书第四卷是德尔布吕克撰写的最后一卷，以解放战争的记述结尾。这部著作由埃米尔·丹尼尔斯继续完成。第五卷和第六卷涵盖了克里米亚战争和普法战争之间的时期，分别于 1928 年和 1932 年出版。1936 年，第七卷出版，讨论了美国内战、布尔战争和日俄战争，由丹尼尔斯和奥托·海因茨共同撰写。
The first volume of the Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte appeared in 1900; the second in 1902; and the third and fourth in 1907 and 1920 respectively. A second edition of the first two volumes (Berlin, 1908) and a third edition of the first volume (Berlin, 1920) contain additional notes and answers to critics but are otherwise unchanged. The fourth volume of the Geschichte, the last that Delbrück wrote, ends with an account of the wars of Liberation. The work was continued by Emil Daniels; the fifth and sixth volumes, covering the period between the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars, appearing in 1928 and 1932. In 1936, a seventh volume, which discusses the American Civil War and the Boer and Russo-Japanese wars, was published under the joint authorship of Daniels and Otto Haintz.
汉斯·德尔布吕克，《历史中的数字》（伦敦，1913 年）是这位历史学家 1913 年在伦敦大学发表的两场讲座的重印本。本书以简明扼要的篇幅，用德尔布吕克自己的话语，概述了《战争艺术史》的前三卷，并概述了其主要主题。
Hans Delbrück, Numbers in History (London, 1913) is a reprint of two lectures delivered by the historian at the University of London in 1913. This volume, in brief compass and in Delbrück's own words, surveys the first three volumes of the Geschichte der Kriegskunst and outlines the main themes.
德尔布吕克较短的军事著作散布在《普鲁士年鉴》和其他出版物中。然而，德尔布吕克本人认为最重要的是四本文章集。《Historische und politische Aufsätze》（柏林，1886 年；第 2 版，1907 年）包含一篇重要的文章，“Uber die Verschiedenheit der Strategie Friedrichs und Napoleons”。Erinnerungen, Aufsätze und Reden（柏林，1902 年；第 3 版，1905 年）除了一篇关于毛奇的著名文章外，还包括一篇关于 1864 年丹麦战争中总参谋部工作的文章。德尔布吕克的第一次世界大战著作收录在三卷《Krieg und Politik》（柏林，1917-19 年）中。最终集于 1926 年出版，标题为“Vor und nach dem Weltkrieg”，其中包括德尔布吕克在 1902-1914 年和 1919-1925 年期间最重要的文章。
Delbrück's shorter military writings are scattered through the pages of the Preussische Jahrbücher and other publications. There are, however, four collections of the articles that Delbrück himself considered most important. Historische und politische Aufsätze (Berlin, 1886; 2d ed., 1907) contains an important essay, “Uber die Verschiedenheit der Strategie Friedrichs und Napoleons.” Erinnerungen, Aufsätze und Reden (Berlin, 1902; 3d ed., 1905) includes an article on the work of the general staff in the Danish War of 1864, in addition to a notable essay on Moltke. Delbrück's First World War writings have been collected in the three volumes of Krieg und Politik (Berlin, 1917–19). A final collection appeared in 1926 under the title Vor und nach dem Weltkrieg and includes Delbrück's most important articles for the periods 1902–1914 and 1919–1925.
关于德尔布吕克在第一次世界大战期间的立场，请参阅上面引用的收藏，以及小册子Bismarcks Erbe（柏林，1915 年），这可能是他对与盟军谈判和平最热情的呼吁。德尔布吕克对鲁登道夫 1918 年战略的精辟批评发表在Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Deutschen Verfassunggebenden Nationalversammlung und des Deutschen Reichstages 1919–1926: Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918 (Vierte Reihe) 《Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses》（柏林，1925 年），3：239–373。德尔布吕克的证词选集也可在 RH Lutz 编辑的《1918 年德国崩溃的原因》一书中找到，该书由胡佛战争图书馆出版，编号 4（斯坦福，1934 年）。
For Delbrück's position during the First World War, see the collections cited above, and also the pamphlet Bismarcks Erbe (Berlin, 1915), which is perhaps his most impassioned plea for a negotiated peace with the Allies. Delbrück's masterly critique of Ludendorff's strategy in 1918 is printed in Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Deutschen Verfassunggebenden Nationalversammlung und des Deutschen Reichstages 1919–1926: Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918 (Vierte Reihe im Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses) (Berlin, 1925), 3:239–373. Selections from Delbrück's testimony will be found also in The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918, ed. R. H. Lutz, Hoover War Library Publications, no. 4 (Stanford, 1934).
德尔布吕克对战争的许多事后思考仅以小册子的形式存在。参见，例如，Ludendorff、Tirpitz、Falkenhayn (柏林，1920)；Ludendorffs Selbstporträt （柏林，1922 年），对 Ludendorff 的Kriegführung und Politik （柏林，1922 年）的回答；考茨基和哈登（柏林，1920 年）；和Der Stand der Kriegsschuldfrage（柏林，1925 年）。最后两部作品主要关注战争罪的问题。
Many of Delbrück's afterthoughts on the war exist only in pamphlet form. See, for example, Ludendorff, Tirpitz, Falkenhayn (Berlin, 1920); Ludendorffs Selbstporträt (Berlin, 1922), an answer to Ludendorff's Kriegführung und Politik (Berlin, 1922); Kautsky und Harden (Berlin, 1920); and Der Stand der Kriegsschuldfrage (Berlin, 1925). The last two works are largely concerned with the question of war guilt.
即使对德尔布吕克的著作进行不完整的列举，也必须包括他的《政府与人民意志》（柏林，1914年），这是一系列关于帝国政府和宪法的讲稿；以及他的五卷本《世界史》（柏林，1924-1928年）。前一部著作已被罗伊·S·麦克尔维翻译成英文，书名为《政府与人民的意志》（纽约，1923年）。
Even an incomplete listing of Delbrück's works must also include his Regierung und Volkswille (Berlin, 1914), a series of lectures on the imperial government and constitution; and his five-volume Weltgeschichte (Berlin, 1924–28). The former work has been translated into English by Roy S. MacElwee under the title Government and the Will of the People (New York, 1923).
德尔布吕克的完整传记尚未撰写。有关传记详细信息，请参阅《 Geschichte der Kriegskunst》第 1 卷和第 4 卷的介绍以及《Krieg und Politik》的尾声；另请参见 Johannes Ziekursch 的《Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch》（柏林，1929 年）和 Friedrich Meinecke 的Historische Zeitschrift 140 (1929), 703。 Richard H. Bauer 在《现代欧洲的一些历史学家》中的文章，编辑。 Bernadotte Schmitt（芝加哥，1942 年），100-127，仔细记述了德尔布吕克的生活和工作，尽管德尔布吕克的军事著作仅以一般方式对待。 FJ 施密特、康拉德·莫林斯基和齐格弗里德·梅特在《汉斯·德尔布吕克：历史学家与政治家》（柏林，1928 年）中讨论了德尔布吕克著作的哲学基础以及他作为历史学家和政治家的重要性。历史学家的政治和军事思想在《Am Webstuhl der Zeit: Eine Erinnerungsgabe Hans Delbrück dem Achtzigjährigen von Freunden und Schülern dargebracht》（柏林，1928 年）中也得到了充分的阐述，这是埃米尔·丹尼尔斯、保罗·罗尔巴赫、格罗纳将军和布赫芬克将军等人的论文集。另见 Arthur Rosenberg，“Hans Delbrück，der Kritiker der Kriegsgeschichte”，Die Gesellschaft (1921)，245；弗朗茨·梅林，《战争史》，《新时代》，《Ergänzungsheft》，第 1 期。 4（1908 年 10 月 16 日）；和 V. Marcu，《我们时代的人与力量》，译。 Eden 和 Cedar Paul（纽约，1931 年），201ff。
No full-scale biography of Delbrück has yet been written. For biographical details, consult the introductions to volumes 1 and 4 of the Geschichte der Kriegskunst and the epilogue to Krieg und Politik; and see also Johannes Ziekursch in Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch (Berlin, 1929) and Friedrich Meinecke in Historische Zeitschrift 140 (1929), 703. Richard H. Bauer's article in Some Historians of Modern Europe, ed. Bernadotte Schmitt (Chicago, 1942), 100–127, is a careful account of Delbrücks life and work although Delbrück's military writings are treated only in a general manner. F. J. Schmidt, Konrad Molinski, and Siegfried Mette in Hans Delbrück: Der Historiker und Politiker (Berlin, 1928) discuss the philosophical basis of Delbrück's writings and his importance as a historian and a politician. The historian's political and military ideas are also treated fully in Am Webstuhl der Zeit: Eine Erinnerungsgabe Hans Delbrück dem Achtzigjährigen von Freunden und Schülern dargebracht (Berlin, 1928), a collection of essays by Emil Daniels, Paul Rohrbach, Generals Groener and Buchfinck, and others. See also Arthur Rosenberg, “Hans Delbrück, der Kritiker der Kriegsgeschichte,” Die Gesellschaft (1921), 245; Franz Mehring, “Eine Geschichte der Kriegskunst,” Die Neue Zeit, Ergänzungsheft, no. 4 (October 16, 1908); and V. Marcu, Men and Forces of Our Time, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York, 1931), 201ff.
德尔布吕克的战略理论引发了大量有争议的文献。 1920 年之前出现的最重要的文章列于Geschichte der Kriegskunst , 4:439–44。对魏玛时期德尔布吕克战略概念最全面的评价是 Otto Hintze, “Delbrück, Clausewitz und die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen,” Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte 33 (1920), 131–77。
Delbrück's strategical theories gave rise to a flood of controversial literature. The most important articles appearing before 1920 are listed in Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 4:439–44. The most thorough appraisal of Delbrück's strategical concepts during the Weimar period was Otto Hintze, “Delbrück, Clausewitz und die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen,” Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte 33 (1920), 131–77.
1945 年之后，人们对德尔布吕克的战略和政治著作重新产生了兴趣。《战争史》第四卷于 1962 年在柏林重印，前三卷于 1964 年重印。小沃尔特·J·伦弗罗 (Walter J. Renfroe, Jr.) 的英文翻译正在进行中：《政治史框架内的战争艺术史》（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特，1975 年-）。关于德尔布吕克的政治活动，以下内容值得参考：A. Harnack, “Hans Delbrück als Historiker und Politiker,” Neue Rundschau 63 (1952), 408–26;彼得·拉索 (Peter Rassow)，“汉斯·德尔布吕克 (Hans Delbrück) 作为历史学家和政治家”，Die Sammlung 4 (1949)，134-44； Anneliese Thimme, Hans Delbrück als Kritiker der wilhelminischen Epoche (杜塞尔多夫, 1955)，这是关于这个主题的最好的著作。德尔布吕克的政治活动在 K. Schwabe, Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral: Die deutschen Hochschullehrer und die politischen Grundfragen des Ersten Weltkrieges (Göttingen, 1965) 中也得到了适当的关注。安德烈亚斯·希尔格鲁伯 (Andreas Hillgruber) 在《德国历史学家》编辑的文章中对他作为历史学家的地位进行了很好的评价。汉斯·乌尔里希·韦勒 (Hans-Ulrich Wehler)，IV（哥廷根，1972 年），40–52。 Arden Bucholz，《汉斯·德尔布吕克与德国军事机构》（爱荷华城，1985 年）描述了德尔布吕克的战争观与总参谋部历史学家的战争观之间的冲突，以及这种冲突如何受到现实世界事件的影响。
After 1945, there was renewed interest in Delbrück's strategical and political writings. The fourth volume of the Kriegskunst was reprinted in Berlin in 1962 and the first three in 1964. An English translation by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., is under way: History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, (Westport, Conn., 1975-). On Delbrück's political activities, the following are worth consulting: A. Harnack, “Hans Delbrück als Historiker und Politiker,” Neue Rundschau 63 (1952), 408–26; Peter Rassow, “Hans Delbrück als Historiker und Politiker,” Die Sammlung 4 (1949), 134–44; Anneliese Thimme, Hans Delbrück als Kritiker der wilhelminischen Epoche (Düsseldorf, 1955), which is the best work on this subject. Delbrück's political activities also receive appropriate attention in K. Schwabe, Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral: Die deutschen Hochschullehrer und die politischen Grundfragen des Ersten Weltkrieges (Göttingen, 1965). A good appraisal of his stature as a historian is Andreas Hillgruber's essay in Deutsche Historiker, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, IV (Göttingen, 1972), 40–52. Arden Bucholz, Hans Delbrück and the German Military Establishment (Iowa City, 1985) describes the conflict between Delbrück's views of war and those of the general staff historians and how it was influenced by events in the real world.
13.俄罗斯军事思想：西方模式与斯沃罗夫的影响
13. RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT: THE WESTERN MODEL AND THE SHADOW OF SUVOROV
沙俄军事史在现代西方学术界总体上鲜少受到关注，在苏联也好不到哪里去。因此，对此感兴趣的研究者主要依赖于革命前俄国关于当代军事问题和战争史的大量文献。遗憾的是，这些著作大多仅在少数西方大型图书馆有藏，而且当然都是俄文的。
Imperial Russian military history in general has received very little attention in modern Western scholarship and not a great deal more in the Soviet Union. The interested researcher must therefore rely primarily on the very extensive prerevolutionary Russian literature on current military problems and on the history of war. Unfortunately most of these works are available if at all in only a few major Western libraries and, of course, are in Russian.
在为数不多的西方研究俄罗斯军事事务的著作中，几乎没有一部专门探讨军事理论。唯一一部以西方语言撰写的关于俄罗斯军事思想的综合性研究是彼得·H·C·冯·瓦尔德（Peter HC Von Wahlde）的博士论文《帝国俄国的军事思想》（印第安纳大学，1966年），可惜这部论文非常出色，但可惜未能出版。除此之外，俄语文献也寥寥无几。G·P·梅谢里亚科夫（G.P. Meshcheriakov ）的《十九世纪的俄罗斯军事思想》（莫斯科，1973年）篇幅相对较短，意识形态色彩浓厚，且未讨论1899年以后出版的任何著作。苏联最多产的军事作家L·G·别斯克罗夫尼（L.G. Beskrovnyi）在理论方面著述甚少。他的资料汇编《19世纪和20世纪初的俄罗斯军事理论思想》（莫斯科，1960年）附有一篇导论。在《俄罗斯军事史资料论》（莫斯科，1957年）中，别斯克罗夫尼也收录了一些关于理论问题的简要章节。
Among the small number of Western studies dealing with Russian military affairs almost none is primarily devoted to military doctrine. The only general study of Russian military thought in a Western language is the excellent, but unfortunately unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Peter H. C. Von Wahlde, “Military Thought in Imperial Russia” (Indiana University, 1966). Not much more is available in Russian. G. P. Meshcheriakov, Russkaia voennaia mysl' v XIX v. (Russian military thought in the 19th century) (Moscow 1973) is relatively brief, highly ideological, and discusses nothing published after 1899. The most prolific of Soviet military writers, L. G. Beskrovnyi, has published little on theoretical matters. His useful collection of source material, Russkaia voenno-teoreticheskaia mysl' XIX i nachala XX vekov (Russian military-theoretical thought of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries) (Moscow, 1960), has an introductory essay. In Ocherkt po istochnikovedeniiu voennoi istorii Rossii (Essays on the sources for the military history of Russia) (Moscow 1957), Beskrovnyi includes relatively brief sections on theoretical matters.
主要军事思想家的著作在冯·瓦尔德的书目中均有列出，1900年以前则在梅谢里亚科夫的书目中列出。克里斯托弗·达菲的《俄罗斯的西进军事之路：俄罗斯军事力量的起源与本质，1700-1800》（伦敦，1981年）对18世纪的军事制度和重大战役进行了精彩的概述，但由于其涵盖范围有限，因此论述也较为简略。目前尚无类似的关于整个19世纪的综合性著作。约翰·谢尔顿·柯蒂斯的《尼古拉一世统治下的俄军，1825-1855》（达勒姆，1965年）虽然几乎没有涉及军事思想，但仍具有一定的参考价值。在众多伟大的俄罗斯统帅中，只有苏沃洛夫得到了令人满意的英文研究，即菲利普·朗沃思的《胜利的艺术：苏沃洛夫大元帅的生平与成就，1729-1800》（纽约，1965年）。库图佐夫和巴克莱·德·托利在迈克尔和戴安娜·乔塞尔森的《指挥官：巴克莱·德·托利的一生》（牛津，1980年）以及罗杰·帕金森的《北方之狐：库图佐夫，战争与和平的将军的一生》（伦敦，1976年）中都未得到令人满意的论述。关于苏沃洛夫和库图佐夫的苏联文献浩如烟海。关于伟大的改革家德米特里·米柳京，可参见福雷斯特·A·米勒的《德米特里·米柳京与俄国改革时代》（纳什维尔，1968年）以及罗伯特·F·鲍曼的《1870-1874年俄国普遍兵役制之争》（耶鲁大学博士论文，1982年）。
The works of the chief military thinkers are conveniently listed in the bibliographies of Von Wahlde and, to 1900, in Meshcheriakov. Christopher Duffy, Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700–1800 (London 1981) provides an excellent survey of both the institutions and the major campaigns of the eighteenth century, although its scope necessarily means that the treatment is summary. There is no similar general work for the nineteenth century as a whole. John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825–1855 (Durham, 1965) is useful although it has almost nothing on military thought. Of the great Russian commanders, only Suvorov has been the subject of a satisfactory English study, Philip Longworth, The Art of Victory: The Life and Achievements of Generalissimo Suvorov, 1729–1800 (New York, 1965). Kutuzov and Barclay de Tolly have received much less satisfactory treatment in Michael and Diana Josselson, The Commander: A Life of Barclay de Tolly (Oxford, 1980) and Roger Parkinson's very superficial The Fox of the North: The Life of Kutuzov, General of War and Peace (London, 1976). The Soviet literature on Suvorov and Kutuzov is extensive. On Dmitrii Miliutin the great reformer, see Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, 1968) and Robert F. Baumann, “The Debate over Universal Military Service in Russia, 1870–1874” (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1982).
近年来，一些西方学者开始关注俄罗斯军事史，但并非主要侧重于理论研究，其中以迪特里希·贝劳（Dietrich Beyrau）、约翰·L·H·基普（John L.H. Keep）、雅各布·基普（Jacob Kipp）和布鲁斯·门宁（Bruce Menning）最为著名。贝劳、基普和门宁主要研究陆军，基普则研究海军。沃尔特·M·平特纳（Walter M. Pintner）在其书目论文《俄罗斯军事（1700-1917）：社会与经济方面》（载于《历史趋势》第2卷第2期，1981年冬季）中讨论了他们截至1980年的文章。另可参阅门宁近期发表的《俄罗斯与西方：18世纪军事模式的问题》（载于A·G·克罗斯主编的《 18世纪的俄罗斯与西方》，马萨诸塞州牛顿维尔，1983年）；以及《G·A·波将金：启蒙时代的军人政治家》（载于国际军事史委员会《美国军事史学会会刊》第7期，华盛顿特区，1982年）。以及《18世纪俄罗斯军事创新》，载《战争与社会》第2卷第1期（1984年）。另见沃尔特·M·平特纳的《18世纪俄罗斯的军事风格、俄罗斯社会与俄罗斯权力》，载《18世纪的俄罗斯与西方》。除约翰·L·H·基普即将出版的著作《沙皇的士兵》外，另见其《罗曼诺夫王朝统治者的军事风格》，载《战争与社会》第1卷第2期（1983年）。迪特里希·贝劳的著作《革命前俄罗斯的军事与社会》（科隆，1984年）在本文撰写时尚未出版。
In recent years several Western scholars have turned their attention to Russian military history, although not primarily to theory, notably Dietrich Beyrau, John L. H. Keep, Jacob Kipp, and Bruce Menning. Beyrau, Keep, and Menning have written on the army and Kipp on the navy. Their articles through 1980 are discussed in the bibliographical essay by Walter M. Pintner, “The Russian Military (1700–1917): Social and Economic Aspects,” Trends in History 2, no. 2 (Winter 1981). Consult also Menning's more recent “Russia and the West: The Problem of 18th Century Military Models” in Russia and the West in the Eighteenth Century ed. A. G. Cross Newtonville, Mass., 1983); “G. A. Potemkin: Soldier Statesman of the Age of the Enlightenment,” International Commission on Military History, ACTA, no. 7 (Washington, D.C., 1982); and “Russian Military Innovation in the 18th Century,” War and Society 2, no. 1 (1984). See also Walter M. Pintner, “Russia's Military Style, Russian Society, and Russian Power in the Eighteenth Century,” in Russia and the West in the Eighteenth Century. In addition to John L. H. Keep's forthcoming book, Soldiers of the Tsar, see his “The Military Style of the Romanov Rulers,” War and Society 1, no. 2 (1983). Dietrich Beyrau's work, Militär und Gesellschaft im Vorrevolutionären Russland (Cologne, 1984) was not available when this essay was in preparation.
与更早的时期相比，旧政权最后五十年直至第一次世界大战爆发这段时期在现代文献中着墨较少。苏联时期最有价值的著作是LG Beskrovnyi的《19世纪的俄罗斯陆军和海军：俄罗斯的军事经济潜力》（莫斯科，1973年）和PA Zaionchkovskii的《19世纪末20世纪初的专制政权与俄罗斯军队，1881- 1903年》（莫斯科，1973年）。然而，这两部著作对军事思想的探讨都相对较少。关于第一次世界大战前夕的俄军，参见艾伦·K·怀尔德曼的《俄国帝国军队的终结：旧军队与士兵起义（1917年3月-4月）》（纽约，1975年）。关于战略计划和国际关系，参见A·M·扎伊翁奇科夫斯基的《俄罗斯向帝国主义战争进军》 （莫斯科，1926年）；杰克·斯奈德的《欧洲战争计划中的进攻崇拜，1870-1914》（伊萨卡，1984年）；诺曼·斯通的《东线战场，1914-1917》（伦敦和纽约，1975年）；以及D·C·B·列文的《俄罗斯与第一次世界大战的起源》（纽约，1983年）。
The last fifty years of the old regime almost until World War I are less well covered in the modern literature than are earlier periods. The most useful Soviet works are L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX veke: Voenno-ekonomicheskii potentsial Rossti (The Russian army and Navy in the 19th century: The military-economic potential of Russia) (Moscow, 1973) and P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletii, 1881–1903 (The autocracy and the Russian army at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, 1881–1903) (Moscow, 1973). Neither deals significantly with military thought. On the Russian army on the eve of the First World War see Allan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldier's Revolt (March-April, 1917) (New York, 1975). On strategic plans and international relations, see A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow, 1926); Jack Snyder, The Cult of the Offensive in European War Planning, 1870–1914 (Ithaca, 1984); Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (London and New York, 1975); and D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York, 1983).
14. BUGeaud、GALLIÉNI、L YAUTEY：法国殖民战争的发展
14. BUGEAUD, GALLIÉNI, LYAUTEY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH COLONIAL WARFARE
在法国三位主要的殖民地军人中，只有比若（Bugeaud）拥有客观的传记作者。安东尼·特拉尔·沙利文（Anthony Thrall Sullivan）的《托马斯-罗伯特·比若》（Thomas-Robert Bugeaud，康涅狄格州哈姆登，1983年）与其说是着重描写比若元帅对七月王朝统治下的法国的态度演变，不如说是着重描写他在阿尔及利亚的经历本身。然而，这本书的重要意义在于它揭示了非洲军团几乎从阿尔及利亚征服之初就感受到的疏离感。加列尼（Galliéni）和利奥泰（Lyautey）更多地是被英雄崇拜的对象，而非被客观研究的对象。目前还没有一部优秀的加列尼传记。他在A.S.卡尼亚-福斯特纳（A.S. Kanya-Forstner）的《征服西苏丹》（剑桥，1963年）一书中多次出现，而关于他的印度支那政策，则见于金·蒙霍兰德（Kim Munholland）的文章《“合作战略”与法国对东京的绥靖，1885-1897》（载于《历史杂志》第24卷第1期）。 3 (1981), 629–50。利奥泰吸引了众多传记作家，其中包括安德烈·莫洛亚的《利奥泰》（1931）和安德烈·勒雷韦朗的《利奥泰》（巴黎，1983）。利奥泰是一位魅力十足且极具说服力的法国帝国主义宣传家，这些作者大多透过他的视角来看待世界。利奥泰本人于1900年1月15日在《两世界评论》（Revue des deux mondes ）上发表的《论殖民军队的角色》（Du rôle colonial de l'Armée ）一文，对法国在东京的军事手段进行了充满想象力且理想化的描述，这篇文章的写作时间恰逢当年关于殖民军队法案的辩论。关于利奥泰在摩洛哥的军事手段的有效性，请参阅我本人的著作《征服摩洛哥》（纽约，1983）。
Of France's three major colonial soldiers, only Bugeaud has acquired an objective biographer. Anthony Thrall Sullivan's Thomas-Robert Bugeaud (Hamden, Conn., 1983) concentrates rather more on the evolution of the marshal's attitudes toward the France of the July Monarchy than on his Algerian experiences as such. However, the book is important in pointing up the alienation felt by the armée d'Afrique almost from the beginning of the Algerian conquest. Galliéni and Lyautey have been more the object of hero worship than objective study. No good biography of Galliéni exists. He appears with some frequency in A. S. Kanya-Forstner, Conquest of the Western Sudan (Cambridge, 1963) and, for his Indochinese policies, in the article by Kim Munholland, “‘Collaboration Strategy’ and the French Pacification of Tonkin, 1885–1897,” The Historical Journal 24, no. 3 (1981), 629–50. Lyautey has attracted a number of biographers including André Maurois, Lyautey (1931) and André le Révérend, Lyautey (Paris, 1983). Lyautey was a charming and plausible propagandist for French imperialism, and these authors look at the world very much through his eyes. Lyautey's own “Du rôle colonial de l'Armée” in the Revue des deux mondes of January 15, 1900, is an imaginative and idealized description of French methods in Tonkin, which was written to coincide with the debates on the colonial army bill of that year. For a corrective on the efficiency of Lyautey's methods in Morocco, see my own The Conquest of Morocco (New York, 1983).
对于法国而言，尚无与C.E. Callwell的《小规模战争》（伦敦，1896年）类似的著作。休·斯特拉坎在其著作《欧洲军队与战争行为》（伦敦和波士顿，1983年）中关于殖民战争的章节正是以此为基础。卡尼亚-福斯特纳对西苏丹的研究非常出色。他着重探讨了军民冲突以及殖民地士兵桀骜不驯、野心勃勃的性格，而非战役本身的战术方法。我自己的著作《征服摩洛哥》和《征服撒哈拉》（纽约，1984年）则考察了另外两个地区征服过程中的政治军事问题。罗斯·E·邓恩的《沙漠中的抵抗》（伦敦，1977年）是一部兼具人类学和历史学视角的著作，研究了征服时期阿尔及利亚-摩洛哥边境的部落。该书评估了法国渗透对部落凝聚力及其抵抗能力的影响。肯尼斯·J·珀金斯的《指挥官、上尉与殖民者》（纽约，1981年）探讨了北非各地对当地居民的不同军事管理方法。尽管该书对突尼斯、阿尔及利亚和摩洛哥军官采取的不同方法提出了一些有趣的见解，但其概括略显笼统，细节之处也存在争议。马克·米歇尔的《呼吁非洲》（巴黎，1982年）则秉承了法国国家论文的严谨性和权威性。他不仅考察了第一次世界大战期间殖民地军队的招募和使用情况，还揭示了殖民地军官对军队及其作战价值的诸多有趣看法。
No equivalent of C. E. Callwell's Small Wars (London, 1896), which forms the basis of Hew Strachan's chapter on colonial warfare in European Armies and the Conduct of War (London and Boston, 1983), exists for France. Kanya-Forstner is excellent for the Western Sudan. He concentrates on civil-military friction and upon the headstrong and ambitious character of colonial soldiers rather than on the methods of campaigning per se. My own books, The Conquest of Morocco and The Conquest of the Sahara (New York, 1984) examine the politico-military problems of conquest in two other regions. Ross E. Dunn, Resistance in the Desert (London, 1977) is a partly anthropological and partly historical study of the tribes on the Algero-Moroccan frontier at the time of conquest. It assesses the impact of French penetration on tribal cohesion and their ability to resist. Kenneth J. Perkins, Quaids, Captains, and Colons (New York, 1981) looks at the differing methods of military administration of the native populations in North Africa. Although it makes interesting points on the different approaches followed by officers in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, it is somewhat sweeping in its generalization and can be challenged in detail. Marc Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique (Paris, 1982) is written in the exhaustive and magisterial tradition of a French thèse d'état. He not only examines how colonial troops were recruited and employed during the Great War but reveals many interesting attitudes held by colonial officers toward their troops and their value in combat.
15.从起源到第一次世界大战的美国战略
15. AMERICAN STRATEGY FROM ITS BEGINNINGS THROUGH THE FIRST WORLD WAR
二战前美国的战略思想更多地体现在战争行动中，而非书面或口头表达。美国军事行动背后的思想通常只能从美国军事领导人的报告、信函和回忆录中零星的记载中提取，或者直接从行动本身推断。部分原因是1945年以前美国缺乏系统的战略著作，部分原因是此类著作出现较晚，人们对战略思想史的兴趣也自然是近期才出现的，因此，对美国战略思想史的研究才刚刚起步。
American strategic thought to the time of World War II expressed itself less in written and spoken form than in action, in the conduct of war. The thought behind American military actions must usually be extracted from scattered references in the reports, correspondence, and memoirs of American military leaders, or simply inferred from the actions themselves. Partly because there was thus a dearth of systematic American strategic writing before 1945 and partly because with such writing having developed only recently, historical interest in its background has naturally been only recent, the exploration of the history of American strategic thought is only beginning.
约翰·谢伊的《美国军事经验：历史与学习》（载于《跨学科历史杂志》第1卷，1971年冬季刊，第205-228页）对美国人对待战争的态度以及隐含的战略思想的历史进行了精彩的简要介绍。这篇文章与谢伊关于美国革命的多篇论文（其中一些也涉及战略）一起被收录于约翰·谢伊的著作《众多且武装的人民：美国独立战争军事斗争反思录》（纽约，1976年，第225-254页）。拉塞尔·F·韦格利的《美国战争之道：美国军事战略与政策史》（纽约和伦敦，1973年）是路易斯·莫顿主编的《麦克米伦美国战争史》中的一卷，比谢伊的著作更为全面，但在许多方面仍属于初步探索。
John Shy, “The American Military Experience: History and Learning,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1 (Winter 1971), 205–228, offers an excellent brief introduction to the history of American attitudes toward war and implicitly toward strategic thought. The essay is reprinted along with various of Shy's essays on the American Revolution, some of them also touching on strategy, in John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New York, 1976), 225–54. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York and London, 1973), a volume of The Macmillan Wars of the United States, Louis Morton, general editor, is a more comprehensive effort than Shy's but still in many ways a preliminary exploration.
19 世纪美国这类系统性的战略著作主要有三本书：亨利·瓦格·哈勒克的《军事艺术与科学要素》（纽约和费城，1846 年），该书后来出版了第三版，并附有关于墨西哥战争和克里米亚战争的评论（纽约和伦敦，1862 年）；丹尼斯·哈特·马汉的《关于部队先锋队、前哨和分遣队勤务的基本论述》（纽约，1847 年；修订版，纽约，1864 年），尽管书名暗示了对战术的重视，但该书也对战略进行了简要的探讨；以及约翰·比格洛上尉的《主要从美国战役中阐述的战略原则》（纽约和伦敦，1891 年；第二版，修订增补版，费城，1894 年；纽约，1968 年重印）。在第二次世界大战之前的军事回忆录中，最能清晰阐述作者战略构想的，不出所料是尤利西斯·S·格兰特将军和威廉·特库姆塞·谢尔曼将军的回忆录：《尤利西斯·S·格兰特个人回忆录》，2卷（纽约，1885-86年），以及《威廉·T·谢尔曼将军自传》，B·H·利德尔·哈特作序，2卷（纽约，1875年；重印，2卷合为1卷，布卢明顿，1957年）。
Such systematic strategic writing as there was in the United States in the nineteenth century exists mainly in three books: Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science…(New York and Philadelphia, 1846), which appeared in a third edition, with critical notes on the Mexican and Crimean Wars (New York and London, 1862); Dennis Hart Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops…(New York, 1847; rev. ed., New York, 1864), which offers brief considerations of strategy despite the heavily tactical emphasis implied by the title; and Captain John Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy Illustrated Mainly from American Campaigns (New York and London, 1891; 2d ed., rev. and enl., Philadelphia, 1894; repr. New York, 1968). Among military memoirs before World War II, those most articulately developing their authors' strategic conceptions are not surprisingly those of Generals Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 2 vols. (New York, 1885–86), and Memoirs of General William T. Sherman by Himself, foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart, 2 vols. (New York, 1875; repr., 2 vols, in 1, Bloomington, 1957).
历史学家对美国战略思想演变的认识主要来源于对特定战争史的研究；同样，重点也一直放在战略的运用上。直到最近，美国战争史作家才开始摆脱对战术和作战的过度关注，转而深入探讨战略及其背后的理念。戴夫·理查德·帕尔默的《狐狸之道：美国在独立战争中的战略，1775-1783》（军事史文集第8卷，康涅狄格州韦斯特波特和伦敦，1975年）至今仍是几乎唯一一部主要从战略视角评估美国战争史的著作。道格拉斯·索撒尔·弗里曼的《乔治·华盛顿传》第六卷《爱国者与总统》和第七卷《和平时期的第一人》（约翰·亚历山大·卡罗尔和玛丽·威尔斯·阿什沃思合著，纽约， 1948-1957年）虽然并非主要着眼于战略，但对于研究独立战争的战略而言，却是不可或缺的。
Historians' views of the evolution of American strategic thought have to be drawn largely from histories of particular wars; again, the emphasis has been on strategy in action. Only recently have American writers' histories of wars diverged from a preoccupation with tactics and operations to include considerations in depth of strategy and the conceptions shaping it. Dave Richard Palmer, The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America, 1775–1783, Contributions in Military History, no. 8 (Westport, Conn., and London, 1975) remains an almost unique effort to assess the history of an American war primarily from a strategic perspective. Indispensable on the strategy of the War of Independence although not mainly directed toward strategy is Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, vol. 6, Patriot and President, and vol. 7, First in Peace, by John Alexander Carroll and Mary Wells Ashworth (New York, 1948–57).
弗里曼对美国内战中南方邦联领导层的研究也开创性地将美国战争史的研究从战术和作战细节提升到战略层面，尽管弗里曼常常将战略与其他军事艺术层面混淆：道格拉斯·索撒尔·弗里曼，《罗伯特·E·李传》，4卷（纽约，1934年）和《李的副官：指挥研究》，3卷（纽约，1942-44年）。在联邦方面，与弗里曼的指挥研究最为接近的是肯尼斯·P·威廉姆斯，《林肯找到一位将军：内战军事研究》，5卷（纽约，1950-59年）。除了弗里曼的《李将军传》之外，没有哪部由美国人撰写的关于内战军事领导人的传记，在关注传主的战略构想方面，能与英国上校乔治·F·R·亨德森的《石墙杰克逊与美国内战》相媲美，该书由陆军元帅[加内特]沃尔斯利子爵作序，共2卷（伦敦和纽约，1898年；2卷合订本，纽约，1936年）。
Freeman's studies of Confederate leadership in the American Civil War also pioneered in raising American war history from tactical and operational details to strategic considerations, although Freeman often blurred strategy with other levels of the military art: Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: A Biography, 4 vols. (New York, 1934) and Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command, 3 vols. (New York, 1942–44). The closest approximation to Freeman's command studies on the Union side is Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War, 5 vols. (New York, 1950–59). Except for Freeman's Lee, no biography of a Civil War military leader written by an American can rival in concern for the subject's strategic conceptions the British colonel George F. R. Henderson's Stonewall Jackson and the American Civtl War, introduction by Field-Marshal [Garnet] Viscount Wolseley, 2 vols. (London and New York, 1898; 2 vols, in 1, New York, 1936).
在无数关于美国内战的历史著作中，值得注意的是，最关注战争战略的著作却是最新出版的之一：赫尔曼·哈塔韦和阿彻·琼斯合著的《北方如何取胜：美国内战军事史》（厄巴纳、芝加哥和伦敦，1983年）。阿彻·琼斯是美国军事史学家中的佼佼者，他对整个军队和战争史的了解可谓博大精深。他还参与撰写了另一部著作，其中包含了对欧洲战略思想对南方邦联军事领导人影响的最佳研究：托马斯·劳伦斯·康纳利和阿彻·琼斯合著的《指挥政治：南方邦联战略中的派系与理念》（巴吞鲁日，1973年）。
Among innumerable histories of the Civil War, it is significant that the one devoting most attention to the strategy of the war is among the most recent: Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1983). Archer Jones, outstanding among military historians of the United States for his knowledge of the entire history of armies and war, also contributed to a work that includes the best available study of the influence of European strategic thought on the military leaders of the Confederacy: Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones, The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy (Baton Rouge, 1973).
十九世纪美国战略研究匮乏的一个主要原因是，美国士兵当时主要忙于西部边境的维和任务，而非战争。因此，印第安边境问题分散了人们对战略的注意力。即便印第安战争确实构成了一些战略问题，但美国士兵往往倾向于将战略与欧洲战争传统视为密不可分，这种倾向常常使他们对摆在眼前问题的战略层面视而不见。关于印第安边境与美国军事思想之间关系的最佳论述，可见于罗伯特·M·尤特利的两部著作：《边境正规军：美国陆军与印第安人，1866-1891》（纽约和伦敦，1973年），载于路易斯·莫顿主编的《麦克米伦美国战争史》；以及《边疆对美国军事传统的贡献》，载于《美国边疆军事：第七届军事史研讨会论文集，美国空军学院，1976 年 9 月 30 日至 10 月 1 日》，詹姆斯·P·泰特编辑（华盛顿特区，1978 年），第 3-13 页。
A major reason for the paucity of American strategic studies in the nineteenth century was the need for American soldiers to concern themselves largely with their duties on the western frontier, which involved more peace-keeping constabulary work than war making. Therefore the Indian frontier diverted attention from strategy. To the extent that the Indian wars did pose strategic problems, a tendency of American soldiers to regard strategy as inseparable from the European tradition of warfare often strangely blinded them to the strategic dimensions of the issues before them. The best considerations of the relationship between the Indian frontier and American military thought are to be found in two of the works of Robert M. Utley: Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891 (New York and London, 1973), in The Macmillan Wars of the United States, Louis Morton, general editor; and “The Contribution of the Frontier to the American Military Tradition,” in The American Military on the Frontier: The Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 30 September-1 October 1976, ed. James P. Tate (Washington, D.C., 1978), pp. 3–13.
与美国海军战略的蓬勃发展形成鲜明对比的是，世纪之交美国崛起为世界强国并未改变其对战略研究的忽视。美国最初向海外投射力量时，军事力量自然主要体现在海权运用上，而陆军的作用相对较小，很大程度上只是其治安职能的延伸。即便美国在1917-1918年参与欧洲陆战的经验也未能立即激发美国更积极的战略思考，这主要是因为20世纪20年代和30年代的大部分时间里，美国的国家政策都否认了再次大规模干预欧洲的可能性。然而，到了20世纪三四十年代，从课程档案和一些军事著作中，我们已经可以窥见美国战略思想日趋成熟的雏形。特别值得一提的是霍洛威·H·弗罗斯特中校的《国家战略》，载于《美国海军学会会刊》第51卷（1925年8月），第1343-1390页，这是一篇内容极其广泛且极具远见的文章，绝非仅限于海军领域；以及奥利弗·普雷斯科特·罗宾逊上校的《国家战略基础》（华盛顿特区，1928年）。
On land, in contrast to the blossoming of American naval strategy, the emergence of the United States as a world power at the turn of the century did little to change the neglect of strategic study. The military element in the first projections of American power overseas was, naturally, for the most part an exertion of sea power, and the army played a comparatively minor role, largely an extension of its constabulary duties. Even the American experience of European land warfare in 1917–1918 did little immediately to stimulate a more vigorous American strategic thought, largely because national policy through the 1920s and much of the 1930s disavowed the prospect of any second large-scale military intervention in Europe. Nevertheless, by the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century a foreshadowing of the maturation of American strategic thought to come can be perceived in the curricular archives and in a few military writings. Particularly worth mentioning are Lieutenant Commander Holloway H. Frost's “National Strategy,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 51 (August 1925), 1343–90, a remarkably wide-ranging and prescient essay by no means exclusively naval, and Colonel Oliver Prescott Robinson, The Fundamentals of National Strategy (Washington, D.C., 1928).
16.阿尔弗雷德· T ·海耶·马汉：海军史学家
16. ALFRED THAYER MAHAN: THE NAVAL HISTORIAN
马汉的已出版作品大致可归入以下几类：
Mahan's published works fall conveniently into the following categories:
海军史：《海湾和内陆水域》（纽约，1885 年）；《海权对历史的影响，1660-1783 年》（波士顿，1890 年）；《海权对法国大革命和帝国的影响》，2 卷（波士顿，1892 年）；《海权及其与 1812 年战争的关系》，2 卷（波士顿，1905 年）；以及《独立战争中海军的主要行动》（波士顿，1913 年）。
Naval histories: The Gulf and Inland Waters (New York, 1885); The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston, 1890); The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 2 vols. (Boston, 1892); Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, 2 vols. (Boston, 1905); and The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of Independence (Boston, 1913).
当代史：《南非战争史，1899-1900》（伦敦，1900 年）；以及《南非战争》（纽约，1900 年）。
Current histories: The Story of War in South Africa, 1899–1900 (London, 1900); and The War in South Africa (New York, 1900).
传记研究：《法拉格特海军上将》（纽约，1897 年）；《纳尔逊的一生：英国海上力量的化身》，2 卷（波士顿，1897 年）；以及《从英国海军史中汲取的海军军官类型》（波士顿，1901 年）。
Biographical studies: Admiral Farragut (New York, 1897); The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain, 2 vols. (Boston, 1897); and Types of Naval Officers Drawn from the History of the British Navy (Boston, 1901).
自传：从帆船到蒸汽船：海军生活回忆录（纽约和伦敦，1907 年）。
Autobiography: From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Naval Life (New York and London, 1907).
灵修：内在的收获：关于基督徒生活的思考（波士顿，1909 年）。
Devotional: The Harvest Within: Thoughts on the Life of a Christian (Boston, 1909).
论文集和讲稿集：《美国对海权的利益，现在和未来》（波士顿，1897 年）；《与西班牙战争的教训及其他文章》 （波士顿，1899 年）；《亚洲问题及其对国际政策的影响》（波士顿，1900 年）；《回顾与展望：国际关系、海军和政治研究》（波士顿，1902 年）；《战争的一些被忽视的方面》（波士顿，1907 年）；《海军行政和战争：一些一般原则及其他文章》（波士顿，1908 年）；《海军战略与陆地军事行动原则的比较》（波士顿，1911 年）；以及《军备与仲裁，或武力在国家间国际关系中的地位》（纽约和伦敦，1912 年）。
Collections of essays and lectures: The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston, 1897); Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles (Boston, 1899); The Problem of Asia and Its Effects upon International Policies (Boston, 1900); Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political (Boston, 1902); Some Neglected Aspects of War (Boston, 1907); Naval Administration and Warfare, Some General Principles with Other Essays (Boston, 1908); Naval Strategy, Compared with the Principles of Military Operations on Land (Boston, 1911); and Armaments and Arbitration, or the Place of Force in the International Relations of States (New York and London, 1912).
罗伯特·西格二世和多丽丝·D·马奎尔主编的《阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉书信集》 （共三卷，安纳波利斯，1975年）收录了大量传记及其他相关资料。关于马汉的完整传记研究，按出版顺序排列如下：查尔斯·卡莱尔·泰勒的《海军上将马汉的一生》（纽约，1920年）；威廉·D·普勒斯顿的《马汉：美国海军上校阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉的生平与事业》（纽黑文，1939年）；罗伯特·西格二世的《阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉：其人及其书信》（安纳波利斯，1977年）；以及威廉·E·利夫齐的《马汉论海权》（俄克拉荷马州诺曼，1981年修订版）。前两部传记对马汉持赞扬态度；第三部传记则持批评态度，总体上缺乏同情；第四部传记则持肯定态度，但有所保留。
A wealth of biographic and other pertinent data is to be found in Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, eds., Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, 3 vols. (Annapolis, 1975). The full-length biographic studies of Mahan are, in order of publication, Charles Carlisle Taylor, The Life of Admiral Mahan (New York 1920); William D. Puleston, Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahart, USN (New Haven, 1939); Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis, 1977); and William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, Okla., 1981, rev. ed.). The first two are adulatory; the third critical and generally unsympathetic; the fourth favorable with reservations.
关于马汉及其著作的论文和文章汗牛充栋。其中最有价值的有：詹姆斯·A·菲尔德的《马汉海军上将自述》，载于《海军战争学院评论》 （1976年秋季刊）；肯尼斯·J·哈根的《阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉：让美国重返海洋》，载于弗兰克·J·梅里和西奥多·A·威尔逊编，《美国外交的缔造者》，共两卷（纽约，1974年），第一卷，第十一章；朱利叶斯·W·普拉特的《阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉》，载于威廉·T·哈钦森编， 《马库斯·W·杰尼根美国史学论文集》（芝加哥，1937年），第十一章；威廉·雷泽尔的《马汉论海洋的运用》，载于《海军战争学院评论》 （1973年5-6月刊）。以及 Margaret T. Sprout，“马汉：海上力量的布道者”，载于 Edward Mead Earle 编辑的《现代战略的缔造者》 （普林斯顿，1943 年）。
Essays and articles on the subject of Mahan and his work abound. The most useful are: James A. Field, “Admiral Mahan Speaks for Himself,” Naval War College Review (Fall 1976); Kenneth J. Hagan, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: Turning America Back to the Sea,” in Makers of American Diplomacy, ed. Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, 2. vols. (New York, 1974), vol. 1, ch. 11; Julius W. Pratt, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” in The Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. William T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), ch. 11; William Reitzel, “Mahan on the Use of the Sea,” Naval War College Review (May-June, 1973); and Margaret T. Sprout, “Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power,” Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943).
罗纳德·斯佩克特在其著作《战争教授：海军战争学院与海军职业的发展》（罗德岛州纽波特，1977年）中详尽地论述了海军战争学院的创立及其早期发展。杰拉尔德·S·格雷厄姆在其著作《海军霸权的政治：英国海上霸权研究》（剑桥，1965年）和保罗·M·肯尼迪在其著作《英国海军霸权的兴衰》（纽约，1976年）中对马汉关于海权在英国帝国历史中作用的分析进行了批判性考察。朱利叶斯·普拉特在其著作《1898年的扩张主义者》（巴尔的摩，1936年）和沃尔特·拉费伯在其著作《新帝国：1860-1898年美国扩张的解读》 （伊萨卡和伦敦，1963年）中探讨了马汉对美国帝国主义的影响，但这种影响被夸大了。彼得·卡斯滕在其著作《海军贵族：安纳波利斯的黄金时代和现代美国海军主义的兴起》（纽约，1972 年）中，对他的海军主义角色进行了深入探讨。
The founding and early years of the Naval War College are well covered in Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession (Newport, R.I., 1977). Mahan's analysis of the role of sea power in the history of the British Empire is critically examined in Gerald S. Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy: Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy (Cambridge, 1965); and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York, 1976). The influence of Mahan on American imperialism is treated, and overstated, in Julius Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore, 1936); and Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898 (Ithaca and London, 1963). His role as navalist is thoroughly examined in Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern Amerian Navalism (New York, 1972).
17.作为战略家的政治领袖*
17. THE POLITICAL LEADER AS STRATEGIST*
广义而言，军民关系问题占据了现代史文献的大量篇幅。关于战时文官领导这一普遍问题，哈维·A·德维尔德（Harvey A. DeWeerd）的论文《丘吉尔、劳合·乔治、克列孟梭：文官的兴起》（收录于《现代战略的缔造者》一书）至今仍具有重要价值。德维尔德借鉴了刘易斯·芒福德（Lewis Mumford）的《技术与文明》（纽约，1934年）以及杰西·D·克拉克森（Jesse D. Clarkson）和托马斯·C·科克伦（Thomas C. Cochran）主编的《作为社会制度的战争》（纽约，1941年）等著作，后者是一部论文集，其中包含对文官战争和现代战争的探讨。此外，J·F·C·富勒（J.F.C. Fuller）的《战争与西方文明：战争作为政治工具和大众民主的表达》（伦敦，1932年）也值得关注。
Defined in the wider sense, the issues of civil-military relations take up much of the literature of modern history. On the general problem of civilian leadership in wartime, Harvey A. DeWeerd's essay, “Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau: The Emergence of the Civilian,” in the original Makers of Modern Strategy, is still valuable. DeWeerd drew on such general works as Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York, 1934) and Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran, eds., War as a Social Institution (New York, 1941), a collection of essays that includes a discussion of civilian and modern war. Also of interest remains J. F. C. Fuller, War and Western Civilization: A Study of War as a Political Instrument and the Expression of Mass Democracy (London, 1932).
自二战以来，关于军民关系的研究数量呈爆炸式增长。塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿的《士兵与国家：军民关系的理论与政治》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1957年）是该领域的经典著作。戈登·A·克雷格和亚历山大·L·乔治合著的《武力与治国之道：我们时代的政治革命》（纽约，1982年）一书也探讨了战时领导层与平民之间的关系。
Since World War II, the number of studies on civil-military relations has grown enormously. Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1957) is a standard work. A recent book by Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: The Diplomatic Revolution of Our Time (New York, 1982), contains a discussion of wartime leadership and civilians.
关于越南战争的著作汗牛充栋，其中虽有偏见且缺乏资料引用，但戴维·哈伯斯坦的《最优秀和最聪明的人》（纽约，1972年）仍属佳作。亨利·基辛格的两卷回忆录《白宫岁月》（波士顿，1979年）和《动荡岁月》（波士顿，1982年）以及西摩·赫什对国务卿的回应之作《权力的代价》 （纽约，1983年）也值得一读。哈里·G·萨默斯二世的《论战略：对越南战争的批判性分析》 （加州诺瓦托，1982年）从军事视角探讨了近期美国文职领导人在战争中的表现，值得关注。
The Vietnam War produced many works on the subject, the best of which, despite its tendentiousness and lack of citation of sources, is David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1972). Henry Kissinger's two volumes of memoirs, White House Years (Boston, 1979) and Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982), should be consulted, as well as Seymour Hersh's answer to the secretary of state, The Price of Power (New York, 1983). A work with a military perspective on recent U.S. civilian leadership in war is the noteworthy study by Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif., 1982).
关于第一次世界大战的政治和战略文献浩如烟海，尤其以德国的为甚。若要全面了解特奥巴尔德·冯·贝特曼·霍尔维格及其军队的问题，可参阅戈登·A·克雷格的《普鲁士军队政治》（纽约，1964年）。格哈德·里特的著作也必不可少，包括《施利芬计划：对神话的批判》（慕尼黑，1956年；英文版伦敦，1958年）及其主要著作《国家艺术与战争工程》（慕尼黑，1954年及以后）的第三卷和第四卷。弗里茨·费舍尔的《德国在第一次世界大战中的目标》（纽约，1967年）影响深远。康拉德·雅劳什（Konrad Jarausch）为贝特曼撰写了一本精巧的传记，《神秘的总理：贝特曼-霍尔韦格和德意志帝国的傲慢》（纽黑文，1973）。有关贝特曼与军队之间关系的研究，请参阅 Karl-Heinz Janssen, Der Kanzler und der General: Die Fiihrungskrise von Bethmann Hollweg and Falkenhayn (Göttingen, 1967)。在参与者的众多回忆录中，值得一提的是埃里希·冯·法尔肯汉 (Erich von Falkenhayn) 的《Die Oberste Heeresleitung》，1914-1916（柏林，1920 年）。
The literature on politics and strategy in the First World War is compendious, especially for Germany. For a general treatment of the problem of Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and the military, see Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (New York, 1964). Indispensable are the works of Gerhard Ritter: Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos (Munich, 1956; Eng. trans. London, 1958), and volumes 3 and 4 of his major study, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk (Munich, 1954ff). Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967) has had far-reaching effect. Konrad Jarausch has written a workmanlike biography of Bethmann, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann-Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, 1973). For a study of relations between Bethmann and the military, see Karl-Heinz Janssen, Der Kanzler und der General: Die Fiihrungskrise von Bethmann Hollweg and Falkenhayn (Göttingen, 1967). Among the many memoirs of participants should be noted Erich von Falkenhayn, Die Oberste Heeresleitung, 1914–1916 (Berlin, 1920).
关于英国在第一次世界大战中的总体研究，可参考以下著作：欧内斯特·卢埃林·伍德沃德的《大不列颠与1914-1918年战争》（纽约，1967年）；A·J·P·泰勒的《战时政治》（纽约，1965年）；以及彼得·斯坦斯基主编的《左翼与战争：英国工党与第一次世界大战》（纽约，1969年）。关于主要战时领导人的传记，可参考以下作品：J·A·斯彭德和西里尔·阿斯奎斯合著的《赫伯特·亨利·阿斯奎斯，牛津勋爵的生平》（伦敦，1932年）；罗伊·詹金斯的《阿斯奎斯》（伦敦，1978年），该书是詹金斯1964年著作的更新版，被认为是阿斯奎斯的最佳传记；马格努斯·菲利普的《基钦纳：一位帝国主义者的肖像》（纽约，1959年）。哈罗德·尼科尔森，《乔治五世：生平与时代》（伦敦，1953年）；大卫·劳合·乔治，《战争回忆录》（伦敦，1933-1937年），现已由马丁·吉尔伯特的《劳合·乔治》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯，1968年）和大卫·R·伍德沃德的《劳合·乔治与将军们》（伦敦，1984年）进行评注补充。马丁·吉尔伯特关于温斯顿·丘吉尔的著作极具价值：《温斯顿·丘吉尔：战争的挑战》 （波士顿，1971年），该传记的第三卷，另有两卷本论文集《温斯顿·丘吉尔：第三卷》 （波士顿，1973年）作为补充。另见比弗布鲁克勋爵，《政治家与战争》（伦敦，1968年）。
Among the general studies on the British in the First World War are Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War of 1914–1918 (New York, 1967); A. J. P. Taylor, Politics in Wartime (New York, 1965); and Peter Stansky, ed., The Left and the War: The British Labor Party and World War One (New York, 1969). For biographies of the principal wartime leadership, the following works should be consulted: J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, The Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford of Asquith (London, 1932); Roy Jenkins, Asquith (London, 1978), which is the updated version of Jenkins's 1964 work, regarded as the best biography of Asquith; Magnus Philip, Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist (New York, 1959); Harold Nicolson, George V, His Life and Times (London, 1953); David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1933–37), now supplemented critically by Martin Gilbert, Lloyd George (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968) and David R. Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (London, 1984). Martin Gilbert's works on Winston Churchill are of great value: Winston Churchill: The Challenge of War (Boston, 1971), the third volume of the biography supplemented by a companion volume of papers in two parts Winston Churchill: Companion Volume III (Boston, 1973). See also Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War (London, 1968).
在众多关于第一次世界大战期间法国文职领导人的著作中，乔治·克列孟梭的《胜利的荣辱》（巴黎，1930年）尤为重要。皮埃尔·雷诺万的《法国的战时政府形式》（纽黑文，1927年）和杰弗里·布鲁恩的简短传记《克列孟梭》（剑桥，1943年）至今仍具有参考价值。其他关于克列孟梭的著作包括：杰里·克莱门斯·金的《福煦与克列孟梭》（剑桥，1960年）；大卫·罗宾斯·沃森的《克列孟梭——政治传记》（伦敦，1974年）；以及埃德加·霍尔特的《老虎》（伦敦，1976年）。
Of primary importance among the many accounts of French civilian leadership in the First World War is Georges Clemenceau, Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire (Paris, 1930). Pierre Renouvin, The Forms of War Government in France (New Haven, 1927) and Geoffrey Bruun's short biography, Clemenceau (Cambridge, 1943) are still useful. Other works on Clemenceau include: Jere Clemens King, Foch versus Clemenceau (Cambridge, 1960); David Robins Watson, Clemenceau—A Political Biography (London, 1974); and Edgar Holt, The Tiger (London, 1976).
关于二战时期统一指挥和政治领导问题的文献浩如烟海，在此仅列举一些最有价值的著作。若要了解德国的经验，可参阅戈登·A·克雷格所著《德国，1866-1945》（牛津和纽约，1978年）的相关章节。几乎所有获得权力并撰写回忆录的德国将领都对阿道夫·希特勒的军事领导能力有所评价。其中最值得一提的包括：海因茨·古德里安的《士兵回忆录》（海德堡，1951年）；弗朗茨·哈尔德的《战争日记：陆军参谋长每日记录，1939-1942》，汉斯-阿道夫·雅各布森主编，共3卷（斯图加特，1962-1964年）。阿道夫·豪辛格 (Adolf Heusinger)，《Befehl im Widerstreit》（蒂宾根，1950 年）；埃里希·冯·曼斯坦因，《维洛伦围攻》（波恩，1955 年）；沃尔特·沃利蒙 (Walter Warlimont)，《Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht》，1939–45（法兰克福，1962 年）。同样值得查阅的还有德国最高统帅部的战争日记：Kriegstagebücher des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht，ed。珀西·E·施拉姆，4 卷。 （法兰克福上午，1961 年及以后）。诸如《艾伦·布洛克，希特勒：对暴政的研究》（纽约，1964 年）和《约阿希姆·费斯特，《希特勒：一部传记》（法兰克福，1973 年）等有关希特勒的一般传记包含了很多材料。大卫·欧文颇具争议的《希特勒的战争》（纽约，1977 年）从希特勒的角度展示了事件。关于希特勒和军队的专门研究比比皆是，其中包括安德烈亚斯·希尔格鲁伯 (Andreas Hillgruber) 的重要书籍，《希特勒的战略：政治与战争，1940-1941》，第 2 版。 （慕尼黑，1982）；克劳斯-尤尔根·穆勒 (Klaus-Jürgen Müller)，《Das Heer und Hitler：Armee und NS Regime》（斯图加特，1969 年）；巴里·A·利奇（Barry A. Leach），《德国对俄罗斯的战略，1939-1941》（牛津，1973 年）和《Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg》，编辑。 Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt（斯图加特，1979-）。
The literature on the problem of unified command and political leadership in the Second World War is too voluminous to allow more than a citation of some of the most useful books. For a general introduction to the German experience, see the appropriate chapters in Gordon A. Craig, Germany, 1866–1945 (Oxford and New York, 1978). Almost every German general who attained authority and later wrote his memoirs had something to say about Adolf Hitler as a military leader. Among the most noteworthy are: Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg, 1951); Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch: Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabs des Heeres, 1939–1942, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1962–64); Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit (Tübingen, 1950); Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn, 1955); Walter Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 1939–45 (Frankfurt a.M., 1962). Also worth consulting are the war diaries of the German Supreme Command: Kriegstagebücher des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, ed. Percy E. Schramm, 4 vols. (Frankfurt a.M., 1961 ff). Such general biographies of Hitler as Allan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York, 1964) and Joachim Fest, Hitler: Eine Biographie (Frankfurt a.M., 1973) contain much material. David Irving's controversial Hitler's War (New York, 1977) shows events from what might have been Hitler's perspective. Special studies on Hitler and the military abound and include such important books as Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung, 1940–1941, 2d ed. (Munich, 1982); Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und NS Regime (Stuttgart, 1969); Barry A. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 1939–1941 (Oxford, 1973) and Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Stuttgart, 1979-).
关于丘吉尔作为军事领袖的成就，他的二战回忆录至今仍具有重要价值，尤其是温斯顿·S·丘吉尔的《大联盟》（波士顿，1950年）。马丁·吉尔伯特的《温斯顿·丘吉尔：最辉煌的时刻，1939-1941》（波士顿，1983年）更是不可或缺。其他近期出版的关于丘吉尔的著作包括：罗纳德·莱文的《作为军阀的丘吉尔》（纽约，1973年）和R·W·汤普森的《大元帅丘吉尔》 （纽约，1973年）。约翰·康奈尔的《韦维尔：士兵与政治家》（伦敦，1964年）和大卫·弗雷泽的《艾伦布鲁克》（伦敦，1982年）对两位英国军事领袖的生平事迹进行了精彩的描述。英国官方著作《第二次世界大战史：英国军事系列》由……编辑。 JRM Butler（伦敦，出版日期不详）的战略著作共六卷，其中 JRM Butler 的《大战略》第2 卷（1939 年 9 月至 1941 年 6 月，伦敦，1957 年）具有代表性。
On Churchill as a military leader, the volumes of his Second World War memoirs continue to be of value, especially: Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950). Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939–1941 (Boston, 1983) is indispensable. Other recent books on Churchill include: Ronald Lewin, Churchill as Warlord (New York, 1973) and R. W. Thompson, Generalissimo Churchill (New York, 1973). Excellent accounts of two leading British military figures are to be found in John Connell, Wavell: Soldier and Statesman (London, 1964) and David Fraser, Alanbrooke (London, 1982). The British official work, History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series, ed. J. R. M. Butler (London, various dates) includes six volumes on strategy, of which J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. 2, September 1939-June 1941 (London, 1957) is representaive.
美英联合战争是大量文献的主题。例如，赫伯特·费斯所著的《丘吉尔、罗斯福、斯大林：他们发动的战争和他们寻求的和平》（普林斯顿，1957年）就是一部佳作。弗朗西斯·L·洛文海姆、哈罗德·D·兰利和曼弗雷德·乔纳斯编辑的《罗斯福与丘吉尔：他们的战时秘密通信》（纽约，1975年）也同样出色。后来的研究成果并未超越这部著作。罗伯特·达莱克所著的《富兰克林·D·罗斯福与美国外交政策，1932-1945》（纽约，1979年）也值得参考。遗憾的是，目前尚无关于罗斯福作为军事领袖的成就的权威论述。不过，请参阅詹姆斯·麦格雷戈·伯恩斯的《罗斯福：狮子与狐狸》（纽约，1956 年）和《罗斯福：自由战士》（纽约，1971 年）。
American and British coalition warfare is the subject of a wide literature. For a fine example see Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957). Also excellent is Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, ed. Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas (New York, 1975). Subsequent efforts have not improved on this work. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York, 1979) should also be consulted. There is unfortunately no definitive account of Roosevelt's accomplishments as a military leader. Nonetheless, see James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956) and his Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom (New York, 1971).
美国陆军的官方战争史包含几卷杰出的著作：马克·S·沃森，《参谋长：战前计划与准备》（华盛顿特区，1950年）；莫里斯·马特洛夫和埃德温·S·斯内尔，《1941-1942年联合战争战略规划》（华盛顿特区，1953年）；莫里斯·马特洛夫，《1943-1944年联合战争战略规划》（华盛顿特区，1959年）；以及雷·S·克莱恩，《华盛顿指挥所：作战部》（华盛顿特区，1951年）。几位美国高级官员的回忆录和传记也十分重要：亨利·L·史汀生和麦克乔治·邦迪，《和平与战争中的现役》（纽约，1948年）；福雷斯特·G·波格，《乔治·C·马歇尔：胜利的组织者，1943-1945》（纽约，1973年）。 Stephen Ambrose，《最高统帅：德怀特·戴维·艾森豪威尔的战争岁月》（巴尔的摩，1970 年）。此外， Alfred Chandler, Jr. 编辑的《德怀特·戴维·艾森豪威尔文集：战争岁月》（共 5 卷，巴尔的摩，1970 年）也必不可少。
The U.S. Army's official history of the war contains several outstanding volumes: Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C., 1950); Maurice Matloff and Edwin S. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 (Washington, D.C., 1953); Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–44 (Washington, D.C., 1959); and Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington, D.C., 1951). Several of the memoirs and biographies of leading U.S. officials are important: Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948); Forrest G. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945 (New York, 1973); Stephen Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Dwight David Eisenhower (Baltimore, 1970). Also indispensable are The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, ed. Alfred Chandler, Jr., 5 vols. (Baltimore, 1970).
18.反对战争：1914年的进攻理论
18. MEN AGAINST FIRE: THE DOCTRINE OF THE OFFENSIVE IN 1914
要了解1914年以前战术理论的演变，最权威且最易获取的资料来源是《皇家联合军种学会会刊》（伦敦，1855年至今）。该刊不仅刊登了英国陆军内部辩论的主要文章，还总结了欧洲大陆期刊上的主要文章，并收录了国内外相关文献的评论。威廉·巴尔克的《战术》（柏林，1892年）出版了四版，最后一版被翻译成英文（堪萨斯州莱文沃思堡，1911年）。各版本的变化反映了1914年以前这一关键时期战术思想的发展，不仅体现在德国军队，也体现在所有欧洲主要军队。巴尔克还详细介绍了这些军队的武器装备变化。关于世纪之交的更多细节，可参阅让·德·布洛赫的《未来战争》（共六卷，巴黎，1898年）。这部巨著还有俄文版和德文版，但英文版的出版计划搁浅，只有总结全书论点的最后一卷被翻译成英文。该卷分别以《战争现在不可能了吗？》（伦敦，1899年）和《战争的未来》（波士顿，1899年）为题出版。然而，这些完整版包含了许多其他版本不易获得的专业技术细节。
The best and most easily available source for the evolution of tactical doctrine before 1914 is The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (London, 1855—), which not only publishes the main contributions to the debate within the British army but summarizes the principal articles that appear in Continental periodicals and carries reviews of the literature, foreign as well as British. Wilhelm Balck, Taktik (Berlin, 1892) went through four editions, of which the last was translated into English (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1911). The changes in the successive editions reflect the development in tactical thinking during the critical period of the pre-1914 era, not only in the German but in all the principal European armies. Balck also gives details of the changing armament and equipment of these armies. Further such details, for the turn of the century, will be found in Jean de Bloch, La guerre future, 6 vols. (Paris, 1898). There are also Russian and German editions of this massive work, but a project for an English edition collapsed, and only the final volume, summarizing the arguments of the work, has been translated. It was published under the titles Is War Now Impossible? (London 1899) and The Future of War (Boston, 1899). The unabridged editions, however, contain many technical details not easily available elsewhere.
在德国陆军领域，巴尔克的著作需要辅以弗里德里希·冯·伯恩哈迪的杰出且不落俗套的著作，尤其是《论今日战争》（伦敦，1912年）。该书试图将克劳塞维茨的理论与二十世纪相衔接，颇具启发性。除了对施利芬及其理论提出诸多中肯的批评外，书中还包含大量精辟的战术分析。关于这一时期德国陆军的最新综合论述是B.F.舒尔特的《德意志军队1900-1914：变革与转变之间》（杜塞尔多夫，1977年）。
In the German army, Balck's work needs to be supplemented by the brilliant and heterodox works of Friedrich von Bernhardi, especially Vom heutigen Kriege, translated as On War Today (London, 1912). This is an interesting attempt to bring Clausewitz up to date to the twentieth century, and in addition to its many pertinent criticisms of Schlieffen and his teachings, it contains a great deal of shrewd tactical analysis. The most recent general account of the Germany army during this period is B. F. Schulte, Die deutsche Armee 1900–1914: Zwischen Beharren und Veränderen (Düsseldorf, 1977).
道格拉斯·波奇的《向马恩河进军》（剑桥和伦敦，1981年）和亨利·孔塔明的《复仇1871-1914》 （巴黎，1957年）对法国军队理论与实践的混乱状态进行了详尽的描述。这两部著作使费迪南·福煦的《战争原则》（巴黎，1903年，后译为《战争原则》，纽约，1918年）和德·格朗梅松的《致陆军高级军官的两场讲座》（巴黎，1911年）有了更清晰的认识。查尔斯·阿尔当·杜·皮克的《战斗研究》在他去世后出版（巴黎，1903年），并多次再版。英文译本《Battle Studies》由美国陆军战争学院出版（宾夕法尼亚州哈里斯堡，1920 年；repr. 1946）。 JN Cru 将这部作品描述为“l'oeuvre la plus forte, la plus vraie, la plus scientifique qui soit jamaisvenue d'une patche militaire française”（'Témoins [Paris, 1929], 52）。还有一篇约瑟夫·C·阿诺德 (Joseph C. Arnold) 撰写的有价值的文章，“法国战术学说 1870-1914”，发表于《军事事务》第 42 期，第 1 期。 2（1978 年 4 月）。
The confused state of theory and practice in the French army is well described by Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne (Cambridge and London, 1981) and Henri Contamine, La revanche 1871–1914 (Paris, 1957). These put the lectures of Ferdinand Foch, Des principes de la guerre (Paris, 1903), translated as The Principles of War (New York, 1918), and of de Grandmaison, Deux conférences faites aux officiers de l'état major de l'armée (Paris, 1911) in perspective. Charles Ardent du Picq's Etudes sur le combat was posthumously published (Paris, 1903) and has been frequently reprinted. An English translation, Battle Studies, was published by the U.S. Army War College (Harrisburg, Penn., 1920; repr. 1946). The work has been well described by J. N. Cru as “l'oeuvre la plus forte, la plus vraie, la plus scientifique qui soit jamais venue d'une plume militaire française” (‘Témoins [Paris, 1929], 52). There is also a valuable article by Joseph C. Arnold, “French Tactical Doctrine 1870–1914” in Military Affairs 42, no. 2 (April 1978).
对于英国陆军而言，最佳的起点是T.E. Travers的开创性文章《技术、战术与士气：让·德·布洛赫、布尔战争与1900-1914年英国军事理论》（“Technology Tactics and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War and British Military Theory 1900–1914”），该文发表于《现代史杂志》（Journal of Modern History ）第51卷第2期（1979年6月）。G.F.R. Henderson的《战争科学》（The Science of War，伦敦，1905年）收录了作者在1892年至1905年间的主要战术研究，并阐述了1899-1902年南非战争对英国陆军的影响。E.A. Altham的《战争原则：历史图解》（The Principles of War Historically Illustrated，伦敦，1914年）清晰地描述了第一次世界大战前夕英国总参谋部的战略和战术思路。罗伯茨伯爵的《武装的民族》（伦敦，1907年）与伊恩·汉密尔顿爵士的《强制兵役》（伦敦，1911年）之间关于国民兵役的论战，也为我们深入了解爱德华时代英国的职业军事思想提供了宝贵的视角。罗伯特·布莱克编辑的《道格拉斯·黑格爵士私人文件，1914-1919》（伦敦，1952年）将这一论战延续到了战争年代。一位可能对其产生一定影响的俄国作家是德拉戈米罗夫将军。他的《战术教程》（1879年）已被翻译成法文和德文。
For the British army the best starting point is the seminal article by T. H. E. Travers, “Technology Tactics and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War and British Military Theory 1900–1914,” Journal of Modern History 51, no. 2 (June 1979). G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War (London, 1905) contains the main tactical studies by this writer between 1892 and 1905 and illustrates the impact made on the British army by the South African War of 1899–1902. E. A. Altham, The Principles of War Historically Illustrated (London, 1914) gives a clear account of the strategic and tactical thinking of the British general staff on the eve of the First World War. The polemic over national service between Earl Roberts, A Nation in Arms (London, 1907) and Sir Ian Hamilton, Compulsory Service (London, 1911) also provides good insight into professional military thought in Edwardian England. Robert Blake, ed., The Private Papers of Sir Douglas Haig, 1914–1919 (London, 1952) carries the story into the war years. A Russian writer whose work may have had some influence was General Dragomirov. His Course on Tactics (1879) was translated both into French and German.
最近有一项研究与本文的主题直接相关，即杰克·斯奈德的《欧洲战争计划中的进攻崇拜，1870-1914》（伊萨卡，1984 年）。
A recent study bearing directly on the topic of this essay is Jack Snyder, The Cult of the Offensive in European War Planning, 1870–1914 (Ithaca, 1984).
这些思想的更广泛的思想背景也应该进行研究，罗伯特·沃尔的《1914年的一代》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1979年）和罗兰·N·斯特龙伯格的《战争的救赎：知识分子与1914年》（堪萨斯州劳伦斯，1982年）都是优秀的概览性著作。关于英国的具体情况，可参阅卡罗琳·普莱恩的《战前英国的思想》（伦敦，1928年）。
The broader intellectual background to these ideas should also be studied, and there are excellent general surveys by Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979) and Roland N. Stromberg, Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914 (Lawrence, Kans., 1982). For Britain in particular see Caroline Playne, The Pre-War Mind in Britain (London, 1928).
19.机器战争时代的德国战略， 1914- 1945年
19. GERMAN STRATEGY IN THE AGE OF MACHINE WARFARE, 1914–1945
关于德国在第一次世界大战期间使用武力的文献状况非常不发达。尽管这些年来书籍和文章的数量一直在稳步增加，但实际研究却下降到接近于零。一个值得注意的例外是赫尔穆特·奥托 (Helmut Otto)，《Zur Militärstrategie des deutschen Imperialismus vor und während des ersten Empireistischen Weltkrieges》（Diss. B.，波茨坦，1977 年）。 Peter Graf v. Kielmansegg， Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg，第 2 版根据现有文献提供了清醒的介绍。 （斯图加特，1980）以及赫尔穆特·奥托和K·施米德尔合著的《第一次世界大战：军事史概要》（第四版，柏林/东德，1983），分别从西德和东德的视角出发。沃尔特·埃尔泽的《1914年的德意志陆军》和《1914-1918年世界大战的战略构建》（奥斯纳布吕克，1968年重印）对第一次世界大战的战略特征进行了简要研究，尽管带有偏见，但仍具有价值。基思·罗宾斯的《第一次世界大战》（牛津和纽约，1984）是英国作者最新一次尝试在不参考任何德国资料的情况下撰写关于第一次世界大战战役的著作。最好放弃这类研究，转而专注于B.H.利德尔·哈特的《第一次世界大战史》（波士顿，1964年）、J.F.C.富勒的《战争行为，1789-1961 》 （伦敦，1961年）及其著作《机器战争》（伦敦，1942年）。唐纳德·J.古德斯皮德的《德国战争，1914-1945》（波士顿，1977年）和特雷弗·N.杜普伊的《战争天才：德国陆军和总参谋部，1807-1945》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯，1977年）则是普遍存在的美化德国军事经验的例证。
The state of the literature on the German use of force during World War I is remarkably underdeveloped. Although the number of books and articles has been steadily increasing over the years, actual research has declined to near zero. A notable exception is Helmut Otto, Zur Militärstrategie des deutschen Imperialismus vor und während des ersten imperialistischen Weltkrieges (Diss. B., Potsdam, 1977). Sober introductions, on the basis of the available literature, are provided by Peter Graf v. Kielmansegg, Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1980) and by Helmut Otto and K. Schmiedel, Der erste Weltkrieg: Militärhistorischer Abriss, 4th ed., (Berlin/GDR, 1983), from a West and East German perspective respectively. A brief study on the strategic character of World War I by Walter Elze, Das deutsche Heer von 1914 [and] Der strategische Aufbau des Weltkrieges 1914–1918 (repr. Osnabrück, 1968) is valuable, though biased. Keith Robbins, The First World War (Oxford and New York, 1984) is the latest attempt by an English author to write yet another book on the battles of World War I without any reference to German sources. One is well advised to forget this kind of study and to concentrate on B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (Boston, 1964), and J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789–1961 (London, 1961) and his Machine Warfare (London, 1942), instead. Donald J. Goodspeed, The German Wars 1914–1945 (Boston, 1977) and Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977) are examples of the widespread tendency to romanticize the German military experience.
关于大战略的争论仍然深受弗里茨·费舍尔的著作《世界强权的战略》（第三版，杜塞尔多夫，1964年）的影响，约翰·A·摩西在其著作《幻象政治：费舍尔论战在德国史学中的地位》（伦敦，1975年）中对此进行了探讨。兰斯洛特·L·法拉尔的《分而治之：德国为达成单独媾和所做的努力，1914-1918》（纽约，1978年）为作战行动的开展提供了新的视角。卡尔-海因茨·扬森在其著作《总理与将军》（哥廷根，1967年）中对法尔肯海因进行了论述，但尽管已有大量研究，鲁登道夫至今仍未有一部专业的传记问世。汉斯-乌尔里希·韦勒 (Hans-Ulrich Wehler) 最近对鲁登道夫的战争概念进行了阐述，“'绝对者'和'总体'克里格：冯·克劳塞维茨·鲁登道夫”，Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift 10 (1969), 220–48。关于德国高级指挥官的资料很少，仍然有必要很大程度上依赖他们的回忆录。伊莎贝尔·赫尔（Isabel Hull）的《德皇威廉二世的随行人员，1888-1918》（剑桥，1982 年）将传记与政治和军事历史融为一体。
The debate on grand strategy is still shaped by Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 3d ed. (Düsseldorf, 1964) which is discussed by John A. Moses, The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography (London, 1975). Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr., Divide and Conquer: German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace, 1914–1918 (New York, 1978) sheds new light on the conduct of operations. Falkenhayn is discussed by Karl-Heinz Janssen, Der Kanzler und der General (Göttingen, 1967), but Ludendorff still awaits a professional biography despite a host of studies. Ludendorff's concept of war was put in perspective most recently by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “‘Absoluter’ und ‘totaler’ Krieg: Von Clausewitz zu Ludendorff,” Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift 10 (1969), 220–48. There is little on the German senior commanders, and it remains necessary to rely heavily on their memoirs. Isabel Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888–1918 (Cambridge, 1982) integrates biography with political and military history.
诺曼·斯通的《东线战场，1914-1917》（伦敦和纽约，1975年）是一部优秀的作战研究著作。令人惊讶的是，其他战线却没有类似全面的分析。因此，人们不得不依赖冗长的德国官方史料，例如帝国档案馆编纂的《世界大战1914-1918：各战线军事行动》（14卷，柏林，1925-1944年）和帝国档案馆编纂的《世界大战专题论述》（37卷，奥尔登堡，1921-1930年）。这些史料既有总参谋部史学的优缺点，也有其自身的局限性。 Michael Salewski 偶尔发表的论文“Verdun und die Folgen：Eine militärische und geistesgeschichtliche Betrachtung”，Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 25 (1976), 89-96 值得注意。 Timothy Lupfer 对战术进行了分析，《条令的动态：第一次世界大战期间德国战术条令的变化》（堪萨斯州莱文沃斯堡，1981 年）。杰出作品包括托尼·阿什沃思（Tony Ashworth）的《1914-1918 年堑壕战：活与让活系统》（伦敦，1980 年）和埃里克·J·利德（Eric J. Leed）的《无人之地：第一次世界大战中的战斗与身份》（纽约，1981 年）。关于第一次世界大战进攻和防守最有价值的研究仍然是埃里希·马雷克斯（Erich Mareks）的《Angriff und Verteidigung im Grossen Krieg》（柏林，1923）。
A good operational study is Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (London and New York, 1975). Surprisingly, there is no similarly comprehensive analysis of any of the other fronts of the war. As a result one is forced to rely on the cumbersome Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918: Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande, ed. Reichsarchiv, 14 vols. (Berlin, 1925–44) and Schlachten des Weltkrieges in Einzeldarstellungen, ed. Reichsarchiv, 37 vols. (Oldenburg, 1921–1930), the German official histories with all the advantages and disadvantages of general staff historiography. The occasional paper by Michael Salewski, “Verdun und die Folgen: Eine militärische und geistesgeschichtliche Betrachtung,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 25 (1976), 89–96, is noteworthy. Tactics are analyzed by Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1981). Outstanding are Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914–1918: The Live and Let Live System (London, 1980) and Eric J. Leed, No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I (New York, 1981). The most valuable study on offense and defense in World War I is still Erich Mareks, Angriff und Verteidigung im Grossen Krieg (Berlin, 1923).
关于这一主题的宏大军事政治论述包括格哈德·里特（Gerhard Ritter）的《剑与权杖：德国军国主义问题》（The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany），共4卷（佛罗里达州科勒尔盖布尔斯，1969-1973年），尤其是第4卷《德国军国主义的统治与1918年的灾难》（The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918），以及F·克莱因（F. Klein）等人的《第一次世界大战中的德国》（Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg），共3卷（柏林，1968-1969年）。马丁·基钦（Martin Kitchen）的《沉默的独裁：兴登堡和鲁登道夫领导下的德国最高统帅部的政治，1916-1918年》（The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916–1918 ）（伦敦和纽约，1976年）则篇幅较短。威廉·戴斯特（Wilhelm Deist）的巨著《1914-1918年世界大战中的军事与内政》（Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914–1918），共2卷，是一部重要的文献汇编。 （杜塞尔多夫，1970 年）是研究这一时期任何学生的必备参考书。关于战争期间的和平运动，请参阅弗朗西斯·L·卡斯滕的《反对战争的战争：第一次世界大战期间英国和德国的激进运动》（伦敦，1982 年）。
The grand military-political treatments of the subject are Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, 4 vols. (Coral Gables, Fla., 1969–73), especially vol. 4, The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918, and F. Klein et al., Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1968–69). More limited is Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916–1918 (London and New York, 1976). The monumental compilation of documents by Wilhelm Deist, Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914–1918, 2 vols. (Düsseldorf, 1970) is indispensable for any student of the period. On the peace movement during the war see Francis L. Carsten, War against War: British and German Radical Movements in the First World War (London, 1982).
任何想要研究第一次世界大战本质的人都必须参考弗里德里希·G·荣格的《技术完善》第5版（法兰克福，1968年）中引人入胜且带有倾向性的文章《世界大战》，以及雷蒙·阿隆的《总体战的世纪》（纽约州花园城，1954年）和杰弗里·贝斯特的冷静评估《战争中的人性》（纽约，1980年）。
Anyone who wants to study the nature of World War I will have to consult the seductive and tendentious essay “Die Weltkriege” in Friedrich G. Jünger, Die Perfektion der Techntk, 5th ed. (Frankfurt, 1968) as well as Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Garden City, N.Y., 1954), and the sober assessment by Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York, 1980).
对国防军问题的研究必须从弗朗西斯·卡斯滕（Francis Carsten）的《国防军与政治》（牛津，1966）和哈罗德·戈登（Harold J. Gordon）的《国防军与德意志共和国》（普林斯顿，1957）开始，他们分别从自由主义和专业的角度讨论了国防军政治。德国的贡献包括 Rainer Wohlfeil 和 Hans Dollinger 编辑，Die deutsche Reichswehr: Bilder, Dokumente, Texte（法兰克福，1972 年）； Thilo Vogelsang，《国防军、国家和国家社会主义党》（斯图加特，1962 年）；和 Karl Nuss，Militär und Wiederaufrüstung in der Weimarer Republick: Zur politischen Rolle und Entwicklung der Reichswehr (柏林/东德，1977 年)，以及 Heinz Hürten 编辑的文件集：Die Anfänge der ära Seeckt (杜塞尔多夫，1979 年)，Zwischen Revolution und Kapp-Putsch（杜塞尔多夫，1977 年）和Das Krisenjahr 1923（杜塞尔多夫，1980 年）。汉斯·赫茨菲尔德 (Hans Herzfeld) 的文章“Politik, Heer und Rüstung in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Ein Versuch”，Ausgewählte Aufsätze (柏林，1962) 不应被忽视。
A study of the Reichswehr's problems must begin with Francis Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics (Oxford, 1966) and Harold J. Gordon, The Reichswehr and the German Republic (Princeton, 1957), who discuss Reichswehr politics from a liberal and a professional perspective respectively. Among German contributions are Rainer Wohlfeil and Hans Dollinger, eds., Die deutsche Reichswehr: Bilder, Dokumente, Texte (Frankfurt, 1972); Thilo Vogelsang, Reichswehr, Staat und NSDAP (Stuttgart, 1962); and Karl Nuss, Militär und Wiederaufrüstung in der Weimarer Republick: Zur politischen Rolle und Entwicklung der Reichswehr (Berlin/GDR, 1977), as well as the collections of documents edited by Heinz Hürten: Die Anfänge der Ära Seeckt (Düsseldorf, 1979), Zwischen Revolution und Kapp-Putsch (Düsseldorf, 1977), and Das Krisenjahr 1923 (Düsseldorf, 1980). The essay by Hans Herzfeld, “Politik, Heer und Rüstung in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Ein Versuch,” Ausgewählte Aufsätze (Berlin, 1962) should not be overlooked.
汉斯·迈尔-韦尔克所著的《塞克特》（法兰克福，1967年）是对首任陆军总司令的一部里程碑式的致敬之作。彼得·海耶斯所著的《肩章上的问号？库尔特·冯·施莱歇尔与魏玛政治》（《现代史杂志》第52卷，1980年）是关于施莱歇尔的最佳研究。然而，关于最引人入胜的人物威廉·格罗纳，却鲜有优秀的传记。多萝西娅·格罗纳-盖耶所著的《格罗纳将军：士兵与国家元首》（法兰克福，1955年）勉强可以替代。威廉·戴斯特所著的《国防军与德国重整军备》（伦敦，1981年）则包含了对格罗纳的最佳简要评价。 Michael Geyer 在《Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit: Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik 1924–1936》（威斯巴登，1980 年）中简要讨论了军队中的“青年土耳其人”群体。
Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt (Frankfurt, 1967) is a monumental tribute to the first Chef der Heeresleitung. Peter Hayes, “A Question Mark with Epaulettes? Kurt v. Schleicher und Weimar Politics,” Journal of Modern History 52 (1980) is the best study on Schleicher. There is no good biography on the most interesting figure, Wilhelm Groener. Dorothea Groener-Geyer, General Groener: Soldat und Staatsmann (Frankfurt, 1955) is a poor substitute. Wilhelm Deist, The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London, 1981) contains the best brief assessment. The group of “Young Turks” in the army is briefly discussed in Michael Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit: Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik 1924–1936 (Wiesbaden, 1980).
关于作战和战略问题，请参阅 Geyer，Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit，特别是 Gaines Post, Jr.，《魏玛外交政策的军民结构》（普林斯顿，1973 年）。关于战略的政治经济背景，请参阅 Dorothea Fensch 和 Olaf Groehler 编辑，“Imperialistische Ökonomie und militärische Strategie: Eine Denkschrift Wilhelm Groeners,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 19 (1971), 1167–77。关于海军，请参阅维尔纳·拉恩 (Werner Rahn) 的权威解释，《Reichsmarine und Landesverteidigung 1919–1928: Konzeption und Führung der Marine in der Weimarer Republik》 (慕尼黑，1976 年) 和 Jost Dülffer《魏玛、希特勒与海军陆战队：帝国政策与海军陆战队：德国杜塞尔多夫》 (Düsseldorf， 1972），以及 A. Gemzell，组织、冲突和创新：德国海军战略规划研究，1888-1940 年（斯德哥尔摩，1973 年）。
On operational and strategic problems consult Geyer, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit, and especially Gaines Post, Jr., The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1973). On the political-economic context of strategy see Dorothea Fensch and Olaf Groehler, eds., “Imperialistische Ökonomie und militärische Strategie: Eine Denkschrift Wilhelm Groeners,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 19 (1971), 1167–77. On the navy see the definitive interpretations by Werner Rahn, Reichsmarine und Landesverteidigung 1919–1928: Konzeption und Führung der Marine in der Weimarer Republik (Munich, 1976) and Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau (Düsseldorf, 1972), as well as A. Gemzell, Organization, Conflict, and Innovation: A Study of German Naval Strategie Planning, 1888–1940 (Stockholm, 1973).
关于安全和裁军/重整军备，参见 Michael Salewski, Entwaffnung und Mtlitärkontrolle in Deutschland 1919 bis 1927 (慕尼黑，1966)；同上，“Zur deutschen Sicherheitspolitik in der Spätphase der Weimarer Republik”，Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 21 (1974)，121-47；马歇尔·M·李，“裁军与安全：德国在国际联盟中的安全建议，1926-1930：国际组织中修正主义目标的研究”，Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 25 (1979), 7-34；尤其是爱德华·贝内特 (Edward W. Bennett)，《德国重整军备与西方，1932-1933》（普林斯顿，1979 年）。德国安全的替代方法（与乔恩·雅各布森（Jon Jacobson）所讨论的德国外交相反，洛迦诺外交：德国与西方，1925-1929 [普林斯顿，1972]）仍然需要仔细探索。 Karl Holl 和 Wolfram Wette 编的Pazifismus in der Weimarer Republik: Beiträge zur historischen Friedensforschung (Paderborn, 1981) 是一个有用的开端，但 Leo Gross, Pazifismus und Imperialismus: Eine kritische Untersuchung ihrer theoretischen Begründung (莱比锡, 1931) 仍然是巨著。关于德国政府的辩论和选择，请参见 Josef Becker 和 Klaus Hildebrand 编辑，Internationale Beziehungen in der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929–1933（慕尼黑，1980 年）。
On security and disarmament/rearmament, see Michael Salewski, Entwaffnung und Mtlitärkontrolle in Deutschland 1919 bis 1927 (Munich, 1966); idem, “Zur deutschen Sicherheitspolitik in der Spätphase der Weimarer Republik,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 21 (1974), 121–47; Marshall M. Lee, “Disarmament and Security: The German Security Proposals in the League of Nations, 1926–1930: A Study of Revisionist Aims in an International Organization,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 25 (1979), 7–34; and especially Edward W. Bennett, German Rearmament and the West, 1932–1933 (Princeton, 1979). Alternative approaches to German security (as opposed to German diplomacy, which is discussed by Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925–1929 [Princeton, 1972]) still need careful exploration. A useful start is Karl Holl and Wolfram Wette, eds., Pazifismus in der Weimarer Republik: Beiträge zur historischen Friedensforschung (Paderborn, 1981), but Leo Gross, Pazifismus und Imperialismus: Eine kritische Untersuchung ihrer theoretischen Begründung (Leipzig, 1931) remains the magnum opus. On the debates and options of the German government see Josef Becker and Klaus Hildebrand, eds., Internationale Beziehungen in der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929–1933 (Munich, 1980).
第二次世界大战期间的战略和行动确实是一个非常广泛的领域。从戈登·赖特（Gordon Wright）的《全面战争的考验》（纽约，1968 年）和两本出色的德国调查《Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg》开始是有用的。 Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt，10 卷。 （斯图加特，1979ff）和德国在 Zweiten Weltkrieg编辑。格哈特·哈斯 (Gerhart Haas) 等人，6 卷。 （柏林/东德，1974ff），它将百科全书式的治疗与艰苦的研究结合起来。 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen，《Zur Konzeption einer Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1939–1945》（法兰克福，1964 年）和同上，《Der Zweite Weltkrieg：Grundzüge der Politik und Strategie in Dokumenten》（法兰克福，1965 年），以及同上和 Arthur L. Smith，编辑，第二次世界大战，政策与战略：带有评论的精选文件（圣巴巴拉，1979）将德国战略置于世界政治发展的背景下。安德烈亚斯·希尔格鲁伯，《希特勒的战略：1940-1941 年的政治与战争》，第 2 版。 （慕尼黑，1982）是迄今为止对德国战略最深入的研究。他的《Der Zweite Weltkrieg》，第二版。 （斯图加特，1982）是一项有用的调查，他的“Die 'Endlösung' und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus”，载于《Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte 》 ，id ed., ed.。 M. Funke（杜塞尔多夫，1978），94-115，是一篇关于军事与意识形态战争结合的开创性文章。 Andreas Hillgruber 和 Gerhard Hümmelchen 提供了有用的年表，Chronik des Zweiten Weltkrieges，rev。编辑。 （Königstein/Ts.，1978）。旧文学沃尔特·格尔利茨 (Walter Görlitz)，《Der Zweite Weltkrieg》，2 卷。 （斯图加特，1951-52）和 Kurt von Tippeiskirch，Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges（波恩，1954）值得一提。
Strategy and operations during the Second World War are a very wide field indeed. It is useful to begin with Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War (New York, 1968) and the two excellent German surveys, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 10 vols. (Stuttgart, 1979ff) and Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Gerhart Haas et al., 6 vols. (Berlin/GDR, 1974ff), which combine encyclopedic treatment with painstaking research. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Zur Konzeption einer Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1939–1945 (Frankfurt, 1964) and idem, Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Grundzüge der Politik und Strategie in Dokumenten (Frankfurt, 1965), as well as idem and Arthur L. Smith, eds., World War II, Policy and Strategy: Selected Documents with Commentary (Santa Barbara, 1979) place German strategy in the context of world political developments. Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941, 2d ed. (Munich, 1982) is by far the most incisive study of German strategy. His Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1982) is a useful survey and his “Die ‘Endlösung' und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus,” in Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte, id ed., ed. M. Funke (Düsseldorf, 1978), 94–115, is a seminal essay on the combination of military and ideological war. A useful chronology is provided by Andreas Hillgruber and Gerhard Hümmelchen, Chronik des Zweiten Weltkrieges, rev. ed. (Königstein/Ts., 1978). Of the older literature Walter Görlitz, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1951–52) and Kurt von Tippeiskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Bonn, 1954) are worth mentioning.
关于战争目标最重要的研究是诺曼·里奇的《希特勒的战争目标》，第 2 卷。 （纽约，1973-74）以及鲁道夫·赫布斯特（Ludolf Herbst）近期颇具挑战性的著作《全面战争与经济秩序：政治上的战争、意识形态与宣传 1939-1945》（斯图加特，1982 年）。 Wolfgang Schumann 和 Dietrich Eichholtz 主编，Anatomie des Krieges: Neue Dokumente über die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Zweiten Weltkrieges (柏林/东德，1969) 以及 Gerhart Hass 和 Wolfgang Schumann，Anatomie der Aggression: Neue Dokumente zu den Kriegszielen des faschistischen Imperialismus im Zweiten Weltkrieg（柏林/东德，1972）从正统马克思主义的角度概述了同样的问题。 Eberhard Jäckel，《希特勒的世界观》（Hitler's World View）（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1981 年）概述了希特勒对战争的看法。 Klaus Hildebrand，《Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Kalkül oder Dogma》（斯图加特，1971 年）是对 1933 年至 1945 年间外交的最佳简短总结。
The most important studies on war aims are Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims, 2 vols. (New York, 1973–74) and the challenging recent work of Ludolf Herbst, Der totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft: Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939–1945 (Stuttgart, 1982). Wolfgang Schumann and Dietrich Eichholtz, eds., Anatomie des Krieges: Neue Dokumente über die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Berlin/GDR, 1969) and Gerhart Hass and Wolfgang Schumann, Anatomie der Aggression: Neue Dokumente zu den Kriegszielen des faschistischen Imperialismus im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin/GDR, 1972) outline the same problem from an orthodox Marxist perspective. Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View (Cambridge, Mass., 1981) outlines Hitler's perspectives on the war. Klaus Hildebrand, Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Kalkül oder Dogma (Stuttgart, 1971) is the best short summary on diplomacy between 1933 and 1945.
闪电战受到了过多的关注。基础研究著作包括艾伦·S·米尔沃德的《战时德国经济》（伦敦，1965年）；格哈德·福斯特的《全面战争与闪电战》（柏林/东德，1967年）；查尔斯·梅森格的《闪电战的艺术》（伦敦，1967年）；以及作为修正之作的马修·库珀的《德国陆军1933-1945：其政治和军事失败》（伦敦，1978年）。
Blitzkrieg has received inordinate attention. The basic studies are by Alan S. Milward, The German Economy at War (London, 1965); Gerhard Förster, Totaler Krieg und Blitzkrieg (Berlin/GDR, 1967); Charles Messenger, The Art of Blitzkrieg (London, 1967); and as a corrective Matthew Cooper, The German Army 1933–1945: Its Political and Military Failures (London, 1978).
研究战争不可缺少的文件包括《国防军上级部队作战手册》（Kriegstagebücher des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht），编辑。 Percy E. Schramm 等人，4 卷。 （法兰克福，1969 年）； Franz Halder，Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabs des Heeres 1939–1941 [Kriegstagebuch]，编辑。 Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung，3 卷。 （斯图加特，1962–64）；和 Walther Hubatsch 编辑，《Hitler Weisungen für die Kriegführung》（法兰克福，1962 年）。对于海军，请参阅 Michael Salewski，Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945，第 3 卷。 （法兰克福，1970–75），尤其是卷。 3、Gerhard Wagner 编辑，Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939 bis 1945（慕尼黑，1972 年）。
Among the indispensable documents for the study of the war are the Kriegstagebücher des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, ed. Percy E. Schramm et al., 4 vols. (Frankfurt, 1969); Franz Halder, Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabs des Heeres 1939–1941 [Kriegstagebuch], ed. Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1962–64); and Walther Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung (Frankfurt, 1962). For the navy see Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, 3 vols. (Frankfurt, 1970–75), especially vol. 3, and Gerhard Wagner, ed., Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939 bis 1945 (Munich, 1972).
针对战争各个方面作战研究的大量文献与对二战整体特征的研究匮乏形成鲜明对比。基础性论述包括汉斯-阿道夫·雅各布森和于尔根·罗尔韦尔主编的《二战决定性战役：德国视角》（纽约，1965年）、拉里·H·阿丁顿的《闪电战时代与德国总参谋部，1865-1941》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克，1971年）以及库珀的《德国陆军》（尽管库珀本人对装甲战情有独钟）。
The abundance of operational studies on any conceivable aspect of the war contrasts with the lack of studies on the overall character of World War II. Basic treatments are Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jürgen Rohwer, eds., Decisive Battles of World War II: The German View (New York, 1965), Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865–1941 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1971), and Cooper, The German Army, despite Cooper's fascination with armored warfare.
有关 1938 年至 1940 年期间的战役，请参阅 Williamson Murray，《欧洲权力平衡的变化，1938-1939：通向毁灭之路》（普林斯顿，1984 年）。更具体的研究是 Robert M. Kennedy，《德国在波兰的战役》（华盛顿特区，1956 年）；汉斯-阿道夫·雅各布森 (Hans-Adolf Jacobsen)，《Fall Gelb：Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan bis zur Westoffective 1940》（威斯巴登，1957 年）；同上，Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 1939–1940（哥廷根，1956）；同上，Dokumente zum Westfeldzug 1940（哥廷根，1960）；和 RHS Stolfi，“现实与神话：法国和德国的战争准备，1933-1940”（博士论文，斯坦福大学，1966 年）。关于针对英国的战役，请参阅罗纳德·惠特利 (Ronald Wheatley) 的《海狮行动》( Operation Sea Lion ) (牛津，1958 年)； K. Klee，《Das Unternehmen 'Seelöwe》。英国的 Die geplante deutsche Landung（哥廷根，1958 年）；同上，Dokumente zum Unternehmen 'Seelöwe'（哥廷根，1953 年）；沃尔特·安塞 (Walter Ansei)，《希特勒对抗英格兰》（北卡罗来纳州达勒姆，1960 年）；特尔福德·泰勒，《征服进行曲》（纽约，1958 年）；同上，《破浪》（纽约，1967 年）。
For the campaigns between 1938 and 1940 see Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938–1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton, 1984). More specific studies are Robert M. Kennedy, The German Campaign in Poland (Washington, D.C., 1956); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb: Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan bis zur Westoffensive 1940 (Wiesbaden, 1957); idem, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 1939–1940 (Göttingen, 1956); idem, Dokumente zum Westfeldzug 1940 (Göttingen, 1960); and R. H. S. Stolfi, “Reality and Myth: French and German Preparations for War, 1933–1940” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford Univ., 1966). For the campaign against Great Britain, see Ronald Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion (Oxford, 1958); K. Klee, Das Unternehmen ‘Seelöwe.’ Die geplante deutsche Landung in England (Göttingen, 1958); idem, Dokumente zum Unternehmen ‘Seelöwe' (Göttingen, 1953); Walter Ansei, Hitler Confronts England (Durham, N.C., 1960); Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest (New York, 1958); and idem, The Breaking Wave (New York, 1967).
马丁·范·克里维尔德 (Martin Van Creveld) 在《1940-1941 年希特勒的战略：巴尔干线索》(Hitler's Strategy 1940–1941: The Balkan Clue ) (剑桥，1974 年)中讨论了巴尔干战区的事件；克劳斯·奥尔斯豪森（Klaus Olshausen），《巴尔干半岛的Zwischenspiel：Die deutsche Politik gegenüber Jugoslawien und Griechenland vom Mai bis Juli 1941》（斯图加特，1973年）；保罗·N·赫恩 (Paul N. Hehn)，《第二次世界大战中德国与南斯拉夫游击队的斗争：1941-1943 年德国在南斯拉夫的反叛乱》（纽约，1979 年）。关于地中海，请参阅 Gerhard Schreiber，“Der Mitteimeeraum in Hitlers Strategie: 'Programm' und militärische Planung”，Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 28 (1980), 69–99， Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg第三卷，以及 Josef Schröder，Italiens Kriegsaustritt 1943（哥廷根，1969）。关于北非剧院，请参阅 Charles B. Burdick，《Unternehmen Sonnenblume：Der Entschluss zum Afrika-Feldzug》（Vowickel，1972 年）； Waldis Greiselis，Das Ringen um den Brückenkopf Tunesien 1942/43（法兰克福，1976 年）；以及 A. von Taysen 的小型作战研究，《托布鲁克 1941》（弗莱堡，1976 年）。
The events in the Balkan theater are discussed by Martin Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940–1941: The Balkan Clue (Cambridge, 1974); Klaus Olshausen, Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan: Die deutsche Politik gegenüber Jugoslawien und Griechenland vom Mai bis Juli 1941 (Stuttgart, 1973); and Paul N. Hehn, The German Struggle against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II: German Counterinsurgency in Yugoslavaia 1941–1943 (New York, 1979). For the Mediterranean, see Gerhard Schreiber, “Der Mitteimeeraum in Hitlers Strategie: ‘Programm’ und militärische Planung,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 28 (1980), 69–99, the third volume of Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, and Josef Schröder, Italiens Kriegsaustritt 1943 (Göttingen, 1969). For the North African theater, see Charles B. Burdick, Unternehmen Sonnenblume: Der Entschluss zum Afrika-Feldzug (Vowickel, 1972); Waldis Greiselis, Das Ringen um den Brückenkopf Tunesien 1942/43 (Frankfurt, 1976); and the small operational study by A. von Taysen, Tobruk 1941 (Freiburg, 1976).
对苏战争最受关注是完全合理的。阿尔伯特·西顿的《1941-1945年俄德战争》（伦敦，1971年）、亚历山大·韦尔特的《战时的俄罗斯，1941-1945年》（纽约，1964年）以及厄尔·F·齐姆克的《从斯大林格勒到柏林：德军在东线的失败》（华盛顿特区，1968年）都是极佳的入门读物。此外，霍斯特·博格等人主编的《德意志帝国与第二次世界大战》第四卷《对苏进攻》（斯图加特，1983年）也必不可少。在更为专业的研究中，读者可以参考A·比尔的《巴巴罗萨失败》（明斯特大学哲学博士论文，1978年）。 FP 十 Körte，De Duitse aanval of de Sovjet-Unie en 1941，z vols。 （格罗宁根，1968）；巴里·利奇（Barry Leach），《德国对俄罗斯的战略，1939-1941》（牛津，1973）；克劳斯·莱因哈特 (Klaus Reinhardt)，《莫斯科的温德：1941/42 年冬季的希特勒战略计划》（斯图加特，1972 年）；阿尔伯特·西顿，《莫斯科之战，1941-1942》（伦敦，1971 年）； Earl F. Ziemke，《德国北部战区作战，1940-1945》（华盛顿特区，1959 年）；曼弗雷德·凯里格 (Manfred Kehrig)，斯大林格特(斯图加特，1974 年)；恩斯特·克林克 (Ernst Klink)，《Das Gesetz des Handelns：Die Operations 'Zitadelle》，1943 年（斯图加特，1966 年）； Wolfgang Wünsche，Die Entschlussfassung der obersten politischen und militärischen Führung des faschistischen Deutschland für die Sommeroffective der Wehrmacht an der sowjetischdeutschen Front 1943（Diss. A.，德累斯顿，1975）； Hans Meier-Welcker 编辑，Abwehrkämpfe am Nordflügel der Ostfront 1944–45（斯图加特，1963 年）；和 Heinz Magenheimer，Abwehrschlact an der Weichsel 1945（弗莱堡，1976 年）。
It is altogether appropriate that the war against the Soviet Union has attracted the most attention. Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941–1945 (London, 1971), Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945 (New York, 1964), and Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, D.C., 1968) are excellent introductions. In addition the fourth volume of Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, ed. Horst Boog et al. (Stuttgart, 1983) is indispensable. Among the more specialized studies, one may want to consult A. Beer, Der Fall Barbarossa (Diss, phil., Münster, 1978); F. P. ten Körte, De Duitse aanval of de Sovjet-Unie en 1941, z vols. (Groningen, 1968); Barry Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 1939–1941 (Oxford, 1973); Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau: Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/42 (Stuttgart, 1972); Albert Seaton, The Battle for Moscow, 1941–1942 (London, 1971); Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, 1940–1945 (Washington, D.C., 1959); Manfred Kehrig, Stalingrat (Stuttgart, 1974); Ernst Klink, Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation ‘Zitadelle,’ 1943 (Stuttgart, 1966); Wolfgang Wünsche, Die Entschlussfassung der obersten politischen und militärischen Führung des faschistischen Deutschland für die Sommeroffensive der Wehrmacht an der sowjetischdeutschen Front 1943 (Diss. A., Dresden, 1975); Hans Meier-Welcker, ed., Abwehrkämpfe am Nordflügel der Ostfront 1944–45 (Stuttgart, 1963); and Heinz Magenheimer, Abwehrschlact an der Weichsel 1945 (Freiburg, 1976).
阿尔伯特·西顿的《欧洲堡垒的陷落，1943-1945》（伦敦，1981年）全面描绘了战争最后两年的景象。他还涵盖了西线战场，而西线战场的研究远不如东线战场深入。相关的基础研究著作包括：汉斯·施佩德尔的《入侵1944》（图宾根，1944年）；艾伦·威尔特的《大西洋壁垒：希特勒在西线的防御，1941-1945》（艾姆斯，1971年）；约翰·基根的《诺曼底六军：从D日到巴黎解放，1944年6月6日至8月25日》（伦敦，1964年）；以及赫尔曼·荣格的《阿登攻势， 1944/45》（哥廷根，1971年）。
Albert Seaton, The Fall of Fortress Europe, 1943–1945 (London, 1981) provides a comprehensive picture of the last two years of the war. He also covers the western theater of war, which is less well studied than the eastern. Basic studies are Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944 (Tübingen, 1944); Alan Wilt, The Atlantic Wall: Hitler's Defenses in the West 1941–1945 (Ames, 1971); John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, June 6th-August 25th, 1944 (London, 1964); and Hermann Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive 1944/45 (Göttingen, 1971).
人们对坦克战给予了极大的关注，但只要提及 Walther Nehring 的《Die Geschichte der deutscher Panzerwaffe 1916 bis 1945》（柏林，1968 年）和 Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin 的《Panzer Batties》（伦敦，1955 年）就足够了。
Lavish attention has been given to tank warfare, but it suffices to point to Walther Nehring, Die Geschichte der deutscher Panzerwaffe 1916 bis 1945 (Berlin, 1968) and Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, Panzer Batties (London, 1955).
对于德国空军和海军，请参阅 Williamson Murray，《击败战略：德国空军，1933–1945》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地，1983 年）；理查德·J·奥弗里 (Richard J. Overy)，《空战，1939-1945》（纽约，1981 年）；迈克尔·萨莱夫斯基 (Michael Salewski)，《Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945》，第 3 卷。 （法兰克福，1970–75）；和 Friedrich Rüge，Der Seekrieg 1939 年之二 1945 年，第 3 版。 （斯图加特，1962 年）。关于武装党卫队，请参阅 George H. Stein，《武装党卫队：战争中希特勒的精英卫队，1939-1945》（纽约州伊萨卡，1966 年）； B. Wegner，《希特勒的政治士兵：武装党卫军 1933–1945》（帕德博恩，1982 年）；以及 Richard Koehl，《黑衣军团：纳粹党卫军的结构和权力斗争》（麦迪逊，1983 年）。
For the Luftwaffe and navy consult Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1983); Richard J. Overy, The Air War, 1939–1945 (New York, 1981); Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, 3 vols. (Frankfurt, 1970–75); and Friedrich Rüge, Der Seekrieg 1939 bis 1945, 3d ed. (Stuttgart, 1962). On the Waffen SS, see George H. Stein, The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939–1945 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966); B. Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten: DieWaffen-SS 1933–1945 (Paderborn, 1982); and Richard Koehl, The Black Corps: The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS (Madison, 1983).
关于军事政治关系，Manfred Messerschmidt，Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat：Zeit der Indoktrination（汉堡，1969），Klaus-Jürgen Müller，Das Heer und Hitler：Aree und nationsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940（斯图加特，1969），以及 Robert J.奥尼尔的《德国军队和纳粹党，1933-1939》（伦敦，1966 年）设定了非常高的标准。关于战争期间军队与国家社会主义政权之间关系的全面论述尚未撰写。
On military-political relations, Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg, 1969), Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940 (Stuttgart, 1969), and Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939 (London, 1966) set very high standards. A comprehensive treatment of the relations between the army and the National Socialist regime during the war has yet to be written.
如果再次回顾整个时期，人们可能会想回到戈登·A·克雷格的《普鲁士军队的政治》（纽约，1964 年）和赫伯特·罗辛斯基的《德国军队》（纽约，1966 年）。
Surveying the whole period once more one may want to go back to Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (New York, 1964) and Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New York, 1966).
20.利德尔·哈特和戴高乐：有限责任和移动防御原则
20. LIDDELL HART AND DE GAULLE: THE DOCTRINES OF LIMITED LIABILITY AND MOBILE DEFENSE
对两次世界大战之间英国战略演变最全面的论述是诺曼·吉布斯的官方历史著作《大战略》第一卷（伦敦，1976年）。迈克尔·霍华德在《大陆承诺》（伦敦，1972年）一书中对英国在20世纪面临的战略困境进行了精彩的概述。巴兹尔·H·利德尔·哈特的《回忆录》（两卷本，伦敦，1965年）由于其普遍存在的自我辩解的语气以及对英国军事领导人的过度批判，阅读时需谨慎，但它在展现两次世界大战之间英国军队的特征方面仍然非常出色。布莱恩·邦德的《利德尔·哈特：军事思想研究》（伦敦和新泽西州新不伦瑞克，1977年）是迄今为止唯一一部全面论述利德尔·哈特的著作，其中三章专门对哈特在20世纪20年代和30年代的思想进行了批判性分析。迈克尔·霍华德的《战争的起因》（伦敦，1983年；第二版，马萨诸塞州剑桥，1984年）中收录的利德尔·哈特讣告文章指出，哈特在对大陆军的承诺这一问题上的思想存在混乱。杰伊·卢瓦斯在《军队的教育》（伦敦，1965年）中关于富勒和利德尔·哈特的章节至今仍是了解这两位作家的精彩入门读物，尽管他们是否成功地“教育了军队”仍有待商榷。安东尼·特里索尔所著的《“骨头”富勒》（伦敦，1977年）是一部基于富勒遗留手稿的优秀传记，可惜的是，这些手稿与利德尔·哈特的传记相比数量稀少。肯尼斯·麦克西所著的《坦克先驱》（伦敦，1981年）生动地记述了富勒和其他英国机械化倡导者的事迹。约翰·J·米尔斯海默所著的《常规威慑》 （伊萨卡，1983年）对1939-1940年德国军事计划的相关文献进行了精彩的总结。在较为重要的军事回忆录和传记中，布莱恩·邦德主编的《参谋长：亨利·波纳尔爵士中将日记》第一卷（伦敦，1972年）尤为值得关注。罗德里克·麦克劳德和丹尼斯·凯利编，《艾恩赛德日记，1937-1940》（伦敦，1962年）；R·J·明尼，《霍尔-贝利沙的私人文件》（伦敦，1960年）；以及约翰·科尔维尔，《英勇之士：戈特元帅VC勋爵》（伦敦，1972年）。另外两本值得一提的著作，它们对英国军事政策的制定过程提供了重要的启示，分别是彼得·丹尼斯的《默认决策》（伦敦，1972年）和乔治·佩登的《英国重整军备与财政部，1932-1939》（爱丁堡，1978年）。
The most comprehensive account of the evolution of British strategy between the world wars is Norman Gibbs' official history, Grand Strategy, vol. 1 (London, 1976). Michael Howard provides a scintillating survey of Britain's strategic dilemmas in the twentieth century in The Continental Commitment (London, 1972). Basil H. Liddell Hart's Memoirs, 2 vols. (London, 1965) must be read with caution because of their pervasive tone of self-justification and their excessively critical view of Britain's military leaders, but they nevertheless excel in conveying the character of the army between the wars. Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (London and New Brunswick, N.J., 1977), the only full-length account of its subject to date, devotes three chapters to a critical analysis of Liddell Hart's ideas in the 1920s and 1930s. The obituary essay on Liddell Hart reprinted in Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars (London, 1983; 2d ed. Cambridge, Mass., 1984), points out the confusion in his thinking about the Continental commitment. Jay Luvaas's chapters on Fuller and Liddell Hart in The Education of an Army (London, 1965) still constitute a stimulating introduction to both writers, though whether either succeeded in “educating the army” remains open to question. Anthony Trythall, ‘Boney’ Fuller (London, 1977) is a sound biography based on its subject's surviving papers, which unfortunately are sparse in comparison with Liddell Hart's. A lively account of Fuller and other British advocates of mechanization is Kenneth Macksey, The Tank Pioneers (London, 1981). An excellent summary of the literature on German military planning in 1939–1940 is contained in John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, 1983). Among the more important military memoirs and military biographies are Brian Bond, ed., Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Pownall, vol. 1 (London, 1972); Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly, eds., The Ironside Diaries, 1937–1940 (London, 1962); R. J. Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha (London, 1960); and John Colville, Man of Valour: Field Marshal Lord Gort VC (London, 1972). Two other books that deserve mention for the light they throw on the making of British military policy are Peter Dennis, Decision By Default (London, 1972), and George Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932–1939 (Edinburgh, 1978).
目前尚无专著全面记录两次世界大战期间法国战略的发展。杰里·金的《福煦对克列孟梭：法国与德国的分裂， 1918-1919》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1960年）概述了20世纪20年代和30年代初法国战略困境的根源。朱迪思·M·休斯的《奔赴马奇诺防线：20世纪20年代法国军事准备的政治》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1971年）和保罗-埃米尔·图尔努的《保卫边境：高级指挥部、政府，1919-1939》（巴黎，1960年）则对这些问题进行了更深入的探讨。菲利普·CF·班克维茨 (Philip CF Bankwitz)、马克西姆·魏刚 (Maxime Weygand) 和《现代法国的军民关系》 (马萨诸塞州剑桥，1967 年) 阐述了军官与文职当局之间的关系，并在 Paul-Marie de la Gorce、La République et son armée (巴黎，1963 年) 和雅克·诺贝古 (Jacques Nobécourt) 的《军队政治历史》(Une histoire politique de l'armée) 中进行了进一步研究。 1，De Pétain à Pétain，1919-1942（巴黎，1967）。弗朗索瓦-安德烈·保利 (François-André Paoli) 的《1919 年至 1939 年法国军队》第 4 卷可以很好地考察这些年法国军队的技术演变。 （万森纳，1970-77），由亨利·杜泰利完成，《法国土地问题，1935-1939》（万森纳，1981）。杰弗里·克拉克 (Jeffrey Clarke) 的《军事技术在共和法国：法国装甲部队的演变，1917-1940 年》 (安娜堡，1970 年) 和拉迪斯拉斯·麦西洛维奇的《尸检 d'une défaite》 (洛桑，1973 年)对机械化和条令方面的冲突进行了清晰的分析和阐述。戴高乐自己的建议出自他的《战争回忆录》第一卷（巴黎，1954年），但最好还是通过他的《重剑》、《军队》、《法国和儿子的军队》和《三人研究》（最后一本纳入了他的预言性“1940年1月26日备忘录”）来参考其原始形式， （巴黎，分别于 1932 年、1934 年、1938 年和 1945 年）。关于他的思想的其他重要证据出现在他收集的信件、笔记和通行证，卷。 1919 年 6 月 2 日至 1940 年 6 月（巴黎，1980 年），以及他在 1930 年代与雷诺的通信，作为附录发表在《Evelyne Demey, Paul Reynaud, mon père》（巴黎，1980 年）中。雷诺的《法国军事问题》（巴黎，1937年）是另一部重要的资料来源，但他后来的回忆录《法国拯救了欧洲》（巴黎，1947年）对他和戴高乐与军方的争论进行了过于戏剧化和带有倾向性的描述，因此应谨慎阅读。对戴高乐思想的形成和接受的研究可以追溯到吕西安·纳钦近乎圣徒传记式的著作。戴高乐：法国将军（巴黎，1944年），致更具调查性的阿瑟·罗伯逊，《戴高乐将军的战争主义》，让-雷蒙德·图尔努，佩当和戴高乐以及保罗·华德的《戴高乐上校和盲人》（分别于1959年、1964年和1980年，巴黎）。戴高乐的传记作者也考虑了他对军事思想的影响。例如布赖恩·克罗泽 (Brian Crozier) 的《戴高乐：战士》(De Gaulle: The Warrior)（伦敦，1967 年）；伯纳德·莱德维奇，戴高乐（伦敦，1982 年）；和戴高乐的唐·库克（伦敦，1984 年）。进一步了解在战争学院认识年轻戴高乐的下级军官的回忆，例如安德烈·拉法尔格（André Laffargue），《范塔桑·德·加斯科涅》（Fantassin de Gascogne）（巴黎，1962年）和乔治·卢斯托瑙-拉考（Georges Loustaunau-Lacau），《法国反叛回忆录，1 914-1948》（巴黎，1948年）。东正教士兵的观点可以通过主要回忆录和传记来衡量，特别是马克西姆·魏刚 (Maxime Wey-gand)，《回忆录》，第 3 卷。 （巴黎，1950–57）；莫里斯·甘梅林，Servir，3 卷。 （巴黎，1946-47）；阿尔弗雷德·孔凯 (Alfred Conquet)，《Auprès du Maréchal Pétain: Le Chef, le politique, l'homme》（巴黎，1970 年）；玛丽-尤金·德贝尼 (Marie-Eugène Debeney)，《战争与人类》(La guerre et les hommes)（巴黎，1937 年）；理查德·格里菲思，贝当元帅（伦敦，1970 年）；赫伯特·洛特曼，贝当（纽约，1983 年）；皮埃尔·勒·戈耶 (Pierre Le Goyet) 的《Le mystère Gamelin》（巴黎，1975 年）。 J. Duval, Les leçons de la guerre d'Espagne (Paris, 1938)也提出了谨慎现代化而非大规模破坏性变革的基本原理； Jeffery Gunsburg，《分裂与征服：法国最高统帅部与西方的失败》，1940 年（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特，1979 年）；摘自 Gunsburg、Jean Delmas 和 Gilbert Bodinier 在《Revue Historique des Armées》中的文章，第 1 期。 4（1979）。最后，要了解戴高乐提案辩论的外交和经济背景，可以参考让-巴蒂斯特·杜罗塞尔的《颓废，1932-1939》（巴黎，1979 年）；罗伯特·弗兰肯斯坦的《法国重整军备的代价，1935-1939》（巴黎，1982 年）；以及罗伯特·杨的《掌控法国：法国外交政策和军事计划，1933-1940》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1978 年）。
No single volume yet documents the interwar development of French strategy. Jere King, Foch versus Clemenceau: France and German Dismemberment 1918–1919 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) outlines the origins of the dilemmas of the 1920s and early 1930s. The issues are more closely explored in Judith M. Hughes, To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920s (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), and Paul-Emile Tournoux, Défense des frontières: Haut commandement, gouvernement, 1919–1939 (Paris, 1960). Relations between the officers and civilian authorities are illuminated by Philip C. F. Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) and are investigated further in Paul-Marie de la Gorce, La République et son armée (Paris, 1963), and in Jacques Nobécourt's Une histoire politique de l'armée, vol. 1, De Pétain à Pétain, 1919–1942 (Paris, 1967). The French army's technical evolution in these years is best examined through François-André Paoli, L'Armée Française de 1919 à 1939, 4 vols. (Vincennes, 1970–77), completed by Henry Dutailly, Les problèmes de l'armée de terre française, 1935–1939 (Vincennes, 1981). Conflicts over mechanization and doctrine are clearly analyzed and set in perspective by Jeffrey Clarke, Military Technology in Republican France: The Evolution of the French Armored Force, 1917–1940 (Ann Arbor, 1970), and Ladislas Mysyrowicz, Autopsie d'une défaite (Lausanne, 1973). De Gaulle's own recommendations emerge from the first volume of his Mémoires de guerre (Paris, 1954), but may be best consulted in their original form through his Le fil de l'epée, Vers l'armée de métier, La France et son armée, and Trois études, the last incorporating his prophetic “Mémorandum du 26 janvier 1940,” (Paris, 1932, 1934, 1938, and 1945, respectively). Additional significant evidence about his thinking appears in his collected Lettres, notes et carnets, vol. 2, 1919-juin 1940 (Paris, 1980), and in his correspondence with Reynaud in the 1930s published as appendices in Evelyne Demey, Paul Reynaud, mon père (Paris, 1980). Reynaud's Le problème militaire français (Paris, 1937) is another important source, but his subsequent memoir, La France a sauvé l'Europe (Paris, 1947), contains an over-dramatized and tendentious account of his and de Gaulle's disputes with the military establishment and should be read with caution. Studies of the formulation and reception of de Gaulle's ideas extend from Lucien Nachin's almost hagiographical Charles de Gaulle: Général de France (Paris, 1944), to the more investigative Arthur Robertson, La doctrine de guerre du Général de Gaulle, Jean-Raymond Tournoux, Pétain et De Gaulle and Paul Huard's Le Colonel de Gaulle et ses blindés (Paris, 1959, 1964, 1980 respectively). De Gaulle's biographers also consider his influence on military thought. Examples include Brian Crozier, De Gaulle: The Warrior (London, 1967); Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaulle (London, 1982); and Don Cook, Charles de Gaulle (London, 1984). Further light is shed in recollections by junior officers who knew the young de Gaulle at the Ecole de Guerre, such as André Laffargue, Fantassin de Gascogne (Paris, 1962) and Georges Loustaunau-Lacau, Mémoires d'un français rebelle, 1914–1948 (Paris, 1948). Orthodox soldiers' views may be gauged through the principal memoirs and biographies, notably Maxime Wey-gand, Mémoires, 3 vols. (Paris, 1950–57); Maurice Gamelin, Servir, 3 vols. (Paris, 1946–47); Alfred Conquet, Auprès du Maréchal Pétain: Le chef, le politique, l'homme (Paris, 1970); Marie-Eugène Debeney, La guerre et les hommes (Paris, 1937); Richard Griffiths, Marshal Pétain (London, 1970); Herbert Lottman, Pétain (New York, 1983); and Pierre Le Goyet, Le mystère Gamelin (Paris, 1975). The rationales for careful modernization rather than wholesale and disruptive change also emerge from J. Duval, Les leçons de la guerre d'Espagne (Paris, 1938); Jeffery Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940 (Westport, Conn., 1979); and from essays by Gunsburg, Jean Delmas, and Gilbert Bodinier in the Revue Historique des Armées, no. 4 (1979). Finally, the diplomatic and economic context of the debate over de Gaulle's proposals may be understood through Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La décadence, 1932–1939 (Paris, 1979); Robert Frrankenstein's Le prix du réarmement français, 1935–1939 (Paris, 1982); and Robert Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933–1940 (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).
21.来自中央蓝区的声音：空气动力理论家
21. VOICES FROM THE CENTRAL BLUE: THE AIR POWER THEORISTS
论述军事航空史的著作包括：Robin Higham，《空军力量：简明史》（纽约，1972年）；Basil Collier，《空军力量史》（纽约，1974年）；Charles H. Gibbs-Smith，《航空：从起源到二战结束的历史概览》（伦敦，1970年）和《飞行时代》（纽约，1974年）；Alfred F. Hurley 和 Robert C. Ehrhart 主编，《空军力量与战争》（华盛顿特区，1979年）；Eugene M. Emme 主编，《空军力量的影响》（纽约，1959年）和《美国两百年飞行史》（圣地亚哥，1977年）；Howard S. Wolko，《为了飞行：航空航天技术专家》（华盛顿特区，1981年）。约翰·W·R·泰勒和肯尼斯·芒森合著的《航空史》（纽约，1978年）；罗杰·E·比尔斯坦著的《美国飞行史，1900-1983：从莱特兄弟到宇航员》（巴尔的摩，1984年）；以及罗伯特·F·富特雷尔著的《理念、概念、理论：美国空军基本思维史，1907-1964》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地，1971年）。截至本文撰写之时，富特雷尔教授已完成其后续著作的初稿，该书涵盖1965年至1980年。理查德·P·哈利恩的《航空学、航天学和空军力量文献》（华盛顿特区，1984年）是一部近期出版的优秀书目。有关“航空史：现状”的十三篇有价值的书目论文集，请参阅《航空航天史学家》 31，第 1 期（1984 年 3 月）三十周年纪念刊。
Among general works treating the history of military aviation are the following: Robin Higham, Air Power: A Concise History (New York, 1972); Basil Collier, A History of Air Power (New York, 1974); Charles H. Gibbs-Smith, Aviation: An Historical Survey from Its Origins to the End of World War II (London, 1970) and Flight Through the Ages (New York, 1974); Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart, eds., Air Power and Warfare (Washington, D.C., 1979); Eugene M. Emme, ed., The Impact of Air Power (New York, 1959) and Two Hundred Years of Flight in America (San Diego, 1977); Howard S. Wolko, In the Cause of Flight: Technologists of Aeronautics and Astronautics (Washington, D.C., 1981); John W. R. Taylor and Kenneth Munson, History of Aviation (New York, 1978); Roger E. Bilstein, Flight in America, 1900–1983: From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts (Baltimore, 1984); and Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1964 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1971). At this writing, Professor Futrell has completed the first draft of his follow-on volume covering the years 1965 through 1980. An excellent recent bibliography is Richard P. Hallion, The Literature of Aeronautics, Astronautics, and Air Power (Washington, D.C., 1984). For a valuable set of thirteen bibliographical essays treating “Aviation History: The State of the Art,” see the thirtieth anniversary issue of Aerospace Historian 31, no. 1 (March 1984).
关于载人飞行的史前史，可参阅贝里尔·贝克尔的《征服天空的梦想与现实》（纽约，1967年）和克莱夫·哈特的《飞行之梦：从古典时代到文艺复兴时期的航空学》 （纽约，1972年）。M·J·伯纳德·戴维的《空军力量与文明》（伦敦，1941年）和科利尔的《空军力量史》的开篇章节中也有较为简短的论述。关于第一次世界大战前19世纪和20世纪初的发展，可参阅哈利恩书目第10-12页所列的资料。
For the prehistory of manned flight, see Beril Becker, Dreams and Realities of the Conquest of the Skies (New York, 1967) and Clive Hart, The Dream of Flight: Aeronautics from Classical Times to the Renaissance (New York, 1972). Shorter accounts appear in the opening chapters of M. J. Bernard Davy, Air Power and Civilization (London, 1941) and Collier, History of Air Power. For nineteenth- and early twentieth-century developments prior to World War I, see the sources cited on pages 10–12 of Hallion's bibliography.
关于第一次世界大战期间英国军事航空的基本历史，可参阅沃尔特·雷利和H.A.琼斯合著的《空中战争》（共7卷，伦敦，1922-1937年）。关于德国对英国的轰炸，可参阅雷蒙德·H.弗雷德特的《烈焰天空》（纽约，1966年）。关于独立部队的行动，可参阅雷利和琼斯合著的《空中战争》第6卷，第118-174页，以及艾伦·莫里斯的《众多部队之首：英国皇家空军独立部队的故事》（伦敦，1968年）。此外，内维尔·琼斯的《战略轰炸的起源》（伦敦，1973年）和李·肯尼特的《战略轰炸史》（纽约，1982年）也很有帮助。其他关于第一次世界大战航空的重要著作包括：M.毛雷尔主编的《第一次世界大战中的美国空军》（共4卷）。 （华盛顿特区，1978-79 年）；IB Holley, Jr.，《理念与武器》（纽黑文，1953 年；康涅狄格州哈姆登，1971 年重印；华盛顿特区，1983 年重印）；James J. Hudson，《敌对的天空》（锡拉丘兹，1968 年）；Aaron Norman，《伟大的空战》（纽约，1968 年）；Alan Clark，《王牌飞行员：西线空战》（纽约，1973 年）；John R. Cuneo，《空中武器，1914-1916 年》（哈里斯堡，1947 年）；John H. Morrow, Jr.，《第一次世界大战中的德国空军力量》（内布拉斯加州林肯，1982 年）； George van Deurs，《舰队之翼：海军航空兵早期发展史，1910-1916》（安纳波利斯，1966 年）；Douglas Robinson，《齐柏林飞艇作战史：德国海军飞艇师历史，1912-1918》（西雅图，1980 年）；Richard P. Hallion，《战斗机的崛起：第一次世界大战中的空战》（安纳波利斯，1984 年）；Denis Winter，《少数中的佼佼者：第一次世界大战的战斗机飞行员》（佐治亚州雅典，1983 年）；Pierre Lissarague 和 Charles Christienne 编，《法国军事航空史》（巴黎，1980 年；英文译本即将由史密森学会出版社出版）；以及 Sydney F. Wise，《第一次世界大战中的加拿大飞行员》（多伦多，1980 年）。有关其他各种语言的资料，请参阅《航空航天史学家》第 31 卷第 1 期（1984 年 3 月）中的文章以及 Kennett 的《战略轰炸史》第 204-205 页。有关英文资料的详尽汇编，请参阅 Myron J. Smith, Jr. 的《第一次世界大战空战：书目和年表》（新泽西州梅图钦，1977 年）。
The basic history of British military aviation in World War I is Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, 7 vols. (London, 1922–37). For the German bombing raids against England, see Raymond H. Fredette, The Sky on Fire (New York, 1966). For the operations of the Independent Force, see Raleigh and Jones, The War in the Air, 6:118–74, and Alan Morris, First of the Many: The Story of the Independent Force, RAF (London, 1968). Also helpful are Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing (London, 1973) and Lee Kennett, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York, 1982). Other important works treating aviation in World War I include: M. Maurer, ed., The U. S. Air Service in World War I, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1978–79); I. B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons (New Haven, 1953; repr. Hamden, Conn., 1971, and Washington, D.C., 1983); James J. Hudson, Hostile Skies (Syracuse, 1968); Aaron Norman, The Great Air War (New York, 1968); Alan Clark, Aces High: The War in the Air over the Western Front (New York, 1973); John R. Cuneo, The Air Weapon, 1914–1916 (Harrisburg, 1947); John H. Morrow, Jr., German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln, Nebr., 1982); George van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet: A Narrative of Naval Aviation's Early Development, 1910–1916 (Annapolis, 1966); Douglas Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat: A History of the German Naval Airship Division, 1912–1918 (Seattle, 1980); Richard P. Hallion, Rise of the Fighters: Air Combat in World War I (Annapolis, 1984); Denis Winter, The First of the Few: Fighter Pilots of the First World War (Athens, Ga., 1983); Pierre Lissarague and Charles Christienne, eds., Histoire de l'aviation militaire française (Paris, 1980; English translation forthcoming from the Smithsonian Institution Press); and Sydney F. Wise, Canadian Airmen in the First World War (Toronto, 1980). For other sources in various languages see the essays in Aerospace Historian 31, no. 1 (March 1984) and in Kennett, History of Strategic Bombing, 204–205. For a thorough compilation of English-language sources, see Myron J. Smith, Jr., World War I in the Air: A Bibliography and Chronology (Metuchen, N.J., 1977).
关于两次世界大战之间航空发展的最佳资料，请参阅上文引用的理查德·哈利恩（Richard Hallion）书目第16-24页。杜黑（Douhet）的意大利语和法语资料来源列于爱德华·米德·厄尔（Edward Mead Earle）主编的《现代战略的缔造者》（Makers of Modern Strategy，普林斯顿，1943年），第546页。标准的英文译本是迪诺·法拉利（Dino Ferrari）的《空中指挥》（The Command of the Air，纽约，1942年；华盛顿特区，1983年重印）。该书收录了《空中指挥》（约1921年；1927年修订版）、1928年的一篇专著、1929年发表于《航空杂志》（Revista Aeronautica）的一篇文章，以及杜布莱（Doublet）关于“19——战争”的长篇论文，该论文最初发表于《航空杂志》（1930年3月），第409-502页。关于杜黑的其他英文资料可见于伯纳德·布罗迪在其著作《导弹时代的战略》 （普林斯顿大学出版社，1959年）中题为“杜黑的遗产”的章节注释，以及1983年重印版《制空权》的编者导言注释。此外，还应参考弗兰克·J·卡佩卢蒂的《朱利奥·杜黑的生平与思想》（罗格斯大学博士论文，1967年）。
For the best sources on aviation developments between the wars, see pp. 16–24 of Richard Hallion's bibliography cited above. The Italian and French sources for Douhet are listed in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943), 546. The standard English translation is by Dino Ferrari, The Command of the Air (New York, 1942; repr. Washington, D.C., 1983). This volume includes The Command of the Air (c. 1921; rev. ed. 1927); a 1928 monograph; a 1929 article from Revista Aeronautica; and Doublet's long essay on “The War of 19—,” which originally appeared in Revista Aeronautica (March 1930), 409–502. Other English language sources on Douhet are cited in the notes to Bernard Brodie's chapter on “The Heritage of Douhet,” in his Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959) and in the notes to the editors' introduction to the 1983 reprinting of Command of the Air. To these should be added Frank J. Cappeluti, “The Life and Thought of Guilio Douhet” (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1967).
米切尔最重要的出版著作可能是他发表的大量杂志文章，其中大部分收录于美国国会图书馆出版的《威廉·米切尔准将参考文献目录 1879–1936》（华盛顿特区，1942年）。他的著作包括《我们的空军：国防的基石》（纽约，1921年）、《翼式防御：现代空军力量的发展与可能性——经济与军事》（纽约，1925年）以及《空中航线》 （伦敦和费城，1930年）。关于米切尔，唯一可靠的传记是阿尔弗雷德·F·赫尔利所著的《比利·米切尔：空军力量的捍卫者》（纽约，1964年；新版，布卢明顿，1975年），该书侧重于他的思想而非事迹。关于特伦查德，其人格魅力远胜于其思想，可参阅安德鲁·博伊尔所著的《特伦查德》（伦敦，1962年）。对于这一时期，诺布尔·弗兰克兰的《对德轰炸攻势：概述与展望》（伦敦，1965年）一书言简意赅，却道尽了诸多要点。当时关于英国皇家空军立场的最相关著作是约翰·斯莱索的《空军力量与陆军》（伦敦，1936年）。斯莱索直到20世纪60年代一直是英国皇家空军最雄辩的理论家；例如，他的《西方战略》（纽约，1954年）、《中央蓝》（伦敦，1956年）和《伟大的威慑》（伦敦，1957年）等著作便可佐证。关于轰炸机与政治的关系，可参阅乌里·比亚勒的《轰炸机的阴影：1931-1939年英国政治中的空袭恐惧》（伦敦，1980年）。
Mitchell's most important published writings were probably his numerous magazine articles, most of which are listed in Library of Congress, A List of References on Brigadier General William Mitchell 1879–1936 (Washington, D.C., 1942). His books included Our Air Force: The Keystone of National Defense (New York, 1921), Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military (New York, 1925), and Skyways (London and Philadelphia, 1930). The only reliable biography of Mitchell is Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power (New York, 1964; new ed., Bloomington, 1975), which concentrates on his ideas rather than his exploits. On Trenchard, whose personality counted for more than his ideas, see Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London, 1962). For this period Noble Frankland, The Bombing Offensive against Germany: Outlines and Perspectives (London, 1965) says much in few words. The most relevant contemporary book on the RAF stance was John Slessor, Air Power and Armies (London, 1936). Slessor remained until the 1960s the RAF's most eloquent theorist; see, for examples, his Strategy for the West (New York, 1954), The Central Blue (London, 1956), and The Great Deterrent (London, 1957). On bombers and politics, see Uri Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1931–1939 (London, 1980).
两次世界大战期间美国理论发展的重要资料来源包括：Futrell，《思想、概念、理论》； Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.，《击败希特勒的空军计划》（亚特兰大，1972年）；Robert T. Finney，《空军战术学校史，1910-1940》和Thomas H. Greer，《陆军航空兵空军理论的发展，1917-1941》（均由阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地于1955年出版）；Charles M. Melhorn，《双翼狐狸：航空母舰的崛起，1911-1929》（安纳波利斯，1974年）；John F. Shiner，《富卢瓦与美国陆军航空兵，1931-1935》（华盛顿特区，1983年）；以及DeWittS.科普，《几位伟大的上尉：塑造美国空军力量发展的人和事》（纽约州花园城，1980 年）。
Important sources for theoretical developments in the United States between the wars include: Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine; Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, 1972); Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1910–1940, and Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917–1941 (both Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1955); Charles M. Melhorn, Two Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911–1929 (Annapolis, 1974); John F. Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931–1935 (Washington, D.C., 1983); and DeWittS. Copp, A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events That Shaped the Development of U. S. Air Power (Garden City, N.Y., 1980).
关于近期对英美战前理论和理论的批判，参见威廉姆森·默里（Williamson Murray）的《英美空军理论的战前发展》，载于其著作《失败战略：德国空军，1933-1945》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地，1983年）附录1，第321-339页。关于美国部分，默里大量借鉴了托马斯·A·法比亚尼克（Thomas A. Fabyanic）的精辟见解，其著作为《美国空战计划批判，1941-1944》（圣路易斯大学博士论文，1973年）。关于两次世界大战之间的日本，参见阿尔文·D·库克斯（Alvin D. Coox）的《日本帝国空军的兴衰》，载于A· F·赫尔利（A.F. Hurley）和R·C·埃尔哈特（R.C. Ehrhart）主编的《空军力量与现代战争》 ，第84-97页及其引用的资料；另见罗杰·皮诺（Roger Pineau）所著《山本五十六海军大将》，载于迈克尔·卡弗（Michael Carver）编，《战争领主》（波士顿，1976年），第390-403页。关于海军航空，特别是美国海军航空，参见克拉克·G·雷诺兹（Clark G. Reynolds）所著《海军飞行论》，载于《航空航天史学家》第31卷第1期（1984年3月），第21-29页。关于德国空军，参见霍斯特·博格（Horst Boog）所著《日耳曼空军与空战史学》，载于《航空航天史学家》第31卷第1期（1984年3月），第38-42页，以及他的《1935-1945年德国空军的高级指挥与领导》，载于赫尔利（Hurley）和埃尔哈特（Ehrhart）编，《空军力量与现代战争》 。另见默里（Murray）所著《失败的战略》；爱德华·L·霍姆泽，《武装德国空军》（内布拉斯加州林肯市，1976年）；雷蒙德·L·普罗克特，《希特勒的德国空军在西班牙内战中》 （康涅狄格州韦斯特波特市，1983年）。蒙特·杜安·赖特， 《最可能位置：1941年以前的空中导航史》（堪萨斯州劳伦斯市，1972年），是对一个长期被忽视的主题的典范研究，对于理解二战前夕的空中能力至关重要。
For a recent critique of both British and American prewar theory and doctrine, see Williamson Murray, “The Prewar Development of British and American Air Power Doctrine,” appendix 1 to his Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1983), 321–39. For the American portion, Murray leans heavily on the perceptive insights of Thomas A. Fabyanic, “A Critique of U.S. Air War Planning, 1941–1944” (Ph.D. diss., St. Louis University, 1973). For Japan between the wars, see Alvin D. Coox, “The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Air Forces,” in Air Power and Modern Warfare, ed. A. F. Hurley and R. C. Ehrhart, pp. 84–97 and the sources cited therein; also, Roger Pineau, “Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,” in The War Lords, ed. Michael Carver (Boston, 1976), 390–403. For naval aviation in general, with emphasis on the United States, see Clark G. Reynolds, “Writing on Naval Flying,” Aerospace Historian 31, no. 1 (March 1984), 21–29. For the Luftwaffe, see Horst Boog, “Germanic Air Forces and the Historiography of the Air War,” Aerospace Historian 31, no. 1 (March 1984), 38–42, and his “Higher Command and Leadership in the German Luftwaffe, 1935–1945,” Air Power and Modern Warfare, ed. Hurley and Ehrhart. Cf. Murray, Strategy for Defeat; Edward L. Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe (Lincoln, Nebr., 1976); and Raymond L. Proctor, Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War (Westport, Conn., 1983). A model study of a long-neglected topic, crucial to understanding air capabilities on the eve of World War II, is Monte Duane Wright, Most Probable Position: A History of Aerial Navigation to 1941 (Lawrence, Kans., 1972).
关于二战时期空军力量的文献浩如烟海，仅英文文献中最详尽的参考书目就长达五卷；参见小迈伦·J·史密斯（Myron J. Smith, Jr.）的《空战书目，1939-1945》 （Air War Bibliography, 1939–1945），共五卷（堪萨斯州曼哈顿，1977-1982）。基本入门资料是官方历史著作：关于美国陆军航空队的整体历史，可参考韦斯利·弗兰克·克雷文（Wesley Frank Craven）和詹姆斯·利亚·凯特（James Lea Cate）主编的《二战时期的陆军航空队》（The Army Air Forces in World War II），共七卷（芝加哥，1948-1958）；关于英国皇家空军轰炸机司令部的历史，可参考查尔斯·韦伯斯特爵士（Sir Charles Webster）和诺布尔·弗兰克兰（Noble Frankland）合著的《对德战略空袭》（The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany），共四卷（伦敦，1961）。关于1975年以前出版的重要著作，请参阅我的著作《二战战略轰炸》（纽约和伦敦，1976年）的参考书目和注释。此后一些尚未在本注释中引用的重要贡献包括：托马斯·M·科菲的《施韦因富特之争：美国第八航空队争夺昼间轰炸权》（纽约，1977年）；马克斯·黑斯廷斯的《轰炸机司令部：1939-1945年战略轰炸攻势的神话与现实》（伦敦和纽约，1979年）；威尔伯·H·莫里森的《不归路》（纽约，1979年）和《没有屋顶的堡垒》（纽约，1982年）；小海伍德·S·汉塞尔的《对日战略空战》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地，1980年）。 Richard J. Overy，《空战，1939–1945》（纽约，1981 年），这无疑是关于空战整体最全面的单卷本历史；WW Rostow，《入侵前轰炸战略》（奥斯汀，1981 年）；De Witt S. Copp，《浴火重生》（纽约，1982 年）；James C. Gaston，《美国空战计划》（华盛顿特区，1982 年）；以及 Richard H. Kohn 和 Joseph P. Harahan 编辑的《二战和朝鲜战争中的空中优势》（华盛顿特区，1983 年）。
The literature on air power in World War II is so extensive that the most thorough bibliography yet attempted, of English-language sources alone, runs to five thick volumes; see Myron J. Smith, Jr., Air War Bibliography, 1939–1945, 5 vols. (Manhattan, Kans., 1977–82). Basic starting points are the official histories: for the U.S. Army Air Forces as a whole, Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, 7 vols. (Chicago, 1948–58); for RAF Bomber Command, Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 4 vols. (London, 1961). For important works published up to 1975, see the bibliography and notes to my Strategic Bombing in World War II (New York and London, 1976). Among the most important contributions since then that have not yet been cited in this note are: Thomas M. Coffey, Decision over Schweinfurt: The U.S. 8th Air Force Battle for Daylight Bombing (New York, 1977); Max Hastings, Bomber Command: The Myths and Realities of the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939–1945 (London and New York, 1979); Wilbur H. Morrison, Point of No Return (New York, 1979) and Fortress Without a Roof (New York, 1982); Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Strategic Air War against Japan (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1980); Richard J. Overy, The Air War, 1939–1945 (New York, 1981), which is unquestionably the most comprehensive single-volume history of the air war as a whole; W. W. Rostow, Pre-invasion Bombing Strategy (Austin, 1981); De Witt S. Copp, Forged in Fire (New York, 1982); James C. Gaston, Planning the American Air War (Washington, D.C., 1982); and Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, eds., Air Superiority in World War II and Korea (Washington, D.C., 1983).
克拉克·G·雷诺兹的《快速运输机》（纽约，1968年）仍然是该主题的最佳论述，但也可参阅威廉·J·阿姆斯特朗和克拉克·范·弗利特的《美国海军航空兵，1910-1980》，第三版（华盛顿特区，1981年）以及罗伯特·L·谢罗德的《二战时期美国海军陆战队航空兵史》，新版（加利福尼亚州圣拉斐尔，1980年）。近年来出版的最佳第一人称记述包括：爱德华兹·帕克的《娜内特》 （纽约，1977年）；菲利普·阿德里的《轰炸机飞行员》（肯塔基州列克星敦，1978年）；埃尔默·本迪纳的《堡垒的陷落》（纽约，1980年）；以及詹姆斯·A·古德森的《云中骚动》（纽约，1984年）。
Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers (New York, 1968) remains the best treatment of its topic, but see also William J. Armstrong and Clarke Van Fleet, United States Naval Aviation, 1910–1980, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C., 1981) and Robert L. Sherrod, History of United States Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, new ed. (San Rafael, Calif., 1980). Among the best first-person accounts that have appeared in recent years are: Edwards Park, Nanette (New York, 1977); Philip Ardery, Bomber Pilot (Lexington, Ky., 1978); Elmer Bendiner, The Fall of Fortresses (New York, 1980); and James A. Goodson, Tumult in the Clouds (New York, 1984).
关于大规模城市轰炸这一令人沮丧的话题，以下三篇短文颇具启发性：罗伯特·C·巴切尔德的《大规模轰炸的演变》，载于其著作《不可逆转的决定，1939-1950》（波士顿，1962年），第170-189页；迈克尔·谢里的《滑向全面空战》，载于《新共和》，1981年12月16日，第20-25页；以及厄尔·R·贝克的《盟军对德国的轰炸，1942-1945年及德国的回应：判断的困境》，载于《德国研究评论》第5卷第3期（1982年10月），第325-337页。关于战前禁止城市轰炸的努力，可参阅美国陆军少校理查德·H·怀曼的《空战的第一条规则》，载于《空军大学评论》第35卷第1期（1982年1月），第1-10页。 3（1984 年 3 月至 4 月），94-102。
On the dismal topic of the massive bombing of cities, three short essays are instructive: Robert C. Batchelder, “The Evolution of Mass Bombing,” in his The Irreversible Decision, 1939–1950 (Boston, 1962), 170–89; Michael Sherry, “The Slide to Total Air War,” The New Republic, December 16, 1981, 20–25; and Earl R. Beck, “The Allied Bombing of Germany, 1942–1945, and the German Response: Dilemmas of Judgment,” German Studies Review 5, no. 3 (October 1982), 325–37. For a brief review of prewar efforts to outlaw the bombing of cities, see Major Richard H. Wyman, USA, “The First Rules of Air Warfare,” Air University Review 35, no. 3 (March-April 1984), 94–102.
二战战术航空史仍有待研究。以下是一些有益的入门读物：威廉·A·雅各布斯（William A. Jacobs）的《1944-1945年欧洲战区战术空军理论与美国陆军航空队近距离空中支援》（“Tactical Air Doctrine and AAF Close Air Support in the European Theater, 1944–1945”），载于《航空航天史学家》（Aerospace Historian）第27卷第1期（1980年3月），第35-49页，该文内容远比标题所暗示的更为详尽；肯特·罗伯茨·格林菲尔德（Kent Roberts Greenfield）的《陆军地面部队与空地作战队》（Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team），陆军地面部队历史研究第35号，1948年；富特雷尔（Futrell）的《理念、概念、理论》（ Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine）；以及科恩（Kohn）和哈拉汉（Harahan）合著的《二战和朝鲜战争中的空中优势》（Air Superiority in World War II and Korea）。
Tactical aviation in World War II still awaits its historian. Helpful starting points are: William A. Jacobs, “Tactical Air Doctrine and AAF Close Air Support in the European Theater, 1944–1945,” Aerospace Historian 27, no. 1 (March 1980), 35–49, which treats more than its title implies; Kent Roberts Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team, Historical Study No. 35, Army Ground Forces, 1948; Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine; and Kohn and Harahan, Air Superiority in World War II and Korea.
自 1950 年以来出版的关于苏联空军的标准著作包括：阿舍尔·李，《苏联空军》（纽约，1950 年）；罗伯特·A·基尔马克斯，《苏联空军史》（纽约，1962 年）；罗伯特·杰克逊，《红色猎鹰》（纽约，1970 年）；雷·瓦格纳编，利兰·费策尔译，《二战中的苏联空军：官方历史》（纽约，1973 年）；肯尼斯·R·惠廷，《苏联空军，1917-1978》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地，1979 年）以及《二战中的苏联空军》，载于赫尔利和埃尔哈特编，《空军力量与现代战争》，第 98-127 页；亚历山大·博伊德，《1918 年以来的苏联空军》（纽约，1977 年）。 Robin Higham 和 Jacob W. Kipp 主编，《苏联航空与空中力量》（博尔德，1977 年）；Robert P. Berman，《转型中的苏联空中力量》（华盛顿特区，1978 年）；Von Hardesty，《红色凤凰：苏联空中力量的崛起，1941-1945》（华盛顿特区，1982 年）；Paul J. Murphy 主编，《苏联空军》（杰斐逊，北卡罗来纳州，1984 年）；以及 Joshua M. Epstein，《衡量军事力量：苏联对欧洲的空中威胁》（普林斯顿，1984 年）。另见 Jacob W. Kipp，“苏联航空与空中力量研究”，《航空航天史学家》第 31 卷，第 1 期。 1（1984年3月），第43-50页，以及小迈伦·J·史密斯著，《苏联空军和战略火箭军，1939-1980：英文资料指南》（加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉，1981年）。每年3月，《空军杂志》都会对苏联空军的已知情况进行全面更新。
Standard works on Soviet air power published since 1950 include: Asher Lee, The Soviet Air Force (New York, 1950); Robert A. Kilmarx, A History of the Soviet Air Force (New York, 1962); Robert Jackson, The Red Falcons (New York, 1970); Ray Wagner, ed., and Leland Fetzer, trans., The Soviet Air Force in World War II: The Official History (New York, 1973); Kenneth R. Whiting, Soviet Air Power, 1917–1978 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1979) and “Soviet Air Power in World War II,” in Air Power and Modern Warfare, ed. Hurley and Ehrhart, 98–127; Alexander Boyd, The Soviet Air Force since 1918 (New York, 1977); Robin Higham and Jacob W. Kipp, eds., Soviet Aviation and Air Power (Boulder, 1977); Robert P. Berman, Soviet Air Power in Transition (Washington, D.C., 1978); Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941–1945 (Washington, D.C., 1982); Paul J. Murphy, ed., The Soviet Air Forces (Jefferson, N.C., 1984); and Joshua M. Epstein, Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (Princeton, 1984). Compare Jacob W. Kipp, “Studies in Soviet Aviation and Air Power,” Aerospace Historian 31, no. 1 (March 1984), 43–50, and Myron J. Smith, Jr., The Soviet Air and Strategic Rocket Forces, 1939–1980: A Guide to Sources in English (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1981). Each year, the March issue of Air Force Magazine is devoted to a full-scale updating on what is known of the Soviet air forces.
关于核武器背景下的空军力量文献，请参阅本卷中劳伦斯·弗里德曼（Lawrence Freedman）论文的参考文献。关于1950年至1982年间常规空军力量的最佳概述，请参阅M·J·阿米蒂奇（M.J. Armitage）和R·A·梅森（R.A. Mason）合著的《核时代的空军力量》（伊利诺伊州香槟市，1983年）及其引用的资料。迄今为止，持续时间最长、规模最大的空军力量“试验场”——1960年至1975年美国在印度支那的军事经验——尚待历史学家深入研究。然而，即便十年之后，由于美国政府未能积极推进现存文献资料的解密工作，相关研究仍然受到严重限制。关于1977年12月之前出版的英文资料，请参阅小迈伦·J·史密斯（Myron J. Smith, Jr.）的《东南亚空战，1961-1973》（新泽西州梅图钦，1979年）。史密斯书目的有益补充是理查德·迪恩·伯恩斯和米尔顿·莱滕贝格合著的《越南、柬埔寨和老挝战争，1945-1982：书目指南》（加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉，1984年）；尤其参见第七章。莫米尔的《三次战争中的空军力量》提供了美国高级空军指挥官的观点。阿米蒂奇和梅森的《核时代的空军力量》包含一个很有价值的导论章节。拉斐尔·利陶尔和诺曼·厄普霍夫主编的《印度支那空战》（波士顿，1972年）虽然批判性很强，但仍然保持了平衡。美国空军历史办公室至少出版了六卷名为《美国空军在东南亚》的系列丛书；这些书籍以及其他资料列于迈克尔·戈恩和查尔斯·J·格罗斯的《已出版的空军历史：仍在跑道上》（载于《航空航天史学家》第31卷，第1期）一文中。 1（1984 年 3 月），30–37。关于印度支那的零星见解也可在 Kohn 和 Harahan 合著的《二战和朝鲜战争中的空中优势》一书中找到，例如退役中将埃尔伍德·R·奎萨达 (Elwood R. Quesada) 将越南战争中的空中力量描述为“有点像我过去常说的‘作战自慰’”（第 69–70 页）。关于越南战争中的海军航空力量，参见海军历史中心，《美国海军与东南亚冲突精选书目，1950–1975》，修订版（华盛顿特区，1983 年 11 月）。
For the literature regarding air power in relation to nuclear weapons, see the bibliographical note for Lawrence Freedman's essay in this volume. For the best summary accounts of conventional air power between 1950 and 1982, see M. J. Armitage and R. A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age (Champaign, 111., 1983) and the sources cited therein. The longest and by far the most extensive air power “laboratory” to date, the American experience in Indochina from 1960 through 1975, awaits its historian, whose efforts even a decade later are severely restricted owing to the failure of the U.S. government to pursue an aggressive program of declassifying the surviving documentary evidence. For English-language sources published through December 1977, see Myron J. Smith, Jr., Air War Southeast Asia, 1961–1973 (Metuchen, N.J., 1979). A helpful supplement to Smith's bibliography is Richard Dean Burns and Milton Leitenberg, The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, 1945–1982: A Bibliographic Guide (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1984); see especially chapter 7. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, provides the views of the senior American air commander. Armitage and Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age, has a valuable introductory chapter. Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff, eds., The Air War In Indochina (Boston, 1972) is highly critical but nonetheless balanced. The USAF Office of Air Force History has published at least six volumes of its series entitled, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia; these are listed, along with other sources, in Michael Gorn and Charles J. Gross, “Published Air Force History: Still on the Runway,” Aerospace Historian 31, no. 1 (March 1984), 30–37. Occasional insights on Indochina can be found as well in Kohn and Harahan, Air Superiority in World War II and Korea, such as retired Lt. General Elwood R. Quesada's characterization of the air effort in Vietnam as “a little bit of what I used to refer to as operational masturbation” (pp. 69–70). For naval air power in Vietnam, see Naval Historical Center, A Select Bibliography of the United States Navy and the Southeast Asian Conflict, 1950–1975, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C., November 1983).
最后，尽管空军技术，尤其是电子技术的新兴趋势尚未完全属于历史学家的研究范畴，但我们可以从R.A. Mason的《空军力量读本》（英国布拉克内尔，1980年）中窥见一斑。该书有一章简要概述了当代技术发展及其对未来空军应用可能产生的影响。Mason（与Armitage合著）在《核时代的空军力量》第九章中进一步阐述了这些观点。关于遥控飞行器的潜力，还有两篇引人深思的文章：John S. Sanders的《无人世界》，载于《国防与外交事务》巴黎航展特刊（1981年）；以及Michael C. Dunn的《让他们活着回来》，载于《国防与外交事务》 （1984年5月），第25-27页。
Finally, although it is not yet the province of the historian, the emerging trends in the technology of airpower, especially in electronics, can be glimpsed in R. A. Mason, Readings in Air Power (Bracknell, England, 1980), one chapter of which presents a brief survey of contemporary developments in technology and their possible implications for the future application of air power. Mason (with Armitage) develops these points further in chapter 9 of Air Power in the Nuclear Age. Two provocative essays on the potential for remotely-piloted vehicles are: John S. Sanders, “World Without Man,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, Paris Air Show edition (1981); and Michael C. Dunn, “Bringing ‘em Back Alive,” Defense and Foreign Affairs (May 1984), 25–27.
22.苏联战略的形成
22. THE MAKING OF SOVIET STRATEGY
研究苏联战略演变的资料浩如烟海；英文文献中不乏优秀之作，苏联方面也著述颇丰。然而，在使用苏联史料时，必须充分理解特定时期的政治环境。例如，为了全面了解约瑟夫·斯大林的角色，既不能依赖1956年以前那些对他极尽吹捧的著作，也不能依赖赫鲁晓夫时期那些对他极尽诋毁的著作。只要牢记这些注意事项，苏联史学在诸多领域都具有重要的参考价值。
An abundance of material is available to the student of the evolution of Soviet strategy; there are a number of excellent works in English, and the Soviets have produced a voluminous literature on the subject. The Soviet sources must be used with a clear understanding of the prevailing political conditions at any given time. For instance, in order to achieve a balanced view of the role of Josef Stalin, one must not rely on either pre-1956 works, which slavishly worship him, or works written during Khrushchev's reign, which vilify him. With such caveats in mind, one finds Soviet historiography useful on a wide-ranging set of issues.
了解苏联内外政策史的背景，可参阅亚当·乌拉姆的优秀著作《扩张与共存》（第二版，马萨诸塞州剑桥，1974年）。伦纳德·夏皮罗在其著作《苏联共产党》中详细记述了苏联共产党的历史。马克思和恩格斯关于军事的思想散见于他们的著作集中。其中最有价值的包括恩格斯在《反杜林》（埃米尔·伯恩斯译，C.P.杜特编，纽约，1939年）中论述的武力在历史中的作用，以及恩格斯的《军事史》（莫斯科，1957年）。关于军队反革命性质问题的总体观点，可通过阅读《马克思恩格斯选集》 （纽约，1974年）中的《路易·波拿巴的雾月十八日》来理解。
Background on the history of foreign and domestic policy in the Soviet Union can be acquired through Adam Ulam's excellent Expansion and Coexistence, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1974). The history of the Soviet Communist Party is chronicled by Leonard Shapiro in The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The thought of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on the military is scattered among their collected works. The most useful include Friedrich Engels on the role of force in history in Anti-Duhring, trans. Emile Burns and ed. C. P. Dutt (New York, 1939) and Engels, Izbrannye voennye proizvedentia (Moscow, 1957). General points about the problem of the counterrevolutinary nature of the armed forces can be understood through a reading of “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works (New York, 1974).
关于红军创建的最佳单一来源是约翰·埃里克森的《苏联最高统帅部》（纽约和伦敦，1962年）。关于这一时期的苏联文献包括利奥·德·托洛茨基的《革命的起源》（共3卷，莫斯科，1925年）以及尼·沙塔金更为客观的著作《苏联军队在入侵和战争时期的组织和建设》 （莫斯科，1954年）。关于波兰战役，尼·埃·卡库林和瓦·梅利科夫的优秀苏联研究著作《波兰战争》 （莫斯科，1925年）进行了深入探讨。一些关于红军的早期著作至今仍具有价值。其中包括马克斯·维尔纳的《列强的军事实力》（纽约，1939 年）和 D·费奥多托夫-怀特的《红军的成长》（普林斯顿，1943 年）。
The best single source on the creation of the Red Army is John Erickson, The Soviet High Command (New York and London, 1962). Soviet sources on this period include L. D. Trotsky, Kak voorazhalas' revoliutsiia, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1925) and a more dispassionate account by N. I. Shatagin, Organizatsiya i stroitel'stvo sovetskoi armii v period inostrannoi interventsii i grazhdanskoi voiny (Moscow, 1954). The Polish campaign is examined in an excellent Soviet study by N. E. Kakurin and V. A. Melikov, Voina s belopolyakhami (Moscow, 1925). A number of older works on the Red Army are still valuable. These include Max Werner, The Military Strength of the Powers (New York, 1939) and D. Feodotoff-White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton, 1943).
关于苏联军事思想演变的最有价值的研究是雷蒙德·加索夫的《苏联军事学说》（加利福尼亚州圣莫尼卡，1954年）。专门探讨内战对苏联思想影响的英文文献很少；约翰·埃里克森的著作最为有用。然而，苏联方面对此主题著述颇丰。其中一本特别值得关注的著作是S.I.阿拉洛夫的《列宁与红军》（莫斯科，1958年）。关于托洛茨基与伏龙芝辩论的主要文献包括伏龙芝的文集《思想录》 （莫斯科，1927年），由A.S.布勃诺夫编辑，以及伏龙芝文集的众多版本《选集》 （莫斯科，1934年、1950年、1957年、1965年）。关于米哈伊尔·伏龙芝的思想及其相关辩论，沃尔特·达内尔·雅各布的《伏龙芝：苏联的克劳塞维茨： 1885-1925》（海牙，1969年）是一部有用的英文资料。另见V·特里安达菲洛夫的《现代军队作战的性质》（莫斯科，1929年）；米哈伊尔·图哈切夫斯基的《战争作为军事斗争问题》，载于《苏联大百科全书》第12卷（1934年）；鲍里斯·沙波什尼科夫的《军队的战争》 （莫斯科，1927年）；以及A·A·斯韦钦的《战略》（莫斯科，1927年）。
The most valuable study of the evolution of Soviet military thought is Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Santa Monica, Calif., 1954). English language sources specifically on the impact of the civil war on Soviet thought are sparse; John Erickson's book is the most useful. The Soviets, however, have written extensively on this subject. One particularly interesting book is S. I. Aralov, V. I. Lenin i krasnaia armiia (Moscow, 1958). The primary sources on the Trotsky-Frunze debates include Frunze's collected works, Sobranie sochinenii, ed. A. S. Bubnov (Moscow, 1927) and the numerous editions of the selected works, Izbrannye proizvedeniia (Moscow, 1934, 1950, 1957, 1965). A useful English-language source on the thought of Mikhail Frunze and the debates is Walter Darnell Jacob, Frunze: The Soviet Clausewitz: 1885–1925 (The Hague, 1969). See also V. Triandafilov, The Character of Operations of Modern Armies (Moscow, 1929); Mikhail Tukhachevsky, “War as a Problem of Military Struggle,” in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 12 (1934); Boris Shaposhnikov, Mogz armii (Moscow, 1927); and A. A. Svechin, Strategiia (Moscow, 1927).
一些最丰富的苏联史学材料记录了 1920 年代末直到大清洗的时期。例如，参见 IA Korotkov 最近编辑的短文集Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mysli：Kratki ocherk 1917 iyun-1941（莫斯科，1980）。 I. Tyushkevich 的《Stroitel'stvo vooruzbenrtiykh sil'》（莫斯科，1980 年）也详细、最新且冷静。由 AB Kadishev 编辑的Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh 1917–1940，虽然技术性更强，但非常出色（莫斯科，1965 年）。这一时期的传记文献也很有用。尤其信息丰富的是 Lev Nikulin，Tukhachevskti：biograficheskii ocherk（莫斯科，1964 年）。
The period of the late 1920s until the purges is chronicled in some of the richest Soviet historiographic material available. See for instance, a recent collection of brief essays edited by I. A. Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mysli: Kratki ocherk 1917 iyun-1941 (Moscow, 1980). I. Tyushkevich, Stroitel'stvo vooruzbenrtiykh sil' (Moscow, 1980) is also detailed, current, and dispassionate. Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh 1917–1940, edited by A. B. Kadishev, is excellent if somewhat more technical (Moscow, 1965). The biographical literature from this period is also useful; especially informative is Lev Nikulin, Tukhachevskti: biograficheskii ocherk (Moscow, 1964).
第二次世界大战是苏联军事史上的主导性事件，因此也成为大量且日益丰富的相关文献的主题。六卷本的《苏联大战争史》（莫斯科，1955年）是官方史料。总参谋部也出版了一些论战性较弱的历史著作，例如由S.P.普拉托诺夫中将和I.V.帕罗特欣上校编辑的《第二次世界大战， 1939-1945》（莫斯科，1960年）。此外，还有大量但较为分散的回忆录。S.M.什捷缅科的两卷本《战争年代的总参谋部》（莫斯科，1973年）就是一个典型的例子。该书的英文版名为《战争年代的总参谋部》（纽约，1976年）。最好的英文资料包括约翰·埃里克森的史诗巨著《通往斯大林格勒之路》（纽约，1975 年）和《通往柏林之路》（纽约，1983 年）。
The Second World War is the dominant experience in Soviet military history and as such is the subject of an enormous and growing literature. The six-volume Istoriya velikoi otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow, 1955) is the official history. The general staff has also produced a number of histories that are less polemical, including Vtoraya mirovaya voina 1939–1945, edited by Lt. General S. P. Platonov and Col. I. V. Parotkhin (Moscow, 1960). There is also a rich, if diffuse, memoir literature. S. M. Shtemenko's two-volume Generalnii stab v gody voiny (Moscow, 1973) is a fine example. It is available in English as The General Staff in the Years of the War (New York, 1976). The best English-language sources include John Erickson's epic works The Road to Stalingrad (New York, 1975) and The Road to Berlin (New York, 1983).
蒂莫西·科尔顿在其著作《委员、指挥官和文职权威：苏联军事政治的结构》 （马萨诸塞州剑桥，1979 年）5中对苏联军事委员制度的演变和发展进行了精彩的研究，该书涵盖了苏联军事史的所有时期。
The evolution and development of the Soviet military commissar system has been brilliantly researched by Timothy Colton in Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1979)5 which covers all periods in Soviet military history.
23.盟军在欧洲的战略，1939- 1945年
23. ALLIED STRATEGY IN EUROPE, 1939–1945
关于二战盟军战略的文献浩如烟海，种类繁多，散见于官方和非官方渠道。其中最有价值的二手资料是多卷本的官方历史丛书，这些丛书基于英国和美国国家档案馆的大量原始档案，由两国官方历史机构在战后编纂而成。对于英国方面，由J.R.M. Butler编辑的《二战史》（英国军事丛书）中的“大战略”子丛书尤为有用。关于美国战略在华盛顿、海外战场和国际会议上的演变，相关著作包括由Kent R. Greenfield编辑的《二战中的美国陆军》丛书、由Samuel E. Morison编纂的《二战中的美国海军作战史》丛书，以及由Wesley F. Craven和James L. Cate编辑的《二战中的美国陆军航空兵》丛书。
Literature dealing with Allied strategy in the Second World War is voluminous, varied, and scattered in official and unofficial sources. Among the most valuable of the secondary sources are the multivolume officially sponsored historical series, based on the massive collections of primary records in the national archives of Great Britain and the United States, and produced by the official historical offices of those countries after the war. Particularly useful on the British side are the volumes in the Grand Strategy subseries of the History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, edited by J. R. M. Butler. Pertinent works on American strategy as it evolved in Washington, the overseas theaters, and in international meetings are in the U.S. Army in World War II series, edited by Kent R. Greenfield, in the History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II series, produced by Samuel E. Morison, and in the Army Air Forces in World War II series, edited by Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate.
英美两国主要政治和军事领导人的传记和回忆录包含宝贵的信息，但质量自然参差不齐。就英国而言，温斯顿·S·丘吉尔在其《第二次世界大战》系列著作中，以一手资料和个人回忆为基础，堪称杰作，对于研究战争战略和政治家风范具有极高的价值。遗憾的是，富兰克林·D·罗斯福总统没有留下回忆录。丘吉尔和罗斯福的通信集已由沃伦·F·金博尔编辑，收录于《丘吉尔与罗斯福：完整通信集》（共三卷，普林斯顿，1984年）。关于罗斯福战时领导才能的二手文献也在不断增加。罗伯特·E·舍伍德的《罗斯福与霍普金斯：一段亲密的历史》（修订版，纽约，1950年）是一部生动且多为第一手资料的记述，至今仍是关于战时战略和政策方面最有价值的著作之一。关于罗斯福在战争时期的角色和政策分析，请参阅莫里斯·马特洛夫的《罗斯福先生的三场战争：作为战争领袖的富兰克林·罗斯福》，哈蒙军事史纪念讲座第6号，美国空军学院（科罗拉多州，1964年），以及同一作者的另一篇文章《作为战争领袖的富兰克林·罗斯福》 ，载于哈里·L·科尔斯主编的《全面战争与冷战》（哥伦布，1962年）。关于对美国在二战中的领导作用的评价，包括总统与其军事顾问的关系及其成败，请参阅莫里斯·马特洛夫的文章《传统的局限：重新审视美国在二战中的领导作用》，载于西德尼·阿斯特主编的《作为国家经验的二战》（渥太华，1981年）。亨利·L·史汀生和麦克乔治·邦迪合著的《和平与战争中的现役》（纽约，1948年）一书，从战争部长的角度对美国战略和政策进行了极具价值的阐述。约翰·R·迪恩的《奇异的联盟》（纽约，1947年）至今仍是一部准确而富有启发性的英美苏战时合作的亲历者记述。参谋长联席会议成员的回忆录也很有价值，例如亨利·H·阿诺德将军、欧内斯特·J·金海军上将和威廉·D·莱希海军上将的回忆录。陆军参谋长乔治·C·马歇尔将军没有留下关于其战时经历的回忆录，但福雷斯特·C·波格基于对一手和二手资料的仔细评估以及对马歇尔将军的多次采访而撰写的多卷本传记，为了解他的战时经历提供了重要的信息。
Biographies and memoirs of the leading British and American political and military leaders contain valuable information but naturally vary in quality. On the British side, the masterful volumes by Winston S. Churchill in his series, The Second World War, based on primary material as well as his recollections, are of enormous value for the study of war strategy and statesmanship. Unfortunately, President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not leave memoirs. The correspondence of Churchill and Roosevelt has been collected in Churchill and Roosevelt, The Complete Correspondence, ed. Warren F. Kimball, 3 vols. (Princeton, 1984). Secondary literature on Roosevelt's war leadership continues to grow. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, rev. ed. (New York, 1950), a vivid, often firsthand account, remains one of the most useful published volumes on wartime strategy and policy. For an analysis of Roosevelt's wartime role and policies see Maurice Matloff, “Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars: FDR as War Leader,” Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History, no. 6, United States Air Force Academy (Colorado, 1964) and the same author's essay, “Franklin Roosevelt as War Leader,” in Total War and Cold War, ed. Harry L. Coles (Columbus, 1962). For an appraisal of American leadership in the Second World War, including the relations of the President and his military advisors, and their successes and failures, see the essay by Maurice Matloff, “The Limits of Tradition: American Leadership in World War II Reconsidered,” in The Second World War as a National Experience, ed. Sidney Aster (Ottawa, 1981). A valuable treatment of American strategy and policy, as viewed by the secretary of war, is contained in the account by Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948). John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York, 1947) remains an accurate and illuminating eyewitness account of Anglo-American and Soviet wartime collaboration. Useful accounts by the wartime members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the memoirs of General Henry H. Arnold, Admiral Ernest J. King, and Admiral William D. Leahy. General George C. Marshall, the army chief of staff, did not leave memoirs of his wartime service but Forrest C. Pogue's multivolume biography, based on a careful appraisal of the primary and secondary sources and numerous interviews with him, supplies an important part of the story.
有关 1941 年前美国战略规划的更详细讨论，请参阅 Mark S. Watson 的《参谋长：战前计划和准备》（华盛顿特区，1950 年），特别是美国陆军在二战中的官方系列丛书中的第 1-5 章和第 10 章；Maurice Matloff 和 Edwin M. Snell 的《联盟战争战略规划，1941-1942 年》（华盛顿特区，1953 年），第1-3章；Maurice Matloff 的《美国战争方法，1919-1945 年》，载于Michael Howard编辑的《战争理论与实践》（伦敦，1965 年）；以及 Maurice Matloff 的《战前军事计划和准备，1939-1941 年》，载于《美国海军学会会刊》第 79 卷（1953 年 7 月）。
For a fuller discussion of American strategic planning before 1941 see Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C., 1950), especially chapters 1–5, 10, in the official U.S. Army in World War II series; Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 (Washington, D.C., 1953), chapters 1–3; Maurice Matloff, “The American Approach to War, 1919–1945,” in The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (London, 1965); and Maurice Matloff, “Prewar Military Plans and Preparations, 1939–1941,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 79 (July 1953).
关于波莱罗计划的制定和火炬行动的决策，请参阅 Matloff 和 Snell 合著的《 1941-1942年联合战争战略规划》第8、12、13章；Sherwood、Roosevelt 和 Hopkins合著的《罗斯福和霍普金斯》第23、25章；Stimson 和 Bundy合著的《和平与战争中的现役》第 17 章；以及 Winston S. Churchill 的《命运的转折点》（波士顿，1950 年）第 1 卷第18、22章和第2 卷第2 章。
On the development of the Bolero plan and the decision for Torch, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, chapters 8, 12, 13; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, chapters 23, 25; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, chapter 17; and Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston, 1950), book 1, chapters 18, 22 and book 2, chapter 2.
关于二战中期英美战略的争论，莫里斯·马特洛夫的《联合战争战略规划，1943-1944》（华盛顿特区，1953年）、迈克尔·霍华德的《大战略》第四卷（1942年8月至1943年9月，伦敦，1972年）、约翰·埃尔曼的《大战略》第五卷（1943年8月至1944年9月，伦敦，1956年）以及丘吉尔的《命运的转折点与包围圈》（波士顿，1951年）均有详细论述。迈克尔·霍华德和约翰·埃尔曼的著作均属于《第二次世界大战史》英国军事系列。
The midwar debate over Anglo-American strategy is treated in detail in Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944 (Washington, D.C., 1953); Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, vol. 4, August 1942-September 1943 (London, 1972); John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. 5, August 1943-September 1944 (London, 1956); Churchill, The Hinge of Fate and Closing the Ring (Boston, 1951). The volumes by Michael Howard and John Ehrman are part of the History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series.
关于德黑兰会议的讨论详情，可参阅丘吉尔的《闭合环线》第4、5、6章；舍伍德的《罗斯福与霍普金斯》第23章；马特洛夫的《联盟战争战略规划，1943-1944》第16章；以及埃尔曼的《大战略》第5卷第4章。另见美国国务院，《1943年开罗和德黑兰会议》（华盛顿特区，1961年）。
Details of the discussion on the Teheran Conference may be found in Churchill, Closing the Ring, chapters 4, 5, 6; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, chapter 23; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, chapter 16; and Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. 5, chapter 4. See also U.S. Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, D.C., 1961).
1944 年初几个月英美辩论的细节可追溯到 Matloff 的《1943-1944 年联合战争战略规划》第18、21章；Gordon A. Harrison 的《跨海峡进攻》（华盛顿特区，1951 年）第 5 章和Forrest C. Pogue 的《最高指挥部》（华盛顿特区，1954 年）第6、12章，这两卷都是美国陆军在二战中的官方系列丛书；Ehrman 的《大战略》第 5 卷第6、7、9章； Churchill 的《合围》第11章和《胜利与悲剧》（波士顿，1953 年）第 4 章。有关欧洲战略辩论最后阶段的分析，请参阅 Maurice Matloff 的文章“铁砧决策：战略的十字路口” ，载于 Kent R. Greenfield 编辑的《指挥决策》（华盛顿特区，1960 年）。
Details of the Anglo-American debate in the early months of 1944 are traced in Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, chapters 18, 21; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, D.C., 1951), chapter 5, and Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, D.C., 1954), chapters 6, 12, both volumes in the official U.S. Army in World War II series; Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. 5, chapters 6, 7, 9; Churchill, Closing the Ring, chapter 11, and Triumph and Tragedy (Boston, 1953), chapter 4. For an analysis of the last phase of the debate over European strategy see Maurice Matloff, “The Anvil Decision: Crossroads of Strategy,” in Command Decisions, ed. Kent R. Greenfield (Washington, D.C., 1960).
有关美国在太平洋战争中的战略和计划的详细故事，请参阅路易斯·莫顿的《战略与指挥：最初两年》（华盛顿特区，1961 年）；菲利普·A·克罗尔的《马里亚纳群岛战役》（华盛顿特区，1959 年）；罗伯特·罗斯·史密斯的《菲律宾的胜利》（华盛顿特区，1963 年），所有这些卷都是美国陆军在二战系列丛书中的；塞缪尔·E·莫里森的《阿留申群岛、吉尔伯特群岛和马绍尔群岛、新几内亚和马里亚纳群岛》和《太平洋的胜利》第 7、8 和 14 卷（波士顿，1951-1960 年），这是美国海军在二战中的作战史系列丛书；以及格林菲尔德的《指挥决策》第11章和第21章。
For the detailed story of American strategy and planning for the war in the Pacific, see particularly Louis Morton, Strategy and Command, The First Two Years (Washington, D.C., 1961); Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas (Washington, D.C., 1959); and Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines (Washington, D.C., 1963), all volumes in the U.S. Army in World War II series; Samuel E. Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, New Guinea and the Marianas, and Victory in the Pacific, vols. 7, 8, and 14 (Boston, 1951–60) in the History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II series; and Greenfield, Command Decisions, chapters 11, 21.
对于研究美国战时政策及其与苏联的关系而言，两份官方文件中收录的当代资料尤为有用，它们分别是：《苏联对日战争的介入：1941-1945年军事计划》（美国国防部新闻稿，1955年9月）和美国国务院出版的《1945年马耳他和雅尔塔会议》（华盛顿特区，1955年）。关于美国在对日战争和对德战争中分别与苏联的政治军事关系的简要分析，请参阅欧内斯特·R·梅的《美国、苏联与远东战争，1941-1945》（载《太平洋历史评论》第24卷，1955年5月）和莫里斯·马特洛夫的《苏联与西方战争》（载《美国海军学会会刊》第82卷，1956年3月）。
Particularly useful for American wartime policies and relations with the Soviet Union are the contemporary sources incorporated in two official documentaries, The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan: Military Plans 1941–1945, Department of Defense Press Release, September, 1955; and U.S. Department of State, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1955). For summary analyses of American politico-military relations with the Soviet Union in the war against Japan and Germany respectively, see Ernest R. May, “The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Far Eastern War, 1941–1945,” Pacific Historical Review 24 (May 1955); and Maurice Matloff, “The Soviet Union and the War in the West,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 82 (March 1956).
24.美日两国在太平洋战争中的战略
24. AMERICAN AND JAPANESE STRATEGIES IN THE PACIFIC WAR
总的来说，关于 1941 年至 1945 年战争前后美国和日本战略的英文文献的特点是：侧重于战前时期，特别是外交和海军战略方面；以及几乎完全缺乏对日本学者重要研究的翻译（日本自卫队正在编纂的多卷本战争史目前也没有英文版的计划）。
In general, the English-language literature on American and Japanese strategies preceding and during the war of 1941–1945 has been characterized by emphasis on the prewar period, especially the diplomatic and naval strategic aspects; and by the nearly total lack of translation of important studies by Japanese scholars (nor are there plans yet for an English edition of the Japan Self-Defense Agency's ongoing multivolume history of the war).
从第一次世界大战到珍珠港事件这段时期，最好的著作包括：罗杰·丁曼的《太平洋上的权力：海军武器限制的起源，1914-1922》（芝加哥，1976年）；入江彰的《后帝国主义：远东新秩序的探索，1921-1933》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1965年）；多萝西·博格的《美国与1933 -1938年的远东危机》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1964年）；斯蒂芬·E·佩尔茨的《珍珠港竞赛：第二次伦敦海军会议的失败与第二次世界大战的爆发》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1974年）；以及多萝西·博格和冈本俊平主编的《珍珠港历史：日美关系，1931-1941》（纽约，1973年）。 Robert JC Butow，《东条英机与战争的到来》（普林斯顿，1961 年）；以及 Gordon W. Prange 等人，《黎明时分我们入睡：珍珠港事件不为人知的故事》（纽约，1981 年）。
For the era from the First World War to Pearl Harbor, the best books are Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922 (Chicago, 1976); Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938 (Cambridge, Mass., 1964); Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1974); Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941 (New York, 1973); Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, 1961); and Gordon W. Prange et al., At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York, 1981).
近期有三部著作脱颖而出，成为对二战期间美国和日本国家战略最具思考性和最严谨的论述：入江彰的《权力与文化：日美战争，1941-1945》（马萨诸塞州剑桥，1981年），是任何严肃研究者的起点；克里斯托弗·索恩的《同一种盟友：美国、英国与对日战争，1941-1945》（纽约，1978年），一部深入而令人不安的分析著作；以及迈克尔·沙勒的《美国在中国的十字军东征，1938-1945》（纽约，1979年），对一个已被著述颇多的主题进行了引人深思的重新审视。
Three recent works stand out as the most thoughtful and sound on American and Japanese national strategies during the Second World War: Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), the starting point for any serious student; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945 (New York, 1978), a searching and disturbing analysis; and Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945 (New York, 1979), a provocative reexamination of a subject about which much has been written.
目前尚无专著全面论述太平洋战争中日本、美国或盟军的国家和军事战略。肯特·R·格林菲尔德的《二战中的美国战略：重新思考》（巴尔的摩，1963年）和塞缪尔·E·莫里森的《战略与妥协》（波士顿，1958年）是两部对英美整体军事战略进行精辟而简明的研究著作。
There is no single volume on Japanese and American, or Allied, national and military strategies in the Pacific war. Perceptive but brief studies on overall Anglo-American military strategy are Kent R. Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore, 1963); and Samuel E. Morison, Strategy and Compromise (Boston, 1958).
美国、英国、澳大利亚、新西兰和印度的二战官方史料均包含有关对日战争的卷册，其中一些卷册专门论述了战略。然而，大多数官方史料的重点在于作战行动。英国的系列史料包括一卷关于英国外交政策的卷册和三卷关于大战略的卷册，其中包含大量关于美国太平洋战略制定的资料。路易斯·莫顿的《战略与指挥：最初两年》和《美国陆军在二战中：太平洋战争》（华盛顿特区，1962年）是研究美国对日战争军事战略的两部不可或缺的著作；还有格蕾丝·P·海耶斯的《二战时期参谋长联席会议史：对日战争》（安纳波利斯，1982年），该书实际上于1953年完成。美国陆军二战系列丛书中的其他几卷也提供了大量关于美国在太平洋战争中军事战略演变的信息，包括莫里斯·马特洛夫和埃德温·M·斯内尔的《1941-1942年联合战争战略规划》（华盛顿特区，1953年）；莫里斯·马特洛夫的《 1943 -1944年联合战争战略规划》（华盛顿特区，1959年）；理查德·M·莱顿和罗伯特·W·科克利的《1940-1943年全球后勤与战略》（华盛顿特区，1955年）。以及罗伯特·W·科克利和理查德·M·莱顿合著的《全球后勤与战略，1943-1945》 （华盛顿特区，1968年）。查尔斯·A·威洛比主编的《麦克阿瑟将军报告》前三卷（共4卷，华盛顿特区，1966年）涵盖了美国和日本在西南太平洋作战中的战略和战术。
The American, British, Australian, New Zealand, and Indian official histories of the Second World War all contain volumes on the war with Japan, some of which devote valuable sections to strategy. For the most part, however, the emphasis is on operations. The United Kingdom series includes a volume on British foreign policy and three on grand strategy that contain much data about American strategy making for the Pacific. Two volumes that are indispensable on American military strategy in the war against Japan are Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, D.C., 1962); and Grace P. Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War against Japan (Annapolis, 1982), which actually was completed in 1953. Additional volumes in the United States Army in World War II series that have a great deal of information on the evolution of United States military strategy in the Pacific conflict are Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 (Washington, D.C., 1953); Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944 (Washington, D.C., 1959); Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943 (Washington, D.C., 1955); and Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945 (Washington, D.C., 1968). The first three volumes of Charles A. Willoughby, ed., Reports of General MacArthur, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1966), cover both American and Japanese strategy and tactics in Southwest Pacific operations.
25.前两代核战略家
25. THE FIRST TWO GENERATIONS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGISTS
除了我的著作《核战略的演变》（伦敦，1981年）之外，还有一些关于核战略的通史著作。唐纳德·斯诺的《动态世界中的核战略》（阿拉巴马大学，1981年）提供了全面的概述。迈克尔·曼德尔鲍姆的《核问题》（剑桥和纽约，1979年）并非一部完全令人满意的历史著作，它过于侧重肯尼迪时期；相比之下，他的《核革命》（剑桥和纽约，1981年）则内容更为丰富，并对核武器的出现给国际体系带来的变革提出了许多独到的见解。弗雷德·卡普兰的《末日巫师：核时代的战略家》（纽约，1983年）虽然侧重于轶事，缺乏广度，但其中包含许多关于核战略家本身，特别是那些与兰德公司有关的战略家的有趣内容。从截然不同的角度来看，科林·格雷的《战略研究与公共政策》（肯塔基州列克星敦，1982年）对美国战略研究界的表现进行了批判性评估。戴维·艾伦·罗森伯格对美国战略政策的发展进行了最为详尽的研究，令人印象深刻。他发表于《国际安全》第7卷第4期（1983年春季）的《过度杀伤的起源：核武器与美国战略，1945-1960》一文尤为重要。
In addition to my Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London, 1981), there are a number of general histories of nuclear strategy. Donald Snow, Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World (University, Ala., 1981) provides a broad overview. Michael Mandelbaum's The Nuclear Question (Cambridge and New York, 1979) is a not wholly satisfactory history, concentrating too much on the Kennedy period; by contrast, his The Nuclear Revolution (Cambridge and New York, 1981) is far more substantial and contains many interesting insights on the changes to the international system resulting from the advent of nuclear weapons. Fred Kaplan's The Wizards of Armageddon: Strategists of the Nuclear Age (New York, 1983) is anecdoctal and lacking in breadth, but it contains much of interest on the nuclear strategists themselves, especially those involved with the Rand Corporation. From a completely different perspective, Colin Gray's Strategic Studies and Public Policy (Lexington, Ky., 1982) provides a critical assessment of the performance of the American strategic studies community. The most impressive detailed research on the development of U.S. strategic policy has been conducted by David Alan Rosenberg. His “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983) is particularly important.
第一部关于核战略的重要学术著作是由伯纳德·布罗迪编辑的《绝对武器》（纽约，1946年）。他的《导弹时代的战略》（普林斯顿，1959年）是该领域的第一本教科书，至今仍是一部极具价值的入门读物。布罗迪对战略思想的发展越来越感到失望。这一点在他的著作《升级与核选项》（普林斯顿，1966年）以及论文集《战争与政治》（伦敦，1973年）中均有所体现。
The first major academic work on nuclear strategy was edited by Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York, 1946). His Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959) was the first textbook on the subject and remains an extremely valuable introduction. Brodie became more and more disenchanted with developments in strategic thinking. This is reflected in his Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton, 1966) and in a collection of essays, War and Politics (London, 1973).
核战略家的公众形象逐渐被赫尔曼·卡恩这位令人敬畏的人物所主导。他的第一本书是基于他著名的系列讲座而作，名为《论热核战争》（普林斯顿，1960年）。第二本书是为了回应第一本书受到的批评而作，书名为《思考不可思议之事》（纽约，1962年）。他的第三本书，或许也是他最好的作品，是《论升级：隐喻与情景》（纽约，1965年）。
The public image of nuclear strategists came to be dominated by the formidable figure of Herman Kahn. His first book, based on a famous lecture series, was On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, 1960). The second, titled in response to criticism of the first, was Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York, 1962). His third, and possibly his best, was On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York, 1965).
托马斯·谢林在核问题概念框架的构建方面可能产生了更为深远的影响，他的著作极富想象力且见解深刻。他最著名的两部著作是《冲突的战略》（纽约，1960年）和《军备与影响》（纽黑文，1966年）。鲜为人知但同样阐述其基本思想的，是他与莫顿·哈尔珀林合著的小册子《受控反应与战略战争：战略与军备控制》（纽约，1962年），该书由伦敦战略研究所于1965年6月出版，对军备控制的概念进行了早期探讨。
Thomas Schelling has probably had a more lasting influence in terms of the conceptual framework within which nuclear issues are commonly understood, and his writing is imaginative and rich in insight. His two best-known books are The Strategy of Conflict (New York, 1960) and Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966). Less well known but a useful exposition of his basic approach is a pamphlet published by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London in June 1965, Controlled Response and Strategic Warfare: Strategy and Arms Control (New York, 1962), writtten in collaboration with Morton Halperin, which provides an early discussion of the concept of arms control.
阿尔伯特·沃尔斯特特对当代战略思想的发展产生了相当大的影响，尤其是在其与政策制定的关系方面。他没有撰写过任何专著，但发表了许多重要的文章。其中最重要的是发表在《外交事务》第37卷第2期（1959年1月）的《恐怖主义的微妙平衡》。他先后在《外交政策》杂志上发表的两篇文章——《是否存在战略军备竞赛？》和《竞争对手，但并非竞赛》（1974年夏秋两季）——对公众辩论产生了重大影响。
Albert Wohlstetter has exercised a considerable influence on the development of contemporary strategic thinking, especially in its relationship to policy making. He has not written any full-length books but has contributed a number of significant articles. The most important of these is “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959). Two articles published in successive issues of Foreign Policy, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” and “Rivals but No Race” (Summer and Fall 1974), had a major impact on the public debate.
这些作家都在当代战略研究的“黄金时代”——即20世纪50年代中期至60年代中期——声名鹊起。这一时期的其他重要著作包括威廉·考夫曼主编的《军事政策与国家安全》（普林斯顿，1956年）、罗伯特·恩迪科特·奥斯古德的《有限战争：美国战略的挑战》（芝加哥，1957年）以及亨利·基辛格的《核武器与外交政策》 （纽约，1957年）。这些著作的写作目的都是为了回应当时人们所认为的“大规模报复”政策的缺陷。格伦·斯奈德的《威慑与防御》（普林斯顿，1961年）也是这一时期的重要著作。
These writers all made their names during the “golden age” of contemporary strategic studies, which lasted from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. The other seminal works of this period were William Kaufmann, ed., Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, 1956), Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, 1957), and Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957). These were all written in response to what were seen to be the deficiencies in the policy of “massive retaliation.” Another important book of this period was Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, 1961).
此后，对核战略问题的最重要分析往往出自美国国防部长之手。罗伯特·麦克纳马拉尤其在1961年至1968年担任五角大楼部长期间及其卸任后，多年来主导了相关辩论。他的基本思想体现在他根据向国会提交的年度报告整理而成、在他辞职后出版的论文集中，即《安全的本质：任职期间的反思》（伦敦，1968年）。詹姆斯·施莱辛格是第一位真正意义上担任国防部长的战略家。他在1974年初和1975年初向国会提交的报告表明，他试图调整美国战略，使其摆脱麦克纳马拉制定的方针。这一尝试在20世纪70年代末卡特政府时期仍在继续。例如，参见沃尔特·斯洛科姆的《反制战略》，载《国际安全》第5卷第4期（1981年春季）。
After this period the most important analyses of nuclear strategic issues tended to come from American secretaries of defense. Robert McNamara in particular set the terms of the debate for many years, both during his tenure at the Pentagon from 1961 to 1968 and after. His basic ideas are contained in essays derived from his annual statements to Congress but published after his resignation: The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (London, 1968). James Schlesinger was the first strategist actually to become secretary of defense. His presentations to Congress of early 1974 and 1975 convey his attempt to reorient U.S. strategy away from the approach laid down by McNamara. This attempt continued in the late 1970s under the Carter administration. See for example Walter Slocombe “The Countervailing Strategy,” International Security 5, no. 4 (Spring 1981).
在试图推动美国政策进一步偏离麦克纳马拉模式的学术战略家中，科林·格雷尤为活跃。他与基思·佩恩合著的《胜利是可能的》（载于《外交政策》杂志第39期，1980年夏季刊）一文引起了广泛关注。罗伯特·杰维斯的《美国核战略的谬误》 （伊萨卡，1984年）一书则体现了对这类论点的反驳，其论证牢牢扎根于“黄金时代”的概念。
Among academic strategists attempting to push U.S. policy even further away from the McNamara approach, Colin Gray has been particularly active. An article that gained considerable attention was written with Keith Payne, “Victory is Possible,” Foreign Policy, no. 39 (Summer 1980). An example of the reaction to this sort of argument, and one based firmly in the concepts of the “golden age” is Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, 1984).
26.核时代的常规战争
26. CONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
探讨核时代如何运用常规力量进行战争的理论文献十分匮乏。自1945年以来，所有思考和著述战争问题的学者，其思想自然都受到核武器带来的问题的主导。关于这一主题的文献浩如烟海，其中常规作战通常被视为核武器作战的过渡阶段或补充手段，而很少关注其具体作战方式。尤其是在20世纪50年代末和60年代初，人们倾向于认为，在核武器的阴影下，唯一可能发生的常规战争形式是某种游击战或所谓的“丛林战”。
Literature discussing the theory of how wars might or should be conducted with conventional forces in the nuclear age is sparse. The minds of those who have thought and written about war since 1945 have naturally been dominated by the problems raised by nuclear weapons. There is a vast field of literature on that subject, within which conventional operations are generally considered as a phase in or adjunct to ones including nuclear weapons, and little attention is given to how they are conducted. There was a tendency, particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s to think that the only form of conventional war likely to occur under the shadow of nuclear weapons was some form of guerrilla or so-called brush-fire war.
巴兹尔·H·利德尔·哈特是个例外。他的《捍卫“西方”》（伦敦，1950）和《威慑还是防御》（伦敦，1960）是两部重要的著作，它们都是论文集或讲稿集，探讨了战争可能采取的形式以及如何组织军队进行战争。罗伯特·E·奥斯古德在其重要著作《有限战争》（芝加哥，1957）中，以及灵活反应理论的提出者麦克斯韦·D·泰勒将军在其著作《不确定的号角》 （纽约，1959）中，也强调了摆脱对核武器的迷恋，并拥有无需核武器即可进行有限战争的武装力量的必要性。当时对这一讨论做出重要贡献的还有莫顿·H·哈尔珀林的《核时代的有限战争》（纽约和伦敦，1963）以及他后来的《当代军事战略》（波士顿，1967）。亨利·基辛格的《选择的必要性》（伦敦，1960）记录了他对有限战争观点的转变，这一点非常重要。在他的《核武器与外交政策》（纽约，1957 年）一书中。
Basil H. Liddell Hart was an exception. His Defence of the “West (London, 1950) and Deterrent or Defence (London, 1960) are important books, both collections of essays or lectures dealing with the form wars might take and how forces should be organized to fight them. The need to escape from being mesmerized by nuclear weapons and to have armed forces capable of fighting limited wars without them was also emphasized by Robert E. Osgood in his important book Limited War (Chicago, 1957) and by General Maxwell D. Taylor, the author of flexible response, in his The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, 1959). Other important contributions to the discussion at that time were Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York and London, 1963) and his later Contemporary Military Strategy (Boston, 1967). Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (London, 1960) is important in recording the change in his views about limited war from those given in his Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957).
E·J·金斯顿-麦克劳里所著的《全球战略》（伦敦，1957年）展现了当时典型的英国军事观点，涵盖面广。雷蒙·阿隆的《大辩论》（纽约，1965年）以及安德烈·博弗雷将军的重要著作《战略导论》（巴黎，1963年；伦敦，1965年）和《行动战略》 （巴黎，1966年；伦敦，1967年）则体现了法国更为理论化的视角。阿拉斯泰尔·布坎为国际战略研究所编辑的《现代战略问题》 （伦敦，1980年）收录了一系列极具价值的论文，其中一些探讨了核时代常规战争的理论层面。 《欧洲的武器与稳定》，由阿拉斯泰尔·巴肯 (Alastair Buchan) 和菲利普·温莎 (Philip Windsor) 与 Le Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère 和 Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik 共同为同一研究所编辑（伦敦，1963 年）；La sécurité de l'Europe dans les années 80，由 Pierre Lellouche 为法国国际关系研究所编辑（巴黎，1980 年）；和《战略思维的新方向》，由 Robert O'Neill 和 DM Horner 编辑（伦敦，1981 年）。罗伯特·奥斯古德在《重新审视有限战争》（博尔德，1979 年）中，根据越南战争的结束调整了自己的观点；谢尔福德·比德韦尔的《现代战争》（伦敦，1973 年）和朱利安·利德的《军事理论》（纽约，1983 年）都对战争进行了概括性的回顾。
A typical wide-ranging British military view of the time is given in E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, Global Strategy (London, 1957). A more theoretical one from the French is contained in Raymond Aron, The Great Debate (New York, 1965) and General André Beaufre's important books, An Introduction to Strategy (Paris, 1963; London, 1965) and Strategy of Action (Paris, 1966; London, 1967). Valuable collections of essays, some of which deal with the theoretical aspects of conventional war in the nuclear age, are to be found in Problems of Modern Strategy, edited by Alastair Buchan for the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London, 1980); Arms and Stability in Europe, edited by Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor for the same institute in conjunction with Le Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère and Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (London, 1963); La sécurité de l'Europe dans les années 80, edited by Pierre Lellouche for the Institut Français des Rélations Internationaux (Paris, 1980); and New Directions in Strategie Thinking, edited by Robert O'Neill and D. M. Horner (London, 1981). Robert Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, 1979) adjusted his views in the light of the end of the Vietnam War, and both Shelford Bidwell, Modern Warfare (London, 1973) and Julian Lider, Military Theory (New York, 1983) review warfare with a broad brush.
作者自己的著作《1945 年以来的战争》（伦敦，1980 年；纽约，1981 年）描述并评论了文章中提到的传统冲突，并附有涵盖这些冲突的完整书目。
The author's own War since 1945 (London, 1980; New York, 1981) describes and comments on the conventional conflicts referred to in the essay and contains a full bibliography covering them.
关于西欧常规防御的具体问题，已有许多小册子、文章和书籍进行了论述，其中一些最有价值的包括：1975年伦敦皇家联合军种研究所研讨会报告《北约中央战线常规战略》；罗伯特·科默，《必要——联盟战争的准备》，兰德公司，1976年8月；乌尔里希·德·梅齐埃，《北约联盟中的武装力量》，乔治城大学，1976年；戈贝尔编辑，《为正确任务选择错误力量》，安大略省皇后大学，1981年；弗里曼，《中部地区：前沿防御》，美国国防大学，1981年；伊恩·贝拉尼等人，《常规部队与欧洲平衡》，兰卡斯特大学，1981年；以及费迪南德·冯·森格尔将军。埃特林，《中欧防御——20世纪80年代的挑战》 ，载《十五国》特刊第2期（1981年）。《加强欧洲常规威慑》，欧洲安全研究报告（伦敦和纽约，1983年），提供了最新的评估，并收录了该问题不同方面专家的宝贵论文。P ·格里菲斯和E·丁特合著的《圣诞节前未结束》（奇切斯特，1983年）提出了一个非正统的观点。
The particular problem of the conventional defense of Western Europe is covered by a number of pamphlets, articles, and books, of which some of the most valuable are: “A Conventional Strategy for the Central Front in NATO,” report of a seminar at the Royal United Services Institute, London, 1975; Robert Komer, “Needed—Preparation for Coalition War,” Rand Paper, August, 1976; Ulrich de Maizière, “Armed Forces in the NATO Alliance,” Georgetown University, 1976; “The Wrong Force for the Right Mission,” edited by Goebel, Queen's University, Ontario, 1981; “Central Region: Forward Defense,” by Freeman, U.S. National Defense University, 1981; Ian Bellany et al., “Conventional Forces and the European Balance,” Lancaster University, 1981; and General Ferdinand von Senger u. Etterlin, “Defence of Central Europe—the Challenge of the 1980s,” Fifteen Nations, special issue no. 2 (1981). Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe, a report of the European Security Study (London and New York, 1983), provides a recent assessment and incorporates valuable papers by experts in different aspects of the issue. Not Over by Christmas, by P. Griffith and E. Dinter (Chichester, 1983), puts forward a less orthodox view.
关于苏联视角的文献浩如烟海。若想深入研读原文晦涩难懂的文字，可参阅瓦西里·索科洛夫斯基元帅的《苏联军事战略》（纽约，1975年）；约瑟夫·道格拉斯和阿莫雷塔·霍伯编的《苏联军事思想选读，1963-1973》（弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿，1980年）；或哈丽雅特·F·斯科特和威廉·F·斯科特合著的《苏联战争艺术》（博尔德，1982年）。此外，德里克·利伯特编的《苏联军事思想》（马萨诸塞州剑桥和伦敦，1981年）；约翰·恩克森和E·J·费希特旺格编的《苏联军事力量与表现》（伦敦，1979年）；以及约翰·贝利斯和杰拉尔德·西格尔编的《苏联战略》（伦敦，1981年）均收录了一系列论文。克里斯托弗·唐纳利在《国际防务评论》（第11卷第9期，1978年；第12卷第7期，1979年；第14卷第9期，1981年；第15卷第9期，1982年）上发表的关于该主题各个方面的文章质量很高，唐纳利等人为《加强欧洲常规威慑》第二部分所做的贡献也同样出色。涵盖该主题的最佳且最易读的著作是约瑟夫·D·道格拉斯的《苏联在欧洲的军事战略》（纽约，1980年）。
There is a plethora of literature on the Soviet perspective. Those who wish to wade through the turgid prose of the original material can read Marshal Vasili Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York, 1975); Selected Readings from Soviet Military Thought, 1963–1973, edited by Joseph Douglas and Amoretta Hoeber (Arlington, Va., 1980); or Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War (Boulder, 1982). A series of essays is to be found in Soviet Military Thinking, edited by Derek Leebaert (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1981); Soviet Military Power and Performance, edited by John Enckson and E. J. Feuchtwanger (London, 1979); and Soviet Strategy, edited by John Baylis and Gerald Segal (London, 1981). Christopher Donnelly's articles on various aspects of the subject in the International Defense Review (vol. 11, no. 9, 1978; vol. iz, no. 7, 1979; vol. 14, no. 9, 1981; vol. 15, no. 9, 1982) are of high quality, as is the contribution of Donnelly and others to part 2 of Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe. The best and most readable volume covering the whole subject is Joseph D. Douglass, Soviet Military Strategy in Europe (New York, 1980).
27.革命战争
27. REVOLUTIONARY WAR
该主题的文献浩如烟海，几乎难以驾驭；即使是与美国独立战争相关的书目也篇幅浩繁。近期的例子包括：迈伦·J·史密斯（Myron J. Smith, Jr.）的《秘密战争：史料指南》（The Secret Wars: A Guide to the Sources），共3卷（加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉和牛津，1980年），该书仅涉及1939年至1980年；罗伯特·布莱基（Robert Blackey ）的《现代革命与革命者》（Modern Revolutions and Revolutionists）（加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉，1976年）；爱德华·F·米科勒斯（Edward F. Mickolus）的《恐怖主义文献：精选注释书目》（The Literature of Terrorism: A Selected Annotated Bibliography）（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特，1980年）；以及克里斯托弗·L·苏格内特（Christopher L. Sugnet）等人的《越南战争书目》 （Vietnam War Bibliography） （马萨诸塞州列克星敦和多伦多，1983年）。
The literature of the subject is enormous and virtually unmanageable; even bibliographies relevant to revolutionary war are of overwhelming length. Recent examples are Myron J. Smith, Jr., The Secret Wars: A Guide to the Sources, 3 vols. (Santa Barbara, Calif., and Oxford, 1980), which deals only with 1939–1980; Robert Blackey, Modern Revolutions and Revolutionists (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1976); Edward F. Mickolus, The Literature of Terrorism: A Selected Annotated Bibliography (Westport, Conn., 1980); and Christopher L. Sugnet et al., Vietnam War Bibliography (Lexington, Mass., and Toronto, 1983).
罗伯特·阿斯普雷的《暗影中的战争：历史上的游击战》（两卷本，纽约州花园城，1975年）和沃尔特·拉奎尔的三部曲：《游击战》（波士顿，1976年）、《游击战读本：历史文集》（费城，1977年）和《恐怖主义》（波士顿，1977年）是该领域的综合性著作。DM·康迪特、伯特·H·库珀等人主编的《内部冲突中的挑战与应对》（三卷本，华盛顿特区，1967年）收录了57个历史案例。哈里·埃克斯坦主编的《内部战争：问题与方法》（纽约，1964年）是早期对该主题进行广泛而系统探讨的著作之一。
Comprehensive general works include Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History, 2. vols. (Garden City, N.Y., 1975), and the trilogy of Walter Laquer: Guerrilla (Boston, 1976), The Guerrilla Reader: A Historical Anthology (Philadelphia, 1977), and Terrorism (Boston, 1977). Fifty-seven historical cases are treated in D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr. et al., eds., Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1967). An early effort to treat the subject broadly and systematically is Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War, Problems and Approaches (New York, 1964).
毛泽东的著作至关重要。四卷本的《毛泽东选集》（伦敦和纽约，1954-1956）是其基础之作，而《毛泽东军事文选》（北京，1963）则精选了前者中的部分文章，颇具价值。塞缪尔·B·格里菲斯的《毛泽东论游击战》（纽约，1961）一书分析了毛泽东的思想，其中收录了1937年发表的《游击战》一文的译文。流传最广的版本是林彪编纂的《毛泽东主席论人民战争》（北京，1967），通常被称为“小红书”。在众多版本中，菲利普·德维莱尔的《毛泽东传》（伦敦，1969）最为实用。
The writings of Mao Tse-tung are of central importance. The four-volume Selected Works (London and New York, 1954–56) is basic, while the Selected Military Writings (Peking, 1963) usefully collects essays from the larger work. His ideas are analyzed in Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1961), which includes a translation of the 1937 essay Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare). The most widely read version is Chairman Mao Tse-tung on People's War (Peking, 1967), compiled by Lin Piao, and generally known as the “little red book.” Of the various compilations, that by Philippe Devillers, Mao (London, 1969), has been most useful.
在当代革命战争研究者中，热拉尔·沙利安德（Gérard Chaliand）是最敏锐的学者之一。他的著作《第三世界的革命》（纽约，1977）汇集了他研究成果以及直接参与多个革命运动的经验，并辅以他的文集《游击战战略：从长征到阿富汗的历史文选》 （伯克利，1982）。彼得·帕雷特（Peter Paret）在其著作《从印度支那到阿尔及利亚的法国革命战争》 （纽约，1964）中探讨了反革命理论，并与约翰·夏伊（John Shy）合著了早期革命战争入门读物《20世纪60年代的游击队》（第二版，纽约，1962）。许多美国读者最早接触毛泽东思想是在爱德华·L·卡岑巴赫和吉恩·Z·汉拉汉合著的《毛泽东的革命战略》（载于《政治学季刊》第70卷，1955年，第321-340页）一文中，而对越南革命的了解则始于伯纳德·福尔的《没有欢乐的街道》（纽约，1957年）。在众多反革命战争“专家”中，罗杰·特林基耶的《现代战争：法国视角下的反叛乱》（纽约，1964年）和罗伯特·汤普森的《世界战略中的革命战争，1945-1969》 （纽约，1970年）尤为引人注目。哈里·G·萨默斯二世的《论战略：越南战争的背景》 （加利福尼亚州诺瓦托，1982年）一书，因其大胆而又颇具争议地尝试将西方古典理论应用于革命战争而备受关注。
Among contemporary students of revolutionary war, Gérard Chaliand is one of the most incisive. Revolution in the Third World (New York, 1977) brings together the results of both research and direct involvement in several revolutionary movements, and is complemented by his compilation, Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan (Berkeley, 1982). Peter Paret explored counterrevolutionary theory in French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria (New York, 1964), and with John Shy wrote an early introduction to revolutionary warfare, Guerrillas in the 1960s, 2d ed. (New York, 1962). Many American readers first encountered Maoist theory in Edward L. Katzenbach and Gene Z. Hanrahan, “The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung,” Political Science Quarterly 70 (1955), 321–40, and first learned about the Vietnamese revolution from Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy (New York, 1957). Notable among the many “experts” on counterrevolutionary war are Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York, 1964), and Robert Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945–1969 (New York, 1970). Of special interest for its heroic and controversial effort to apply classical Western theory to a revolutionary war is Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Novato, Calif., 1982).
*除非另有说明，否则参考文献均由文章作者编写。
* THE BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES have been prepared by the authors of the essays unless otherwise indicated.
*由唐纳德·阿本海姆编写。
* Prepared by Donald Abenheim.
*由彼得·帕雷特撰写。
* Prepared by Peter Paret.
*由唐纳德·阿本海姆编写。
* Prepared by Donald Abenheim.
*由马克·冯·哈根撰写。
* Prepared by Mark von Hagen.
* Hajo Holborn 的原始注释已由 Donald Abenheim 修改，其中一些内容已纳入第二篇论文的参考书目注释中。
* Hajo Holborn's original note has been revised by Donald Abenheim, and some of it has been incorporated into the bibliographical note for essay II.
*由作者编写，并根据 Hajo Holborn 原论文的参考文献注释进行了补充。
* Prepared by the author, with additions from the bibliographical note for Hajo Holborn's original essay.
*由唐纳德·阿本海姆编写。
* Prepared by Donald Abenheim.
指数
Index
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一、姓名和主题
I. NAMES AND SUBJECTS
绝对战争，参见全面战争空中力量
absolute war, see total war air power
阿列克谢耶夫，米哈伊尔
Alekseev, Mikhail
俄罗斯沙皇亚历山大一世
Alexander I, Czar of Russia
阿尔瑟姆，EA
Altham, E. A.
阿玛德，阿尔伯特·德
Amade, Albert d'
歼灭战略
annihilation, strategy of
古代、军事制度和战争
antiquity, military institutions and wars of
阿里奥斯托，洛多维科
Ariosto, Lodovico
阿诺德，亨利·H.
Arnold, Henry H.
阿伦，雷蒙德
Aron, Raymond
阿斯奎斯，赫伯特·H.
Asquith, Herbert H.
消耗战，战争
attrition, wars of
普鲁士王子奥古斯特
August, Prince of Prussia
弗朗西斯·培根
Bacon, Francis
布莱克，威廉
Balck, Wilhelm
理查德·巴内特
Barnet, Richard
鲍尔，马克斯
Bauer, Max
博弗雷，安德烈
Beaufre, André
贝克，弗里德里希·冯
Beck, Friedrich von
贝克，路德维希
Beck, Ludwig
贝尔纳·福雷斯特·贝利多尔
Bélidor, Bernard Forest de
贝利撒留
Belisarius
贝内德克，路德维希·冯
Benedek, Ludwig von
边沁，杰里米
Bentham, Jeremy
亨利·柏格森
Bergson, Henri
伯恩哈迪，弗里德里希·冯
Bernhardi, Friedrich von
贝尔蒂埃，亚历山大
Berthier, Alexandre
贝特曼·霍尔韦格、西奥博尔德·冯
Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von
约翰·比格洛
Bigelow, John
Biringuccio，Vanuccio
Biringuccio, Vanuccio
俾斯麦，奥托·冯
Bismarck, Otto von
布利斯，塔斯克·H.
Bliss, Tasker H.
闪电战
blitzkrieg
布洛赫，扬
Bloch, Jan
布隆伯格，沃纳·冯
Blomberg, Werner von
布鲁姆，威廉·冯
Blume, Wilhelm von
密歇根州博格达诺维奇
Bogdanovich, M. I.
博古斯拉夫斯基，阿尔布雷希特·冯
Boguslawski, Albrecht von
切萨雷·博尔吉亚
Borgia, Cesare
博顿，休
Borton, Hugh
查尔斯·布罗德
Broad, Charles
布罗迪，伯纳德
Brodie, Bernard
布罗格利，弗朗索瓦-玛丽·德
Broglie, François-Marie de
布鲁克，艾伦
Brooke, Alan
布阿特，埃德蒙
Buat, Edmond
比若，托马斯-罗伯特
Bugeaud, Thomas-Robert de
布哈林，尼古拉·伊万诺维奇
Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich
比洛，海因里希·迪特里希·冯
Bülow, Heinrich Dietrich von
邦迪，麦克乔治
Bundy, McGeorge
凯撒
Caesar
卡德威尔，查尔斯·E.
Caldwell, Charles E.
卡蒙，休伯特
Camon, Hubert
凯里，马修
Carey, Mathew
卡诺，拉扎尔
Carnot, Lazare
卡特，吉米
Carter, Jimmy
卡斯特拉内，埃斯普里-维克多·德
Castellane, Esprit-Victor de
卡斯特罗，菲德尔
Castro, Fidel
卡瓦尼亚克，路易-欧仁·德
Cavaignac, Louis-Eugène de
查利安德，杰拉德
Chaliand, Gerard
夏诺因，查尔斯-保罗
Chanoine, Charles-Paul
奥地利的卡尔大公
Charles of Austria, Archduke
大胆的查理
Charles the Bold
切尔尼舍夫，人工智能
Chernyshev, A. I.
蒋介石
Chiang Kai-shek
艾蒂安·弗朗索瓦·德·舒瓦瑟尔
Choiseul, Etienne-François de
周恩来
Chou En-lai
丘吉尔，温斯顿
Churchill, Winston
公民军队，另见群众军队、国民军队
citizen army, See also mass army, national army
民事和军事权威，以及两者之间的关系
civil and military authority, relations between
克拉克，亚瑟·C.
Clarke, Arthur C.
克劳塞维茨，卡尔·冯
Clausewitz, Carl von
克列孟梭，乔治
Clemenceau, Georges
克莱维尔，路易斯-尼古拉斯·德
Clerville, Louis-Nicolas de
科尔伯特，让·巴蒂斯特
Colbert, Jean Baptiste
科林，简
Colin, Jean
殖民战争
colonial warfare
科尔森，路易斯
Colson, Louis
雇佣兵队长
condottieri
康拉德·冯·赫岑多夫，弗朗茨
Conrad von Hötzendorf, Franz
征兵。另请参见集体征税
conscription. See also levée en masse
考克斯，滕奇
Coxe, Tench
坎宁安，威廉
Cunningham, William
达拉第，爱德华
Daladier, Edouard
戴维斯，杰斐逊
Davis, Jefferson
达武，路易·尼古拉斯
Davout, Louis Nicolas
达扬，摩西
Dayan, Moshe
迪恩，约翰·R.
Deane, John R.
德贝尼，欧仁
Debeney, Eugène
德布雷，雷吉斯
Debray, Régis
防守，另见进攻与防守的对比
defense, See also offense vs. defense
德拉菲尔德，理查德
Delafield, Richard
德尔布吕克，汉斯
Delbrück, Hans
笛卡尔，勒内
Descartes, René
乔治·杜威
Dewey, George
迪尔，约翰
Dill, John
迪士尼，沃尔特
Disney, Walt
杜利特尔，詹姆斯·H.
Doolittle, James H.
杜黑，朱利奥
Douhet, Guilio
约瑟夫·杜门克
Doumenc, Joseph
德拉戈米罗夫，密歇根州
Dragomirov, M. I.
德雷福斯事件
Dreyfus affair
德莱顿，约翰
Dryden, John
杜舍纳，德尼-奥古斯特
Duchêne, Denis-Auguste
杜勒斯，约翰·福斯特
Dulles, John Foster
戴森，弗里曼
Dayson, Freeman
厄尔，爱德华·米德
Earle, Edward Mead
埃伯特，弗里德里希
Ebert, Friedrich
经济与战争
economics and war
艾森豪威尔，德怀特·D.
Eisenhower, Dwight D.
大卫·埃拉扎尔
Elazar, David
恩格斯，弗里德里希
Engels, Friedrich
让·埃拉尔·德·巴尔勒迪克
Errard de Bar-le-Duc, Jean
埃蒂安，让-巴蒂斯特
Estienne, Jean-Baptiste
战争中的伦理
ethics in war
埃蒂安，欧仁
Etienne, Eugène
萨伏依的欧根尼
Eugene of Savoy
法尔肯海因，埃里希·冯
Falkenhayn, Erich von
法尔内塞，亚历山大
Farnese, Alexander
芬利特，托马斯·K.
Finletter, Thomas K.
弗拉维尼，让
Flavigny, Jean
费迪南·福煦
Foch, Ferdinand
筑城
fortification
费尔南·福罗
Foureau, Fernand
法国国王弗朗索瓦一世
Francis I, King of France
弗兰克兰，诺布尔
Frankland, Noble
弗雷泽，大卫
Fraser, David
腓特烈大帝
Frederick the Great
腓特烈·威廉，伟大的选帝侯
Frederick William, the Great Elector
弗里曼，道格拉斯·索撒尔
Freeman, Douglas Southall
法国大革命及其影响
French Revolution, and its influence
弗雷塔格-洛林霍芬，雨果·冯
Freytag-Loringhoven, Hugo von
弗里德里希，鲁道夫
Friederich, Rudolf
弗里奇，维尔纳·冯
Fritsch, Werner von
弗罗斯特，霍洛威 H.
Frost, Holloway H.
伏龙芝，MV
Frunze, M. V.
富勒，JFC
Fuller, J.F.C.
富勒顿，JD
Fullerton, J. D.
伽利略
Galileo
加利埃尼，约瑟夫-西蒙
Galliéni, Joseph-Simon
加梅林，莫里斯
Gamelin, Maurice
英迪拉·甘地
Gandhi, Indira
戴高乐，夏尔·德
Gaulle, Charles de
总参谋部
general staff
埃米尔·詹蒂莱
Gentile, Emile
甲，武阮
Giap, Vo Nguyen
奥古斯特·奈德哈特·冯·格奈森瑙
Gneisenau, August Neidhardt von
戈尔茨，科尔马·冯·德
Goltz, Colmar von der
将军
Gonen, General
约翰·古奇
Gooch, John
Grandmaison，Louis de
Grandmaison, Louis de
格兰特，尤利西斯·S.
Grant, Ulysses S.
格林，格雷厄姆
Greene, Graham
格林，纳撒尼尔
Greene, Nathaniel
格鲁，约瑟夫·C.
Grew, Joseph C.
格里博瓦尔，让-巴蒂斯特·德
Gribeauval, Jean-Baptiste de
格里戈连科，彼得罗
Grigorenko, Petro
格罗纳，威廉
Groener, Wilhelm
格劳秀斯，雨果
Grotius, Hugo
海因茨·古德里安
Guderian, Heinz
游击战
guerrilla warfare
格瓦拉，埃内斯托·“切”
Guevara, Ernesto “Che”
吉贝尔，雅克-安托万·德
Guibert, Jacques-Antoine de
弗朗切斯科·圭恰尔迪尼
Guicciardini, Francesco
古列维奇，AA
Gulevich, A. A.
古谢夫，SI
Gusev, S. I.
瑞典国王古斯塔夫·阿道夫二世
Gustavus Adolphus II, King of Sweden
海格，道格拉斯
Haig, Douglas
哈尔德，弗朗茨
Halder, Franz
哈莱克，亨利·瓦格
Halleck, Henry Wager
亚历山大·汉密尔顿
Hamilton, Alexander
汉密尔顿，伊恩
Hamilton, Ian
汉尼拔
Hannibal
哈里森，戈登
Harrison, Gordon
亨德森，乔治 FR
Henderson, George F. R.
法国国王亨利四世
Henry IV, King of France
赫伯特，希拉里·A.
Herbert, Hilary A.
希罗多德
Herodotus
赫特尔，克里斯蒂安
Herter, Christian
兴登堡，保罗·冯
Hindenburg, Paul von
奥托·欣茨
Hintze, Otto
历史、相关性
history, relevance of
阿道夫·希特勒
Hitler, Adolf
霍巴特，珀西
Hobart, Percy
胡志明
Ho Chi Minh
霍华德，迈克尔
Howard, Michael
雨果，维克多
Hugo, Victor
赫尔，科德尔
Hull, Cordell
大卫·休谟
Hume, David
亨廷顿，塞缪尔·P.
Huntington, Samuel P.
赫尔利，阿尔弗雷德·F.
Hurley, Alfred F.
约旦国王侯赛因
Hussein, King of Jordan
哈奇森，弗朗西斯
Hutcheson, Francis
帝国主义
imperialism
国际法，参见战争伦理学，伊斯梅，黑斯廷斯·莱昂内尔
international law, see ethics in war Ismay, Hastings Lionel
伊瑟森，G.
Isserson, G.
杰克逊，托马斯·J.“石墙”
Jackson, Thomas J. “Stonewall”
扬斯，马克斯
Jähns, Max
让·饶勒斯
Jaurès, Jean
杰伊，约翰
Jay, John
托马斯·杰斐逊
Jefferson, Thomas
詹金斯，罗伊
Jenkins, Roy
约德尔，阿尔弗雷德
Jodl, Alfred
约瑟夫·乔弗雷
Joffre, Joseph
拿骚-锡根的约翰
Johann of Nassau-Siegen
约米尼，安托万-亨利姆
Jomini, Antoine-Henrim
卡恩，赫尔曼
Kahn, Herman
考夫曼，威廉
Kaufmann, William
约翰·肯尼迪
Kennedy, John
肯尼迪，约翰·F.
Kennedy, John F.
赫鲁晓夫，尼基塔
Khrushchev, Nikita
金，欧内斯特·J.
King, Ernest J.
金，詹姆斯·E.
King, James E.
杰里·金
King, Jere
基辛格，亨利
Kissinger, Henry
基奇纳，HH
Kitchener, H. H.
库图佐夫，米哈伊尔
Kutuzov, Michael
拉加迪，雅各布·德
La Gardie, Jacob de
威廉·拉姆苏斯
Lamszus, Wilhelm
拉米，弗朗索瓦-约瑟夫
Lamy, François-Joseph
兰斯当，第五代侯爵
Landsdowne, Fifth Marquess of
兰德韦尔，另见民兵
Landwehr, See also militia
朗格卢瓦，伊波利特
Langlois, Hippolyte
让-马里·德·拉特·德·塔西尼
Lattre de Tassigny, Jean-Marie de
劳伦斯，近端锋
Lawrence, T. E.
拉扎德，皮埃尔·埃利齐耶
Lazard, Pierre Elizier
领导
leadership
李查尔斯
Lee, Charles
李，罗伯特·E.
Lee, Robert E.
佐治亚州利尔
Leer, G. A.
列宁，弗拉基米尔·伊里奇
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich
米歇尔·勒泰利耶
Le Tellier, Michel
levée en Masse，另见征兵
levée en masse, See also conscription
罗纳德·莱文
Lewin, Ronald
利德尔·哈特，巴兹尔·H.
Liddell Hart, Basil H.
有限战争
limited war
林彪
Lin Piao
利普修斯，尤斯图斯
Lipsius, Justus
弗里德里希·李斯特
List, Friedrich
亨利·劳埃德
Lloyd, Henry
劳合·乔治，大卫
Lloyd George, David
洛奇，亨利·卡伯特
Lodge, Henry Cabot
后勤
logistics
路易十四
Louis XIV
弗朗索瓦·米歇尔·勒特利耶·卢瓦
Louvois, François Michel Le Tellier de
卢斯，斯蒂芬·B.
Luce, Stephen B.
鲁登道夫，埃里希
Ludendorff, Erich
利奥泰，休伯特
Lyautey, Hubert
麦克阿瑟，道格拉斯
MacArthur, Douglas
托马斯·麦考利
Macaulay, Thomas
麦克莱伦，乔治·B.
McClellan, George B.
马基雅维利，尼科洛
Machiavelli, Niccolò
马克·冯·莱本奇，卡尔
Mack von Leibench, Karl
麦克纳马拉，罗伯特·S.
McNamara, Robert S.
麦克诺顿，约翰
McNaughton, Johnn
詹姆斯·麦迪逊
Madison, James
马奇诺，安德烈
Maginot, André
马汉，阿尔弗雷德·塞耶
Mahan, Alfred Thayer
马汉，丹尼斯·哈特
Mahan, Dennis Hart
查尔斯·曼金
Mangin, Charles
人力，参见征兵制
manpower, see conscription
曼施泰因，埃里希·冯
Manstein, Erich von
毛主义
Maoism
毛泽东
Mao Tse-tung
马歇尔，乔治·C.
Marshall, George C.
马丁，劳伦斯·W.
Martin, Laurence W.
卡尔·马克思
Marx, Karl
马斯洛夫斯基，DA
Maslovskii, D. A.
群众军队，另见公民军队
mass army, See also citizen army
莫德，FN
Maude, F. N.
拿骚的莫里斯
Maurice of Nassau
梅，欧内斯特·R.
May, Ernest R.
米德，乔治·G.
Meade, George G.
内华达州梅德姆
Medem, N. V.
戈尔达·梅尔
Meir, Golda
梅嫩德斯，马里奥·B.
Menendez, Mario B.
雇佣兵
mercenaries
中世纪、军事制度和战争
Middle Ages, military institutions and wars of
米赫涅维奇，NP
Mikhnevich, N. P.
民兵
militia
米柳京，德米特里
Miliutin, Dmitrii
米尔恩，乔治
Milne, George
米切尔，威廉
Mitchell, William
莫洛，沃尔特·冯
Molo, Walter von
赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇 (1800–1891)
Moltke, Helmuth von (1800–1891)
赫尔穆特·冯·毛奇 (1848–1916)
Moltke, Helmuth von (1848–1916)
莫姆森，西奥多
Mommsen, Theodor
蒙塔朗贝尔，马克-勒内
Montalembert, Marc-René de
蒙特库科利，雷蒙多
Montecuccoli, Raimondo
孟德斯鸠
Montesquieu
蒙哥马利，伯纳德·L.
Montgomery, Bernard L.
蒙哥马利-马辛伯德，阿奇博尔德
Montgomery-Massingberd, Archibald
士气，另见心理学和战争
morale, See also psychology and war
莫迪凯，阿尔弗雷德
Mordecai, Alfred
米什拉耶夫斯基，亚利桑那州
Myshlaevskii, A. Z.
拿破仑一世
Napoleon I
拿破仑三世
Napoleon III
纳赛尔，加麦尔·阿卜杜勒
Nasser, Gamel Abdel
国民军，另见公民军
national army, See also citizen army
全国动员
nation in arms
海战
naval warfare
内勒，WK
Naylor, W. K.
尼赫鲁，贾瓦哈拉尔
Nehru, Jawaharlal
内伊，米歇尔
Ney, Michel
内兹纳莫夫，AA
Neznamov, A. A.
俄罗斯沙皇尼古拉一世
Nicholas I, Czar of Russia
尼米兹，切斯特·W.
Nimitz, Chester W.
尼维尔，罗伯特-乔治
Nivelle, Robert-Georges
尼克松，理查德·M.
Nixon, Richard M.
核战略
nuclear strategy
进攻，另见进攻与防守
offense, See also offense vs. defense
进攻与防守；
offense vs. defense;
奥尔登巴内维尔特，约翰·范
Oldenbaarneveldt, Johan van
阿曼，查尔斯
Oman, Charles
奥本海默，J.罗伯特
Oppenheimer, J. Robert
奥斯古德，罗伯特
Osgood, Robert
异教徒，布莱斯·德
Pagan, Blaise de
彼得·帕雷特
Paret, Peter
帕克曼，弗朗西斯
Parkman, Francis
帕斯卡，布莱斯
Pascal, Blaise
佩利西耶，阿马布尔
Pelissier, Amable
伯里克利
Pericles
贝当，亨利-菲利普
Pétain, Henri-Philippe
彼得大帝
Peter the Great
皮克，查尔斯-阿尔当杜
Picq, Charles-Ardent du
格奥尔基·瓦伦廷诺维奇·普列汉诺夫
Plekhanov, Georgi Valentinovich
政治、政策和战略
politics, policy, and strategy
职业军队，另见雇佣兵；雇佣兵；常备军
professional army, See also condotttert; mercenaries; standing army
宣传
propaganda
心理学与战争，另见士气；宣传
psychology and war, See also morale; propaganda
夸尔斯，唐纳德
Quarles, Donald
拉贝瑙，弗里德里希·冯
Rabenau, Friedrich von
拉宾，伊扎克
Rabin, Itzhak
拉姆齐，弗朗西斯·M.
Ramsay, Francis M.
兰克，利奥波德·冯
Ranke, Leopold von
里根，罗纳德
Reagan, Ronald
征兵，参见征兵
recruitment, see conscription
雷斯顿，詹姆斯
Reston, James
独立战争
revolutionary war
雷诺，保罗
Reynaud, Paul
黎塞留，红衣主教
Richelieu, Cardinal
里特尔，格哈德
Ritter, Gerhard
罗伯逊，威廉
Robertson, William
鲁恩，阿尔布雷希特·冯
Roon, Albrecht von
罗斯福，富兰克林·D.
Roosevelt, Franklin D.
罗斯福，西奥多
Roosevelt, Theodore
吕斯托，弗里德里希·威廉
Rüstow, Friedrich Wilhelm
圣阿尔诺，雅克
Saint-Arnaud, Jacques
萨伦格罗，罗杰
Salengro, Roger
萨莫里·图雷
Samori Touré
萨夫金，VE
Savkin, V. E.
萨克斯，莫里斯·德
Saxe, Maurice de
沙恩霍斯特，格哈德·冯
Scharnhorst, Gerhard von
托马斯·谢林
Schelling, Thomas
施莱歇尔，库尔特·冯
Schleicher, Kurt von
詹姆斯·施莱辛格
Schlesinger, James
施利希廷，西吉斯蒙德·冯
Schlichting, Sigismund von
施利芬，阿尔弗雷德·冯
Schlieffen, Alfred von
施密特，卡尔
Schmitt, Carl
科学与战争
science and war
Seeckt，Hans von
Seeckt, Hans von
塞尔旺，米歇尔-约瑟夫
Servan, Michel-Joseph
塞维尔斯基，亚历山大·德
Seversky, Alexander de
沙波什尼科夫，鲍里斯
Shaposhnikov, Boris
莎伦，艾瑞尔
Sharon, Ariel
谢尔曼，威廉·T.
Sherman, William T.
围攻战
siege warfare
斯莱索，约翰
Slessor, John
亚当·史密斯
Smith, Adam
索德里尼，皮耶罗
Soderini, Piero
索雷尔，乔治
Sorel, Georges
斯皮尔斯，爱德华
Spears, Edward
斯佩尔，汉斯
Speier, Hans
斯皮诺拉，安布罗格里奥
Spinola, Ambroglio
斯普劳特，玛格丽特
Sprout, Margaret
约瑟夫·斯大林
Stalin, Joseph
常备军
Standing army
斯塔克，哈罗德
Stark, Harold
司汤达
Stendhal
史蒂文，西蒙
Stevin, Simon
斯蒂尔韦尔，约瑟夫·W.
Stilwell, Joseph W.
史汀生，亨利·L.
Stimson, Henry L.
战略的定义
strategy, definitions of
战略与政策，参见政治、政策和战略
strategy and policy, see politics, policy, and strategy
战略与战术，参见战术，以及与战略的互动
strategy and tactics, see tactics, interaction with strategy
约阿希姆·冯·斯图尔普纳格尔
Stülpnagel, Joachim von
苏加诺
Sukarno
弗吉尼亚州苏霍姆利诺夫
Sukhomlinov, V. A.
萨姆纳，威廉·格雷厄姆
Sumner, William Graham
孙子
Sun Tzu
苏沃洛夫，亚历山大
Suvorov, Alexander
斯韦钦，AA
Svechin, A. A.
战术，定义
tactics, definitions of
战术，与战略的互动
tactics, interaction with strategy
塔尔塔利亚，尼科洛
Tartaglia, Niccolò
Taylor，AJP
Taylor, A.J.P.
泰勒，麦克斯韦
Taylor, Maxwell
科技与战争：中世纪与文艺复兴时期；17世纪；18世纪；19世纪；20世纪
technology and war: Middle Ages and Renaissance; 17th century; 18th century; 19th century; 20th century
泰尔，让-皮埃尔·杜
Teil, Jean-Pierre du
特勒，爱德华
Teller, Edward
滕珀尔霍夫(f)，格奥尔格·弗里德尼奇·冯
Tempelhof(f), Georg Friednch von
撒切尔夫人，玛格丽特
Thatcher, Margaret
蒂利，约翰·冯
Tilly, Johann von
铁木辛哥，S.
Timoshenko, S.
蒂尔皮茨，阿尔弗雷德·冯
Tirpitz, Alfred von
蒂托，约瑟夫
Tito, Joseph
托克维尔，亚历克西·德
Tocqueville, Alexis de
东条秀树
Tojo, Hideki
全面战争
total war
特雷西，本杰明·富兰克林
Tracy, Benjamin Franklin
特伦查德，休
Trenchard, Hugh
Triandifilov，V.
Triandifilov, V.
列昂茨·托洛茨基
Trotsky, Leonz
杜鲁门，哈里·S.
Truman, Harry S.
图哈切夫斯基，米哈伊尔
Tukhachevsky, Mikhail
亨利·德·拉图尔·奥弗涅·蒂雷纳
Turenne, Henri de Latour d'Auvergne de
无休止的战争，参见全面战争
unlimited war, see total war
厄普顿，埃默里
Upton, Emory
塞巴斯蒂安·勒·普雷斯特·沃邦
Vauban, Sébastien le Prestre de
波尔-莫里斯·韦尔普里
Velpry, Pol-Maurice
卡尔·沃格特
Vogt, Karl
沃罗希洛夫，克莱门蒂
Voroshilov, Klementi
保罗·沃莱
Voulet, Paul
瓦尔德西，阿尔弗雷德·冯
Waldersee, Alfred von
沃克，沃尔特
Walker, Walter
瓦伦斯坦，阿尔布雷希特·冯
Wallenstein, Albrecht von
战争的定义。关于具体的战争和战役，请参见下文索引的第二部分。
war, definitions of. For specific wars and campaigns, see second section of index, below
爱德华·华纳
Warner, Edward
乔治·华盛顿
Washington, George
韦维尔，阿奇博尔德
Wavell, Archibald
韦伯，马克斯
Weber, Max
威尔斯，HG
Wells, H. G.
韦斯科特，艾伦
Wescott, Allan
韦根德，马克西姆
Weygand, Maxime
韦兰，OP
Weyland, O. P.
维拉莫维茨，乌尔里希·冯
Wilamowitz, Ulrich von
普鲁士国王威廉一世，德意志皇帝
William I, King of Prussia, German emperor
德国皇帝威廉二世
William II, German emperor
拿骚的威廉·路易斯
William Louis of Nassau
沉默的威廉
William the Silent
威利森，卡尔·威廉·冯
Willisen, Karl Wilhelm von
威尔莫特，切斯特
Wilmot, Chester
伍德罗·威尔逊
Wilson, Woodrow
沃尔斯特特，阿尔伯特
Wohlstetter, Albert
沃尔夫，莱昂
Wolff, Leon
山本五十六
Yamamoto, Isoroku
山下智之
Yamashita, Tomoyuki
约克·冯·沃滕堡、汉斯·路德维希
Yorck von Wartenburg, Hans Ludwig
马克西米利安·约克·冯·瓦滕堡
Yorck von Wartenburg, Maximilian
泽勒，加斯顿
Zeller, Gaston
二、重要战争和战役的年表
II. CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE MORE IMPORTANT WARS AND CAMPAIGNS
古代战争
Wars of antiquity
中世纪战争
Wars of the Middle Ages
文艺复兴时期的战争
Wars of the Renaissance
荷兰起义
Revolt of the Netherlands
三十年战争
Thirty Years' War
对土耳其人的战役
campaigns against the Turks
路易十四战争
Wars of Louis XIV
腓特烈大帝的战争
Wars of Frederick the Great
美国独立战争
War of American Independence
法国大革命战争
Wars of the French Revolution
拿破仑战争
Wars of Napoleon
墨西哥战争
Mexican War
1848/1849年的战役
campaigns of 1848/1849
克里米亚战争
Crimean War
美国内战
American Civil War
七周战争（1866年）
Seven Weeks' War (1866)
普法战争
Franco-Prussian War
英布战争
Anglo-Boer War
日俄战争
Russo-Japanese War
第一次世界大战
First World War
俄国内战
Russian Civil War
中日战争
Sino-Japanese War
中国内战
Chinese Civil War
芬兰战争
Finnish War
第二次世界大战
Second World War
1945年后的殖民战争
Post-1945 colonial wars
朝鲜战争
Korean War
阿以战争
Arab-Israeli wars
苏伊士运河探险
Suez expedition
印度的战争
India's wars
第一次印度支那战争
First Indochina War
第二次印度支那（越南）战争
Second Indochina (Vietnam) War
婆罗洲活动
Borneo campaign
福克兰群岛战争
Falkland campaign
两伊战争
Iran-Iraqi War